[inaudible conversation] >> good morning, everybody, if you could take your seats we'll get started shortly. good morning, thank you all for coming to the 2017 u.s. strategic forum. we'd like to thank the korea foundation for their support.

we are fortunate to have the csis trustee and ambassador here to to give opening remarks. before i introduce them i'd like to say words about safety here at csis. we feel secure in our building, but we have the duty to prepare for any eventuallity. i'm lisa collins, a fellow, serve as your responsible safety officer for this event. please follow my instructions should the need arise and familiarize yourselves with the emergency exits in the back on right and left. to introduce our first two speakers, ambassador richard armitage is currently the president of arm itage complanl. he's had a distinguished career in government and policy. and the ambassador has been

former south korean ambassador from 2013-2015. ambassador lee had a long he is teamed career working in south korea ministry of foreign affairs. ambassador armitage will speak first followed by ambassador lee. >> thank you very much, good morning, everyone. welcome you to csis. quite a crowd here. something going on on the peninsula of korea? when i was asked to speak here and make a few remarks appreciating ambassador lee or president lee as you may prefer, i was wondering what we were going to talk about. in the space of a couple of weeks, ten days or so, we had an icb m. shoot, an alleged hydrogen bomb. we have icbm's allegedly moved

to the coast in north korea. we've got a president here in the united states that's bellowing about appeasement from south korea and bellowing about the possibility of removing ourselves from course, which is exactly the wrong thing to do in my view at this time. this is not-- this didn't recognize the spectacular things we've witnessed in the republic of korea in the last several months. it wasn't very long ago, right upstairs, we had moon jae-in for a dinner and made a wonderful presentation at dinner. here was a republic of korea just came out of a beautiful, peaceful, democratic election while the previous president was being put in jail and on trial. and it was all done seamlessly.

this is a nation that deserves support. so i have a charge for all the americans in the room here today, when this conference is over, there should be no doubt in the minds of any of our friends from the republic of korea that the united states is 100% behind them, behind them in military and security terms, behind them in economic terms, behind them politically. this is a charge i give to my american friends. [applaus [applause] >> so i've spoken my piece. you know what i think and now we'll hear from someone who really knows what he's talking about. mr. president, president lee. [applaus [applause] >> ambassador, thank you for your strong commitment and short remarks which gives me a little more time to speak. thank you very much.

and we have those who are going to join us, and distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, very good morning and welcome to the rok, u.s. strategic forum 2017. on behalf of korea foundation, it's my pleasure to stand again with csis in washington d.c. first of all, i would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you for your commitment in participating in this forum. my special thanks go to those who travelled here from outside of washington d.c. and especially those who remain the long journey from seoul, a couple of korean attendants arrived after midnight last night.

it was exactly nine months ago today when i stood here last time to open the first korea-u.s. strategic forum. at that time i remember the sense of anticipation we all had for the new president-elect, u.s. president-elect and the concerns that we shared at the then republic of korea. since then, as mr. armitage just mentioned, many changes have occurred, each requiring our time and attention and critical analysis. i think we can all agree that another december forum in 2017 was too long wait, hence, we moved today's forum to september for the critical issues at hand. i would like to draw your attention to several points of

common interest that are of particular note this year. firstly, this year marks the 135th anniversary of the establishment of the korea-u.s. diplomatic relationship in 1882, at a small port city on korea's western coast. peoples of the u.s. and korea, then chosen, encountered each other as almost total strangers and finally signed the first agreement between our two countries. secondly, this year marks the fifth anniversary, the result of several years of negotiations. even after the deal was reached, five more years were needed for the korean side to gain approval of national assembly. with that in place since 2012, the interdependence of our two

countries not only as an integrated market, but also as even stronger security allies has become increasingly reinforced. certainly, the new administration launched in washington d.c., respectively, while americans were experiencing a different style of relationship to that of the past, koreans were exercising their democratic freedoms as they changed their president in a surprisingly lawful and peaceful manner. they turned a political crisis into an opportunity for exemplary model. 70 to 80% approval rating which president moon jae-in has

enjoyed since his inauguration reflects the pride of the korean people. lastly, a long dark shadow over all other issues on korean peninsula, and that's, of course, north korea. early morning on the day before yesterday, sunday, i was awoken by breaking news alert on my mobile phone. it was about trump's announcement of a possible withdrawal from this. by then, i thought my opening remarks were in need of slight change, slight modification. then at mid day, the latest news on north korea broke and i stood there transfixed gazing at the news on my tv and computer screen. i had prepared for this moment, lost its relevance so i began to think what i could deliver

in remarks, i could not think of hf -- those and delete the whole part. and talking about the so-called h-bomb on one of the seoul tv channels, what should be do? do we have any option other than another round of condemnation, sanction resolutions and displaying u.s. strategic assets in korea? could the sanctions ultimately stop north korea from becoming a nuke state? can we expect any productive dialog with kim jong-un regime if and when it becomes a nuke state? you i unfortunately have no answers. i'm hoping that some or most of you do, however, as an ordinary citizen of korea born right after the war, one thing i'm

sure of is that no matter how great the situation becomes any military action that risks ending up with full fledged war on the peninsula can never be an option unless it is truly the last resort of survival of our and our allies. ladies and gentlemen, let's not forget beyond the north korea nuclear issue there's another pressing issue that demands our attention. economy cooperation. in addition to security cooperation, economy cooperation under the fta food as a second foundation of pillar for our bilateral relationship. when it was signed it was the most figure trade agreement for korea and for the united states, since the signing of nafta. despite the fact that world's trade volume continues to

flouder following the financial crisis in 2008 and rapid rise of china as a trading partner for both u.s. and korea, the nations experience increase in volume and market share. and held on august 22nd in seoul -- i must concede that i have no knowledge whether president trump's announcement on saturday was based on the assessment of the first joint meeting or not. i carefully read -- sorry, i carefully read the article written by cutler with respect for her insight and i could not agree more with most of the points she made therein. today we have the best speakers not only on issues of security, but also trade from both korea and the u.s., including wendy.

where is she now? that's why i am confident that the session three will also be productive one to show the way, how to proceed the next steps, for the government navigations. and yet, i do not wish to take too much time away from our wonderful speakers we have lined up for today's forum except for a few word on korea foundation that i'm representing. every year the korea foundation puts heavy emphasis on products and programs in the united states. the foundation has provided the lion's share of funding to it for the programs proposed by the u.s. universities and think tanks, since the establishment in 1991. these efforts have further strengthened the relationships between our two countries and promoted that understanding between our two peoples.

for this year's forum the korea foundation and csis has invited the best scholars and diplomates in our diplomatic history. among the delegates you can find some familiar faces you can remember from our forum last year, at the same time you can see scholars, former government officials, but should be no stranger to you even if this is the first time for you to see them at our forum. i'm especially glad that there was a time to speak at our luncheon here today and i believe that we, the korean delegates are ready to share both our personal views as well as policy of the newly formed government. this is the first occasion for the korea foundation to arrange a forum with a partner from the

u.s. since this government was formed. and our alliance is facing perhaps the greatest threat on the korean peninsula since the cease-fire, obviously, due to the nuclear testing and launching missiles and prove evaluation of north korea. on the front, it seems we stand, where the future of the future is to be decided. we have to overcome this crisis and bring our economic cooperation beyond the fta. i believe it would provide us with a truly timely opportunity to share our views with each other, and certainly as a result of this forum we can offer guidance to both the u.s. and korea policy makers now and the future of the alliance.

last but not least, i'd like to express my sincere appreciation to dr. jo john whomney we'll meet tomorrow and for making this forum possible. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, ambassador armitage and ambassador lee. we'll have them take player seat. and now stephanie murphy will come out and give a speech shortly. thank you very much. bare bear with us as we introdu introduce congressman murphy.

>> good morning, i'm the senior and advisor here and professor at georgetown. on behalf of ambassador armita armitage, john hammery and everyone here we'll welcome you for what should be an interesting day long series of discussions about critical issues regarding korea at a very critical time. my role this morning is to introduce our keynote speaker congressman stephanie murphy-- correspondi congress woman stephanie murphy. they have a full schedule the next 12 days so we're especially grateful she was able to join us this morning. congress woman murphy represents florida's district in u.s. house of

representatives. she currently serves on the house armed services committee and house small business committee where she serves as ranking member on the subcommittee on work force. previously congresswoman murphy was a business woman and college instructor after a national security specialist in the office of secretary of defense where she received numerous award for her distinguished service, including the secretary of defense medal for exceptional civilian service. she worked on a variety, range of security issues from counterterrorism to foreign military relations to strategic planning for the defense department. prior to her public service, she was a strategy consultant at deloitte. she holds an ms in foreign service degree from georgetown university, and a ba in economics from college of william and mary.

ladies and gentlemen, please help me welcome congressmurphy for her remarks this morning. [applause] >> thank you, and thank you to csis and the korea foundation for inviting me to speak. i'm really honored to be here this morning and especially given recent events on the korean peninsula. i don't think this event could have been more timely. victor, thank you for that warm introduction. >> at georgetown university school, where i received my master's degree. victor is a good teacher and better public servant and i hope his service will have another chapter. i also hope that professor cha is not grading my performance and i hope i do better than the b-plus which was my average in grad school. for benefit of the audience

here and on-line, let me briefly reintroduce myself. i'm stephanie murphy, a member of congress. i was born in vietnam and came to the united states as a refugee with my family after the fall in 1975. i'm in a district including orlando and northern suburbs and a member of house on services committee where i serve on the subcommittee for readiness and emerging threats and capabilities. in addition, along with the congressman from massachusetts and congressman panetta from california, i co-chair the national caucuses national security task force. so the purpose of this recently established task force is it to help democrats in congress propose strong, smart and strategic national security policies. to support the current administration when it advances policy, foreign policies that comport with our nation's core

interest and value and vigorously oppose the administration when it proposes those that undermine values. as leaders of the task force we don't see any value in reflexively opposing the administration nor any more values in blindly supporting them. i think it's about being fair and presenting smart and strong policies that work for this country. before coming to congress, i worked in a variety of roles as a civilian roles in department of defense, and mine was the asia-pacific region. although i identify as a moderate democrat in congress, i have two secretaries of defense, donald rumsfeld and gates. i can't tell you how different those experiences were. i'm a believer of the old maxim to the greatest extent possible, politics should end

at the water's edge. i continue to cling to this principle and at this point quite frankly, desperation. in my brief framing remarks i'd like to underscore the importance of alliance between the united states and south korea, to identify what i believe are the two main challenges to this alliance and offer views from congress how these challenges should be addressed. let me have a few word about the alliance. it's somewhat of a cliche for government officials to assert that the relationships between two nations are common values. however, between the u.s. and south korea, it's true. it goes well beyond this, this alliance is special because it was built in battle, forged in fire and shaped by shared sacrifice. between 1950 and 1953, the citizens of our two nations fought and often fell side by

side to repel north korea's invasion of south korea and south korea's very existence. in 1953, following the armistice, there was a defense treaty for each country to come to the other's defense. and south korea has evolved from a dictatorship from democracy, from a largely underdeveloped country to a powerhouse and the u.s. has been there to lend a helping hand for economic and security support and currently over 28,000 u.s. troops nationed in south korea who help defend our allies. but make no mistake about it, south korea's success over the years is attributable, first and foremost, to the talent, ingenuity and grit of the south korean people and their leaders. put differently, south korea's remarkable rise like so many consumer products the world has come to depend on was made in south korea. products like the phones i see

many of you using to fact check my speech. because our two nations fought together in a war that's never really ended and because our service members continue to stand together along perhaps the most dangerous border in the world, our relationship is the furthest from transactional, temporary or tactical. instead it's authentic, deeply personal and resilient. likely to endure despite setbacks, tensions and differences of opinions inevitable between any partnership, between proud, sovereign and democratic nations. at the same time, i believe a warning is in order. the proven depth and durability of our security and economic relationship should not breed complacency. a strong alliance like a strong marriage is not self-sustaining, just ask my husband. it requires patient and persistent upkeep by officials in both nations. it should never ever be taken for granted.

so let me now turn to identify what we see as two broad challenges to the u.s. and south korean alliance and how each should be confronted to maximize the chance of success. the first and most obvious challenge is the one posed by increasingly belligerent unpredictable and dangerous regime in north korea. as everyone in this room knows painfully well, north korea has conducted six tests, each a violation of international law. the four tests under kim jong-un and north korea tested a nuclear device one had a has a powerful more yield than the device it tested in september of 2016. it's a dangerous, defiant and destabling event and the test has generated verbal

condemnation from the international community, including china and russia, but it's too early to say whether these strong words will be followed by strong actions and if so, what those actions will entail. and whether or not they'll make any difference in altering north korea's strategic calculus. meanwhile, north korea continues to develop and test missile delivery systems, approximately 16 different tests this year alone. tests conducted in july lead the u.n. security council including china and russia to impose strict sanctions on pyong yang, which is cautious optimism. however, it will be to see how quickly they're enforced, and remains to be seen whether the security council will agree to strengthen these sanctions

further in light of north korea's latest nuclear test. more generally, it's unclear what precise impact sanctions will have on north korea's economy and on the regime's inclination, if any, to negotiate a nuclear freeze for some degree of sanctions release. in the short-term, north korea responded to the sanctions in typical fashion, flying a lifl last month that flew over japan and of course, north korea proceeded with the latest nuclear test in the face of broad international opposition. the reality is -- the reality is that we are now in truly uncharted territory. and we've not yet cracked the code how to influence decision making in pyong yang. and the goal is to hit the territory of guam, u.s. state of hawaii and eventually the u.s. mainland. according to conventional

wisdom, kim jong-un's point is to avoid the fate of iraq, gadhafi in libya and outside forces and therefore ensure regime survival. this rationale bewilders the united states and other countries. we may test pyong yang, but regard north korea's progress in the nuclear program is the sole behavior that could compel the action that could result in regime change or collapse in north korea. from this perspective north korea seems to be making a fundamental miscalculation in its own best interest and could bring about the exact results, regime extinction, that pyong yang speaks to avoid. ....

specifically come he asserted north korea seeks to threaten the u.s. homeland in order to undercut the credibility of the united states extended deterrence guarantees to south korea under our so-called nuclear umbrella. i agree with this analysis. kim jong-un may well believe his actions could cause u.s. policymakers to act anymore unilateral fashion undermining the alliance. he may even believe the u.s. would hesitate to come to south korea's defense if the u.s. perceives that doing so could expose the u.s. to direct attack. again, however, believe he is making a fundamental miscalculation. if anything, the increasing threat to the u.s. homeland posed by north korea should

bring the united states and south korea closer together, not drive a wedge between us. because our fates are so closely intertwined. u.s. policymakers must make crystal clear that the u.s. commitment to south korea and the importance of washington attaches to cooperation with seoul is stronger than ever. as victor and jake silva noted in a recent op-ed north korea is the land of lousy options but those options only become worse if there's any real or perceived erosion in use south korea relationship. that leaves me to what i see a second main challenge to the lives which is the changing complex political dynamics in washington and seoul with recent elections of president trump and president moon. let me focus on the former. i think it's safe to say we have a significantly unconventional leader in the white house. when it comes to the trump administration and its approach to the multifaceted u.s. south great partnership, my concerns fall into two categories.

first i'm concerned about apparent inability of the administration to nominate and secure senate confirmation of qualified individuals to fill positions at stat state and defe responsible for policy towards korea and east asia. for example, nearly eight months into this administration there is no nominated ambassador to seoul, no nominated assistant secretary in the state department bureaus east asia and pacific affairs. there's the undersecretary for arms control and international security. there's a special envoy for the north korean human rights issues. over at the department of defense no individual has been nominated and confirmed for the position of assistant secretary of defense for asia-pacific affairs or deputy assistant secretary of defense for east asia. absolutely no disrespect to the individuals who may be holding his positions on an interim or acting basis. some of them are excellent but we all know senate confirmation provides enhanced credibility and stability.

