terms of that being the last major campaign against california indians but it doesn't mean that the genocide absolutely stops there. >> host: benjamin madley, an associate professor of history at ucla and the author of this book "an american genocide: the u.s. and the california indian catastrophe 1846-1873". thank you for joining us on booktv. >> guest: thank you very much. keep watching for more television for serious readers. [inaudible discussion]

[inaudible discussion] >> good afternoon, welcome to the heritage foundation and our lewis layman auditorium. we join white house join us on the heritage.org web site and those chinaing us on c-span booktv in the future. those here inhouse we ask that courtty heck that our mobile devices of various sort have been silenced or turned off. those watching online, you're welcome to send questions or commentses at any time. simply e-mail us as speaker@heritage.org and we will post the program on the heritage home page for your future reference as well. welcoming our guests today and leading our program is dakotawoods, senior research fellow for defense programs and our center for national seps defense, mr. wood served our nation for two deck they'd u.s. marine concerned, including strategic analyst for the commandants of the marine corps and the office of the offers of net assessment. upon retirement he helped

organize the national biosurveillance integration statement at the department of homeland security, for five years he served as a senior fellow at the center for strategic and budgetary assessments after which he was strategist for the u.s. marine corps special operations command. join me in welcoming dakota wood. [applause] >> thank you, john. it's a real pleasure today to have you all here and to heave dr. crane from carlisle where the took he hyperloop, the fastest run to d.c. so we're glad that travel wasn't interrupted. we always try to do something artful with an introduction but i couldn't do anything but to draw from pure biographical description and go over his brown. it's remarkable. currently serves as chief of historical services at the army heritage and education center in carlisle barracks, director of

the u.s. army military history institute, you sack a trend here. served with strategic studies institute for several years. on the war congress from 2000 to three and held the general doug lars macarthur chair of research. also healed the aero space studies and. all this followed a 26-year career in the u.s. army, connect with nine years as a professor of history at the u.s. military academy. holds a bachelor degree from the military academy and is masters and doctorate degree phenomenon stan understand university. the u.s. army war college. by my account he's authored 11 books or mono graphs since the year 2000. i don't know whether they're hobbies you might have --

>> we have at least 11 of them. civil war, world war i, world war ii, korea, vietnam, and then his most recent war, a lot of historical stuff and putting it in modern context counterinsurgencying extra and the environments in which that holds here in the modern day context. named one of news week's people to watch 2007 for his leading work on counterinsurgency and an army title but i ignore that, as a former marine, retired marine. november 2008 named international archivist of the year by the stone foundation, and just recently in 2016, the selected to receive the society of military history samuel elliott morrison prize for a lifetime contributions to the field of military history. so it's a real mother to have dr. crane with us. we look forward to your insights on where we have been and where we're at and possibly where we're going in counterinsurgency

[applause] >> thank you very much. fasten your seatbelts. i have 30 slides to go through and i will leave time for questions. what i'm trying to do is it late and not satisfy. so buy copies of the back and it's a lot cheaper than i can get so it i highly recommend -- if you're interested, it's a good deal out there. this is a image of the book, the other picture there is outside the embassy in baghdad. that sign struck me as fairly interesting, gives a sense of the atmosphere over there. i often wonders who was walk neglect embassy drink while they were armed. obviously need be warning signs about it. how i got into this, the term cassandra in oz, cassandra was a figure from greek mythology who was cursed to tell truth to power and never get heard, and i got involved in a number of things in the early years of

this millennium, the red one on the right was the piece i did, avoiding vietnam, where i talked about the arm ya response to vietnam which is not to learn how to fight the wars bet-under but to figure out how to avoid these kind of wars and i quote in 2002 we need to revisit counterinsurgency doctrine. this one on the left is i was put in charge of an army war college team to come up blink tree build iraq for the mayor of baghdad, in late 2002 when the army thought though would bee in charge of reconstruction. the day we fish issue ilk the report and delivered it was the day that second rumsfeld createdded the office of reconstruction under their general and nobody was interested now studies so we left it to the army staff. we sent to the planners in kuwait, and they used it to help develop their plan so we all know how that came out and we came much more famous for being ignored than we were for what the plan would have done if

people paid attention it to. because of that, when the time came to rewrites counter-ininjure send si doctrine my west point class made david petraeus asked he to be part of the team do that. general mattis for the marine corps. we're really furniture that this time in the history hover toes two servicers they can pull two combat leaders out of the bar and put them in positions to really revise the training and education for she wases to bring them into the 21st century and war fighting. the general petraeus' motto, his engine of change, which is -- the big idea is you send people out to the field, you get your lessons as fast as you and can you bring them back into the training system. get them to collect the bring leader development and doctrine. i used to tell people you can see my position in the engine of chiang i. used to tell people i was one tooth on weeing cog. i can call him david, classmate,

but there were -- we had a number of arguments during the promulgation and development of the doctrine. we knew who was the boss and i won a few but not as men as -- not as many as he did. the whole idea is to create a learning organization for modern warfare, both economy general matis were doing that for the army and ma corps average very atypical process to develop to the doctrine. we did it in less than a year which is light speed for anybody dealing with military doctrine. that was because he had general petraeus as the champion, we went around the normal bureaucratic avenues to get around. we had a big tent, number of contributors from all they ever world involve in this. it was a joint army marine effort, true army-marine efforts. each chapter hood an arm and and marine corps author for it. we had a sarah soul from the center for human rights, in the initial vetting conference.

