challenges we have within that. economic forces, environmental climate change, prices, shifting weather. those are all parts of what we do here on the farm. that is part of again, the story of food that i try to write about. i hope people take away that will taste of the food from the stories that i write. >> for more information on booktv's recent visit to fresno and the many other destinations on our city store, go to c-span.org /cities tour. >> good afternoon everybody. my name is tom mankin. i'm also the president and ceo and it is my pleasure to welcome you here for a discussion of this book. the big stick. the limits of power and

military force. what we are going to do is, because the author always should have the last word even if he doesn't, we will give him the last word. so what i'm going to do is first turn to my colleague eric edelman, a practitioner and resident here. and counselor to the center for budgetary assessments for his comments. i will turn to my other friend and colleague ãi'm sending conspiratorially here. a distinguished professor of global affairs here for his comments. and then we will turn to the author, to elliott. and then open the floor to you for your questions and go from there. with no further ado, eric, if you would. >> tom thank you, it is great to be here. i think it is important that every book event, we remember

the important part is to sell books for the authors. so i think all we need to get a copy of "the big stick". it is our television audience. you need to get a copy of "the big stick". it is available on amazon and it is a very important book. particularly important at this point in time. we are meeting today on groundhog day and i think that is very apropos. by the way those who do not know punxsutawney phil saw his shadow so we are in for another six weeks of winter. the movie groundhog day is one of my favorite movies. and those of you that is seen know that bill murray wakes up every day and it is groundhog day again. and in some sense i think that is a metaphor for what professor cohen is writing about. because it seems that every so often the united states needs to relearn a lesson that

military power is important. we've had to relearn that lesson after world war ii, after korea, after vietnam and i think we are not going to have to relearn it again after the exertions of the last 15 years some sense that is really the subject of professor cohen's book. and as a now lapsed diplomat having been a practitioner for 60 years, i certainly associate myself with the comments that george kennan made, although he is not my favorite foreign service officer, but ãhe is sort of the arts type of the diplomat. in 1946 in addressing that the national war college, he said you have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy we have a little quite armed force in the background. the mere existence of those courses he said, is probably the most important single instrumentality in the conduct of us foreign policy.

and i thoroughly agree with him. that is not to say that one wants to use those forces promiscuously as sometimes people think the foreign service wants to do. but it does mean that ã effective diplomacy is the availability of usable military power. and if you need any better example of that, i would argue that the rather pointless diplomacy that her secretary john kerry engaged in syria in the obama administration the last year and and a half would be exhibit a. professor cohen begins his book. his book by the way i want to say is about more than the use of military power and the importance of hard power. it is really a book about the role of the united states in

the international system and why hard power and the alliances which it sustains are a crucial part of that role. and i think he makes an excellent case both for the importance of that role in the first instance. he makes an excellent case about why the united states can still afford to play that role and in fact must play that role. and the challenges that we face, multiplicity of challenges in the form of a rising china. in the form of russia, the continuing challenge of jihad is him and the danger of fragile and failing states to the international order. and how only us military power along with other instruments of national power, can address those challenges. and he concludes the book just

to give you a sense of what you will read if you take my advice and thought invite is also some very good propositions about how we think about the use of force. because like i said, i do not think i or he would argue that promiscuous use of military us military power is called upon. the challenges that he describes, and i will end on this note and turn the floor over to my colleague. the challenges he describes in asia and europe and the middle east to me are very very reminiscent, and i think he agrees with this, and the book supports this ãa kind of challenge that statesmen based in the interwar period. and i want to conclude my remarks with a quotation from winston churchill. a book on gathering the storm

which i think speaks to both what professor cohen has addressed in his bush and also the current moment. and he says that it is his purpose churchill that is, that someone who lived and acted during that period to show how easily the tragedy of the second world war could have been prevented. how the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous. how the structure and habits of democratic states ãlike the elements of persistence and conviction. which can give security sample masses. and how the matters of self-preservation, no policies pursued for 10 or 15 years at a time. we shall see how the council and prudence and strength may become the prime agent of mortal danger. and how the middle court has adopted from safety and acquired life, would be found to lead directly to the bull's-eye of disaster. we shall see how absolute is

