mention for the documentary on marijuana. a number of students won an honorable mentions and the national debt and terrorism and also receive being honorable mentions on their documentary on global warming. . >> mulally east analyst

discussed the israeli-palestinian conflict how of gaza strip interest in the peace process it is one hour 35 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> afternoon in the vice president for policy research and i am a the moderator for today's discussion with the politics of daily life this is the latest of the family foundation in serious lecture series we are not

relatives although we are perhaps distant cousins at this even to you can find it on our web sites and even c-span is covering it as well and it will be available later on the web site the because it is recorded please put your phones on silent but we do encourage tweeting we hope you will connect regularly with us on twitter and facebook we have a lot of articles in graphics and tools for understanding the region and the also just published a new book which

looks at ways to get from where we are today to and alternative future. looked at it on our website it is available on amazon as an old-fashioned book or the e-book here in the contemporary space we are rebuilding there the original building across the corner at with a rapidly growing institution if you are able to contribute we have pledge cards available where you signed in. we're looking at the critical humanitarian situation in a round the cause of strip with the palestinian authority with

that movement itself with the shift in the gulf and possibly impacting the situation in gaza it has been under a blockade for almost a decade now and got worse as the palestinian authority is also refusing payments and asking that those issues confront that dire situation part of the discussion today is how they can mitigate the current suffering but also the it regional and international deliberation and how does one of the oil those even

after that last war in in 2014 was very devastating than so we serve the one to avoid another conflict so we are very fortunate to have a panel with us today there full biography is before you buy will introduce them briefly. immediately to my right is a policy fellow and as a palestinian network of a think tank without borders to foster public debate on palestinian human-rights and the framework within international law and then the president of the foundation and the expert on

of the views with the israeli thinking as well m previously with the americans been serving with distinction in the valley east but to my immediate left is the acting director of the washington office of the united nations in office agency that has approximately 12200500 staff in those affiliations across mental-health in the beef and the emergency assistance and to the extreme right to tell her of the brookings institution and then started in georgetown then stanford then indonesia now currently

writing a book for the his domestic origin. nl we will have time for questions at the end that we will close promptly at 1:30 p.m. today. if you could paint a picture of the current humanitarian and economic situation on the ground with gaza and paid a picture of what is obstructed and proceeding and how we describe the situation. i know there has ben day un report and amendments to that. >> as you mentioned there was a report called gaza

2020 that was five years ago so i will share a brief course asian the population increase from 2.1 million. >> purity at that number is only 2017 so much of this infrastructure municipal and social services struggling to keep pace with their own population by 2020 the electrician needs will be to double damage to the offer is a reversible and health services will be for a young population there has been continued development in the gaza strip through 2014 during that conflict we had 290,000 civilians sheltering and 86,000 refugee homes to image including 7,000 destroyed and thousands

still remain displaced. there were some savvier social recycle - - second distress. nearly one-third experienced some type of ptsd d. so rather than development i can tell you the last few times we see a lot more jockey cards are on the street so people are going backwards. offical unemployment is 32 points and four men and 60 percent for women but unemployment for the youth is the of personnel from electricity so just on the current electricity crisis blackouts are running about 22 hours per day than really

disrupts their daily life and to put that into perspective they could have electricity for as long as this panel discussion takes place so then they scrambled to get everything done that they can sell more than 90 percent of the tap water is not drinkable implants are functioning in only 15% of capacity in more than 100 million liters of sewage is pumped into the ocean every single day. the equivalent of 40 olympics size swimming pools going into the ocean. so the u.n. put out an updated a few weeks ago and i want to read one portion this underscores that these projections have deteriorated further. . .

average daily class times students is four hours a day. causes only water source is nervous about depleted by 2020 and reconstruction triggered increased imports of construction material to gaza. however, access to materials needed to allow the gaza economy and its services to recover has been restricted. the question that everyone asks is what can be done at this point how can that be reversed. the un has been asking all actors including israel and the international community to invest in the sustainable development initiative which hasn't been done as needed. treated by lies the economy and

will support need to improve the freedom of movement for people both in and out of gaza. something that robert piper said is the alternative would be a gaza that is more isolated and more desperate, more devastating escalation will increase and the prospect for inter- palestinian directly insulation will end. >> thank you. will ask you a number of follow-up questions. first of all, what is your current situation given that you're probably the main source of their? secondly, qatar used to be and maybe that is changing has been a contributor and so on and are that europeans i'm talking humanitarian. thirdly, what are the current passageways.

put on. >> sure. i'll take them in order. the funding situation i always have a funding issue and this year at this very moment we are facing a deficit of $126.5 million on a budget of about 750 million a year. it's quite substantial. we are working to make it budget deficit out and we also expect the next several years and we calculated that we have roughly a $100 million structural deficit that we face every year and that's we need to overcome. as you know the united states contributes about 22% of the overall funding for the agency. in terms of the other donors we do have quite a bit of support from the countries and european union and the european union

itself is the number two contributor and the european countries whether part of the genre not to give about 25% and the rest of the world the additional 25%. to answer your third question here the imports, as you know there used to be -- most of those have been close. one of the procurement done through the tunnels. have a very active and coordinated role with the israeli governments. the materials that we need to bring in for construction or food items or whatever may be may have a sophisticated system that we work with israel on in order to develop that. for the average person there is a dual use with many things that could be considered secondary use generally foodstuff are able to come in the biggest problem

