i wanted to call one off my very first books a larger english and they didn't like that. so, what i meant was that black people have more english. so, nobody is going to try to use black english at a job interview. if we understand that it's really an okay form of speech but different, something else that any black person intuits is there's a way you speak here and another way you speak there. so, black english is not a problem in that way. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> good evening. i'm bradley grahamming though oregon politics and paris, along with my wife and an behalf over

the entire staff, welcome. thank you very much for coming. our guest this evening is one of the for most authorities in washington on u.s.-iranian relations. we should be in for a very timely and interesting discussion. he's also one of the strongest advocates of dialogue and engagement between the united states and iran. trita parsi heads the national iranian-american council, which is a nonprofit organization which he founded to facilitate participation by irann-americans in american signature -- civic life in and in washington it's the third larger group of iranianed in the united states, the first two being northern and southern california threat to's own interest in -- trita's own

interest any iran is personal. he was born there although he left with his parents when we was four years old and greeds up in sweden and arrived in the united states as an adult, but iran has remained a focus of his studies and work. his ph.d thesis at johns hopkins dealt with iranian-israeli relations and became the basis for his first book, published a decade ago, treacherous alliance, about secret dealings among iran, israel and the united states. his second book, a single roll of the dice, examined u.s.-iranian relations during the initial year of the oobama administration, and now comes his latest work, losing an enemy, which, as he says in the preface, is in many ways the third part of a trilogy, although he thought he was done

after this book, given the nuclear agreement, but now who knows. we have a new administration, and it's hard to see exactly where they're going with u.s.-iranian relations. but in "losing an enemy" trita develops into the u.s.-iranian relationship. this time we're counting how the nuclear deal was negotiated. trita had exceptional access to many of those involved in the talks. he want consulted and briefed bed u.s. officials throughout the process and also maintained frequent contact with iran's foreign minister. drawing on these and other primary sources trita provide fresh detail and insight about these historic negotiations, but his book is important not only as a detailed history of a major diplomatic breakthrough that has altered the situation in the

middle east, it also offers lessons in why diplomacy succeeded this time in averting potential war and at least stalling development of iranian nuclear weapons, and how it might serve as a model in resolving future international conflicts. so, ladies and gentlemen, please silence your cell phones if you haven't already and join me in welcoming trita parsi. [applause] >> thank you so much. thank you, bradley. really tremendous pleasure being back here at politics and prose and thank you for coming here. as was mentioned, this is my third book, and it's on the same topic. my previous books dealt with the joeow political situation in the middle east, particularly rivalry between the united states, iran and israel. hoped while be a bit of a

different book. the prefer prefer book -- previous book showed loud diplomatic opportunitieses were missed or reject. pushingpushing the situation tos war. but for the third one we had a triumph of diplomacy, a tremendous achievement, that showed what could be achieved when smart policy prevailed over the desire to appear tough. and while it certainly depend like to a situation in which we could say peace as achieved, it did cruise an opportunity to lose an enemy -- create an opportunity to lose an enemy. then a certain tv reality star won the election in the united states and i had to rewrite the book and we're to where we are were before. if we understand what went right and what has gone wrong can be reversed, the opportunity to lose an enemy may still exist.

now, throughout these negotiations, i was in a report unique situation. i had access to both sides, as was mentioned. was advising the obama administration on the nuclear issue while i also had access to the irann side to understand their perspective. wasn't unusual i could be the white house on monday, receive a briefing, before a new round of talks talks and end up having a two-hour private coverings with the iranian foreign minimum stare couple of days later. this ability to observe the two sides up close gave me the opportunity to understand their fears, their calculations, their motives and how they were hoping their strategy would be able to work out. and it gave me an opportunity also to be able to write a book in which i could tell the story of how this achievement actually came about. to tell the story of how this international crisis that was on

the brink of war actually was resolved without a single fire being shot. or as donald trump would probably put i, how the worst deal in the world actually was reached. but it's important to recognize these negotiations and this issue ultimately was not just about the nuclear issue. its consequences range from war to peace. and really was about the balance of power in the mideast. think we see that clearly now as we see that the deal has work, yet so many of the problems are still remaining remaining in the east. to better understand it want to go back in time and start with the geopolitics. april 2012. in a small city in a european country, a most unusual group of officials and former officials had gathered. they were iranian ambassadors as well as one or two of the

members of the irann negotiating team, u.s. officials, including several u.s. generals, and also israelis, very senior ones, in the room, and at a time when israel and iran didn't even talk to each other or recognize each other's existence this truly was a rather unique moment. whats evener in unique and shocking was not who was in the room but what was actually being said. this is not about enrichment. it was never about enrichment. the room was completely silent as the senior israeli official looked across the room straight into the eyes of the iranians and uttered these word. for two decade the israelis insetted that iran's nuclear program, particularly enrichment of our rain national was a threat to israel. the israelis and united states

