the u.s. assistant relationship with pakistan is a crutch for pakistan. they know, the pakistan mindset is that the americans will come in at the 11th hour hour because they have so much invested in us. whether it's on the nuclear issue, that relationship will continue to be a crutch. that orientation towards india, they know that if we just go to for that americans are getting get worried that they will come in and save the day or not save the day. there will come in for us. i think until that changes, it's status quo. >> toby. >> going back to your book, the premise of which is how do you, as india, manage the terrorism problem cross-border. what about the other scenario which may not be the most seemingly problem but is realistic. it happens because of the history and what's happened in

the past and they feel we must to do something about it. then add elements like isis. i wonder what happens to a crisis where it's a third-party actor, not one of these groups that we know of that manage an attack. in a situation where we are lost in all the conversation about india pakistan crises is that india and pakistan do not. [inaudible] you have a third-party pick about it. what's the best thing i can do quest market pakistan didn't and india close to a wall. if it's a nuclear one, great. how do you manage that situation as the u.s.? you not even talking to each other about that possibility. >> that is a real concern and a valid question. i don't know that we have good

levers there to try to facilitate that intelligence discussion. the trend now seems to be to avoid those discussions and to set prerequisites rather than having any kind of discussion. at the same time, there's no mystery. people on both sides know what needs to happen on kashmir and afghanistan. the problem is largely that those views are really difficult to sustain politically because they're not nationalists and their international : >> i probably would like to do

something a maybe there are channels where you could start to approach this in a way that isn't so politicized. is a little bit more in the margins. could the u.s. facilitates and the like that? i think we have to have a clear agenda about what it was we are doing. this is an is an talking kashmir or about the normal cross-border stuff. this this is a trend that we proceed, can we formulate an agenda that addresses that. it's possible. our intelligent relationships with both states at this point bound by certain agendas are structures make that hard but should not be impossible. >> it's interesting that were having this conversation but if we are speaking a little bit less than a year ago it was a very hopeful time.

we had -- there is this yo-yoing aspect and that we would be having a conversation three months from now. one of the things that has made the conversation particularly hard looking at it from the new delhi perspective is the lack of progress of anything from the mumbai attack. not just at a policy level but a public level. i said if pakistan was serious about getting at least the more moderate to recognize that there isndeed some sort of strategic shift underway in pakistan there ways to do this. one would be to show progress on mumbai. this has been eight years now not like it happened yesterday. show some willingness to

clampdown on. [inaudible] you have been meeting public prayers someone who is responsible for hundred 66 deaths including americans. you. you can see why the indian position becomes extremely cynical because of this. if there were in fact concrete progress on two or three of these things where you could say look, we have done this, there was concrete progress in a domestic pakistani perspective on going off to the tpp, if there are some equivalents or even if it is not exactly the same thing but something concrete which you can undeniably show essay any dispatch a neutral person can see there is progress against groups and individuals who have heard indians badly then i think you open up a little bit of a

window. >> you mention this issue about in the u.s. and with pakistan coming in the way. i want to ask about attention which is that on the one hand it makes perfect sense in the u.s. partnership, the larger space on the other hand, the more it solidifies the more the china pakistan becomes more more natural. if you're going to look at the peaceful economic -- the one scenario could be connecting to the east-west, how do you scroll back? in some ways in the u.s. but then there is no real indian

interest if you'd ask me and pushing pakistan in china further into each other's arms to challenge the indian rights. >> i think think the way it's viewed and i think it's accurate is that pakistan and china are in a pretty tight race and i don't think india is effectively making that embrace. it's hard for it to be tighter than it is or has been for a long time. the pakistan china relationship has independent history. was the famous all weather friendship. pakistan and china have recently stepped up support for pakistan in the un on other issues. i don't think india is in fact worried about this in terms of china be in or russia being pushed closer. that's a very live debate. not just pakistan but china,

russia because of u.s. policy. but nobody but nobody in india thinks getting closer to the u.s., because pakistan in china are already so close that is not seen as something to do. >> so we talked to the audience and take questions but before that let me ask all of you in one line, no more suggest where you think the u.s. policy on india and pakistan relationship will be in two years time perhaps after the administration takes over. >> i think it will look the same as it does today. no change. >> it's muddling through the semi. >> i think it will be worse. i think we are in the process of moving out. >> can you define worse? >> our leverage on the situation will be much diminished. >> i agree. i agree. i think we will have less leverage.

>> on that optimistic note let me open it up and you can raise your hand and identify yourself and ask a brief question so we can get through as many as we can. i will try to come to all of you. >> i'm a masters student, my question with establishing surgical strikes is it a possibility this could lead to using these as domestic pressure valves? kinda like people accuse clinton of the monica lewinsky strikes. is there potential for this to lead to further precedent for other politicians? >> we will take a couple collections. >> i'm from pakistan. i want to look role the u.s. can

play in terms of conflict resolution. on the indian side india will not allow any intervention. also want to know about what is making the u.s. go further? is it domestic politics or the international were issues. [inaudible] what is constraining the u.s. from going further? >> i think you are right. this is a precedent. it has been i don't think it's something others i don't know what you meant by other leaders, you need mean future prime minister's? [inaudible]

>> i don't know about that. but on the indian side is certainly something i think the domestic political calculus is part of this. i think this will be heightened over the next two and half years as you head into the 2019 election. >> on this idea there is a pressure release valve, think valve, think this is something states already do. they always issue replies and then publish an account in a newspaper say next number of people were killed whether it's cross-border fire. this is not particularly new. i think another part of this that were not paying attention to is we talk about pressure when in fact it's actively stoked by governments on both sides. it is not a bottom-up pressure

that the public -- i think there's definitely moves to be and by media cells within governments on both sides that are trying to push this. the lines that are coming into these leaked stories into the media that were different than the accounts reported by the army chief were not just coming out of thin air. there's definitely some active cultivation. one method of managing pressure is too maybe just not cultivated as much. >> i think your question looking ahead could you imagine using this as a way to divert the say such a disaster they need another strike to recover from it. think we are probably not quite there yet, but it was a big pr victory in india. one of the ways that seems to be explained and pakistan is that it had to be a false false flag because it

allowed for this. the problem is it d legit delegitimize these kind of attacks taking place in india. that is challenging. it speaks to the need to be able to translate across the border. >> i like the way you phrase the question which is what is restraining the u.s. from doing something. that's an interesting perspective. it's just not the top priority of the u.s. in the suite of national security interest in south it's not at the top of the list. i would not not even say it is the top three. in the conversations i have been in once you have those discussions or should we go in and how, there are way too many

cost to each bilateral relationship. the u.s. india relationship existed its own vacuum and the u.s. relationship exists on its own back in. the bureaucracy is the structure to look at it in a unified way. there's no one position that works think about that is a new policy prescription for the next administration. i think the is something else happening which we don't talk about that much and it's becoming harder to defend the pakistani position on militancy. and you can't ignore the in terms of the use of proxies. in past decade we have seen this issue become much more violent. it affects american interest directly. so when you translate that i think you'll find there's not a lot of u.s. support for the pakistani position. i think that is something for the pakistanis to think about. >> one, two, and three please. >> if you. >> if you can make this short.

