september with the theme the constitution and you. we're asking students to choose any provision of the u.s. constitution and create a video illustrating why the provisioning is is important. provision is important. >> now, middle east analysts discuss the israeli-palestinian conflict and how the territory of gaza factors into the peace process. hosted by the middle east institute, this is about an hour and 35 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon, everybody. my name is paul salem, i'm the vice president for policy analysis here at the middle east institute, and i'll be the moderator for today's discussion on issues surrounding the

politics, the daily life, the challenges relating to the gaza strip. this event is the latest in mei's george and rhonda salem family foundation series. mr. george salem will be with us soon, i suppose. we are not relatives, although we're both salems, but we're distant cousins, perhaps. this event today is being live streamed from our web site, and i think also c-span3 is covering it as well. it'll also be available later as a video or a podcast from our web site as well. because it's being recorded and just for, you know, general decorum, please put your phones on silent. ..

>> that are available at the front desk where you signed in.

we're looking today at the critical political and humanitarian situation in gaza. a lot going on in and around the gaza issue. tensions between the palestinian authority and in the movement itself shifts in the gulf involving saudi, uae, possibly impacting the situation in gaza. gaza has been under a blockade for almost a decade now. things have recently gotten worse as the palestinian authority also is reducing salary payments and sort of asking that electricity get in, a lot of issues impacting gaza strip very direly in the situation. part of our discussion today is not only to ask how the

international community can help mitigate current suffering, but how do we bring gaza back into regional deliberations into some kind of a political process. and how does one avoid dynamics that some scholars, may be some on the stand are warning could raise the risk of war again after the last war in 2014, which was very, very devastating on the gaza strip, also led to loss of life among israelis. we certainly want to avoid another conflagration of that kind. we're very fortunate and pleased to have a very excellent panel with us today. you have their full bios in the packets you picked up. i'll introduce them before entering into discussion with them. immediately to my right is a fellow currently based in new york. he's with the palestinian

policy network. think tank without borders to educate and foster debate within the frame work of international law. to my extreme left is lara friedman, president of the foundation for middle east peace, well-known, i believe, to many of you, expert on congressional views, u.s. executive branch policy towards israel and palestinian and israeli thinking as well. she previously was with americans for peace now and served with distinction in the middle east as u.s. foreign service officer. to my immediate left is mr. christopher mcgrath. he's the acting director of washington office of united nations relief at work agency which has approximately 12,500 staff in over 300 installations across the gaza strip. education, health, mental health and microcredit. and emergency assistance to palestinian refugees in gaza

and elsewhere. and to my extreme right is mr. natten -- natan sachs. he held fellowships and is writing a book on israeli grand strategy and domestic origin. i will engage our panelists in discussion for a while and questions for you and we'll close promptly at 1:30 today. chris, let me start with you, if you could paint a picture of the current humanitarian and perhaps economic situation on the ground and in gaza and also paint a picture what are the aid flows which are obstructed and which are proceeding and how would you sort of describe the situation since the conflict of 2014.

i know there's been a u.n. report gaza 2020, and amendments to that. start off with a picture how you see things today there. >> i'll be happy to. thank you for hosting this today. and in 2012 released a report gaza 2020 a livable place question mark. let me share a quote. year 2020 population of gaza will increase to around 2.1 million. we're already at that number and it's only 2017. fundamental structure and electricity. water and sanitation, municipal and social services, it's struggling to keep pace with the needs of the growing population. by 2020, electricity provisions will need to double to meet demands. damage to the coastal aquifer will be irreversible and hundreds of expanded schools and health services for an overwhelmingly young population. since 2012 there have been continued dedevelopment in the gaza strip and conflict in

2014. during the 2014 conflict there we had 290,000 civilians sheltering in schools. 86,000 refugee homes were damaged, including 7,000 that were completely destroyed and 5,000 that had major damage to them. and tens of thousands of people still remain displaced from that. in addition, there was severe psychosocial distress particularly on the children. when we reopened the schools virtually 100% of the children suffered some signs of ptsd. as i mentioned, a significantly dedevelopment since 2012, rather than development, going the wrong direction. i've gone to gaza frequently and the last times we've gone there we've seen more donkeys on the streets and going backwards. and perhaps troubling,

unemployment for youth to 25 is 60%. drugs, disposables, electricity as everybody has heard lately. on the current electricity crisis, blackouts are running about 20 to 22 hours a day. that really disrupts people's daily lives and put that in perspective. families in gaza may have electricity for as long as the panel discussion will take place today what we see is families getting up at all hours of the day whenever they have electricity to scramble to get everything done that they need electricity for. the-- more than 90% of the tap water is undrinkable for humans and desalization plants are only 50% capacity. more than 100 million liters of raw and partially treated sewage are pumped into the ocean every day equivalent of 40 olympic size swimming pools per day of raw sewage going into the ocean. as you mentioned there was an update to the report, the u.n.

put out an update a few weeks ago to the 2020 report and again, i want to read one portion of it here. this report underscores that most of the earlier projections for 2020 have deteriorated further and faster than anticipated in 2012. reap gdp per capita decreased and health care service continued to decline and doctors and hospital beds have not been met thanks in large part to the services, gaza maintained high education standard, but class time remains as low as four hours per day. gaza's only water source is expected to be irreversibly depleted by 2020. and those by the 2014 is triggered increased imports to construction materials to gaza however access to material needed to allow the gaza economy, infrastructure, basic services to recover and expand has been highly restricted. so the question that everybody asks is what can be done at

this point and how can that be reversed, this trend. the u.s. has been asking all actors including israel, pa, and international community to invest in sustainable investment. and revitalize the economy and freedom of movement for people and goods both in and out of gaza and just sort of turn to something that robert piper, the u.n. humanitarian coordinator said, the alternative will be a gaza that's more isolated and desperate. threat of renewed devastating increase, and prospects will dwindle and with them the prospects for peace between israel and palestinian. >> thank you very much, chris. ask you a number follow-up questions. the first of all, what is the funding situation, given you're probably the main source there and secondly used to be, maybe