insisted no solution could be found unless iran completely sealed its rein. activities, the so-called zero enrichment objective. but now, this israeli official in front of the iranians were saying the men threats of wore and forcing israel to take military action did not have anything to do with iran's nuclear program. instead, he continued, israel needed to see a sweeping attitude change on the side of the iranians. israel could not accept that iran was questioning its legitimacy and its right to exist. it could not accept that the united states would strike a deal with iran, a nuclear deal that would in any many ends iran's isolation because that would leave israel abandoned in order to meet iran's hostility on its own without the full support of the united states. israel could not allow the

united states to come to terms with iran without iran coming to terms with israel. that was the message. and if the united states were going to go in this direction, israel could not accept this and would do everything in its power to stand in the way of such a deal. it was a moment of tremendous honesty but also outmost clarity. the better understand why these israelis war making this argument, we have to go back another two decades. the 1991-1992. the soviet union collapsed. iraq had been defeated in the persian gulf war by the united states and the u.n. coalition. this created a new geopolitical situation, both regionally and globally. a global level, the united states was now the sole super power of the world. on a regional level the previous balance of power happened but

what not clear what would it be replaced with. with iraq defeated, israel and iran now emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region. for two, three previous decade, despite official enmity, behind the scenes that had been cocoa lab brateing and enjoyed a secret security relationship. they were facing common security impair tide. threats from iraq and the soviet union with these two threats gone a new constellation emerged, one in and israel and iran enorms of the most powerful states and then began viewing each other as potential threats and rivals. it wasn't back of run's ideology, because they had already enjoyed a relationship during the '80s in spite of iran's ideology. was because of the change in the geopolitical configuration of the region. the israelis moved very fast and argued that in order for israel

to be able to make peace and take the risk of peacemaking with the palestinians, the united states needed to contain and isolate iran because iran was now the new threat to the region in the israeli view. the clinton administration obliged and adopted a policy called the dual containment policy. the idea that iraq and iran needed to be jointly contained and isolated. essentially a new order was established in the region based on the centrality of israel, egypt and saudi arabia, and based on the prolonged isolation of iran and iraq. for the audience, this was a major blow. they had collaborated with the united states quietly against iraq during the persian gull war and they were hoping they would be rewarded by come out of the cold and being able to enjoy an important position in the region again. but instead the united states doubled down on isolation, and

iranian response was, to spread extremism, and target what they viewed was the weakest link in the american strategy, which was the peace price between the israels and the palestinians. if that process was sabotage the rest of the u.s. strategy will fall apart, as long as the u.s. was seeking an order in the region based on iran's isolation, iran would make it as costly as possible for the united states to pursue that policy in the hopes it would cause its collapse. but despite everything the iranians did, it wasn't the iranians that succeeded in collapsing that order. it was the united states itself. by george w. bush invading iraq, and hoping to be able to change that country and other countries in region to its own liking and establishing an order only based on new and pro-american wrecktimes in the region.

the --ing extra failed miserably and the invasion of iraq did not build a new order. only managed to destroy the previous one. and more importantly, we're seeing the consequences of this today, the united states weakened itself to the point in which it no longer had the capacity item pose on the region a new equilibrium, new balance of power. ever since we have seen an essentially orderless middle east. so much though fighting and war that is take little place is driven by at the fact you have so many vacuums and the larger nationers are vying for influence, fighting each other, perhaps no so much offensively as defensively because they don't want to she in the new balance of power tilted against them. whatever balance that would eherm afterwards. for are and saudi arain a, here's the important part. this was the collapse of -- a disaster.

they were the main benefactor of the previous order. they enjoyed maximum -- under the protection of the united states and the region. for iran, this was a blessing in disguise. the united states had defeated saddam, and the united states had removed the taliban in afghanistan, two of iran's main rivals at the time. and in the process they head weakened-to-the point it was increasingly difficult for it to uphold the policy of isolating iran. instead what we saw was iran was unleashed. but as long as the united states contained -- refused negotiations and refused to recognize iran this, iranians could not lock in this new favorable geopolitical circumstance. what they needed was a crisis, something that would force the united states to the table, and that would enable negotiations that by definition would cause

the united states to end its policy of regime change and come to terms with iraq. iranians wanted this recognition for very same reason the israelis did not want to see iran get the wreck nation. that recognition would put an end to decades of american policy of isolating iran. now, ironically, the iranians and the israelis actually used the same instrument to be able to achieve their objective which was the iranian nuclear program. from the israeli perspective, this menacing program was used to make unrealistic demands such as the idea that enrichment in iran had to be completely and entirely ended, and without in order to make sure that no compromise could be reached at all. as long as no compromise was reached, what had been defined as an existential threat, the analysis was, the united states

