foundation in washington, dc for a forum on u.s.-taiwan relations. the event should be getting underway shortly. live coverage on c-span2. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] s. >> good afternoon. welcome to the heritage foundation, and our sayre are alice son oddem you're, we're pleased to welcome those on our heritage [organ.org web site, ae

ask you to check that the various mobile devices have been silenced or turned off as we prepare to begin. for everyone inhouse there will be a slight shift in the program agenda. our keynote will now follow our first panel, but it will also occur before the break that is scheduled before the second panel. so, opening our discussion today will be dr. lee edwards, distinguished fellow and conservative thought here at the heritage foundation. please join me in welcoming dr. edwards. [applause] >> good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. and welcome to the heritage foundation. we thank you so much for coming out today. august is something of a slow month in washington, dc, and we're so pleased that we could attract some of this town's limited attention to the matter of u.s.-taiwan relations.

and i extend a warm welcome to our speakers, panelists, and of course, to you, members of the audience. particularly want to offer my appreciation to the taiwan benevolent association of america, and the institutes for taiwan-american relations for partnering with us on today's program. this is only the most recent in our series of similar events which we have done with tbaa over the years. i know they've always been quite fruitful and i expect today's conversation to be no less so. if i may i'd like to say on a personal note that i first visited taiwan in 1969. and there have been a few changes since then. there was no metro when i first visit thread all of those days ago. and i've had the privilege of meeting and interviewing three

taiwan presidents, including the honorable lee dong way. i'm among those americans who never forget the significant contributions of the republic of china during world war ii and then the cold war. you know, it is indeed a very interesting time in u.s.-taiwan relations. first, the governments. we have new ones. president when took office last year and her party took control of the legislature. on the u.s. side, president trump took office just this past january. and the presidential inaugurations in each of our countries represented a transfer in power between political parties. whichever party we support, in both our countries, whether --

now, transfer of power is not something that happens on the other side of the straits. there the institutional framework is quite different, tied up in chinese communist party. the faces may change but the party never loses. which brings me to the other rather interesting thing going on in u.s.-taiwan relations, that is china's behavior since madam tsai's election. clearly beijing is intent on teaching the taiwanese a lesson in who it chooses for leaders. adoubleed down, squeezing taiwan's international space, objecting to its participation in international organizations,

siphoning away the diplomatic allies, and pressuring it economically. it's doing all this in the cause of getting madam tsai to accept a position on one china that is the antithesis of what she and her party stand for. well, here at heritage, we're not blue or green. but, but we do believe that whatever the relationship between taiwan and china, it must have the express support of the taiwanese people, and at this point in history, they have elected madam tsai and the tpp and the views they represent on this question. maybe future elects will change this. who knows. but until then, the position of

our own new government should be to support taiwan in the face of the coercion it faces from beijing. how do we do that? well, i'll have to worry about coming up with the answers. we assembled a fine group of experts who explore precisely this question and we look forward to a lively discussion. thank you all very much. >> thank you very much. i ask the panelists to join me up here on stage.

>> each of the speaks will have 12 minutes to provide they're perspectives on the cross-straits relations and the united states. we'll. >> in order. so, we'll begin with patrick cronin, senior director of the asia security pacific at the center for new american security. that will be followed by professor dun of the national university in tie one and the director of the global tie one institute and then professor scott kazer in. university of maryland. >> a grate pleasure to be back at the heritage foundation which has been a repository for u.s.-taiwan relations for decade as we just heard from our soaping peeker eloquently.

it was decades ago i learned about taiwan from dean chang as a young, very bright young man who still a very bright young man but a little older. and doing great work. the moderator, i'm the speaker so i have to say something about u.s.-taiwan relation in the trump administration and the new administration. was at the white house yesterday can tell you the administration is starting to come together but still lagging behind expectations and hopes for appointments of key people but these are coming shortly and very good people in the wings ready to go in that will be familiar to people who watch the u.s.-taiwan relations them basic point about the trumps a mrs.s taiwan policies the status quo is the current means but not an end. i mean that the cross-strait relationship is often cast in

academia, and also in the media as subject to potential major revision, and that this revision should be made in the form of some kind of fancyiful grand bargain with china or a small bargain, maybe a bad transactional deal so you can pawn off taiwan for the south china sea or korea. it's not how the trump administration views the taiwan policy in my view. so, i think for the trump administration, they've been essentially testing and probing a bit from even before the inauguration, as you know, with tweets and telephone calls, to find out whether there could be a fairer bargain, better bargain in this kind of negotiation over what is the status quo, and here if i can just back up and try to understand the thinking at the heart of the white house right now.

it is -- it's not that the rules-based system is wrong. it's just that it's run its course for what it can do for the u.s.-national interests and for u.s. allies and partners, and now other powers and especially big, growing powers like china, have learned to game that system and those rules. they've done the same things in terms of the cross-strait bargain in three communiques and the six assurances. as a result a desire to figure out can we regain a bitter deal for tie one so it -- taiwan so it can have to the voice it should have over future and the security to know it's not going to be threatened with invasion or force and having to submit and succumb to coercion. this is about a negotiation that's going on here on the cross-strait bargain so the early trial balloons from the trump administration can be seen as good or pad and can be

portrayed as grand bargains in making but i think it's much more about testing out what is more to come from a eventual policy focused on a new ena freer and more prosperous taiwan and taiwanese people. that's the objective. how to do that? you have to be bound by the constraints of history and by previous administrations and that's that the administration is starting with, starting with the cross-strait status woe in effect and secretary of state tillerson's re-affirmation not postthe taiwan relations act and the one-china policy and the three communiques and the six assurances. but it's a democratic prosperous taiwan -- this isn't particular lay partisan position. it's a reafilm make or our earlier position in trying to

recognize the ground has shifted and we need to regain a better position. president tsai, just shifting gift from the trump administering's view of this exciting new administration in taipei, she has been an extraordinarily careful practitioner of statecraft, and yesterday every time dr. tsais tries to um come up with a new phraseology other than the '92 consensus and talk, the general secretary of the communist party dismiss it. they don't want her to regain some new leverage and some new autonomy. they want to actually squeeze taiwan further, whether it's stealing diplomatic recognition or cutting back tourism, which has been made up by other countries from now, understand. -0 finding other ways to put coercive pressure on taiwan to change the rules and write the

rules unilaterally about be cross-strait relation palestine beijing. this is what is happening in the south china sea in a more open way in terms of china trying to walk back the permanent court of arbitration, july 2016 judgment, which went vastly against china on the south china sea, and china has ignored and it written their own rules, and if we let them, they will. and much the same on the cross-strait relationship and the answer for the trump administration and president tsai, we don't want to let them do that. so we have a find a reasonable way to find a better bargaining position. dr. tsai is being very careful. president trump being more audacious how he wants to try these trial balloons, but coming together underneath the trump administration, very professional group of watchers who will go into place and try to figure out how to do what my final big opinion here is, how to essentially look four a status quo plus, the plus bag

revision of this degrade situation of our lynch only the cross-strait relation and the increase in autonomy and prosperity in and the security of taiwan. so, i think this is what we have seen with the arms sale. a very measured list of arms but at the same time it came at a very precarious time when the united states was negotiating at the summit level with -- between general secretary xi and president trump as mar-a-lago, and i think the trump administration wanted to be very clear it was not bargaining away our interests in the region, whether in south china sea with freedom of navigation operations or cross-the strait with taiwan to try to win greater chinese support for putting pressure on north korea. i don't want to digress and talk about north korea. that's what everybody in the

world is talking about. so i want to stay focused on tie one. i will say -- taiwan, there's one intersection in the near term between taiwan and korea i worry about. if you think about a potential deer to you're racing of u.s. power progleeks the first and second island chain toward asia-pacific, the idea that four billion ballistic missile -- the chinese are privately -- to see whether or not the united states could be psychologically triple and weak end in respects to power projection capability by hastening the day or the thought or the idea that somehow we will not be able to project hour in the first or second chain and that bears on the defense of taiwan.

so, the security of the taiwan, free from coercion and free from attack depends on power projection, on economics and a lot of things, but at the foundation is a strong defense. so very important, and i think this administration, the trump administration, secretary mattis, and the rest of the team, will be very serious about following up on not just that arms sale but cooperation itch think dan blumenthal and randy shriver are things i would watch closely on taiwan and this administration, have said well we make sure we seek higher level engagement across the board with taiwan, as possible, as practical. but they said in a piece late last year, after the election, that history show when taiwan feels isolated it takes action to destablize the strait and it's in the enlightenings interest interest of the -- this

-- this is chinese reasoning like to put back' forth between various different arguments. well, the u.s.-taiwan narrative here is clear, we're on the right side of history, and i think the arms sale, the engagement, desire for a strong commitment that we saw secretary mattis in singapore talk about the commitment openly. so it's no longer a secret we're openly committed to taiwan. in fact it's a very old story and i'll stop there and wait for q & a. >> thank you very much. professor dun. >> thank you, mr. chair, and i'd like to appreciate to the institution from heritage foundation, taiwan ben never

been benevolence association. my focus on the cross-strait policy. i would like to jump to the declining popularity of -- there's poor -- popularity is 47. later, 39%. and six months later, 26%. one year later, this year, 28%. so, we look at this decline in popularity that is the fact. another less see -- who support taiwanese or leaders who support status quo, and last year, 15%,

then 60%. that's a much higher than chinese popularity. of course, it's really not a popular but i like you to know what happens now in taiwan. while it is such kind of lack -- i mean, the kind of popularity, of course you see taiwanese have different kind of perspective. people talk about -- and remember one year safe, look at rhetoric. we have to exert behavior. so that is really important. a lot of rhetoric toward taiwan, okay, but how? so let me back to the so-called international environment.

of course, the united states, very important example. so let's see what happen in the international -- that the kind of uncertainty. let's see trump make america great again. of course, that is what they know. the regional agreement like tpp, and terms of bilateral agreement, that is nafta. and also now that you see what happen north korea, we don't just -- not blame to anyone. we like to see it -- trump administration must talk with china. like to say something with russia with regard to serious

issues. so, taiwan's people -- for sure it is -- so, let's see the economic for taiwan. the white house the other day, the first ten billion, western europe, and taiwan's issue the united states at the investment summit, 31 billion investment. tie taiwan would like to survive or maintain economic growth. taiwan need to attract foreign direct investment. this is kind of international

environment. we are talking about democracy. what is democracy? in rhetoric, we can say allot but in the last ten years we put the -- of the people, that is really important. but if we look at the current administration, we all know how -- in taiwan. so, i'd like to use the term -- taiwan's democracy under siege. why? because tpp, everything, we know -- i would like to say, -- the reform doesn't touch upon political appointment, high ranking officials.

so that's kind of challenges. ask me how much you -- i say in the end, 58% reduction. 60%. but they push for reform just in one year. i remember in europe, they always impacting europe. a kind of so-called reform. but in ten years, how come you just push through one year. last week, again, -- if you are

kind of party, you like to -- a kind of unity among people. look to sit down, talk about the so-called how to cooperate. one thin' 1980s come here and the university in chicago, and i remember public policy, including -- today is 2017. but why not taiwan? well, a lot. i'm a scholar. i just remind -- you have to look at what happened in taiwan. without a sound democracy, and

really -- so, alarming to say i talk about the -- talking about the diamond, when policy of some kind of policy or should consider two scenarios. the united states guarantee the tie one economic development. if not, we have to consider other. talking about a third scenario. pressure, economic pressure, from china. if people have anything, then how you do? but who?