still has been a contributor and so on, are the europeans there in force, talking humanitarian and thirdly, what are the current pathways? there used to be a lot coming from the tunnels, from the sinai, most are largely closed. what is getting through so three questions if i may. >> sure, i'll take them on order. on the funding situation as you know, always has a major funding problem. this year, at this moment we're facing a deficit of 126.5 million dollars on a budget of about 750, 15 million per year so quite substantial. we are working to make that budget deficit up and we also expect the next several years to have similar deficits. we've calculated that we have roughly a 100 million dollar structural deficit that we face every year and that's what we need to overcome now. as you know, the united states

is still the largest contributor representing 22% of overall funding for the agency. in terms of the other donors, we do have quite a bit of support from the gulf countries. we have support from european union and european country. >> to u n.r.a. >> the european is usually number two contributor and european countries whether they're part of that or not given to unra. the imports as you noted, there used to be the economy, and u.n. never engaged in tunnel economy business and none of that was done through the tunnels. from the u-nra. the materials that we need for construction or food items or whatever it may be, we have a very sophisticated system that we work with israel on in order to facilitate that so we don't

generally have that there. and so many things having a secondary use. generally food stuffs are able to come in, but most people are unemployed and can't afford to buy items. exports is the major hindrance near because gaza is traditionally a manufacturing, you know, economy, and they export their goods, furniture, clothing, whenever it may be. vegetables and fruits. without being able to export. the jobs aren't there. without the exports the economy is going to suffer. >> and on the-- you answered as to other donors, but does qatar, turkey, others have aid programs they run themselves or provide to

gaza? >> yes, there are. they are other u.n. agencies operating in gaza. we happen to be the biggest because of the scope of our activities, but eu and qatar and others give to the u.n. and for construction and assistance to the people and support the defacto government there. >> thank you, chris. let me turn to you. help me understand had the complicated politics between hamas and then between the people and hamas itself. walk us through what's going on politically. why is it he's doing the things he is doing? is he shifting? how does this play out politically. >> thank you for hosting this panel. i'll try to go through a

chronological order how things have been happening the past six months or so to try to give some context to where we are today. >> bring your microphone closer. >> can everyone hear me? okay. so a great deal of attention was given to gaza after the electricity crisis that happened about a month ago, but that was the result of a decision that had been taken by president abbas on the west bank and it followed from a number of decisions that president abbas has taken from the beginning of the year. so some of the decisions that president abbas took included things like imports of medical supplies into the gaza strip and cutting the salaries of pa employees, employees of the palestinian authority that are present in the gaza strip rather than the west bank. part of the decision for

president mahmoud abbas with concerns allegedly that the pa has a budget deficit and is attempting to control parents of salaries which forms a big part of the budget. the fact that the policies that president abbas was taken were focused on the gaza strip showed a concerted effort on his part to increase activation off the gaza strip and pressure on the hamas government within gaza. the third step that president abbas took, asked israel to stop or said he would stop making payments for electricity supply that israel gets to the gaza strip. the combination of three steps resulted in a significant escalation of the humanitarian crisis in the gaza strip, the latest of which was the electrici electricity. and why is president abbas doing that at the moment. there are local dynamics and

international dynamics and regional dynamics, unfold are for at least the past four years, but most notably since 2014 and since the war between hamas and israel. immediately, instead of immediate contact in january, was the entry of the new american president in the u.s. president trump has already showed signs of wanting to have policies that would produce the ultimate deal between israel and the palestinians and was positioning himself as someone who could provide that deal. there was also a sense coming from the american administration, coming to us that there would be some regional dynamics that would evolve or change noticeably between america's premier allies, quote, unquote, and islamic extremists and countries that support quote,

unquote, movements. with american-- with an american policy shifting under the trump administration, president abbas most likely took the decision he wanted to position himself as a strong man on the ground, as someone who is able to implement trump's-- the trump administration's agenda, and someone who is able to unify and present a single palestinian voice to the trump administration and someone who is able to take strong policies towards the hamas government in the gaza strip. so all of that probably formed a back drop of president's decision to escalating towards the gaza strip. and that's the context what's happening and from there things started expanding. we see on the ground, there's a significant opportunity for president. at one time the hamas government and the gaza strip

was quite isolated. and we had heard that the economy has been severely impacted meaning there were no taxes on merchandise coming through the tunnels and hamas' relationship with countries such as iran and saudi arabia were on the rocks and in egypt meant that hamas was swept up in the policy of marginizing. and between the gaza strip and egypt were closed. all of these factors together r ulted in a situation where the hamas government was isolated and presented an opportunity for president abbas. on the other hand, there was also an increasing effort by president's rival to come back into the political establishment to do the gaza strip. there were discussions happening between he and powers

within gaza with the backing of uae to position himself as someone who could come back into the political establishment. for the threat of him coming into partner, the possibly an american administration that would be supportive of some policies that president abbas was taking culminated in his decision to increase measures that would isolate hamas and possibly weaken the government to the extent where the pa would be able to come back into the gaza strip and take over control. territory. and of course, what we saw in the gulf crisis with saudi arabia's escalation as-- who was accused of supporting terrorist organizations, that is reflected within some of the dynamics happening in the gaza

strip and part of the challenge now to sort of show that it isn't supporting organizations such as hamas, is only playing in abbas' hands and comes up further weakening. that's the context in in which this happened. of course, it's flawed for several reasons and i can talk about now and they were entirely counterproductive and they have back fired. and the decision on the ground now, hamas is closer and the new alliance forming that's forming a significant threat to the president who has backtracked from some of the policies to reinitiate with hamas. >> and whose backing in the

gambit. uae and egypt has been close to-- previously and so on. what was he counting on in terms of support? >> i think that-- i wouldn't be able to directly say, but i think my reading of the situation and my assessment of the situation, there-- if he was able to present himself as a secular palestinian authority, that is able to take control of the gaza strip and west bank, then he would be able to have the support of countries such as saudi arabia. and even as egypt and u. a d might fall into step if he was able to present a strong hand and demonstrate he's able to take control of the gaza strip. that backfired. what has resulted instead the uae continuing to support a

possible successor to president abbas and egypt coming out more strongly than before in terms of support as a success serment egypt was probably seen as a country that could fall either way and it's now come out very clearly as a country that's supportive of him coming back into power. the thing to understand in president abbas' policies in deciding to further increase gaza's isolation, he bought into the rational which is that you can increase pressure on a population of people in order to weak and political faction or in this case, a running government which is hamas' government in gaza. so that's, apart from that it's

