>> what are you reading this summer? >> is the life and times of robert kennedy. robert kennedy was a new senator. an incredible book about bobby kennedys life, political life, the history of his family and it is an enjoyable read. >> booktv wants to know what you are reading. .. [inaudible conversations]

>> good afternoon. i am senior fellow at the hoover institution, my name is amy zegart, codirector of the center for international security and cooperation at stanford. we are delighted both institutions have come together to cohost this book event with graham allison and niall ferguson to discuss "destined for war: can america and china escape thucydides' trap?". i want to remind all of you the book is available for purchase and graham allison will sign a few questions at the end of the talk. you can't escape the trap of the bookstore outside. graham allison as many of you know is director of harvard's center, and dylan professor of government and founding dean of harvard's kennedy school of government. like legions of students, i vividly remember my first time

walking into the kennedy school for my first forum event in 1986. it was an intoxicating place where you could feel the brainpower working at the policy being changed in the room. graham allison has been the man behind this magic for a very long time. the standard of policy relevant scholarship since he was 10 years old in 1986. he is the ultimate triple threat serving at a number of distinguished positions in academia, government and the private sector. he served as special advisor to the secretary of defense under presidents reagan and assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans under president clinton. he has been a trusted advisor to seven secretaries of defense both democrat and republican. he serves on the advisory board of the secretary of state, secretary of defense and director of the central

intelligence agency. he has the sole distinction of having been twice awarded the formative defense's highest civilian award, the distinguished public service medal, first by weinberger and again by bill parry who is here with us today. as many of you know, graham allison has written extensively about nuclear weapons, terrorism and decisionmaking. his first book, essence of decision explained to the cuban missile crisis, one of the most influential books in political science and has become required reading for the vast majority of political science students today. that is saying something. if you're a political scientist you know there have been so many articles and books about the cuban missile crisis there has even been a periodical about why we should stop writing articles and books about the cuban missile crisis. it is one of the most proud intellectual landscapes and

graham allison's book has stood the test of time. that book has sold 450,000 copies, the tom clancy of the field. >> influential books including a 2000 book called the grandmaster's insights on china, the us and the world, and nuclear terrorism, the ultimate preventable catastrophe, selected as one of the hundred most notable books of the year. this book," destined for war: can america and china escape thucydides' trap?" is no different. i typed in best-selling political science books on amazon.com and a three offers at the top were ken follett, our franken and graham allison. there is only one weakness in graham allison's illustrious

career. he never saw the light as his colleague, neil ferguson did, to move from harvard to stanford. i am here to say it is not too late for you. we hope after your visit, it will be for a longer time. joining him in conversation today is a smart a colleague who decided to move to california, niall ferguson. he is a colleague of mine, senior fellow at the hoover institution, also a senior fellow at the center for european studies at harvard and visiting professor at beijing. he is one of the leading economic historians, astute and widely followed political commentator and prolific author. graham allison has sold 450 books, niall ferguson has written 450 books. incredibly prolific author.

kissinger, the latest volume, a highly awarded book, civilization, the west and the rest, the ascent of money, financial history of the world, how britain made the modern world and colossus, the rise and fall of the american empire. you can find them in the sunday times and the boston globe. before coming to stanford he was professor of history at harvard for 11 years and before that he taught at nyu and the london school of economics. he has won a number of awards and the only person i know who can say he won an international emmy for his series the ascent of money and the award for best documentary from new york international film festival for his feature-length film kissinger. he was named by time magazine one of the most influential people in the world. i have to add in 2017 he

achieved a first in the hundred year history of the hoover institution which was to get every single fellow interested in international security affairs together for the first of a series of salons which has proven to provide incredibly fascinating, illuminating conversations and you are about to see why when you hear these two professors talk about graham allison's book. please join me in welcoming graham allison and niall ferguson. [applause] >> introductions are better here than at harvard. one thing amy didn't mention is graham allison and i have been co-authors. we published an article on history last year arguing the president of the united states needed a council of historical advisors, this one especially, and we are not in an adversarial

relationship. the book we are going to talk about is a book i watched evolve when i was at harvard and i have to congratulate you, you got the timing just right. if you aren't worried now about the possibility of conflict between china and the united states, when you leave this room i guarantee that you will be. let me begin our conversation with a quotation from the book. when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, danger ahead. china and the united states are currently on a collision course for war unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it. war between the united states and china in the decade ahead is not just possible but much more likely than currently recognized.

on the historical record, war is more likely than not. i have to ask you to set up your case, assuming people who bought the book but not yet read it. persuade us that war is more likely than not between the united states and china. >> thank you for participating in this event, and the joint venture, it is a great honor and opportunity. in the 70s, couldn't possibly -- i wouldn't be able to do any work. too many to do, the colleague at

harvard said how do you get work done? i spent as much time in this room as i used to spend shoveling snow. in any case a great pleasure to be here, thanks for the introduction. for this group, for general audiences and younger audiences today concept that there could be a war between great powers is inconceivable. 7 decades without war, war between great powers has been consigned to the dustbin of history. it is nothing to do with the 20th century. in his previous centuries. there haven't been for a long time. any historian will recognize how silly that observation is. this period of 7 decades is

anomalous, john geddes's proposition is a powerful proposition. so the notion piece is the natural condition of mankind or for whatever reason our better angels have become so powerful we have become so wise or in any case war between great powers is obsolete. in the case of us and china, every day, there is noise about what is happening in this relationship, china is a trading partner, there is a near convection in the north china sea or whatever. beneath the surface of this, then the substructure driving these events.