people from human rights commune, people from academia, the media, when we had our major vetting conference we had jim fowler there and george packer, tom ricks was involved. we trade to get a lot of people involved in giving us ideas how to better fight these kind of wars average lot of help from think tanks, rand, a number of others like that, who also gave us their input. but in the end it was going to be the army and marine corp authors that sat down and figured out the final form of this. with some input from general osers. general pet trace -- pet trayus read every word we did. massaged everything help was the last guy who look eight before i went out to general review to the forces. still have ptsd over what's called petraeus pronoun.

have to make sure what the this or it refers back to the antecedent and precedent nightmare but i tell the story, he says i'm not that hard. yes, you are. the intent of the manual was to be applicable to counterinsurgencies anywhere at any time but the 2006 version especially was shaped very much by iraq. that just because general pet trayous now he was going to iraq but the input from the soldiers and ma flense field giving us their idea was shaped very much by iraq. so the 2006 version of the doctrine, this verse mach manual that is aimed at iraq. >> it was different from a normal focus on combat. very population centric. your had to protect the population first. and eventually -- people need to accept the government was

legitimate. the main gwen is legitimacy, legitimate governing authority. still of the kill and capture people. a lot of force involved. but you have to be careful how you apply it in a mosaic war that differences from village to village, valley to valley, city to city, and won't win the war with military force alone. you can't kill yourself to victory in these kind of wars. it takes a team effort, not only your own interagencies and also the home -- host nation has to win a lot of its own war as well. intelligence gathering is more cultural anthropology. you have to understand our societies work, economies work, how policies work, jenner roles. a very different kind of intelligence process. and you have to think campaign design. unlike the old days, when people and the army in the '70s i knew who the enemy was, the next soviet motorized regiment coming over the hills. might be going back to those

days. i'm not sure. the way you fought the war in the '70s, beat the first echelon of the soviet and the second echelon came and you nuked them but you knew who the enemy would be. in modern wars you don't. the first step before you can plan is to figure out the problem set. a much different kind of warfare and you have this process called campaign design, which we introduced and which is now involved in all of our doctrine. you have -- you're fighting a set of enemies, not an enemy. so you have to disaggregate your enemies and deal with each one differently. perceptions are more important than reality in this kind of war. what people think you do is more important that what you do. you have to manage information. and a big -- the dominant theme of the whole doctrine was learn and adapt. you head to learn and adapt fastest than your enemy did. the dominant approach was -- we talk all right. it's expensive, time consuming but very effective and things

called lines of effort. and again, a point i'll make again later, much of what is called counterinsurgency is just modern warfare. as much as we anyway not like counterinsurgency at not going away because modern warfarer is not going away. this is where i talk about lines of effort. this is lines of warfare in a diagramment you have a -- a whole set of operations going on. not just combat operations. it's also the host nation security forces, developing -- restoring essential services, develop going governance and economic development all parted of what it takes to be victorious in these kind of wars because you're trying to change people's altitudes. you're trying to get more people to support the government than don't. this is not hearts and mind coin. hearts a minds is very much a social science approach, you make everybody love you. we realized we were doing the

doctrine there ire parts of the name you have to grab sometimes to get people to do what you want them to do. there's a bunch of coercive things as well as use you carrot and stick both. you change behavior and change attitude. you want the get the public to sport the governing authority, and everything is wrapped in information operations. everything you do has an information reaction. you have to deal with that as well. this is modern warfare in a simple diagram. it looks like on the ground. this is general mattis' plan in anbar province with the marines early in the iraq campaign. he identified his problem set as three different enemies, three different insurgencyies. in an bar there were three different enemies, a tribal incentury generalsive with the sunni tribe, incentury general i

from people we through out with the baath edicts in 2003, and then there was a group from al qaeda. the foreign fighters. and the idea was, had to deal with each of those separately. the sunni tribes were -- wanter dotted get back into society so attracted with jobs. the baathists want told get back into the government and could be attracts by political compromise, the foreign fighterred have to be killed or captured. as we know what happens in anbar province, evandally we get the sunni tribe to kill the al qaeda guys. they turn. we turn the tribe to come to our side and they help us take out the foreign fighters. that's the way these kind of wars can e tend to go. now, we had a number of battles within -- we had internal battles and external battles to get the doctrine done. one of them was numbering the manual. the manual is fm3-24. initials numbering for the

manual was fm3 pot 7-22 which meant it was the 22nd cad gore under civility operation. showed up and said this is among the team we talk about it, and we said counter-incentury ginnie differs from. praying beaut level of violence involved and needed its own category inwent to the campaigns arms director atsaid i wouldn't change the number on the manual. it was like monk could walk into the vatican and said i wouldn't rearrange the owes test. -- testament. they said the whole system win collapse. two likedder general pet petraeus had the same idea. when he made the suggestion it was great idea so the number changed. this is the only manual you find any u.s. government inventory with a reference bibliographyy of civilian works, recommend