reprehensible because it's using a form of punishment to achieve a goal, it's proven to be flawed. hamas has been weakened, but rather than collapsing or the pa coming back into the gaza strip, we've seen escalations between gaza and israel. if they use that to further weaken hamas, it's a misreading of the situation from the israeli side as well. there's a separation of gaza strip from the west bank and maintaining hamas has a government in gaza that's able to administer without presenting the security. so there's a number of factors here that abbas' calculus has misread. >> on the west bank, maybe a few words how do you think that this played into politics and

different groups tried to take advantage on the palestinian side and maybe a few words about how you see-- i mean, what do they have as far as supporters and hamas and factions and how you see sort of the future there in terms of palestinian politics. >> so in terms of mou how it plays in the events in jerusalem. we would benefit going back to 2014, the days before the latest flareup or the last flareup between gaza and i will. the events that happened in jerusalem escalated the situation on the ground between israel and gaza. hamas was weaked then as it is now and it was open to reconciliation agreement then as president abbas hoped it would be earlier this year and there was tensions that happened in jerusalem with

abduction and murder of three israelis teenagers. the same elements that paved the way in 2014 are present today. hamas gets a lot of legitimacy for positioning itself as a movement obviously that's protecting the area in jerusalem and so it's an organization that would probably be able to play opportunisti opportunistically. and if they had come in and the crisis wasn't immediately averted last month with egyptian fuel shipments coming into the gaza strip that probably would have been the point at which the next war would have escalated. so, i don't think we can separate gaza from what's happening in jerusalem. i think they're connected and a lot of hamas' organization as a

political oranges arrives how it critiques in the west bank and positions itself as the final resistance against israeli aspirations as they see as a takeover jerusalem and the west bank. and that's in connection to the west bank. in terms of hannan, it's a twist of fate because the coordination back to the early 1990's and under his leadership there was a significant amount of oppression that hamas felt in the west bank particularly and also in the gaza strip. now there's an opportunistic alliance. hamas benefits from this, from the uae support and taking on some of the government

responsibilities that hamas has been trying to shed for year, but israel and prevented from shedding. and obviously there's another political entry point into the political establishment. even though his entry point is through gaza, gaza continues to be a critical element of the palestinian establishment. even though we often think of it's all problem that's somehow marginal and separated from the palestinian political establishment, it isn't. for them to hold a foot hold into the gaza strip. in terms of abbas, legitimacy is facing a tough line from a younger establishment and both increasing the authoritarian,

but also completely incapable of getting any keened of concessions from israel. if hannan is able to position himself as someone with political power my guess is he would be able to get support within the west bank as well. having said that, there are likely to be other contenders, none to mind as ones that could be as powerful, but certainly there would be a power dynamic that would have a chance. >> thank you very much. and we turn to you. if you could enlighten us. what are the current discussions and debates about changing developments in gaza, gaza, an area that israel withdrew from and tonight have centers there since then and yet has current relationships. what are the debates whether

it's the palestinian security standoff or the uae role in some kind of dynamic. what's that and the risk of war. >> thank you and thank you to mei for being here, and i'm on the extreme right, i think the extreme right will be disappointed, but i'll try and represent. the current status quo i think we heard from chris earlier, it involves seeing a terrible and it's terrible for the people inside gaza, but for many israelis, the feeling of about a decade at least it's a very good situation. although there may be tactical advantages with hamas, the three wars have been damaging as well and palestinian leaders in charge in the last round were very queen on avoiding it, especially them. maybe less. there's a growing recognition

of the statues-- status quo. on one hand there's a widespread despair to solve what israelis see as the basic problem, a powerful neighbor and goes to war every couple years, has no one gun with the pa and if it were on the mexican-american border, you would have extremely unstable conditions. you'd have a very, very difficult situation and probably war. so the solution from the israeli perspective, i think also from that position would be one palestinian gun, one

palestinian authority, controlling the gaza strip, an end to a renegade state at war with its neighbor. now, we're here by the way, we never assumed that hamas might do this, might say okay, we won't have a separate military or be a renegade state. let's assume that's the constant and what nick else might do. first of all, that's true. hamas is not giving up separate powers no matter the damage to the gaza strip which is morally incomprehensible, but it's a fact. and conquer the gaza strip no matter the cost, better than going to war every couple of years, but usually by far, more level heads prevail. the cost, first of all, the gaza strip would be horrendous and in previous population, the

last war the damage in gaza was far worse than israel, but people were running to the shelters in the middle of the night. however the situation is in gaza -- the other way to try to do it is help the government that's not officially at war with israel and that's pa. and now with a request and request from abbas, the minister of energy, the right wing side we should not acquiesce to this. we should not exacerbate the situation in gaza. in the end the israeli feeling by and large, they're not going to be more pro hamas and they're not going to-- and this is the domestic palestinian issue and palestinians need to solve it. israel finds itself resorting

to the same basic strategy, treeing to pressure hamas. there was a market in the block cade. very right wing, talking about the new surrounding hamas and not to pressure too hard because then you get into a war you don't want like in 2014. and for example, a very impressive organization followed inside the real situation in gaza. there was a market easing of things, very far from lifting blockade and it's gotten worse recently. we've had this debate. but the stance has been still the blockade. an interesting irony, and you ask about the debates in the government. the irony is ones more hopeful

about peaceful solution down the road. and ones who are trying to cooperate with the pa, the others are more hawkish on the strip. and separate palestinian state risks the whole project trying to achieve reconciliation. the ones who have no hopes or desires with solution with abbas are singing a different tune. sally bennett opposed tore every reason, speaking about a dinner position towards the gaza strip. and there's one who sees himself as a successor to netanyahu. building an artifical island off the gaza strip to allow gaza to have an outlet to the world. the irony sometimes the right wing in israel, especially

right now talking about easing the status quote. and they don't see a two-state solution to the plan. the sim-- and do you back this that how hamas would be under the fold and then turn to abbas, you constantly trying to resolve this from the core you're risking war. hamas cares more about its powers than the gaza. see what is it left with? well, it finds itself in a conundrum of the terrible status quo, and it's near the center of population of israel. conditions we've heard are

horrendous. the aquifer is the same under the southern coastal part which is very heavily populated. and the gaza strip, et cetera, et cetera. a terrible catastrophe of the people looming, the strategy, they don't have one. then comes up the possibility, and he worked with them in the '90s. in pt charge of it later and lost him. and some at the top know him well. and he's backed by the egyptians, fighting some of the same enemies and he's backed by uae. and so, in that context, if you think of forgetting about the two state solution and forgetting about abbas and the west bank, and to some it's the