i came upon the idea of that insight but that helped eliminate what is happening, namely a rising power that is threatening to displace a ruling power. that storyline is as old as history itself. the founder of history, thucydides, said about the conflict between athens and sparta, the great city states of classical greece, the famous line all students of international relations have studied, he said, quote, it was the rise of athens and the fear that is instilled in sparta that made the war inevitable. he identified a dynamic in which a rising power feels bigger, stronger than a small power.

the arrangements that were set in place, confining, even unfair. i can remember some of this, the ruling power looking at this, this upstart trying to upset the situation that provided the environment in which is able to grow. this dynamic between the rising power and the ruling power greatly exhausts trusts is misinterpreted by the others, if you suspect evidence and vice versa. magnification of this understanding and similarly preaching vulnerability to the impact of external actions and events in which stopping athens or reaction, there is a cascade

at the end of which is an outcome no one would have imagined. the dynamic is not the rise and ruling power, is not a good idea. the arrangements are great because they have a long period of peace and they are rich and the government official from time to time i have given this to people, i believe it is true, the us constructed in the aftermath of world war i 2, economic and security order provided for longer peace and greater prosperity than china ever saw so they should be extremely grateful and should participate in this, they say who wrote these rules and where were we when the pools were written and where the rules fare from our perspective and should

they be adjusted? i should have more sway and you should be happy or grateful. this dynamic leads us to be vulnerable to events like what is happening in korea. of what is happening in korea were happening in the relationship between the us and britain, in a way that was threatening to the tea party, british and americans would sit down and say a little pipsqueak like this could not disturb relations between two big states. forget about it. let's sit down and solve this problem and if we can agree on some things we will flip a coin. the relationship between the us and china, in north korea the chinese as you know very well haven't participated in this conversation, you and i did, we were part of a high level

postmortem with both americans and chinese, from the chinese perspectives in beijing's a problem in courier is always that we are there. there would be no problem in korea if the americans were not in korea. we would solve this problem in a second. from the american perspective the ideas that -- we fought a war there. 40,000 americans died there. we helped build a society there, a very successful democracy. the 13th largest market economy in the world. we are not walking away from that. we are proud of this and we should be proud. the problem is north china, you should solve this problem with the little guys. as you have written brilliantly,

world war i. a good chapter in single chapter terms, the answer after the war, how did this happen? if we only knew. still is the right answer. how could the assassination of an archduke by a serbian terrorist who nobody cares much about except the guy in vienna, he shouldn't go there. the guy that assassinates him is a serbian terrorist from a group called the black hand. if you were writing a movie wouldn't make this up. the spark that feeds the fire that burns down the whole house, it makes no sense. did anybody want the war that they got? know. the hungarians would like to smoosh the serbs because of the

way they were behaving but as you point out, would have allowed them to do that without having a great war. one thing led to the other and by the end, everyone lost -- it is so startling and irrelevant as we think about china, no one in the us wants a war with china. i don't know of a single person who thinks that wouldn't be crazy and no one in this chamber in the ministry of defense thinks a war with the us is a good idea. war would be catastrophic. at the end of world war i, what did they care most about? was gone. they were trying to hold together an empire. the emperor was gone. the whole regime was overthrown.

the kaiser is trying to back his buddy in vienna, he is gone. the french are backing the russians for a whole generation, society never recovers and britain which has been a credit for 100 years turned into a debtor so if you had given these people a chance for a do over, nobody, not a single one would made the choice he did but they made the choices, one led to another and that is what happened. the situation nobody wants more, everybody knew the war would be nuts. >> your analogy here would be the rivalry between britain and germany essential to the outbreak of that war, in this case britain in 1914 was the

incumbent power, germany was the rising power is chinese today, they were heavily interdependent economically and nevertheless came with disastrous consequences. >> in my reading of it, it is consistent with your own history of it, they are entangled with other parties about who would not otherwise have been, bismarck in germany, he would have understood how weak the austro-hungarian's where. he would have never let the alliance with russia -- the kaiser didn't know what he was doing and began to work similarly, the british have been careful not to get too entangled

with other parties on the continent and they were watching, fearful of germany, we better talk about this, we should have more relationships with the russians, the brits were worried about the russians. they thought the russians were threatening their empire in india. in the book. >> i should explain, gives you 16 cases, and incumbent power feeling threatened by a rising power and this is the political science parts. 12 other -- this results in conflict. i would like to talk more about the 1914 analogy which is a powerful one and i would like to get to the contemporary parallel in which a small rogue regime

precipitates that. the peloponnesian war, you might not have registered these but china's leaders have. could you raise your hand if you read the peloponnesian war or part of it? >> being back at oxford, let me make a shout out, you can go right now and download for free on to the peloponnesian war and the first hundred pages will knock your socks off. i hope you like the other book too which you have to pay for. >> it is not downloadable for free yet but i'm sure someone is working on it. watch out.