>> i have two comments in a question. >> because of time i need to get to others let's make it as short as possible. >> your talking about the pakistan and india and then deciding what policy should pakistan or india have come i think they would better decide what is a good policy and the second thing is, we've talked about what would india do in case another attack do? what would u.s. two. with all these efforts of isolating pakistan and liberties which are not being there, my question to the panelists what you think pakistan will do if it is cornered? >> i don't think were deciding on any policy but we are debating it.

>> my name is karen fisher. currently not associated with anybody, i have just returned from nine years of living in kashmir 20 years in india. my question is to -- i'm really very happy that you brought the context in this debate. because i think there's a lack of understanding of the radicalization that is happening in the area as a result of the prime minister ship. my questions are such, and the last couple of days there has been a new army chief appointed in india. there has been a huge argument about why he was selected

because there were two other people higher in seniority. from what i can understand based on the writings by some of the army people i know, he was selected because of his experience in covert operations and warfare. now this takes me to the issue and i'm wondering, to what degrees does the u.s. concerned that india, in in addition to surgical strikes and other things that have increased may actually itself get more involved in working with nonstate actors and destabilizing areas within pakistan because there's a lot of debate about this? and one more question. >> could we move on and will come back if we have time. >> thank you.

>> my name is ed, i was a a field officer with the michigan gop and you talked about now i can't remember. you talked about how our issue is mismanagement status solutions and that's what we should a board. however i don't see her next administration playing the role of a moderator. in that case where the pressure would be on us to take a certain side, you think heightened interest in the issues of india and pakistan would evoke a heightened interest from russia in order to turn that area? do you think this would evoke a pressure or a reaction from russia to force him to take a side? >> i just want to respond to

both. i would not recommend that we pursue approach that isolates pakistan. it's not possible. it hasn't happened in the past decade given the difficult issues that have been worked on. it's not realistic to pursue that. the strategy of building anti- pakistan sentiments against the country as a tactic not a strategy. pakistan is way too connected in it diplomatically to europe in the united states and within the region. the the russia china factors are the biggest ones and it's not possible. i didn't hear that from anyone appear. i don't think anyone would advocate for that. there is great harm in that. they're be great there be great harm in the lemonade all assistance for pakistan if you want the region to be stable.

russia is already engaged in the region. they always have better and have a long history there. i think the china pakistan engagement that we see in this closer embrace will bring the russians and more. they have expressed some interest in the economic routes that china pursuing and they're building off on that to pursue their own economic interests. a lot of that is more organic and independent of what of the for the u.s. chooses to do. >> i think you have seen interest in india now for several years to develop more covert and special operations capabilities it could use against targets in pakistan whether it be terrorist targets were state targets are further some discord and violence. that was one of the options that we addressed in our book

analysis of things india could do. what we see their is the risks for india are probably lower than employing the army or air force in a more direct force way. it also raises questions about how you would connect that to a strategy to change pakistani behavior. in part because if it's covert you cannot claim credit for it. you can't do that in domestic discourse which is increasingly important for this government. because many of those things may be seen as illegitimate. what undermines the diplomatic isolation strategy that india seems to have in place at the moment. you n see the ten tatian and i would predict will see more of the but my question would become as their case case in india where people think that will ultimately lead to some change? or is it merely punitive in this

unstable equilibrium across nuclear sub conventional capabilities. >> on the isolation of pakistan question, i agree it is both unrealistic and undesirable. you can't turn pakistan into north korea, that's ridiculous. but i do think that there could be some benefit in pakistanis themselves asking questions about why other neighboring countries including bangladesh and they started out being so vocal about pakistan being part of the solution, the fact that the policies they have pursued have independently in my view, obviously this is something that the administration has welcomed but argue that bangladesh should have independently come to the conclusion that pakistan has not been a helpful actor and may be

a harmful actor. so if there is an internal conversation in pakistan that looks upon that and asked the question and takes it away from the india pakistan relationship, perhaps that would lead to policies that would be helpful. >> in terms of the army chief i don't read too much into that. i think indian army chiefs are completely under political control. with general has specialization, this is more like they chose this guy like this general, it was a bit of a contribution controversy can see superseded other generals so they have to say he has great experience. i don't read too much into the choice of a particular general in terms of signaling policy. i look at other things including things like the speeches.

>> i see it as something along the lines of a future bargaining on the lower scale that is talked about. this counter pressure to things going on in afghanistan may be kashmir. appoints people and made if you look at the literature in 2000 and about what expectations are about what india might be doing there. one is at the scale is so low. even if even if there is activity it's not having a dramatic effect the way it was going on. states can be involved in providing material support to nonstate actors in many different ways they can start from passports to money to arms and training. where on that spectrum will that happen effect on the outcome. if you looked at something --

his point was basically that the indians were trying to do the seriously you should see a larger scale of activity. so if they wanted to do something much bigger they could, but but given the scale of what is going on it might be a low-level part of a bargaining chip. >> will take the last rent and they will come back. >> i'm from the london school of economics. a lot of the ideas you talked about our significant public on both sides. but that politically manifested itself with the government coming into power in 2014 which is not a confrontation in government and pakistan however year ago the mainstream center the government came into power

even though it's endemic in pakistan. how do you explain this. there's. there's a political manifestation on one side and [inaudible] the other. >> in the final question. >> i am from pakistan, my apologies in advance with the impression i got from this discussion is that india all have taken back. [inaudible] so none of you talked about -- none of you talked about , what was he doing. a new that pakistan should change its behavior but my understanding is is that it is the big brother that needs to change his behavior. in in south asia it's india not pakistan.