to who can find -- anything happen in taiwan, the people in taiwan. people have this kind of feelings, so if the united would like to support taiwan, then they have to pay much attention to not rhetoric but also the reality, behavior, democracy, economic policies for taiwan. otherwise, -- need to get the chinese people to support something, then people will use -- to support something or disapprove something. so, i'm quite frankly speaking about the policy so i'd like you, all of you, to see about a

policy in taiwan, consider these three areas together. the united states congress. second, taiwan democracy and economic development, rebuild economy, rebuild democracy. don't forget, the u.s. has a lot of economic with taiwan. have to advise taiwan's authority. what kind of policies of -- with china. need to help the people in taiwan -- i just like use my

presentation to let you know these very important three scenarios in taiwan, and don't just look at the so-called rhetoric you. you have to look, really look deep, into what happened in taiwan and you can know whether it is your efforts or liability. that's my presentation. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. russell chow. >> first of all, thank you, dean, walter, and the heritage foundation for the invitation to speak her at this timely event. heritage is a special place for me because actually over a decade ago i cut my teeth here at a young intern, and so for me this is sort of a homecoming, to be able to speak on this stage and with such a distinguish ed

group of co-panellities itch want to say the views in my statement today are my own. talk about cross-strait relations. the common refrain we often here in washington is cross-strait relation is at a still but this neglects powerful undercurrents shaping relations in profound ways that have an impact our the who governments interact with one another going felter. given the wallet of expertise demonstrated on the stage today about u.s. policy towards ailes and taiwan and one privilege about domestic politics politicd taiwan, my 10 to 12 minutes are best spent focusing on specifics as to what has happened since 2016 in cross-strait relations and to establish a baseline here upon we may have a discussion about the actual state of cross-strait affairs. in january 2016, the democratic progressive party, won landslide

victories. despite a approximatelyat campaign that focused on domestic issues, and al president's tsai to maintain the school tuesday quo, they went on the offense to highs late the new go. the prc announced it was resuming relations shift gambia. for now i think we know that beijing pulled off on establishing diplomatic relations for reasons we know now. on may 20th tsai was nation rated at the first female president of taiwan. she maintained her campaign pledge and eye lyinged her administration's approach to cross-strait relation based on the contribution, the relations between the peoples of the taiwan area and the mainland area, and throw, historical fact of the 1992 molding.

beijing some rigged off the speech and indicate an unemployment test paper. the prc announced it was spunking high-level government dialogue. channels remain froze ton this dade. the prcs a political warfare machinery went to work so people who are interested in a deep dive of what was formerly known as the plate wall department, i recommend every to study that by my colleague mark stokes. in september 2016, organization with ties to the pla, the china energy fund committee which describe its as a high end institutal think tank hosted a conference the washington d.c. the event flew be anything the radar screen and presented a keynote remark.

previously served at premier and chief of the general rnc officials. in october, on a day meant to celebrate the establishment of the roc government, the president tsai issued a major policy speech after becoming president. most notably, president tsai called on beijing's leaders to face up to, quote, face owl the reality that the republic of china exists and that, quote, the two side the straits should sit down and talk as soon as possible. president tsai added that anything can be clued for discussion as lon as it's conducive to peace and welfare of the people of both sides. more broadly, in her speech, the context overage until a development -- regional development. and an effort to develop policy in a framework. while the cpp supports unification, its form of unification, these efforts went

on overdrive of tsai was elected president. an unprecedented move -- the pr consider noticed the birth of the nationalist peter. the official ceremony was attend bid six of the seven members of the powerful politburo standing committee. they waxed about sun's legacy and was hosted as symbol of chinese unity. in a speech, the prc president, that ccp members the most loyal collaborator asks the fate can faithful successors and asserted anybody was aloud any party to split off from china anytime or in any way. stirring a great deal of controversy in taiwan the politically charged ceremony was a reportedly attended by over 32 retired military officers from taiwan. in the same month the former kmp chair person in the party's initial presidential

candidate led a delegation to end the forum. and that was met with xi. the they will met with xi this year. then on dem 2, 02016. president trump trump accepted a congratulatoriy phone call from the president of taiwan. and they exchanged views about economic and other regional issues. things got interesting afterward. the prc blamed the ty government for organize traiting the exchange township the two leaders calling it a petty action that cannot change the one china structure, base reiterate the importance over the one china policy, urging the united states properly handle the taiwan issue to avoid disturbances the u.s. sign --

sino relations. let be pound out the ridiculousness that a single ten-minute phone call between pruitt elect trump and president tsai could ever represent a departure in relations. and the -- military aircraft from be las eastern theater of command conducted exercises and -- encircled and resumed a full court diplomatic press to squeeze taiwan's international pace. beijing is stealing die juan's diplomatic allies and forcing allies to downgrade and preventing taiwan's government from participating in international organizations even where statehood is not a requirement. indeed a small african nation flipped on december 20, 2016.

panama severed relations in june. taiwan has 20 diplomatic allies. beijing is forcing -- to downgrade, nigeria is forcing -- in dubai, ecuador, bahrain, jordan, trade offices were forced to remove references to taiwan in their name of their embassy is. things heated up in the beginning of the year when other warships went up the taiwan straits. this wassing southwest of the centerline. in 2017 they had aircraft through the taiwan strait a second time. the most telling changes after the election of -- came in and after february of this year. the head of the institute of tie one studies at the chinese academy of social sciences was replaced. the form director was well-known

taiwan hand in the policy community, and it was replaced by someone who was not a tie western expert and much more of an international affairs. so, i believe -- another interesting development happened when the senior statesman took over as chairman of the national society of tie one studies. the organization -- taiwan studies. it was stacked with officials and the nscf leadership structure is four deputy chairmans renting the taiwan offers, the state of council of taiwan affairs, the academic of sciences, and the chinese revolutionary committee. another interesting development in february how in yet another unprecedented fashion the state council of taiwan affairs office weighed in on tie one's 228 incident which is a politically incident and refers to the mass

protest that led to a bloody crackdown as, quote, a just action by taiwanese in a fight for baseic rights. a formative element in taiwan's now distinct political identity. in the most recent data set on identity in taiwan produce, current as of june 2017, the personal of people whom identify only at taiwanese are the clear majority as 56%. up from 17% in 1992. and bowl who tie at being both taiwanese and chinese ex-36%. down from 46.4 in 1992. and lastly, only chinese at 3.8% and down from 25.5% in 1992. in march, commune just rights activist was detained by beijing

authorities for over five months inch may, more senior memberes from the prc taiwan's policy plate war changed and shuffled and now there are rumors may be some additional shuffle neglect leadup to the party conference. in may, president tsai issued a statement highlightings three news. situation, calling for a new podle for cross-strait relations. now, in -- on top of all these political warfare types of activities, it's important to know that in july, when the famed chinese human rights activist passed away, president tsai delivered a stirring eulogy. she said i hope that the chinese authorities can show confidence in engaging in political reforms so taiwanese can join freedom and democracy. a turning point in cross-strait relations. the chinese dream is not supposed to be about military might. should be taking ideas into consideration.

only through democracy and which every chinese person has freedom and respect, chinese become a proud country. to be sure as my co-panelists noted, president tsai's approval lading was hallen from 69% to now being around 33%. while at face value -- president ma who enjoyed a very high approval rating when he came into offers but for the two terms his approval rating hovered between a low 20% and high 30s. think if you put that into context, probably pretty normal expect -- normal ebb and know electric me conclude. despite the comments that the prc has a wait and see mode, i think it's clear that its, as beijing made up its mind and is

unwilling to work with the new government. taiwan is flexible and creative in the approach to the prc but here low approval rating can impact her ability to maintain a steady ship. her low approval rating has less to do with her handling of cross-state real estates and more about her domestic agenda. and the own news -- onus is on beijing to resume relationships with taiwan. [applause] >> professor kazer in. >> okay, thank you. i'd like to thank the heritage foundation for inviting me here today. actually my first time at heritage. so, i'd have to say a few worths before prospect for stability in the taiwan strait. i note that my comments here are in essence an effort to try to extract from day-to-day events and focus on the broader trends in the relationship and the broader incentives that face the prc, nice way of saying in

contrast to mr. chow's presentation, which was very concrete, mine is going amount to speculation and to be taken with a grain of salt. obviously cross-strait relations have been tense over the past year and a half since was elected president and this contrasts with the eight years of relative detente we saw during the administration of jo. i'll argue that's taiwan vat remains relatively stable and the risk of conflict remain low. the longer term trend are more troubling. let me explain why i believe the taiwan strait is relatively stable despite uptick in tensions.

so, let me try explain why i think the strait remains stable. in -- an accident to lead to rapid escalation. my since all three of these scenarios are relatively unlikely. the first rationale and what i think i the most straightforward scenario is one where chinese leaders come to believe that coercion would be an effective way to generate more accommodating policies in taiwan to push taiwan in a direction of unification at relatively low cost. prc leaders might come to belief that -- using military means at acceptable cost. a second scenario is when prc leaders recognize that military coercion would be costly and risky but they might

nevertheless come to believe that curb trends in the taiwan strait they feel come build to act despite high costs and risks. the chinese leaders come to believe that on the taiwan issue, time is not on the beijing's side and need to act sooner rather than later. finally, they may view it as helpful for political reasons. if the growth is slow on the mainland or an economic cries eye runted in chinese a cried in the strait could divert people's attention and rally around the flag that would bolster popular support for the chinese communist party. let me say a few words about these scenarios and why each is relatively unlikely. to begin with the worst case, it's unlikely the prc leaders would view the initiation of a military operation to tie one to achieve unification is

incredibly risk and potentially cost limiter many ways that a war could go horribly awry, the escalation to fob war with the u.s., triggering of severe economic crisis and china and the possibility of a humiliating defeat. i think the scenario remains highly unlikely begin the risks until beijing would feel backed into a corner, and that's a possibility i'll come back to in a minute. a more likely scenario is one where beijing adopts a militarily coercive approach short of war. that is using threats or exercises to push taiwan to adopt more accommodating policies such as china, such as relating to one-china principle. even a shift to a more militarily coercive approach has risks to beijing.

so generally recognize it it's easier to make threats to deter changes to a status quo than to use coercive threats to compel changes to a status quo. there's a general sense that the prc coercion was useful when they were trying to deter what it saw as a step toward -- the diplomatics in 1996 missile tests signaled to tie one the island risked losing a lot in trying to get gains. this course doesn't seem necessary teed gwen that the tsai government, at least for my, hatline quite conservative in its approach to cross-strait relations. assuming this relatively conservative approach to cross-strait relations continue inside taipei, then a chit to a

more coercive approach in beijing would compel taiwan to be more accommodating. it's hard to see how this would work out well for beijing. it would have the potential to back tie one into a corner and could be damaging to president tsai is she backed down. the chineses critical. when washington viewed taiwan as a troublemaker, i think thewes be much more sympathetic to taiwan in a sonaraire you be pr -- more generally it's worth emphasizing that a military showdown in the taiwan strait, short of war, would cause a great deal of unease. and it would undercost confidence china has a great opportunity to portray itself as a responsible power, and this is a source of stability and calm.

so, i suspect that prc leaders view military ownings as risk and counterproductive and so i think it's unlike they view military coercion as an attractive option for making process on the issue of taiwan status in the near term. in the second scenario where the leaders might use a military cores, they don't recognize the high cost and risks involved. they fear that trends the taiwan strait are unfavorable and the island may be lost forever. they would arrest what they see is future losses. so if, for example, leaders no beijing believe that trend inside taiwan identity, such at those that were just pointed out, and domestic politics in tie one, mean the island is moving toward taiwan independence, and i would be better to deal with this problem now rather than allow taiwan's identity to continue to sew fed

identify on the eye -- solidify on the island and leaders could conclude it would be better to act sooner than later and initiate conflict and might believe that time is not anthony's side. clearly beijing has reason to worry about some trends in the taiwan strait. immigration across the straits is not appeared to have the effect on taiwan identity and voting part concerns and china has good reasons to believe over the long haul, china is still on beijing's side. most obviously china's economic and military power continues to grow, even as u.s. global leadership is looking ever more tenuous. within taiwan, tsai's popularities declining and her party faces challenges associated with governing. beijing has been quite adept in keeping tie one as the international bird cage, where the taiwan spaces seems to be

shrinking. seems beijing can still afford to be patient on the taiwan issue, that and that trend favor the prc. a third reason beijing midnight want to pursue coercion is creating a diversionary effect if the economy war to go off the rails in china i. think it's worth emphasizing the pursuit of a diversionary policy would be quite risky and potentially counterproductive. don't want to complete live disdismiss the possibility of military conflict but a serious military crisis would magnify the many changes faced by the prc leadership and i suspect this court of action would only be contemplated if things thingn china. don't know what goes on in xi jinping's head and those on the panel have a better understanding dine but when i look at the myriads challenges

facing china and i think there's pretty good reasons for whatnotting to kick the can down the road if that can be done in a reasonably graceful with we tsai in power. doesn't mean that at the strait is not a dangerous employs and woken remain tense and the prc won't continue to squeeze taiwan international but there's strong ensivetive nor the prc to ant with replayed as long as ty's government appears to be doing the same imworry more about some of to the longer term trends in at the taiwan strait and the stability. support for reewan nick indication will remain negligible in taiwan. as the mail tier balance of power continues to shift in china's favor, particularly if the u.s. becomes less engaged in the region down the road, worry that in the future china may come to -- become more confident