when it comes to international affairs in general, and alliance preservation in particular, personnel is policy. i'm heartened that irresponsible individuals ike steve bannon at sebastian gorka had departed the administration. and that experience national security professionals like the white house chief of staff john kelly, the secretary of defense james mattis of the national security advisor h. r. mcmaster seem to be gaining influence. nevertheless, the fact remains unique subject matter experts in place at every level in the national security bureaucracy to develop and execute policy. to reassure allies and to deter adversaries. the administration has been severely lacking in disrespect. my second concern about the trump administration is this. too many members of the administration including the president himself to not appreciate that the rhetoric they and the actions they take to appeal to certain domestic

political constituencies can cause relationships with foreign allies harm and, therefore, undermine our national security. consider, for example, president trump's initial reaction the atwitter to north korea's most recent nuclear test. if there were any event to gravity called for thoughtful and deliberate and sober minded response is not limited to 140 characters, this was it. unfortunately the president turned again to social media. even more troubling than the medium through which he chose to deliver his message was the message itself. ththe president that use south korea under president men of appeasement, invoking the historical memory of british prime minister neville chamberlain failed effort to stop german aggression by agreeing to hitler's demands. use of such a loaded term they play well with a certain segmet of the presidents base, but it's hard to overstate just how

false, foolish and a potentially damaging this claim can be. here we are facing an unprecedented threat of military escalation by a rogue nuclear state, and the leader of the most powerful nation on earth chooses to twitter shame and twittetwitter in flint are clos. if one of north korea's goals is to test the u.s.-south korea alliance as i believe it is, then pyongyang must be positively gleeful over this twitter exchange. i'm also worried by reports that the trump administration again with an eye to pleasing a domestic political audience could announce that it intends to withdraw from course fda purchase agreement was initiated and site under the bush 43 administration and thus modified finalized and approved by congress with bipartisan support under the obama administration. the united states and korea are major economic partners, and the united states is korea's second-largest trading partner

after china and korea is the united states seventh-largest trading partner. the fda's a centerpiece of the very important economic relationship. my purpose here is not to defend every cause in the fta although i do believe it is on net a beneficial agreement for both countries. instead of want to emphasize that both president bush and president obama saw the course fta as more than simply a trade deal. they also correctly you did as a vehicle to deepen and expand influence with a vital ally in the key region. china has an fta with korea. over this and many other reasons u.s. policymakers should want our economy and korea's economy to be tied more closely together, not less. against this backdrop unilateral decision by guide states to withdraw from this agreement even if it is a tactical point renegotiate aspects of the agreement is likely to be seen by south korea as a betrayal of america's commitment to the

broader alliance at an incredibly precarious time. if the united states can be trusted to do business with south korea on the basis of a mutual agreement negotiated by two presidents of both political parties, why should we believe our security assurances are real? i hope the trump administration is asking itself hard questions like this and that it will proceed with wisdom and care. unfortunately, two characteristics i've seen in short supply so far in this administration. let me close with a thought about the importance of u.s. leadership and the role of congress and ensuring our congress does not retreat from its global responsibility in indigent rising populism. i understand why calls to put america first can resonate with hard-working families throughout the united states who are struggling here at home and do sincerely wonder why our country is spending precious taxpayer dollars on defense, diplomacy and development abroad. at the same time i firmly

believe that the united states is safer, stronger, and more prosperous with our service members, our diplomats, our trade officials and our aid workers are sufficiently numbered, adequately resourced,, and deeply engaged with the world. the world is a better place when we work side-by-side with our partners in asia and other regions, both to prevent conflicts and to prepare ourselves to prevail, should conflict occur. and also a personal story to share a strongly i support this principle that the u.s. and global security flow from and depend on u.s. global engagement leadership. earlier this summer i had a chance to host tim, six year old sons kindergarten class. that is bravery, just saying that they were visiting washington and we were walking towards the world war ii museum, and one of the little boys asked me, ms. stephanie, why hasn't the been a world war iii?

you know, i give what i believe to be a truthful and press not exactly age-appropriate response. i told them there are two main reasons why we not experienced direct and devastating conflict between major powers in the last 60 years. and the procedures leadership around the world. and the second is the institution catalyzes the united states and its partners in asia and europe established after world war ii. and so rest assured if this child grows up to be the next u.s. pacific command, i'll take credit. my experience on capitol hill has led me to believe that there's a strong bipartisan recognition in congress that u.s. global engagement leadership and alliances matter. and matter a great deal which is good because i'm also of the view that congress as a coequal branch of government and the one with the primary power of the purse should not timid about exercising its considerable

authority when it comes to foreign policy. we should use the power conferred upon us by article one of the constitution and wielded in a way that is consistent with our long-standing national interests and values. ideally with the approval of the executive branch, but over its objectives if necessary. if congress use of the trump administration take any steps that would weaken our alliance with south korea, congress should step in. and with that i'll wrap up here because of four to the q&a, and thank you again for the invitation. thanks. [applause] >> well, thank you, congresswoman murphy. she has agreed to take a few questions, again, despite this being our first day back from recess and a very full agenda. i open the floor in him and him that you think of a couple of questions. in the meantime if i could ask

you, stephanie, there are, congress has been quite active on the north korea issue, passing a lot of bills that event i think arming the administration, whether it's republican or democrat, with the tools to authority, particularly in terms of sanctioning. but in your discussion, a very thoughtful discussion on north korea, you mentioned part of the -- they have to recognize their survival comes to in negotiation, some sort negotiated settlement. i guess the question then is from your perspective and your colleagues, what does the congress in terms of that side of the equation, in terms of this question of negotiation and some sort of diplomatic settlement? >> i think that there is general agreement that the best path forward is diplomatic.

and so we have to exhaust all means possible in that. and i think one of the things, though we have provided the tools on sanctions, there's still a level of uncertainty as to how well implemented those sanctions have been. it's why earlier this you i introduced a bill to call for a north korea fusion cell. but within the intel fusion cell would have all of the agents, intel agencies work together, and cia has since put together their own intel fusion cell but it do think it needs to be expanded. but within that bill one of the areas of focus was to gather information we need to know to ascertain whether or not how well the sanctions have been implemented and whether or not they are having an effect. i think as you said people think sanctions to work until they do. but it requires everybody being

on board and actually executing on their piece of that. and so i think we need to push forward and make sure that those sanctions are in permitted to the fullest extent possible and see what other means we can apply to create pressure to encourage north korea to come to negotiating table. >> the other place that congress has played a very important role is on human rights. the north korean human rights act i think is up for renewal pretty soon. there was a groundswell of interesting issues with the u.n. inquiry report a few years ago. to what extent does congress,, you under colleagues see yourself playing a role, and in what way would it be renewed? what is the view on that? it seems to come attention towards the issue seems to have

dissipated in the past few months. >> well, i think one area we have expressed through an letter to the administration is that appointment of that special envoy on human rights. that it multiple cosigners. i think there still is an interest in seeing human rights addressed, and particularly because of the connection that you've often raised, which is that there's a connection between north korea's human rights violations and the way that it's getting resources to fund some of its missile development. >> thanks. terrific. so let me open the floor now to questions. if you ask a question please first tell us who you are, and then i think for the sake of our guest and for the audience we would appreciate questions rather than questions disguised as something else.

>> that's a hard task in d.c. it's like asking a politician to be brief. >> we will go to rob warren reich you. wait for the mic. it's coming. >> congresswoman, thank you for an excellent address. president trump has indicated that perhaps he's considering giving notice that he would withdraw from korus fta, a six-month trigger i believe. what a be possible that congress could overwrite them on this? you had bipartisan support, overwhelmingly before for the course picky think it would be again an initiative could be taken? >> i think that withdrawal from chorus would be a huge mistake. it has been, it is been beneficial to a lot of states across this country and so i think there are members of congress who are very deeply interested in seeing it

continue. the ways in which from a technical perspective that congress could come if the president were to announce that, prevent it from happening is put in an appropriations bill that no funds shall be used to implement a withdrawal from korus fta. and so that would be one option on how congress could intercept something like that. >> yes, right here. >> on japanese newspaper. you stated in your speech that the trump administration has yet to fill many important positions and post towards asia, and executive branch. injure observation why do you think are the reasons?

>> while, we can go with conspiracy theory. you know, i think that when it comes to the steady obama that have been a number of articles that have been written about the dismantling of that department. and i really believe that if you look at your budget and your personal policy you will see what your priorities are. i have actually fearful that the lack of personal appointments and also some of the funding cuts that it seen in the diplomatic and development space is a reflection with this administration priorities are. but again that's an area where i would disagree. our tools of national power include diplomacy and intel and economics, not just military. so we can't just fully fund that

emboli solely on that. >> -- and just solely rely on that. >> yesterday for a person of one of the member states of the u.n. made the following statement come when he wrote regime is a nuclear weapon and icbms pointed at you, you do not take steps to lower your guard. no one would do that. we certainly won't. was the speaker represented of the united states or north korea? in case you haven't guessed it was neatly -- nikki haley. an icbm, couldn't the north koreans make the same statement with equal legitimacy? >> what -- could you repeat the last part? >> excusing? >> could you repeat the last sentence? >> couldn't the north koreans make the same statement that nikki haley made with equal legitimacy? >> you know, i think that it's

in koreas, north korea's development of nuclear weapons and their missiles are in violation of international law. the possession of, u.s. possession of weapons is not. their development is in violation of international law. >> thank you. yes. i'll go to the site in the second. >> visiting fellow at the use korea institute at johns hopkins university. the american handling of the korean issues look very interesting to me. the normalization with cuba may be in danger or not. what kind of implication and i find from that cuban case?

>> it's so aggressively advancing its nuclear weapons and missile technology in violation of international law. it's hard to imagine some sort of return to normalization like with cuba. i think those are very, very different scenarios. what north korea is doing right now in the region is aggressively destabilizing, flaunting international norms. i think that moving to normalization without some sort of halt or some sort of agreement to roll back what they have done illegally would be a mistake. >> i feel like, quite often, i mean for those of us who study this, bring up cuba, they bring

up iran, and try to draw parallels. and i think on the surface they may look like there are parallels, but if you look at it with any degree of detail, they are very different. in the cuban case the obvious difference is cuba was not testing, was not an aggressive testing campaign to threaten u.s. territory, which make the condition for any sort of even integral discussion about a cuba model very difficult i think at this time. let me go over to this side of the room. i can't see behind the podium. yes, ma'am, right there. >> christina, use air force legislative fellow. i think in light of recent events, kind of the big elephant in the room is this question of south korea nuclear rising south korea. earlier this year president

trump has stated that he would be open to considering a new clear eyes south korea, or south korea developing kind of nuclear capabilities. if you could please share with us the polls of u.s. congress this particular issue. >> we expect decades with a lot of efforts into nonproliferation and reducing a nuclear weapon around the world. i don't think that necessarily that we should allow what is going on here with north korea to escalate and nuclearize the peninsula further. that's the point of the deterrence or nuclear umbrella is so that south decree does not have to develop its own nuclear weapons. and so long as that commitment exists and is a firm commitment on the u.s. part, they shouldn't

be a need for south korea to develop its own nuclear capabilities. but having said that, there are a number of areas where it appears this administration is making some adjustments to south korea's defensive capabilities. and we all understand that even those conventional weapons, those threshold, halos, things like that changing create the response by china -- payloads -- by china. went to proceed very carefully how we allowed our response to north korea's actions to contribute to or take away from the stability of the region. >> you mentioned china. could you say a little bit about your views on how you think china has been handling this and whether you think that the

administration's policy of having the secondary sanctions sort of in their back pocket to directly sanction and list chinese companies and entities, if the chinese are not wahpeton, do you think that is a child strategy? i would love to hear your views. >> i think china has a really important role to play here, and whether or not exercise its full range of ability to influence the situation, i think it ha anr to that is probably fallen short of full range. although chinese government officials will tell you that we are overestimating china's power over north korea. and so secondary sanctions are just to encourage china to think carefully about it. but i wonder if this nuclear test doesn't make it think differently about its role. and i think it has to think both

in terms of carrot and stick. what we've been pushing china to do is sanction north korea, make it painful for them, not to continue the game of thrones think, but winter is coming on the korean peninsula. and so one would imagine any sort of oil sanctions at this time would be particularly pronounced and felt strongly by north korea. so i think that's stick part of it. but one of the carrots that are available for korea, and how do you look at what it is that north korea is trying to achieve and see, you know, i do note that the u.s. is ever going to be able to assure north korea that we won't topple them. no matter how many people say it, but can china provide some sort of assurances on that character side in addition to

the stick to get some traction in this scenario? >> the game of thrones went over my head. i'm not a game of thrones, but 99% of people of th -- are. no offense to hbo. >> i'm a journalist from south korea. i have two questions to you, and first question is about, it's actually under this alliance that's part of the alliance. i would like to know that, under bush administration and the trump administration what would be the commonalities and differences between the policies towards the korean peninsula? and the second question is about maybe since victors are today, nominate as new ambassador to korea, what would be your

arrival date to korea as a new ambassador? [laughing] may be question which you can answer or why it has been delayed so we positions that has been under this trump administration which you briefly touched on today at the army of the positions are regarding asian issues are still in to fix i just want to know the reason that as well. thank you. >> do you want to go first? >> sure. i'll give you a moment to accept your new position. so differences in the alliance. you know, as with many things with this administration, there's more rhetoric than actual substantive change in policy, as a gift. obviously if we move forward with pulling out of korus, that would be a significant change in policy. but right now we're just hearing a change in tone and tenor of how we're talking to a dear ally. but if you look at what we've done as a government, in the

ndaa that was passed the significant investment in asia security we continue to do exercise with south korea. all of the things that have been cornerstones of the alliance are continuing to date. but that's not to take that for granted that it will continue, but i think right now we are just trying to do with a little bit of the rhetoric, and that's been the main change. >> well, great. stephanie, thank you so much for taking the time -- [laughing] i thought, i mean, i think your comments were extremely thoughtful. i know that you travel to the region and you are emerging as one of the leaders on asia policy in korea, on the hill. and again knowing that this is your first day back and the

agenda you have in front of you, we really appreciate you taking the time to be with us. so ladies and gentlemen if we could think the congresswoman very much. [applause] >> thank you. we will not have a 15 minute coffee break. we will reconvene here at 10:45. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> make a few remarks.

appreciate ambassador li or lee as you may prefer. i was wondering what we're going to talk about in the space of a couple of weeks, ten days or so we had an icbm shoot over japan. we had an alleged hydrogen bomb. we had icbms allegedly move to the coast now in north korea. we've got a president here in the united states that's bellowing about appeasement from south korea, and bellowing about the possibility of removing ourselves from korus, which is exactly the wrong thing to do come in my view, at this time. this is not, this doesn't recognize the spectacular things we've witnessed in republic of korea in the last several months. was a very long ago right upstairs we had president pena for a dinner. he made a wonderful presentation here in this very room, made a

wonderful presentation at dinner. here's the republic of korea villages, out of a beautiful, peaceful, democratic election while the previous president was being put in jail and on trial. and it was all done seamlessly. this is a nation that deserves support. so i have a charge for all the americans in the room here today. when this conference is over there should be no doubt in the mind of any of our friends from the republic of korea that the united states is 100% behind them, behind that in military and security terms, behind them in economic terms, behind them politically. this ithis is a charge i give ty american friends. [applause] >> so i've spoken my piece. you know what i think, and now we'll hear from someone who really knows what he's talking

about, mr. president, president li. [applause] >> thanthank you, ambassador. thank you for your strong commitment and short remarks was getting a little more time to speak. thank you very much. your excellency, ambassador, congresswoman murphy and those who will join us, vice minister of korea, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, very good morning and welcome to the rok you a strategic forum 2017. on behalf of korea foundation it is my great pleasure to stand here once again as we opened the second korea use strategic form and cooperation with csis here in washington, d.c.. first of all i would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you for your commitment

to participating in this forum here my special thanks go to those who travel here from outside of washington, d.c., and especially those who made the long journey from salt actually a couple of korean attendance arrived after midnight last night. it was exactly nin nine months o today when i stood here last time to open the first korea-u.s. strategic forum. at that time i remember the sense of anticipation we all had for the new president-elect, u.s. president-elect, and the concerns and anxiety that we shared over the then president of the republic of korea. since then as mr. amitabh just mentioned, many changes have occurred. each requiring our time and attention and critical analysis.

i think we can all agree that another december for in 2017 was too long white since we moved today's forward in order to address these critical issues at hand. i would like to draw your attention to several points of common interest that are of particular note. firstly, this year marks the 130 fifth anniversary of the establishment of the korea-u.s. diplomatic relationship in 1882. at a small port city on korea's western coast, peoples of the u.s. and korea then chosen encounter each other as almost total strangers, and finally signed the first agreement between our two countries. secondly, this year marks the fifth anniversary of the korus

fta which was a result of several years of negotiations. even after the deal was reached, five more years were needed for the korean side to gain approval of the national assembly. with a korus fta in place since 2012, the interdependence of our two countries not only as an integrated market but also as even stronger security allies has become increasingly reinforced. thirdly, the new administration launched in washington, d.c., and seoul respectively, while americans were experiencing a different style of leadership to a debt of the past. koreans were exercising their democratic freedoms as they changed their present and in a surprisingly lawful and peaceful manner. they turn a political crisis

into an opportunity for rebirth, serving as an exemplary model democracy for the world. solidly 70-80% approval rating which president moon jae-in has enjoyed since his inauguration i believe reflects the pride of the korean people. lastly, there is a final sector that cast a long, dark shadow over all other issues on korean peninsula. there is of course north korea. early morning on the day before yesterday, sunday, i was woken by breaking news on my mobile phone. it was about president trump's announcement of possible withdrawal from the korus fta. by then i thought my opening remarks were in need of slight change, slight modification. then at midday the latest news on north korea broken.