the need of a broadcast of international action pursued by many states and common across the earth perspective of the ebb and flow of national politics. >> thank you. >> thank you tom. it is a great pleasure to be here and having a chance to offer some comments on what is really a terrific book by someone i consider a colleague and a friend. i think i could go on at some length at the virtues of the book. frankly i have to do to get a sense of that is to read that glowing reviews that have been written everywhere from the new york times to the wall street journal to the weekly standard to get a sense of how good it is. and frankly that would not be much fun anyway. and in the interest of perhaps discussion, i will briefly mention five thoughts that this book about me. one where i violently disagree with him and for which all have to do with the state of us

military power today where i suspect we violently agree. and so, the first one, and this is truly in the best interest of some of the just best tradition of hairsplitting. i will take issue with the three paragraphs i did not like. [laughter] as opposed to 225 pages that i did. and elliott knows where i'm going with this. so elliott slays the dragon of grand strategy. by pointing out that any sort of grand intellectual design or theory (is not going to survive very long in the real world. and as someone who actually just came from teaching a class with the words grand strategy in the title ? [laughter] let me push back. because i think that your critique of grand schemes is well taken. but i think that you may actually be critiquing a strawman version of grand strategy. so deeply that grand strategy is not a step-by-step plan or

something that can leave our land seamless coherence then you are right it is truly dangerous. but i was happy most people who argue and favor of grand strategy think it is something a little bit different than perhaps more modest. i think it is a very basic set of principles and ideas, priorities that guide how you interact with the chaotic world. even how you adapt in the face of unforeseen events. it is the sense of what is most important to me as a country? what are the things that most threaten that.and in a very general sense how can i find what resources i have to get the good stuff?i think if you take that as the definition you can actually find a lot of historical examples of grand strategy done very well from fdr to treatment to reagan and beyond. furthermore, i would point out that i think grand strategy, actually it is essential to good strategy and decision-making as you call for and you outline.

because i think you have to have a grand strategy. some conception of how the pieces of your foreign policy fit together to know what interests are worth fighting for. and which ones are not. it is difficult to apportion resources across theaters without some global integrated conception of what you're trying to achieve. unstated grand strategy is not the enemy of the military policy or military strategy is actually the ally. and this is where we agree probably. this has to do with what you describe very nicely as the american hands. i like this because it is a great job of laying out the numerous strengths of the united states. how rumors of our demise of the much exaggerated in the past and very well may be so today. and although at a global level

the united states has great advantages over any challenger, at a regional level is getting quite dreary. it is important because the key challenges and competitions they are not primarily global, they are regional in scope. china is not challenging us on a global basis yet. the real challenges in east asia. and here the regional balance have been very problematic. i think it is quite doubtful whether united states and nato could actually defend the baltics and even parts of eastern europe with resources in place.there are no questions about whether we could defend taiwan today or other parts of east asia 10 years from now. so there is a spiritual local regional distinction i think we ought to keep in mind. and the question of how strong is the american hands? we all strip our challenges when it comes to capabilities but in the key regions where the rubber really hits the road these days, i think we are

actually headed for trouble. if we are not there already. and that brings me to one third one. which i think the book addresses very nicely. which is that, when you look at these regional balances, it is not just us and the adversary that make up the equation. us allies are a big part of it too. us allies add immensely to the strength of the united states that we can wield. that is good. most of them are not relative ã that is bad. you point out how both the relative and absolute military capabilities of most of our european allies basically have fallen off a cliff in the past 20 years. that the client is adding tremendously to the difficulties we face. in our defense strategy today. it is making for harder quite if we have to defend taiwan or japan or the baltic because they are increasingly overmatched. -- places like the middle east at a time when instability is traditionally invoked those intervention.what we've seen

over the past 20 years is that the allies of glad and sacrifice with nearly all of our profits from positive to afghanistan and counter icicle, they brought back progressive back to the table. because a strategy has always been a coalition strategy, that is a significant problem. this brings me to i think the fourth point that your book really points out nicely. which is the issue of strategic ãme for the last two issues together i think what emerges is that we are rapidly approaching the point of where we and our allies and we cannot do the things that we have traditionally done that we pledged to do that we think we ought to be able to do. the united states is non-authentic to regional war capacity anymore. just to give one example. this is really problematic because now we face a problem with pronounced instability in all of the areas we care about. and as one believes as i do, with the military backbone,