the most remarkable thing for me is this is something china's leaders referred to. xi xinping refers to the thucydides trap, in a speech in seattle. remind me if i've got that wrong. we heard chinese ambassadors in the united states, it may seem arcane if you are not into ancient history, it doesn't seem arcane in beijing. one question, who is smarter than issue is part and who is athens? i am not quite sure. >> it is not isomorphic. next thing is the mutual colleague, the work we tried to do, ernest maywood point out when you get an analogy be

careful, similar at the top of the win column, if you can't make three bullet points taken aspirin and consult a historian. these are not exactly like -- in fact the spartan case, people may not remember. the persians, that is what we call it rainy and is now, athens -- that were professional. and in the pickup game.

a pretty impressive navy greeted an alliance. whereupon a few other times in history. and creative energy in athens, unbelievable. came from an event in silicon valley in the tech world. whether they had been in 50 years, sophocles, euripides, philosophy, socrates. democracy, pericles, look at the parthenon. you can find a building in

california. from sparta, people are looking out saying these people are out of control every day. crazy new things that are not comfortable to us. it was essentially seal team 6. when kids are 4 years old you check them out, they kill them. and 25 years old, they can't get married until they are 30, they are getting ready to fight people and that is when they do. drama and history and philosophy, this seemed very threatening to the spartans. they said to the spartans, the way things are the way they are

supposed to be so after the war with the persians, the athenians wanted to build back their wall to protect them from invasion from people like the spartans. you cannot have a wall. we need to discipline you and be able to march there. and build this wall. why would they build this while? they didn't want to obey us. if you said what is the similarity between the us and china, extreme differences, from an american perspective the international order we helped build and provide and manage over seven decades worked very well. it involved historical terms, i give the americans high marks in many areas but from a chinese

perspective, things should be adjusted and particularly in the asian arena, why is that the arbiter of events in the south china sea? they would look up every day, there is the u.s. navy and when there is a dispute about an island where somebody wants to build and islands, we have an opinion and we think our opinion should dominate because we are the dominant navy. we have been there since the battle of midway, things are so calm and successful, what could have happens between you and japan and you and india? in the best of cases, i agree with you, that is then and now is now, time for you to leave.

>> can't help -- the nature of the case compels us to advance honor and interest came out and we just have it and a distinctly american -- the analogy is not quite perfect but we come back to better analogy which is a germany britain pre-1914 analogy, if there is one thing this book can tell us, how to avoid a version of 1914 in china, four examples of things turning out okay. the us soviet relationship, what

should we learn from the minority of cases, great powers avoided the trap. >> i have a chapter called 12 -- from the failures and successes. the success stories, spain versus portugal, the rise at the beginning of the 20th century, the cold war, the us met the surge of the soviet union, the open case in the post-cold war period, the dominant tower in europe, from each of these cases lots of agreements to learn. the two most instructive are the rise of the us relative to britain and the cold war. in the case of the us, the british had two problems, a

rising germany that was more approximate and seen as a threat because the germans were building a navy that seemed threatening. most americans are uncomfortable, teddy roosevelt is one of my heroes. i'm a big admirer of teddy roosevelt. i tell the story of america, emerging into what teddy roosevelt was confident would be an american century which it was. a 37-year-old arrives in washington. it was the secretary of the navy, assistant secretary, the number 2 person. had been railing about the

abomination of spain in our hemisphere. and seeing them, what happened in the decade after teddy roosevelt arrives in washington? you could read in the chapter about it. the ship in havana harbor, to declare war against spain, puerto rico, that is how guam to be part of it. teddy roosevelt could connect the atlantic and pacific. sponsored a coup, and the car now.

and the british and germans settle the matter. and any discretionary. threatens war with each of them decided better to leave. and john muir, with teddy roosevelt, exploring, saying the river there, congress national forests, look it up on that in the us. this is like 100 year syllabus. had taken teddy roosevelt camping in yosemite where teddy roosevelt says this is a national park.

the secretary of state, this is 100 yosemite, this is america. this is canada, do it again. this is america. we threaten war with canada and took it and didn't pay for it at all. most people remember -- they will be out of here. european partners. if any nation in our hemisphere misbehaves as we decide, we would send the marines and change it. if xi xinping or his successor should be inspired by teddy

roosevelt, in a desperate path. >> by comparison, the more outraged i become, comparison with misbehavior, issues which appear in the us media south china sea, nothing to compare with the kind of aggressive assertion of primacy the united states engaged in -- >> the great british tradition, prime minister of britain to 1902. and as teddy roosevelt has done one outrageous thing after another.