would avoid taking military against iran and the balance of power would be one that would be favorable to israel. the iranians had a different calculation but the same instrument. yes, advancing the nuclear program to lead to war but a because the united states failed in iraq and had bmw become so costly and the american population was tired of ware fair it could lead the united states trying to come to the table and found common ground with the iranians. the crux for the united states was, how to prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability without taking military action, without allowing the israelis to take military action, and without enabling iran to be in a position to define the new balance of power after a negotiations. the bush administration's strategy was to refuse negotiations, insist on the

enrichment, pursue shankses shad issue threats of war. an utter failure. the iranians had zero enrichment uranium when bush came into and 150 sin the fugues at the time. by the time bush left office, the iranian had 8,000 centrifuges and 1,500 or more kilos of low enriched uranium, enough to build one nuclear weapon. clearly lay different approach was needed, and then senator barack obama campaigned on the idea of re-instating diplomacy as a central pierce of american statecraft, rejecting the burk doctrine of not negotiate withing country wisdom of disagree with and negotiating with iran was the centerpiece of that platform. once senator obama became president president obama he

discovered how quickly diplomacy could be. at first attempt in 2009, end end up failing. mainly because of problems on the iranian side. obama quickly ended up in a situation in which he was stuck with very same strouds that bush -- president bush had. sanctions, sabotage, pressure, and cyber warfare. precisely because heed a tried diplomacy, though, and precisely because he enjoyed international lidge si in a way that lush did not, obama succeeded where bush could not. he imposed the most striking, hard-hit sanctions that any country has been under yet. even the iranian central bank was put under sanctions which essentially closed iran's access to the international financial system. the united states succeeded in convincing europe to cut all oil imports from iran.

iran exported roughly 40% of the oil to the european union at the time. the day congress passed sanctions imposing sanctions on iran central bank, iran's currency dropped roughly 30%. riots broke out in tehran. iran's gdp slunk shrunk. for how long could it be able to sustain this amount of pain? the iranians without a doubt had underestimated obama. they never thought the world would be willing to go along with sanctions in this manner. but obama had also underestimated iran. clearly it was hurting, but iran did not break. nor was it without a response. just as the iranians responded to bush's refusal to negotiate by doubling down on their

nuclear program, they responded to sanctions by building more centrifuges. and eventually what ended up coming out of this was that if the american calculation was that sanctions would cause the iranian cost benefit calculus to change and make the iranians realize it would be too costly and painful for them to go forward with a a nuclear program, the iranian calculation was by just expanding the program as much as possible, white make the sanctions policy too costly for the futures. let me give you a quote from rouhani's chief of stamp the mentalities to break the mentality of the other side by showing them that pressure doesn't work. we escalated our nuclear activities to show what pressure actually would produce. the end result was that the united states inched closer and closer to collapsing the iranian

economy, the israelis nitched closer and closer to taking military action, and the oniranons i.d closer to having a nuclear weapons capability. the one moment that the american side was so worried that the israelis would take the freedom of launching a surprise attack against iran, north very well the united states was opposed to, that pentagon officials insisted that the moon soil had to be included in all of the briefings they received because of the fear the israelis would need a specific window to be able to successfully strike iran. also the three clocks were ticking, and the official p5 plus one negotiations were actually lead nothing where, president obama was convinced he needed to set up a secret channel directly to iran's supreme leader in order to be able to directly negotiate far away from the eyes of the media in order to better be able to assess how much effect are to

the sanctions having on the iranians and are they willing to yield? thanks to the person who at the time was the chairman of the foreign senate relations committee, john kerry, an opportunity existed to use the country of ohman to be able to set up these secret negotiations. senator kerry had played an instrumental role in get throwing americans who had been wrong my jailed in iran released, using the help of the ohmany government, and the ohmanysed had approach their able to get the iranians to deliver and the ability to directly access iran's supreme leader. so by july 2012, for the first time, a small delegation of american officials traveled to ammann and meet with the iranians. the general from the american side was jake sullivan who were

mid level, not much known got them. the iran beyond sent three individual, one a deputy foreign minister. once they'll saw the americans decide not have sun at their rank the deputy foreign minister never entered the room but instead sadr senate a different room and observed and conducted negotiations without directly interacting with the americans. by all conditions they end up being a really bad meeting. the u.s. side was very there to be able to assess had the ohmanie's succeeded in getting a channel to the iranian supreme leader in order to be able to see how close their we iranians to could could pit lating, and e iranians were there to see our close the united states was for could pit lating on the enrichment. the war trying to figure out how to u.s. could come to terms and accept enrichment and the u.s. side had no authority to discuss that issue. there was a failure. and then you had the u.s.