and even the indian politicians are asking for evidence so where the evidence is my question? >> i let you take the question on the national if you want. i just think that pakistan's national security policy as it has been constructed at least for the past decade has not worked. it doesn't work for the country itself. it's much more dangerous, more violence and attacks against the state internally. i'm not talking about with india. in those nonstate actors involved in that process are also involved in afghanistan and india. that's a a common link. that's what i'm focusing on right now during my time as a policymaker in the u.s. government that's what we're honing in on. the india pakistan relationship has tons of problems which will

be bilateral in the u.s. does not have a role until it is needed. if you want to focus on pakistan itself you have to question do these policies work, is it in our interest to continue whatever engagement we have with nonstate actors? is it in her interest in the context of the region and then look at the united states, the uk, other countries other countries in europe are looking at this with deep concern especially with isis and other jihadist elements finding private support networks, whether the state is involved or not. this is a much bigger issue than just india not being responsible or pakistan being the bad guy here. >> twenty-two thinks on the election, one for my understanding and to get more details on this, the main state-sponsored exit surveys that came out after that is that he was elected primarily on the issue of the economy and management and even if he wasn't

elected on nationals credential, i think pakistan has a history of working with nationalist counterparts in making progress in terms of the peace process. the dialogue with the government for many years his government was one that launched the nuclear test and had a driving national agenda behind that. there is an opportunity for making deals. sometimes people think the hardliners at the most likely and incapable of making those deals. the people who are able to come to the table are always the hardliners. so, i think just because it's a nationalist doesn't for close on the prospect of making progress. >> the last question about us focusing on groups and behavior

in pakistan and why that's a problem, i think it goes back to something though suggested earlier than that is the narrative that pakistan has pretrade in the last several years doesn't carry much water at this point. i'm not saying that's right a wrong, i think it is an important point to the extent that reflects policies and pakistan that here are not seen as caring the country forward in a positive direction. makes it harder for the u.s. to engage pakistan in a productive way. that's unfortunate. >> i will go what was said. in terms of policies they were elected 2014 to be india's -- development. foreign investment, better economic management, there's a big question on all of that right now but that's what he sold himself as primarily but it's also true that he satisfied an indian craving for so-called

strong leader and one element to be in a strongly is the idea that he would not be pushed around. i attend in several of his campaign rallies in the run up to the election. even though the focus was on jobs and inflation there's never a speech where he did not mention the weakness of the government when it came to -- and so on. so i would say the economic aspect was dominant. essentially he's a strong leader that's how he styles himself, the indian version of putin or any of the sort of -- take your pick. that is why this becomes so important for him because anything that erodes the sense of him being a strong leader which is why i argue he would

respond and he did it become significant to him. >> i was trying to end the panel for a long time but we missed it. sorry for those we cannot get to. the me wrap up quickly by saying my standard line after these events is it is nothing is black-and-white. as white. it is so complicated and complex that drawing simplistic conclusions will be dangerous. i leave you to decide what the sum of the conversation is today. but i'm often accused at being a pessimist to let me try my hand and being an optimist. let me challenge you and yes it's very difficult to work on this problem, manage may be the most realistic option. i would point out as i've challenge myself to think about this, it is an odd rivalry but if you think of the major outstanding problem, each one of them has a solution you can look

at kashmir you can think about where you would end up it will be somewhere around that formula. even terrorism i would argue is intrinsically linked to the space. i would challenge all of us to think through whether it really is as impossible as we think. at the end of the day nobody can disagree that normalization sells everybody's problem. i think we should think about it more broadly for all of us and we have in the past. with that join me in thanking the panelist and thank you for joining us. [applause] [inaudible]

[inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] >> tonight it is booked to be a prime time with a look at notable books of 2016. starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern we discuss the book true vine, two brothers, kidnapping, and a mother's quest. the mother's quest. a true story of the jim crow south. then, on the gene and intimate

history. after that, michael hayden looks at plane to the edge. american intelligence and the aid of terror. carol anderson on her book, white rage, the unspoken truth of our racial the divide. that's tonight at eight bistro nazi spent too. on c-span three it's american history to be in prime time with programs in world war ii. we began at eight eastern with a discussion on the origins of the cold war. see it on c-span three. >> as 2016 draws to close c-span remembers the passing of important public affairs and clinical figures. our program continues tonight with a portion of the funeral service for former israeli prime minister. here's part of the remarks by bill clinton. >> as it has been said, his critics often claimed he was a

naïve, overly optimistic dreamer. they were only wrong about the naïve part. he knew exactly what he was doing and being overly optimistic. he knew exactly what he was doing with his dreams. he never gave up on anybody. and i mean anybody. you are the prime minister talk about their beautiful friendship. that followed a very tough campaign. but he always kept the door open. >> i was just part of our in memoriam program that looks at the passing of several key political figures in 2016. we'll feature portions of the funeral services for activists and boxer, mohammed ali an astronaut of former u.s. senator, john

glenn, both of whom died this year. see it at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> this holiday we can on c-span's here are some of our future programs. saturday at 7:00 p.m. eastern, librarian of congress carla hayden archivist of the united states david and david's gorton, secretary of the smithsonian institute on the preservation of our national treasures. >> and his bequest he wrote that he wanted the institution to be toward the increase and diffusion of knowledge. that is what the smithsonian has turned out to be. >> at 9:00 p.m. eastern the inaugural women's leadership summit for the next generation of young women at the ronald reagan library. and i'm 40:00 p.m., federal judges thomas griffith and patricia both from the d.c. circuit and senior federal judge

of the fourth circuit discuss the history and impact of the bill of rights, 225 years after ratification. >> applying those words to the very factual circumstances and dispute that can send a country over the course of more than 200 years is what challenging. >> on sunday, author jean and professor richard epstein and christopher debate u.s. involvement in foreign wars. >> it's also a difficult question. we have to look at the way in which we have to start to deal with these things. if you make it over time you use force is going to be a calamity them when you don't use force. that's when the real calamities will happen. >> beginning at 9:00 p.m. the muslim public affairs council convention with remarks by california democratic

councilman. >> what we are trying to do is highlight the values of the constitution of the united states, the values of freedom of speech, freedom and practice of religion, equal dignity, equal protection of law and due process of law. and those values are challenged today. >> watch on c-span and c-span.org. or listen on the free c-span radio app. >> next, a discussion on the paris climate agreement and the ongoing collaboration between the u.s. and japan in combating climate change. speakers look at the goals and the potential impact of the incoming trump administration. held by the brookings institution, this is one hour in

20 minutes. [inaudible] good afternoon. i am -- at brookings. it is a pleasure to will welcome you to the program cohosted a the east asia policy studies. just one year ago a long-awaited breakthrough took place when negotiators from 194 countries reached a climate change agreement in paris. with the goal of reducing greenhouse emissions. in less than one year the agreement had entered into force. these are remarkable record-breaking speed. undoubtedly the undoubtedly the paris agreement was a remarkable breakthrough. i think really this success will hinge on the post paris agenda.