i sat there transfixed, gazing at the news on my tv, on computer screen. most part of the text i prepared for this moment, lost its relevance i begin to think what message i could deliver in my brief remarks. i couldn't find words to replace the already prepared ones and decided to delay the whole part. i felt actually helpless as i watched the north korea report bragging about so-called successful test of h-bomb. life on one of -- life on one of the tv channel. what shall we do? do we have any option other than another round of global condemnation, section resolutions? and just plain use strategic effort in korea? could the sanctions ultimate stop north korea from becoming a new state? can we expect any productive dialogue with the kim jong-un

regime, if and when it becomes a nuke state? i unfortunately have no answer to those questions. i am hoping some of you or most of you do. however, as an citizen in korea was born right after the war, one thing i'm sure of is the matter how great the situation becomes, any military action that risks ending up with full-fledged war on the peninsula can never be an option. unless it is truly the last resort for survival of the rok and its allies. ladies and gentlemen, let us not forget the fact that beyond the north korean nuclear issue there is another pressing issue that demands our attention. economic cooperation. in addition to security cooperation, economic cooperation under the korus fta has served as a second foundational pillar for our bilateral relationship. when it was signed, the korus

fta was a most significant trade agreement for korea ever since, or for the united states. it was the first commercially meaningful free trade agreement since the signing of nafta. despite the fact that trade volume has continued to flounder in the years following the crisis in 2008 and despite the rapid rise of china as a major trade partner for both korea and u.s., our two nations still enjoyed a rise in both trade volume and market share last year. a special session of the joint committee under the korus fta was held on august 22 insole. i must concede that i have no knowledge of whether president trump announcement on sunday about possible withdrawal from fta with space on assessment of this first joint meeting or not. i carefully read, sorry, i carefully read the article

written with renewed respect for the insight and they could not agree more with most of the points she may. today with the best speakers and discussants, not on on issues of security but also on trade from both korea and the u.s. including wendy. that's why i am confident that session three will also be productive one to show the way how to proceed the next steps for the future of the korus fta, the government delegations. teargas, i do not we should take too much time away from the wonderful speakers we have lined up for today -- dear guests -- except for a few words on korea foundation that i am presenting. every year the korea foundation puts a heavy emphasis on projects and programs in the united states. the foundation has provided the lion's share of funding of trade

for the programs proposed by the u.s. universities and think tanks since korea foundation establishment in 1991. these efforts have further strengthen the relationship between our two countries and that promoted better understanding between our two peoples. for this form, the great foundation and the csis have invited the best scholars from experts and diplomats to discuss the challenges that this critical juncture in our two countries diplomatic history. among the korean delegates you can find a few of my faces that you may remember from our forum last year. at the same time you can see permanent scholars in formal dash of former government officials appear together, most of them should be no stranger to you even if this is the first time for you to see them at our forum. i am especially glad that buys foreign minister was able to find his time to speak at our luncheon here today.

altogether, believe we the korean delegates are ready to share both our personal views as well as our official policy line of the newly formed government. this is the first occasion for the korea foundation to arrange a form with a partner with the u.s. and is done since the moon, was performed. the rok-u.s. alliance is facing perhaps the greatest threat on the korean peninsula since the cease-fire was put in place in 1953. ivy is a do to the escalating nuclear test and missile launch and publication of north korea. on the economic front it seems we stand at crossroads with the future of the five year old korus fta is to be decided. we have to overcome this crisis and bring our economic cooperation beyond the fta. this is why i sincerely believe this forum will provide us with

a timely, truly timely time to share our views with each other, opportunities and challenges. i'm certain as a result of this forum we can offer items to both the u.s. and korean policymakers now and the future of the alliance. last but not least i would like to express my sincere appreciation to the doctor and we will meet with tomorrow. victor and all the staff of the csis for their hard work to make this form possible. thank you. thank you very much. >> c-span2 live this morning for a daylong discussion about north korea and we've been hearing from scholars and opinion leaders and former government officials from the u.s. and from korea. focusing on the challenges u.s.-south korea alliance, the north korean threat, and also look at the opportunities to work with china and japan.

the upcoming session called opportunities and challenges for the alliance here president trump tweeting earlier this morning on allowing japan and south korea to buy a substantially increased amount of highly sophisticated military equipment from the united states. this discussion being hosted by the center for strategic and international studies in washington, d.c., and expected to get started here in just a few minutes. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> thank you everyone. if you could start take your seats we will begin shortly. please, start taking your seats. thank you. if we could have all the speakers come up to the stage and now, thanks.

>> we just heard starting shortly here again live this one for discussion about north korea. cnn reported today russian president vladimir putin is warning of a global catastrophe that north korea poses. he was speaking in china and is is the only way forward is through diplomacy. again, that some cnn. from the "new york times"," aftr being allies for 67 years u.s. and south korea are split over north korea. an uneasy relationship between south korea's president and president trump who met at the white house back in june, as north korea carries out a series of missile and nuclear bomb tests, their relationship more important than ever. you can read more in the "new york times" online and this discussion about ready to get started again here. live coverage for the all-day forum here on c-span2.

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for coming back after remarks by congresswoman murphy and president lee, and ambassador armitage. we're going to now start the next panel, the first substantive panel. in putting together this panel i don't think we could've gotten a more diverse group, not just come not in terms of their interest in asia, because a all sure that, but in terms of the wealth of experience that we have, both on the academic side and in policy from the people that we have on the stage. i think their full bios are in your programs, but i will briefly introduce them in a minute. you know, often the beginning of any administration, the first few months are very formative

months in terms of the shape, the tenor of the relationships that emerge between a new head of state and all of its regular partners, all of the country. in this particular case we essentially have two new heads of state, yuma, president trump here in the united states, as well as president moon in south korea. so we are right now in this very informative. where the first few months, the first few interactions that take place actually a very important role in the longer term relationship, the directions that are set between the moon and the trump administration. we thought it was important to start off the expert substantive panels with a discussion on the alliance, and on what our experts see as the agenda for the alliance going forward. let me introduce them very briefly to you, and i want to

take a emphasize a wealth of experience that we have here. starting at the far end, choi kang, my good friend, is vice president of the asian institute, independent think tank in south korea. we also serve as senior advisor on national security council for the administration are sitting next to him is abe denmark, the newly car note the inaugural you there. the newly inaugurated director of asian programs at the woodrow wilson center for international scholars, having just left the obama administration as deputy assistant secretary for east asia in the office of the secretary of defense. sitting next to him is professor yoon young-kwan. many of you know him as

professor of international relations at seoul national university which is the georgetown of korea. [laughing] more importantly, he also has served as minister. he was minister of foreign affairs for the government. and then sitting next to him, last but not least is michael pillsbury. any of you who are in this area in washington, d.c., or who study china know mike as one of the long time greatly experience people on the hill, but not only that come here served to u.s. presidents on not just asia policy but broader strategy, and nationals could issues. so really a wealth of experience across the board. the way we're going to do this initially is where going to ask each of our panelist to make some initial remarks, and then

we would use that as a supreme court for discussion among the group as well as with all of you. so i think i will start off with just a very basic question to all of you, which really emanates from my initial remarks, which is that we are in a very important transitional time, informative time in the alliance between these two new leaders. i'd like to hear from each of you what you think are the key tasks, vicki challenges, vicki opportunities going forward. as i would like to begin doctor pillsbury, if that's okay. >> how will i know when my minutes are up? i going to nudge me gently? >> you be fine. don't worry about it. >> pursuant to your request, victor, i wrote out a list of 12 ways that the united states could improve its relationship with its overall relationship.

with the republic of korea. and obviously to do all 12 justices are impossible but i thought i would touch on your question. i think some copies of the statement have been passed around but not everybody has one the very first thing, and i'm a friend of of the trump administration i don't represent them. i was an advisor to the transition, so i may be the only friend of president trump in the room. i don't know if that you might want to identify myself with that point of view. because my first recommendation is president trump's commitment to visit south korea this year, strikes me as an opportunity for a real breakthrough in improving the alliance relationship. there are various ways and visit can be had in terms of what often called deliverables. seems to me that chances are

good for a major success in that trip. secondly, ways to improve policy coordination on north korea. there's already been progress on this. president obama took it very seriously, the so-called strategic patience term actually covered, and may be abe denmark were going to, covered for specific things. more can be done just over the weekend, this joint statement between white house and blue house, there's very good progress, but it seems to me policy coordination on north korea is easy to say. i think you will probably find nobody gets it, but how to do it seems to me requires a longer term vision, and it requires what sounds boring sometimes to the newspaper media people, it requires study groups and figuring out what exactly are

some scenarios, and, frankly, what is the military balance, what are some of the military options? because a great deal of our relationship with south korea is, in fact, military. so i'm going to unpack some of these things in my additional recommendations under this larger rubric of enhanced policy coordination on north korea. it seems to me the consultations between the two presidents is where we have to start. this idea of some people have had in the past that phone conversations are not good between heads of state. it should be left to assistant deputy to handle these things. there's a case for that. but the of the case is the more to heads of state talk on the phone, the more the exchange ideas, the better. that's what i come out. then to get more specific, the role of china is generally

speaking not part of u.s. korean alliance management. it's supposed to be about the defense of south korea but again and again china comes up. one of the strange ways this has happened is a failure of our military relationship with china. we tried to reassure china about many things, but a lot of chinese military guys, and i cover this in my book, the 100 your marathon, have conspiracy theories about the united states that rival alex jones and breitbart in terms of their interpretation of what the americans are up to. this has happened now with the fattah put up if you go to raytheon website you will find a very detailed description of what the radar range can do and how there's a switch in a little trailer between short range radar coverage and long-range radar coverage. there are also a series of

online articles that show the range of the thadd radar when the switch is turned. this has inflamed some people in the chinese military and intelligence complex that somehow thadd is part of a large american plot to neutralize the chinese nuclear deterrent capability against the united states. there's ways to reassure the pla, as a skull have tried this myself, schlink and that just radar coverage doesn't help very much. it's a very weak. the return is very weak. you can't know very much. the united states has other systems, for example, in space to learn these things. we don't have a national missile defense system that covers the chinese deterrent. that's a public policy for many, many years. this does not work. aid, you can correct me if i'm wrong, buddy don't think will have much luck in persuading chinese military that thaad is

osama aimed against them. well, to anticipate this would've been good. to work on it would be even better. that's why my foot area for improvement is doing a better job explaining the capabilities of thaad took the most boring thing to say isn't the radar. it's the range of the missiles hit the missiles are very short range. a lot of chinese military and competence i been to actually believe in the thaad is a missile that can fly 1500 miles and stop a chinese nuclear missile from being fired at america. that's simply not true. ..

>> victor has found in a very original way materials or how america's military alliances in asia, including with south korea, were formed. this is so different from the chinese perception. if i can put words in your mouth i read in the book in many cases the us strategy, at the time, was to restrain tendencies or even the use of force but part of the alliance partners is not to encircle china into invade and dismember the chinese. i am hoping there will be a chinese translation, victor, of your book, power play. and that it will be widely read. you cite so many original documents. i will skip over us. there's room for improvement in

the trilateral relationship among south korea and japan and the united states. one of the sticking points is something you can show off if you know what it means. [inaudible] your hand up if you know what. [inaudible] is? it's a central obstacle. i see seven hands. it is one of the central obstacles in improving the trilateral relationships and, at first all three agree to it and then present moon made it sound like he didn't. it's an agreement on the protection of military secrets. i think it's at least 60 countries we have these agreements with and it's an obstacle to improving military and intelligence coordination between the three countries. i would say that in terms of technology transfers and helping the korean defense ministry's

2020 reform plan there is more that can be done and i think the trump administration has already started down this path and it's partly a joke but cutting the rights of the f35 those are benefits for the us air force and it will benefit south korea's decision to move ahead and there's a larger topic that in south korea is called fence perform and defense reform implies not just modernization of weapon systems and new technologies and it implies the conditions that the american military has testified to congress about in the conditions that would make sense to south korea if it wants to transfer wartime operational command. this is a topic of testimony by our commander for the us forces and it focuses on commander

control and just a whole series of things that come under the same concept that the defense of ministry refers to as its 2020 reform. that's another area where progress could be accelerated and we don't want to create the notion that south korea is being left alone in wartime by the operational demand change but we don't want to insult the south korea sovereignty that they can't take care of this function of self. in the last two or three -- i try to venture into the area of trade and usually trade and security issues are never mixed in this is considered a sign of a reckless person who tries to mix trade insecurity. however, more and more since the 80s, if you looked at the national security records of henry kissinger and there were certain of the reagan

administration trade is a part of national security and a good ambassador for the best ambassador, victor, are able to combine trade and security issues in a very thoughtful way so that there is double successes. this seems to me is the challenge with south korea. it is so important in our trade network that we've got to find ways where we essentially say the free trade agreement has its own mechanism, processes building, so-called joint committee exist. it doesn't have to be a topic of a free-for-all and competitive thinking because, in fact, as i argue both south korea and the economy are challenged by china. we have a common interest in the chinese playing by the rules, not just the wto but there's another agreements that they have signed up.

i'd like to see progress in south korea and american trade talks within the context that the joint committee exist and there is a dispute mechanism is ready to handle any challenges. it seems to me this should be coordinated with both countries concerned about chinese competitiveness. frankly, they are out competing both of us. common interests indicate parallel activities that could take place in wto or elsewhere and leave some of the other that could build suspense and there is a question of a nuclear energy cooperation and another question that i could ask you all is who knows what cairo technology is? but your hand up. cairo technology and -- there

are ways that south korean defense minister already raised this and this should be a review of rather to return us nuclear weapons to deployment in south korea and there are also there are additional steps that can be taken in the nuclear energy cooperation area that's, i think, would get the attention of north korea. not advocating that and i'm against at the present time against nuclear weapons for south korea but i'm not totally against it -- to speaking as a scholar. in these talks which are due in 2020, it's 24 years, in these talks the korean side seems to be interested in uranium enrichment facilities and they do not have now and this is a new frontier for the i aea to

work out verification agreements but the united states, in my view, to improve with north korea could be more open-minded about uranium enrichment and the so-called pyro issue. again, there's two and half years to go on that. that's a general list but how i am sort of bullish on improving us suffering relations and it seems to me we been drawn together by the reckless behavior of the leader of north korea and that is very good news because some of the pessimists a few months ago for this to be the topic of a huge split between president trump and present moon. quite optimistic that his behavior has actually pushed our countries closer together. >> and that is a great start. thank you.

let's go to foreign minister. >> this morning i found it interesting article from the new york times and the title was an alliance of 67 years is tested by north korea. i fear that is the situation. after listening to strong remarks in support of alliance by secretary in congresswoman murphy i was very much reassured him relieved. we are facing three important challenge issues for maintaining a strong alliance between south korea and the united states. the first issue is what kind of policy for both governments to

pursue for deep likewise north korea and how to implement it. both agree on the policy of maximum pressure and even after the nuclear test last sunday, i think, we need to focus on continuing and applying pressure on north korea. we need to bring north korea to the negotiating table and but such pressure, i think, must be carefully calibrated. if the us appears to be affecting resident regimen change a panic and kim jong-un will be more likely to lash out. [inaudible]

were started by a strict power which had nothing to gain by war and much to lose. instead of cornering it north korea we need to send a clear signal consistently that our goal is not to negotiate change and to prevent war but a policy change. in addition, while applying maximum pressure on north korea we need to have our diplomatic channels open for test their intention and explore what is possible. some of the concern about the north korean policy of the government but i think kim jong-un has been a firm in clear that pressure is needed until north korea comes to the table.

for example, we emphasize that more than just a statement was needed and propose that both allies conduct a mis. [inaudible] is definitely not an appeaser. the second issue is what to do about extended insurance in the era of north korea's nuclear icbm. most under north korea's capability to strike the mainland of the united states may seriously weaken the credibility of us commitment of extended nuclear deterrent. so, are oka what kind of measurd be taken to face this new

challenge. another worry is that north korea may become much more reckless. for instance, in the may attack an island. [inaudible] it south korea may not retaliate because they have a nuclear weapon. south korean military leaders held in declaring that in case they provoke they would strike back not just the original point of attack but also the command center. so, this kind of initial local conflict can easily escalate into all-out war on the korean peninsula. how to stop this escalation is

an important issue to be handled. the third issue is how to prepare for the upcoming negotiation, if it ever comes. there are few groups in favor of negotiation. one group says that the approach to denuclearization starting with free north korea and nuclear capability and proposes a grand bargain between the us and china and this will be that the us should begin to think about unthinkable which means we remove troops from south korea. i really don't know what president trump is thinking about this matter and he may have a different idea but anyway, what kind of negotiation

is one thing clear is that the issue should be thorough preparation to a quote consultation between the allies. especially while trying to achieve the goal of denuclearization of north korea and the alliance should not be comprised. otherwise, there will be a significant blow to the strategy interest and not just of south korea but also of the united states. all of these three major issues because of contact coordination between allies and we need to fear the mechanism for that. thank you. >> thank you. now we will go to.