elections in november of that year, and as a result nothing could happen. but by january 2013, new sense of urgency was taking hold at the white house. general 2012, then secretary of defense leon panetta, had stated publicly that iran's breakout time was 12 months. meaning that from me moment the iranians make a decision they wanted to build a bomb to actually having a bomb would take roughly 12 months. by january 2013, a year later, the breakout time had shrunk to eight to 12 weeks. as a result of the iranians quickly advancing the nuclear program and building more sentry centrifuges and amassing more low enrichment our rainan. clearly the iranian clock was ticking fastest than the sank clock or the jury clock. if nothing changed the united states be in a situation in which it ehear had to accept,

acquiesce to an iranian nuclear weapons capability or go to war. the least likely scenario was that the iranians would could pit late because time simply was on their side. and as a result the decision was made to go back to ohman. and a new delegation was sent in march 2013, this time a much larger and much more senior delegation headed by bill burns, then secretary of state. the equivalent of the gentleman that the iranians sent during the first meeting who came now and directly engaged with the united states. a very different setup was set up. they were just to give you some context in p5 plus one meetings in parallel but no clue there were secret negotiations, the iranians insisted that as the other delegations entered the room they would all have to enter the room, all have to sit down, and once they were all

seated, they iran yandle gages would come in and once the talks were over, and usual lay competition of different speeches, they iranians would have to stand up first, leave the room entirely before anyone else could leave? why to enslur would be to chit-chat on the sideline no coffee break order anything like that. in ohman it was a completely different thing. they were broken up in different teams, they were taking walks together, they were trying to create a bit of a personal rapport in order to actually make sure that proper diplomacy could take place. the most important thing that happened was that this time around, the u.s. negotiators were armed with something they had never been armed with before, the opportunity to play the enrichment card. very careful terms presented the iranians thal that the united states could accept enrichment on irann soil given that the iranians would accept significant restrictions to their program and transparency. this was exactly what the onans waited for, for more than ten years.

but there was a problem. because of the tremendous mistrust between the u.s. and iran and between iran and the united states, the iranians could not go back to tehran just being able to say that they orally that they had been promised that the united states would accept enrichment. they needed in rite writing. the u.s. side had absolutely no authority to put this in writing because the fear was the iranian wood be able to pocket this concession, be able to leak it, cause a significant disunity within the p5 plus one. the mistrust between the united states and iran was creating a problem even when on substance they're about getting closer to each other. something needed to break. something was needed in tornado be able to bridge the trust gap between the two sides. that's where ohman stepped in once again. the idea emerged that instead of the united states sending a letter to the iranians in

writing explaining that under what circumstances they could accept enrichment, letter be sent to the sultan of eye man, person that both the president of the united states and the supreme leader of iran respected. ...

>> completely different no idea that enrichment more or less had been resolved, they immediately go to work throughout august, and ayman, september and new york and by november 2013, an interim deal is finally struck. and this deal was so critical for the united states because it

reversed the time dynamics in time was on the iran side and agreeing to completely stop new centrifuge and united states not add aing new sanctions but keeping new sanctions that dynamic in time was on iran's side was more or less neutralized or reversed which was a huge victory for the u.s. at that time and then after another 18 or so months of excruciating negotiations by july, 2015, they finally had a deal. there was a deal that show is is that diplomacy had prevailed that had war with iran was prevented as well as a military -- nuclear weapon this in iran. throughout the talks, the biggest at least the enemy, biggest enemy of the negotiations of, of course, the israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu. and he did quite a lot to harm the talk there's no doubt about

it, in fact, some of it we know because as you know president obama had a -- a habit of spying on foreign leaders including friends and once that was revealed he stopped -- he stopped tapping into angela merkel for instance, but he did not stop buying netanyahu u and reason for that because it was a suspicious that israeli were doing things to harm negotiation and it was revealed that they were coordinating with certain members of congress and that they were also leaking information that they have been given to them by u.s. negotiate force about the negotiations in order to undermine the nuclear talks. but what is so ironic about this is that in some way perhaps this deal would not have been reached had it not been for netanyahu because -- by him making the iranian nuclear issue an existential issue he eliminated status quo

option kicking can down the roads and in a calculation to force united states to take action. of course, his hope it was that it would be military action . instead, to his surprise obama managed to figure out how the united states could take diplomatic action. but how did he not eliminated status quo option, chances are the united states and obama would actually a not have taken dplo maltic action but instead chose ton contain issue, kick the can down the roads and let it it be the headache of the next administration but eliminating that, he forced obama to choose between war and peace and obama chose peace. but what is even more ironic is that if he had thought about this a little bit harder, he might have figured out that something really simple he could have done to kill the nuclear talks -- as you all know he went to congress and blasted a deal said it was the worst deal ever he said that it paved iran's way to nuclear weapons.