military -- this raises some troubling questions where we are headed. so i think we are poking a very stark choice. this is something that eric and i are working on right now. we are even going to have to pay significantly more to maintain the defense strategy in the international order that we have enjoyed or will have to become accustomed to doing less and guaranteeing less in the world. i think obviously we should take the first choice. and i think you can do that without breaking the bank if you're willing to make some difficult but fairly commonsensical adjustments with respect to entitlement spending and revenues. but the gap between our commitments and capabilities has become too big to ignore. as a fundamental question for policy going forward. in this brings me to the final point. and i know a lot of you would agree with. military powers really crucial to america's forming policy and

we are reminded of this every day right now. you can have a scenario in which the united states opens the floodgates of military spending. in which we really reassess the big step. but in which we really stuck them on the other side geopolitically leaner and less effective than before. because in this scenario we have also undercut our alliances, we pursue trade policies that work against the international and national prosperity have enjoyed for the past 70 years. we have stuck reassuring countries around the world that we started bullying and caressing them.we decimated our reputation for steadfastness and reliability. that is not such a crazy scenario these days. by all means, yes, the importance of carrying a big stick but also the other aspects of american policy that have traditionally made this nation so great. >> okay. >> what say you? >> first i just want to thank my friends and colleagues here and i want to thank all of you

for being here. this is a book which i think i could only have written with the college that i have, the students i have had and with the environment of this remarkable institution. which, you know, brings together this i think quite unique mix of history and policy and practice. i look at my three colleagues appear. all distinguished scholars, all with government experience. and i hope that is made that book distinctive. furthermore, i have always thought that part of the way is you been doing anyway that is out in public square. so i wrote this book with the intention that it would be read by people who are not students of military affairs and do not normally think about it. it ended up in ãi have been pleased with the new york times review. which was by somebody who i think is an expert on family kind of issues.

got me maybe the nicest, which is is organized like a bento box. [laughter] >> i will take that. and i think part of the tradition is simple and spirited disagreement. that will do that too. before i address the previous remarks, just a one or two things about the writing of the book. for me, one of the most challenging parts of it was the chapter called 15 years of war. and that in part because i felt obliged to tackle the question of iraq and the question of policies in which i myself have been engaged and advocating and in some cases, implementing. once i went into government. and i have to say that was very tough to do. i'm still not entirely sure how well i did it.

because it meant no really looking hard at things that i thought before, some which i no longer think. that is never easy. on the other hand i would also say, and there was a certain way would also having been in the thick of it, it does make it harder to be dispassionate observer and critic and analyst. once again, i think one of the great things about ãit enables you to do that. president daniels, we have a seat for you over here. sorry. [inaudible] >> let me move from that to talk a bit about ãin a way it does get to the core of the book. i think to some extent of this agreement may be semantic and

when you call this strategy on public policy. i think we are, my general editorial principle is one word is always better than two. if you're going to use a word like grand, i confer ãi prefer the word policy. i think there is some disagreement about how effective policymaking gets done. it is partly because i think any time there is enormous uncertainty when you are reacting to events and it is a particular mixer people. i think that will be an even bigger problem now. >> i quite agree with you, you some general principles and general ideas. those will only give you limited guidance. very limited guidance. in the more important things i

go about once you are in the midst of the fog and the merck and struggling with things. i very much agree with you and i think the three of us would agree that one of the difficulties that we have, although the american hand is basically very strong ãyou can really screw it up. as some of you probably know we have only gotten off to good start. [laughter] in a couple of weeks doing that. particularly in the way that you described. and that is blown up our alliance relationships. i would have been more optimistic about our alliance relationships because you know, is that point on the book, europeans for example have fallen off the cliff. but unity of india, not an japan, smaller partners like vietnam. but all that effort. as eric edelman is my master

instructor diplomacy. i learned from him how is actually done. i'm not joking about that. and one of the things i want from him is the wisdom of what schultz said. it is like gardening. you just constantly have to be tending to your allies. it is not natural. it is not something given in the world. i agree that we are, each of those regional balances is more difficult. i argue in the book that the, the big strategic challenges that we face are very different, require different kinds of forces and different ways of thinking. so i think, this is a much more precarious situation than in the past. you know if you'd asked me a year ago i would say well, the reason that it will be precarious but i think you know if we play it the right way and think about it the right way with care, we will be able to make it. then the world we are in.