reading we were told we daytona because that implies government endorsement of civilian work. that war the lawyers together us that but when general pet trace asked -- petraeus asked they gave him a different answer. reading level. army doctrine is women an eight grade reading level, not because soldiers are stupid. the idea is it's going to be read quickly and absorbed quickly. the argument i made this is being written for battalion staffs and above, college graduates, they can read a heard tex so it is -- the reading is up to -- 12th grade level. so good it has been used as a college textbook at a number of universities. adder i had number of professors claim to men we then mall ewan was revises the 20 she war losing their best textbook and want to us change its. this is a time of abu ghraib. got resolved because of the

mccain-feingold -- the bottom line congress passed the regulation that the rules for us, and another army manual became the standard so we didn't have to deal with it. a real tough nutted to deal with. we had a big debate with the human rights community on that and decided we would not allow any gray areas in any kind of morality. no torture no waterboarding, then the manual basically took a very hard line on that and eventually reinforced by what congress came up with. the air power appendix. we needed an appendix on air power nice ground guys need to understand the air roll better. marines didn't want to do it. force it it down people's throats. weaponn't waded to get air force involved. they posed their own appendix the first thing they talked about was the air force controlling off air pair. want to get marines crawling off the ceiling, tell them you're going to think airplanes airplane. we had to do a referee between

tharies store and marines how that would be. in the end the marines were probably right do more harm than good with that. the air force still -- i'm kind of an anti-christ for putting them in the appendix. they're lucky that guy that. weren't going to get anything if the marines had their way but that the air force interested in this and have done some pretty good things since. same thing we they ever army intelligence center. they were uneasy got them to come onboard but delayed in the manual two months and because of that ralph peters had a chance to write a nastieder toal that called the manual womeny -- womeny --womeny. we had a big debate between ralph peters and were changed seven sentences in the manual. when the manual came out in december, ralph peters called this the most improve government publication of the last depp decade.

they went back to hate us it again later when the next book came out but he actually supported. the last one was the paradoxes. this is my idea to put in the manual, which is now a nato manual. just to get people to realize a did kind of war and have to think about it different and there are some possible dilemmas to face in how you use force and how you you conduct it. sometimes in order to protect your force -- you can't lock yourself in four forward operating base. have to get out and patrol, take some risks. you have to provide the people security and they have to see you out there. sometimes the more force you use, is used, the less effective. it doesn't pay to kill five insurgents when the backlash creates 50 more. have to be careful. sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. some of the best weapons were consistent do not shoot. sometimes ball last and dollars

are more effective than but'lls and bombs. if a tactic works this week ick might not work next weeks, or this prones, might not work in the next. why not in the enemy is learning and adapting, too you have people involved in war and they're continuing to change. so, you have to understand that if you -- something works now, might not work in the next village. when the enemy finds a good tactic in iraq it shows numb afghanistan a month later. the enemy is communicating as well. it's a learning and adapting kind of article you have to be. in the last one, many important decisions were nod made by generals, because initially written as most important decisions are note made by generals. guess who has the last say in the development of any doctrine manual. the generals. so they changed that. but at least i kept it in and they changed most to many. but i get to another point later that my revision, my thoughts about the process after watching the doctrine in action, that'ses in yesterdays that the most

important decisions are not made by any kind of soldier at all. criticisms. people didn't like the doctrine. only -- called military malpractice, says the only way to do counterinsurgency is the way the nazi did against the russians. make the people fear you more than the incentury sundays. we're not going fight that way, especially the cn era. number of people say that i was really spiesed, got invited to give a presentation at nyu. and i walked into the conference and the conference is entitle -- didn't del me the name. the conference is counterinsurgency, the new imperialism didn't realize we are we are doing that. but there some that see this as brutal and just a way for -- to -- others have argued that if civil wars are different than

counterinsurgency there are some differents but also a lot of similarities and similar kind of wars. some said there was too much mao in the doctrine, mao is dead. even al qaeda uses maoist terminology. mao is not dead but not always relevant, still we have to understand the language he use. the most influential argument has been the impossible and dangerous ones. a guy at the war college argued the united states can't do coin because it takes to long and don't have the patient. the political culture can't think beyond four years, the society has an attention spanned of 30 seconds and the army doesn't want to do those kind of wars so we should not fight them. that's his argue; because we'll lose, the dangerous argument, won in washington, is john j. fields' argue. which is that if we focus to mitch on coin we'll lose at the conventional stills that are moisture more scorn also make our leaders to overconfident to do coin and is always andsive

and takes a long time. that argument is reallying won out in washington where the defense planning guys now says we will not do any kind of large scale counter-incentury general si in the future. we can hope. also one service will remain unnamed who has argues there's not enough air power in the doctrine. that's charlie dunlap and his writing. now, officer course, petraeus takes those iraq first and it's one of the shaping unfluents for the surge. there are surges, not just surge. there's a troop surge with petraeus used to in baghdad. also -- this is actually what god from general pet trace in february '07. said i need four surge, military surge, the surge in iraqy, political will, american political wail and the civilian surge. got the military surge. the announcement of the surge created a surge in iraqi political wail, especially anbar