>> thank you. thank you for inviting me to speak. i wanted to keep my remarks brief. i want to focus on what i see as challenges into opportunities. focusing specific on the alliance itself. i will start with the opportunities because we get hung up on the challenge and it's important to identify opportunities. one i can cover quickly is the opportunity to strengthen bilateral operation. something that was mentioned earlier. this is a great focus for me when i was in the pentagon and i think it's also a great deal more that can be done. there's a lot of framework in place and there's a lot of mechanism in place and it will take energy and leadership from both seoul and tokyo that we continue to make progress and as well as leadership from washington to encourage progress.

again, i believe that the mechanisms are already there and i think one area to think about would be enhancing trilateral cooperation in major exercise. japan, of course, would have a certificate role to play in the defense south korea and involving japan in parts that exercise, i think, increasing the involvement would be important. i think it's a way to move ahead and beyond. [inaudible] another area of opportunity that i wanted to mention is the opportunity to enhance south korea's military capability. of course, the military is already capable and it's already made commitments to enhance of capability. f35 was already mentioned and other capabilities and progress to get to that eventual condition about having control and the president as i understand it my twitter account

for i came up here was also talked about his decision to sales to three. to allow them to enhance their military capability. overall, this is a positive trend but there's another caution that i wanted to note that i think we need to be able to be careful how this is done. in the past, as the united states has called for its allies to do more and often gets interpreted by our allies, buyer partners, that the united states is taking a step back. we all recall the effect that this had on the in the 1970s. as we call for japan and korea to do more, as we encourage them to enhance our capabilities the united states should also make sure this is done in tandem with an effort to increase american engagement in american commitments. so that this will not undercut

or answer any concerns that this is a potential signal that the united states is looking at taking a step back. to move on to challenges, and i'll try to keep it brief can keep going, first challenge i wanted to talk about is deterrence. i want to make it clear that i'm not talking about strategic deterrence. it's been mentioned before concerned that our allies will have about the implications of the north korea, credible icbm from north korea. i actually feel quite confident that strategic deterrence remains quite robust in the united states has successfully deterred major conflict with nuclear powers for decades. i see no reason why that should change with a potential nuclear north korea. that message needs to be sent

very clearly to our allies that this development that as north korea gets closer to capability will not slack american commitment to our defense of our allies. it's very important to say that message clearly and repeatedly. there is a concern, that i have and others have, about conventional deterrence. that as north korea feels more confident in its capability and nuclear capability that it could feel emboldened to act more aggressively at the conventional level that we've seen before. it was mentioned that the selling of various islands and i would add that i had concerns that with a nuclear capability that north korea may feel emboldened to act more aggressively and we could see instances like that happening more often than we have before. that requires the both the united states and korea enhance

conventional deterrence. the doctrine that came out after 2007 in korea, a part of that, but another cases enhancing our capabilities to make sure we have the ability to defend and deter those attacks. the second challenge that i wanted to mention is reassurance. i mentioned it a bit earlier and referred to it as a need to ensure our allies that this nuclear capability is not going to prevent us from defending our allies but there's a lot more to it than just a simple statement. there's the constant meetings and phone calls and i -- as a former official i'd rather be reassuring phone calls call from high above than the low levels that i was at but enhancing that confidence in maintaining that confusion is very important both historically, at the command level of the unc and the cmc but

also throughout the alliance of the economic and political levels because of that concern about the united states may be pulling back or the concern about a nuclear capability. i mentioned the nuclear piece and my concern. as the united states enhances its capabilities in the region i think here's my last point. i think it is important that the message be clearly, publicly and very loudly to ensure that we are maintaining that position. i think i will stop there. >> thank you. >> i have nothing to say. [laughter] all the points i was going to raise have been mentioned. the four areas of coordination have present challenges and opportunities. first, north korea, second, regional cooperation amongst the

two countries third, global issue. fourth, actually about the alliance management. [inaudible] let me start with north korea issues. of course, there should be no daylight pain south korea and us handling but each site has suspicion about the other. [inaudible] of course, during the month of april and august. are concerned about the action taken by the united states. very serious. several overseers think this point to war. [inaudible] the problem we have is we have

developed a reactive to their actions rather than active. it seems that there is no long term vision of how to end this on the peninsula and how we will achieve this step-by-step. we discussed this issue in previous case. first of all, we have to clear out. [inaudible] otherwise, it will be a constant issue between the two sides. that is a good at all. [inaudible] >> going over the head?

i see. >> yes, it should be very much clear on our common sense a north korea in each and every step. also in policy with think about the dimension not just political, economic, social but also the issues. we need to have more comprehensive approach not to simply focus on the battle but it's very threatening and clear and present danger and we have to think about how we can bring about changes in terms of policy and gradual change of society as well. what i say the conjunction policy we will pursue is north korea.

the second issue at the regional level. [inaudible] in the last statement between conduct and president trump is left out. we have to think about how we will strengthen the foundation in asia as well. what kinds of roles and missions alliance can play in the regional context. and most specifically how we will deal with the rise of china. of course, we cannot contain china. but we have to think how we will engage china. second, what kinds of appropriations between korea and japan and the united states. not just simply mainly focused on the north korean issue but beyond north korea and what kind of roles we can play at the regional level. i hope alliance can be tools to provide public with regional

context. [inaudible] third, public issues like public health, resource management, human rights, democracy, energy security but i have a different take on the nuclear between north korea and the united states. he has announced that he will be. [inaudible] once nuclear energy but that could be problematic. in general we can think about energy operation. [inaudible] we have to think about the other ways of enhancing the focus between the two parties on the energy efficiency kind of things. many things we can do together at the global level but actually each regional statement contains

a global issue but unfortunately implementation is moving very slowly. how we are going to institutionalize and seek momentum for global allies is going to be critical as a very meaningful is a very mutual of our alliance. finally i have to come to the management issue. first, i think i have concern about budgetary between the two because when president trump mentioned in the rose garden issues, fda and. [inaudible] how we will solve this problem without any difficulty. i'm sure we are going into the negotiations this december and for the first time. [inaudible] it will be very tough to have mutually acceptable satisfying results but it does not simply

mask their pain but it's about the way to formulate budget sharing and what they can provide in exchange for increasing budget sharing in the share of south korea. the second issue was mentioned already. we have agreed to condition based and if we decide to expedite the price us that actually requires our government to spend more money in building a more capable military. i'm sure president moon has made a clear statement that he will increase our budget, defense budget from 2.4% of gdp to 2.9% at the end of his term. but whether that is good enough to cover all the program we would like to have by end of this administration. that's another thing but the other thing is about the command structure that we have.

will we maintain or combine forces. the other issue is whatever has a new operation by taking into account the changes that are taking place on the korean peninsula and whether we have to think about the control and that is a point to be discussed. of course, that relates to the extensive current issues. we have concerns about the us commitment to defense.

i would like to do more in defending ourselves against north korea is increasing challenge. thank you. >> great, thanks. so a great start. really all for presenters really covered a lot of ground. the way i like to start as i actually am prompted by your comments are a couple of questions i would like to ask you all. and then we'll go to the audience. but the first question is, is to all of you but particularly addressed to abe and dr. pillsbury raised visible and that's trilateral coordination, the u.s. japan korea.

this is something we've heard quite often whenever it's almost a reflex whenever north korea does a provocation, but particularly from the perspectives because i know abe you work this issue during the obama administration and choi kang going back to the early '90s you been an advocate of this and involved both in government and try to understand can you say like specifically what you would like to see done? if you had, specifically dig out and tell us what are the things you like to see. like a trifle mentioned more integrated exercises that doesn't mean japan is part of the spring and fall exercises in korea or what exactly do we mean when we say deeper, digging deeper? mike mentioned -- what are some of these things that you are thinking of when you talk about greater trilateral cooperation? >> me?

sure. maybe i can think of two or three things. first, i think after concluding with japan yet to think about acquisition and service agreement between the two countries. and then the other, for example, we are very much concerned with submarines around korean peninsula. went to think about the antisubmarine warfare cooperation. the other is like, for example, -- [inaudible] before we going to exercise i think is necessary to have some kind of table of exercise among three countries. look at something what were going to do so we can clear identify where we can go together or we can't. maybe seriously think about this rather grandiose design pushed

by north korea. >> abe? >> i thought those were very good suggestions. i do think that enhancing, bringing trilateral is him into some of our major exercise in the region would be very helpful. starting small at the beginning but gradually building a it up o dempsey to both sides how all this works together. nothing would be important, beginning with tabletop is a good way to go. of course nothing will be an important step after to enhance that military cooperation. the maritime cooperation that was mentioned is also important. i would add to that missile defense. we have some baby steps in the past couple of years of missile coordination but really taking

the next step and turning it into more full-fledged trilateral missile-defense cooperation, focused on north korean missile defense i think would be very important. and then beyond that, the other military sphere, looking at enhancing economic ties, cultural ties. one to the things that surprised me, someone in government considering how careful some people were about talking about trilateral cooperation actually moving it on it, looking at some being done in poland, jenna speaking japan is -- >> compared to china. >> compared to china. there seems to be a bit of, the people seem to be out front of the government in that way. i think there is room to move forward in trilateral cooperation.

but as i said earlier it will take leadership from both sides of his first leadership from the united states to ensure this is moving forward. >> all these things that you mentioned, i do list, minesweeping, tabletop, missile missile-defense, the sorts of things, do you think this is something, because obviously there are lyrical sensitivities so is is something you believe should happen at sort of below the headlines, like it's just, or it needs to be embedded in some bigger, broader trilateral political declaration among the three countries that publicly mandate the three countries to work in this direction? i mean, i've heard arguments on both sides took some people say no, just do it quietly. other safe know, you need sort of high level sort of anointing of this as the official position going forward. what do you think?

>> i think, i think keeping things quite below the writer is a helpful way especially for people, for technicians come for people on the military who just want to have the practical cooperation. there does need to be some political top cover at some point that as you build from small to big there will need to be some sort of political declaration. i think some people thought we already have that in the declarations between prime minister abe and president park. if that needs to be re-declared, if it needs to be, every time there's a change of leadership in either country there needs to be some sort of statement, i think for the united states, that's really a question for those two countries. as an american my focus would be on the practical cooperation. we are doing what we need to do, and if by the country, either japan or korea feels that they need a political declaration at a high level, then our political

leadership can engage to try to encourage you that to make that happen. >> i agree with abe on the more practical cooperation start going for higher-level political declaration. at the same time it seems to me that we can go along with the political declaration in agreeing this trilateral cooperation in providing the regional comments. issues which are tangible in east asia, so we used to have a kind of search and rescue operation. all this can be together but after that can be those things can be reflected in the medical declaration. in the meantime may be -- can be pursued at the working level, the practical enhancement of trust of recognition mechanism amongst the allies. >> great, thanks. i want to ask now, dr. pillsbury

and minister, two questions and then you can choose which ones you want to respond to but have a feeling i know which ones you will respond to. and the first question is -- >> you go first. >> foreign minister, you making in your comments about the importance of pressure but also the importance of signaling to avoid miscalculation or to avoid putting, the last place what any country to be in his what if you like there's nothing to lose in war and there's a lot to lose in peace. that's a very dangerous situation. so i guess one of the questions i think that i certainly have and maybe others do is, is there signaling that of the countries can send to the current north korean regime that has not been signaled already, or to be signaled in the way that would actually make a difference?

and then related to that also is, is the 800-pound gorilla in the room in any discussion these days about korea is china. and mike, you stated china. you know china very well. you have deep networks in china. i guess the question is, in your opinion, in your well-informed opinion, is china ready, are they ready and willing for a long-term strategic conversation about the future of the korean peninsula? because china is such an integral part of any tactic that is the familiar with north korea, but as a number of you mention, the tactics are not helpful unless we had a long-term plan. i know you, we participated for many years in a lot of net assessment grand marshal where the mandate was 20, 25 -- should've had korean

involvement. those of the two questions i'd like to ask, maybe mr. foreign minister you would like to start on the signaling question. >> that's very difficult question to answer, but there are two points that i would like to make. one is the reason why i empathize the imports of sinking clue signal consistently to north korea is that -- sending a clear signal -- misperception, misunderstanding and overreaction. and if we stand confusing signal to the other side, that will be increasing chance of misperception and misunderstanding and overreaction. so i think it is important, very important, to send a clear signal consistently, very well collaborated.

the second point to your question, that i think if you want to have a successful negotiated solution of any conflict, we should provide maximum pressure and at the same time maximum incentive. i wonder whether our side both u.s. and south korea sides have done enough to provide maximum incentives so that tim jen on thinks that -- kim jong-un thinks that without nuclear weapons he can survive, or even prosper. we did try hard to pressure north korea with maximum, i mean strength or force or something like that and i think we did a

little less than that in providing maximum incentive so that the leader of north korea really believed that it is better for him to give up nuclear option. calculation should provide you some kind of incentive that it is better to give up nuclear weapons to survive. to strengthen the domestic political legitimacy or something like that. for example, in the 1994 -- there was an important quote included that was improvement of relationship between the united states and north korea. i think north korea had high

expectation of implementation of that, but i think they disregarded that element, just a simple military tactical, i mean, agreement. so from their point of view, i think we, i mean, the u.s. and south korea, should have done more, tried harder, something like that that's my answer. >> mike? >> victor, i think it's unfair you're asking the easy questions to abe and the asan institute. you are asking the foreign minister and myself the hard questions so i just wanted to object. [laughing] i think there's a link between trilateral cooperation and

u.s.-china relations. in my book the 10 100 your maran i mentioned a particular cia officer named joe was later speakers tomorrow. i hope someone asks him this question. the level of cooperation between china and the united states has been extremely high. far more than the public has known until i published my book with security review permission from cia and the pentagon. we cooperate with china on the largest covert action of the entire cold war, in just a whole range of ways. i list 12 examples in the book and to think that are even more that didn't make it through security review. so it's actually a good thing for people in seoul to be suspicious of the korea and passing over the heads of the

seoul. i don't deny that possibility. the relationship between the u.s. and china is widely misunderstood in asia as being somehow antagonistic as china rises and we get these strange stories about a chinese military guy who says let's divide the pacific in half. there's a kind of conspiratorial thinking that the u.s. and china are about to go to war. but at the same time that this cooperation continues. this comes to bear particularly with trilateral cooperation between japan, south korea and the united states. it would be a nightmare, it would be one of china's nightmares, actually i wrote an article on 12 chinese nightmares in the survival several years ago, so that the trade-off is it we could persuade south korea and japan to have what abe is

proposing, which i tend to agree with, regular exercises, not just one off that involves japanese forces, chinese forces and are forced to perhaps others might want to. the message to beijing is close to a stab in the back, that we are organizing northeast asia against you because, despite our 40 years of cooperation and all the things that joe did, we really don't like china anymore. so that's the kind of trade-off when you raise the grand strategy level issues which i was so impressed in your book, victor, a power-play, mention it again, why didn't we originally in the days of treatment and then john foster dulles, why didn't we have a joint treaty involving south korea and japan?

you actually have a section on the thinking of american policy planners at the time, that these were two different issues. and only a fool would mix them together. but now the grand strategy assessment level has changed, and as china begins to draw close to us in terms of its economic strength in the way the soviet union never did, the soviet union may have best reached 25 or 30% of the of the size of our economy. soviet union, united states. china, if you just go by ibm world bank numbers, china is closing in on us. -- imf. some other economists, justin lin, estimate by 2030 they will be double our economy. despite -- there for quite differently. so in his overall strategic picture look at 20 or 30 years all at one time, the united

states, a new united states president it seems to me who toe from the business world has to look at the overall strategic context or my view is trilateral cooperation among south korea and japan and united states is very important and makes a lot more sense than ten or 20 years ago. so to answer your question to them, i do think it needs political cover. it needs a framework of some kind. it will probably help a lot with both japan and south korea with him to say the americans want this. there's an american framework year if we're not doing it because korea and japan love each other. waiting it because the americans want this. but the damage our relationship with china, that will exist and we will need a good explanation for why we are doing this. and i would suggest one of them could be well, the chinese are

invited to these exercises, too, as long as they meet certain conditions here but the conditions may be very difficult to china to me. democracy would be one of them, a multiparty democracy. sorry for the long answer but i think what you are raising for all four of us is really a grand strategy going forward the next ten or 20 years when a new president comes in, he asked certain kinds of questions that if you are a cheeky think tank person you say what a stupid question people are actually some of new presidents questioning is really quite profound. how did we get here and where are we trying to go over the next 20 years? >> terrific. okay. we have not that much time left but i'm going to take some questions. i'm going to take in groups and then, but please try to keep your question briefed. i'm sorry, not great, concise. that's a more polite word. yes, right here. and please identify yourself.