>> we have been joined by president ron daniels. i would like to recognize him and give him the opportunity to make any remarks that he would like.either from the podium. >>. [inaudible] >> wonderful to have you. [laughter] you do not usually get the president of the university at a book launch. i will say something. [laughter] which is, the model of this university the truth will make you free. and i have never thought of this more importantly than now. >> well, i will abuse privilege of the chair to make a comment and then asked the first question and we will open it up to questions. the comment pertains to the

first full paragraph on page 121. the comment is interesting. [laughter] you have to read the book and see if you agree or disagree. the question you know is, you know very particular question. for an author. you have had the last word in print. and courtesy of a commercial publisher you been able to put the book to bed fairly close to the time that actually appeared. i know it went through multiple revisions and so, i think you must be reasonably satisfied with what is here in the pages. but there has to be something. there has to be something that now on groundhog day, you wish you had said more about or you wish you had added you know with ãor did not meet the word limit. so what ? [laughter] if you could do this, the directors cut as i

said february 3, what would you have put in their they did not in the book? >> i think i would've emphasized a lot more something that increasingly hits me when i talk about the book. that we are now having the great debate about american foreign policy that in some ways, was triggered by the end of the cold war. or should have been triggered by the end of the cold war. the consensus was one that grew out of world war ii. so we are fine until the early cold war. the united states will be a global power. that it will help create global institutions. and set rules of the road that we will be globally deployed with military power to back up our diplomacy. and that we will bear those burdens. and as i point out, those burdens have been very considerable in the terms of

loss of life, treasurer and so on. that great ãand it was basically an international consensus. on that, i would say throughout the cold war. when the cold war ends, the end of communism ãthere should have been some kind of general reassessment. that did not happen. why didn't that happen? i think there are two fundamental reasons. one is that you had a novelist kind of.where the first period of the 1990s called the great picnic, predominance was cheap. it is amazing to think, we did not pay for the first gulf war. other people pay for it. wind up with a surplus. that is unheard of.casualties thank goodness were very low. as and also in yugoslav wars. see had over a decade where predominance was cheap. so why even discuss it?

you have the crisis of 9/11 and everything that followed from it. and the debate then gets turned in that direction. so in some ways this is the delayed version of that. i think you can already see this in the bernie sanders camp. but it would have come sooner or later. well why shouldn't that happen? the second thought i had about that that i want to talk about more and i will be writing a bit about this. in has to do with the nature of the policy of the intellectual community concerned with foreign policy. and i will back to the early days with people like arnold walters which is probably and you don't hear very much anymore. people we think about first ordered questions about international politics, and so on. that is not what most people like us do. we have a foreign policy that argues with each other about

all kinds of things. which the vast majority of americans really could not care less about. which, when you step back and think about it are matters of technique or media ãrather narrow technical concerns as opposed to first order questions. and it is a problem because it has really disabled itself from being able to talk in an effective way with the american people. i mean, brick businesspeople, journalists and so on were just not used to doing that.i said is one of the reasons why it is great ãwhere people like how joining us. i think one thing i would have liked to tackle more of. i would also like to have been clear about my views about donald trump. [laughter] >> you have an

opportunity to clarify that. we will open the support questions, and i do mean questions. the more concise the better. sir, right there. just wait, there is a microphone on its way. >> thank you. regarding speaking of our recently elected president, he had apparently a rather one could say, contentious, it may be ill advised conversation with the prime minister of australia. what impact might donald trump have on our close and long-lasting alliances? over the next say five years? >> give a lot of expertise around here but i think my take would be something like this. in the worst case, this does serious, maybe not irreparable but really serious damage to alliance relationships that matter greatly to us.

the australia thing drive you crazy. i mean, all of us i think periodically australia and i go off a lot. these are our closest allies. we have actually fought alongside them more than we have fought with ãthey are culturally just like us. if you have got to go to war these are the people you want to go to war with. and to gratuitously insult the prime minister of australia in your first conversation with him, it is crazy. now ãthe question is how the australians will react. they might say okay, the americans are really much different than we think. i don't think that will happen. they might just say this is this particular guy. and so then you move on and say well, you know mattis will get them down but in the back of your mind you think the american people elected this.