whatever if we intervened in the civil war, we could have had two americas and this wouldn't be happening to us. and a second chance. >> the message is an interesting one, if the united kingdom did not interfere in the civil war, in the country, against the confederacy. that degree of cultural similarity across the atlantic, by the 1900s nobody minded the prospect of predominance and senior partner, junior partner relationship but that analogy doesn't apply between the united

states and china. that is china being china and it would be fine if we are junior partners and they are senior pat partners it is not going to be like that. >> the brilliance of the british accommodation was they first distinguished between what was final for britain and wanted to keep the priority involving canada, the us could have taken canada and teddy roosevelt was interested in british columbia. he looked at that more than once in the british were aware, but noticing what is vital, what we can adjust to they tolerated behaviors that was certainly crude and unreasonable and unfair but nevertheless they helped americans to see american

and british interests in terms of most important interest and cultural similarities you mentioned and by the time world war i comes, the us is the natural supply line for britain, britain would have done very well in world war i if it had not been for us supplies and us money. when the us entered the war it was natural to align with britain and in between the wars it became thicker. in washington naval conference 1921 the americans agreed to have numbers of ships with the brits where they could feel better about it, and have again bigger, a much bigger navy and when world war ii comes the us is aligned with britain so that the account of where your interests are vital and we can

be aligned and recognizing other areas of strong differences and i can adjust, a big lesson for us even as we think about china because is not a cultural thing for sure. these are two different cultures. i have a chapter called clash of civilizations taking sam huntington's proposition which is basically correct and all i do is the elaborate. if you said what in terms of vital interest, what interest to the us and china share? not having a general nuclear war. we have a relationship of mutual assured destruction with the soviet union. if i do my best to destroy you, after that you can still kill me. we are like siamese twins. a grotesque image but imagine

waking up one day and we each still have our head and arms but our backbone and respiratory system has been fused. however mischievous, however evil are you, however much you want to strangle me, you keep thinking this guy deserves to be strangled but if i strangle him i am going to commit suicide. that is not a good idea so maybe i have to figure out a way to live with. secondly, the economies are deeply interlinked, not just as they were between britain and france which were highly independent but even in supply chains, if you had a war between the us and china, chinese factories would remake themselves and we wouldn't be able to get loans.

that doesn't look good. not everybody in the us agrees with the proposition but everybody who studied the proposition agrees in the current pattern of use of energy and greenhouse gas emissions, we succeed in making a global hundred years from now your great great great grandchildren can't live in. that doesn't make any sense. there is no way the us can do anything to solve that problem if china is not collaborative and there's no way china can solve this problem if the us is not so we have three big areas where you can imagine and other areas adopting. >> i want to open this up to the audience and ask one more question and give the crowd a

chance to ask questions. they are not destined for war, mutually assured destruction, economic independence and environmental concerns. let's look closely at a plausible scenario in which the united states and china despite common interests could nevertheless end up in conflict. we both agreed what was unfolding in north korea, has the potential to be a cause of conflict, given that scenario and looking ahead, a matter of months, nobody in summer of 1914 expected britain and germany by august would be at war, by self-determination, the neutrality of belgium, in a conflict over north korea.

>> a chapter in the book has several scenarios but let's stay with the one that is most urgent right now that we were chatting about yesterday. think of the cuban missile crisis in slow motion. when the cuban missile crisis over the course of 13 days the us and the soviet union came to a point in which we almost attacked the missiles in cuba and if we had more we would likely have had a general war with russia, the soviet union, maybe a nuclear war. in brief, the soviet union was discovered placing nuclear tipped missiles in cuba in october 1962. president john f. kennedy said this is not going to happen and was prepared to attack missiles in cuba to prevent them being completed in such a way they could attack the american

homeland and engaged in a confrontation he thought had a one in 3 chance of nuclear war. to prevent this happening and we survived. in any case this happened. in the current situation i would say not 13 days for sure but the next 13 months maybe or maybe it will be 26 months but in a year or two, kim jong un will acquire the ability to strike san francisco with a nuclear warhead, that is track one. track 2 is donald trump, who says my train will crash into yours before you reach that point if you continue going down your track. these two trains moving inexorably towards a point of

collusion. most of you here probably know enough but let's get through the thing, secretary perry and i, we went through this exercise the first time. at the defense department if a vote had been taken and i was talking to bill yesterday about this, certainly asked carter, and bill, attack north korea. to prevent north korea and enriching or reprocessing plutonium that would allow it to become a nuclear weapon state. how can you live in a world in which an isolated impoverished nutty state like north korea has nuclear weapons? we shouldn't live in such a world and if we can prevent it we should prevent it. there is great risk in attacking north korea even at that time. our south korean ally would have

a heart attack as the president of south korea said to the president of the united states and maybe it would trigger a response that would cause a lot of damage in south korea. in any case i was in favor of it then and as i look back on it now i believe the secretary of defense's view was right. if we attack them then we would not be where we are now if that provoked the second korean war, i would have said i'm not sure this is a good idea. sometimes you have to make very hard choices. that was a hard choice. i would stick with the view i felt at the time held at the defense department. this same little north korea has an arsenal of 25 nuclear weapons. this same north korea has tested