it can resolve the tie one issue once and for all at low cost. i wore about long-term trends and will symptom -- stop there. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. we now open up the floor to questions from the audience. any questions? please wait for the microphone and please identify yourself. >> thank you, dean. i have two questions. first juan for patrick. just mentioned some good people going to work for trump. i wonder do you want to share who are those people? what kind of position they'll we goal in trump's -- and the second question is if there were a military crisis in korean peninsula, do you think the

taiwan has any role to play? we notice more people in washington calling for -- a military tie with taiwan. wonder -- suspension of military tie with taiwan. remember when taiwan security act was introduced many years ago, the executive branch opposed this idea, but when you look at the content, actually, a lot of it has become reality. so, what is push behind all these trend that develop. thank you. >> yes, wish i could say something about political appointments but i would direct that toward the administration. dud mention a couple of good team to keep an eye on so i would look at that. the question of tie one's role in the scenario -- security

scenario of north korea and he the region is very interesting. you mentioned the idea of port visits was raise it as provocative. ... >> north korea seems to be targeted on u.s. territory in the pacific. and if taiwan were to take part in upper right of security systems operations exercises with japan, united states, with other partners, to build capacity, they could well be exercising something that could involve a north korean missile

attack after all north korea's missiles are of unknown reliability. who knows where these things could land? i don't think kim jong-un knows. so as a result, i think it would be very prudent for taiwan to be integrated a little more into regional safety, public safety in the domain awareness and emergency response. >> other members of the panel? >> i think i will add in the main of what is, it's critical. taiwan has one of the most advanced isr capabilities i think along in east asia and being able to utilize about within, particularly in their more passive sort of environment, it would be i think very conducive to maintaining regional security.

on more sort of kinetic side of things i would defer to patrick and dean for their assessment on those issues. >> i'm serving as moderator here. that would be unfair. other questions? in the back. >> my name is garrett. i'm former editor of taiwan communiqué. thank you very much for excellent presentations. had a comet and a question. the comment is on the perceived dropping approval rating of president. president. i just came back from taiwan of three months of research there. the sense i got was that many supporters feel he is not moving fast enough and far enough in terms of reforms. particularly pension reform, judicial reform and so on. it doesn't have anything to do with cross-strait relations whereas she does maintain very,

very solid support. i think that's an important point. the question was for patrick. good to see you again. and in your presentation you did say or you did have a rather positive image of the trump administration in terms of its ultimate goal for taiwan. could you elaborate a little bit on the status quo currently means what it is, but it's not an end for the administration. i think that's a rather intriguing point and if you could elaborate on that a bit, would be appreciated. >> thank you. sure. and not to restate what i've already said, but to think through the probes that president-elect trump made and very think early trump administration and the president himself made with respect to talking about the one-china policy then backing off of it. and then seeing the full throated reaffirmation of the

one-china policy and all that followed from secretary tillerson and other officials. i think that was a reversion back to the status quo for the moment, but not the end of the story. i think the administration is waiting to have a full complement of the people who need to be in place at the defense department, state department. not just the national security council, and at the white house so that they can work on an integrated strategy on these issues. i think this is coming. the reason i'm sounding more optimistic is partly to be a counterweight to the excessive pessimism that is kind of an overhang from the election and is also driven yes in part by the president's own maybe lack of sort of predictable statecraft that we are often accustomed to see from politicians. it's unorthodox, yes. i think he would admit that.

i'm actually optimistic. when i talk to people i know who are going into this administration who are really expert on this issue, i'm just very, very heartened and pressed that they will have a big voice on shaping an intelligent, muscular, assertive, broad ranging, forward-looking posture of high-level engagement and support for taiwan, but within, this is important, within the pragmatic bounds of understanding that we are operating still from a status quo of one that's been increasingly unfavorable weather it's military balance across the street for the isolation strategy that paging is practicing. it's a wait and see plus or -2 tie to chip chip away at taiwan. we want to turn that in the other direction. i think the administration wants to do that. the details remain to be worked out. but the people going in who are going to be doing this know what they are doing.

>> mentioned something about what was just talk about. i'd like to remake of reply. my focus on that, that is kind of damage of taiwan's legal democracy. you can see the growth along all these -- [inaudible] if this is sound liberal democracy, of course you can use other ways, not create a lot of so-called social cleavage of there. that kind of way to handle the country. so let's, i just give warning signal, and we have to pay attention to the democracy, what kind of democracy we are pursuing for. we are investing into it to know more about it.

we found some democracy. of course indirectly were a factor cross-strait policy. that's my point. thank you very much. [inaudible] >> other questions? >> thank you very much for a wonderful speech. i have questions for scott and russell. you agree or would you please comment on remarks from -- talk about taiwan did not expect the united states would intervene if people agree to take independent action? this is taiwan's own choice. and you think this is, even this is not an official statement from the state, but will you treat it as an opportunity or a

threat as a signal for the administration and taiwan -- [inaudible] of the questions i would to address to dan and patrick. doctor mentioned taiwan democracy. the common value with the nine states especially, democracy, but we also noticed the social media. taiwan has been suspended for the crime of criticizing government. also the news media and taiwan tends to be more conservative and self regulate in order to avoid rejections of life as we know it. so -- to protest any kind of antigovernment related events, including the anti-retirement reform act. so would you please comment if

this is a signal that the administration is moving towards one party dominance since silence of opposition voice has begun to think and taiwan wax thank you. >> i will just start off. i think as the comments, i think his comments come his statement is rather consistent with what has been lost in u.s. policy, which is it does not support unilateral changes to the status quo. i think i would just leave it at that with response to comments on mr. yates comments. as far as antigovernment protests, i don't know, from the media i've been seeing in taiwan there seem to be a lot of protests. i don't know if there's any shortages in terms of coverage about anti-pension reform protests are happening or indigenous rights protests that are happening.

so i think it does, the environment is still very vibrant and still very lively media environment, and i think that's reflective of the democracy that is exist in taiwan. so perhaps i don't share the same vantage point in terms of your perspective as to the sort of constraint medium and vibrant in taiwan. i can do think it's actually very perhaps even to vibrant media environment in taiwan. >> i'll go ahead and second the point about dean's comment. i guess i would be surprised if especially given kind of the very public criticism of taiwan during the administration you saw coming from attorney. i would be spicy people that there was an unconditional commitment regardless of what taiwan does. >> okay. yes. it is widely reported that some

matters in the tv news coverage just kept quite limited coverage about the antiestablishment, i should say establishment demonstration. it is true but, unfortunately, the social media player played a major role. [inaudible] but i would like to say what i'm talking about more concerning. [inaudible] not just peaceful transfer of power, not just free press. i see people pay much attention did not just -- also economic and social human security. so that is the matters down talking about -- [inaudible]

a measurement of total picture of our people because the question just focus on whether you approve or disapprove. so that's a general concept, policy through policy. not just individually talking about what kind of policy. so remember, i'm just indicating, this is a measurement not for -- so she must be quite aware this kind of -- [inaudible] and again as i mentioned, part is democracy, nudges election, not just peaceful transfer of power, not just a lot of things. we should pay all of these, not just one of these or two of this. that's my point. thank you. >> if i may --

>> go ahead. >> i wish is good to throw in a very quick thought on democracy. the trends right now in the world are favoring not so much top-down power but bottom-up. in hong kong you were you know what that means, do worry about it as well. i just had a friend in my office this morning from shanghai, and explained to me howbeit put together new paperwork to revalidate a program, an academic program through the propaganda department of the communist party of china. can you imagine, i don't think most americans could imagine having to try to do this. and it's congruent with u.s. values to support those who want that kind of freedom from that kind of the present government. can argue a different kinds of democracy but we know about autocracy and we know what we don't want. i think taiwan is the vertically. i've got a lot of great friends

and i have great respect for the fact we can go from one party to the next in taiwan just as we can with allies in japan and korea and around the world, and our friends put up our messy democracy and the united states we go from one party to another. we like about messy bottom-up process more than being told from top-down exactly how to organize everything we do in our lives. >> just a quick . and this follows on patrick's comments which i agree wholeheartedly. and that is on the issue of the media environment. there is one element that in a little concerned about and that is this information campaign perpetuated by the prc. i think this is a vulnerability in all democracies gwen moore sort of free media environment where investments as well as media campaigns can infiltrate the media environment in spreading false news. this is a vulnerability that is

totally unique to taiwan but also in the united states as well there is a great deal of cooperation that can be done in terms of learning about how to counter this information campaign between the united states and taiwan and even with especially those emanating from the prc. [inaudible] >> other questions? >> again, please identify yourself and your institution. >> yes, i will direct this question to mr. don r mr. chow. i believe taiwan's only the medi-cal injure maybe vatican city durably pope francis is trying to improve relations to beijing. there's also a patriotic catholic church in china which is really a fake church china has but there's one statement

written by pope pius the 11th in the '30s turkey says, does is intrinsically wrong and no one who it's a christian civilization may collaborate with the in and undertaken whatsoever. do you consider for relations with beijing to been undertaken whatsoever, or even going to the beijing olympics. that seems to be an undertaken whatsoever. is the vatican wavering in the relationship with taiwan or how are they working now? >> right now of course vatican does maintain -- relationship with taiwan only. so there's one key difference between china and the vatican. that is how to order the bishop and the archbishop. so that's the kind of question but i don't see in the near future both sides a walk out of

kind of solution. so i don't see lesser changes between the vatican and taiwan,, yes. >> i agree on that one. >> other questions? >> i'm from dallas, texas. i am really interested in what director just expressed. so i would like to know your background and what is this global taiwan institute? [laughing] i mean, i'm really, can you tell us just a little bit? >> sure. i'm happy to plug my organization here. thank you very much for the question. [laughing] so the global taiwan institute is new think tank those establishment september 2016.

we have an office near dupont circle. our mission is to enhance u.s.-taiwan relations to policy research and public education. and so we have a number of programs that include a weekly publication called the global taiwan prefer reset out electronically to all our subscribers which we have about over 1000 now. and it's tutors corrective on threat to taiwan and can take choice and in the broader policy discussions here in the united states. we have biweekly seminars series where we raise visual of taiwan in the brighter policy discussiondiscussion in washinge just held an event on public diplomacy between the united states and taiwan where we had a state department official from the director of the public diplomacy bureau at the state department lisa heller attend, and so we made our debut action of the state department ap bureau website and twitter accounts so we're pretty happy about that. we have her annual symposium that is coming up next month so stay tuned for announcements about that and with fellowships

programs to promote scholarly exchanges between the united states and taiwan, so thank you. >> a question in the back. >> i have a question or professor kastner. injure remark you conclude by saying in the short-term taiwan administration can maintain status quo but in the longer term that china will be more and more likely to be able to do something, i guess implication is china's military and economy grows stronger and stronger, they are more likely to afford the price of doing something to taiwan. that seems to underscore the problem with this strategy by this administration. in the longer term taiwan will be at a disadvantage that the

conservative strategy that you mentioned, the tsai of administration were probably not work out in longer-term with what, what are you saying taiwan should do than in longer-term? thank you. >> it's a good question. i think that taiwan's long-term situation is pretty tenuous but that doesn't mean that i think pursuing a less conservative approach is likely to pay off in the short term. it's more likely to trigger a considerable amount of instability in the taiwan strait. my personal view is that taiwan's best course of action is to try to maintain the status quo as long as it can and kind of hope that the u.s. stays engaged in the region, and that china continues to have a significant stake in stability in the region. i guess i kind of, i don't think the long-term situation is hopeless for taiwan. i think it's a situation that requires a lot of careful

management both by taiwan and by the united states, and kind of careful policies. you know, i don't think a return to kind of the sort of policy that you saw for example, earlier would be in taiwan's interest at all. >> any other responses? >> thank you. this is a follow-up to a question to patrick actually earlier. patrick, when you say you are optimistic about the status quo plus, because a number of taiwan experts will be soon going into the government, do you detect any willingness on the top leadership right now at the white house, at the state, at