situation. there's a difficult dilemma. on one hand in the long-term, the real solution would be to bring gaza on the west bank fold. i think it's possible. in the short-term what you need to do is try to alleviate this. you have a dilemma that's not simple. in my mind, under consideration, things need to be moved rapidly in the direction, i would point out it's not a simple thing. simply jetsonning that and accepting hamas, we're working under the assumption, do not care about the people of gaza is not an easy choice. it may be one that you have to make, but not an easy one. >> let me ask you follow-up

questions, on the short-term issue why hasn't israel gotten the short-term balance right between hamas. >>. what you future holds we don't know, doesn't have interest in the world except when it's squeezed several times in the past and in some ways hamas, you know, manages some aspects, you know, of islamic jihad groups and others and so plays a little bit of a partner role indirectly, perhaps, in containing for managing a situation. why haven't israel and hamas sort of found a livable balance, you know, called it a long-term truce and seems to be in the interest. short since the long-term goals doesn't seem-- why to the brink. another question on turkey, you

know, that israeli turkish relationships have gone through ups and downs and turkey had some ambition to play a role in gaza. just a few comments about where the relationship stands and does it relate at all? >> the first question, i think, is a good question. and they agreed to despise each other across a more or less quiet border. there have been attempts, it's worth remembering, after hamas after one of the elections way back, there was a one brokered by the europeans if demanding the pa to allow the crossings and things could continue more or less as normal with the-- the problem is that part of that is not stable. hamas doesn't pay for much of what happens in gaza.

ramallah shows that's not a viable solution. >> oughts time there have been a recently, dramatic changes, israel sees them preparing for the next round. we don't see gaza flourishes. worth noting. the early stages of the blockade, it comes after the coup when hamas takes over the gaza strip. they start when pa ramallah was about there. in short of israeli mistrust of hamas functions is profound. israelis are sure that every time they give to hamas they' te

emboldening them. and that's part of the rational. the second is it's not clear that hamas itself speaks with one voice. there have been attempts in the past for long-term cease-fire for the individual and hamas, a variety. but even in 2014 when we saw heavy israeli in the west bank and what happened with the war breaking out. that's the last thing they want wanted politically. they didn't have effective authority over the military wing. third, the regional dynamic is quite important. hamas is the spies that most of the countries in the region and it's not just with egypt with you israel.

and what it sees as a sort of general islamist kind of group. so from the israeli perspective, one, i think especially on the right wing, it's an appealing alternative. why should there be a blockade, it's with the largest arab country and second they don't want to annoy. and not to mention all the other countries in the region with animosity towards hamas. i'll try to be brief, i'm talking too much. turkey and qatar are sort of outliers in the region. with turkey it's complicated. a colleague of will have that. the instigation for the crisis

was the flotilla at gaza. turkey wants to play an active role. has more affinity than others in the region do. and even while politically they were bad, trade relations were good and they were growing. the political thing is off from that. and by and large, what we're seeing is sort of an agreement to continue as normal, to continue in political relations, for political relations and rhetoric-- so in short, the israelis with turkey, there's not much trust. there's certainly no affinity towards one, not in the hes that he hasn't changed the h her-- their posture. so, that sort of continues abated. >> thank you so much. lara, turn to you, your views

on, is there an israeli long-term strategy? natan described that. and coming to washington, this administration, where does gaza, where does it appear on their awareness radar and what is the approach? we know there are attempts at reviving the peace process, but where does gaza figure where this administration and do you see in gaza an opportunity for diplomacy or progress might be more difficult on the west bank. what are your thoughts on that. >> thank you. thanks mei for organizing this. as i was preparing my thoughts for this,s this the first on gaza in washington in a very long time which is actually a very telling fact. gaza is off everybody's screen al we--

especially as we start to discuss are we going to have another war? i'm old enough to remember wars in gaza. everybody in this room probably has been through periods of war in gaza. it's like a car accident and no one acts like they have anything except watch the cars collide or drive into a wall. i think the title of this event says a lot, is gaza reaching a boiling point. a friend of mine said gaza is not a pot of water, it's also not a lawn that agrees underneath to be moed. it's not a person worrying about their weight. and natan referenced gesha. my friend runs and she said, i'm paraphrasing it.

we, meaning all of us, we've turned it into the largest controlled experiment with human beings in history testing what is the behavior and breaking point of two million people as pressure increases over time. and that's a fundamental challenge for all of us in this room and probably good if we think about it sometimes how we resolve is before we get to the point of hey, are we about to have another war. in terms of-- i want to start with something positive, it links to how you open the question, is there israeli strategy. i think that natan covered this brilliantly. when you look at the israeli approach it's contact tal, it's not strategic. nobody has a good idea how to end this in a way. you don't end up with these,

and it's a koorn. we're framing humanitarian conditions in gaza and when you hurt one and vice versa. it's a problematic way to set up the calculus and it's fundamentally wrong. that's where a lot of intervention needs to be changing in calculus, but the other part of it and this is where it's distinct in east jerusalem. israel doesn't have strategic objectives in the gaza the way it is in the west bank. the settlements are gone and settlers have given up. i don't see a great resit recitm tendency. there are pragmatic solutions unable in gaza that are much harder in the west bank, if one were looking for those. at this point though we are talking an entirely tactical

approach and the international community, including the united states has acquiesced to that and in that sense we are all complicit and we all-- enablers in a situation where we can see at any different moment that the situation in gaza and the horror show has many, many authors, let's be clear. overarching responsibility it israel. israel turned off the electricity, which that is a moral choice and there are arguments for why dealing with hamas, all of this fathers responsibility and that that leads to-- there are obligations on all sides. but as we look towards the next gaza war, which for months now, i remember people six months ago saying are we going to have another war in the summer? my goodness if we think there's another war in the summer, why don't we do something to avert

it instead of watching the tea leaves. and they talked about this, you can see how these things evolve. the u.s. deserves enormous credit, i believe, something that chris talked about, for not backing away from the humanitarian side of this. our continued support for un unwra, i don't understand if they understand how much political pressure against in it terms of congress. you have a constituency in congress that says the way to resolve this issue, there's no palestinian refugee issue, they've been gone so long. if the u.n. stops calling them refugees they'll stop calling themselves refugees so it's a very attractive solution if you want to get rid of the issue. it's also total crap.