>> my name is mike, so either two-part question. the first is what lessons do you see president moon as having drawn an experience of his predecessors? particularly that of his mentor young when engaging with north korea and dealing with u.s. alliance management? and on the american and what lessons do think president trump should draw from his predecessors experience dealing with north korea and alliance management with the rok? >> great, thank you. other questions? yes, right here. >> i addressed this question to dr. pillsbury. the president tweeted this morning that he will authorize, excuse me, the sale of advanced libidos to the japanese and south koreans. beyond the thaad system what capability think the south koreans acquire to deter and defend north korea?

and what effect do you think these additional capabilities might have on strategic stability with china? >> great, thank you. yes, here. >> steve winters, independent researcher. this is also for dr. pillsbury. you mentioned several times the chinese perhaps irrational fear of encirclement and so forth and you discuss that. to what extent do you think the chinese see the current increasing chaos on the peninsula as something that would increase their suspicions of why this is happening? because in their statements they suggested a double frees and this and that, so they seem to think there are two sides, neither of which is welling to de-escalate the situation. andrews is going to increase

their paranoid view? >> okay, great. why don't we start with those? first questions are, what lessons we think president moon has drawn from his predecessor and mentor? and then i guess for the american side, simile for president trump what lessons have you learned from his predecessors attempts at data with ms. north korea issue? and then to specific questions for mike on arms sales to japan and korea, and then on chinese encirclement. so who would like to go first? >> i think we had a kind of -- in terms of north korea policy in south korea which emphasized

importance of person-to-person relation between the north and south, cooperation and a peaceful coexistence or something like that. and that belief was shared by both president and president moon jae-in. i think that kind of was legitimate because we had some examples like german unification, and germany could be unified both germany's could be unified because of very excellent diplomacy by helmut kohl. but on the other hand, without other politic which was initiated by social democratic leader, the unification could

not have been possible. so it is, it has that kind of appearance, influence. president very much. that kind of dream was the reason why he pursued engagement policy towards north korea, which is also shared by president moon jae-in. i think many, probably most koreans have been dreaming the kind of coexistence, peaceful coexistence. and that's the reason why those three levers have been emphasized the importance inter-korean cooperation. but the problem is that north koreas -- security policy of developing nuclear weapons

narrow the space for those leaders to implement -- implement that part of engagement policy. so even though they may be dreaming, president moon jae-in have idea of engaging north korea in his mind, he is a realistic political leader and recognize the limitation to fully implement that kind of policy. that's exactly why he has been trying hard to strengthen bilateral relationship between rok and the united states, and to overcome this very difficult challenge posed by north korea threat. personally, i still think that it is desirable for korean government to pursue some kind of inter-korean cooperation outside of international

sanctions, like providing medical assistance to north koreans where many people are dying because of lack of medicine. or environmental cooperation come something like that. there is no reason for not trying the kind of cooperation for president moon. and i fully support that kind of initiative. but i think he recognizes it is not the right time to pursue full-fledged economic engagement of north korea. he is definitely i think realizing the current difficult situation. >> thank you. mike, do you want to talk about particularly the question but chinese encirclement fears as a result of the current crisis? >> well, just briefly. there's a debate that's broken

out in beijing which i tried to cover debates in my previous books that happen in china. the debate is part of this initiative that china and then russia joined them put forward with the double suspension as they call it. i agree with nikki haley of course that it's not, it's a nonstarter. but it does show the chinese willingness to take an initiative, and it does show an interesting betrayal in some ways of north korea. as joe told me a long time ago, i keep mentioning him because he sitting at the right table and i like to tease him, a magazine got close in beijing, a very high-level magazine with many sponsors just for raising, just a publishing an article that we should consider with north korea is more about liability than an ally. that's almost 20 years ago.

now enchanters and much more widespread discussion of the option of really getting tough on north korea. so part of what you see in china, it seems to me, is this seven years, the past seven years or so they attended to drop the old biker time hydra capabilities -- bide your time, hydric epidurals, but others have missed this. they think they're still dealing with the old china, and one reason for that, victor, this is why i'm going to get back to trilateral relations, we don't have, we, the united states, have had a lot of net assessment sharing activities in europe. we have not really done a net assessment collaboration with south korea, and i think we should.

we haven't done a formal net assessment cooperation with japan, and i think we should. and what a wonderful idea to do it in a trilateral way. and this must be plucked another georgetown professor, csis guru, mike green, and his new book not by providence alone, i think it's called. he admits when he was at the nsc for five years he could lay his hand on american strategy documents. we decide to write this book and looked them up and present it. it's a fantastic study. ..

whether you add together or they fight separately, who knows what kind of scenarios there would be. the very assessment studies from government to government corporation. behind a lot of these questions including the gentleman over here asking about present drums to eat and what more can we sell to south korea to do what denmark calls a strengthened conventional deterrence which is a very important issue and behind all that is the military balance. and the trends that are occurring. if it is weakening and if deterrence will get harder and harder over the next ten years then we will wish that back in 2017 and 2018 we had done more to strengthen our side of the balance. if it's getting stronger and

stronger than that is a different story and we can be more complacent. i would like to put that on the agenda of think tanks in washington and seoul in tokyo. what is happening to the conventional and strategic balance? my fear is it is getting worse but i am not sure unless there's a sustained effort that we can't answer the more technical questions, do we want upgrade to have long-range missiles or not? if the balance is getting worse than we do. >> do you want to make any comments on the question of arming and the lessons that we've learned from the previous administration? >> present moon is underscoring the backbone in solving the problem. and there's a small -- actually, emphasizing the collaboration

and coordinating and handling north korea. not seeking autonomy from the united states but so data will be pursued between the two parties and also the other thing that of course is conditionality is except the humanitarian effort and that's a different between the normally administration and it's actually something that normally the administration the articles like this. despite all the problem issue that was dialogue with north korea i don't think that's the case in the moon and ministration. if you read his statement he always attaches conditionality and dialogue. whenever there is meaningful progress on the nuclear front we can have dialogue including the summit with conditionality attachments. i think there are two differences between the moon and

ministration of the previous and ministration. i see that he has become much more practical than problematic. >> a couple of comments. first on the lessons for the president. i clearly can't comment on what lessons he has done but i could comment on lessons that i think should be drawn from previous experiences. i'll only focus on two. first is the importance of our alliances. to realize that us alliances are at the foundation of american power and influence in the region and that enhancing collaboration, cooperation and building ties at the military, political and economic level is absolutely essential as asia goes more important and as china continues to rise. without our allies the united

states were not nearly have the same amount of influence and access and power as we do with them. the second is to not put too much mistake in personal relationships with chinese that you can have good meetings and good engagements and you can even say good things to each other but in the end, both countries and both leaders will represent the interests of their countries. just because you had a good meeting and you had a good engagements makes her that were not putting too much mistake in the quality of that arrangement. i think in the past -- this is not specific to any single person or any specific meaning but ensuring that you have a good meeting but that you are realistic about what to expect is very important. other piece i wanted to mention is encirclement.

china's take on our alliances which is appointed doctor pillsbury has touched on several times. obviously there are people in china and some at high levels who believe crazy things about the united states. going back decades and more recent examples about conspiracy theories surrounding. [inaudible] is a recent example of that. the key to understand this is this is not based on technical reality. china's concern is not concerned on the range of a radar or missile but it's political. a lot of these conspiracy theories that are fairly popular in some circles in china refle reflect, instead of a literal belief that this actually happened more of a fundamental

suspicion about american tension and the role of the united states vis-à-vis china. my take on this is that america's role in the role of any american leader is first to defend itself to defend the united states and defend our allies. reassuring china of baseless suspicion is secondary. to me, making decisions about. [inaudible] , for example, cannot happen if you're allowing chinese paranoia to get too far into your decision cycle. the first question is what is best. i say that what is best for your allies once a decision is made then you can start talking about how to talk to the chinese about it and how to make them understand real capabilities in the real tension behind. to me, when thinking about enhanced collateral corporation for any decision that involves the defense of the united states or our allies verse fundamental and really only question is is

this helpful to the united states and is a sample for our allies. once you come to that answer and secondary question is how do we talk to the chinese about this and how will try to react to it and what is the engagement plan was a comes to effect. >> we are out of time. okay. i found it a very interesting and informative discussion. thanks to all of our panelists for the presentation and for answering my questions, as well as the questions from the audience. let's give them a round of applause. [applause] >> we will now have a 30 minute lunch break. we provided lunch boxes for everyone outside in the foyer. grab a lunchbox and come back here and eat we will reconvene here a little bit after 12:30. speakers, please stay at your table. thank you.

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c-span2 for this daylong forum on north korea taking a 30 minute lunch break in the discussion today focusing on the challenges for the us south korea alliance. the north korean threat and also looking at opportunities to work with china in japan. positron between earlier today that he will going to allow us allies, japan and south korea to buy a substantially increased amount of military equipment from the united states. the discussions today being hosted by the center for strategic international studies. [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] this is an all-day discussion on north korea also today president trump announcing that program that has protected young immigrants brought into the us illegally when they were children he has called on

congress to find a legislative solution to protect so-called dreamers, as he decided to phase out the program. jeff sessions made the announcement this morning and here are some of his remarks. >> to have a lawful system of immigration that serves the national interest we cannot admit everyone who would like to come here. it is just that simple. there that would be an open borders policy and the american people have rightly rejected that. therefore, the nation must set and enforce a limit on how many immigrants we admit each year and that means all cannot be accepted. this does not mean they are bad people or that our nation disrespects or demeans them in any way. it means we are properly enforcing our laws as congress has passed them. it is with these principles and duties in mind and in light of imminent litigation that we

reviewed the obama administration daca policy. our collective wisdom is that the policy is vulnerable to the same, legal and constitutional challenges that the courts recognized with respect to the daca program. this was enjoined with a nationwide basis that was affirmed by the fifth circuit court of appeals. the fifth circuit specifically concluded that daca had not been implemented in a fashion that allowed sufficient discretion and that daca was foreclosed by congresses careful plan. in other words the immigration law that congress passed or closed this possibility of daca. in other words, it was inconsistent with the constitution's separation of powers. that decision was affirmed by the supreme court on an equally

undivided basis. we were to keep the obama administration's executive amnesty, policy that it would, too, be enjoined just as was daca. the department of justice has advised the president in the department of homeland security that the department of homeland security should begin an orderly, lawful line down including the cancellation of the memo that authorized this program. acting secretary has chosen appropriately to initiate a line down process. this will enable the department of homeland security to conduct an orderly change and felt the desire of this administration to create a time period for congress to act should it, so choose. we firmly believe this is the response.

>> a response from house speaker paul ryan saying it is my hope that the house and senate with the president's leadership will be able to find consensus on a permanent legislative solution that includes ensuring that those who have done nothing wrong can still contribute as a valued part of the great country. virginia democratic senator also responded in the wake of the present heartless decision to end daca, congressman must e-mail it has the bipartisan dream act to protect dreamers. after the attorney general announcement protesters were headed down to trump international hotel in washington dc. the hotel situated on pennsylvania avenue between the us capital and the white house. [cheering] >> we will keep you updated on this development and bring you

any updates on the c-span at work. again, c-span2 live for a daylong forum on north korea. they are in a 30 minute lunch break. while they are in a break will take a look at the earlier discussions from the morning session. >> thank you. thank you to cis and the korea foundation for inviting me to speak. i am honored to be here this morning and especially given recent events on the korean peninsula i do not think this event could not be more timely. picture, thank you for that warm introduction. in addition to serving as a senior advisor, as he mentioned, he is director of asian studies at georgetown university which is where i received my masters degree. victor is a terrific teacher and an even better public servant. i am hopeful that his distinguished career will have another chapter. i also hope that professor is not grady my performance today. if he is, i hope i do better than that.

so, for the benefit of the fancier and online, let me briefly reintroduce myself. my name is stephanie murphy and i'm a first or member of congress. i was born in vietnam and i came to the united states as a refugee with my family several years after the fall of saigon in 1925. i'm honored to represent a district in central florida that includes orlando and the northern suburbs and i'm also a member of the house of armed services committee where i serve on the subcommittee for readiness and the subcommittee for emerging threats and capability. in addition, along with harassment seth from massachusetts and congressman from california i cochair the house democratic caucus is national security task force. the purpose of this recently established tech force is to help democrats in congress proposed strong, smart and strategic national security policies. and to support the current administration when it advances policy, foreign policies that

comport with our nations court interests and values and to vigorously oppose the administration when it proposes policies that undermine those interests and values. as leaders of the task force we don't really see any value in reflexively opposing the administration nor any more values in blindly supporting them. i think it's about being fair and presenting the policies of this country. before coming to congress i worked in a variety of roles at the civilian employee of the department of defense. the primary region is the pacific region and although i identify as a moderate democrat in congress at dod i staff to sectors of the fence who were appointed by a republican president. donald rumsfeld and robert gates. i can't tell you how different those experiences work. i am a firm and almost fanatical believer in the old-fashioned maxim that to the greatest extent possible politics should stop at the water's edge and

despite the partisan divide in washington today, i continue to cling to this principle. with a sense of determination and at this point quite frankly, desperation. in my brief framing remarks i'd like to underscore the importance of the alliance between the united states and south korea. to identify what i believe are the two main challenges to this alliance and to offer personal views on my prospectus and congress on how they can be addressed. let me begin with a few words about the alliance itself. it has become something of a cliché for government officials to assert the relationship between the relationships between two -- in the case, the statement however tried it it might sound is true. of course it goes well beyond that. this alliance is special because it was built in battle, forged a fire and shaped by a shared sacrifice. between 1950 and 1953 the citizens of our two nations bought and often fell

side-by-side to repel north korea's invasion of south korea to preserve south korea's very existence. in 1953 following the armistice, we signed a mutual defense treaty that commits each country to come to the others defense if attacked. in the decade since south korea has evolved from a dictatorship to democracy, from a large underdeveloped country to an economic powerhouse. the us has been consistently there to lend a helping hand to the provision of economic insecurity supports. they are currently over 28000 us troops stationed in south korea to help defend our ally. make no mistake about it, south korea's success over the years is attributable first and foremost to the talent and grit of the south korean people and their leaders. put differently, south korea's remarkable rise like so many consumer products the world has come to depend on was made in south korea.

products like the phones i see many of you using to fact check my speech. because our two nations fought together in a war that has never really ended and because our servicemembers continue to stand together along perhaps the most dangerous border of the world our relationship is the furthest thing from transactional, temporary or tactical. it's authentic, deeply personal and resilient. likely to endure despite the occasional setbacks and tensions and differences of opinions that are inedible between any partnership between proud, sovereign and democratic nations. at the same time i believe a warning is in order. the proven depth and durability of our security and economic relationship should not breed complacency. a strong alliance like a strong marriage is not self-sustaining emma just asked my husband. it requires patient and persistent upkeep by officials in both nations.

it should never ever be taken for granted. let me now turn to identify the two broad challenges and to outline a few thoughts on how each should be confronted to maximize the chance of success. first and most obvious challenge is the one imposed by the increasingly belligerent, unpredictable and dangerous regime in north korea. the alliance original note one as everyone in this room knows painfully well, north korea has now conducted six nuclear test since october 2006. each one a violation of international law. the last four tests were conducted under the current leader kim duncan and this past weekend north korea carried out its latest detonation of a nuclear device. it is one that appears a vastly more powerful yield than the

device tested back in september 2016. this is a profoundly dangerous, defiant and destabilizing events. as expected, the task has gotten verbal confirmation from the community and is too early to say whether these strong words will be followed by strong action. if so, what those actions will entail. and whether or not they will make any difference in altering north korea's strategic calculus. meanwhile, north korea continues to develop increasing range in sophistication having already conducted approximately 16 separate tests this year alone. test conducted in july led the un security council including china and russia to vote unanimously and to impose strict new sanctions on kim jong-un which is certainly cause for optimism. however, it remains to be seen whether these new sanctions will be adequately enforced, especially by beijing to account for upwards 85% of north korea's international trade. it also remains to be seen

whether the security council will agree to strengthen the sanctions even further in light of north korea's latest nuclear test. more generally it is unclear whether precise impact stations will have a north korea's economy and on the regime's inclination, if any to negotiate a nuclear freeze or reversal in exchange for some degree of sanctions released. in the short term north korea responded to the new sanctions in its typical passion. firing a missile last month of flew over japan and of course, north korea proceeded with its latest nuclear test in the face of broad, international opposition. the reality is that we are now in a truly uncharted territory and we have not yet cracked the code on how to influence decision-making. north korea's evident goal is to develop an arsenal of nuclear tipped ballistic missiles that can reliably hit the us territory of bomb, the us state

of hawaii and eventually the us mainland. according to conventional wisdom conjunctions panel the reason for pursuing this capability is to avoid the fate of the leaders of saddam, omar gadhafi in libya to deter invasion by outside forces and therefore insure regime survival. this rationale bewilders policymakers in the united states and other like-minded countries. we made to test the regime but we regard north korea landless progress in its nuclear and missile progress as the sole behavior that could compel the international community to take action that would result in regime change or collapse in north korea. from this perspective north korea seems to be making a fundamental miscalculation regarding what is in his own best interest and its provocative conduct could bring about the exact result, regime extinction, that he seeks above all to the point. this is the conundrum that lies at the heart of the debate over what to do about north korea.

how do we get conjunctions to leading to denuclearization is the best and indeed the only way to ensure this regime survival. as victor argued, north korea has a less obvious goal. that is to weaken the us south korea alliance that we are all gathered here today to discuss. specifically, he asserts that north korea seeks to threaten the us to undercut the credibility of the united states extended to current guaranteed to. under our so-called nuclear umbrella. i agree with his analysis. conjunction may well believe his actions could cause us policymakers to act in a more unilateral fashion, undermining the alliance. can they even believe that the us would hesitate to come to south korea's defense if the us perceives that it could lead to direct attack. again, however i believe he is making a fundamentalist conflation.