all he needed to do to kill this deal was to go to the microphone and say, this is a fantastic deal. i love this deal. this deal is so good for israel. an this is iran's ultimate defeat. iranian foreign minister told me had maybe hugged a deal -- it would have killed the opportunity for the iranians to continue the negotiations. [laughter] they have no difficulty dealing with maybe saying that this is such a defeat for the west. it actually helped shut up hardliners in iran but had he said this was fantastic, he would have created massive difficulty for the iranian negotiate force. where affiliate things he did and plans head he seemed to not been able to figure this one out. now, here's a question as to whether a better deal could have been had. and as you all know president trump believe is worst deal ever

so clearly must have been better deals. i think there was a better deal that could be had. but not in 2015. the better deal that could be had was if we had had more realistic position ten years ago. 15 years ago. 2003 iranian send an negotiating offer to the bush administration. at the time they have as i mention roughly 150 centrifuge offer to offer nuclear program for inspection and transparency offer to come to terms with the u.s. and other issues such as collaborating against al qaeda. id to out about deal because i was working for a member of congress, and the swiss ambassador of iran who hand delivered proposal to the u.s. government also gave us the briefing and gave us a copy. my boss sent it over to calgrove at white house got a phone call back within two hours drove us intrigued and wanted to know if this proposal actually was authentic if he had the blessing

of the supreme leader in iran. that was the last thing we heard of that proposal until about two or so months later there was an article in the financial times that said that some sort of a negotiating offer had been delivered to u.s. side by the swiss from iran, and the u.s. side of bush administration response was to say mog to iranianings and rep rei are command for having delivered in the first place. 2005, another opportunity march of that year, the last iranian offer was sent to the europeans. before evictions held eventually became president. many that prplings which you can find onis iranians offer to cut their enrichment at 3,000 centrifuge europeans didn't bother to send it to u.s. side because they knew bush would reject anything above zero in one of the briefings at the white house during the negotiation i don't know who but someone brought up that proposal

and asked u.s. negotiators what they thought and said they would jump on that proposal if this was there today but e we've already missed that vote. constantly chasing deal we could have got in years ago. at one moment during talks i think it was asked about that proposal and that was before they have managed to decide exactly how many centrifuge iran would keep and i said will it be more than the 3,000 that you were willing to cult your program out in 2005. he smiled and he said 3,000, that was just opening bid it would have settle for $1,000. no i they build more centrifuge iranians are keeping 5,000 centrifuge and they have far more knowledging the nuclear process. that is alternative cost of just pursuing the combination of pressure tactics and unreal aristic octave. there was a better deal. it is just not a deal that we could get down.

if i could say a couple of words of what this means beyond nuclear issue. what this deal could have done almost did -- is not to prevent war and prevent iran from getting nuclear weapons. it paved the way for a regional all inclusive die on security issue. something that would bring the saudi and iranians to it same table able to have all inclusive dialogue fbi figure out a way to share the region to create a new in the region either by going through war with or by going through the negotiating table there really is no other alternatives in that. but what happened when had donald trump went to riahd and called for iran out isolation again is he closed that door and opened up the door for more and for more rivalries that question of seen in the past decade. the opportunity to lose enemy of

iran scially existed and there's a reason why it was so welcomed by the saudi an israelis at the time. precisely because it would close a door for a potential between the united states and because it would open up the door for a potential pass for the u.s. and iran to go to war again. it became quite clear would have preferred iran with nuclear weapon but isolated in the region and odds with the united states a than iran who doesn't have nuclear weapons but finding way to reintegrate itself into the renal from israeli side it was not that terribly different either as the british foreign minister said at the time in a rather -- interesting conversation or o debate in the british parliament he said, israel wants to keep the west at a permanent state of standoff with iran. that's preferable to actually reaching a negotiated settlement. clearly, there are those who

fear iran of losing a enemy more than they fear iran nuclear program. but as that israeli official admitted in 2012, this was never about enrichment. thank you so much. [applause] >> i'm pleased to take your questions i'm moderating this myself. >> ask everybody -- ask everyone medical record to make sure you get air time on c-span step up to the microphone so everyone can hear you. [laughter] go ahead. step up. >> thanks very much. i have a question about 2013 you mentioned the obama administration was starting to get deeply concerned about iranian enrichment. could you talk about whether the desire to keep talks on track

had an impact on the administration's decision not to enforce the right lane in syria. >> thank you so much. i know that's an argument that has been presented that -- because it was an opening with iran, and because it was started to show some promise, the obama administration refrained from enforcing the right lane that obama hills put up on syria fearing that it would impact nuclear negotiations. throughout this -- i asked almost every side i found no evidence that that was the reason why obama didn't do this. in fact, i will take a step back and put these two things flex to each other. on one hand idea that actions have been taken it could have collapsed a deal and on the other hand, the broader clearly sets strategy over obama when he came to middle east strategies on middle east it was that he believed that the middle east

had lost the tremendous amount of strategic significance. already doing o the first year that obama made an audit and conclusion was that the united states is over committed in the middle east and undercommitted in asia. and vault is need to pivot asia worst thing that could happen was for united states to get degreesed into another war endless war in the middle east, because it would prevent the united states from being able l to prepare itself from the competitor challenge it would get in the next decade or two from china. because ultimately superpower they have to worry about risk of some other o power emerging challenging america's global position. there's no country in the middle east that has the capacity to challenge the united states in a global scale. certainly not the who in yemen has we're hearing such a major threat. the one country that does have a capacity, of course, is china.