is to buy the items that come in export, again, is a major hindrance because gaza is traditionally a manufacturing economy and they export their goods. without being able to export those goods jobs are there and traditional markets have been israel and they got a drink. >> you mentioned other donors but do other programs have aids that they run themselves or they provide directly to gaza outside of una agencies? >> yeah, it's not just you and are a but the eu and qatar give both to other ngos that operate their work's and some also

support the fact the government is there. >> help us under stand the current complicated policy. [inaudible] walk us through what is going on politically -- why he has been doing the things that he is now been doing and is the shifting and how does this play out? >> thank you can, paul. thank you for hosting this panel. i will try to go through a chronological order over the past six months or so as we try to give context to where we are today. can everyone hear me? a great attention was given to

gaza about a month ago that was the result of a decision that had been taken by the president and the west bank and it followed a number of decisions from the beginning of the year. some decisions included things like restricting medical supplies in the gaza strip and cutting all of the salaries of pa employees, palestinian authorities that are present and living within the gaza street rather than the west bank. the decision. [inaudible] allegedly it was said that the pas had the budget deficit and it's something to control as payment of employee salaries which is a big part of the pa budget. the fact that the politics were

taking focused on the gaza strip showed that there was a concerted effort on his part to increase activation and to increase pressure on the government within gaza. [inaudible] he said he would stop making payments for electricity on the gaza strip and the combination of these three resulted in a significant escalation of the humanitarian crisis on the gaza strip. i want to answer the why. why is he doing that at the moment. there's a number of factors. local dynamics and international dynamics that have been unfolding for the past four years but most noted in 2014 hamas and israel. immediately context, itinerary,

was the new american president and president trump had already showed wanting to have policies that would produce the ultimate deal between israel and the palestinians and was positioning himself as someone who could provide that deal. there was also the trump administration coming into office that would involve or change and america's semi alleys quote unquote and islamic extremists quote islamic extremist with american policy shifting under the trump administration the president most likely to get as he wanted to position himself in a strong man on the ground it would be

able to implement the trump administration agenda on the ground and someone who's able to unify the palestinians. and someone who's able to take strong policy to the hamas government in the gaza strip. that forms the backdrop of his decision in generate to escalating the gaza strip. that's the international context. from there things started to expand. if the on the ground there was a significant for the president of the gaza strip over the past few years there was economy severely no taxes on the relationship with iran and saudi arabia and the emergence of the class was

policies of marginalizing. [inaudible] this meant the border to the gaza strip and egypt wasn't -- all of these factors together resulted in a situation where the hamas government was isolated. this presented opportunity for president abbas. on the other hand, there was also an increasing effort by president abbas rival to come back into the political establishment through the gaza strip. discussions are happening between powers within gaza the backing of the eua in egypt to position himself as someone who could come back into the political establishment. the threat of the hamas weakness

and the possibility the idea of an american initiation that would be supportive of some of the policies that president abbas was taking all culminated in his decision to increase measures that would isolate hamas and possibly weaken the government to expand so that they could come back into the gaza strip and take over control of the territory. what we saw in the gulf crisis with escalation as a country supporting a terrorist organization that is reflected within some of the dynamics that are happening in the gaza strip. the challenge for qatar now is to show that it is in supporting organizations such as hamas but playing into president abbas hands and further weakening it. of course, it was a flawed

decision for several reasons and we can talk about now. it actually resulted in counterproductive and they have backfired. the situation we see on the ground now is one where hamas is much closer and there's a new alliance that is forming that is presenting a significant threat to president abbas. he now has backtracked on some of his policies to reinitiate some form of reconciliation. >> let me interject a question here. [inaudible] what was he counting on in terms of support?

>> i wouldn't be able to directly say but my reading of the situation in my assessment is that there was a capitalist need by president abbas that he was able to present himself as a secular palestinian authority able to take control of the gaza strip and the west bank that he would be able to enhance the support of countries like saudi arabia. even egypt and the uae might fall into that if he was able to present a strong hand and demonstrate that he could take control of the gaza strip. that has backfired. what has resulted instead was the uae continuing to support the successor to president abbas in egypt coming out more strongly than it ever has before in terms of support. egypt was probably seen as a country that could fall either way and it's now come out as a

country that is supportive of him coming back to power. it's important to understand that president abbas policies in deciding to further increase gaza's isolation that he bought into the rationale of the which is that you can increase pressure on a population of too many people in order to weaken a political fraction or in this case a running government. apart from the fact that it's morally reprehensible because it's collective punishment to to achieve a political goal it had also proven to be flawed. hamas hasn't weekend but rather than collapse or the coming back into that gaza strip will we have seen are several escalation

of force gaza and israel. actually the reading of hamas' desire to further weaken hamas is a misreading of the situation which is that it benefited from the separation of the gaza strip from the west bank and maintaining hamas' government in gaza that administers the territories without presenting the security. there's a number of factors here that president abbas has misread back let me ask you a bit also to think about the policies on the west bank. maybe a few words about how you think the latest troubles on temple mount in that area played the politics and how the groups take advantage of the palestinian side and maybe a few words about how you see what he has inside the west bank and reporters and so on and affections and how you see the

future there in terms of palestinian equality. >> in terms of the first question. i think we would all benefit going back to a in the days just for the flareup or the less flareup gaza and israel. the events that happened in jerusalem accentuated the relationship between the ground and it has weaken them now. it was open to an agreement then and president abbas hoped it would be earlier this year and there was tension that has been in jerusalem with the murder of the three israeli teenagers. the same recipe is an element that paved the way for escalation 14 are very much present today. hamas gets a lot of legitimacy