the pentagon, that share that kind of willingness? thank you. >> well, without talking about things i can't discuss -- [laughing] went on express optimism, i believe it's coming from the top. i believe the political will is from the top. there is a big agenda. there's a lot to be done. there's obviously too little time and too few hours in the day and too few people appointed so far. but at the same time i can see what is in the works and i'm impressed. and i think there should be bipartisan support even for this kind of approach. i think there will be concerted effort to work with congress on both sides of the aisle to try to build for the support. but i think all things in their time, and we're not quite ready to go back to some of these

issues just yet. there are a few priorities up there for the united states government, and i think you can understand that some things are pressing right now. so wait till the late fall when these people are in place, and i think it will be articulating much better than i have done today the administration's approach to taiwan and i think it will be a compelling one. >> question in the front. >> thank you. my name is charles chan. i grew up in taiwan and have lived in america for many, many years. i of course very concerned about the situation in taiwan. i believe firmly that the well-being of taiwan and the people live in taiwan is in the

hands of people in taiwan. for example, we witnessed the growth of taiwan over the last 40 years, and taiwan had its glory days as one of the four dragons, and lately we kind of lost, we lost somewhere, and i think at the well-being of taiwan, and people in taiwan, are firmly in the hands of the people in taiwan. however, the long-term destiny of taiwan is out of their control. they have no influence of the outcome of what will happen in taiwan ultimately. it really comes down to what's

happening between china and america. whomever become more influential and will get their way. taiwan has been very fortunate that allied with america in the last 70 years, since world war ii. that was because america had upperhand, and the tide is changing. we all witness. so how that change, and will you eventually, in my view, influence or decide the destiny of taiwan? i would like to ask the panelists to share your comment about this. and i think that the outcome of south china sea will be the same. the south china sea, that china wants the natural resources

under the sea. okay, they don't worry about the freedom of passage. and who is going to win, china or america? it all depends on, it all depends on who has upperhand. it all boils down to international relations as who has the upper hand and who has the say. so in a way i'm wondering, okay, that what we discussed today and all the discussion has some at times in different vocations, it will not bear any consequence to the ultimate outcome.

thank you. >> anyone on the panel want to tackle that? >> perhaps i will just say that i respectfully do not share your pessimism with regards to the future being, the destiny be outside the head of the taiwanese people. i think that does nevertheless, highlight to build consensus within taiwan, and it taiwan can successfully build consensus, then i think that destiny is from within the grasp of the taiwanese people to be able to present, if i may say, a united front in order to deter and resist chinese, political, economic and military. and so i would say that there has been in my perspective come in my opinion, promising signs of that consensus emerging,

particularly among younger generations of people, gender people in taiwan. and i think particular where identification is not so much based upon identity is not based upon so much or ethnicity but more on specific identity. i think that is a strength for being building sort of a greater unity among the people. i think to me that is a cipher going resiliency among the population and i think that would be, that would help in being able to contribute to a greater say in what will happen in the future of the trans tsai administration. >> i have to remember so-called east asian model. in the past there's esty recalled flying goose or flying geese really. so in the 1960s, 1970s, even enter into 1980s, japan used

to be goose. but how about today in east asia? the answer is quite clear. so how can you forget or not follow the leading goose? so that's the kind of question we have to investigate into it to know whether taiwan can be so-called for dragon or tiger again. that, we have to seek the answer from because i don't have -- [inaudible] nowadays you know the bare road initiative, you know, lots of people accuse say a.i.d. is new model, but do you know, nowadays -- to make loan for several project, not just one project.

so who knows the future, what will happen in the future? but if one day china replaces the united states as the leading or hegemonic power, maybe it also follow the -- [inaudible] formula after united states. but who knows? big power, great power, always establish its own. history tells us. >> i decide to at an actor point what instead. and to the point about having -- an extra point. being shaped by great powers are not being able to sort of chart its own path, i would just point out that the current government has initiate something called the eastbound pulse which i think is a proactive policy that is trying to engage with south asia and south east asia countries access develop greater

people to people connection was the economy amongst, in that region. in that way it's an attempt i think to try to chart its own path in terms of carving out a new future for taiwan, whether that would be successful i think remains to be seen. but some preliminary numbers in terms of tourism from the people come from the region going to taiwan which is increased as well as building sort of having there being a strong foundation of different types of m.o.u.s that can help pave the way for greater, for more agreements to be signed to help economic interaction i think could potentially be a way to offset this sort of great power and balance that you observed taiwan seems to be trapped in. >> three brief responses. first, don't underestimate

taiwan if lester or human agency for thafor the medicare it's not trigger but i understand it's not acrostic balance. it's a global balance that is the bigger issue. my second wha point would be les not make some linear extrapolation about china. in this year at the 19th party congress xi jinping has added every toddle known to mankind. and he still does not control china, this umpire he is trying to wrest control of her. so we'll see about the intro contradictions within china in the future. thirdly, it's really admonition for the administration of the united states to start to get very serious about the competition we are in. and i think this administration understands that at the very highest level and it's fun to something about it. but because we are not kim jong-un and we control everything inside, you got to work in a messy democracy to try to mobilize reform and improvement and provisions. i think working with friends

like taiwan will be paramount importance in succeeding. >> okay. just a few words. i don't think that type of fatalism is really in taiwan's interest to be honest. i think a lot of taiwan's future is in taiwan's hands. i'm not a military expert but just reading the writings of people like bill murray at the naval war college. my sense is that a lot taiwan can do to enhance its deterrent capabilities. taiwan's economic future in large part depends on what sort of choices are made. i think the degree to which taiwan is able to maintain support in the united states is largely a function of the sorts of policies you see coming from taiwan and what sort of democracy taiwan is. i think there's a lot about taiwan's future that is in taiwan's hands. [inaudible] >> sure. >> scott, i agree with you.

i think the future of taiwan, the well-being of taiwan still is in the hands of people in taiwan. however, we all know there is a red line. don't cross it. if you cross that everything goes. so if taiwan move toward independence, declare independence, separate from china, that's the end of it. so that's today. that's today, okay? ten years from now it could be different, but i think the well-being of today, tomorrow, next year are in the control of taiwan, people in taiwan. >> thank you, sir. >> but ultimate, ultimate destiny, i'm afraid it's

outside, out of taiwan's control. >> thank you. time for one last question. >> i'm an undergraduate student at george washington university and this concerns very much concerns current events. and so this concerns the fact that taiwan actually trains with north korea. and so if any of you could comment on the fact how that would affect -- trades -- how dynamics in region should use decide to step up its involvement let's say port visits to taiwan in the future. thank you. >> thank you. does anyone want to take that? >> that is certainly an interesting proposition. [laughing] okay.

[laughing] >> just recently president tsai issued a statement held in taipei on, and it was held regarding asia-pacific security issues and north korea was raised, and she had i believe, paraphrasing, telling to play an active role, contribute to regional stability and that would include issues related to curbing illicit trade twin taiwan and north korea. i'm aware of reports by reporters that indicated about sort of these types of trade ongoing between taiwan and north korea. i believe there are efforts underway by the government, both in this administration and previous administrations to try to curb that trade. and so, and taiwan can i think play was sort of its position between the east china sea and south china sea is

well-positioned to be an, to play a more active role in making sure that illicit materials that pyongyang is transferring between the waterways of come in east china sea and south china sea to be able to seize those. i think that is a matter for further deliberation, and so hopefully there will be more efforts to try to integrate taiwan into these efforts. >> let me just build on rustles point. it's not taiwan. it's the route asia crickets africa, a lot of country. north korea has found the building of an illicit economy, is a good countermeasure to pressure and sanction and some of our closest friends in southeast asia have been also conduits for trade with north korea. now that were able to marshal more information to focus more on this illicit network we can go to our friends in taiwan and

our other friends and we can together work on putting pressure on these assets industry. this is known of instance where taiwan is part of the solution for regional and global security. security. >> thank you all come all for member of this panel, for a very, very enlightening an interesting discussion and for a very interesting set of diverse perspective. please join me in thanking -- [applause] >> and if folks so please keep their seats. the panel is dismissed. we have the next part of our program is the keynote address from former representative at the taipei economic and cultural purpose and office here in washington, d.c..

he is also the former representative of taiwan to get kingdom and to the european union [inaudible conversations] after dr. shen remarks he will take some questions and answers, so -- >> are you ready? >> we are ready. hopefully the audience is ready. if you could please take your seat. >> let's get started. >> yes, please, dr. shen.

>> i just flew in from taipei last night. [applause] >> and i have to say, the first thing i appreciate, i have to say very stark appreciation for your nice and cold weather. taipei is so hot and all you know all the government agencies had to shut down the air-conditioning from one to three in the afternoon for a whole week. so i appreciate among other things the first thing your nice and cool weather. so good to see so many good friends. i have to tell you that i think i started two '08 talk of u.s.-taiwan relations -- i started to of -- ever since i came here as ambassador in 2014. but today i came back to pay my debt and also i think the cosponsors, the tbaa and i das. so happy to see so many old

friends. i have been retired for 14 months already, and, but i stay very busy. i remain a very close observer and frequent contributor to some major newspapers in taipei about the foreign affairs, writing a lot of foreign affairs, collins our articles. i appreciate some newspapers always be very nice to me. i've already got 34 articles published by these major highways newspapers. i am still following all these issues and also got invited to a lot of seminars, discussions, talk shows, things like that. one of the very frequent questions posed to me, asked me to compare the u.s.-taiwan relations between the current government of president tsai and

the previous government. my answer always starts not from the difference but from similarities and continuity. because i do believe they are very strong fundamentals in u.s.-taiwan relations. that will be continued and that has been continued. let me start by telling you as you know in taiwan the relationship with the united states has always been most important for relationship is priority and for the development, always enjoys not only partisan but multi-partisan support. and from american side, i'm glad to notice that the city is mutual in that way. i think if you were here you probably heard my good friend jim moriarty, the current chair, he made a speech before csis last month. in that speech, and he described

u.s. relations with taiwan. he called taiwan a vital partner that united states has viewed a conference of, quote, a comprehensive and mutually beneficial relationship. now, who has said that in the past? if you will go look, i was here that time in may 2015. she made a speech before brookings. if you remember that, that speech was in the way to extract visit of candidate. she used the exact same words taiwan and use relationship is comprehensive, durable and mutually beneficial effects on so glad to see both in taiwan and united states a lot of strong fundamentals continue and rhetoric still say. but how about in practice? now, in my opinion, the most

critical thing the current president of the united states concerned about in jewish relations with taiwan is how many american jobs the u.s. relationship with taiwan has created. now, you know -- went to wisconsin, investment project produced 3000 american jobs. but how many american jobs have been created by u.s. economic relations with taiwan in total? has anybody done in a study in the past? no. except for me and my colleagues. before my departure. in may last year, let me show you, i still have the booklet. this will need to be updated. based on the formula issued by the u.s. department of commerce, which is for every $1 billion of u.s. exports, about 5300 5300 american jobs will be created. based on that, and then at that

time are circulate a direction to all our offices in united states. go to your area of responsibility to see how many taiwan companies there, to see a many american jobs are created or supported by those taiwan companies. and when you come up with a total, which is 323,456 american jobs are created or supported by u.s. relations with taiwan. it's may 2016. this is 100 times the size of the investment at this time. this is a very, very real strong fundamental and this trend i would say will be continued. i also have to say this is probably underestimate because it didn't include service trade and didn't include arms sales. it didn't include small investment such as investment

into restaurant business or motel business. this strong economic ties will be continued. another indicator is u.s.-taiwan economic relationship. when i first got here we were the 12th largest trade partner of united states. this country is largest trading country in the world. you are trading with 224 countries and territories in the world. we are number 12, not too bad. but if i were here we would jump one place every of their first we jump over saudi arabia as number 11. saudi arabia is at the largest oil exporting country. and then we overtook brazil as number ten. brazil in territory is 235 times larger than taiwan, okay, and then we overtook india as number nine. i still remember when -- was

announced, i had the pleasure of having dinner with a bunch of congressmen. together with the day -- ustr intestine michael froman. i said we just overtook india as a knife largest trading partner of the united states. and he came back to me twice over that dinner and he said are you sure about that? because he was about to go to india together with president obama taking a group of 300 american businessmen to further develop american economic ties with india. so taiwan is so big, even those small tiny remote island but this strong fundamentals will be continued for sure. and then let me also tell you, if we put in comparative framework, mainland china territory is 265 times the size of taiwan. population is 58 times. yes, mainland china and taiwan as a market for american goods,