province. most of the changes in anbar happened before the surge of troops gets there people turned against al qaeda. a lot of that dish talked to the roushys who said they'd happened because they knew were coming and were in it for the long haul. this worst to dying announce a surge with a deadline. what that does, takes away any incentive from the people you're supposed to help, to stay with you because you're telling them you'll leave. and the bad guys aren't going to leave. so the surge and president bush's announcement of support reinforcement the urge of iraqis to rise up against al qaeda. also you have the richard o'hanlon in jill that says the such is working which changed the democratic political debate from the candidate, the power oh get off iraq quick to exploiting the success of the surge, and as nye eve at the time naive, the doctrine was major -- sent out to all major leaders.

not only convinces the army we knew how to fight this scar also convinced ore enemies. didn't realize at the time i was creating this massive information weapon but turned out to be that. and civilian surge, attack the level we get that because petraeus gives the original reconstruction teams, you take care or them. they now belong to. your takes care of civil military coordinations, but never did get the interagency help he need. even though ambassador crocker trade the best they could to make do with the resources they had and really worked together join at thed at the hip. a trick team, petraeus and crocker but could have used more help. a lot of reese rains for the awakening, iraqis tired of violence, sunny realize they were losing, al qaedary ineptitude. basically antagonists the anbarys, especially fluff to

ride up against them. and again, we lose it all when we pull out in 2011. the gains get lost. we are were the glue in the mosaic peace. wasn't just the military, also diplomats. pulled out the diplomat as well and that breaks down this peace that was achieved by 2009. quick observation on iraq. know david petraeus picture, his palace in baghdad. i'm in the middle. that's differ on the left and january martin. john was dave's liaison with the embassy. this is on the left there, that's a ricky gibbs, one motor vehicle students at the army war college, ran into in south baghdad. he had a brigade with ten battalions and an occupations sewn of 1.25 million iraqis. this is a colonel. that is a division size element.

the whole command structure in iraq was strange. you had divisions that were really corps and brigadeses were divisions, and massive occupation zones. this case he's opening a hospital in the middle of an iraqi opening a hospital in south baghdad. that is the director of the army staff on the trip with us. i was there in october, november of '07. in the might he would goo right from there is and the night running combat patrols in the neighborhoods neighborhoods of south baghdad. one of the petraeus initiatives was out in the field. this is shocker. small combat outpost. about 100 some soldiers, company size element. here i am talking with the -- that's the guy is -- i talking about him the book. knows him is the captain in charge of the that outpost and

the end of the tabling is the brigades commander and that's myself, and steve bitle making a tour for general petraeus. what happens, they open up the combat outposts and you have these -- the rise of the sons iraq, militia groups rise up around the out post to help fight against al qaeda. the second person from the left there is sheikh -- sheikh stab back, who showed up tikrit said aim here to run the local militia. he said he was an nco in the iraqi army. i watched him operate. don't think he was an nco. he was the organizer of the local mill lit. she i'm actually outside the photo with captain molt, taking this picture. can't mold said could i swear those guys were shooting at me two months ago and i said, captain molt, welcome to counterinsurgency.

that's the way these war goes. the general is not a slippery, which. this is the interior minister for the iraqi government. interior ministry in iraq was a problem with corruption and sectarianism. you had to learn to identify your friends as much are your enemies 'we had bigger intelligence packets on temperature friend than enemies. have to know who to trust and who wow yao couldn't and bringing um sectarianism is a big problem in iraq. we did good training the iraqi army until maliki took the leaders away after we left. that was a success. not so much on the police. we did better. this actually is general. the guy who reforms the iraqi national police. fires most of the brigades and battalion commanders, their shiite sectarians and replaced them with more moderates leaders them national police were a real asset when we left and when

maliki -- after we left in 2011 the first thing maliki das was put the general in charge of bored post and but a crony in charge of the national police and national police went back to death squads and incompetence the way it was before we were there. we also did some interesting things at the coin behind the wire. that's the detention camp, 25,000 detainees when i was over there about 20,000 reconcilables. five thousand irreconcilables who were locked away. major general stone, one to the smartest guys ran into, among a lot of smart guys, sets up a program where he would -- you teach the moderate prisoners who can read, you bring in a moderates imam to teach them to read the koran and teach a moderate form of islam.