not getting dragged into another war in syria that obama had no faith in how it would end and what actual strategy would be and reason why he doesn't enforce the right lane rather than thinking that if potentially it could have anything to do with a nuclear negotiation again i would not find any evidence that that was the reason. thank you. >> past the deal could you share with us some of your thoughts on what iran is doing with hezbollah, in pakistan, taliban, etc. >> thank you. >> so with a hamas relationship has gone up and down quite a lot for iranians they have originally very bad relations with hamas and today i think today, yesterday hamas leader in tehran and met with the foreign

minister the latest big fight they had is because hamas is, of course, connected to the brotherhood, muslim brotherhood also the core of the opposition to assad in syria at least in early fazes of that war. iran's relationship with hamas has never been what its relationship with hezbollah and lebanon is. as religion with them goes back several decades. there is a -- completely different strategic nature to that relationship. find it extremely difficult that the iranians qowld completely can the off hezbollah. its relationship with with hamas has been far more instrumental rather than strategic but here's the one important thing to understand. objective of any final negotiation to be able to establish a new e quill in middle east realize that states deal with states instead of doing what iranian and other os

have done to constantly find state actors with other states that in and of itself weakens the states, and what we're seeing right now is that with weak sates is and geopolitical environment needs to be collapse states is that is a greater set than anything else. but this is not something that just iranians are doing they're joust doing it better than almost everyone else. the saudis have tried doing it quite extensionively that common pattern that they find a group they fund it usually the extremist organization and within six months that group turns against the saudis. they've had their relationships and there's no break between once that they're established relationships with. that nature of the game and rivalry in middle east have to change. no state should be able to use this because it in and of itself undermines state system which is a let to everyone in the region. >> talk about --

iranian -- >> okay. so iranians in the taliban almost went to war with each other o in 1998 taliban originally supported by the saudis in part of their competition with iran. the united states and iran fought taliban together in 2001 under bush actually. and iranians have defined taliban as one of the main threats for quite some time. what we're seeing now is that there are some signs that that is changing a little bit and saw "new york times" article which i have question marks arranged but nevertheless, about i suspect that one of the reasons for this is is -- in iraq the iranians put a tremendous am of pressure on iraqi government and iraqi government did not agree to a sulfur agreement with the united states status forces of agreement to allow u.s. forces to be in iraq and be above iraq. why? because the iranians do not want to see any american troops anywhere near its borders. but guess what happened in

afghanistan in afghanistan afghan government did sign so far and as a result united states is there. and i think part of what the iranian calculation may be but speculating here is precisely because of that. because afghanistan government that does have decent relationship with iran and iranians have supported because they signed that and allow united states to stay there, and my fact that u.s. politicians very frequently have regime change in iran, the iranians do not want to see any u.s. troops on its borders i think afghanistan kurnghtdly is suffering from rei between united states and iran on that issue. >> thank you. one of the things that was repeated -- a lot leading up to the successful iranian deal during the obama administration was the idea that the russians were a big help in the negotiations that was certainly something that john kerry was saying, and there seem to be some basis for

it. seems like if anything has made the whole world more complicated since the election of donald trump has been kind of the whole -- nature of u.s. russia relations. so part of the question is was russia held back in 2016, and does the relationship now between the u.s. and russia and uncertainty going forward about the iranian deal, how -- can you make any comments about about whether u.s., russia relations are still important in seeing the deal kind of go forward? and was russia held -- fnlings thank thanks so much. in context today when we hear about russia it is difficult to fathom that argument was made that russia so helpful in negotiations, and everything i saw without a doubt the russians played a tremendously helpful role in the negotiations.