that is were talking about the task of implementation. climate change has been a priority item in the u.s. and japan agenda to globalize the alliance as underlined by the joint vision statement the leaders of both countries signed in april of 2015. as two of the largest leaders in the world the domestic measures adopted by the united states and japan to meet the paris emission targets will loom large in the overall success of these efforts. the challenges are steep. we know that in the aftermath of the fukushima accident japan had to move and depend more on fossil fuel and it has not been as fast as we had hope. in the united states there are questions about the implementation of the climate agenda commitments and a lot of uncertainty about the energy and

climate policy with the the incoming administration will pursue. so again implementation looms very large. to help this make sense of the shifting situation we have a panel of experts will help us understand better the nature of the paris agreement and the challenges ahead to ensure its successful implementation. let me introduce them briefly in the order in which i asked them to come to the podium to make presentations. later on will have a conversation with all. a stir with colleague, david victor who is cochair of the initiative on energy and climate and professor of international relations. in his recognized work he has combined an understanding of the science behind climate change was knowledge about a domestic public policy ablation process. is the leading contributor to the united nations intergovernmental panel on

climate change. our next guest's deputy chief of mission at the embassy of japan in washington. the chief negotiator for climate change. we are very much looking forward to learning his insights given he was in the thick of the paris negotiation. i want to thank the embassy of japan for the generous support that make this event possible and to the commitment to enter independence and to understand that the views expressed today are those of the speakers. before joining she served as a deputy assistant secretary for asia, europe, europe, and the americas at the u.s. department of energy. she has had a distinguished

career in government, not only the department of energy but also the department of commerce. she has written extensively on japanese technology and energy issues. we have a climate policy analyst at the new climate analysts. they monitor the omission commitments and actions of countries and is the lead author of the 2016 in missions report cap report of the united nations environmental program. his research focuses on national policies to reduce greenhouse gas and he has conducted extensive research on japan supposed fukushima energy and climate policies. thankful to all the panelists but i want to thank our guests. he and he and his wife are expecting a child any minute now and he still agreed to be here today. thank you very much. david, please come to the podium.

>> sounds like we should be especially grateful for your wife. we'll thank you very much for those nice introductions. i want to say five things and with each ten to 12 minutes of fame to talk a little bit about this in the remarks and i want to say five things in the time that i have. the first is i want to say the nice things about the paris process before we talk about the uncertainties. i have written over the last 25 years a lot about why international cooperation on climate change is going to be hard to organize and not work. i felt the kyoto agreement was one designed to fail. i felt a most all of the efforts were designed to fail one where the other. and i'm very optimistic about paris. so we have to recognize that this process which is more flexible and bottom-up and allows countries to make their own pledges about what they will

do to start with things that are in your self-interest and over time go forward and deepen cooperation. that is the right kind of process for a problem of the structure. it is a process that mirrors the interest and goals of the architects that created it and particularly the united states and china. knowing about the japanese industry this process is better aligned with japan's self-interest. the reason i mention it is this process looks a lot like what the george w. bush administration tried to put into place and is a replacement to the kyoto protocol after the blowback did i think that is one of the things that is the trump administration goes from saying things and tweeting things about climate change to governing and recognizing theirs of the in the world that have interest here, they're going to see there is a

tremendous amount of support for this process. it's a process that largely reflects u.s. interests. that introductory comment is important because we need to think about ways to keep the elements of paris that had been constructed as other parts of it faced pressure from the new administration. so the second thing i want to talk about is what will the trump administration actually do in this area? my colleague nate is in the audience and has written a piece about this question. there are a lot of interesting scenarios in the sense so-called canceling and withdrawing from the paris agreement which is three for your process.

. . we don't know, crucial to emphasize, we do not know how that will unfold. it's easy to look at this and certainly other forces within the administration to climate policy and you can look at other people you look at appointments of defense and treasury and you see folks engaged with a wide range of issues and know the

value of global institutions and can imagine the cabinet meetings and discussions and it's easy to figure out where this process is headed. almost none of this was part of the campaign. you have people who have taken power, who see a mandate for change and they see a mandate around the size of the first derivative of policy, if you'd like, but not the sign and you see folks who believe they have a mandate for change, but this is the most peripheral part of the kind of change that was being asked for. the reason i mention that is because i think there's actually an opportunity to engage with this administration to try to find a reasonable way of disengaging or living up to campaign promises. take the one aspect of this that has received attention from the

campaign and now the transition. which is to cancel the funds that will go to the jeep tf, the climate fun. there's a lot of ways to cancel it. you could cancel it and sam taking my money and not giving it to you and were going to spend it on other stuff at home and goodbye, or you could do actually what the chinese are doing which is to spend the money through other mechanisms and continue to call this a contribution to the process but spend it in mechanisms that are more comfortable and reliable. this is thinking carefully of disengaging and shifting climate change which is the real way to engage with and talk with the incoming trump administration and i'm actually cautiously optimistic that that kind of conversation will find a welcome audience. what would be the effects of the united states engages by burning

down the house or disengages by coming engaged in other kind of mechanisms and so on. i think one of the losses will be u.s. leadership. this is an area where they have played a major role in creating a set of international institutions that largely reflect u.s. interesting capabilities, and yet a playbook on i might change that is not complete. the length of the paris agreement and the length of the decision that was adopted at the same time, the decision is actually longer than the paris agreement and lays out a lot of things that need to be done. number one, is to build a review mechanism. this is a pledge and review system. they pledge to make reductions in emissions and then you reveal them and cooperation emerges as

you review and learn what the different countries are doing in their experiences. right now we have pledges and no review mechanism. somebody needs to step up and provide some examples of how reviewers went be done. very interesting example that came out of the g20 where the u.s. and china committed to have. efforts to review energy subsidies and there's a lot of different models out there but countries need to be there in a leadership position to demonstrate how the review mechanism is actually going to work. also removing the money from the gcf are removing the money altogether. it will have a fact on the confidence for other countries involved that the kinds of commitments that are being made

to them, especially especially too at least develop countries where those are being honored. it could be a lot harder to get things done around the climate change agenda. i think it's crucial we remember that although the effects of withdrawing or moving on parallel profits and jam processes around climate will undermine leadership and confidence. others will not sit still. in particular i have been and struck by the extent to which the chinese remain committed to this process. i expect china will backstop and solidify its support around the paris process. i think that's good news for paris and paris agreement. the eu is ready to do this. the chinese role as the most important, the the indian role is the most uncertain, but i think we the united states and japan need to ask ourselves is