give the job skills and release them back to their tribes where they pledge for their tribal leader they'll stay loyal to the government. also some legal stuff involved in there as will but the bottom line is when i was there they had sent back -- released a little over 2,000 prisoners like that. two had come back. any prison in america would love a recidivism rate like that but the process was working very well. it was interesting, one of the people said they were firing moderate missiles back into iraqi society. we had to happen cheng the whole iraqi legal system. the legal system was based on coerced confessions the way the trials rand, you beat somebody up until the confess and the trial was this person trying to prove their confession wasn't true. we lad to teach them how to do a mores a very sayreal system. this awe new iraqi courtroom. we had to set up a series of those over there to speed up these -- the process of

prescribers got detained, actually got their cases heard and get them resolved in a right amount of time. one of the problems the general stone offend when the showed ', a lot of iraqis had been detained longer than the their sentence would have been if they were guilty. they hadn't actually got trial yet. we also did a lot of things for barriers of movement control. a lot of coercive thing. sectarian -- the ethnic divides, sectarian guides in iraq we imposed for security. baghdad was a much more ethically diverse city before we got there. but we had to impose for security these barriers like this. we put -- we must have used half of the world's concrete in iraq for security. the iraqis patientedded this one. the wires before that, that's the iraqi power grid. interesting but the top wires are the state electricity, which is free. if you want to screw up an electric system, give people free electricity.

and they'd get maybe eight hours a day of free electricity but once the electricity ran out the wires, the other wires wrapped around the pole there are wires to local generator operators and baghdad was powered 24 hours a day, just that at love theme was by local generator operatessors who war making money hand over fist, and we didn't consider that a real job. asked them what do you want from at the government? i want other jab. it's another a job. that's centralized economy, the mindset they empose on people. had to learn to accept local solutions. this is a place south of basra, near basra, a meeting with the local council that the two -- in the front there, that's the sunni and the shiite, shia sheikh flows log tribe to talk about how well they got along and how everything was down and how the reckon sides. thises and wanted everybody to

buy their oranges but did appreciate the fact there was a british unit right nearby to help provide security. but we had to learn to let the iraqis develop their own solutions. often times that are we are very rarely what we would have done. o. slower and complex but worked for them, much better than themes posed solution wes tried put on them. we talked about total with day. you're going get success with american military intervention, takes a long time. never takes three months, never takes six months, usely terribles 20, 30 years, my big example if korea. take 30s years after 1953 for a really what we call a functional democracy to appear. we were the glue that held together local cease fires. not just soldiers, dim polites as well. -- diplomats as well and there is would a reacts. when the new administration name, in 2009, they told the

ambassadors that crocker was too subservients to petraeus and amount boars need to be more independent which caused problems in iraq and afghanistan. we know that the country is fractured, we know what's going on over there. i would argue that this is a failure of foreign policy north counterinsurgency. their counterinsurgency was not allowed to be finished takes a long time. this is the ideal business transition, how to export work. military goes with allies, turnover point for the organization, and they eventually -- this is the idea wrap. the way people talk about in washington. and eventually the civilian organizations hand over responsibility to the indigenous organizations, this is how it happens. bottom line is you're a wishbone quarterback, a military and take the ball ask turn around and there's nobody else to pitch the ball to you're stuck with it. and then the -- when it works, works because the military maintains responsibility for

major resources and governance. a recent book,ard of governance, illustrates this better than i can with this chart. the bottom line is, the military dish if you're going to be success. the military should have the major responsibility for interventions for many years. this is just a chart. i'll leave if the with the heritage foundation. they can post it somewhere. i would add, got this chart from an army agency, differ agree with some numbers butty bottom line is if we're going consolidate gains the military is going to be there for a long time and you can -- the amount of success we have is directly proportional to how long the military stays there. now, we were not perfect. got a number of things wrong. the first one was the development process is upside-down. should start with a national security strategy that gives you the goals of the nation and then a national military strategy, execute them, and then joint

doctrine of the military force and then service doctrine how the different services approach the problem stemple wed did upside down. we developed a doctrine which drove everybody else to develop and it many ways became a substitute for national securitying extra and fill a national security vacuum. this was an operational level manual. coin is a way, not a strategy. and it got oversold, and that's respect to fields, criticism is accurate. union was oversold it is not an end, coin is a way to achiever an end, and somebody else has to set up the ends. the most important decisions in counter-incentury jerry veins are made by politics and voters, and not generals. the military had no say in iraq or afghanistan, for the form of government or who was going to lead it. we also failed in the manual to provide alternatives to clear, hold and build. it takes a lot of time and resources and we needed to

dismissed lower resource ways to successfully execute coin and did not. the other -- the biggest mistake we made in the manual, we made an assumption that the goal odd the host nations were the same as ours and we found in iraq and afghanistan that if is not true. often time we're working at cross purposes and rick do get the people wore supporting to do let think we need to do especially when that threatens their power and that we got badly wrong in the 2006 version of the doctrine. now i want to make observations modern war. then open it up to questions. these kind of wars, cob flick termination is complex. when our fight a against of a set of enemy and no one individual in control makes ending conflicts very difficult. the best you can do to manage them. manage the level of violence somehow. but you're never going to everybody get everybody to agree to the same thing.