from presenting itself in the middle of the movement and the temple mount area in jerusalem. it is an organization that would publicly be able to play opportunistically and take advantage of the situation that's happening in jerusalem now. if the crisis wasn't immediate, as i said last month, with shipments coming into the gaza strip that would probably have the been. [inaudible] i don't think we can separate from what's happening in jerusalem. it is connected. it rises from how it treats the pa in the gaza and west bank. [inaudible] terms of the, it's an ironic

twist of fate that the two are an organization bitter enemies because this goes back to the early 1990s under his leadership there was a significant amount of repression that losses members of the west bank particularly but also in the gaza strip. patient opportunity reliant and hamas benefits from the funding from the uae support him from taking on some of the responsibilities that hamas has been trying to shed for years. israel primarily but also prevented because right now it's contained in the gaza strip is still there. there is that front and they benefit also by getting a political entry point into the

political establishment. even though his entry point is the gaza, gaza is a critical element of the palestinian political astonishment even though we often think of it as its own problem that somehow marginal and separated from the political establishment. for them to gain a strong foothold in the gaza strip is a way to get back into the palestinian authority within the west bank. terms of hamas, is extremely facing the. [inaudible] if they are able to position itself in the gaza strip someone who has political power my guess is that he would be able to get political support within the west bank as well.

having said that there are other contenders and none that his eye here in mind that could be as powerful but certainly there would be a power dynamic that he would have a good chance thank you. the major to you. enlighten us a bit about the current israeli discussions and debates about changing developments in gaza and area that israel withdrew from that has sensors there. has a currently troubling relationship. what is the current debate is whether palestinian authority for the situation and the jewish role of the uae in egypt dynamic. what is the thinking there and the risk of war. >> it's a pleasure to be here. thank you.

i'm on the extreme right and don't think the action right will be disappointed. the current status quo as we heard from chris, earlier, and we've all seen as terrible. terrible for the people in gaza but for many israelis the feeling is that it's a very bad situation. although they may hamas the three wars with gaza are very damaging and the israeli politicians and leaders, eluding those who are in charge in the last round, were very keen on avoiding it. in israel there is a growing recognition status quo, long-standing recognition goes back. with israel the question is always what is the alternative. we see the debate inside israel and how to deal with this in one hand there is a desire,

widespread desire, to solve the basic problem which is a state neighboring israel that is at war with a vastly more powerful neighbor and goes to war every couple of years, has no one gone with the va, it is therefore wherever it would be, whether mexican-american border or anywhere you would have extremely unstable situation. bucky might be different but you would necessarily have a very, very difficult situation and probably war. the solution from the israeli perspective would be one palestinian, one palestinian authority and hamas controlling the gaza strip and an end to renegade at war with its neighbors. no one in israel or here, by the way, was loading we never assume that hamas actually might do this. they might say okay, we won't have a separate military and

won't be renegades and we can assume that that is a constant but the question is what everyone else might do. hamas is not going to give up separate power no matter what the damage is to the gaza strip which is morally reprehensible but is a fact. the question arises what to do. sometimes you hear calls will matter the cost is better to go to war than going to war every couple years but by far the more level heads prevail and the gaza strip would be horrendous than the one in previous rounds for the israeli population in the last war and damage in gaza was far worse than israel but they were running for shelters in the middle of the night and regardless of how it is in gaza is not a situation that politically viable.

then there is this desire even now with the written cross, demand, electricity support there was a debate in the right-wing government in israel about the minister of energy, rightly, that we should not exacerbate the situation in gaza even if does this but in the end the israeli feeling by a large that they won't be pro- hamas that. [inaudible] is in that there is a domestic policy issue. in short, the result is that than israel finds itself partly by choice reverting to the same basic strategy. as it thousand 14, there was a market loosening the blockade part of the lesson that was pointed out. i was talking about exactly the new hamas and the not to

pressure too hard because then you get any work you do not want in 2014. you can date it from the stock for example there was a market evening of the on exports that were allowed of the products is still very far from the lifting of the blockade and part of it has gotten worse recently. we've had this debate in israel but i enlarge the debate is still the blockade. the interesting irony is the ones who are more hopeful that piece from the ones who are more prone to try to help the pa cooperate, they are the ones who are often more hawkish than the gaza strip because they take a

stand that we need to be with the va that separate palestinian state risks the whole project we are trying to achieve reconciliation. the ones who have no hope or desire for a solution are seeing a different tune. thalia bennett who is openly opposed for every reason speaking about the different positions for the gaza strip. our mission. [inaudible] he has his greatest plan of building an artificial island off the gaza strip to allow gaza to have an outlet to the world. the irony is that the right wing in israel talking about using and accepting the status quo because hamas is not a risk to their plans that they don't do the simple reality right now is that in this loop of do you try to get out of status quo which

leads you back to this hope of somehow hamas will be brought under the fold which doesn't happen, of course, and then you turn in constantly in trying to push farther into resolving the problem from the core you are risking war. every time you are sure, there is the risk of war because hamas cares more about his power. >> what are we left with. it's right near the population ofisrael and the conditions are redness in their bed for israel. the water uses the same water that comes up the coast and the aquifer is the same aquifer under the southern part of israel which is very heavily populated in the gaza strip et cetera et cetera. terrible catastrophe of 2 million people living is terrible for israel. solution, they don't have with. said.