that in our interest to have a very important mechanism that will have potentially durable impacts on industrial economies without both our countries, including in particular this country in some kind of leadership role. this is geopolitics around energy and climate and the chinese roll is changing very rapidly and we need to deal with that in a serious and constructive way. the four or five things that i want to talk about is policy here at home. most of this meeting is focused on bilateral relationship and international policy but i think we do need to have some realistic expectations about what possibly could change at home, here in the united states. some things are going to change, clearly. especially if the current courts help the epa by removing some or all of the power plant. we will see epa slow walk revisions to the point where the

power plant is all but dead, there are a variety of other areas where we won't see new roles and we might see some rollback of existing roles. what's surprising is how much won't change. you have industry and a lot of firms that are capital intensive long-lived industries and global firms, just because there's a wiggle on the clean power plant or a wiggle on other aspects of policy doesn't mean they stop doing what they were doing originally. you see the tremendous amount of momentum related to the product cycle and the fact that energy is a capital intensive business and technologies change very slowly. that leads to the fifth and last thing which is about the

trajectory of the mission of the united states. my expectation is that the trajectory that we are on right now will be essentially unaffected by the first four years of the trump presidency. there might be a little more on nuclear power which would help keep emissions down. there there might be little more gas which can have marginal effects on omissions or to rollback economy standards but when you take a step back and look at the whole system, the trajectory trajectory is not going to change very much. two me this is a key point about the us-japan relationship. in my read of the data, there are a range of views but we are not on track to do 26% reduction of emissions. japan is not on track to do that either. it doesn't mean that the united states and japan are not doing anything, in fact the marginal cost of what we are doing, especially in japan is very, very high. our two countries have a tremendous common interest in

shifting the debate around climate change, and in the paris process and other processes away from people focusing on the numbers and toward people focusing on actual effort, the cost of effort, strategies for reducing and making them more cost-effective. if we don't shift the debate to that, we are facing a world where we are struggling to work on the climate change topic but not focusing on what really matters which is the level of effort being made in this is an area where i think leadership is crucial, where our two countries need to find a way and understand how important it is to be engaged in some way so that the pledge and review system that are emerging emerge in a way that are focused on real effort and cooperation over time. thank you very much.

[applause] >> thank you very much. since i was chief negotiator for the japan on this agreement, i think i have to bring you a little update. why paris was good, and also why it was possible. i am going to, okay shall i just press it to change. okay paris agreement, i remember the moment when this was adopted. those three people, we were on the floor but i think it was 3000 people.

it was a moment after many long and lengthy processes. we were finally able to achieve this. this kind of achievement was rare. in the last few years, the united nations were super busy. we started with a conference on reduction and then we had a meeting with sustainable development goals and finally this one. i think the united nations was very successful in the past year. this was the final portion of this. now, the attractions of the paris agreements are actually written there. first of all university alley. everybody's there. about 190 countries have already

signed. i think it's 192 at the moment and many countries have ratified this agreement. the second attraction, this was difficult to understand at the outset. this is simply to say that in the agreement there was a clear difference between developed and developing countries. that's no longer the case. the element that made it possible is a mechanism called nationally determine contributions. everybody comes up with their own contributions, with their own will. then they make a pledge and you

will be under review. this review has two different meanings. other countries will look at what you are doing. the other elements of review is in every five years you have to review your own commitment with the hope. the third or fourth elements may not be so conspicuous, there was a talk of a hundred u.s. dollars of money from developed countries both in private and public fears.

also the concurrent fund, i have strong personal attachment to this the highest i have to get a part in our parliament to make our contributions possible. this was not an easy process. i'll come back to that point later. now, the last element is very important. i'm not sure if you know why it was on the board at the last moment. i think this technological corporation element was the key element to come on board. you have mission innovation to double the r&d expenditures and we have smaller alliance to make a lot more acceptable. other than this, generally the french came up with power africa

projects. these initiatives were very important in the success for the paris agreement. i'll come back to that later. : >> >> of the entire e missions

of the world the. sow times unchanged allot. but the biggest one is china eight times more than our remissions and then in debt and asset russia and with their e mission said just want to let you know, the reality. now the main part of my presentation is in this important thing to consider there is a sense of urgency

i do respect the initiative there ion negative stand friends spends $100 million including of president and the energy minister. and the china corporation plays the role in terms of the investigation that is very important but you might remember on the 13th of november there were a terrorist attacks. at one moment it was only a few weeks before so we were very worried about that. but most of us decided to go

ahead again another moving moment because we have the heads of state and about 150 countries. this is of biggest gathering ever so to show and to fight and the momentum is there. but at the same time it is very much a compromise because everybody got what they wanted the european union leadership and this was a difficult negotiation but in the end but for us

what it is important is the u.s. and japan sometimes those on this particular topic and also we have to major that china and india that is very important they accepted the deal essentially so they had resistance to letter commitment but nonetheless the technical corporate --

corporation and the elements 1.5 degrees and other countries cannot sure if you believe it or not but last year money was the central issue. so that was the cassius' spencer they always participate in the meetings to say we need more money that is one of the most important reasons why. now i think there was an opportunity that these are

the commitments of the major countries. but this is what we are doing for a short period of time. and as a result the reduction of 40% of gdp basis. in the end that would be there in the middle or more than many of other countries and then there to thousand

30 we are one of the best in the u.s.'s their began thises 2025 ended the trajectory is not punishment, and negative punished. but finally gcs. looking at the corporation this is one of the. last year with the g20 summit meeting. this is to make contributions this was a joint initiative so we did

it together. with the 100 billion both private and public. with the year early-warning system. but finally we have a joint mechanism so in short with a gigantic enterprise and then

end consultation and we need something like that. and we also have development issues. with the areas that we work together. but it is a lot wider than that on global issues should be one of the areas where we have to continue working together think you very much. [applause] >> afternoon.