if anything the increasing threat to the us homeland post fight north korea should bring the united states and south korea closer together. it should not drive a wedge between us. our states are so closely intertwined. us policymakers must make crystal clear that the us commitment to south korea and the importance that washington attaches to cooperation with text hundred 20 is stronger than ever. as noted in a recent op-ed north korea is a land of lousy option. those options only become worse if there is any real perceived erosion. that leads to what i see is the second main challenge for the alliance. this is the changing and complex political dynamics in washington and seoul with the recent elections are president trump and present. let me focus on the former. i think it is safe to say that we have a significantly unconventional leader in the white house. when it comes to the trump administration, and its approach the multifaceted us south korea

partnership my concern all into two categories. first, i concerned about the apparent inability of the ministration to nominate insecure senate confirmation of qualified individuals to fill positions at state defense responsible for policy toward korea and east asia. nearly eight months into this ministration there is no nominated us ambassador and no nominated assistant secretary east asian affairs and there's no undersecretary for arms control and international security and there's no special envoy and over at the department of defense there is no individual nominated and confirmed for the position of secretary of defense or deputy assistant secretary for east asia. i mean absolutely no disrespect to the individuals who may be holding these positions on an interim or acting basis and some of them are excellent. we all know that senate

confirmation provides enhanced credibility and stability. when it comes to international affairs in general, and alliance preservation in particular personnel is policy. i'm heartened that irresponsible individuals like steve bannon have departed the administration and that professionals like the white house chief of staff, john kelly, secretary of defense james mattis and the national security advisor hr mcmasters seem to be gaining and influence. nevertheless, the fact remains that you need a subject matter expert in place at every level in the national security bureaucracy to develop and execute policy. to reassure allies and to deter adversaries. the administration has been severely lacking in this respect. my second concern about the trump administration is this.

too many members of the administration, including the president himself, do not appreciate that the rhetoric they use in the actions they take to appeal to certain domestic political constituencies can cause relationships with foreign allies harm and therefore undermine our national security. consider, for example, president tom's initial reaction via twitter to north korea's most recent nuclear test. if there were an event to gravity called for a thoughtful and deliberate and sober minded response, not limited to 140 characters, this was it. unfortunately the president turned against to social media. even more troubling than the medium through which he chose to deliver his message was the message itself. the president accused south korea under president moon of appeasement and evoking the historical memory of british prime minister neville chamberlain's failed effort to stop german aggression by agreeing to hitler's demands. use of such a loaded term may play well with a certain segment

of the president space but it is hard to overstate just how false and foolish and potentially damaging this claim can be. here we are facing an unprecedented part of military escalation by a robust nuclear state and the leader of the most powerful nation on earth chooses to twitter shame and enter inflame our close ally. if one of north korea's goals is to test the us, south korea alliance, as i believe it is, then it must be positively gleeful over this twitter exchange. i'm also worried by reports that the trump administration, again with an eye to pleasing a domestic political ebullience, could withdraw from. [inaudible] this agreement was initiated and signed under the bush 43 administration and was modified, finalize and by congress with bipartisan support under the obama administration. the united states and korea are major economic partners.

the united states has created the second largest trading partner after china and korea is the united states seventh largest trading partner. the fda is the centerpiece of this economic relationship. my purpose here is not to defend every cause although i do believe it is on net, a beneficial agreement for both countries. instead i want to empathize that both president bush and president obama saw the course fda as more than a trade deal. they also correctly viewed it as a vehicle to deepen and expand influence with a vital ally in a key region. china has an fda korea and for this and many other reasons us policymakers should want our economy in korea's economy to be tied more closely together, not last. against this backdrop a unilateral decision by the united states to withdraw from this agreement, even as a tactical ploy to renegotiate aspects of the agreement is likely to be seen by south korea

as a betrayal of america's commitment for the broader alliance at an incredibly precarious time. if the united states can be trusted to do business with south korea on a mutual agreement negotiated by two presidents of both political parties why should korea believe our security assurances are real. i hope the trump administration asking itself hard questions like this and that it will proceed with wisdom and care. unfortunate, two characteristics i have seen in short supply thus far in the administration. let me close with a thought about the importance of us leadership and the role of congress in ensuring that our congress does not retreat from its global responsibility in an age of rising populism. i understand why tom called for america's first resonates with those families struggling here at home and really wonder why our country is spending precious taxpayer dollars on defense, diplomacy and development abroad.

at the same time, i firmly believe that the united states is safer, stronger and more prosperous when our servicemembers, diplomats, trade officials and our aid workers are sufficiently numbered, adequately resourced and deeply engaged with the world. the world is a better place when we work side-by-side with our partners in asia and other regions. both prevent conflict and to prepare ourselves to prevail should conflict occur. i have a personal story to share how strongly support the us and global security flow from independent on us global engagement and leadership. earlier this summer i had a chance to host ten six-year-old's for my son skinner in class and that is bravery, just saying, they were visiting washington and we were walking toward the world war ii museum and one of the little boys asked me, ms. stephanie, why hasn't there been a world

war iii? i gave what i believe to be a truthful and perhaps not exactly age-appropriate response. i told him there were two main reasons why we have not experienced direct and devastating conflict between major powers in the last 60 years. the first is that us leadership around the world and the second is the web of institutions and alliances that the united states and its partners in asia and europe established after world war ii. rest assured, if this child grows up to be the next us pacific commander, i will take credit. my experience on capitol hill has led me to believe that there is a strong bipartisan recognition in congress that us global engagement, leadership and alliances matter. and they matter a great deal which is good because i'm also of the view that congress, as a --

>> we will get started now as our keynote for the luncheon. i'd like to introduce our keynote speaker, minister is the second vice minister of foreign affairs for the republic of korea. before assuming his position he served as the south korean ambassador to india and also the south korean ambassador to austria and the permanent indiana. he has worked on a variety of issues during his distinguished diplomatic career, including trade, nuclear security, energy and climate change policy. he was also recently a visiting professor at the university of foreign studies. please give a welcome round of applause and i will happen to the podium now and give his remarks. [applause] >> good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. i am delighted to be here today to attend this for a cohosted. today i would like to talk about

the three challenges korea has been facing recently and how so the us korea alliance has been for korea in overcoming those challenges. my remarks today, however, are not an expression of the official position of the korean government. as in fact, i do deal with the issues i will talk about today. i would rather, therefore, present my own personal observations on the korean government's policy on these challenges or issues. twenty years ago i was here in washington dc watching as an economy officer at the korean embassy and at the time korea was petering on the verge of

sovereign default. to make things worse, we were about all the presidential election in december. it was indeed a very tense and curious. i did not know what would happen in washington. as you are well aware, we were able to overcome the economic crisis quite successfully with the program. furthermore, in this time we were ushering in a blossoming "after words" and i would witness that this is possible with the united states.

i can testify today you that you warmhearted officials in the us government helped korea to navigate unchartered public waters, at the time. twenty years later today, your ally korea, is again in trouble. we need your help again. let me move on to the three strategies we are facing. the first challenge we had, ten months ago, when then president park was embroiled in influence peddling and corruption scandal. hundreds of thousands of koreans took to the street and demanded

in the immediate resignation of the president. i was then in india serving as ambassador. i was holding my breath because of this very volatile situation in korea. however, the demonstration and the turned out to be very peaceful and even clean. demonstrators swept streets after their demonstration. more importantly, the procedures of our legislative branch and the decision of our constitutional court were carried out in a very orderly and legal manner. early election was held in may and we have a fresh new start. i am proud to say today that this was a victory and the

triumph of the rule of law which came from our ally, the united states. this, of course, would not be the end of the story. the remaining part of the challenge will be how the new government will accommodate the various and diverse voices of the people on the street without falling victim to populist policies. the second challenge lies in the social, economic areas. before i was sent to india, i had been back into a university teaching international relations and getting along with young students.

i was surprised to know how frustrated they are. i was worried about their resentment. they were staring at the self, as those born with a dirty spoon in their mouth, living in hell. indeed, young people in korea are struggling with numerous difficulties, getting a job, getting married, having children, just normal procedure for my generation now seems to be a difficult task to achieve. the window of opportunity are becoming narrower and the social stratification is getting more distinct and rigid. the dwindling job opportunities are leading to growing

inequalities. the moon government is addressing this problem through growth, devoting himself from the defendant economic structu structure. government policies, however, will be in accordance with the principles of modern economy. they will also be a rule-based approach such as an application of antitrust law. in other words, we will overcome this problem with application of stronger economic principles which, again, we share with the united states. the third challenge, the most daunting one comes from north korea. while i was on air, on way to

washington dc the day before yesterday they claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb. north korea is continuing its reckless publication, ballistic missiles have been tested this year alone. one of which flew over japan and the american territory of guam is under threat. well, north korea is rapidly becoming a threat to hard to bear. is this kim jong-un survival tactic or is this lunatic simply trying to change the status for the peninsula? is he the consumer of his own

propaganda? does he believe in what he says in rhetoric? whether he does all of these publications within a of a grandiose plan of unifying the peninsula under his command or not there are two things we cannot assess. first we should not upset north korea is a nuclear weapons state. 15 million south koreans will not accept ourselves being cowed by your nuclear threats. the us will not accept it either as nuclear north korea will challenge and bring about a series, challenge, to your international nonproliferation

regime including the entity system. the second thing we cannot accept in any case is a war on the korean peninsula. given the calamity, award would bring about, we cannot accept a war as an option. this is not because we are weak or we are cowards but indeed because we are only two vivid memories of the korean war. i understand the need to stress that all options on the table for sizing it is needed for okay but we should be careful that this does not translate into an escalation of war or close calculation of north korea.

then, how are we going to deal with. under these two things to do? first, we will continue sanctions and pressure which will eventually lead north korea to a dialogue and the only solution for north korea is encouraging china to get on board with these sanctions and pressure campaigns will be crucial. second, we will enhance our deterrence and we will upgrade our defense capabilities including the one in the air and defense missile system. in this context, our two presidents also agree to revise the current missile guidelines to the extent desired by korea. with regard to.

[inaudible] my present made a decision for the temporary deployment of for additional broad in the face of north korea's provocations. in a nutshell, concerted and well orchestrated corporation between our two governments is crucial. indeed, our two countries have been closely coordinating a approach to tackle the new quote grant nuclear issue for every possible occasion. the recent summit meeting in june and the three meeting in july and numerous telephone calls including the one yesterday between our two presidents demonstrates how closely we have been working together we've been working on

this issue. ladies and gentlemen, i still would like to make additional suggestions for the successful revolution of the issue. may i start with the question? what went wrong? obviously, north korea is holy to blame for this situation. the responsibility rests with tim duncan and his father. however, if we look back on the past years we might be able to identify two intrinsic from our side and the first is we are democracies. as democratic countries we have change of government and accordingly change of policy which, north korea has been taking advantage of while sticking to their aim of their

ambitions. second, the us and the united states as a global power seems, at times, to have been distracted by some other priority issues. this may have left some room for north korea to pursue its nuclear ambitions. if this assessment is fair well, we admit that we have had problems of first ingenuity and concentration i would like to suggest that at this 11th hour we redouble our concerted efforts for the new causation of north korea. we need more focused efforts for the longer period of time and we need a strategy well tuned by

our two countries. finally, with your indulgence i would like to talk about war in dialogue. i am often asked by many foreigners why koreans first, so sanguine about their future, even when a bomb exploded in the, tested in the. my answer is that maybe we have been inured to that kind of threats for decades and they do not really seem to be understanding me. they say that -- well, they don't say it but they seem to be thinking that we are unrealistic and not they are double.

, then when we talk about the possibility of war some people say we are appeasers, cowed by them. that we should become more brief. so we have to be realistic. at least we should be thinking about an escalation of miscalculations and we should be wary of it. that does not mean that we are weak or cowards. this leads me to another issue that we try to talk about the need for having dialogues with north korea and we are criticized for being. the time is not good for that.

as incongruent as it may sound, but we needed. because actually we need to understand it because there are two types of dialogues. one dialogue for denuclearization which should be resumed under the right conditions under cessation of north korea publication threats. another dialogue is about humanitarian issues and we use military with the dmv at the latest states. such dialogues would not upset our efforts for sanctions and pressure on the north korea and would not be a strategy stick.

instead, they will help us ease tensions on the korean law and we really hope that someday, some stage, it will eventually create an environment favorable to a dialogue. the first dialogue for denuclearization. it may sound unrealistic today but we cannot abandon it. ladies and gentlemen, i am well aware of affection for korea, as well as your enthusiasm for and dedication to the strong ties of our alliance. i count on your support. [applause] >> thank you for those remarks. we will now take a few questions

and vice minister has agreed to graciously answer a couple of questions. who will take a couple of questions at the time and if you could please raise your hand and also tell us your name and your affiliation before you ask your question. we have a question in the back there. >> hello. thank you for being here. my name is isabel with inside us trade. curious how korea is viewing these threats from the president trumps withdrawal, specifically from a civilian standpoint and what the feel over there regarding these threats. >> thank you for raising that particular question. some years ago i was chief negotiator for the renewal of. [inaudible] i negotiated with. [inaudible] at the time, i argued that this renewed agreement would be our

third after the alliance and the chorus. it is very important and i am very thankful for its future. some people worry about it but, as i know, our negotiator, conjunct, happens to have many friends in the beltway. he will sort it out. thank you. >> we have one question here on the side. >> thank you for your speech. my name is andy. you mentioned there were two things that you cannot accept. one was a nuclear north korea

and one was a war on the korean peninsula. mindful of the other actions that are involved, china or kj you, if you were forced which one you would you prefer to happen? [. >> we will take one more. there was a question in the front and will take this question, as well. >> my name is florence. this is follow-up on the first question about 123 agreements.

>> well, the phasing out of nuclear reactors in korea is not imminent. it will be a long time ago, 50 years, i do not know. by the time work on it because it is random technologies and expertise accumulated for decades, we have shared interest that building nuclear reactors around the world should not be left to countries other than korea and the united states. regarding the question on this issue, i prefer -- very

hypothetical question. >> we have time for one or two more questions and take them together. we have one in the back. and one over here. >> i am with the washington times and want to follow up on your comments that the white house seemed distracted at times, possibly an opening for north korea to impress the weapons programs. in your assessment of white house response, has it been adequate to tap down pressures on the peninsula or can the us do more and if so what should they do? >> with regard to the current white house i don't see any problem. do attention has been given to this issue. previous ones, understandably

there have been very imminent and important issues all around the world. there have been some cases, i cannot -- very nice words to say about it knowing strategic patience -- but thanks to north korea's continued provocations, we cannot afford such things. >> we had more over here and this will be the last question. >> mister minister, you presented a conundrum for us and i would like to discuss it. you suggested we need a dialogue. you also suggested you cannot have a nuclear armed north

korea. how do we enter a dialogue without first understanding denuclearization? >> it is good to see you. i hope i can answer your question. luckily i do not deal with the issue for the time being at least. my answer to your question is that of my own and i think it can be done. collaboration between our governments making a kind of roadmap and then asked china to jump on it and walk together with the peace and prosperity of northeast asia. of course the devil is in the

details. unfortunately, i cannot go further. >> please join me in thanking the vice minister for his remarks and answering the questions. we now have a short transition break for the next panel. please come to the stage, we will be getting started. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> well, welcome back from your break. i am michael green, senior vice president for asia and japan, professor at georgetown and a veteran of the forgotten bush administration.

the panel is going to look at our alliance in the context of northeast asia. the previous panels touched on bilateral defense issues, on ways to deal with the rising threat from north korea. those issues will come back in this panel but what i hope we can do for the next hour and 15 minutes is provide a larger geopolitical context within which we are now working. the north korean nuclear challenge cannot be divorced from the larger geopolitical memory and vision for the future of northeast asia and we are confounded, in our effort to find a diplomatic solution, by the fact there are different ideas in northeast asia about what the region's past was and what its future should be. views as diverse as the chinese

president's speech in shanghai several years ago when he called for a northeast asia without blocks which most people interpreted as meaning without alliances. a vision of lower us presence, diminishment or end of alliances that held the us at regional stability after the war, something new. others talked about the blaine -- danger of a split or divide in northeast asia with china, russia on the continental side, the us, japan, australia on the other side and career as a peninsula stuck in between. others articulate the vision for building on 70 years of progress and stability, we had the freedom more, vietnam war,

struggles, but prosperous because of the rules and structures we have been building so another vision is one that continues forging deeper ties based on rule of law. a different vision for the future of northeast asia, different interpretation of what it meant and precisely because of those differences we find it difficult for major powers to align on the nuclear problem and north korea uses the fissures and splits to maximize its own position, it's leverage and its threat so we will come back to the nuclear issue but put it in context of a larger issue, political trends, visions and memories that shaped the region and a panel of korean experts who will talk about how our alliance figures in all this. we begin in the order you see, the professor is an expert on

northeast asia and has various roles, that we turn to laura rosenberger who served with great distinction in the state department in the previous administrations, plural. and professor q who has particular expertise on china. blumenthal from american enterprise institute doing a lot of work on chinese grand strategy and the future of northeast asia. and the professor has a broad asia background the particular expertise in japan. we will hit trends in the region and talk about our alliance. these different competing visions of the future of northeast asia i started with, the variable that will control those futures most will be the

us north korea alliance, this began in the wake of the korean war, front-line of the battle against communist expansion. it is now an alliance that will be more decisive than any other bilateral relationship determining how us and china, japan and china, the larger spread of northeast asian power spreads out. hopefully in the next hour and 15 minutes we will point to a way to do that so i will ask each of the panelists to give a 3 to 5 minute topline key take away set of points on their talking memos and come back and get them debate and disagreement going and open up for your questions. >> i wrote this -- the question

is northeast asia and us alliance. we wrote almost nothing in the morning when i heard this for five minutes. as you all know, the security structure is more complex and totally different from the communist structure of the cold war but somehow the purists remain the same, the northern triangular alliance given that alliance, north korea and china and still have an exoskeleton, so any way, good parts, easy to draw cooperation from all the

allies and it is harder to solve the problem because the problem is on the other side of north korea. this complicates the situation, we attempt to dichotomized the problem and at the end of the day, maybe finishing, assault or failure. there are two main variables in the relationship. one is thought. the second issue is diversion over north korean power. interesting point is, kind of a litmus test between us and are okay. the trump administration casts

doubt mostly from us, diversion of north korea, supporters want divergence. this is test paper, litmus paper moon is not going to betray his voters. he is in between, sandwiched by these two. this can the site us rok relationships. the first test, standby with moon's approach but not the second. we have been talking about these

consultations but why only pressures to emphasize confrontations on pressures? for example, even in this grave situation, the us tried to have some contest toward the north like a contest in new york but i don't think it is the same as the government. second question, i know the situation so bad that even since talking about engagement now, we need some choice. nobody is talking about engagement issues, not many venues already.