and deployed short range missiles the cia says can deliver nuclear warheads in south korea. and tested them and deployed them. it is the trainers through four stations. to deliver a warheads against the american homeland. donald trump heard about this the first time in his life when he became president-elect. president obama said there is a crisis brewing here in north korea. i never heard of this in my

life. it is an unbelievable thing if you haven't been studying i get. go to the restaurant and say there's a little country called north korea that has nuclear weapons that might attack san francisco. it is not believable even to me but it is a fact. in any case donald trump left the meeting and within an hour tweeted the not going to happen. this is not going to happen. he said i am telling you maybe bush let this happen or obama let this happen but they let the thing go down the road. i'm not going to allow the usa to be threatened by nuclear weapons from kim jong un and i will do whatever is required to prevent it. at the mara logo summit between xi xinping and trump, trump said

to him you can solve this problem, but if you don't solve this problem, i can solve this problem and if i do you are not going to like it. then he served him chocolate cake for dinner, he excused himself and went in and announced we had lunch 50 cruise missiles against syria. how can we solve this problem? we can solve this problem. can be lunch 50 cruise missiles against north korea to ruin their launchpad? absolutely. the defense department will have no problem doing this and they can do worse than that. if we were to do that, that is step one. step 2, currently, every step 2 is north koreans only use their artillery, north koreans, and they attacks all -- they attack soul. they are kill a lot of people.

if they do that maybe cooler heads say timeout, we should stop, we are on a dangerous road or maybe the americans and south koreans say this crazy guy has killed 1 million people and has capacity to kill more than that. and destroy all the ability, all the missiles he has, now preemptively before he attacks us or south korea, and japan and if we do will we succeed

the gentleman right there in the blue shirt will have the first question my name is george kuhn will have to read the book. i have a metaphor to see what you think. this is based on the assumption that aid to handclapping but it seems to me in the us china case it can only be a one handclapping because, as you mentioned, the culture is so different. i see the us making aggressive move and i don't see china countering so if it is a one handclapping situation. >> good question.

each question can be long this discussion so i apologize if i be telegraphic. if i look at the situation i don't think the chinese are not clapping in the south china sea. i think the chinese believe that the south china sea is as much bear lake as teddy roosevelt bought the caribbean was an american like. we can agree or argue whether this make sense to say that the war on my property and i'm the overseer of it. that is not the way things have been that the chinese are not happy to have the number of violence that used to be in the south china sea and i think this would be a few extra once. they are not happy that the islands divided way they have been. they think the vietnamese have

claimed islands, the lithium dose filipinos who claimed islands and all the islands look like their eyelids. the way that teddy roosevelt said this looks like my river. i don't agree with the proposition that there is no one clapping from the other side split in fairness, of the north korean issue, at this point, you are right. the chinese at this point seem to go along with the idea that the united states and china can work together to deal with. problem. i say this with some authority having a conversation at a high level on the subject of the weekend so, at this point, trumps strategy the mar-a-lago strategy to say to china that this is your problem, you better

deal with it seems to be going quite well. i take the view that of all the things that happened since he became president this has been the so far the most successful. the problem is what if china doesn't deliver in the eyes of the administration. at that point trump will be in a redline situation because at that point he will have to either back down and accept the north korean nuclear program is ongoing or take military action. that is when it gets dangerous and at that point there's no knowing how the chinese will respond. further questions. >> , visiting fellow here and i want to throw something into the equation make it worse. already you might recall this year that the chinese president

was already hailed as the new driver of liberalism at least economic liberalism. certainly what we have seen after the debacle at the nato summit in the response of angela merkel and others you can sense europe saying we better start working with the chinese. the germans are already having a big powwow and at the same time china whether it works or not -- there are indications that it may not be working so well that they're making a major push toward europe with transit and so forth. in the case of eastern europe they've had two separate summits with the countries in the european union but are from your communists.

they are very big players, have a lot of cash and on top of the us chinese rivalry i actually see the behavior towards europe right now is going to distance europe from the united states saying while in the united states is going to be like that that we have to do something to. though it is a worse picture than simply the two parties conflict. >> i agree. you have here that general dynamics. the right power gets bigger and stronger and the third-party action is a very interesting to watch in the case of the peloponnesian war. other parties look to see who is the relatively stronger power and who is writing and falling

and adjust themselves as they're looking after themselves. already, across asia, countries have noticed that china is their dominant trading partner and that china is mean. they are prepared to squeeze them when it feels to their interest. so, lo and behold they have adapted and adjusted and you can see that right across. in fact, if you look at the institutions that people try to build in asia to counterbalance china you can see the weakening because chinese prefer to do one-on-one. in the european case, as one looks at the picture, first what's happening to the economic balance of power. china is today the largest economy in the world measured by the single best yardstick if you had to pick one which is purchasing power. at a long discussion in the book and many people will disagree

but, in any case, cia and imf both believe that purchasing power parenting is the best way to compare economies. by that measure, china -- who is the biggest trading partner with germany? china. who is the main source of capital for most places when looking for new capital? germany. the place that provides loans to start the chinese are developing things, the four of them including aa ivy have four times the capital of the world bank so if you're a country and you're looking for a loan you go to china. excuse me, the loans yes, they use the loans for political purposes. of course. they use loans to provide -- your seems dynamic. this is exacerbated and had been on this weeklong rollout for

this book and this is the middle of the week and someone said have you found any case in which the ruling power then it basically vacates the field in an arena like the climate or an alliance with a bunch of strong parties and you weaken the alliance. i've not been able to find one of those. i think this case may be original in that regard. the idea that china should be the global leader in green is mind blowing. this is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. yes, indeed, they reached an accord and an important record in the recognition of the problem yes, they are investing money in building the green industries but they are the biggest emitter and the idea that china is the champion of liberal trade, again, it's breathtaking as an idea.

china is the most part list economy i think. it's a big economy. how can you manage that? if the contender leaves the field, i'm the only guy left standing. >> is certainly well to the importance of the other players. although it is tempting if you study the cold war that they lapsed into a two player game framework. what the study shows is that the brilliancy is the alliance of relationships with the lesser parts were crucial in developing the players. the exact way your book shows is not just how china and the united states relate to one another but how others respond to that. i think it's already clear that the key american allies specifically on the issue of how the united states will the south koreans.

>> i would predict that the american south korean relationship will become very stressed over the months because the reality of the situation and we almost don't want to say this out loud but lindsey graham went on television and made a speech about it so it's not like it's -- and you can see strategically the situation. tom's proposition is that in order to prevent north korea from being able to do the same san francisco put north korea has already been allowed to do to seoul or tokyo we are prepared to take a course of action that's likely to cause a war in your country. i think president moon is looking at this and thinking, where is the biggest threat to me and how do i feel about it. i think we will actually in the

japanese relationship it'll be interesting to watch i think of the south korean relationship this will become very stressful and we haven't even mentioned russia [we have about five questions but i don't want to be biased against the partial groom so the right to the back. >> other countries. could you put japan and especially india into this picture, please. >> japan and india. >> i'll try to be quick. in the case of japan japan is the third largest economy in the world and they have a defense establishment. if you had a naval war just put the two parties in the east

china sea japan in china today the balance of forces, i would bet on japan. that will continue but over time currently. the mutual defense treaty is a strong treaty. i was a japan is a big player in one of china's problems and one others why it's different than the emergence of the us is that there are strong and powerful other actors in the region but as neil said what this will end up doing is the touchstone is that the relationship will evolve and adapt and adjust in the entitlements the allies could become the reason why one thing leads to the other and the two parties and the four they don't want to be. it's a wildcard, india. i'm probably prejudice about

india from too much influenced. on my book on. [inaudible] with a great chat about the future of india. it's not this book is a previous book where it's a great book because many of the words are his words. this is from my colleague bob blackwell and investor in india and i call him stormy buckle so now it's a fought forethought and many people say india will overtake china. young man, do not use india and china in the same sentence. that's how i said it said this is when he fell off his chair. india is not a real country. he said instead it's a pity for principalities that happen to be united by the british rail line.

i'm not betting on india yet. >> i'll take the upside of that bet. ten years ago it was the tortoise and the hare is in the fable, the two tortoises over to the hair and i think india is fascinating in a number of respects because it's not quite clear how it will play the us china rivalries. this is part of the strategy and idea back in the time of the bush administration is that india could become a really solid ally of the united states in a cause eye containment strategy and that has really worked out. >> if you want to clear a room with indians say the word containment. basically, the indians want to play their hands and the other thing you read a chapter on the

rise of china -- every two years the great financial crisis and this is a fact, every two years the incremental growth in china has been equal to the total gdp of india. to put it in perspective's project that takes a more questions. i'm determined to get gender balance in this discussion so i'm going to go to the lady sitting in the second row. >> i'm a historian in the history department here. my question is i'm interested to know your thoughts on contextualizing longer history of china where we view china is perceiving its original power until its downfall in the mid- 19th century and i wanted your thoughts on this.

>> that is a great question. long before donald trump became famous with the slogan, make america great again, the president of china became question president of china and it was called make china great again. contextualizing it, just as you say, from the chinese perspective from their narrative china was great forever, 5000 years. china was the dominant power in the world, i think, 5000 years but the world only included the area that they could see but still. then there was this 200 years of anomaly in which westerners came and exploited them and paralyze them and invaded them and fought wars with them and dominated them but now that is over. we are getting big and strong again ourselves back to our normal place in our normal place

in the chinese narrative is at the top of the universe. china's sense of order is hierarchal dominance in which china is at the top of the pyramid and everyone else is somewhere lower in the pyramid and the principal injunction in confucian terms is no thai place. thy place is not china's place. china is at the top and everyone is adapted or just to prove that point. if they look and see what is happening and he talks to people who worship him and says were basically restoring we are not rising. they say we are not rising but we are restoring ourselves to where we were before and we would have been otherwise. you had a big gdp because you