i don't know any palestinian authority who considers themselves to be a refugee if the u.n. would give them permission. the american people are committed in a way i think is quite laudable. this is not simply a humanitarian crisis and simply bandaging it is not a u.s. policy. it's as much tactical approach as israeli approach and it's getting worse and worse and worse, which where we are today when we talk about when will be the next gaza war. i was thinking about what i would talk about because it's been a long time since anyone asked me to talk about gazament i was there, say, two years ago. i'm going to be the only one who doesn't work for a humanitarian organization.

and i talked to people on the hill about what i saw in gaza and the response i got, wow, that's terrible. until hamas is gone there'sening we can do. which i found very pre-dibltable and very troubling response in terms, yes, here is what children are going through and people are going through, and here is a gaza perpetually on the verge of breaking down and environmental risks for israel. we've put ourselves in this box. for me when i talk about this today and most people know me for the work i do on settlements in jerusalem. i've concluded today that gaza is no longer a separate issue-- no longer part of the overall peace process, it's a permanent issue and needs to be treated as one. it's been isolated and separated so long it's no less of a permanent status issue

than jerusalem or settlements or refugees. it needs as much attention as those and for those of us who for years said, listen, gaza willen resolved in the con next of a sending agreement and wrap it up. i don't believe that anymore. i don't think that anyone can believe this any more and the ez rile rights -- and for people who somehow believes that gaza solves the west bank by alleviating hf this, it's crap. that he have' coined. you do not get a peace agreement on gaza, and you do not get a peace agreement on gaza until you deal with realities that means first and foremost humanitarian, yes. but no longer as an

international community, as the united states, acquiescing to the calculus that's been imposed by the parties, by israel and about hamas. this is bigger than that. and for years they've said we can't have the people more than the parties. i've said i expect the international community wants peace a lot more than the parties and i suspect without help from the international community this ey're not going get past this. and i don't know of any other conflic conflict. conflict. as long as you can't put yourselves together, we can't do anything, this has to be done. whether you're coming at it from a perspective of u.s. national security, or gaza and

sinai and egypt. the concerns about the israel and security and you get to the question allowing gaza to simmer, whatever you want to do, until we get to the next war is morally abhorrent. it's politically nonsensical and from a security standpoint, it's self-defeating. >> thank you, lara. thank you very much. i'll come back to the question i asked you, this administrati administration, what are you seeing? what are the tea leaves on this administration? and what are the tea leaves on other diplomatic channels that may or may not exist that relate to gaza as part of the situation. >> i was asked what is the trump administration thinking on x. anyone who tells you they know

what the trump administration is thinking rit large on x, is lying now. there isn't a single voice. i could say i talked to one person, political or actually, you know, could be someone political or bureaucratic. i have no idea. i can say i think we're continuing our commitment on that's laudable. and this is expenditure of capital this administration deserves credit. and i'll tell you who is not a fan of this administration in general, some credit on this, they're not that much different on gaza than the obama administration. nobody wants to pay attention to gaza. this is a sinkhole for people politically. there are no easy answers available. anything you do is going to piss off israel, fatah and-- >> is that another technical term? >> i'm sorry, you do this for

enough years and you're going to say what you think and we've set it up that gaza has no-- there's no point of entry from a policy basis for gaza. we set that up as soon as we put the rules on hamas, no, you can't deal with hamas until hamas essentially reforms itself and sends all of its people to jail for supporting hamas. it's simply not possible. if the rules of engagement will not engage until the people in charge lock up, leave and say we're sorry and put them in jail you're saying no place to he be gauge. fine, you tried that, you tried it for a lot of years and it didn't work. when i hear discussions on this ill lustrous channel, and what is going to happen with whom, i sat in a conference where they were debating who would wait longer and be in a better

situati situation, that was a decade ago. i was in ramallah and i asked about the electricity issue, they weren't defending it, but they said it's a failed policy. if we were going to do it, it would have been done ten years ago. we've been down this road over and over, there's always a little difference on the margin and now there's a different factor. is the emirates going it turn this enough that the fatah hamas calculations fundamentally change and suddenly one person gets to be in charge ab-- and we could have a new point of entry. as an analyst, i find an extremely impossible someone from the outside world would say you move this this

direction. there's a cost if you don't. i think same day with slightly different effects and same horrific impacts on the ground. >> thank you very much, lara. let me now turn to the audience for questions. there are roving microphones, so i can see. the gentleman in the far back, introduce yourself and ask your question. >> i'm lou, i used to travel to gaza regularly in 2013, 2014 for news reports. my question is about hamas as a terrorist group. the e uchu recently wrote to ke hamas on the terror list and there's no possibility that the united states is going to drop hamas off the list in the near future. so my question is to end the gaza blockade. is there any specific step, is

this a prerequisite at least for the world to recognize hamas is not a terrorist group? we know that things are-- two things are related, but how closely are the two things related. >> thank you. there is a gentleman next to you since the microphone is in the neighborhood. >> i teach at george washington university. how will the serious situation impact the situation, considering you have russian troops, american troops, kurdish troops, and forces loyal to assad. >> thank you. >> over here the gentleman in the second row, two gentlemen in the second row. gentleman in the red shirt first. >> let the panelists take note of the questions and we'll come back to you.