the possibility of the plan. he worked with them in the '90s was in charge of security in the '90s and then in the gaza strip for later. , the israelis know personally know him very well, his back by the egyptians and the egyptians biting some of the same enemies is back in uae. in that context, if you think of forgetting about the two state solution forgetting about hamas of the space this looks like a good situation. let me conclude by saying this very difficult dilemma here. i don't think it's sensible. on one hand and the long-term, the resolution would be to bring gaza under the west bank hold and perhaps it is possible that the party should do all they can to make it happen. in the short-term, but you

really need to do is try to alleviate the terrible situation in the gaza strip and avoid a much more terrible recurrence of the war. you have a long term and short term dilemma here which is not simple. things need to be moved rapidly but i would point out that it's not a simple thing. the jettisoning and accepting hamas which we are all working under the assumptions of that care about the people of gaza is not an easy choice. it might be a choice you need to make but it is not easy. >> i'll ask you a follow-up question. on the short-term issue why hasn't israel gotten the short term balance right between hamas in gaza for now we don't know what the future holds that doesn't necessarily have an interest in wanting a war except

when it's really squeezed as it has been several times in the past. and in some ways, manages some aspects of jihad groups and plays a partner role in directing perhaps containing or managing the situation. why hasn't israel and hamas found a livable balance from call it a long-term truce, that would seem to be in the interest of both individuals and out of the lungs. achievable but why is it that it's gone to the brink so many times in the war? another question i wanted to ask is a question on turkey. he is really turkey relations gone through ups and downs in turkey has always had an efficient to play some role in gaza is just a few charisma where that relationship stands and does it relate. >> the first question is a good question.

i think why haven't they reached some notice of any where they agreed to have a quiet border. is part they have been some attempts that is worth remembering that after hamas was elected we back there was a motorist broken by the europeans that allowed things to continue more or less as normal pa, presidential guard facilitating. the problem was is that it wasn't safe. part of the answer is why hasn't israel and hamas because ramallah is in the mix. thomas doesn't pay for what happened in gaza. secondly, every time there has been blockade and in recent years very dramatic changes israel intelligence you see hamas. the next round. gaza is not flirting, it is

worth noting. even in the early stages of blockade it after the two when hamas takes over the gaza strip. the early stages start earlier before the disengagement and they start when pa ramallah was in charge and it started with the kidnapping capture of israeli soldier from israeli territory inside gaza. in short, the israelis mistrust hamas is found. why can't they find a common ground for sure because anytime they get something to hamas the fold in history must be the next round. i think they probably still do a lot more than they are doing but that is part. the second is that it's not really clear that hamas itself speaks with one voice. there have been times in the past for a long cease-fire hamas with different even into the

supporting we saw a very heavy israeli hand in the space with the war breaking out and we saw both parties really in the war blessing they wanted politically political didn't want it either. didn't have effective authority over their military wing. even then created, ground was difficult. the regional dynamic is important. hamas is spying and remember hamas as a border with egypt. egypt is, of course, first priority is the war against what it sees as it general islamic group and from the israeli perspective one, on the right wing, it's an appealing alternative and an egyptian problem and let them solve it.

why should there be any blocka blockade. with the flow through egypt's border. secondly, because they don't want to annoy. [inaudible] confessions to hamas is a top priority is not something israelis would do. not to mention all the other countries in the region. i'll try to be brief, i am talking too much. turkey are the outliers in the region and with turkey, the relations are, get it. we have my colleague just that the israeli targets relations have come back to normalcy, of course, the instigation for the big crisis was gaza and turkey still wants to play an active role and has a lot more affinity towards hamas than many of the other regimes in the region. relations between israel and turkey were bad trade relationships were good and they

are growing and on the little thing is off the map. jerusalem things but by and large, we are seeing an agreement to continue as normal and continue political relations was still rhetoric that is quite from one. in short, the israelis with no affinity toward president aired on or that he will change his culture or that the economic and israel and turkey will benefit israel is turkey, as well. thank you. lara. return to you. your views on is there an israeli long-term strategy that is not described elements and what's your view of that coming to washington does this administration where does gaza appear on their awareness radar

and what is the approach at attempting to revive the peace process. the, in gaza, an opportunity for diplomacy or progress where it might be more difficult. >> thank you. thank you for organizing this. as i was preparing my thoughts for this event it occurred to me that this is the first event i can recall on gaza in washington in a very long time which is actually a very telling fact. gaza is off everyone's screen until we start having more discussion about are we about to have another war which is striking. i'm old enough to remember a lot of wars in gaza. everyone in this room probably been through. awards in gaza. each time there is a car

accident in slow motion and everyone acts as if no one has an agency to do anything but watch these cars collide for these cars drive into a wall. i think the title of this event says a lot. is gaza reaching a boiling point? gaza is not a pot of water. it's also not a bond that grows up and needs to be mowed. it's also not a person who is worrying about their weight sold their caloric intake is the question. thanh referenced in my friend tonya talks with me beforehand and i am for everything but returned gaza, meaning all of us by the way, we've turned it into the largest controlled experiments with human beings history testing what is the behavior and breaking points of 2 million people as pressure increases over time.