when i would have said a couple of months ago is probably different than that what i would have talked about today but my cohorts talk about paris agreements affect on the u.s. and the one word to keep in mind this uncertainty. we don't know what the u.s. climate or energy policy will be. but with that in mind there are certain things that we have to put into place some of which we have already heard today it will affect how the united states and the government reacts to the terrorists to move forward. paris was not only about the

government cooperation any more. much more of an emphasis on best practices in actions that were put forward by 50,000 people attended a huge number at the city level or the ngo level zero lot of non state actors to declare he then exxon with the new incoming secretary of state told the paris agreement important step forward for the world government to address the seriousness of climate change sold business community, and many feel it is still in their interest to be sustainable and take action a letter was just

sent in the last week urging the counterparts that the city level to keep up their activities with the neutral city alliance. and as we have just heard heard, there was a lot of negative feelings in the united states because of was not universal end to a paris is now universal. so when that becomes a better awareness, i don't think everyone realizes of big difference. having then add the department of energy, and hearing about technology and technology innovation with the clean energy ministerial

with the joint efforts put together while i was there is deputy assistant secretary with indian clean energy, indonesia at, we were starting to move away from just looking at the climate accord to end numbers to see lot we could do together in terms of technology that we should probably work on any way to move forward. so emission innovation is another thier that came out of that. the u.s. department of energy spends about $5 billion give for take.

but the fact is during the latest bush administration lasted department the energy we were spending more r&d money on clean energy than any of their country in the world there are ways to spend that money can look at how it contributes the high-tech industries. and as we said before, not just u.s. government r&d but if you look at bill gates with the breakthrough coalition it is the private are indeed that needs to be done far beyond the reach of any government that was there. we hear perhaps china will pick up the mantle and run

with it and i agree with that. i am not sure they are totally signed on to the paris accord for climate reasons i think mostly because they seek the -- c. clean industry and the one to reap the benefits of that industry. others including india face issues with pollution and energy security and the activities under the obama administration is really almost a same as what we did for climate. by u.s. companies to be a part of the global market if they don't stand up and

support that but with that said what governor brown has said in a the last couple of weeks. with the 285.9 billion of otc coming this year. another point to keep in mind there are estimates that i have seen 145 million refugees in the world. as a major power the united states will be forced to do something with that to fight resilience and disaster mitigation but again it

comes back to building a low curve in economy. the biggest question merely is, is there enough momentum in the of world to keep the process after paris moving along? i would argue hopefully there is. we heard perhaps the leadership mantle will be picked up and lot of people like governor brown at the state level for the u.s. will keep pushing for the low carbon free insists that we seek and realistically in terms of economic growth and ecological competitiveness competitiveness, it is very difficult for the u.s. to maintain the edge of that beating of the race with

friendly competition with china and japan and others if we don't invest. leslie as we heard earlier, there are some things in the u.s. as a process under way be. idol of think we will see call make a major comeback and natural gas is too cheap solar and wind are no market competitors enter getting even more so. there is a much bigger understanding that energy efficiency is about increasing productivity saving money and making money. and what we need to watch

out for we don't see a total replacement for innovation. japan will pick up, the e.u. , national labs are trying to do what they can but that investment that we have made keep an eye and encourage the administration for economic growth and environmental reasons call will be used. -- call will be used and hopefully that are indeed many to make fat coal use cleaner i know that japan is pushing for clean coal but i dunno free have the u.s. presence to be as successful

as they would to make sure coal is as clean as possible. so the opportunities for collaboration, technological innovation is an area where both countries xl through clean energy. plan with energy resilience. japan still needs to resolve its question after fukushima with renewed clear energy. and how do you build resilience and greasy a skewed storm bigger than we have been the past coming at

least with the apex energy group that was the big issue so building energy resiliency and electricity as it is distributed energy. and lastly there is a lot of room for cybersecurity. that is something we have to do a lot better at. because if we have a huge transformation of technology while we look at the internet of things we need to make sure we can protect

that environment. so capacity building in cybersecurity are areas for us to work on. [applause] >>. >> while uploading i will introduce myself from

germany i was like to think the brookings institution for having me here also the experts sitting here today. i will present the implications of the paris agreement on the japan policy from a technical perspective compared to the previous presenters. first i will go through quickly of the mitigation policy japan has contributions to reduce emissions to the 2013 levels around 25 percent of 2005. now that is enshrined legally and in binding documents for this implementation. with regard to recent energy and climate policy developments i will look to

other policies later but in the last two years with the basic energy plan related to long-term energy which became the basis and also on the nine energy related emissions japan has introduced a law. under the paris agreements they have not done it yet but at the end the minister of the environment has said its up independently the council's and then they will combine their document sometime in the next year.

i guess you are all interested in the power sector with me presenting what has happened with the 2030 plan. demand has been the creasing compared to 2010 through 2015 with the total power generation is about 10% lower for the next several years. when you look at of breakdown and has reduced from 25% that gap is filled by fossils' when it comes to power the hibernating coal

plants but now 18 gigawatt of these plants if they all come into the grid in 2030 coal power share will be above 30% at the same time nuclear-powered with the reactors is now about 25. currently at this moment those saturday n operation of their little starch by a 2030 the reactors would supply about 17% of total power generation. you can see renewable energy growth particularly for the solar technology. if you compare all the of

recent developments in is uncertain if the country is really going towards that direction. however you can say under current policy that will be main that major force. together with other recent organizations we are tracking national level efforts from 2009. . .

targets more ambitious than 26% and you like at the currently implemented policies, the set of policies would not take japan to the 26% reduction and japan would have have to strengthen existing policies to meet the current targets. flier. >> but japan is not the only one country. obviously. most of the countries around the world are not doing enough. this is a figure from the 216 emissions gap report. so when you look at the indc scenario in comparison with compatible pathway as laid out in paris agreements the gap is above 12 giga tons, more than then the total emissions from china today.

so you can understand the magnitude of that gap. a lot has to be done. so, what are the imimpolice indications? there aren't that many studies, especially on modeling study, scenario studyiys bud we made an estimate on which time frame the oecd countries have to reach zero emissions for different emission categories. store frill co2 commissions, the net zero emission has to be achieved by 2050, and the full decarbonization and coal power has to phase out and this is

enormous challenge. i'm not going to discuss here what is possible or not, but it's enormous challenge for sure. if you want to -- i we want to stay on the paris agreement come pat able emission pathway we need to implement strong polls well beyond energy efficiency improvement and addressing the low-hanging fruit or low cast purrs and -- low colow cost measures and that the pal i has to look the into the max numb maximummization and i won't be table to travel from colon to walk injure fost one-day event. that would not be acceptable.

here i'm showing an example of sector transformation required under -- to a chief paris goals. an example of adoption of electric vehicles women did analysis for the nether land elands and as you can see, the almost all new passenger vehicle sales have to be electric or other low emission vehicles before 2040 can and any case netherlands, nobody is with close to that. and achieving 100% evs or low emission vehicles by 2040 requires diffusion of unpre -- ununprecedented vehicles.