of course mainland china is much bigger, but how did mainland china big as compared to china? as a market for american goods. a lot of my american friends of said it must be 20, 30 times or 50 times. some people it say 100 times. let me tell you, last year we bought $26 billion from united states. mainland china only did 112 billion. so mainland china is a market for american goods is only 4.5 times the size of taiwan, even though that territorial fact is 255 times and population 58 times. that shows how big or how small taiwan is. that kind of strong fundamentals will be continued. now, let me tell you another figure which is also very impressive which is that even though we are ninth or tenth largest trading partner, last

year are two-way trade total is 65.4 billion u.s. dollars. but this number is even smaller than our trade surplus with mainland china. our trade surplus with mainland china last year was $66.9 billion. keep in mind you are the largest trading power in the world, and you are trading with 229 countries and territories in the world. we are ninth largest out of 224, but our two-way trade total year after year is still smaller than our trade subset with mainland china. that's a big taiwan is. those fundamentals will be continued. another fundamental, i have to say i commend our professional teams on both sides. even though there's a lot of positions now still vacant and yet to be concerned american side with american site has very good career diplomats just like

our team, just like my colleagues, you know, they did a very good job. i have to say, i can tell you for sure without my good colleagues, the telephone call between president tsai and president-elect obama trump would not have been possible. you wait until i publish my memoir why i mostly more about that. [laughing] okay, but there still a lot of differences. today i think number one difference, it's not between the two administrations in taiwan. the number one difference is that if you talk but u.s.-taiwan relations, today inevitably you have to bring into the cross to relationship into the picture. is it not just taiwan but american is saying the same thing. it remember, if you were there with jim moriarty, my good friend. he said actually that's the first sentence in his speech, i quote, he said strong u.s.-taiwan relations in stable

cross-strait relations are integral and have significantly contributed to original prosperity and stability, end quote. both u.s.-taiwan relations and crusty relations. here he sounded like susan found again because in her 2015 speech, i was still ambassador. i've read the speech many, many times. i can recite almost word for word. three major points. the first point is that she said the u.s. unofficial relations with taiwan has never been better. there has never been better,, meaning since we change our relationship and 79, the relation, it has never been better compared with previous years. the second point she said, the one reason why it's never been better, she said, important ingredient i quote is the stable

management of the cross-strait relations. stable management of cross-strait relations. that's one of the important ingredients quote-unquote of the good u.s.-taiwan relations and and the third point she made is that she wants to see that approach continue. she said that actually -- candidate tsai was coming for a visit early june, only ten days after the speech was made. now, so i would say president tsai also try to continue the approach. however, when she talk about the maintenance of the status quo, that's what important ingredient is lacking, which is the consensus, which beijing considers utmost, actually is precondition to everything. so for that reason today we see the cross-strait relationship i think that i would say that, a

lot of people would agree, are cross-strait relationship probably is at an all-time low. people usually call -- [inaudible] meaning no communication, no mutual trust. and for today, we see that mainland china, now you think, i think the last panel already addressed that, diplomatic, economic or even military limitation against taiwan. what can americans do? did an american strike to help? i think americans try to help but american is a long ways could not make too much difference. you probably have heard american state policy statement, america's always saying we urge our we encourage the two sides

to display ingenuity, to resume the constructive -- [inaudible] but this is not for americans to decide. i can tell you that there have been so many cases recently that shows that even though americans try very hard to help, but at the end of the day didn't change the picture. i know americans were very sincere and started from the days when i was here. americans not only trying to help the issue themselves. americans also try to line up like-minded countries to help. what a thing of the day taiwan still couldn't get in. interpol, remember, i was here, resolution got passed by both houses of congress. on the house side that vote was 392 to zero. it's a binding resolution, but at the day taiwan still could

get in. animal, a lot of my -- panama, a lot of my american friends blame americans, say how come americans didn't stop panama from switching diplomat in of recognition? i said to them it's impossible. america has already recognized the people's republic of china as early as 1979. how could the united states stop panama? and then i think last panel already addressed that, the names of five taiwan foreign missions been changed from the republic of china or taiwan into taipei. could americans do anything? no. and the famous case, a political activist, i think his wife came here. americans also tried to help. he had already been detained for 145 days i guess. americans, i think americans tried to help.

you know how many taiwanese citizens involved the overseas electronic fraud cases in foreign countries? and then there would be repatriated, not back to taiwan but to mainland china for further investigation and even trial. taiwan try to get them back to taiwan, but so far we sent our message to china, never been answered. so could americans help? this is another major concern of ours. i think we talked to american friends, but at the end of the day still didn't make much difference. now, last but not least, the pla, military aircraft. they virtually is circling taiwan's airspace or flying very close. in late july i see it happen twice a week for two weeks.

did americans say anything? could americans help? so i think this is the problem that we have to face today, even though the americans, we have so many friends from capitol hill with the state department, everywhere, but america and you heard jim moriarty said, america has a wide concern among american government agencies about the situation, about the lack of munication between two sites. americans cannot come out to argue for either side or two show formula for both sides saying this will be alternative to consensus. americans couldn't do that. you know about -- americans will not do mediation between the two sides. so even the circumstances, i have to say it's very hard to

taiwan to further develop effective relationship with the united states. but the smart taiwan diplomats always have some strategy to do, which is what i call an imagebuilding approach by us and our congressional friends to initiate a lot of pro-taiwan resolutions. i sometimes get lost how many are there. sometimes i think it gets a little complicated because you're to push things on both houses. sometime you probably just concert on white house and ignore, the other side you can probably slow down. i don't know why the wha resolution which was passed in 2004 now recently been revived

again. and i checked the language and a found that was probably, i was deputy representative, that type my colleagues and i start that, passed in 2004. that's something that would require the state department to make a report and to ask american decision. but this is, i don't know why it was suddenly being revived in late july. it's probably too late because i'll be too late, too early for next year. this is something like, you know, for the cause. ..

the presiding officer: the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., august 11, 2017. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i here by appoint the honorable mitch mcconnell, a senator from the commonwealth of kentucky, who will perform the duties of the chair. signed: orrin g. hatch, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous sword the senate stands adjourned until 4:30 p.m. on adjourned until 4:30 p.m. on

this problem with mainland china and should affect america pour ing the chestnut on the fire. tie -- taiwan some distinguish itself as assets with americans to make the relationship mutually beneficial. number four, think more coordinated or more effort is needed for pro-taiwan congressional actions so as to make them simple for the administration to implement and will bring about real benefit its for taiwan. here i say i elaborate a little

bit what i mean by that. now congressional resolution sometimes get lost. we have to worry about not just eight days, we have to worry -- to give taiwan full access to who on professional health-related issue. for example, we can have direct communication to inform each other about some epidemic diseases. send our experts to technical meeting. we can nominate to the who show

and in the mou, taiwan cdc is called the authority in taipei. now, how many committees taiwan health expert goes to now? i think not too many. let me tell you, today world health world health organization are found bid american money, bit u.s. congress. something we can come in, rather than to revive an old resolution to repeat what being said. this is what i call a more concerted and more timely and more effective congressional resolution is needed. not just talking about taiwan security act, let me ask you, either the taiwan act is tough ump you think the president kill come here for a visit? this is why i feel we need to

have a more pragmatic approach. now, number five, americans show their support of taiwan by not only words but also by actions, such as sending senior u.s. government official is-not officialer official, seener incumbent officials for business visit to taiwan and send a large congressional delegation if americans want to show they're support of tie one. -- taiwan. >> the best way to start is probably the easiest chapter in the original tpp which is ecommerce.

don't know whether you have seen the tpp file. tpp is 5,500 pages. then divided into 30 chapters. we already talk to the americans, starting from the easiest topic, the ecommerce, because our two positioners are close to each other, and later we set up something called def, digital economy forum. every 'er we have a conference, one year the taipei, one year in washington. easy targeting point. if we -- easy starting point. if we pursuing the fta with the united states. think a better stop here if you have questions or comments, i would more than happy to address them. thank you so much. [applause] >> thank you, ambassador. we have final for a couple of questions. here in the back.

>> if you could please identify yourself and your unconstitution. >> robert chin from houston, texas. ambassador, i like to raise up some question. the one china policy and the taiwan relationship to me compliment each other. so from your professional point of view, what kind of labor difference between them? >> i think you have to go back to see the original language in the joint communique between the united states and the people ofs republic of china about establishment of diplomatic relationship between them. the united states did not say -- did not recognize that taiwan is part of peoples republic of china. united states simply said united states acknowledges -- not recognize -- diplomatically -- very dis -- the united states acknowledges the chinese position that there's only one

china and taiwan is part of china. chinese later position explain, saying that means the chinese position held by the chinese people is not just beijing's position. so, you read it and then you look at the taiwan relations act, you can find of course you say -- you twist the interpretation. you can make sense because americans didn't say recognize. let me tell you, otherwise 75 one tries in the world have diplomatic ties with beijing. now know how many diplomatic establishment of diplomatic ties -- how many recognize? only 48 of them. so a quarter of them. a lot of countries, like united states, canadians have taken those off.

japanese use respect. the british usage. so -- use, acknowledge. so i would say if you put that in overall picture, you cannot come up with some conclusion -- united states didn't say they recognize that taiwan is part of the peoples republic of china. thank god they daytona that that. if they did that, they would be in trouble. it's very difficult for the prc to implement that also. i can tell you, about 15 years ago, when i was dcn, a lot of taiwan fishing boats. they already lost their licenses because the u.n. found the drift net fishing so they became the transport ship for mainland

chinese stowaways. first to guam, and then later to hawai'i, later to american west coast. now, i remember there's one year there were 14 cases of being capture bid the u.s. coast guard and people repat trait. who is going to pay for the air fare for the repatriation cost? i said to the american authorities, okay, the taiwan fishing boates, only a few captain, first officers, only five of them were paid for this. another 150 mainland chinese stowaways their be responsibility of the peoples republic of china embassy but the american authorities take that to me saying that not going to pay that. and i said to american friends, i say, if they recognize us as the sole legal governor of china, we will pay for everyone. american friends never came back. [applause]

>> this is true story. >> question for one -- >> show, yes. >> thank you. i'm janice chen. i appreciate the respect for former representative shen and you highlighted the u.s.-china relationship has a lot of constant unit over time and it's interesting -- continuity over time and it's interesting you are citing the speech of jim moriarty on the u.s. views on the interest in cross-strait stability, and i think what is interesting at that same event the former richard bush asked him, was there -- the united states is satisfied with the tsai administration's efforts to reach out to beijing, and

moriarty said we have seen an effort and if you hear us expressing concerns about the lack of dialogue and also acknowledging that the taiwan side has tried to reach out, you can draw your own conclusion. so taiwan has appreciated the u.s. for provide something consistency in its position. and extends to the u.s. congress, the u.s.-taiwan relationship is based on the tra so congress has an important role to play economy fining the terms of the relationship. agree when you say in the taiwanese could do more to main the regional -- play a positive role in regional peace and stability and one way the tsai administration can do that is strengthen taiwan's defense, rebuild military. do you have any thoughts on what would be the next step in the u.s.-taiwan relationship on the defense side and to increase

taiwan security. >> the exact stage of relation -- >> defense and security. >> defense and security. well, i hope we -- americans can continue for one thing. today, if you read taiwan newspapers, you find -- mentioned a lot. came out and say if taiwan declare independence americans would not come to help. we all know, he used to work here, i guess. and to me this is rather surprising thing to say. i think all along american policy is that americans want to avoid or prevent some day facing such a dilemma, whether it would have to come, merely send troops or aircraft carriers again to help defending taiwan.

i think what americans doing all these days, all this year, is trying to -- not to face this kind of dilemma. that kind of strategy is still there that's something we appreciate very much. how you manage, how you operate that strategy very skillfully requires a lot of diplomatic skill, but that's very important ingredient, which is i think taiwan has to do it own part. taiwan has tried -- not to resolve but to diffuse the current -- with mainland china. otherwise it's unfair to put all the responsibility on the american side. enthough americans are very willing to help sometimes, but at the end of the day, it's still could make so much difference because while the six

assurances, america would not play mediation role. america always say we encourage you, but we not going to get into argue for either side or to offer any formula for the two sides to think about. i don't think americans will go into that space. don't know. this is a very good question. i think we have so many experts here. probably can require -- can do another channel. >> please join me in thinking dr. shen for -- [applause] >> we are going to take a ten-minute break. please be back at 4:00 p.m. for panel two. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> a short break now in this forum on u.s.-taiwan relations coming to you live from the heritage foundation today on c-span 2. coming up shortly at 4:00 p.m. eastern time, another panel on the future of economic relations between the u.s. and taiwan.

until then, we'll reair a portion of this scent from earlier this afternoon. >> well good, afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. and welcome to the heritage foundation. we thank you so much for coming out today. august is something of a slow month in washington, dc, and we're so pleased that we could attract some of this town's limited attention to the matter of u.s.-taiwan relations. and i extend a warm welcome to our speakers, panelist to you, members of the audience. i particularly want to offer my appreciation to the taiwan benevolent association of america and the institute for taiwan american relations for partnering with us on the program. this is only the most recent in our series of similar events

which we have done of the years. they have been quite fruitful and i expect today's conversation to be no less so. i'd like to say on a personal note i first visited taiwan in 1969, and there have been a few changes since then. there was no metro when i first there all of those days ago. i've had the privilege of meeting interester and interviewing three taiwan presidents, including the honorable lee dong. i appreciate the republic of china in world war ii again cold war. it is indeed a very interesting time in u.s. tie-taiwan -- u.s.-taiwan relationes. first, the governments. we have new ones.

president tsai ing-wen took office last year and her part took control. on the u.s. side president trump took office just this past january. and the presidential inaugurations in each of our countries represented a transfer in power between political parties. whichever party we support in both our countries, whether we welcome the outcome or disappointed with it we celebrate the institutions that allow this orderly transfer of power to take place. now, transfer of power is not something that happens on the other side of the straits. their the institutional framework is quite different. it's all tied up in the chinese communist party. the faces may change, but the party never loses, which brings

me to the other rather interesting thing going on in u.s.-taiwan relations. and that is china's with since madam tsai's election. clearly, beijing is intent on teaching the taiwanese a lesson in who it chooses for its leaders, it's doubled down, squeezing taiwan's international space, objecting to its participation in international organizations, siphoning away its diplomatic allies, and pressuring it economically. it's doing all this in the cause of getting madam tsai to accept a position on one china that is the antithesis of what she and her party stand for. here at heritage we're not blue or green. but, but --

[laughter] >> -- we do believe that whatever the relationship between taiwan and china, it must have the express support of the taiwanese people. and at this point in history, they have elected madam tsai and the tpp and the views they represent on this question. main future elects will change this, who know is. until then, the position of our own new government should be to support taiwan in the face of the coercion it faces from beijing. how do we do that? well, i don't have to worry with coming up with the answers. we assembledded a fine group of experts who address this question and we look forward to a lively discussion. thank you all very much. [applause]

>> well good, afternoon and welcome to the heritage foundation. i invite the members of the first session, patrick crown -- to join me up here on stage. [inaudible discussion] >> each of the speaks will have about 12 minutes to provide their perspectives on cross straits relations and the united states. we'll go in order on the agenda. so, we'll begin with patrick cronin, senior director of the asia pacific program at the center for new american security.

that will be then followed by professor -- over the national university in taiwan, and then professor scott casner. >> dean, thank you. it's a great pleasure to be back at the heritage foundation, which really has been a repositoriy for u.s.-taiwan relations for decades, as we just hear from our opening speaker eloquently sure. add it was decades ago i was learning quite a bit about taiwan from dean chang, as a young, very bright young man who is still a very bright young man but a little older, and doing great work. he is the moderator, i'm the speaker so i have to shay being that u.s. taiwan relations with the trump administration and the new administration. was at the white house yesterday. can tell you this administration is starting to come together but still lagging behind, i think what expectation was be and

hopes would be for appointments of key people but these are coming very shortly and some very good people in the wings ready to go in. that will be very familiar to people who watch u.s.-taiwan relations. i think the basic point i would make here about the trump administration's taiwan policy is that the status quo is the current means bit it's not an end. and what i mean is that the cross strait relationship is often cast in academia and also in the media as subject to potential major revision, and that this revision should be made in the form of some sorts of fanciful grand bargain with china or a small bargain, a bad transactional deal. so you could pawn off taiwan for the south china sea or coscia. not how the trump administration views the taiwan policy in my view.

so, i think for the trump administration, they've been essentially testing and probing a bit from even before the gnawingation, as you know, with tweets and telephone calls, to find out whether there could be a fairer bargain, a better bargain in this kind of negotiation over what is the status quo? and here if i can just back up and try to understand the thinking really at the heart of the white house right now. it is not that the rules-based system is wrong. it's just that it's run its course for what it can do for the u.s. national interests and for u.s. allies and partners, and now other powers and especially big, growing powers like china, learned to game the system and those rules. and they've done the same thing in terms of the cross-strait bargain in the three communiques and the six assurances and as a rules there's a desire to figure

out, can we regain a better deal for tie one? so that it -- taiwan so it can have the voice it should have over the future and have the autonomy and space and security to know it's not going to be threatened with invasion or force or having to submit and succumb to coercion. so that's what really this is about. about a negotiation that's going on here on the cross-strait bargain. so, the early trial balloons from the trump administration can be seen at good or bad and portrayed as grand bargains in the making. i think it's much more about testing out what is more to come from a eventual policy focused on a new end, an end of a freer and more prosperous taiwan and taiwanese people. that's the objective here. but how to do that? to do that right now you have to be bound by the constrains of history and by previous administrations and that's what the administration is starting

with, starting with the cross-state status quo in effect. and hence secretary of state tillerson's the -- the one china policy and the three communiques and the six assurances. but the end is a democratic prosperous tie one and this should be the enall from a bipartisan u.s. position. this isn't particular lay partisan prognosis. it's re-affirm make of our earlier american position some in sways in trying to recognize the ground has shifted and we need to figure out how to regain a better position. president tsai, just shifting garys from the trump administering's view of this exciting new administration in taipei, she has been an extraordinarily careful practitioner of statecraft, and yet every time dr. tsai tries to come up with a new phraseology, and talk about a new type of interaction, the general

secretary of the communist party and his regime dismiss it. they don't want her to regain some new leverage and some new autonomy. they want to actually squeeze taiwan further, whether it's stealing diplomatic recognition or cutting back tourism, which has been mostly made up by other countries by now, understand, or finding other we taz put coercive pressure on tie one to change the rules and writes the out ewan latllly about the cross-strait relationship in beijing. this what is happening in the south china sea in a more open way, in terms of china trying to walk back the permanent court of ash arbitration, july 2016 judgment which went vastly against china on the south china sea, and china has ignored and it written their own rules, and if we let them, they will. much osame on the cross-strait relationship, and the answer for

the trump administration and president tsai is no, we don't want to let them do that so we have to find a reasonable way to find a better bargaining position. dr. tsai being careful. president trump being more audacious how he wants to try these trial balloons but coming together under the trump administration, very professional group of asia watchers who will go into place and try to figure out how to do what my final big point here is, how to essentially look for a status quo plus, the plus bag revision of this degrate situation of our leverage -- degradation of the -- the security of taiwan. so, i think this is what we have seen with the arms sale. a very measured list of arms but it at the same time it came at a very break care yours time --

precarious when the united states was negotiating at the summit level tweak president xi and president trump at mar-a-lago and i think the trump administering wanted to be clear it was not bargaining away our interests in region, whether the south china sea with freedom of navigation or across the strait of taiwan to try to win greater chinese port for putting pressure on north korea. i don't want to digress and talk about north korea. that's what everybody in the world is talking about except for this group right here, so i want to stay focused on taiwan. ill will -- i will say there's an intersection between taiwan and core yay worry about and -- korea i worry about. potential u.s. degrade situation in protection of the first and second island chane. thead four intermediate ballistic missiles could be

launched is a -- for chinese access. the chines are privately applauding this, to see whether or not the united states could essentially be psychologically tripled and militarily weakened with respect to the power of projection, our power of projection capable, by hastening the day or thing to or the idea that somehow we will not be able to project power in the first or second island chain and that bears on the defense of tie one, so, the security of taiwan, free from coercion, free of attack, defenden's power, economics, a lot of thing, but at the foundation is a strong defense. it's very important and i think this administration, the trump administration, secretary mattis, and the rest of the team, will be very serious about following up on not just the arms sale but cooperation. i think dan blumenthal and randy

shriver two people i would watch closely have asset it very well in terms of trying to make sure that we seek higher level engagement across the board with taiwan, as possible, as practical. but they said in a piece last year, after the elect, that history shows when tie one feels isolate, it takes actions that destabilize the strait. so it's in the enlightened self-interest over the mainland to let taiwan feel secure, and indeed this is what the chinese preach to us about in north korea. so, i don't want to equate taiwan and north korea but just to say this is -- chinese reasoning likeses to flip back anding for between various arguments when its suits their purpose. the u.s. -- it's clear we are on the right side of history and it's clear the arms sale, engagement, desire for a strong commitment -- we saw secretary mattis in singapore talk about the commitment openly.

so it's no longer a secret we are openly committed to taiwan. it's a very old story and i'll stop there and wait for q & a. >> back live now to the heritage foundation and n washington, dc for c-span 2's continuing coverage of the forum on u.s.-tie one relations. next panel discussion coming up, should get started here momentarily on the future of economic relations between the u.s. and taiwan. [inaudible discussion]

discussion [inaudible discussion]

[inaudible] discussion [inaudible] discussion [inaudible discussion]

[inaudible discussion] [inaudible discussion]

[inaudible discussion] >> we are going to start the panel pretty soon. before we start our panel, i like to introduce our cofor and

tba, the president of wong to say a few words for this event. [applause] >> good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. honorable guests and distinguished speakers. on behalf of the taiwan ben never lit association of americans, thank you heritage foundation for letting us have this opportunity to be the cosponsor of this forum. this forum, we hope, not only informs the relationship between the united states of america and the republic of china and also we can have the people of the two countries to understand to

do better relation happy to than ever. so, this is my very short speech and i thank you for your coming and thank you for your support. enjoy this afternoon. thank you. >> i also like to introduce another co-host, co-organizer in its a institution of taiwan and america studies, president wok. [applause] >> now we are going to start panel two and talk about the economic issues. politics is issue but economic is fundamental. we going to go by order on the program. so, start from rile waters from heritage foundation, and then

from the csi, and then the final wong from the college. okay. riley. >> good afternoon. well, as the representative for the heritage foundation, i'm sure today i thought i would begin by talk another bun index of economic freedom and where taiwan ranks. for those who aren't familiar with it, the index of economic freedom has been publish bid the heritage foundation every year for the past 23 years. economies are scored on hundred point scale. there being a completely repressed economy and 100 being the most free. this passengers from north korea with a score of five to hong kong with a score of 90. while the score reflects even country's economic freedom, the score is based on an aggregate of 12 indicators that new the

rule of law, government size, regulatory efficient and i market openness. if the most -- in the most recent index, taiwan scored a 76.5 points, placing it in the category of mostly free and is 11th among all other economies. for some perspective, the u.s. only ranks 17th with a score of 75 points. both taiwan's overall score for economic freedom and the global ranking in economic freedom have been increasing. while the u.s. has been stagnant and decreasing. among other asian countries taiwan is fifth twin hong kong, singapore, new zealand and australia. taiwan was go property rights, limit government spending and good business and afraid tree domes and maintains weak labor freeman, judicial efix tvness and weak investment in financial freedoms. what does this mean?