that is a fundamental challenge for all of us in this room and it would be good if we think about it as we resolve it before we say we are about to have another war. i want to start with something that is positive and links to how you open the question which is is there is a really strategy. the time cover this brilliantly but when you look at the israeli approach it is tactical and partly because no one has a good idea about how to end this in a way where you don't potentially end up with a situation that is worse than israel's border which is an absolute legitimate concern because right now we are still framing development and humanitarian concerns in gaza and security as zero-sum bargain which is very problematic way of setting up this calculus and i think it's fundamentally wrong. that is something where the intervention needs to be

changing that calculus but the other part of it and this is where it's distinct from the west bank is jerusalem is that israel doesn't have the strategic objectives in the gaza strip the way it does in the west bank. settlements are gone and the settlers have given up. i don't see a great citizen tendency. there is in the wrestling with we have to keep this much space for settlers and what percentage and there's none of that. that offers, i would say, a ray of hope that there are pragmatic solutions that you can work on that are available but that are much harder in the west bank if one were looking for those. at this point we're talking entirely tactical approach in the international community united states has acquiesced to that. in that sense, we are all set. we are all enablers in a situation where we can see at any given moment the situation in gaza and the horror show in

gaza has many many authors. let me clear. overarching authority is israel and i agree with him that israel has a completed set of issues to balance but israel turned off the electricity. which that is a moral choice. there are arguments for why dealing with all of this and everyone bears responsibility and that leads to other obligations on all sides as we look towards the next gaza war which for months now i remember are we going to have another war in the summer but if we think there's another war in the summer why wouldn't we try to revert it rather than watching seeing things in jerusalem pop up. you can see how these things evolve. the us deserves enormous credit

for something first talked about for not backing away from the humanitarian side of this our continued support which is something we deserve credit but i'm not sure everyone understands how large it is and i don't know if they understand how much political pressure there is against it in terms of congress. you have a constituency and target untrained congress and the jewish committee which is the way to solve this is the refugee issue. there is no palestinian refugee that they been gone so long to their homes is to get rid of unrest. if the un stopped calling them refugees still stop calling them refugees. it's a very attractive solution if you want to give a permanent status issue. it's also total crap. i don't know any palestinian who says they're refugee because the us give them permission. that is the constant pressure for more than a decade. the aid has continued, the american people are committed in a way which is laudable but this

is not the humanitarian crisis and complete bandaging it is not a us policy is much as a tactical approach as an israeli approach and it's getting worse and worse and worse which is where we are today talking about when will be the next war. i was thinking about what i would want to talk about and it's been a long time since anyone asked me to talk about gaza and were in this box when we talk about gaza. i was there two years ago and i visited the facilities and one of the only people who i know doesn't work for a humanitarian organization that doesn't go to gaza. it was a very sobering experience. coming back i talk to people and i went to talk to people on the hill about what i learned in gaza and until hamas is gone there is nothing we can do. i found this very predictable and very troubling response in

terms of here's what security of a gaza that is perpetually on the verge of breaking down and here's the environmental risk for israel and it doesn't matter until hamas is going to put ourselves in the box. for me, when i talk about this today, and most people know me for the work i do on settlements in jerusalem i've completed today that gaza is no longer a separate issue and no longer part of the peace process in its often need to be treated as one. it is an isolated and separated for so long that it's no less of a permanent status issue than in jerusalem or settlements or refugees and it needs as much attention as those and for those who for years has said listen, gaza will be resolved in the context of a conflict ending agreement and that will wrap it

up and i don't believe that anymore. there is no solution without gaza. he is really right that gives up on the two state solution and it doesn't surprise me that were hearing more pragmatic talk. for people who believe that gaza solves the west bank by alleviating the demographic pressure on israel i will say that is crap. it's a technical political term i've. it is crap. you don't get the palestinians gaza and you don't get a piece on gaza until you start dealing with the reality and that means first and foremost humanitarian realities but it also means no longer an international community ask we have seen to the calculus that has been imposed by the parties by hamas and this is bigger and for years people have said we can't i said for a very long time that i have

said the international committee wants peace and all of them at any given moment and i stress without the pressure and help that they will get past their objection to dealing with each other. i don't actually know any regional conflict in the world where people have said bosnia, rwanda, we can't have peace more than the parties. the humanitarian side says it's awful what happens but as long as we can't these entities are together we can do anything. whether you're coming at it from the perspective of a new ash security perspective or gaza sinai and isis or whether your the national security or whatever it is you still get to the same question which is allowing gaza to simmer longer and until we get to the next war

is morally important, it is politically nonsensical and from a security standpoint it is self-defeating. >> thank you lara. thank you very much. i will come back to the question i asked you. what are you seeing with this administration? and what are the tea leaves on other diplomatic channels that may or may not exist that relate to gaza or as part of the prototype? >> i said to someone recently what they asked the trump administration is thinking and i said anyone who tells me what they know the trump administration is thinking on ask is lying to you. i used to say they're lying to themselves but now there to spot a lie. no one knows and there isn't a single voice. i could say i talked to this one person, political or actually bureaucratic and i would say i have no idea.

i can say that we are continuing our commitment on the communitarian side and that is laudable. that is an expenditure of capital for which the emigration deserves credit. as not a great fan of the administration issues but i will give them some credit on this they're not that much different, on gaza than the obama administration. no one wants to pay attention to gaza. this is a sinkhole people politically. there are no easy answers available and anything you do is going to the soft israel, the congress and by the way,. >> please -- >> you do this for enough years and you say what you think. sorry. we just set it up that gaza is no point of entry. that the hamas is essentially

reformed itself a sense of people to jail for supporting hamas. it's not possible. if the rules of engagement where we will not engage until the people in charge locked up believe is a we put themselves in jail there's no place to engage. okay fine. you try that. you tried it for a lot of years and it didn't work. when i hear discussion on this illustrious panel about the calculations people are making about what is going to begin whom -- i hearken back to a decade ago sitting in a conference in beirut where hamas was debating who was going to wait longer and who would be in a better position when the other guy was weaker. that was a decade ago. we had this game plan for a decade. i asked someone about the electricity issue and they weren't defending it to someone on the inside but they said

basically is a failed policy. if we were going to do this, we should have done it ten years ago. now it is a failed policy. maybe but at this point we been died this road over and over. there's always a little difference on the margin and now this is the different factor. will the emirates turn this enough that the hamas calculations fundamentally change and suddenly one person gets to be in charge we have a new point of entry? i guess we can hope for it. as an analyst, i find it extremely improbable that outside some serious intervention from the outside world saying you will move this direction and there is a benefit to you if you do and there's a cost to you if you don't. i think it's the same more different day with slightly more different effects in the same impact on the ground. >> let me now turn to the audience for questions there are roping microphones and raise your hand so i can see.