>>...

comments were kind of tilted in that regard because i think that's a huge oversight. with regards to the u.s. role and funding, while you said it was a lot of i also wonder how does that then work out with civilians, foreign aid deals provides israel with. that seems rather counterproductive. lastly, in terms of thinking about us as the humidity in crisis. when not talking about crisis there's a hurricane that with her gaza. we talking about iq managing crisis caused by state violence. so i want to, i'm hoping i can hear from you all as to how we address a humanitarian crisis in that regard. >> start with you and move in that direction. anany of the questions you would

want to respond to. >> unfortunately i can't read my handwriting. i just wrote down. the first of all i want to start in the back. that is a key question, the question of hamas a as a terror group of the people can talk about i think chris can probably address the whole issue of the mechanism for reconstruction and the limits that are put on dealing with gaza because hamas is in charge. hamas is a terror organization because they engage in terrorism. whatever you believe, in terms of israel relationship with hamas and what it should be and the fact israel does deal with hamas, let's not pretend they don't. it's the united states and the international committee that says 000 context. hamas. hamas is supported devastating terrorism inside israel, and i would argue that shooting missiles, shooting rockets unnamed into civilian areas is

definitionally terrorist activity. that is not resistance. that is not self defense. when you're just shooting things up and wondering where they will land and you are aiming them towards populations, that is terrorism. that being said the fact that the west bank, especially causes under control of hamas doesn't mean that the entire population of gaza is now guilty of being terrorists or that it is legitimate or legal or moral to inflict collective punishment. we've been having this discussion since the plc elections in mid-2000, right? hamas won those elections there and swear that i was on the ground as an observer. they won been fair and square. not because they're holding guns to anyone's heads. suddenly the palestinian people deserve whatever they get because hamas which by the way ran as the party of change and reform, correct, yes. change and reform, running

again, not on an islamic terrorism as the anticorruption party. they had their agenda as well. suddenly 2 million people in gaza essentially the political horizon for them is erased because hamas is a terrorist organization and the world will basically throw a little bit here and there, try to keep them from really dying. this is a man-made humanitarian crisis. it's just, i'm not an expert on every conflict in the world. i cannot think of any conflict with the world has essentially said we hate the rumors so we're actually going to abandon the people completely or almost completely in a conflict where we are supporting by the way one size military and security perspective. it doesn't hold up as logic and it doesn't hold up as a national security construct for the u.s.

>> chris, any comments? should the blockade, you know, what impact does it have and also issues, you said there have been development. can you said that more about that and how d.c. potential reconstruction for development? >> i be happy to. in the blockade, it's quite an impressive arrangement that they have. the problem as i mentioned in our early remarks here was it's not that imports that it's finallfunto know the problem. there are challenges and those are being worked through. there are items available for purchase. it's the exports. if you can't afford the product you can't buy them. just an example here, 2 million people in the gaza strip, my organization feeds 1 million people in the gaza strip. that's half of the population. w fp, we only see refugees.

w fp sees about another 250,000, talking 1.25 million people out of a population of 2 million that relies on human food assistance. it's not there's nothing on the shelf. it's also not the movement of goods but it specifically even more important the movement of people. prior to the blockade there were roughly 1000 that worked in israel. if anybody has been to the border crossing, it's evident that was built with a view pathing massive amount of people crossing the border. it's enormous enormously for every time i go there, barely anybody there. part of this is the economy is going to recover, there needs to be this exchange and dismembered of not only goods but people and not only goods going in but goods going out. that's the critical component. in terms of the reconstruction,

we have a part of the rule in the reconstruction of shelters come of housing in gaza. we don't have the full control of that system. the gaza reconstruction mechanism is overseen in part by the u.n. there is a very tight regime i can tell you that. it's very strict on whether mature goes. the region we have is importing concrete and other materials, involves videocameras, watching the materials. we have to certify staff members about where the material is, photos of walls we built with concrete, matching that up with the amount of concrete we've requested. it's a very tight regime. of course those are all done for security reasons for israel. they do want the materials used for construction to be diverted for other uses. also we see while there are infrastructure projects taking place and we do quite a few of them, we have some additional ones that are not necessary directly related to refugees in

gaza. there's a hesitancy for many donors to invest heavily in infrastructure in gaza. who is going to control and who's going to run it comes when operated, who's going to make sure it's sustainable in the long run? what happens if there's of the complex? there is some of this hesitation on behalf of men in the international community to address the underlying infrastructure problem. then you talk about the humanity and issues and part of that is employment, but again is there so jobs and you can't just create jobs. we have the second largest employer in gaza. we represent about 11% of the gdp which is outrageous that a u.n. agency doesn't that. i think until this can be systematically addressed, it's not going to really solve the issue. >> comments on some of the questions? >> i'm glad to try to comment on

the question electively some of things or spoken about on this panel. i think it's really important to -- sorry. i think it's really important here to keep stepping back and understand the broader context in which all of this is happening. defining hamas as a terrorist organization where the support that or you don't support that come in my mind is a red herring. it has created a situation where everything that israel does towards the gaza strip is excuse. it becomes excusable under terrorism or the fight against radical islamic groups or any kind of policy that is seen that the present of fighting terror becomes excusable. so before hamas in gaza being aa terrorist haven there was the plo and it was a haven.

when hamas was a terse organization it was a renegade state and there's all these terms they keep getting used and they keep getting used that appear to justify a policy that is put in place to maintain gaza as a problematic enclave that is separate from the rest of the palestinian case. what that is greater is a situation where we're not talking about conflict resolution. we're not talking about trying to resolve the political drivers of the conflict before talking about conflict management we are saying we're going to keep the gaza strip. we spoke a bit about the tactical issues in the absence of a long-term strategy within israel and the fact that israel had debate internally about whether or not to increase isolation of the gaza strip and suffering through some of the security measures. but all of those are operating within the context of palestinian authority in the

west bank which is committed to security coordination which maintains security in the west bank while having an authority in the gaza strip that is actually anti-concession, has refused to recognize israel,, committed to armed struggle against israel, and possessing that organization then represents the policy in the gaza strip and we can keep all of that, leave it on the site and this way we can manage the palestinian territories without allowing them any form of unity and without addressing the political drivers. what hamas is an organization is. so we can think whatever you want to think about hamas. i personally find many of its policies despicable that doesn't mean that hamas doesn't have legitimate political goals that were called for by the plo before hamas, and that if hamas

were to be defeated now would be called for by some organizations after hamas. rather than fixating on this idea of how to become a zero-sum game between hamas and how do we manage the situation in gaza, how to ensure security, we need to be thinking about what the underlying political drivers that give rise to organizations like hamas are to begin with. and the fact of the matter is israel is an occupying state, and gaza has been an occupation. so when we talk about collective punishment and when you talk about hamas not caring for the people under its role, israel as an occupying force as a responsibility to people under occupation by it. the palestinians in gaza are still occupied by israel, and so this idea of collective punishment is actually in violation of international law to begin with, from the side of israelis regardless of what hamas thinks about the people

under its rule. the one other thing i want to say is we can talk about hamas not caring about people under ritual. we can talk about hamas being aa terrorist organization, hamas being illegitimate. the fact is many people spoke with an gaza despise a monster also despise israel which is the biggest architect of this sort of occupying infrastructure and framework around the gaza strip. but when wars flare up, people support the resistance. and there's a reason for that. it's not because all the people in the gaza strip and all the palestinians are terrorists. they support the resistance because they are legitimate internationally sanctioned rights including the rights of self-determination, the right of return, the poor tenant of the palestinian struggle. so whether those are couched in hamas are couched in lone wolf

attacks, those will always be there. instead of talking about this idea of managing gaza, israel is in a difficult position because it has to do with its internal palestinian struggle, in reality it wouldn't be that situation it is important to end its occupation. and get in line with international law and with american foreign-policy which continues to pull for a two-state solution. so if there's any sort of desire to genuinely in the situation in the gaza strip, the way isn't a focus on hamas and stop the fighting it as a terse organization and regime engage with them at all those things, those would be prerequisite in my opinion, but it would be to do with the palestinian issue writ large as a political problem that still has international law supported by international law that israel continues to circumvent in its so-called fight against terror.

>> thank you, tareq. >> there's a lot to do with but i will cover everything. the question about renegade province, a technical term that's not a question of israel's determination, but a question for the p.a. to decide. a province that is a renegade province would be one that is ruled by rebellious military and that would entail very dramatic if the people to declare, it would detail very dramatic sanctions against gaza. sorry, for things in the gaza strip something that is not been done. they have not declared it to be province in rebellion. wwe're seeing a change in that. i think there's a more important sort of undertone. renegade province are calling hamas terrorist or position, i think we're missing the point. there are two main people in a very difficult, terrible

situation. there's also, there are also people neighboring that are much better situation but also by themselves in the shoulder. the question is who you might more, we should hate israel more than hamas are hamas more. that's beside the point. [inaudible] >> thank you. [inaudible] >> i apologize. so whether or not someone hates israel more or hates hamas more, that's really beside the point. the question is what the parties can do, and it's important remember a few things. first is the stronger party, as you mention israel is deathly the stronger party, and has a moral responsible for a lot of things that happen, but it's a terrible mistake, to think that houston had no agency at all. decisions hamas makes versus the ones that p.a. makes have no

effect on things. life in the last decade has been very bad in the west bank. it's been like yours better than the gaza strip. and the same evil and quotation pick something that the decisions has been different and had a real effect on the lives of millions of people. so we can argue who's to blame and who's not by think really we should focus on important thing which is a dramatic crisis of people, and so the stork quibbles about who' who was responsible for what, there's also agencies to party. the question of the terrorist organization, whether it's a definition, whether you define it as we're not. maybe relevan develop as whethee terrorism but that should not be relevant i think to whether one deals with the reality that hamas is there, has a lot of power, should be dealt with, should be spoken to care that because he would like to come i don't but because it's a reality. we speak to me regimes, many organizations that we hate with

good reason but we still deal with them in reality. i would say about the blockade, there's a lot of words that are thrown around. people sometimes say they are the seeds of gaza. would mean you're trying to star the population into submission. that doesn't exist because they're sending a lot of food, allowing things happen. there's clearly a blockade. the israelis defined as a blockade and legally after the incident, gained of legal recognition of fighting a stateless fighting, blockade is one of the things you do in war. the u.s. has done in cuba. many countries have done with many others. the problem is that we have this no man's land of ten years of partial blockade by israel and egypt against the gaza strip with no clear resolution. israel is not intending to conquer the gaza strip. it's not going to simply let hamas to whatever it wants and

attack issue. even if it's much, much weaker, no country, the u.s., denmark, anyone would allow a neighbor to attack it even if it's much, much weaker. if tijuana broke from mexico and started shelling san diego the u.s. would do something about it. now, should it do a tenure blockade? i think that. thanks need to be just dramatically but it's not because there is a palestinian agency whatsoever nor is it it's a stronger power. try to end quickly. i hope i have angered people both sides enough. security cooperation i think is a crucial question in the west bank. i don't know. it depends but i think this is crucial question and especially when a look at what's happening in the gaza strip and when you think that what happened can lead to the constant quickly. we're entering a very dangerous. not only with cosmo with the west bank and these are closely tied to one another a possible of transition of authority of

any that's a good cooperation and what might happen is crucial. i very much of the cooperation continues. it is normalization. it is operating with israel and i think that's a good thing. i think it is allowed the west bank to be vastly better although it is not where it should be, which it should be an independent state alongside israel. >> we had send them -- seven minutes left. i will take it to questions. microphone, please. >> role in, representing the national council on youth and relations and call state analytics. in regard to the crisis, what would an elongation of that mean for gaza? are there any quantifiable impacts we can expect if it lasts for months or years? >> thank you. the gentleman in the front here.

>> welcome to the middle east institute i was born in tehran. i've represent global bridges for humanity, and our goal is usurer tong, not your gun -- use your tongue. the problem of what is going on in palestine did not exist 100 years ago. i am sure 100 years from now it will not exist either. >> quick question because we don't have -- >> the question is amiss. this. for 60 years of negotiation, we have got nothing. when is more powerful partner,, the occupiers out palestinian land going to realize that this cannot go forever? either they have to live together or they're going to die alone. >> thank you. >> thank you for doing this.

i have a question, after i talked to a rabbi, he said the reason israeli attacks a process out on because of hamas, also for the holy promises, israel wants to achieve. and whenever gods and palestine get attacked by israel, obviously blames hamas. so do we really think israel will stop its attacks and occupational mindset in hamas if hamas decides to -- >> thank you. we have one minute for a panelists and then you can ambush them in the hallways afterwards. natan. >> the question of occupation of

israeli occupation of the gaza strip, and when will it finally understand that. it's worth unpacking the firmament. israeli troops are not in the gaza strip and the board is partially closed. that is purple to normal between two countries, right? aborted between many countries is close. the main difference is c-axis and access. that's basically the core of all were talking about, israeli occupation in the gaza strip. so i would be very, very cautious on using that word because israelis time and time again is a gaza and israel is explained the full argument. it's completely obvious. [inaudible] >> i understand that we have very few minutes. you can discuss it later. [inaudible] >> natan. >> i said the occupation boiled down to that. that's what i said. maybe there are invisible

subsets i don't know of but there are, assume there are none i know of it boils down to effective control of the territory that's what these organizations talk about which is the air and the secret it's not the border with egypt. it boils down to effective control which is what they see and the epic this is what it boils down to. it's a dangerous to use this rhetoric of israel is responsible actually everything because it weakens the possibility of convincing israelis that if occupation ever into something with change. in israel you might they pull out of the gaza strip and resulted for worse for palestinians and also for israel. and, therefore, we need to be i think very, very careful about this. when will israelis change the mind? it's around august 1993 when you decide to engage the plo, except the idea of id already accepted and then 2000 and later accept a two-state solution. has this happened?

no. as israel done everything they should? actually not. that's not forget that our two parties. six different prime ministers, et cetera. we arguing about who is right and who's wrong, it was evil, is occupied or not. i think that is not the question. we needed asking ourselves have actual situation of real people is improved. i'll stop there. time is short. >> i'll be quite quick. i think this is where probably natan and i disagree. it's not just about making the lives of the inhabitants that the big it's not giving them political rights and full equality. so in the west bank the lives of people could be better but there also committed to security coronation. you are also unable to live and maintain life that is devoid of occupation and is ready control

into your everyday life, including checkpoint, including whether or not you're able to have roads. this idea that life is better than everything is okay is fundamentally inaccurate. and then the fact that the person, what happened in the accord, it was a rupture of this idea when life is better, people will stop demanding political rights. people continue demand political rights. that's not happening in the west bank and not happening in the gaza strip are in terms of the idea of occupation, the plaintiff lechery shows why the concert of his occupied. it's not only the sea and the air tickets also the fact if you have cancer in the gaza strip you cannot get released because they do not allow you to leave. people who are born and raised in the gaza strip would have to register within israel to be allowed to get some form of identity at some point. so israel is the body is able to

get the body and another way which that is occupied. i think i'm going to end with this final comment about when will those, when will the situation change. i am not shying away from criticizing the palestinian leadership. the fact that the palestinian struggle has devolved into some sort of factional zero-sum game between them. but ultimately until the average israeli starts seemed impact of the occupation on their life and unable to go to tel aviv or go to jerusalem without saying that they are fundamentally electing a supporting governments that are maintaining the occupation, until the shift happens within israel, then the occupation is actually quite sustainable. we have been saying for the past

50 years since 67 but also since 48 the situation is not sustainable, it's very sustainable. and tell us starts changing, things are going to change on the ground. >> i will yield back one minute. >> all right. >> so i want to close by going back to what i said before, which is i think gaza has to be woven back into the discussion of resolving israeli policy encompassed as a whole. we're talking about whether or not when, not even whether, when will be the next war in gaza to a week ago were talked about whether or not jerusalem is going to completely explode and were going to see it across the west bank. we've had a low level quasi-many antibody which is bubbled up the past three years around jerusalem. when we talk about global terrorism, that's not from gaza. that's in the west bank and is happening in east jerusalem. this comes down, and i agree with a lot of what both of my

colleagues said, even when the disagree with each other, the immediate challenge would look at gaza is clearly humanitarian. you would have to be a sociopath to look at gaza and not feel not just terrible the substance of human responsibility for trying to make things better. but the reality is you can band-aid it all you want. what's absent overwhelmingly, the overwhelming absence or is a political ricin and that's after not just in gaza. it's more obvious it's absent in gaza but it's long been absent in the west bank and for east jerusalem as well. and again i'm old enough to remember the logic after hamas took over gaza which is the community was shut out hamas and people see how bad life is in gaza while we let life flourish in the west bank. and i've watched the past ten years as life in the west bank

is basically seen the political horizon for ending occupation despair, settlements constantly expanding, areas being depopulated. let's be honest here, that wasn't even a real, if that it worked, if weeds in gaza turned into this difficult place in the west bank turn into hong kong, you could it's a all right, this is maybe a winning strategy, people will see turning away from abbas has benefits. but abbas has no credibility. spend some time there. get outside of there and talk to people and don't go to the town, is not an example of what's happening in the west bank. the area in the south have hills and in the valley is a much better example of what's happening in the west bank where you were seeing huge areas of what should be a future palestinian state if anyone a a series about a two-state solution being effectively depopulated. in the valley is happening essential i was talking with

someone, you don't need very many settlers extranet outpost our pen pins with strings and uf the pins and strings backed by the idea to take over massive areas and yet the israeli government passing laws which suspend the rule of law to allow this to continue. fundamentally, you asked what about the religious site even if moscow's way, even if we have a viable peace plan, what about the religious side? some of my best friends in israel were on the left are deeply committed. if you talk, doesn't matter, we all know these people who come out at the position of real love of the land. let's not forget the cradle of judaism. the idea of giving up control is very painful if you are religious at all. even if you're not religious should understand why there's a connection for the jewish people. but when i talk to my friends and they say i drink of the day when i can come back and be welcomed not as an occupier as a person with a legitimate right

and legitimate history here, that's what they are fighting for. i think that strand of religious commitment to a land does not demand perpetual occupation. at the end of the day though humanitarian obviously, the political horizon across the board, that is what we always get back to here and after every war that's what we will be so missing until somebody resurrects it for the israelis and palestinians alike. >> thank you, lara. [applause] >> it's been a excellent and sobering panel. i want to thank you all for coming. and before thanking the panel, if you could stay seated place for a moment before we finish. i wanted to again take the family foundation for its support and our board member for his continued to support. please join me in thanking this excellent panel. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> tonight on "the communicators" w we're at the black hat cover since in las vegas with jeff moulton, executive director of the stevenson national center for security research and training at louisiana state university. >> hospitals are being attacked almost daily. the federal government, the market space, the banks are getting whacked almost daily. we're not going to eliminate this threat. we've got to learn to live with it. we have lived for malindi and with the flu virus. they never eradicated the flu virus. we learn to live with it. you do certain things when you know you are exposed and the flu is going around, you get a shot, isolate yourself from other

folks that have with the flu. there's hygienic measures you take in the physical world that are not u.s. in the digital world. >> watch "the communicators" tonight at eight eastern on c-span2. >> now a discussion on south korea's military defense with a retired lieutenant general and a south korean army. posted by johns hopkins school of advanced international studies, this is one hour and 20 minutes. >> hello, everybody. if you could please turn your cell phone off, it would be really appreciated. good evening. i hope you enjoyed the food. i would like to thank all of you for coming here to attend tonight event only half of the trance of go