had a lot of people. they were all miserably poor until the industrial revolution and until the industrial resolution everyone was misery for people you have a bigger gdp but therefore, so what? they didn't have an industrial revolution they did have technology that they didn't have a market economy so basically now they have imported the march of civilization for the purposes of you state restoring china where it ought to be at the top of the pyramid. >> i like this question because it's fascinating in the way which historical american lives become a part of the way in which strategic questions are framed. it's absolutely true that there is the story which has been reinforced by western story

years that the period from the 1840s to the 1940s is an amazing century and -- the american narrative is the force of the different one and it still fundamentally one in which there is a providential exceptionalism to the united states. i've seen the cold war history. [inaudible] he makes the argument that the americans have this exceptionalism that this ideological component and that's the narrative on the american side and that still very much intact even in a slogan like make america great again. let's get some other questions and. there's a right in the back of the young man. yes, use or. >> thanks very much. my name is leo and the master student. i'm curious to know what your thoughts about whether the

actions of donald trump literally pulling away from the international order makes the prospect of conflict more likely to spark back. >> i think the idea that the ruling power trying to maintain some level of order in which the writing power would adapt and adjust because obviously the rate of adjustment for the types of adjustment depends on the underlying correlation so my strength, if i am the ruling power, can be enhanced by my relationship with other strong powers. by other powers respect for what we're trying to accomplish together. so, that the ruling power retreats from various domains it's not surprising that the

president chinese lavished the spotlight as some people say great leader, you are leading our financial global liberalization and economic and it's fantastic. chinese like being respected as they become more -- in the climate space i would expect will be doing the very same thing. >> can i appeal to those who haven't needed their phones. please, do it. were doing our best to convert our conversation without jingles interrupting us. there's a gentleman in a red shirt. >> i'm isaac and the freshman here. i was wondering if you could talk about -- for the past 70 years we've seen what an american led international order looks like and what would it chinese led international organization look like? >> that is a great question and

it's one worth completing train contemplating. again, i'm a red blooded red next american and i come from north carolina and i can't imagine -- i know that somewhere these are in the bible for the constitution or in some authoritative document it says usa means number one. [laughter] i have no doubts the good guys are. i don't believe in moral equivalence. we are the good guys and other guys i have doubts about. >> it's amazing that you lasted so long at harvard. [laughter] >> i took my shirt off from time to time so people don't quite notice. >> it's a hard question to answer is that the chinese generally do not articulate a vision of what that would look like. on the contrary, the standard line is we have far too

preoccupied with our domestic problems to even think of such questions. there's a quite deliberate avoidance of the scenario that you are alluding to, even as a whole series of question that are clearly designed to expand china's influence or with the one belt one road question can project in foreign countries and graham mentioned the financial innovation that is going on the fascinating thing for me about china's rise is that it continues to be relatively quiet and understated. here's the analogy with germany with because the germans are always assisting that their leadership constantly insist that they are entitled to be a world power. it was the stridency of german

rhetoric that contributed to what paul kennedy called the rise of the inflow german antagonism. the chinese are interesting in this respect. they learn from history. one reason that grandma and i got into this is that we suspected we lived in the united states of amnesia where there is no attempt formally to and filtrate historical knowledge in our senior officials of the us government. kissinger complained about it in the 1960s. when you go to beijing and you talk to senior officials there you will realize that they systematically study history and that the policy is reading assignments. all but your book is the latest one. i'm prepared to bet that it's already been read desperate can you confirm or deny that it's been read. >> i can tell an anecdote. i was in new york last night as part of this rollout is a

high-level financial person had just come back from this one belt, one road that the chinese president held china and it he had got him on the side and said what you think of this new book and he said, it's not published until next week in the us and he said i read my copy last week and it's been tested but i want to ask you about this or that. it's already circulating their, now with copyright. [laughter] >> they may be reading the galleys which have been widely circulated and they may be reading it in english. in some cases this is an amazing illustrious list that you are joining. i first heard of this being read with a standing committee had been asked to read top fields old regime and the revolution.

but it turned out that there was a book at the height of the european financial crisis that they were all reading a short history of europe. this is the list to be on. it's not what mark zuckerberg is reading. let's get a couple more questions in. the lady right in the middle of the middle block there. past the microphone to her. >> thank you. i am interested in talking about war between china and america the timeframe because there is a study by the commission of the us army of rand corporation and it says that the title is sinking to the unthinkable and it seems that since there's a great discrepancy between the military capacity of europe and china so an earlier war, let's say, within the ten years which

is from 2,522,015 that could make america wage the war against china and strike china so hard that it would set back china to another 50 years or so rather than waiting till 2015. can you answer this? the timeframe? there might be less chances of war between china and america. >> very good question. there's an excellent rand study that eyesight in trying to do the military balance between the us and china and there's no question in the us defense department spends more than the next five competitors find. the us has a vested interest in

a big way for a long time and is clearly strongly, superior to china in every domain but if you look at the events, for example, a naval war in the region this becomes a different picture. that's what the rand study points out. basically since the chinese place in the land and the americans have to play from the sea, as well as from the bases in the region including in south korea or japan or guam, if i have to operate my carrier, for example, in the south china sea and all you have to do is build missiles on the land in china, million-dollar missiles can be destroyed billion-dollar carriers. that's not a good game. the chinese are not required to probably symmetrically play asymmetrically. that's a big point about that study. the other point with respect to the thesis here is the thesis is not that because i'm bigger and

stronger than you are in icu rising i think it's a good time to go to war with you. almost none of my cases to someone decide this is a good idea and let's go to war. or that the rising power things i figured strong enough and he'll go to war with you. again, there's a couple cases that's a big exception. most of the cases and most of the recent cases are we are in this structural dynamics that the studies described in third-party action, not our actions, but some other place and up having an impact on this interaction so in the north korean case -- what i believe and agree hundred% with what neil said but if the chinese president could say to kim jong-un, do this and do that would do it he would say it. he's told us.