the gentleman in the far back. introduce yourself and ask your question, please. >> my name is. [inaudible] i used to travel to gaza regularly in 2013 and 2014 for news reports. my question is about hamas as a terrorist group. the eu has recently ruled to keep hamas on the terror list and there is no possibility that the united states is going to put hamas off the list in the future. my question is to end the gaza blockade is there any specific step like his is a prerequisite to at least for the world to recognize that hamas is not a terrorist group and we know that things but that the two things are related. how close are the two things related?

>> thank you. there is a gentleman. >> i teach at george washington university. how well is the situation impacted the palestinian issue considering that you have russian groups, american troops, turkish troops and the forces lawyer to assad. >> thank you. >> advisor. my question is when it comes to the security corporation and security forces, of course, we know hamas is benefited for a while but how safe and secure is the security corporation if

there more crisis like the one we had will hamas be able to continue? >> thank you for gentleman on the second row, as well. >> there is no blockade. i think it is a myth. [inaudible] we have 1000 trucks every day and is real only looks at the military stuff in the very small stuff. they want to. [inaudible] if tomorrow, oprah will open the borders of egypt that the situation will not change. the blockade is not true. >> thank you.

lady in the third row. >> my name is on and i'm from the justice coalition. the definition of a renegade state is referred to as hamas and i'm wondering what exactly that definition is because when we think of israel, a country that continually violates international law, destroys infrastructure of gaza, kill civilians et cetera, i think we have to think about what the construction is of renegade state. secondly, i'm a little surprised in this panel that it seems like we're talking about how palestine and israel as if they are equal parties in the conflict. it's clearly the case, opposite, that israel has the power to mitigate the conditions that palestinians are facing. i'm curious as to why the comments were tilted in that regard because i think that's a huge oversight. with regard to the us role in

funding efforts while you said it's laudable i wonder how it then works out with billions of dollars of military foreign aid that your sprites israel with that seems counterproductive. lastly, in terms of thinking about gaza in the humanitarian crisis were not talking about there's a hurricane that was her gaza were talking about a humanitarian crisis caused by state violence. i'm hoping that i can hear from you all as to how we address humanitarian crisis in that regard. >> thank you. let's go to our panel. choose any of the questions you want to respond to. >> unfortunately, i can't read my handwriting. the questions that i just wrote down. first of all, i want to start in the back because as a key question question of hamas as a terrorist group and other people

can talk about, chris can address the whole issue of the mechanisms for reconstruction and the limits that are put on dealing with gaza because hamas is in charge but hamas is a terror organization because they engage in terrorism. whatever you believe, in terms of israel relationship with hamas, and what it should be the fact that israel does deal with hamas in gaza, let's not pretend that they don't. it's a zero context. hamas has supported devastating terrorism inside israel and i would argue that shooting missiles, shooting rockets on aimed into civilian areas gives definition terrorist activity. that is not resistance, that is not substance. when you are just shooting things up and wondering where they will land and you're aiming them toward populated areas,

that is terrorism. that being said, the fact that the west bank that gaza is under the control of hamas doesn't mean that the entire population of gaza is now guilty of being terrorist or that it is legitimate or legal or moral to inflict collective punishment. we been having this discussion since the elections in mid- 2000 right? hamas won the elections there and swear. i was on the ground and they won the election fair and square not because they were holding guns to their head. so the palestinian, hamas iran as the party of change and reform. they were running against, not running on islamic terrorist but as the anticorruption party. obviously, they had another agenda, as well. suddenly they say 2 million people in gaza essentially a political rosin is erased because hamas is a terrorist

organization and the world will basically throw a little bit here are there and try them but hamas said this is a man-made humanitarian crisis. i'm not an expert on every conflict in the world. i cannot think of any conflict for the world has essentially said we hate the rulers were actually going to abandon the people completely or almost completely. in the conflict where we are actively supporting, by the way. one-sided military and security perspective. it doesn't hold up as logic and it doesn't hold up as a national security contract for the us. >> thank you, lara. chris, any comments? the issue of the blockade, what impact does it have and he said there's been development can you say more about that mark and how do you see potential

reconstruction? >> i'd be happy to. on the blockade i've been there and it's quite an impressive arrangement that they have their. problem, as i mentioned, in our earlier remarks here was it's not the imports that is fundamentally the problem. there are challenges and those are being worked through but there are items available for purchase but it's the experts and economy. as i said, if you can't afford the products, you can't buy them. an example here is 2 million people in the gaza strip and my organization seeks one feeds and wf p we only feed refugees but wf pcs about another 250,000 were talking about 1.2 million people that relies on un food assistant. it's not that there's nothing on the shelf.

it's also not the movement of goods but specifically even more important the movement of people. prior to the blockade there were roughly 100,000 palestinians who worked in israel. if anyone has been to the arabs crossing is evidence that those massive massive amounts of people crossing the border and an enormous place. every time i go there barely anyone there. as hard as it is, if the economy will recover there needs to be an exchange and movement of not only goods but people but goods going out and in. that's a critical component. in terms of reconstruction, we have a part of the role in the shelters of housing. we don't have the full control of that system and the gaza reconstruction is overseen in part by the un and there's a

tight regime, i can tell you that. the arrangement we have with importing in materials involves video cameras, watching materials, staff members about where the material is, photos of matching that up with the amount of concrete so it's a very tight regime and those are all done for security reasons.