third question. the net politics, leadership here including even some experts, their voice is much louder in korea but sometimes inconsiderate. being more careful and considerate, much more exaggerated, louder in korea and considering moon's tradition about the voters, china, korea, china, relationship, talk about geographical pictures, very different in substance. but this, china, korea, could china korea relationship the important in the construction to

solve this problem? but somehow always trilateral cooperation between us, japan, and korea, not korea, china, us, which i consider really important to solve the problem. >> we will come back to some of those. >> mike did a nice job laying out different visions of northeast asia and i want to talk about the importance of continued us leadership in seeing that direction continue not only in the united states but the alliance and important values, rules we have worked together so hard to cultivate in the last few decades. let me start by talking about

korea which fits in a very challenging location geographically. korea has been doing a lot of work to get the balance right between economic relationship with china and security relationship with the united states. this is a constant struggle and constant balancing act and i worry the us commitment to korea ever became in doubt, that would strengthen china's hand, lead to greater economic dependency between korea and china and make seoul less able to resist pressure on the us security alliance, looking to create other directions, we know a lot of progress has been made in the bilateral relations on trilateral cooperation which i believe is important for dealing

with north korea crisis and important for managing the rise of china and security interests in the region. absent us leadership i don't we would see the progress we have seen in the last few years but don't forget would continue in the direction of our collective insurance. we all know the perils of china filling a vacuum in the region if us leadership were to be in question. we have already seen china asserting its own vision for an economic framework in the absence of tpp agreement with the us participating. i think there are other ramifications for the us withdrawal from the paris climate accord that china is seeking to claim that mantle of leadership. i worry about playing into china's hands. finally i want to highlight the role of russia in the region which sometimes gets forgotten

but particularly recently we have seen vladimir putin flexing russia's muscles in the region. a lot of statements from vladimir putin's it sound very reminiscent of what we heard from the chinese about other missile systems in the region. it is important to bear in mind the role russia is playing in the region if the us were to pull back on its commitment to our allies security. i say all of this not to sound pessimistic because i'm extraordinarily optimistic about the us korea alliance. i'm optimistic about the northeast asia region. it is incredibly important that here in the united states we continue to put ourselves on course for sustained us leadership to ensure the region continues to develop in a region

12 to see it continue to do so. as somebody who believe strongly in our alliance, know that our korean colleagues will carry that mantle of leadership when it comes to international rules, norms and values the region is so dependent upon. >> reading the information waiting and great honor, to put a presentation in front of this. china is profoundly changing, and identity of great power. xi has a new strategy. xi suggest equal partnership with the united states, the policy is in favor of south korea and emphasized normal state to state relationship with

north korea. xi as opposed to the north korea nuclear mission as well as provocation. china -- audacious on the korean peninsula. you see the power of negotiation in 2016 and suspension in 2017. xi xinping in collaboration on north korea, july 4th this year, the united states and south korea carefully evaluate china under xi xinping and its implication. xi's new policy of ambition to the korean peninsula may bring greater cooperation with the united states and south korea. it matters for stability and

peace in northeast asia. the most challenging question is how to reserve this issue to ensure china's cooperation since the new government in south korea, china opposition to this has been more test like. the relationship between seoul and beijing is not likely to improve soon unless both are able to find out the mission. xi xinping saw the issue as national interest from one matter to another in germany, july 6th this year. in this case china's cooperation is at issue, a tremendous challenge before south korea. i'm also afraid the feud with china may ruin south korea's

economy, i suggest as follows, deploying south korea to protect the u.s. army's facilities from the attack of north korea. the south korean president must provide an assurance to xi xinping that it was not utilized against china and south korea supporting strict policies, not seeing china as an adversary in south korea and the united states. i hope the united states needs to provide technical insurance to china in a similar vein. the alliance must elevate, alleviate china's policy that might be pursuing the regiment state for the policy to north

korea, or the pledge of the policy, regime change and unification -- almost identical with those policies. the increasing pressure with warnings on september 3rd, testing of a hydrogen bomb with icbm capabilities. kim revealed he would not pay any respect to chinese interests as well as the united states. northeast asia is falling into a grave security dilemma. no one knows the outcomes. what is urgent is to establish cooperation among south korea and the united states and china.

they need to increase mutual trust. civilian expert-based dialogue, those three need to reopen the intent of nuclear weapons and difficulties to deal with these issues and crisis management mechanism and the end state of the korean peninsula. it applied over the horizon, we need to move. we need fresh ideas. thank you. >> great topic to come back to. >> very happy to be here. i can imagine our korean friends here, nerve-racking and distressing. in the united states too, living with this kind of threat, this kind of person in charge must be

awful. my heart really goes out and i we will find a solution over time. geopolitically the context, since the end of the cold war president after president said the greatest threat the post-cold war world faces is terrorists and rogue regimes getting wmd. it can happen and it did happen, that is a huge failure. if you're a dictator hell-bent on getting weapons, that has enormous geopolitical consequences for the middle east and here. i can come back to this later but the idea we are treating north korea as a state rather than a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons boggles the

mind. nice data in a real sense of the term, it should be treated and was treated for time by the bush administration as something else. that has all kind of applications for policy. the second thing in the geopolitical context is china, the end of the done period of reform and opening up, ended ten years ago, the reform period when xi xinping had that information. at the same time, china has the most ambitious policies of the last 20 years so less resources opening up period pending but an extensive territory that goes

through western parts of afghanistan all the way to claims in south korea and that in itself is geopolitical context. when it comes to korea the first analysis with china has got to be that it is an empire with expensive territory, not all of this but the first unit. i am sure to koreans, echoes of paying tribute in a material area where repeated when south korea got enormous pressure not to have a bad system, not to take care of its own security interests. that is how it views maritime

east asia, civilization -- part of the sino sphere and that impinges on its current strategy inside maritime east asia including korea. korea has been historically geopolitical cost base suddenly for china, a century of humiliation really began, the fight with japan and all that explains, not trying to justify but do what i everyone knows, toward unification under the are okay. the us dropped the ball on leadership over the last 10 or so years, really employing a humanitarian policy that speaks to koreans or moves towards what has been stated under the last

administration to support unification of that. i will stop and that is a huge issue, certainly at the least prepared for that. i will start with this and say from the deck of view of the department of defense korea and japan will get everything they want they will have strike capabilities, missile-defense capability, alliances will be tighter than they have ever been, they have been tighter in some ways than they have ever been and that is fine. in certain ways. it is fine with respect to the competition with china. getting to a heavy militarized northeast asia, distinct possibilities of nuclear breakout and strike capabilities. it is fine in terms of pushback with china but without a end

state leading to unification, it can be very dangerous. >> bringing up a japan issue. president moon's japan policy making a speech, national independence day, using independence day speak about japan. this time he made a very careful

allegiance. pickup two points, he mentioned it needs to go beyond bilateral relations and cooperation toward cooperating toward peace and prosperity in northeast asia. you want to move beyond the single approach to japan but now you want to broader discord with cooperation with japan and similar issues. that is one point. the second point, it is undesirable that history drags down the development of the bilateral relationship. the previous president park also mentioned this, this is something that you have to

translate words into action. and approach you want to cooperate on political security and economic matters with japan while separating separately particular issues. the next question is whether president moon will be able to do this. that particular point like i said before, the past relations have been overwhelmingly characterized by bilateral decisions that have been developed for economic and political and security relationships overshadowed by

particular historical realities. the relationship has often been called a special relationship, not the ordinary one but special. for cooperation, also the benefit analysis, very narrow, bilateral, we are entering the 21st century and those powers are more complex than before as conditions change with regional multilateral ties developed so these contests have reshaped the stage two countries play and incentive structures that guide their choices before, so viewed in the bilateral contest, now,

political, security epidemic incentives for cooperation with japan, decreased as china plays big power and economic benefits and incentives for cooperation in japan defined as jobless economy that is evident but there is an intriguing need for bilateral cooperation in multilateral context. japan, south korea, security cooperation in the region, not in the bilateral contest but the trilateral contest we have to do that so that is an important question but the challenge is

there is lingering problem, bilateral problem between correia and japan, perennial issue of problem and on the other hand trilateral is him is absolutely crucial for deterring north korea but if that is redirected to china containing china, south korea have to avoid so the question is how to promote trilateral is him kind of defining it in terms of north korean threat and if you want to

extend this trilateral listen into security system, a daunting task for promoting this trilateral is him and the second is the trade issue, a trade panel today, a trump list, free trade, free trade regime, a liberal regime to establish it. it is severely disrupted by the new american asset from tpp and

indicating repeal of korea. and in the region into sustaining the liberal trade regime into regions, need to reactivate mta, regionally reoriented multilateral free trade negotiations and tpp minus whatever you call it so that we hope to hope the united states. back to the liberal regime. test resilient -- just resilience, bilateral relations have been down to the bottom in

the past four or five years, december agreement concluded but largely fatal because now we have, and the japanese people getting out that way. the bed issue for recovering the government. really predicated on this particular problem and president moon's dilemma promised to seek through the campaign but just

campaign thing and now just a pledge much more careful, he shows careful approach mentioning renegotiation at the moment. and the minister of foreign affairs. and very interesting. whether moon will continue to get this problematic approach and more tailored to populist

demands. >> thank you for very concise, precise descriptions of bilateral relations and geopolitics with a number of issues came up which i call tactical or operational or means rather than end, not the most important thing, dialogue the most imprinting, dialogue is not the most important thing, i agree with your analysis of the need for trilateral is him. these are all mechanisms, what we should focus on his objectives in northeast asia as allies. if i could spend a few minutes stressed testing this group of liberal and conservative korean americans, see if there's a divergence between the us and the are okay - are okay, i want

to ask what do korean friends want from the united states with us china relationship. what do we want from korea's relationship, unspoken sources of doubt, none of us in the government now have to worry about that happening anytime soon so i think we can put those out candidly. we have various descriptions of north korea and the korean peninsula itself. southern panelists praised the formula that i don't know secretary tillerson will own but no unification and no regime change in our policy. question for the panel is in your own view in your lifetime, what do you want to see as the end state for the korean

peninsula? starting with you. not representing the hillary clinton campaign or whatever, in your view what is -- what would you like to see? >> best part about leaving government and leaving politics, i will be just me. to me the end state is a north korea that is unified with the south, denuclearize to, a player in line with the norms we believe will continue the peace, prosperity and security of the region. i know that is extraordinarily aspirational and a lot of challenges for getting there. that is what i believe is in our collective interests. >> anybody want to add or subtract or disagree? you didn't mention the us creole

alliance. >> that should have been implied. by continuing to carry forth the rule of norm values, that is absolutely tied up directly with the us korean alliance. the security situation evolves, there are conversations that can be had about particular's of the security aspect of the alliance but i see no future for the region that continues to develop with rules, norms and values we believe in for the us alliance. >> unification under the democratic rule of the are okay --rok in the lives of the united states is not too aspirational. i don't think one can say the us is putting values of asia when

korea is one big lave slave -- slave labor camp. we push values in asia but then say correia, let's not deal with the humanitarian issues, deter or coerce them but have a concentration camp as their country. the grand strategy with china. as far as a continental maritime value, longtime alliance with unified korea because our strategy should be to hold the line while pushing china to do more on the asian continent and be more nervous about russia than it is today. >> unified korean peninsula allied with the united states

integrated in asia underpinned by open rule of law. is that a vision, your peninsula, not ours. is that a vision you would disagree with? >> of course. this is such a word like a sacred word, if you talk about unification you have a benefit. i want to hold this for west germany's foreign minister, what he said in the interviews, kissinger and the west germany system. we never mentioned unification toward germany officially because it can be -- some kind

of conspiracy because always west germany has the upper hand. regarding moon's policy he is similar, peace first and unification as a process. right now unification in entire ways, not war, is peace manageable? right now, like a security dilemma and more of an arms race but he is trying to have something else. always we forget, pride among koreans especially conservatives try to have a nuclear weapon, tactical weapon and things like that but the balance, the good

part, you don't want to live in a terrorist kind of state. >> you are an agenda expert. comment on what you heard. in your view, can a 12 - xi xinping's chinese leadership live in it unified peninsula that underpins rule of law that we have been describing? or do they get a vote? >> i suppose democracy -- unify korea without nuclear is asian, a relationship between the united states and china has been changed. i think the country has a great

capability dealing with them issues. the level of communication and cooperation is much higher than ordinary people see. they will find a certain way, not the kind of work. these two giants must find a way to work and also china is changing, much more poor and democratic even though xi xinping is in power. it cannot last forever. we have to lift our eyes and watch carefully china's move but i assure the united states and china can find a second way out.

>> you cited my book twice as often as he did. >> this is why he is asking a strategic question. trying to unbundle what you said. are you optimistic we can convince china to accept the future of the korean peninsula? are you optimistic? >> i believe the capabilities of the united states but we are not sure, the short time we work on. >> do you think china accepts the future? how do we get to that point? is it through accommodating things like that saying this is the way it is going to be? >> yes. the chinese, the policy right

now that they agreed to a few months ago is tied north korea around china's neck until china feel so much pain, the problem is a mixed message talking about empathy. dealing with china at the end of the day, this is punishing, the kind of money we go after in china, but this militarization, japan with strike capabilities

is going to happen. and the nice fella in shenyang. and i think we should be more difficult to get. and much be a tougher negotiation, giving china assurances about what we do. that would be a strategic trade-off. >> sounds like it is possible for the us and china for the korean peninsula. >> there is so much pain about this relationship including our own aversion to taking on chinese state-owned enterprise

directly in north korea and sister organizations. .. i have always been of a strong view that this is not -- that us and chinese interests, when it comes to north korea, will never align. it is not a problem that we consistently outsource. the role will have to be the case and be very active. i am not convinced that we can never ship the chinese far enough. i actually think in the chinese

mind we talk a lot about stability of the peninsula and not wanting to have us troops north of on one of the things we forget is that they are a communist party very calming estate and a economist party leadership. there is something that is actually running to the pcp about supporting a regime change in the north. that is something that is asked essential and i don't know that that can ever be something that can be reassured on. i do think that much greater pain on the chinese is necessary, in part, because it will, at some point, have a strategic effect, i hope. part of the reason we've never been able to turn the screws tight enough pressure wise internally is that we've never been willing to go after.

i would add very one final point. sorry, not that i have any views on this. i think it's very important when we talk about these things and i know dan is not implying that we would do this without south korean colleagues of the table in the conversation but the idea has been floated by some in the past that a us china direct dialogue to horses out there would later bring in seoul. i think it's important that the idea that nothing about a status is incorporated into any conversation around. >> let's hear from our south korean colleagues and we will wrap up in your questions. >> i do agree with her that i more pessimistic, not completely pessimistic but repeated. [inaudible] as we all can see, right now this structure rivalry between

us and china and we are witnessing for the us and china to operate to solve these problems. i talked today about a lot of test cases and this can be the test case, i think. at this moment i don't think it's one man's decision. trump cannot decide this. strong leadership in a nationalism and everybody. that is the successful condition for consolidating power. in that case, it is not going to be easy that strong leaders. a domestic politics affects international policy more than the other and vice versa. it's not easy to do that. >> okay. i think we need a trade-off to

achieve the communication especially between the united states and china. what kind of trade-off is the united states willing to provide to china and what kind of trade-off they can exchange. that is the concern of korea. >> your concern that korea will of the us will give away too much? >> of course. [inaudible] >> just a question that would it be better if the blumenthal's idea was to put it in a box in us and china don't have a dialogue on resolving the north korea. >> of course they have to but the problem is how to communicate in the united states and south korea and that's very important and always whenever we have a power between south korea and china we also have to have a

true indication or worse and that reviews the kind of mistrust and uncertainty between intense political. >> who on the panel thanks we are committing katie strategically well. >> it's a mixed bag, i think. in some ways the military side of the command and even the conversation between something that you live through between the portion and in some way it is better in difficult times. it is a mixed bag. i don't know that even -- spirit

yes, but at the lower level i don't think it there yet. >> good, we are showing them the way with this panel. [inaudible conversations] >> i might say that the security track and also in terms of economic security in the region i think it is useful for stakeholders in the region to be able to establish an economic network. for example, whether it be the dpp and the middle powers would be equal to revitalize traded

networks and they will create some politic impacts pass over security submission in the hand of the united states will also be able to come in and in terms of regional we have to look at not just strictly security issues but also issues that we expect to have more regional ethics. >> the reason i am pushing on this with the panel is because i think that the chinese decision-making on north korea is not set and i personally think that one of most important variables in the debate within beijing will be how they view the long-term alliance and if

the us and rok appear to be diverging that long-term view we will enable decision-makers to avoid decisions or we will empower those within beijing to say time is on their side and in the long run will have an economic influence and to control the open dissipation in asia at the expense of the united states. we can have disagreements and is vital for the north korea hundred and united states to have dialogue that while we may have tactical disagreements is no difference on the and state that we have all agreed on on the peninsula. the problem with making bad or dialogue or specific things too much of the debate or put another way the problem with trying to find the perfect solution to satisfy china and the us in the specific issues is

the signal to beijing can be us alliances and play. it's influx and it's in play and i personally don't believe that but i'm quite and i think others who engage with china and japan i thank you will agree that very often those in the peninsula but often in tokyo think the alliance is much more wobbly in the long run and much less solidarity in our vision and then is actually the case that is demonstrated. it's important that we have these dialogs. let me turn to the audience and will come back to the panel but take questions from you and i think we have microphones raise your hand and i will call on you and no speeches please. might appear. >> microphone is coming hello.