and that is the work worst part of what i worry about ... .... .... >> what i would consider two fundamental features of not alliances but the russians more broadly. the first is the united states is a steady as she goes, reliable, dependable country. it doesn't make much explanation to get at what i mean here. but that i think we are going to see a greater degree of

volatility in american politics. if you are an ally who counts on america being predictable in terms of it counts on you during a crisis that is bad. the second thing is the idea the united states tends to place the good opinion. it tends to exercise the power in a generally benign way. >> i agree with what elliot and howl have said.

i will make a couple additional observations. one is, although, i think in tern quarters there is a disposition to believe that what we have seen in terms of relations with mexico. the phone call with prime minister turn boil and the phone call that may have edge to it with chancellor merkal that this is really just a sort of bumpy beginning of an administration in the early days that most presidential transitions are a bit rocky. i think as thomas wright is saying if you go back and read what donald trump has been significant this is consistent. he has always been complaining about trade. only the names of the guilty parties changed.

mexico in the 1980s, japan in the 19 -- japan in the 1980s, mexico in the 1990s and now it is china. and they have always been free loaders. what you see is not going to change. also, the views are not going to be attributed to just the views of the president. but they are a view they heard from the president's predecessor who in interviews, particularly in the last year, made it clear he things american allies are free loading and we are getting a free ride from the united states. i think in americmany quarters will see foreign loaders and foreign governments begin to

wrestle with the notion of is this really a passing phenomenon or something more deeply rooted in the united states. it really goes back to elliot's point that the american public elects these presidents. the third observation i would make going back to elliot's comments about secretary shultz. i was his special assistance from '82-'84 and he is living proof that adage no man is a hero to valor is wrong. academic international relations tend to -- when it looks at alliances tend to fall generally to the proposition there is a natural, realist, international relation. there is a natural propensity in the system for states to balance rather than bandwagon with other states. in my experience and the

governme government. there are tender shoots that need to be taken care of in the garden all the time. you might be surprised how quickly some of these relationships could come unglued. >> on the aisle there. third row. yup. coming your way. >> thank you. i haven't read the book obviously but there is an old saying that to a man with hammer everything looks like a nail. similarly, to man with a powerful military things look

different. looking even just at this century would better decisions have been made if the decision makers hadn't thought they had such a big hammer? >> that is an interesting question. the problem is if you could probably look at particular decisions and you might have different views about any given policy and might say it would be better if they didn't have the option. it is never about a single option. if you didn't have a really big military you might not have had peace in the cold war. you know? and i think one of the points that has been made often is you always know the troubles you have had. you don't know the troubles you have warded off. i think we may find ourselves in

a period where what it looks like when you don't have predominant military power. i think from my observation of political leaders for the most part they are careful when it comes to submit u.s. forces to conflict. there is something in that respect, sobering about the office of the president. >> sir? >> what advice do you have for china and the south sea? is it a case it is closer to them and something they care

about more than we do. does that change our calculation? in what ways should we be using the threat of military force to affect the outcomes we want there? >> i think we should care about it a lot because we have large interests. first, it goes back to what is the rules based international order that we helped create in the aftermath of world war ii. however, imperfect, and occasional hip hypocritical we may be it is a good order. when they say it is chinese territorial waters that order has been broken. point a. point b; if they get away with asserting the kind of power they would like to you are endangering several american allies because this is a huge piece of territory. when you look at where the chinese draw the so-called

nine-dash line. again, the position of the world rests on this system. if we failed to look at we will not have much alliance system left. i suppose as the segue back to your original question, tom. i think one thing i would have put more of in the book is a much more explicit argument about just how bad things can get if we don't have that international order which i believe absolutely requires american military strength. i think it could get very, very bad. so when they say these are regional conflicts you can pull back from one and it doesn't have a bearing on the other. i don't think -- i really don't think that is the case. we live in a globalized world and they were all interconnected.