it's the underlying infrastructure problem. then you talk about humanitarian issues and part of that is employment, but again, there's no jobs and you can't just create jobs. we have the second largest employer in gaza and represent about 11% of gdp which is outrageous. i think until those can be systematically addressed, it's not going to really solve the issue. >> thank you. >> comments on questions. >> yes, i'm going to comment on a question that were talking about on this panel, give me a number of thoughts. i think it's really important. [inaudible] i think it's important to keep understanding the broader

context in which all of this is happening. fighting a terrorist organization, whether you support that are don't support that is direct because it has created a situation where. [inaudible] it becomes excusable under the fight of terrorism or the fight against radical islamic groups or any kind of policy that aims to fighting terror becomes excusable. before hamas and gaza, there was a. [inaudible] when hamas was a terrorist organization they were renegade states. they're here to justify a positive foot in space to

maintain gaza as a problematic enclave separate from the rest. what that has created is a situation where were not actually talking about conflict resolution. were not talking about trying to resolve political conflict, were talking about conflict management. were saying were going to keep the gaza strip. we spoke a bit about the tactical issues and the long-term strategy within israel and the fact that israel is determining whether to increase the gaza strip and some of the security measures. all of those are operating within the context of working to have palestinian authority in the west bank which is committed to security and maintain security in the west bank, while having an authority in the gaza strip that is actually. [inaudible]

there committed to arms struggle against israel and suggesting that organization represents 2 million palestinians in the gaza strip. we can keep all of that on the side and this way we can manage the palestinian territories without allowing them unity. [inaudible] we can think whatever we want to think about hamas. i think many of the policies are despicable, but that doesn't mean that hamas doesn't have legitimate political goals that were called for and that if hamas were to be defeated now would be called for by some organizations. rather than fixating on this idea of how do we manage the situation in gaza.

we need to be thinking about what the underlying political driver is that drives the organizations like hamas. the matter is gaza is still under occupation. israel has a responsibility to people on their occupation. the palestinians in gaza are still occupied by israel. this idea of collective punishment is in violation of international law to begin with. regardless of what hamas thanks about the people under israel. the root one other thing i want to say is we can talk about hamas not caring about the people under this rule and to them being a terrorist organization. the fact of the matter is many

people i spoke with, they despise hamas and israel. it's the architect of occupying infrastructure. when wars flare up, people support the resistance. there's a reason for that. it's not because all the people on the gaza strip. they support the resistance because there are legitimate rights including the rights to self-determination. whether those. [inaudible] those will always be there. instead of talking about this idea of managing gaza, they're in a difficult position because they've had to deal with it, in reality there was a situation.

[inaudible] get in line with international law as with american foreign-policy and their continuous call for a two state solution. if there's any desire to genuinely and the situation on the gaza strip, the way isn't to focus on hamas and keep defining it as a terrorist organization, but it would be to deal with the palestinian issue as a political problem that still has international law or demands that are supported by international law that his job continues in its so-called fight against terror. >> thank you. >> there's a lot to deal with but i won't cover everything. the first is about renegade province. the technical term. it's not a question of israel's determination but a country or province is usually

one that's ruled by rebellious military and that would entail very dramatic, if they were to declare it reggae, it would entail. dramatic sanctions. that's something they have not done. in part. [inaudible] we are seeing this change now. i think there's a more important undertone. i think we are missing the point. there are 2 million people in a very difficult terrible situation. there's also in gaza and israel. so the question of who you hate more, that's kind of

beside the point. whether or not someone hates israel more or hates hamas more, that's beside the point. the question is what the parties can do and it's important to remember a few things. first, the stronger party also has a moral responsibility, but it's a terrible mistake. the decision that they make have no effect. the last decade it's been very bad in the west bank. it's been lightly years better than before. the same evil israel is dealing with they've affected

the lives of millions of people. we can argue about who's to blame but i think we should focus on important thing which is a dramatic crisis of people. evidence of that is the question of the terrorist organization. whether it's a definition of do you define it this way or not, i think relevant use of terrorism, but that should not be relevant to the reality that hamas is there and has a lot of power and should be dealt with. not because anyone likes it, i don't, but because it's reality. they speak to many regimes and organizations that behave but we still deal with them in reality. i would say about the blockade, there's a lot of words that are thrown around.

there's clearly a blockade. citing, blockade is one of the things you do in war. the problem is we have this no man's land of ten years of partial blockade against the gaza strip with no clear resolution. it's not intending to remove hamas and attack israel because even if it's much weaker, no country, the u.s., denmark, anyone will allow a neighbor to attack it even if it's much weaker. tijuana broke from mexico, they would see the u.s. start

doing something about it. should they do a tenure blockade? i think not. i think things need to be changed, nor is it that israel is a stronger power. i'll try to end quickly. i think this is a crucial question and especially when we look at what's happening the possibility of transition and authority is crucial. [inaudible]

>> thank you. we have seven minutes left. i will take two questions. gentlemen. >> i represent the national council. in regard to the guitar crisis, what would an elongation of that event mean for gaza. are there any quantifiable impacts we can expect to fit last for months or years. >> thank you. the german in front. >> i was born in tehran.