tim irate for the nation in investigative journalism. i have a question mostly for the korean panelist. i spent quite a few months in south korea recently and over the last two years and i have never heard koreans talk about forced unification under south korea and i hear koreans talk about wanting to visit their families, wanting to have unification in some way but not forced unification under us pressure with us troops throughout korea and that is not what most koreans i filter say or even think. how do you koreans do that? this doesn't seem to be a very reliable policy. >> glad you don't hear that because i didn't hear that on the panel. it is a good question and were

talking about the estate. >> i heard it. were talking about the and state. i'm trying to separate the and state from the tactics and the immediate policies but let's see if any of the korean panelist want to answer? >> the full so that there is no consensus on this, at all. >> i don't think the united states is willing to. [inaudible] this is not an option and were very close to the north korean. [inaudible] and we've been living with 10 million people over there and the oppressed economy is within

the. [inaudible] also, in the 21st century we can say that the united states and south korea can find a way out and this is what i believe. i don't think north korea is. [inaudible] >> other questions. let's get on the side of the room. >> steve, manchester trait. two quick questions but much more based on today's news. everyone talks about president trump and the buyer in damage in the picture is at president trump talks about bringing fire and damage to north korea and everyone speaks about the ability of north korea to rain rockets down on seoul have amend

this casualty rates. the second issue that is not talked about but is thought about and that is the idea that maybe china perhaps with united perhaps china and the us will quietly go in to north korea and try to destroy the north koreans nuclear facilities before they really are able to develop a bomb. quick question. how is that felt? is there a possibility of this fire in damage on the other side and two, is there any possibility of a question quiet us agreement to perhaps, chinese us agreement to not out the nuclear facility for it really does create something that can't be delivered to any place. >> 's i guess you mean a preemptive strike. >> rather the concern and the policy about it. >> is there a real possibility of a preemptive strike --

[inaudible conversations] >> if i could. it's an interesting point you race. this is not a static issue by any stretch. unification or change in one way or another is going to happen, i think, because of an intense pressure by in a global embargo we do all of these things and china is going to go in and take care of it. i think none of us have any doubt about that. >> and part of the reason that china has the best is so heavily in north korea particularly in the national resource areas is because they are slowly, in my view, carving out levels of --

whether we on this panel decide that unification is the future and state or not. the reason korea, i think, is always a geopolitical card and the great powers fight wars there is because china will do what it believes is in its national interest whether we get our act together or not. if kim starts to crack and they can't stand him anymore they may do things unilaterally and we have to be prepared -- we have to be prepared for unification, collapse, no matter what. that would be my answer to that. on preemptive strikes i -- you know, i hate to say -- is unlikely. >> of course we have to prepare for any contingencies especial

especially. [inaudible] we will fight back if were attacked with nuclear weapons. but before that we have to think is there better options. for small, whether or not you're really willing to have preemptive strikes and are you capable of and i recognize where the north korean nuclear bombs are located and otherwise. [inaudible] china also wants to increase military preparation is to control and manage the north korean which is close to the chinese border and i am quite sure that they are being exercised.

the key question is whether the united states and china has a kind of compromised or who will be in or when they will take that kind of action. i fear without a consensus or agreement and then who will be taking the kind of initiative. this is my caution. >> well, to answer his question briefly basically i would agree with dan on preemption. it's very unlikely. your question was if is the us capable of a preemptive strike and absolutely, yes, but do we know where everything is in the answer is absolutely not. appear to strike would be, less than effective in terms of eliminating the program and the threat and, of course, until in risk in terms of a wider war. that said, i personally believe

that if hillary clinton were present right now or marco rubio they would also be sending a very tough deterrence message in a be deploying strategic assets in us cree exercises and they would also be looking at preemptive options. this has reached a stage where is the only prudent thing to do and the us and the rok need to demonstrate clearly that even though can may have some new capabilities it has changed our fundamental commitment to defending the republic of korea and our interest in that we are fully prepared to go to war. we always have been. a lot of the saber rattling you see although it has a world wrestling feel when it comes out on twitter is probably, i think, the prudent deterrent messaging that any administration would

have done at this point. stylistically maybe -- go ahead. >> i was about to say that i can confirm you can't put aside the twitter. the commander as chief his words carry strong weights from as you are saying, they are heard more loudly in full even here and you cannot put his words aside. i can confirm that all of those options you laid out would have, in fact, been part of in the planning and transition documents for hillary clinton administration. in terms of where we are strategically blood i do think we would be sending very clear deterrent messaging but deterrent messaging in order to be effective has to be credible and has to be clear. what has worried me about what we have seen is that it has been mixed and it has not been clear and no one really knows what fire and fury meant no one news

locked and loaded me and no one really knows and it made these things mean and i'm not sure the president himself knows what he means by that. it's really dangerous. what i worry about is not actually either, as north korea taking preventive action or what the united states should be explained these options but they are very bad options. what i worry about is a constellation. there are two miscalculations in areas that worry me the most. one is because of a lack of clarity in deterrent language that something is said that is misinterpreted and something is said that leads him to believe that a strike is imminent and so can ask out of what he believes to be preemption. that is a very dangerous scenario. scenario number two is, in fact, one of the reasons that it has always been considered so dangerous of north korea obtaining this capability is, in fact not that it they would use it but that it's much more it

increases the risk of north korea taking conventional action against the south and that's whether some other kind of activity i think we assume the risk of that go up incredibly as this capability developed. in a time when messaging is unclear and there's a high risk of calculation this is why i think alliance coordination is of utmost importance right now. but we can't have is for some scenario like that take place for the us and korea don't have a clear expectation is exactly what the response will be and who will be packing it. >> the credibility question where i thought it might be going is we have decimated our military for the last eight years to a point where it will take a long time to build it back up. for those who argue for a containment, deterrent strategy

we are well beyond the curve on missile-defense decimated in the last eight years. well behind the curve on everything from tactical aircraft to long range strategic bombers. [inaudible] that is one of the legacies i think that hurts us the most of the last eight years. i don't see any improvement along the way. south koreans are asking for all kinds of assets to be put in place right now desperate not to mention that we thought of the last eight or nine years that we cut our nuclear arsenal. the south koreans are asking for a lot of strategic access and we could probably get them there

but at a huge risk to other parts of the world. i think that is not discussed enough and i think the congress and the president ought to fix this. >> korean people are so-called even in a crisis in american people are surprised. there is a reason. it's a war at the end of the day. whether it is clear bombs or other conventional war that is why this crisis is not different. we have been in the same situation for the last half a century and these days we are really worried because of terms present mood lamented a few days ago when president trump can say whatever you wishes for him to strike through peaceful dialogue but if i say something different

and america considers it even if i declare it piece that no war without our permission so i'm asking that unpredictability of the policy strength of the alliance is not good. [inaudible] [crowd boos] i think most. issue now we are entering a new phase in which united states has a national security issue because of the missiles and everything. there's a discussion over and

too many koreans the issue or problem is not only the national security but security problems it's about economic problem of north korea in human rights. together we talk to solve not just. nuclear missile problem but also the north korea problem and then there is military action may be a part of the solution but not the ultimate solution and the course of. [inaudible]

>> laura is worried that -- we think the posture was inevitable giving the option rather than burning sanders even be elected and i will you on the spot for that one but the tweets and declaratory policy are problem. you're worried that kim jong-un we believe it and i'm actually worried that he won't. i worry about the inconsistency in manner of the president declaratory policy weakening what is an enormous instrument of national power which is the voice of the american presidency. also worry, i think, we all do, with the position puts president moon in and i remember well, as with dan from the bush years, there were some pretty big disagreements between the two presidents but at least for president bush's part he never voiced it in public. i think president trump will

have to in his team will have to and maybe this most recent phone call will be the beginning of that. he'll need to exhibit discipline is part is how we talk about our ally and were talking about the beginning of this panel to the extent that the big players china, you mention russia in japan and the other peninsula, not to mention condoning, it's in the box. we are not united and we really, really we get our hands, of course koreas as well, that coronary policy does matter. >> i don't think the declaratory policy has been -- i think that there's inconsistencies in timing but, as i said before, first of all two things is a problem with the strategy of the long-term deterrence. we have no idea what makes kim jong-un. that's scary.

when people bring out pulled where and we knew stalin in moscow for 20 years and they were cold world allies and even then there were near misses. to sit here and say that the right declare district i don't mean to make light but to say that the right declare tree policy will -- i don't agree that. [inaudible conversations] will we need to do and what we've done effectively is scared china. i've never seen china the scared on this issue before in my life. what we need to get to the strategic entity, in my view, is that we are agreed here on is china is very scared about what he will do and what we are capable of. >> so this relates to the big geopolitical discussion and big question. you use the word that it scares china and i would substitute

incentivize china. what motivates china. what six china out of its complacency. fear of the us attack of that. i think that is where you're going. another thing that does that is a recognition that contrary to strategic expectations in beijing, us alliances are getting stronger, not weaker. the tension between the two because if the blood urgent rhetorical line is not credible or that creates tensions with seoul then we may win in the short term of being scary about preemptive strikes but lose in the longer term in terms of alliances that's a very subtle balancing act which comes back to the thing that we keep hitting on witches why these two presidents have to get in step and they have to be on one page on this going forward. we can do this further and this is really interesting.

i appreciate the views. we've had some big disagreements but also some really strong agreements on the future we have for the korean peninsula and i feel like too often when we do these panels in washington or seoul we don't get to that fundamental vision that we share. i'm glad we were able to do it and look at tactical differences in interpretations. it's been a really good panel and i put it. get a 15 minute break, i think. i don't want to split yes, we have a 30 minute coffee break. everyone we can do here at 245. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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personnel, if you negotiate with china from that perspective you're negotiating from weakness. you are giving away one of your most important assets in your life and partnership. to give that away as part of the deal. [inaudible] it will undercut our allies. the second reason is it's a bad idea is because north korea will cheat on any deal. we know that. we have to be prepared for any

efforts because they will cheat. if it fails in the process we've undermined our alliances and set herself up in a weaker position. i don't think this administration -- there was some flirtation and rumors that parts of the white house and the grand marshal china and i think that is off. [inaudible] >> president trump would be a fool to believe it. i don't think he will anymore. president trump will visit china in november right? [inaudible] >> yeah, we don't know. >> president trump would like

china to do more for north korea. there seems to be a good time for both sides to have a -- >> if your question is is it possible for them to have a discussion, i think it is possible but there will have to be a clear understanding that the us position with north korea strong and frankly before he goes off to do everything can to demonstrate that we are not retreating from asia and frankly withdrawing from tpp will hurt and it will mean he goes into the meetings with a weaker position. i don't think that the administration will or negotiate for but unfortunately the present will have a weaker hands

because of the tpp and the certainty of deterrence make the us position with our partners and allies less certain. that will be his. [inaudible] it is possible to have a productive discussion. at least, on the defense and political side us and china have a common front. my view is is that if beijing. [inaudible] is a way for china to avoid. [inaudible] looks like. is getting soft on north korea or distancing from the us or that japan and us are splitting apart then it will lead people to say don't do anything. the american line is coming apart and kick the can down the road and time is on our side.

that night, i think, is critical in that with the decision, current decision to back and be treated in the criticism to talk with white house. [inaudible] maybe they will put this in place. [inaudible] >> i think the us and china have different strategic visions of the future. these visions are not in direct conflict right now but in the back of people's minds and in their assumption is the us and china, japan and korea all have so much different future and are hedging and getting leverage for their preferred outcomes. the clearer it is that us korea

and japan are committed to a future of a strong alliances with rule-based order and free trade, the sumer we can make that clear and frankly, the easier it is to work with china. the more uncertainty there is that it makes it harder for the training side to reject. this is not just the trump administration. it was in the obama administration as well. some think they send mixed signals. the us and china can work together but, it is not in my view,. [inaudible] it will be based on the us is committed to the policies had the past decade which is rule-based, open, international system in asia, strong alliances and standing properties with

china whenever possible. those are not necessarily mutually contradictory but the war uncertainty about us attention the harder it is to swear those two different visions. [inaudible] >> it struck me as overly -- when i can to stop trade with china or russia. i think what he meant was what us is going to put sanctions on countries or more specifically on companies in other countries that are helping north korea and that is what he meant, i think. in his twitter style it came out as we will stop trade which, of

course, we won't do. trade is regulated under one of the articles in the constitution. it's not run by the president but by congress. [inaudible] >> i think it is necessary. i think there will be more. there are enormous holes or openings for north korea to get technology and money from chinese companies and beijing has cracked down to some extent but it is not enough given what the north koreans and given the fact. >> thank you so much. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979 c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television. it is brought to you today fight your cable or satellite provider. >> president donald trump will phase out a program that is protected young immigrants brought into the country illegally as children. he will call for congress to find a legislative solution to protect the immigrants who are often called dreamers. attorney general jeff session made the announcement this morning. >> to have a lawful system of immigration that serves the national interest we cannot

admit everyone would like to come here. it is just that simple. there is an entrée that would be an open borders policy and the american people have rightly rejected that. therefore, the nation must set and enforce a limit on how many immigrants we admit each year and that means all cannot be accepted. this does not mean they are bad people or that our nation disrespects or demeans them in any way. it means we are properly enforcing our laws as congress has passed them. it is with these principles and duties in mind and in light of eminent litigation that we review the obama administration's daca policy. our collective wisdom is that the policy is vulnerable to the same, legal and constitutional challenges that the court recognized with respect to the

daf a program which was enjoined on a nationwide basis in a decision that was affirmed by the fifth circuit court of appeals the fifth circuit specifically concluded that daca had not been implemented in a fashion that allowed sufficient discretion and that daca was foreclosed by congresses plan. in other words the immigration laws that congress passed for closed this possibility of daca. in other words it was inconsistent with the constitution and separation of powers. that decision was affirmed by the support on an equally undivided basis. if we were to keep the obama administration executive amnesty policy the likeliest outcome would be that it would be to be enjoined just as was dafa. the department of justice has advised the president and the department of homeland security that the department of homeland

security should begin an orderly, lawful fine down including the cancellation of the that authorized this program. acting secretary duke has chosen inappropriately to initiate a line down process. this will enable the department of homeland security to conduct an orderly change and fill a desire of this administration to create a time. for congress to act should it so choose. we firmly believe this is the responsible path. >> senate republican leader mitch mcconnell says president obama wrongly believed he had the authority to rewrite our immigration law. today's action by president trump corrects that fundamental mistake. this congress will continue working on securing our border and ensuring a lawful system of

immigration that works. republican senator orrin hatch said he urged the president to rescind daca but he says we need a permanent solution that recognizes the positive impact dreamers have in our communities. democratic senator richard blumenthal says there is no such thing as an orderly wind down of daca. this despicable decision upends families and trails hundreds of thousands of dreamers life. dreamers marched through our nation's capital today is stopping at the trump hotel. >> they then continued on to capitol hill.

congress returns from summer recess today and they will work on federal spending, current spending authority expires at the end of this month. members also considering the president's request of $7.85 billion for hurricane harvey response. we have the house live free on c-span and here and c-span to the senate comes back in about 15 minutes or so. 45:30 vote on a judicial nomination for the district of columbia. senators also begin debate over harvey response money. the house rules committee is meeting at 4:00 o'clock eastern and they will determine what amendments will be allowed to the 28 spending bill that comes up in the spending bill this week. one of those may include harvey recovery a midwife covered on c-span three online at c-span .org or on the free c-span radio app. as we wait for the senate to gavel in at 3:00 o'clock eastert we will take a look at the week ahead in congress with theo journalist follows the house and senate.