in short, the short answer is that taiwan is doing a good job after maintaining economic free dumb but improvements could be made and should be made. the more economically free a country is the more prosperous the people will be. for example, whether you measure prosperity by the income per person, whether it's a measure of social progress, or a measure of how innovation friendly a country is. heroic tie one's in the has three. if we look at the wealth in taiwan, not just gross national product but total wealth in 2016. taiwan totaled 3.2 trillion u.s. dollars 50678% increase from 2006. making on par with countries like switzerland and india. purchasing power of taiwanese is $10,000 more per capita then ten years ago. there are now growing concerns about stagnant growing, perhaps where the u.s.-taiwan economic

relationships becomes ever more important. i might not go into how taiwan ranks as a large u.s. trading partner or the side of they questions. the u.s. and have mained recommendations and makes sense for the trend to economy for the u.s.' sake or for the stewart of taiwan's growth and economic independence from china. of course one of the easiest ways to solidify the u.s.-2009 economic relationship would through a free trait agreement. the current u.s. administration has highlighted preference for bilateral economic negotiations over multilateral dialogue and if the administration is as focused on the transactional outcome from negotiations with the trading partners as we have heard this, pound for pound mentality, perhaps taiwan has proven itself to merit the launch of formal trade negotiations. we at the heritage foundation

have in fact been arguing are now u.s. taiwan free trade agreement. was seen as a way to balance the large trade surplus with the u.s. and open the japanese markets. taiwanese officials to appease concerns in congress over the growing trade deficit encouraged its own self-initiated buy american practices. this includes taiwan adopting fifer able measures for u.s. businesses, removal of tariff and nontariff barriers and outright purchases of u.s. agricultural and industrial products. of course, in the past 40 years, strong economic relations aren't enough for current officials to merit a free trait trade agreement with taiwan, perhaps the last 13 years of dialogues and formed stabbed through the u.s.-2009 trade investment framework or agreement may suffice. if that's not enough, the administration is look more near

term and transafghansal, taiwan's able to open up the market to u.s. beef and pork import may be an aspect of leverage in an opening round of trade agreement. u.s. taiwan free frame agreement would be more a forecuss on tariffs. nonning a call tour trevor averages 4% and agriculture tariff is 16. 2009 scores relatively high on trade freedom at 86 points out of 100 but issues can be addresses including continued establishment of norms regarding investment, regulatory and market access transparency. taiwan's labor investment freedoms are lacking as labor freedom scores a 55 and investment freedom is 65 out of 100. there are often concerns by u.s. companies regarding the inconsistency of regulations, not to mention limitations on

investments in certain sectors, increase of the 6-day commenting -- 6-0 day commenting period on proposed regulation is a step in the right direction. it's important to remember, though, that a free trade agreement aren't just means for increasing economic cooperation and establishing a stable neck norm but for the removal of government intervention from interfering with market toasts and will take strong leadership on both sides to help push that past both public and private somes. in the '80s the prime minister took the initiative to push the privatization of the japanese enter prizes past the labordowns and other members to quote a concerner representative, who is speaking at a heritage conference, while he was the director of the economic division when it was known at ccnaa in 1987, and as he advocate for the launch of trade

talks with the u.s., he said, we are anxious to look into wives protect egg the u.s.-2009 trade relationship from the wide swings and political activities generated in both countries regularly. both president trump and president tsai have what takes to push past the political swings that exist today and expand the u.s.-taiwan economic relationships if they can commit to the economic partnership by signing a free trade agreement. in the meantime i'm enthusiastic about president tsai's initiative invest in southeast asia and the smart city initiatives to make taiwan into the asia silicon valley but it will by difficultment certainly u.s. tech startups have enough difficulty of their own in our own silicon valley, competition can be fierce and uncertainty exists for all startups. it will be important for president tsai to help create an environment where investors want to invest and allowed for

innovation to tai -- to take place. i'm optimistic about the future of the bilateral relations and hope the taiwan administration can find friends in the current administration and that we can continue to prosper together. thank you. [applause] >> now the director on the project on the chinese economy at csi. >> i want to thank the heritage foundation the other sponsors for putting on this event and for inviting me, and i wanted to use the time to talk about the ways that the u.s. and taiwan can expand their economic cooperation. i don't hold a lot of optimism for the likelihood of a bilateral free trade agreement or bilateral investment agreement but die think there

are a lot of practical ways to expand economic cooperation, and so i want to -- this is a glass three-quarters full story with that one element missing, but i don't think that's the entire story. so that's what i want to leave you with today. let me elaborate on four points. the first is that as riley said, there are already extensive deep economic ties between taiwan and the united states. trade, investment, people-by-people ties, integration into supply chains as partners around the globe, and these ties are mute mutually beneficial and very few losers the high light are though taiwan trade surplus with the united states goss tot reflect on my jam of who is winning or losing

or what is the score in relationship. that the trade surplus is the product not of protectionism but of the arrangement of the global supply chain and the oddities of one keeps track of trade. geographically as opposed to by ownership. so, this has been a strong relationship for some time, and it's been strong because there there is high mutual compliment between the two economies. there are -- both are wto members. both are signatories to the wtos information technology agreement. i think the announcement of the investment in wisconsin is a natural youth growth and sign of this and i think we'll see more offer these type of stories.

both the second point. both the u.s. and taiwan have benefited from being part of a global supply chain, and global supply chains that include china. in fact, taiwan has benefited from the inclusion of taiwan -- of china in the global supply chain even more than the united states. taiwan has offered immense amount of technology, management skill, investment, in china, and they of course, because it's a common language, that hat happened a great -- has helped a great deal there are around a million taiwanese who live in china, which has helped further those ties and the benefits to taiwan's economy. in addition, although both are wto members, the cross-strait

economic relationship is not entirely consistent with wto practices that members keep toward each other and instead its managed by xpa and as a result of that taiwan, unlike any other wto member, has been able to massive barriers to imports from the mainland, a quarter of all tariff lines are banned for being imported from china. lots of investment from china is also blocked, although not entirely. and so this type of ability to maintain those type of protects for taiwan's economy has been something that no one else has had in -- meant that the downside have been -- of the economic relationship with china has been limit by -- in ty taiwan. the best statistic that shows that is we know that the

proportion of labor and manufacturing in almost every major industrialized country has fallen dramatically over the last 20-some years. there's a single exception, and that is taiwan. in 1993, taiwan had 28% of the workers in mr.ing. today it has 27% of its workers in manufacturing. so, essentially no change, and so the way it has engaged china as far this the global spy chain has been distinctive. that is a backward looking statement. doesn't necessarily guarantee the future. there's a lot of challenges that everyone faceses a result of chinese industrial policy, which is much more aggressive over the last several years under xi jinpings' much more challenging for everybody that is part of the global supply chains.

nevertheless if you're just dog a historical analysis it's been a big boon for taiwan compared to just about everybody else. in terms of thinking about how the u.s. and taiwan can expand cooperation, i think an fta or bilateral investment agreement would be nice but a relatively limited benefit. and it would be politically very risky for taiwan to take on. but limited benefit because most of the benefits between the two economies are because they are in global supply chains. we count bilatllly but it's the global supply chained that are the big benefit. so unless you improve the global supply chinese evening until supply chains, reducing bare -- barrier, won't give you big bang for the bike. and taiwan scored 67.5 and the

u.s. 75. if you look at the bilateral rankments with us they're already really low barriers, so, most of the easy stuff has already been picked off and i think there oar things we could do in the short term that would be -- that would yield some positives for both economies, particularly for taiwan's economy. so i think the first thing that would be at the top of my list -- the fourth point -- the first thing at the top of the list, both the united states, taiwan and everybody else has to push back hard an chinese protectionism. the number one challenge to everyone in the global economy, china's efforts to expand and dominate into global supply chains where erv else is -- everybody else and you can do that bilaterally, regional limit tpp was an important initiative. tpp, 1 -- even without the u.s., without taiwan it in, would be

helpful in that regard but job number one is limiting the destructive consequences of china's movement into other parts of the supply chain through subsidizing its disprize forcing technology transfer. that's number one for everybody. the second, and riley touched ton this but not in much detail -- taiwan's -- the biggest foreign economic policy initiative of the tsai government is the new southbound policy. and i was in taiwan in june for a week doing research on it with two colleagues. we have a report coming out in the fall on it. and although it's just getting off the ground, the new southbound policies actually has the potential to be quite helpful to taiwan's economy. it promoted expanding economic ties with countries in east asia, south asia, and southeast asia, as well as australia and new zealand, some or more

promising than others but there's real meat on the bones in helping to modify tie one's economic structure, and expanding people-to-people ties, particularfully areas of education. -- particularfully years of education. although the u.s. is knot a member of the new southbound policy countries, the u.s. could do a lot to encourage all of those countries that are part of it to participate, to facilitate, interactions and that's because, again, these taiwanese businesses moving more toward that region are part of global supply chains and directly affects the interests of american companies as well. so i think there's lot the u.s. can do to help facilitate the effective implementation of the new southbound policy. second -- third, the other big regional initiative beyond the new southbound policy and tpp, which i've already mentioned, is

china's initiative and there's -- although taiwan, you wouldn't think, can be a dominant country in investing in infrastructure buildout, actually there arlet of opportunities for companies from taiwan to develop. and so developing the road is a chinese investment initiative but a lot of opportunity ford economies that are not part of aiab, including the u.s. is not part of the aib, and there are potentially -- because the price tag of the development road is so large, getting a tiny sliver of the investment would be helpful. fourth -- the second to last point what we can do. the united states -- although a bilateral investment agreement or free trade agreement with tune won't happen soon, there's lot taiwan can do to cover the last 13-1/2 points of the

freedom index to get taiwan tied with hong kong. that gap is often framed -- almost consistent through flamed as -- a ba bilateral -- it's seen as a concession. think that 13-1/2 points entirefully taiwan's self-interest to make the change thursday liberalization to help its economy, and regardless of whether the u.s. or anyone provides reciprocating concessions on the other side. and so i would just mention two areas. one would be in services, access to taiwan services market, liberalizing the mark. the other second would be an immigration policy. when -- to allow more worker immigrants into taiwan's economy. when we were in taiwan in june -- i think still going through the legislative u.n. now -- there's a discussion

whether there ought to be a small modification of taiwanese immigration law to increase the number of worker images by several hundred, maybe up to a thousand. very small numbers. taiwan needs tens of thousands of immigrants to move to taiwan to work, to contribute to its economy. not -- we shouldn't be talking about hundreds or -- we should be talking tens of thousands. so that there needs to by a significant liberalization of taiwanese immigration law and shouldn't be seen as a concession to nibblings. lastly, to turn the tables, the united states is at 75, and and the u.s. isn't going the right direction and there's a lot that taken and everyone else -- taiwan and ann else can do to encourage the united states to recommit to its the multilad recall training system.

... [inaudible] they are serving as professor for humanities at ithaca college. >> think you. >> thank you for inviting me and organizing this important forum for elevating the

american public interest and awareness. the big point i'm trying to make is like good economics also make good politics. let me explain. i'm trying to argue to make a strategic case for the 25%. i don't disagree that the ways of looking at the partnership, if you look at this, 75% has historically been a strong relationship, mutually beneficial, the u.s. is taiwan's second largest trading partner. taiwan with a population of 23 million is the ninth largest trading partner of the united states. two-way trade between the two economic partners, goods and services is about $85 billion

last year of which $65 billion is in the good trade the u.s. has a deficit, but if you look at the services. [inaudible] if you look at the total picture you would say it's mutual beneficial. according to the u.s. department of commerce, export supported and estimated 208,000 jobs in 2015. this is the latest data available. one hundred 30,000 supported by goods export and exports.

of course, in goods alone, right now about 10.3% of taiwan experts go to the united states. 9.5% of their inpu imports to the u.s. for we know as recently as 1985 about 40% of the exports came to the united states. now the picture has changed because 26% of the exports go to china and another 13% go to hong kong. [inaudible]

it's very helpful to highlight economic development from the import industrialization. the diffusion of technology, the transfer of highly skilled talent. u.s. and china extend regionally and globally to asian nations. this is a very important point because former president obama reasserted the importance and unfortunately i think that

when all is said is the first cpp with mild loss of on the surface relationship is pretty good. about 198301 unilateral price is now u.s. treasury department by one taiwan analysis or treating partner analysis if they enjoy a significant bilateral trade surplus with the u.s. defined

as over $20 billion. taiwan does not because it's about $9 billion. surplus is 3% of gdp and i will come back to this point in a moment. in other words, of the three criteria of the treasury scrutinized this is one, but of course taiwan is not the only trading nation that has very high surpluses. in fact, i will argue, usually people say if you have a large surplus that is you are suspicious that they have a very high trade surplus you value family if this is true.

i think i want you waiting for example, i want fiscal policy historically has been very conservative and they have actually seen rising externals that. as last year there is a $59 billion, making taiwan that the 37th largest in the world are not a member of the monetary fund has no recourse. fiscal policy, in other words. [inaudible] population one is all this contributes to a very large balance that will eventually shift. having said all this, and i will you that it is very the

management of economic relations under a larger form policy for example japan are very close life 80s small curtis u.s. japan was in a trade or. and of course is a metaphor, and of course now often all we hear about the u.s. trade is that the prophecies in the fourth i think economic relations has a lot more substance and importance than simply force to the larger foreign is always a conceptual this economic relationship in

broader strategic terms i will argue that the government may need to cut some slack for taiwan. i agree it is in everybody's benefit for taiwan to become freer to rise from 76.5290 it is in their self-interest to live i realize become a candidate for regional integration, pending taiwan is in a unique situation that is tough among americans trade partners. even though it's the largest trading partners of many countr country, of all its trading partners, taiwan is the one facing china's sovereignty claim and china is also diplomatically strangling the participation.