use your tongue not your gun. the problem of what is going on in palestine did not exist hundred years ago and i am sure. >> quick question. >> question is this. for 60 years of negotiation, we have got nothing. it is a more powerful partner that occupies our palestinian land and we realize it cannot go for ever. either they have to live together or they're going to die alone. >> thank you. the gentleman over here. >> thank you. [inaudible] >> after i talked to one of the rabbi, he said the reason

the israeli attacks on palestine is not only because of hamas but also because of the holy promises that israel wants to achieve in palestine. >> whenever gaza and palestine get attacked by israel, they obviously blame hamas could do you really think israel will stop at the tax and its mindset in hamas if hamas. [inaudible] >> thank you. we have one minute each and then you can ambush them in the hallways "after words". >> okay. the question of occupation of the gaza strip and when. [inaudible] israel. [inaudible]

the border is partly closed but that is perfectly normal between two countries. the main difference is the sea access in the air access. that's basically the core of all we are talking about. i would be very cautious on using that word because israelis, time and time again if you say gaza or israel. [inaudible] >> i understand. we have very few minutes. you can discuss later. >> i said the occupation boils down to that. okay. maybe there are invisible settlers that i don't know of but it boils down to the effective control over the territory. that's what these organizations talk about which is the air and the sea. is not the border with egypt. there's no military troops that boils down to the

effective control which is the sea in the air. this is what wells down too. it is dangerous to use this rhetoric for absolutely everything because it weakens the possibility that if occupation every ended something with change. in is is really mind they hold down the strip. we need to be very careful about this. when will is really change their mind, around august 1993 when they engage the plo and accept the idea, in 2000 and later. has israel done everything it should, absolutely not. but let's not forget there's been the two parties that have broken down. i just want to point out what's happening is were arguing about who's right and who's wrong.

again, i think that's not the question. we need to ask ourselves how the actual situation of real people. [inaudible] >> since time is short i will be quite frank. i think this is where we probably disagree. it's about giving them political rights and equality. in the west bank the lives of people could be better, but they're also committed to security. you're also unable to live and maintain a semblance of life that is devoid of occupation and devoid of israeli control including whether or not they're able, this idea of life is better and everything is okay is fundamentally inaccurate. the fact of what happened in

87, it was a rupture of this idea that when life is better, people stop demanding political rights. that's not happening in the west bank and it's definitely not happening in the gaza strip. in terms of the idea of occupation that shows why the gaza strip is occupied, it's not only the sea in the air, it's also the fact that you're not able to get chemotherapy. to my mind that the form of occupation. people who are born would have to register within israel to have some form of identity at some point. they maintain a population registry. think i'm going to end with this final comment about when will the situation change. i'm in no way shying away from

the leadership. i think the talk in the beginning was about just that and that it has evolved into some game between hamas, but ultimately, until the average israeli starts seeing the impact of the occupation on their life and are able to go to their coffee shop in tel aviv without seeing that they are fundamentally electing a government that is maintaining the occupation, until that shift happens within israel, then the occupation is quite sustainable. we been saying for the past 50 or 60 years that the situation is not sustainable but it's actually very sustainable. until the cost start changing for israel. >> thank you. i yield back my time.

>> i want to close by going back to what i said before which is that gaza has to be woven back into the discussion of resolving the conflict as a whole. we are talking right now about whether or not, not even when but whether the be a foreign gaza. week ago we were talking about whether this would completely explode. we've had a low-level quasi- that just bubbled up around jerusalem. when we talk about lone wolf terrorism, that's not from gaza, that's from the west bank and it's happening in east jerusalem. this comes down, and i agree with a lot of what both of my colleagues said even though they disagree with each other. the immediate challenge when we look at gaza is clearly humanitarian. you have to be a sociopath to look at gaza and not feel some sort of human responsibility

to try to make things better. the reality is, you can mandate it all you want. the overwhelming absence is a political horizon and that's absent not just in gaza. there's really nothing, but it's long been absenc absent. i'm old enough to remember the logic after hamas took over gaza which is the international community is going to shut them out and people will see how bad life is in gaza while we let life flourish in the west bank. i've watched the past ten years as life in the west bank has basically seen the political horizon disappear, settlements constantly expanding in areas being depopulated. let's be honest. if that had worked, if we had seen gaza turn into this

difficult place, you could've said okay, this is maybe a winning strategy. people will see turning away from hamas has benefits, but a boss has no credibility in the west bank. spend some time. get outside and talk to people. don't go there. that's not a example of what's happening in the west bank. the shimon valley is a much better example of what's happening in the west bank where you are seeing huge areas of which should be a palestinian state being effectively depopulated. you don't need very many settlers if you can have outposts that are like pins with string and use the pins ends drink back by the idea to take over massive areas. you have the israeli government passing laws which extend the rule of law to

allow this to continue. fundamentally, you asked what about the religious side even if it hamas goes away and we have a viable peace plan. some of my best friends in israel who are on the left are deeply committed. they come out of a position of real love of the land. let's not forget that the cradle is judaism. the idea of giving up control of that area, you should understand why there's a connection of the jewish people to this area. when i talked my friends and they say i'd dream of the day when i can come back to this area and be welcomed not as an occupier but a person with a legitimate right and history here, that's what they're fighting for. i think that strand of religious understanding does not demand occupation. at the end of the day, the political horizon across the

board is what we always get back to you. after every war, that will still be missing until someone resurrects it. >> thank you. [applause] >> it's been a very excellent and sobering panel. i want to thank you all for coming. if you could please stay seated for a moment before we finished. i'd like to thank the family foundation for their support and the board members for their continued support. please join me in thanking this excellent panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations]