.. arafat during our financial

system. >> okay, stephen, this gentleman here. >> steve buckingham, this question is for david berger. it seems i've been hearing you describe the united states. a lot of things you are saying sounds like the united states. i think about the education bubble we have here the united states is like a lot of other bubbles, the housing bubble has

created economic and cultural turmoil. part of the problem is they are not enough payoff of the investment in education. they were told to go to college and their inspiring stories like george soros worked his way through the london school of economics and then got dirt poor selling trinkets on the eastside and in eventually and mystery baking. anywhere they are being disillusioned with their own system and looking to have more liberal policies in the liberal order and they are disconnect. like you had made achievements. they found a way of life, all likelihood. and so, it just appears perhaps

education needs to be revalued. as a society after we value education. the last election about bernie sanders, free college for everyone. >> you had both bernie sanders in the u.s. you have jeremy corbyn in britain and one of the big appeals is the disillusionment disillusionment -- [inaudible] but to repay people that are already paid back. this is just writing a massive check to the middle and upper middle class, which overwhelmingly dominates higher education.

in the same he was proposing that company was also proposing not to increase welfare benefits . i think it is chance as much as designed. they were put together a pragmatic feeling to lots of different groups. but i think they will have noticed the enormous popularity. although, i think that is one of , clearly something so relatively quickly in the u.k. the cultural and political power of higher education is a very understated subject and indeed we were just talking earlier

about this election in britain by the two of the for the first time. we talked about the university anywhere goes to kind of establish and they are not -- they leave home, but they become kind of rooted and established in none group thinkers somewhere

that they are educated in ways they can rationalize more effectively. no one joke about this is i sometimes say, you know, explaining brexit i say i blame the masses. mass immigration and mass higher education has produced brexit. >> okay, right over here. white jacket. >> thank you for coming. i worked on a number of political campaigns. is there in the nature of the sacred that we have here, sort of we've got things that the

elites have themselves to come which i believe the last election proved to be completely objectionable to large segment. i would say hourly, things like planned parenthood, abortion, free immigration, you know, we have things that people of an educated status would say are nonnegotiable. so what do british coming in no common value schemes, do they lend themselves to a nature policy wise reject it? the nightcap, good question. not that similar to hear. integration with certainly be one of a kind of emblem.

i mean, we don't have immigration. we have had immigration and have become much more open, but certainly beyond keeping down a bit in the 80s and 90s and then a new surge after 2004 when the communists countries have shown in the european union came to the u.k. that has become one of the central dividing line in this argument. and indeed it's become i think just social change more generally. the idea of social change, these are sort of good things in this

requires them a very large amount of fluid to the, which i said right at the beginning of some pain site not only comfortable, but desirable and seek to kind of handle change. but, the other liberal mainstream ideas. the european union seem to sort of crystallized the modern european openness. but of course it did so at the promise of reducing the democratic voice. now, they fell to similar things that kind of affected their

lives were imposed -- one of the key differences they are in the way in which an global, all of these global negotiations in some sort of deal to further open up trade and services must inherently be a good thing and we have to come together. we have to come together in europe to negotiate and protect ourselves from the global bond markets. elites, even in the top 15% from

a 20% the population, they understand they cannot see the rationality enough and benefits then. but the cure is worse than the disease or it is the same as a disease. it doesn't really make a difference to me. the religious issues play somewhat less of a role in u.k. politics. minority integration is another one of in terms of caring about it. what easily disturbed by this feeling there are whole neighborhoods where people feel a bit anxious about it they will be schools entirely minority

dominated. they think that is fine. that is modern world. but because they have less of a sense of you might say in ethnic identity than those of common norms than a common way of life. they are less disturbed by the consequences of large-scale immigration. >> let me sharpen my point a little bit. this is on immigration. bring that out a little bit. what struck me when fred siegel was writing city journal, the sky is rather courageous. one of your comments in the book, which you would get tremendous pushback here. you talk about social cohesion and immigration. immigration is the assimilation of immigrants.

it would be easier essentially to assimilate 100,000 australians as opposed to 100,000 afghans. you'd get tremendous pushback. so this is the difference that gets between anywhere in somewhere attitude. the question of social cohesion, maybe the different types of societies people come from do make a difference. how dare you even bring this up to someone who would say this is the situation with gordon brown a couple years back. giving a chance to think about this. >> that's a really good point. what it underlines is a return to this different attitude to groups identity and the

liberals, the last team to beat group is when it comes to economics and the social class. when it comes to culture society, at least in britain it becomes a collection of individuals. so what difference can i possibly make? some ways don't see the vet. they see a society, radically different views depending the economic window cultural lens. they're all mostly and there's no such thing as society when it comes to people's, how we use difficulty in cultures and ethnicities and all that kind of stuff. but we can genuinely believe

what anybody knows -- [inaudible] just a language, culture way of life mutually shared with australians and they can assimilate them about obviously it is common sense and it will take longer. it will be more friction filled and difficult process. >> the gentleman right here. >> s., brian marshall. among british values, i would think it has been covering very significant. no of the parliament. much of the legislation coming from outside the country in

considerably well with an extent, that would be a major problem in the united states. i've not heard very much about it being a concern in britain. is that a case? most of the discussion is relating to immigration. >> no, there has long been a minority of people who have object did strongly better represented by the european union. the same way -- what happened in the 1980s and make you name these, it has been a success story in many ways. in the 1990s, its success went

to the end of the cold war. in brussels. a rushed ahead with the euro. it introduces concept of european citizenship, which subsequently made it difficult to control freedom of movement. one thing that we have is people coming when they arrived they had to be treated the same way which defended against the common sense notion americans would have, slovakian and the idea that should have been a? for public good. ben also had the over rapid enlargement. we are leaving the european union because in large groups we would promote more than the

other and integrating and does he say, the route to parliament is important here in the immigration story. quite a few people came from the late 40s to the 80s, 90s. people from the caribbean, africa, indian, pakistan, britain became used to society. but in the 80s and 90s, politicians, they wanted to risk bond to the anxiety people felt about it. in the early 90s, it's actually negative. more people were leaving the north men were coming. that kind of makes it easy to observe the newcomers.

after 2004 with the great surge from eastern europe, people would realize we could do nothing about it because this is a set of rules we signed up to. it hadn't been a deal between 2004 because people don't believe in can only develop it. a lot of poor countries joined. we were the only big country to allow to labor market by the way of people in people realize it's basically existential of who comes into your country and we weren't able to affect. this is true on a range of other issues, too. you know, the whole point is they have different preferences

on things. you different national preferences to the choices you make on the risk, whether it's financial products are britain americans disagree about these things than we have different ways to disagree about these things. when you join a club in affectionate type to sum it back to the wto. suddenly all these preferences are harder to impose. now it may be worth doing that if the reward is big enough. you really are getting richer, but there's a feeling of the european union to be sacrificing national sovereignty and not getting back in return. >> the fourth row. yet, you start. >> i'm a student from london,

england. my question is how much would you argue our media has more of a say towards political participation and back run a context and identity. >> the media plays a bigger role. >> towards participation than background. >> well, i think the media -- the media plays an interesting role in it the argument and it's possibly part of the solution. we've had a narrowing of our political culture in the last two or three generations. they tended to become more and more the miller, much of our

political class and special advisers who then go on to become congressmen. and you've seen that have a saying in my top, you see a narrowing of the liberalism they see so dominantly. and yet, the internet, which is the kind of somewhere trolls, the kind of elite filters on the communication of being complete a blown away at its very ugly a lot of the time. it is messy, but it is giving a voice to people who didn't have a voice before. i think it's too early to see quite how that media revolution,

a populist democratic media revolution. i think in some ways one could see this as kind of an optimistic development. in the short-term, it certainly made the tone of politics uglier. but it's a bit like populist parties in europe. many populist parties in europe with minorities and coalitions. not in all cases, but the finns party in finland, for example, the compromising government, lost a lot of public support, but it learned it's a difficult

trade-off. you change your behavior and i think that's been a civilizing influence. you might say the same thing about the kind of new media opening. the fact everyone can have their own newspaper and to eat or even on facebook and what people might listen to. because we are near the stages of it, i think it may see the becoming responsible people become the platform here. >> yes, go ahead. >> my name is nan palmer.

i was just wondering something the native tape the same is true for britain. basically a lot of anywhere is there certain groups of anywhere kind of just using anti-intellectualism sentiments as kind of a scapegoat in gaming populist influence. you mentioned certain bridges we might be able to use to find compromise and i was wondering if he thought we could never reconcile that sentiment. >> did you mean that they are using -- who is using anti-intellectual sentiment? i didn't quite understand that. >> for example with the past

election, we would all consider president trump as anywhere, but i think it is very successful in harnessing the populist sentiment. >> well, the statement during the brexit campaign by the british politician who said people are fed up. he said that effectively. what he meant his obviously we are not fed up with expert -- [inaudible] where engineers are hard scientists. the media is dominated by people who have journalists or commentators or academics or

whatever. and they are not neutral. invariably they have agendas. they have the triggers at their fingertips, but they are not neutral. it is also true what we are seeing in the last generation or two this eradication of the politics of deference in our society. in britain. there is more kind of structure and they think it is in some ways the deference is not on the whole the sentiment that these to make democracy. it should be differential in

many ways. i think it is kind of a bit too rapid, to kind of spilled over for any form of authority, just because someone's deputies subject for 10 years i feel differently about it. much greater attached to sentiment and feeling and emotion. reinforced by the revolution in many ways. that can go too far. they may actually simply no more.

>> a wealthy person has the leader of a populist cause, we can in fact go back to julius caesar. the gentleman way in the last row. >> david, you mentioned -- [inaudible] i have friends in munich and i think they are right. what are we missing? >> they have great technical universities. just look at the list produced. it is dominated by the u.s. like i said, germany has great technical universities. it doesn't have great sort of general global universities.

with the exception of technical universities. it does not attract huge flows. >> i mean, germany did one sleeve and it's actually a deliberate novel policies. the government doesn't stream larger amounts of money so it doesn't have an oxford and cambridge for a harvard and yale. >> they come here are the go to britain for education. >> okay, this gentleman. >> hi, my name is joe patrick. so, it seems that we are in a global trend in the rise of big men.

president trump here, aired on. how do you feel anywhere in summer is related to this rising demand? >> there is in impatience -- people are impatient to being governed by institutions and they want to be governed by people. you even see that in china or after the death of mao, they tried deliberately to move away from a personal estate system. the threat was able to raise nec xi jinping is behaving more like an emperor than a chairman of the committee. this is a think partly a result of the disintermediation through the internet of the institutions

in politics. one other point to make here about the relationship is paid today feel a heck of a lot better and are better educated in 1920, the average school in the u.s. might have been eighth grade, 15 years old. today you have many more people going through many more levels of education and they simply even in the u.s., many people go through two years of secondary education. they don't actually feel they need professionals to tell them how to do x, y, z. they think they are to you know already. you also had earlier in the 20th century, many people from rural areas to urban areas. the urban area was unfamiliar.

it was not what you grew up with. you look to the professionals t. tell you how to behave in this new environment. you are now at home in the. they are always coming up. so there is a pushback on that. >> we've got time for two quick questions. >> thank you very much. you made an interesting point. [inaudible] you made an interesting point at least to me with respect to

experience and you said the distinct difference between the individual acts area in the person that can create an idea in 15 minutes or so. somehow my analogy is viewed as mythology in some respects, given a lot of credit versus take the dow jones here in the states in some respects, very few companies on the dow jones that are 20 years old or so. that kind of experience is gone. the type of x. versus the instant, salter said here with respect to the instant expertise one cannot just by getting 15 minutes.

>> bf, i was in a way talking more about status in those kinds of jobs that required a lot to do well. you didn't have to be smart to do the job. the disappearance of those jobs in recognition from a lot of occupations in some ways the small, kids who produce all these massive digital economies. that is a sort of finality in

the dow jones. how they will settle down, there are probably certain jobs in microsoft, google better protected like that. but yes, part of that general shift to admiring cognitive ability, those other qualities we need to carry the moral standing experience of things that everybody can play that game. 50% are in the bottom house.

>> the last question from the gentleman here. >> david, how do you explain ireland or do you have any interest in joining brexit? >> it was the welsh voters and people talk about it as being a kind of perhaps the great last act to english working class. there is some truth in that. there is a legitimate resentment

about the downplaying of the interest in the new arrangements that emerged in the last couple of decades, saving whales in the ceiling that the english subsidized don't have their own voice. the population is 55 million, i think we are kind of debate. the bed. when we roll over and don't get squashed, it's kind of necessary for self-restraint. they have been rebelling against it. but i would say they get nearly

40% voted to leave. this is not an overwhelming voice. all of the places like the west midlands of england also had very large remaining votes. everywhere was pretty mixed. there was a bias in scott and, in london and there might be not anti-englishness, but scotland has been trying to leave the united kingdom.

there is a feeling that although it might sound that they would prefer the historic resentment in beatnik kind of little guy in the context and the united kingdom. the last election has shown there is no second referendum in scotland. the conservative body did much better beginning to tire of the s&p. also, it is much harder for someone to be independent. we were both inside the european union. the costs economic and otherwise quite dramatically.

>> following england -- [inaudible] >> they decided to get out of the bed entirely rather than risk being squashed by the big english bear. the irish commentators complain about the irresponsible way in which the english welsh of been jeopardized in the open border. but i think it's pretty unrealistic to expect english voters to place 55 billion. you really think 55 million should put an anxiety about the understanding way before the

fundamental desire for a return to national sovereignty. you are judging the english if you are saying that. we certainly don't apply to the smaller nations. i think it's a very good will, away around northern ireland with some sort of substantive passport or border check when they come in the mainland. perhaps the irish government, we can house on the irish border with the combination of the two things. i think it's unfair to expect

the english to express their interests. >> i don't need to be rude, but if i may, you have also the differences with the irish culture, scottish culture, with the english experience another broader argument that then i'm brexit. >> very many arguments we haven't had time and many subjects we have an address. >> thank you. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> right now i am reading a book from aei called the safety net that works. really, really trying to understand a lot of the issues surrounding poverty to take my experience at the local level and try to find answers to a lot of the problems we deal with with people in poverty now we move them into the middle class. in a technical standpoint i am reading a lot of policy right now. we've got a lot on the table and i just reread the book that i very much enjoyed how the moon is down by john steinbeck and it

tells the story about how a foreign invader came in to a small town in basically hijacked the community for some benefit. i think it's interesting -- an interesting right now. those are the ones i have been reading ben on the future, the hillbilly elegy will be the next one we pick up. >> thank you for your time, congressman ferguson. it seems like you are focusing on a lot of narratives on policy. what attracts you to those narratives that are outside of the classic bill or memo you made. >> well, part of it is driven by a desire to work for this nation. that's what i'm passionate about doing. i think they give a different is

that otherwise wouldn't have. it is morning and it's a lot of fun. being able to translate that knowledge into policy is also very exciting. we do that because it's relevant to what we are working on. >> it on both tv we want to introduce you to kevin young, author of his new book, "bunk: the rise of hoaxes, humbug, plagiarists, post-facts, and fake news". comes out this fall.