still have a kinking lack of intereight capability in the american government. i tell my student at the war college thus government is like giants fiddler crab, one giant claw that is the department of defers, and this little tiny include claws that is the mythical interagency. you can fit all the foreign service officers in the state department on one aircraft carrier. there's more people on that than there is fsos in the state department. because of this lack of interagency capability, mission creech is a self-inflicted wound do more than the typical military tasks, pick unthings to do especially in a violent situation where civilian agencies are not equipped to deal with that. the military has to pick up more responsibilities even though the defers planning guide situation we won't. decapitation strategy. you leave to have -- there's a

reason woe don't bomb the empour record's palace in tokyo in world war ii, we thing the empour here has to be involved in the termination of the war, have to be careful who you kill. some people you have to be prepared to talk. to don't want to kill them all. sometimes the decapitation makes more enemies. have to be careful how you do that. doesn't grow out of the barrel of an american gun. self-evident. have to get public support and you can't do that with force. ...

and of the enemy gets the spin the way that information gets presented. who controls the ground controls the message and again special forces in my view has soared, to action. to use to be counter insurgents and now if you want to counterinsurgent you train foreign forces and if you want to kill someone you get a special forces guy, completely reverse from what it used to be and i think we need a better balance. for an offense advising is a important issue, but no one wants to do it. we are still fighting one year warrants or four month or seven month wars. i've heard briefings of that 12 months is as far you can go and why seven months is the limit in the air force and why four months for others. these kind of wars longevity counts. you have to have longer to worse and i know there is some

argument about stress and other things, but personal relationships are important in the can establish those in four months. precision is not always the answer. sometimes it's nice to hammer someone. sometimes b-52's are not always. there are two forms of war. hr mcmaster let's use this quote i mean, if no one is going to fight us the way we fight and to be honest and we are most asymmetrical all. no one fights like us, no one can fight like us so when we talk about asymmetrical warfare we are tagamet the way the rest of the world fights and i'm not sure that is the right term to use. last one, dilemma a counterinsurgent's. us military intervention will always be long and cost fleet to meet objectives and political leaders should be honest about that from the start. don't hold your breath, but we always interventions will be short and effective, but they

never are. just because you can do counterinsurgency doesn't mean you should, but just because you say you do counterinsurgency doesn't mean you are. in my view we have never done counterinsurgency in afghanistan , never committed the resources to it or developed-- we don't really develop a strategy and we have been there for eight years. again, the most important decision made by politicians and voters and not by generals. a great quote from one of the operations officers under general pretorius in iraq, i don't know if we had the wrong form of government or the wrong people in it. describing our problems in iraq. think about both of those, complex problem set and neither of them not military response ability. again, what we label as counterinsurgency is really just modern war among people.

i got to admit i have a whole lot of frequent flyer miles. i'm involved in a project with the nato partnership for peace or we have developed an exploitable counterinsurgency crit: sending out partnership for peace nations with a list of light 35 nations that want to get it and i have been told i will get first call on being on the teaching team to go to these places. i looked at the list of the 35 nations and none of those are france or britain or places like that. they aren't exactly guarding spots. i have to work on that. i've been to nigeria and there's a lot of people interested in this sort of stuff, but they have big problems to work with in their different situations. my last point, this is where dan who is sitting over here in the audience who is one of the guys that contributed in the latter part of counterinsurgency effort. we've never been able to never do this again. we could work on the semantics, but we have never been able to never do this again.

right now the event planning guy says no long-term coin. we have said that before, set it after vietnam. i dedicate the book to a young man was killed in iraq and one of the purposes of the book is to make sure when we do this again and we will do this again that we do a better. those are my-- that finishes my prepared remarks and i will present the most useful thing i have from the marines from this whole process, this slide about questions. [laughter] >> actually got a lot of great ideas from the marines, that they did give me this slide as well, so i will open it to the audience for any questions you may have. thank you. >> let me ask you to elaborate on that last point. we will do this again.

we will do with wrong and we want to stay long enough. are there lessons for how the army-- and the other services how they can design themselves to basically have a crumpled on building? you know, those damn fools will send us out again and they won't let us finish it and we will be the best we can and then they will pull us out. are there ways the u.s. army could be designed it to be damage tolerant to some as we can to do the best he can conceivably do given those practical constraints? >> i will steal a term i got from steve biddle, a lousy bumpers sticker, but we need an army of mediocrity. the point there is the conventional power of the american military is, it is the hammer that gives us our capability. we can't lose that conventional hammer and the fear it engenders and opponents. at the same time as one of my students observed at the war college this past semester, we

have on army and military designed to win the nation's battle, not to win the nation's war. to win the nation's wars yet to be able to do this other stuff, so the question is how-- do we went to design a military to win the nation's wars meeting other capabilities that beyond the conventional into governance and economic developing? it obviously needs a row-- robust interagency and needs an army willing to go into these things, so when i talk about army mediocrity in these we got to have swiss army knives as general perkins caused them soldiers to be prepared to do a lot of different things and turn the mindset like general betray us gets into and says you are now president of the university in europe to reestablish that we

need a mindset that is going to do them. we are trying to set up these brigades had to do that mission better and that's a good idea, but we only have so much structure. even with things like regionally aligned units, regional aligned forces we are setting up in the question is who does the second rotation because these things always take a long time, so you have 10 reports of generals to do a lot of different things again, it's a tough question to answer. i would love to say more for structure, but we have the budget problems and all of the other problems we have got, so i think the only real viable answers we have to have an intellectually agile force that's able to shift and train

up to the missions they have and be prepared to learn to adapt to be agile. that's not a good answer, but i think it's the one we have got to live with. >> can you talk about operating in the native language both in the media and you just mentioned about the swiss army soldiers, teaching any of the ground troops i guess in this case arabic? >> it's a dilemma. one of the things that came out of our work with human train teams, the idea of the human train things is that a key player in all of our stuff, our cultural anthropologist generated this idea that we need teams to go out help us understand the culture night actually ended up not a fan of those. i think we became focused too much on and apologists instead of the anthropology.