it's way beyond the target of next generation vehicles for 2030. so an enormous challenge. however, when you look at this is a particular cass for the transfer sackettor or the passenger vehicles, there are times that changes are already -- signs that changes are happening. when you look at norway, 30% of the new car registration this year are electric vehicles. a small country and has a very specific case but it's quite interesting. and also in the netherlands and germany, there were political actions to phaseout conventional combustion engines by 2030 or 2035. of course, this -- it's in the also the binding target or policy but news the deinvolvement is quite interesting. and also, for japan, the government has not set any new

target beyond what is written in the 2014 basic energy plan, but toyota just announce they will mass produce electric vehicles and this is a new development since toyota have always focused more on fuel cell vehicles. this is my last slid of the preparation so to summarize, basically we are facing enormous challenge to stay on track for paris agreement goals, for energy and industry co2 emissions we have to reach net zero by -- before 2050 and if you want to achieve that, with conventional energy policies and conventional analysis to marginal abatement costs and economic assessments, just not enough. we have to go well beyond that and we have to look into resource efficiency, we have to

look into the changes of way of our life, lifestyle, all these different aspects of our economy have to be taken into account. lastly, in some sectors luke i showed with the transfer sectors changes are already happening. and as -- japan can potentially lead the change together with the u.s. thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] block.

>> we're going to move on to our discussion and conversation among the panelists and also bring the audience with questions. and i appreciate very much all the presentations. they were on target and excellent, and it's a challenging time to talk about energy and climate policy because you have attended a number of panels and one word is uncertainty. and i have to say that after the presentations, despites the fact there's a lot of uncertainty. the questions whats they will the united states do, vis-a-vis paris, engagement, we don't know how that would work out. i came out of this presentations with some level of optimism on climate conditions and some scenarios. optimism, why? we heard from the presentations that many other countries remain undeterred and they will continue reducing emissions,

continue with the commitment to the paris agreement, but also because we heard that plan, private sector investment strategies are already taking the industries toward the path of clean energy. would like to probe on this question and to ask you -- to ask you to go deeper and to enter act with one another. and at the international level, as to what may be the reaction from other countries, even the if there is an exit from the united states. the united states abdicates leadership. on two issues. you mentioned about the paris agreement or the climate change regime as under construction. we have not put all the pieces together. we have the first part but don't have the review far and that is fundmental to ultimate success.

so who is going to deliver on the real part, the united states has not played traditional leadership roles. what we also heard about the importance of the dcf. the focal point of the negotiations, making sure that these funding was there to developing countries could also make progress in their emission reduction target. what happen is the united states is not there to provide the finds. i assume we all assumed they would be there. with e -- if you can address one another the expectation of the international response and the future of of the climate change regime if the united states abdicates its leadership, whoever wants to go first. >> well, i want to know -- i don't think it was where the united states disappears, but i'm grateful we're not going to disappear.

whatever happens i don't think the paris agreement -- as i said earlier, paris agreement is full comprehensive. we have already passed the honest of no return. so this is not going to lead to at the demise of the buyer structure of the paris agreement. the process in terms of political leadership, unless the elections next year prove to be otherwise, countries, eu will continue with the initiative and we will be part of it. people are talking about china. china has their own reasons why they need to keep disagreement alive. so i think they'll be there. indias very much for the technical innovation. i'm sure they will be there. so, collectively, countries will provide leadership.

>> first want to apologize. i'm not trying to strike a relaxed california attitude about our conversation but i threw out my back on saturday american and there's no amount of vicodin in that would make it possible to set upright. i agree with that assessment. really depends on how they access. if they exit by disengaging a bit, spend something money on bilateral programs and calling it their contribution, and doing other things with small groups, that's actually not going to be so toxic to the paris process, and might actually be help inflame some -- helpful in some regards by crediting -- one way 0 think about this is experimentalist regime. we don't know what works. lots of countries are trying too do things, but they don't know which mechanisms are going to function. so i think -- i don't know if

that's the most likely scenario, but i think the trumped a administration is going to learn quickly that other countries want this to go thing to work. so depends a lot on how we lead, to raise in it's do context what clinton might have said decade earlier, depends on what you mean by the word "leave." the other thing i'll say is i appreciate the scenario about what might happen in japan energy policy. when we take a step back, the whole world is not on track to meet two degreesing are or well below two degrees. there's no cierre nor on the planet where we meet he ambitious goals sew entire community needs to grapple with the fact that some things that were crucial to bets' countries to agree in paris are not growing to be feasible and one is the long-term target and a

difficult conversation about the realistic goals. in the immediately but overdue and that's reportless of what the -- regardless of what the trump administration does. >> just to build upon what you said i like the word "momentum." i think there is momentum to keep a lot of these pieces going, especially at the ngo, city to city, state to state, et cetera, level, but i worry when we come to that five, year point where we're supposed to come up with perhaps what was thought to be stronger indcs and change -- made our commitments stronger so we could reach programs these goals we're not on target to reach. if the u.s. is not there, i am not sure quite how that happens. certainly on the technology side, i-we played a very big

role in working with other countries on their inbcs and on clean energy, and if that slows down too much i also would worry, not just about u.s. competitiveness, but very high-tech increase increasingly high-tech technology and putting something forwards to keep the momentum moving between the countries that don't have the resources to do it even if they want to. >> i agree that the world has already gone beyond the point of no return, so even if in the u.s. paul pulls out of the paris agreements we have to move forward. however, there will be some countries or certain sectors in certain countries that would say, okay, if the u.s. is not taking action so why should we we? and that can also happen in '.