and it was quite surprising to many, very frustrating to iranian that even ukraine crisis did not shatter the unity that existed between the united states russia, and other countries. and present the united, in fact, after the deal -- when the deal went to congress, for senate and house to vote for approval of the deal, even then the russians played a tremendous role because senator durbin and nancy pelosi invited all members congress at the time showed up to meet with the ambassador of france, britain, germany, and russia. because at the end of the day as much as trump say i want to walk out of that deal we have to remember this is a international agreement between several states not a bilateral agreement between the united states and iran. and in those meetings, according to the senators that

interviewedded on this issue ran ambassador was by viers chew of being a russian most convincing ambassador at the end of the meeting senator looked at all of the senator and say i want the you to take a look at these four -- am bass cores remember which country they're from and remember the last time you saw these four countries coming to you and all saying this has a good deal in the united states should support it. had it just been europeans it would have been affect but fact that russian was there and played role after the deal with something that was very surprising our senator. >> thanks for that going forward -- going, i think president trump is going to find out that being president is very different from running for office. [laughter] this is an international deal. if he breaks it, and he has telegraph very clearly that despite the fact that there's been now six iea reports saying iranians are doing what they're supposed to do living up to agreement is clearly stated that he intends to say that they're

not living up to agreement and next to certify to congress. he's not going to end up having a fight request iran. he's going to end up having a fight with entire p fight plus one to create massive problems as much as walking with out of the paris agreement probably have some of the most severe long-term effects for the united states and globe as a whole. walking out of this greem will have some very severe immediate affects because of the crisis. >> thanks. thank you. >> hi, i'm curious as to why did omen choose to take such a role to bring iran and the u.s. closer and also more curious how dc allies reacted towards such a role. >> thank you. thank you so much. >> iranis like to do these kinds of things. they like to quietly in the background help resolve

problems. and specific individuals involved this this have resolved other problems that i'm not at liberty of discussing. i was shocked when i found out what they had done. but the core thing was this: at the time, many of the countries in the region either hoped or feared and all in agreement this was leading towards a war. iranis on the side thinking that would be a disaster. they had the capacity to be able to do something that almost no one else could do precisely because they have that relationship of trust with both sides and that relationship actually goes back couple of decades even before the islamic republic. actually it is in power to large part as a result of an intervention and iran did in 1973 or o '74 i believe it was during the time of the show it was rebellion, and iran sent troops 700 iranian troops died for the sake of staying in power.

ever since there's been a very dramatically different relationship between ayman and iran and that of any other of the state. so they have that history. and at the same time the very trusted american ally, and they have the capacity and thanks to them proving their ability to get the three americans released from jail, they have proven their ability to be able to help on this issue as well. and from the outfit believe that ultimately the iranians would never yield or give any meaningful compromises or confession to the u.s. unless it was in a direct negotiation authorized by the supreme leader. and no one was closer than iranians to provide that. fnlings how did the allies react towards that? >> not particularly well. [laughter] >> why didn't we hear anything about it in the news? >> most ho of them actually know anything about this this. this was kept --

very, very good secret. and other things that were happening so for instance, some of the negotiation there were other individuals there, but they were not allowed to be visible so they enter hotel room using back doors and other things. what we saw as being official negotiations was i'm not saying it was a facade but something else going on in the background as well and reason for it this was very simple. that enemy of this deal were not many -- but they were plenty in opportunities and capacity. and most importantly the negotiations requester so fragile that even if they weren't that many they could create a problem. and a as a result these things had to be kept a secret as possible. remember how surprised you must have been when you woab up that day founding out there was between cuba and america, when had president obama went in december of that year and announced there's been a secret

negotiations. precisely because of the way these punishes both cuba and iran have politicized here it wo difficult to conduct negotiation and open because there would be too many members of congress an others who would have a political interest in tab tajing it. >> now this is not a lot of people go to ayman but a great place -- to involve negotiations. >> i would like to compliment you an excellent presentation. i have to questions actually that are related one has had to do with your own personal experience through the negotiations if you have a role or if any, and secondly for somebody like myself who studied agreement very carefully, and realized that much of the quality that will come to iran with enrichment capacity and centrifuge back ended in process over the last five years of the agreement that get many, many benefits. it must be in the assumption made that behavior will change

in the country and become more westernized. and i think i'm relate aring both your personal experience with your -- efforts and your comments over bringing in a new team how that may evolve into some improved processes going on in iran, that may make more confidence in those who have bouts in the agreement that they will change behavior in other areas besides the enrichment process. >> excellent question thank you so much. i had no particular role i was not in the negotiations. but i -- advised the obama administration so that's easy. on the seconds part in regards to changing behavior, the entire issue was iran is a member of the proliferation treaty there was valid suspicions that he had done things that he was not allowed to do. and the question then was -- does that mean that iran gets a permanent punishment or --

about does something needs to be done in order to ensure that iran regains the confidence of the international community and afterwards essentially enjoys the same rights that all other countries that are members of the mvt do. if it was to permanently impose a punishment on iranian it would essentially not be a deal. only way to be able to get a deal is to -- ensure at the end of the day if iran has done everything right iran should be no different from any other state because they're not -- allowed into the mpt because you're good as switzerland you're allowed into mpt because you abide bit rules of the mp trk and paying for what they made wrong in the past so intent then is to make sure that period is as long as possible so true confidence can be gained iranians want to do deal to only last five years. united states originally wanted to be 20 plus years and then ended up being aspects blasting