if we pulled back from that i think the consequences would be felt around the region and globally. >> i would just say whether you look at the world through tlens that elliot described with the rules based institution or the point of view of america first and more jobs for americans. our prosperity rested on freedom of access to global comments and freedom of the seas. the international trade and prosperity of the world depends

on this and that is why we care about the south china sea or the east china sea. the challenge we face of the changing regional balances and that some of the rising rejinal powers, or as some cases, declining regional powers that are exerting themselves to completely dominate their own regions have found if they can take actions that fall below the threshold that would normally elicit a military response they can through a series of salami slices begin to chip away at the foundations of this order. so we are faced with a very challenging question.

at what point do you respond? do you make them out? maybe not. that would seem to require a response that would put us in conflict with china. maybe you wait until three islands, four islands, what about ten? a hundred? what about when you wake up and found they created an air defense information zone over the area and you can no longer fly over it. this is the challenge i think we face and it isn't just in the south china sea. it is elsewhere as well. >> i am not sure what pulling back means in the geographic context of the western pacific where the united states has territory. american citizens who are represented in congress in the western pacific.

just two brief points. >> one to echo what elliot said. i think we need to rediscover our image nation of the tragic in terms of thinking what the real breakdown of international order looks like. we have been blessed to have this order for the last 70 years. i think it is hard for people to understand what can happen when things really go wrong. the second point is that. it is important to have a point of what you are trying to accomplish and whether you are willing to use the cohersion. i am all for taking a harder line with china.

if you take the line rex tillerson made we will deny china access what is the level of cohursion necessary to bring that about. if the answer is yes, then okay. if the answer is no that is a dumb thing to say because it will make you look weak and foolish. >> we will take one last question. henry? >> i tend to agree with the panel's consensus about trump's danger to alliances but to play devil's advocate and apologize to the devil but short of military events that doesn't inspire allies to contribute more to resources and collective defense. >> well, you know, there is an argument you can make to that

effect. and i suppose if i thought this was part of an strategy as opposed to control i would understand it. but that is not what i think is going on. i think there is poor impulse control. you are dealing with somebody who takes everything very, very personally. secretary dave would be out there flogging the europeans and it really didn't work. what scares me is if people

begin to think about the united states not being reliable do you think there reaction would be we need to rebuild and be fair of the good ole days or will they say let's cut another deal with the gas problem. i think you are likely to get the second. the fact is a number of our a allies are doing things. you look at the australians, japanese, the brits. even in europe this isn't the way to get it. i would basically agree with that. i think there is an argument to be made that trump has put his finger on real problems with respect to the burden and share. for them to solve them in the way it would require trump not to be trump.

i don't think that is a reasonable expectation. i would say when the united states has had success getting allies to spend more on defense in the past we are providing as asurance, if you send your neck out we have your back. the bet trump is making is if the united states does less allies will have to do more and that may not pay off. i would argue it doesn't work. it requires a lot of time skwu tension -- and attention of the

secretary of defense especially. there is no reason we cannot get more out of our allies and we need to do so for the reasons elliot was talking about. at the reagan national defense forum in early december, for the first time that event invited a coup couple foreign dignities to join. they said we got the message and heard president trump and president-elect clear and we and nato got it and have to step up our game. but we can only do that if we are american leadership. i think that is an important part of the equation.

i would add to caveats. one is not everything we get out of our allies is necessary their financial or military contribution to the alliance. we get a lot of value from our allies both by giving us access to the territory, their geographic position and the united states could not operate in asia without allies in japan and the republic of korea. those are tangible contributions but the contributions and value added to the united states none

the less. and finally we have to recall what howell talked about earlier which is it is almost universally true but most of our traditional allies are facing a less good hand than the one that elliot describes for the united states in terms of demographics and economics etc. so while we can ask them to do more we have to have some realist realistic. part of what, i think is the part of the possible here is to have a better division of labor with allies and a more explicit division with our allies over who contributes what to the common defense. there the united states will have to get more directive with

allies about what we want them to spend their pounds and euros on. i don't think it can be in the past. >> i can say the answers to some of the questions lie in the page. but we will were pro-seed on the to next part. before we do thereat, there is the important matter of thanking our panel elliot, howell and eric.

>> you are watching booktv on c-span2. we visted fresno, california at a talk to authors and literary sites. next, learn about a plane crash that killed migrants in 1948.