language is tricky. we talk about teaching people arabic and if you give some soldiery mother to or two in not enough to be useful. you need the real arabic speakers and that's a much different process and i think of all the services the army does the best is the foreign area officer program in developing people who will be experts in areas. there's never enough of them, but i think we need to examine a program of it. you have got to obviously the importance of cultural intelligence is understood better, but it goes back to my point about longevity. best thing you can do is live with people for a long time to fully understand them. >> i know that israeli military for every infantry company they send one person away for six months or so to work on arabic. >> the problem with the american army is middle east is only one theater of many and i know there are attempts and regionally aligned units to pick up

different language skills, but we are focused all of the world. israel has the advantage of these focused on a small area. i know we are trying to do more of that, but we have a lot of issues in a lot of places and we only have 70 people. those are good ideas, though. >> doctor crane from the heritage foundation. in your books and remarks you talk about having a very big tent and i remember you mentioned not just a conference room, but actually meeting hall with over a hundred people from different organizations. do you now have any regrets about the size of the group you had to deal with? >> i would argue for anyone that wants to do a project that it's a great model of how to do it basically when i first set out general petronius in november, 2005, he said it went to have a draft and by january.

i imagine to go she to february and then i had to get to the marines and get everyone together and we talked about and he said when we get done with the draft we want a small group of 30 people to sit in a room in early break it over the coals and talk about it they said okay great idea. i went to pick the 30 people are. so then they sent out invitations and we can assume most of these people will say no. everyone that was sent an invitation said yes. so, the the 30 people in the depth 150 and we couldn't fit them in a room so we ended up in a big auditorium and a lot of these groups say we will divide them into working groups and i said no, we have 150 smart people here we will get in a room and talk about this together. i have to say it's hardest intellectual thing i have ever done, but i felt like i mentioned in the book like i was

ringmaster to the stars here in the know of all these people trying to figure out and how this together. we generally brought in each chapter offered to do a brief on the chapter. i brought it summative critique it that would be hard on it and we open it up to discussion among the audience and then at the close of it we told the audience i know you have more to send us. sent us by e-mail and through mail and we got dell use with stuff in the next month, so generated stuff. steve mentioned the war college, he was sitting on his cell phone texting me stuff for the hope you're not. every thought he would send me this text. that's not really the design i wanted, but most people i sarah brought in a bunch of human rights people. harvard paid to bernese people here and they generated a debate over torture initially and when they understood we agreed that it opened up the conference to openness and everyone would get listened to. packet a big pocket of stuff from them.

a lot of the got a corporative into the manual. at bunch of cia guys are that i called the smith brothers that set the back and they give us great stuff as well. we got stuff from steve metz. we got stuff from other war colleges, other services. we had a number of different other countries involved. a big contingent that the lead seeker with a brit and mauling foster who wrote an article about how bad that americans were counterinsurgency and general put serious had him start of the thing with his pitch like waving a red flag in front of a bold to get everyone going. you knew that was his role to get up there he took the shot and got things rolling. the idea was to get people thinking and to generate thought and i thought having 150-- in this case having 150 people in the room worked fine. it was hard and i was completely exhausted at the end of the

today's, but i think we got great stuff out of it. again, i'm gone to other conferences since and you take 150 smart people and they break them up into workgroups i think you lose the power of that downright-- dynamic. i wish we had more time for it, but because they had the ability to vent afterwards and send us our stuff afterwards it kept the dynamic going. that was great. >> one of my question-- my question is do you believe the us will have the capability to successfully institute counterinsurgency and nationbuilding with our forces so spread out among almost every where will we have a the resources or ability to have like a long process of nationbuilding? >> tough question.

in the end of the host nation has got to come up with their final solution, so ideally you want the host nation to allow their own stuff. in a rack with their oil money was the potential for that iraqis to do a lot on their own. if we could have got them focused better get afghanistan is different problem. resource wise that the dilemma and i think you blame a lot of the countries who said they would donate and did not pick that's not just american, that the world. bottom line is you have to realize much as you can on hopefully you have an indigenous host nation resource enough to pick up some of the slack. we can't-- you know it's a careful balance if you try to do too much the host nation will never try to do anything, so how do you balance helping them with building their own capacity and that's why one paradox is it's better if the one host nation does it tolerably than if you do

it really well. it's an interesting balance. nationbuilding is one of those very weighty terms with a lot of baggage with it. you want to improve capacity, indigenous capacity, but i don't think-- i'm not sure if you can really build a nation. you can do state building. you can build state capacity and statement to two shins probability nation takes generations, i think. i don't like that term. there is one in the back corner. >> you mention the people on the ground control the message. i was wondering if-- how do you determine that the american message has been solidified and accepted when our goals are achieved and whether that's a continual process?