eight years. some aspects lasting 15 years. but the most important aspect which is the inspection and the very element is lasting permanently because iranians are going to ratify granted that the united states doesn't do anything to kill the deal and congress does what it needs to do in year eight then iran is going to ratify the additional that means that those elementses will become completely permanent. and question is, is your calculation that there will be -- behavioral change well the calculation is, even if there sct a behavioral change and iran is exactly the way it is thousand, it is still getting world 15 year and it is actually making sure they know about nuclear program because of the inspection and still be better off 15 years from now than it is today if there is no deal but without a doubt there was a hope that if there was a interaction, and if there was greater integration between iran and west there would be slowly and surely change miss behavior. but i think the most important thing we have to remember is

this, i hear a lot of people in washington quite justifily understandably asking after this deal have we seen my massive change in the region? and the answer often times is no. they're still supporting hezbollah and syria other things and doing things that we disagree with. let me ask you this after two or so years of this deal, what behaver of the united states and region has changed?

>> we are just about out of time. maybe two more questions. >> i just had a couple of questions to respect to interest and how -- we understand that israel was against the deal became elaborate on what saudi arabia was doing behind the scenes and a question with respect to qatar. where does i ran figure into this constant barrage of advertisements on tv against qatar? >> thank you so much. on the first question, i want to emphasize c.s. netanyahu was against and the political establishment was against. the security establishment is true many key individuals were very much in favor of the deal and continue to speak out in favor of the deal because they believed ultimately this was good.

netanyahu is definite when it comes to this. the saudis have to less visible group when it came to a position that they were making the opposition clear to the administration. unlike the israelis who would come in and say we want you to have two push harder on this issue. sadly doesn't have a nuclear programs to have nuclear expertise. their problem was in some ways more honest and direct. how can you make a deal with this government in i ran? they don't want to see any deal whatsoever, at all. i would say the saudi opposition to the deal has become much more visible and perhaps intensified after the deal than what it was before. netanyahu was taking it prior to the deal. there's certain moments in which their remains are convinced. november of 2014 there was a final negotiation. they had a deadline.

they had not extended it and they thought they could extend it to the iranian came close to deal. the iranian foreign minister said he was discussing a press release with the german foreign minister and then he went to the vienna airport and he met in a private airplane with the saudi foreign minister. he came back and the iranians say after that it was a complete sea change and he backed down on what he had said earlier on. they don't believe they were close to an agreement to begin with and is one of the u.s. negotiator said the iranians look to what happened and they looked at the meeting with the saudi foreign minister and took two plus two and made five out of it. there are her narratives as to whether the saudis played a role or not. they don't know exactly what happened. with regards to qatar, then out of the country for the last

couple weeks in the joy about being out of the united states is i don't see any political ads on tv in europe so i don't know what you are talking about when it comes to that. >> thank you. >> i would just like to ask you to comment further on the internal repercussions within i ran if trump decides, if trump walks away from the deal and you can feel free to differentiate between the repercussions according to different ways of walking away. >> thank you. one thing i think is important to understand, if the u.s. walks out of this deal, what this will do for any future opportunities to be able to get any negotiations going. the hard-line regardless of what the united states is doing or saying you cannot trust the u.s.. even the supreme leader said i'm

supporting the negotiators but ultimately i think we have to be very careful because you can't trust them. it would be really sad if trump does anything that would give the supreme leader the vindication of being able to say that he was right. part of the reason for that beyond the immediate effects of collapsing and potentially putting nuclear weapons back on the table is the next time there is a need to dissolve something something -- resolve something diplomatically goes within iran's elite, how will they make the argument that yes we should go back to the negotiating table because we can't strike a deal in the west will live up to. just as we have would tremendous difficulty on this site if they broke away from the deal. can you imagine how it would be for the next obama to make the argument we have to pursue pursue negotiations instead of pursuing the path of george

bush. it's not just about this deal. stop the future being able to resolve things diplomatically. let me say something about internal politics that i think is very important. it's connected to what the previous gem on asked about changes that i think there have been changes internally while we have seen some of them's small but important. they have not been reported in the united states so we may be forgiven for having missed them. you heard there were elections in i ran again and not free and fair elections but more competitive than the nonexisting elections in saudi arabia. what most people probably did not hear is that in the city council which the elections are -- under the presidential election all the major cities they took all of the seats. in the very conservative city of -- a woman ran for the city council. on the platform of opposing the

pay jerky. the slogan was elect the week. she won. [applause] deal may want women who won in the last election tripled or quadrupled. these are internal changes that are taking place that won't speed up if there's peace between the united states i ran and the middle east and there were mostly certainly be undermined if we have more external tension. so if we want to see that type of the change in the foreign-policy will ultimately have to come because i ran is changing entirely. rest assured threats or sanctions and a threatening regime change is not helping via reigning people. thank you so much. [applause] >> thank