taiwan actually faced a triple whammy. taiwan join the wto in 2002 which would have been fantastic as the economic united nations. unfortunately the next year it collapsed so taiwan did not benefit from it. regionalism in asia-pacific, the two most important movements currently are the tpp, the transpacific partnership which the u.s. led until the trump administration and the regional comprehensive partnership which many said was led by china. taiwan is not part of that. taiwan is also facing difficulty benefiting from regionalism and how about bilateral is him.

we're talking about free trade agreements and i hear a lot of people talk about the pros and cons and the feasibility of u.s. taiwan free trade agreement. consider this. i think the case for signing with taiwan should not ruled out on economic grounds or security ground. economically, one can argue that taiwan presents a more attractive case than most were they already have free trade agreements with the u.s., except maybe south korea. for example, in the aftermath of 911, the united states signed with jordan, bahrain, israel, and columbia. i don't think any one of these could be economically more important than taiwan and

taiwan should be a member of the tpp 12 or 11, they would become the fifth largest member in the tpp. i think on economic grounds, scott is also right that you engage in very specific negotiations. certain sectors of the u.s. would benefit, particularly the service area. years ago bought the peterson institute and the government officers estimated that there would be a small benefit to the u.s. under security realm, i think it also makes sense because this would actually help overcome or offset some of the triple we meet i just talked about, particular diplomatic isolation and security threat for taiwan as a major economic

player on the world stage and it will also possibly further gravitation of the taiwanese economy through mainland china. think about this. in the 80s, taiwan economy was oriented toward the east which means the united states, and with china opening to the outside world in the '90s in 2000, the taiwanese economy was with the west but with the election last year have actually noted that too much economic dependence on china poses security threats. i agree that the new policy has a lot of potential, but i think at the same time that the reorientation should not

be ruled out also. that's why i'm making a strategic case for strengthening u.s. taiwan relationship. thank you. i will open it to the floor and we can take some questions before we close the event today. >> if i could quickly make a point, i don't believe taiwan should limit itself to just meeting 90 points in our index. there are ten more points above that. food for thought.

[inaudible] >> thank you very much. quick question, earlier this year trump withdrew the u.s. from tpp. the u.s. government is planning to participate in the trade organized by china. i would agree with points about the new southbound policy may not benefit taiwan at all. they have the third meeting in

may. they're going to decide in november and taiwan is excluded from that as well. what we can do to not be excluded from the world economy right now because i understand the relationship and what else taiwan can do. thank you. >> i think, despite the diplomatic or political isolation, taiwan's economy is heavily integrated in the global economy and being part of wto and a pack has been extremely helpful.

i think, in talking with friends from taiwan over the last several years about tpp, the concern was always when would taiwan be able to join. i think now we've seen the concern is that will tpp ever come into existence. the existence of it is more important to taiwan than taiwan being a member of tpp because it puts tremendous pressure on taiwan china to liberalize its economy. that is the number one biggest benefit because china would lose its competitive advantages by not meeting the norms of tpp because it covers so many areas that were not covered by existing rules and filling in those blanks are

really important, particularly related to investment and e-commerce. i think the number one goal is to figure out how to keep tpp alive and then hopefully at some point down the road, the u.s. will regain interest and hopefully, maybe not the next three and half years but in three years and seven months perhaps and then maybe creating an opportunity for taiwan to join. i wouldn't worry about our septic. it is such a thin superficial agreement that doesn't touch on a lot of agreements that are important for taiwan. taiwan not being a member will not have significant impact. i would focus more on what taiwan can do through this new southbound policy and the other ways in which taiwan can

establish expanded ties with the united states. to answer your question but to also comment on something that vincen vincent said about china's economic gravity, certainly that gravity is very large and it's unusual that you have that depth of interaction with the strategic enemy. that is very rare, but i think there's no escaping that gravity. not just for taiwan, but for everybody. china's economy is a huge driver of growth. so, you had to figure out, the strategic choices to figure out how to escape it for how to limit the risks, how to make it so that the downside of it in the near term in the short term are limited to some

extent, but you can't entirely escape it. it's too big, too important, too large of opportunities. that's why so many taiwanese companies are in china and that's why everyone is making deals with their soul on a whole bunch of issues because of the size of that economy. it puts everyone in a precarious position that we are rarely in. we have to figure out how we limit the risks even though escaping it seems to be an impossibility. >> maybe i can pick up on scott's point. i agree, i think the use of many allies including the united states have this problem of china's gravity and trying to manage the collective problem, then perhaps the u.s., it will be

very helpful for the u.s. government to see that maintaining taiwan's economic strength and independence is actually in the u.s. interest. that should bolster the u.s. position. that is just the point. i'm trying to make about the larger point, sometimes the international trade commission they are doing their job by focusing on sector openness, the trade deficit and globalization and i think all of this is great, but sometimes we focus too much on the trees and forget about the forest. i'm just trying to make a point about seeing the larger pic picture. >> to look at the what to do aspect, i believe policy

engagement with eastbound polic policy, and they both have merits in their own, but if we could foresee the future we would all be millionaires. if i could predict the growth or decline for the chinese economy and the impact it will have relative to the growth of south and southeast asian economies, i would be a millionaire billionaire or however much you want to give me, that kind of thing. as china's economy begins to slow in growth and if china sort of maintains this restriction on market access or tie of political and economic considerations while these new and emerging economies find their own voice, my opinion is they will

probably lean more toward taiwan who has shown themselves to be the beacon of growth in asia for free markets and democracy. >> i want to make one note on the southbound policy. i think due to the geographical proximity and closeness and so on, taiwan should have done this a long time ago. i wish this policy well, i hope that it will be implemented not in a very instrumental way, for example if you ask taiwanese students, what foreign language they would like to learn, the first choice would not be vietnamese or indonesian. but if you look at the demographics, there are many new immigrants and taiwan and

one in for our children have a mother who is not taiwanese. the society is actually changing. asking is it should've been done a long time ago and it's a very natural thing to know your neighbor better. now as to your question of what taiwan can do, i think they should do everything. they should liberalize its economy to make itself more attractive and really engage the u.s. on the scientific resolution, they should continue pursuing regional opportunities. sometimes there is a snowball effect. they ca should continue pursuing free-trade agreement with major trading partners such as the u.s. and i think if the u.s. is willing to do

it will have a snowballing effect and they should consider to play a constructive role in the groups they are a member of such as apex and so on. i am cautiously optimistic about the economic future of taiwan. it is, in a sense, very integrated in the world economy despite its diplomatic isolation. >> good afternoon. for 14 years i worked in taiwan companies and during the past ten years the china market,.

[inaudible] made taiwan as a guarantee of quality. today i really want to compare with the brands in japan or korea as all of you may know, most mainland people are opposed to by the electric cooker. electric cookers. [inaudible]

today i have a question how can we promote the blooming market of taiwan friend. thank you. >> any comments. >> i think your question points to a very important but also difficult economic transition of the taiwanese economy and that is how do you move from an economy that basically you make the apple but apple put its label on that machine and called it apple to being a major band. taiwan has notable success in

the information technology sector. for more than 20 years and has been searching for another sector. i don't think i have found it yet. in fact, this reliance on a single sector is not optimal. i don't have an answer to your question, but i agree with your observation. >> i guess i would say that whether or not there are a lot of taiwanese koreans that are famous that are in stores or in your home is probably not the number one concern you ought to have. for the health of taiwan's economy, being oem and being part of global supply chains has been very. working with the economy the size with 23 million people, that's the number of people

who live in shanghai. there's not a lot of global shanghai brands but having tasers and several others is quite an achievement. if i was looking, i know they have put forward several new industries to focus on, and for me the sciences and healthcare seemed like a natural for taiwa taiwan, and i think that's because of how excellent taiwan's healthcare system is relative to the rest of the world, and so having such a high quality healthcare system provides the opportunity to have a home market that can test a lot of these things and also having the engagement with china, you can do a lot of clinical trials with chinese companies and strong ip rights but i

guess it could be stronger so, of course there will be some amount of speculation. i think economists talk about the dutch disease, i think there might be a new term called the taiwan disease that how do they get so focused on a single sector that drives growth but you get entrenched interest in other areas and it's difficult to transition to other sectors or move up which is a big challenge. i think what taiwan is doing, if i was in their position i think i'd be trying a lot of the same things and so i'm still a glass half-full, it's still an economy that is full employment. they have a coefficient of inequality that is better than just about everybody. under .3. u.s. is almost at .5 so, there

are many things that can be done and i think people are so worried in taiwan, which is smart, it's always better to be more careful and looking toward the risks that you face. that is a smart thing to do. that's what i do at home every day with my kids. i tell him about all the risks they face and all the things they shouldn't do, but sometimes you have to realize that there are lots of opportunities and positives as well. i hope we take a balanced picture on what the opportunities are. >> great. it's 5:00 o'clock and i want to thank you to our friends and our guests and our panelists. thank you so much. let's have a big applause for our three distinguished

guests. >> casey, don't go away, i want to think casey for helping us out and organizing the event and for serving on this panel. i thank you so much. i wish you have a nice weekend. thank you very much. [applause] >> think you. [inaudible conversation] [inaudible conversation]

>> earlier today president trump held a discussion on the workforce and apprenticeships had trump national golf club in new jersey. during the event he was questioned about north korea and what he met by his locked and loaded tweet. here's a look. >> what did you mean by military solutions are locked and loaded as it relates to north korea. >> i think it's pretty honest. we are looking at it very carefully and i hope they will fill understand the gravity of what i said and what i said is what i mean. hopefully they understand exactly what i said in the

meaning of those words. those words are very easy to understand. >> any progress on the diplomatic back channel. >> we want talk to progress or back channels. we want to talk about country that has misbehaved for many many years, decades actually through numerous administrations and they didn't want to take on the issue and i had no choice but to take it on and we will either be very successful quickly or successful in a different way quickly. >> why is andrea merkel wrong. >> well i think she's speaking for germany. she's a good woman and perhaps she's referring to germany. she certainly not referring to the united states. >> you said you wanted to send a strong message. do you think the rhetoric is actually waving attention. >> my critics are only saying that because it's me. if it was someone else uttered

the exact same words, they would say what a great statement, what a wonderful statement. we have tens of millions of people in this country that are so happy with what i'm saying because this thing finally we have a president that is sticking up for our nation and sticking up for our friends and our allies. this man will not get away with what he is doing. believe me. if he utters one threat in the form of an overt threat which he has been uttering for years, or if he does anything with respect to guam or anyplace else that's an american territory or an american ally, he will truly regretted and he will regret it fast. thank you all very much. >> think you. >> every week in the clinton white house there was something. it was a very tense

environment and then we had a special prosecutor named ken starr. he was like the bogeyman back then. i spent more time in that white house responding to requests than doing anything else. i remember those and going through every document trying to find that thing that can starr wanted. and so, coming in now, i can do my job. >> watch our interview with the white house office of public liaison tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. c-span radio, and then.org. >> c-span "washington journal", live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up saturday morning,

the cato institute like brandon discusses ways to reform the national flood insurance program which must be reauthorized by the end of september and is nearly $25 billion in debt. senior pentagon correspondent on u.s. nuclear capabilities and the cost of modernization. world magazine reporter emily talks about states changing their legal age to marry law. be sure watch c-span "washington journal" live at seven eastern saturday morning. join the discussion. >> live coverage of the 2017 conference saturday on c-span at 10:30 a.m. eastern senator elizabeth warren and naacp former head ben speak at the conference. later, 4:30 p.m., former vice president al gore and pamela ciampa of forward .us. join us for live coverage of

the 2017 conference on c-span. >> like many lawmakers during august, kansas senator jerry moran held a town hall meeting. he met with constituents in great bend and took questions on efforts to repeal and replace the healthcare law, veteran services and the opioid epidemic. this is one hour 20 minutes. >> afternoon. i'll cut to the attention that comes with some national media press. we welcome them to great bend. i'm delighted to be here as well. as you would know, congress is out of session now until labor day and i'm using my time