thank you. >> information operations are key aspect of this. i talked about the fact that you have get people to understand what you have done the dilemmas you have so many different audiences of international audience, your own audience at home, audience on the ground, your own soldiers, enemy soldiers and somehow you have to get a message that's consistent among those different elements, so it's hard to coordinate we don't have-- as a nation we don't have a real good way to coordinate those messages. we don't have a us information agency or something like that, so it becomes difficult for all elements of the us government to control the messages and it's hard. you have a problem with managing excitations and that's one of-- in the manual that's one of the important tenants is to manage expectation. we show up in a backward village in afghanistan and they want paved roads and running water

and television and all kinds of seven immediately and we are americans and they say you are americans anybody man on the moon. you can do anything. president obama used that all the time. a lot of times you to walk in and say here's what we cannot do because you have to manage expectations and if you get a situation where people in these cultures especially if they think they have been promised something and you don't give it, this is not someone that while you just it was good intentions gone awry, no, you lied to me. you purposely lied to me, so you have to be careful in some of the problems with some the inter- agencies is they will go in and promise something in a contract and you and the military get stuck with the result if it does get done. the bottom line is it's a difficult problem and as a nation we have to think about how do we coordinate messages across different levels and you have to be consistent or general poetry is used to talk about

people, he had a couple tenants for information operation. never put lipstick on a pig. be honest when things go wrong. be first with the truth, so we also have the upfront with these things and one of the big problem this who controls the ground patrols the message is we will go out and trade a special forces raided a village in afghanistan in amounts and we had to the read and we withdrawn their gone and then we go to assess what happened and we dried in the next day and you're in your jeep then you have media with you and you drive into the village and there are some parts of afghanistan where their main parts of economic is salacious, kind of a excuse for damage. we don't think we did anything wrong, but we were still hurts, so we show up in this village and everyone is lined up along the road with their arms in a sling because they all got wounded and they all have and margaret buried in the backyard. of course you can dig them up in check so the media guy says you

have 45 wounded in 15 dead and margaret's and that goes in the. of the taliban and is a master at as soon as we have a read within an hour there is something on the screen that shows dead babies and him: a mosque and that sort of stuff. you have to be proactive. you have to think about the information aspect of what we do before we do it. already have the information response prepared, so the military if you get in the planning self it's amazing the care we take on these operations , but it's not the same to the whole us government. we don't investigate things afterwards as well or as fast as they should, but that's a problem every level, not just on the ground and the question is how do we as the us court made our message across the board the international marina? >> we appreciate you. [applause].

>> we do have some books for sale. i will be buying one and we also have some refreshments. thank you very much for attending and hope you stay tuned to other events we have coming up on the calendar. thank you. >> you won't find it that cheap anywhere else. [laughter] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> here's a look at some authors recently featured on the tvs afterwards. our weekly author b-- author interview program. journalist jesse eisinger examined how the justice department handles like high crimes. connecticut representative rosa delauro discussed her work on

social programs. and journalist cheryl atkinson reported on how smear tactics are used to influence public opinion. in the coming weeks on afterwards former "breibart news" editor milo will explore limits on freedom of speech. "wall street journal" writer and editor george malone will offer his thoughts on his publications influence. and this weekend on afterwards, arizona senator jeff flake calls for a return to the core principles of conservativism. >> i remember sitting on the floor at one point with mike pence and he said sometimes after we have presented with the president still no child left behind, which for conservatives a think tank conservative that was federal intrusion into local education and that was not good for conservatives on. mics that i feel sometimes like we are minute men called up to

the battlefront only to be told the revolution is older. [laughter] >> so there we were and we had to vote on prescription drug benefits, which added about $7 trillion in unfunded liability and didn't think that was very conservative. than republicans engaged in just horrible types of spending as well, your american euro was fully underway. 2001 to 2006 and we really lost our way and because we could not claim that we were fiscally conservative anymore and mean that was thrown out the window with all this spending, then we had to argue about things like flagburning you know and delve into the wedge issues. i think in some ways we have never gotten back. we had the majority the house in the senate and we had the white house and we lost it 2006 we lost the house and senate in 2008 lost the white house. so just because we have those majorities today doesn't mean we

will have them even two years from now or a year and a half from now. >> afterwards airs on book tv every saturday at 10:00 p.m. and sunday at 9:00 p.m. eastern. you can watch all previous afterwards program on our website, book tv.org. book tv recently visited capitol hill to ask embers of congress what they are reading this summer. >> i'm reading the fish have it moved. i'm reading james clyburn's book , less experiences and i'm also reading about the life of the credit scott king, my life, my love, mike legacy about credit scott king. >> what inspired these choices? >> lets me just say that then when she was really in the movement as now women in physical or black women never gotten the credit we should have gotten for what we did in the movement