>> i was do-in japan. >> i was talking about the optimistic metage but i want to address the pessimistic message and how hoses to do with the reality of the goals and what a tremendous efforts to dejapan and the united states bull all other countries to get is on track to the emission tarrings and i was struck by an observation you made that instead of looking at numbers we should look at the level of effort. how would that become a u.s.-japan dialogue? if you walk can us through some of the discussions that would hope. >> this is precisely what leadership is needed on the review process. so, when we look closely to the review process, after five years, there actually won't already be enough dat data to know if countries implementing

processes. so the first round will be more procedural than substantive. this is why we need countries to go out and show how it's done. because it's no scenario by which 190 countries are going to agree under consensus making rules. you know this. you're not going to get consensus around things that are very complicated and difficult, where there's some significant number of countries that don't want the mechanism to work, to be intrusive. can you imagine saudi arabia or russia or others agreeing to a formal intrusive review system? that might happen eventually but it needs to start with demonstration, and i think this is a review system where countries are pledging to make their best efforts and i'm worried if we don't have leadership around the review mechanism, we're actually not going to know very much about the actual level of effort, and i would think that is in our

interests and might be to a greater degree in japan's interest, because the margin the japanese program for emissions reduction, i think optimistic assumptions be the nuclear restart is a very, very expensive program and if you're worried about industrial competitiveness you have to founding account on how to make emission reduction as a way that's cost effective and link the different economies. >> other comments? >> i would just totally agreement. under the g-20 you mentioned that the u.s. and china are looking at -- are in in the process of reviewing, getting rid of fossil fuel subsidies. the negotiation process to get that underway took over a year or mow, more and still not as robust as it could be. so having leadership on that

review is very important. >> i want to make another point. the first point is, our problems essentially i think is in the area of nuclear. we have to risk -- we used to have 54 reactors, and then we lost 16 to fume talk to scream ha -- fukushima fukushima we one estarted three. that's number one the second thing is, the cooperation between u.s. and japan should be technological innovation. this is the area where we can work together, regardless of what happens to the res e paris agreement itself. on the other hand, technology investment has to come with some kind of -- on the beauty of

paris agreement is that we have china and india onboard. they are lured to this agreement mainly because of the technological elements. so we have to keep that. for that we need sometimes. so you u.s. with possible with -- from the common fun is dom mating. i'm more concerned about the elements from the u.s. withdrawal from international climate change. >> so, let me then bring the audience. there's going to be a microfine. and you can say who you are and ask a precise question. >> hi. allen lobe, attorney in washington. one of the things see here, reminds me of the clean air act which is worked on in the u.s. at one time. there's momentum until the day that there isn't.

so, at the point you get beinged -- bogged down you ask what to do. the clean air act has back stahm mechanisms there would be a prognosis to drive things forward despite despite resistance. so one thing that makes me wonder is if you -- well, there's a quote by mark twain, you put all our eggs in one basket, guard the basket. so, in this case we can guard the basket but the clean air act example says that might not be good enough. so one suggestion would be to have as a backstop mechanism a universal carbon tax that all countries agree to and so if somebody is recalls tran country and done meet -- -- starts

temping people with -- i'm bogging down myself -- that people can gather together and say, okay, everybody else adopted a tax and this is a trade advantage. we're going to oppose the tax on them that they haven't imposed on themselves. what about that is a backstop mechanism? >> go ahead. >> there are -- one statement of life in international politics, very few real backstop mechanisms in foreign affairs there the way they are in domestic law. that's arrest don't think we're with such momentum we're beyond the point of no return itch don't see is going back to days when there is nothing going on but i sock the system, if the u.s. exits badly and other countries don't lead, the system goes into a stasis. i'm inning rebid any economics trending tells me to love the

idea of a universal carbon tax. but i'm probably unelectable for other reasons. but the problem with that is it requires countries to agree, and we know they're not going to agree. theirs then -- i frankly am very intrigued by they idea offal trade measures. you can design trade countermeasures and trade border measures in a way that would be wto compatible and could create incentive for countries to do something of i don't think we're near that yet but it requires enough countries who are willing to implement that and threaten that measure and those are not easy measures to then because the countermeasure is potentially ugly. so i think there's still a lot of risks for the paris process right now. >> this gentleman in front.

>> thank you very much. i'm -- we started this year to upgrade the task force, which objective to enable local communities to manage both cultural cal capital or natural capital. my first question is, how do you relate paris agreement with sustainment and development goals. that are i reinforcing each other? i attend the annual meet over the world bank, and did not appear clearly that is it feasible to stain the goals but can back the praise agreement. second, the united states, the federal government cannot do that much because the states are

in charge of regulation and so on. japanes quite -- in many technology. suggestion, i would don't you join in new project like a road so men countries and communes and you offer a unique contribution, knowledge,er and technology and try to address some critical issues quickly and not talking about bureaucratic -- because european union is much weaker this last two months the european union lost the capacity to ask the country and members countries to move forward. the same is going on in france. elections in germany. so u.s. and i challenge you, u.s. and japan, get along together, impreempt what you can do and you can do at lot of and forget discussing to much about global yemenite. thank you.

>> -- global agreement. thank you. >> any comments. >> development of the relationship between -- sustainable -- one of them is involvement, and involvement we have -- so it's very clear. the climate change is for the sustainable development so the links are very clear. on the second issue, yes, i think japan is very much in trouble. that with expected but the individual countries like -- if the government done change, france, and germany, anyway, will continue their initiative. it was meant to be the mechanism you're talking. gcf is in financial institution but was meant to be very flexible in terms of -- they can do all sorts of different activities involving private companies so i think the best

methodology to make use over to gcf but i was a member of the board and the board meetings can be very rough, very rough. but nonetheless they can play an important role in coming up with new ways of fighting. >> between sgd and the paris agreement bowlings they're literature, one chapter in the report this year and also some other research organizations doing the analysis and they're not always.com -- always compatible or reinforcing each other. so when you want to stay on the paris agreement track and 1.5 degrees and you have to have this biomass and carbon cap system and that would require huge amount of bilateral agreement that can compete with

food production and conflict with food security. >> that would require magical thinking, yes. >> very interesting. other comments or take more questions? >> other questions from the audience? no? if there are no more questions i think i want to thank all the panelist. this has been a really fascinating discussion. a lot coming. we need to be watching closely develops and thank you for sharing your expertise today thumb for coming. news plus -- [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> this holiday weekend on booktv. saturday night, at 10:00 eastern, on "after words," "wall street journal" editor joanne loveland looks also top women leaders in corporate america and at 11:00, cnn critical contributors talk about journalists book, unprecedented, the election that changed everything. and a look back at the 2016 presidential campaign. and sunday afternoon, a little after 5:00, professor blanch cook talks be the final volume to her eleanor roosevelt series. and at 10:00 p.m. eastern, sl

price on the death of the steel industry and its effect on a working class town seen through the lens of high school football, in his book "playing through the whistle." for our complete schedule go to booktv.org. >> you're watching booktv on c-span2 2. with top nonfiction books and authors every weekend. booktv, television for serious readers. >> i'm pamela paul, editor of "the new york times" book review, and i am here to introduce four of our 100 notable books of 2016. every year, editors at the book review select 50 fiction books and 50 nonfiction books that we consider notable. this is a year-long process, at the book review. we go through all of the books we have reviewed in our pages that year, and we select the 100