the relationship between beijing and conjunct and never have the chinese been willing to accept kim jong-un to come and visit. even the premieres, they never gone to visit there. i talked to a chinese colleague recently said how do you talk to this guy? they said we don't go see him. the ambassador said we could talk to the ambassador in beijing and he has some ability to communicate messages but he's is a very stressed relationship. here a third-party could take an action as we were describing before could end up in this cascade. i think the military balance is relevant and i think that vulnerability is more a function of these settlement third-party than it is with whether i'm stronger or weaker. >> a phrase i heard recently

from the chinese officials relating to the original korean war is that china and the united states would drag into war via. i've heard that phrase often enough to think that it's become a certain official status. of course, the reality is that china became involved in the korean war because they were told to do it in when you tell that story this week i gave a lecture that you're entering a very broad terrain to acknowledge that the founder of the people's republic was made a glug by stalin. we have time for one more question. then we need to wrap it up. i'll allow one of our senior faculty members to ask the last question. i got a freshman and i'm pleased that i did that. i'm glad a fresh came.

>> scott from the science department. graham, i was worried when donald trump said this won't happen because it puts you into a redlined commitment chart problem and yet, donald trump is remarkably inconsistent. he could back down on the torture issue is a nato was obsolete and now it is not obsolete. he could say i want to go to kim jong-un to talk to him and so, should we be as worried about redlined -- on one hand it's a person to be vindictive and on the other hand he's inconsistent. >> that's a good assessment. >> it's not a particularly reassuring sentiment. >> i think it's nice to end on an uptick and i think scott's optimism is certainly given the nature of the containment in

which china is demonized as the source of heavy problems the new flip-flop is, i think, verbal. it's clearly one in which there is no set strategy over no notion of continuity in one of the chinese has been involved in the mar-a-lago summit said they were thrilled that they got through it and things turn out as well as they did and that he said we know we are one away. [inaudible] the notion of whether this consistent trust is likely to be continued or not, you might be saying there's a lot of uncertainty. i think it's trying to decipher and i would wish, therefore, okay, there's a very strong

security team so hr mcmasters, matus, tillerson will be a strong sector estate so there's a big team they are serious people and they'll think through the christmases before we take action. at the same time, we have people in palo alto and asked san francisco asked if kim jong-un could launch a nuclear missile and if you asked someone even on the campus of josé, what, no. absolutely not. what risk would you be prepared to take to prevent that? they don't want to take risks but they don't want it to happen. i think it's quite possible that this is a visceral sense that he has that i have to stand for something and i stand for a

great america that is strong and will not allow a little country like that to do this. and if china doesn't help solve the problem then i will. i would not discount the proposition that if the train district john train continues on the track we will see not just a credible threat to attack but will see him attack. we'll see where that leads. if you study the missile cuban missile crisis we look at it in retrospect would you have what a one in three chance nuclear war or would you prevented them from having missiles in cuba mark they already had nuclear missiles in russia that could kill you so they can kill you 20 minutes earlier. that's a big deal -- this makes no sense. the human cuban missile crisis

began to surface and they said what the hell are we doing this and how did we get here? that's why they became inventive at the end. i'm hoping by end on a positive note that if this national security team works their way through this problem and sees my god, they could find herself in a war with china and if that happens it will all go to hell is crazy. will become inventive and if they became inventive the us and china were working together there's more than one solution to this problem. >> with that, i'll give amy the last word. thank you, graham. [applause] >> i speak for everybody when i say, never has it been so enjoyable to talk about so much

doom. destined for war is destined for purchase on the table outside right outside these doors. finally once again in thinking neil and graham. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> here's a look at some of the books being published this week new york police detective ralph freedman reflects on his career as the most decorated detective in the nypd history in a street warrior. former police chief for ferguson missouri explains how the ferguson police force operated in the city after the death of michael brown in placing ferguson: placing america. also being published this week, coordinator of the pacing and social justice project alex

reports on how other nations use alternative policing methods. doctor shamus offers his thoughts on how to approach the sphere of death in the way we die now. bruce henderson recounts how a group of jewish boys escaped to germany and then returned in world war ii to fight hitler in sons and soldiers look for these titles and bookstores this week. watch for many of the authors in the near future on book tv on c-span2. good afternoon, everyone. welcome to the navy memorial. thank you for coming out on a tuesday afternoon. we'll jump right in. we have mr. wright here today wrote in during vietnam. it's an excellent