>> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. .. >> good morning. welcome to the in american dialogue. my name is michael camilleri. i direct the dialogues will of law program. almost three years ago president obama and castro embarked on a historic opening which -- the relations between the united

states and cuba. the trump administration announced a series of regulatory changes designed to partially roll back the obama administration's strategy of maximizing engagement with the people of cuba. a few months from now cuba will undergo a historic leadership transition while reckoning with a more abundant economy, demographic challenges, and a relationship with the united states that is rapidly deteriorating as a result of president trump's policy changes and still unresolved sonic attacks against u.s. diplomats. in fact, the diplomatic drawdown in havana had a a direct impacn this event as a suspension of these the services in. havana prevented us from bringing a speaker from cuba to purchase but in today's discussion. nonetheless, to help us make sense of alle that's happened n recent months and assess what the future might bring for cuba and the unitedte states, cuba u. relations, where privileged welcome to the dialogue three

distinguished friends and colleagues with decades of experience working on cuba. to my immediate left emily medrol is the executive director of the center for democracy in the americas emily served in the obama administration ofof the national security council and in the cuban affairs office at the state department and was previously a a professional stt member on the senate foreign relations committee. michael bustamante is an assistant professoror at florida international university, specializing in modern cuba, cuban americans and the caribbean. he is coeditor of the volume new history of the cuban revolution. and jorge dominguez is the antonio madero professor for the study of mexico as harvard university and chair ofhe the harvard academy for international and area studies. he is the author of our editor of various books and former president of the latin american studies association.

before diving into the conversation i'd like to quickly acknowledge ourur partners at te world press photo exhibition who for over six years more than 4 million people in 100in cities around the globeto have enjoyed the work of award-winning photographers. today we're fortunate to enjoy on the edge of changes series and its provocative and stunning pictures of everyday life of jupiter to cdsog cycling throug, throughout the discussion today. we also want to acknowledge the support of the ford foundation and particularly marty, without whom this event would not have been possible. like to acknowledge two of my colleagues at the dialogue, president emeritus peter, and her colleague, cuban american lawyer who provides invaluable support to the school of law program. if anybody from opec easier rest assured the coffee and donuts what were not provided by -- [inaudible] so with that we will dive into

the discussion to each of our panelists will speak for about ten minutes delivering opening remarks and then we'll open it up for discussion, have plenty of time for your questions and comments. emily, w let's start you. >> great, thanks. if you were to put u.s.-cuba relations on a line graph come if you were to plot it with engagement on the y axis, it would be a jagged line for sure. we've taken two steps forward, one step back, one step forward from two steps back over several decades. but the long-term trendline is decidedly in the upward direction. and this time last year, so october 2016, the obama administration released the sixth of six rounds of regulatory changes governing u.s.-cuba sanctions.

each round of regulatory changes was designed to increase the flow of people, goods and information to and from cuba. these were couched in a larger policy of engagement, over two years during the final two years of the obama administration, the u.s. and cuban governments met regularly, engaged in dialogue a number of issues and ultimately signed almost two dozen bilateral agreements. these agreements touched on issues such as law enforcement information sharing, cooperation on health, designating sister marine protected areas. i really wide-ranging discussions on a number ofem issues. i say this time last year we were on a pretty steep part of the line graph in the upward direction. more than anything, those two

years of rapid progress toward normalization provedin that the u.s. and cuban governments can cooperate and that the cooperation can bear fruit. i think it's really important because after decades of not cooperating, we were really, it wasn't as. sure thing that is cooperation could bear fruit and, in fact, if you look at the last 30 years, we've seen that, in fact, it did. this week everyone is aware and michael just mention it, that without a downward tick on the line graph with the release of new regulations governing cuba sanctions. the treasury department and commerce department govern the implementation of sanctions for cuba, and they released some r w rules that in part rollback and insa part change travel to u.s. travel to cuba and the financial transactions with which use entities can participate in

cuba. the state department in concert withan this released a list of 0 prohibited entities within u.s. persons cannot engage in direct financial transactions. this announcement was the fulfillment of a june and us with a president trump made in miami where he directed department and agencies to begin to draft these rules so we've been expecting them for some time. and, in fact, ice would argue tt the downward tick we've seen this week is, in fact, not very severe. i will d get in to why but the specific changes that were announced this week with regard to travel, individuals were previously be able to travel under the people to people category, and now are no longer able to do so. however they are led to travel as individuals under the support

for the cuban people category. there is a new definition for the sport for the cuban people category that allows for people to stay at private bed and breakfast compete at private restaurants. and there's a requirement that individuals do a little come something else to constitute a full-time itinerary under this category that individuals can still travel to cuba. i think that's the big take away. there's also, most notably i think the state department list of 180 prohibited entities are a number of hotels where individuals cannot stay. a number of stores in old havana where individuals cannot shop. a number ofs government entitis within u.s. businesses cannot do business. and in the coming dayss and weeks, ipl know that it's alreay happened in many respects lawyers will be pouring over these new rules to determine what the avenue for continued engagement. but it's important to know that

engagementnt can continue. a lot about the progress over the last two years have been preserved. wete still have u.s. embassy in havana, the cubans have an embassy in washington. americans or u.s. travelers can still travel to cuba and can enjoy a lot of the flexibility that was implemented during thei obama administration. general licenses, for example. oftentimes, or now travelers do not need to seek specific permission from the treasury department to travel. you can self certify that their travel meets the rules governing u.s. sanctions. that remains in place. dialogue will continue. the u.s. and cuban governments have made clear they will continue to dialogue in areas of mutual interest, and so it's not by any means even close to a full reversal of the engagement

we've seen over recent years. and all of this comes at a time where there is considerable momentum. u.s. travelers continue to travel to cuba. in may ofen this year we already reached the mark of the number of u.s. travelers to cuba for the entire calendar year of 2016. this comes at a time where there's congressional momentum, bipartisan congressional momentum. representative rick crawford has introduced a bill to allow for the financing, for the use of financing in agricultural sales and there are 44 republicans in the house on that deal. and in the senate bill to let the travel ban a has 55 total centers senders signed on to thatng bil. that's a majority, so i think that it's important to realize that there is a path, a steady path of momentum from travelers, congress, also the service

sector we saw john deere and caterpillar science and party big deals at the trade fair in havana. that demonstrates that there is, there may be some negative news and negative rhetoric coming out government, but it can't quite put back in about upon ws unleashed over the last two and half years. but there are challenges, and i think we'll hear more about those in a little bit some other panelists, but for example, is a leadership transition in cuba coming up in february and we don't yet know what that will bring. also we arets operating currenty at skeleton staff, the u.s. embassy in the van and the cuban embassy in washington. and this comes as a result of mysterious symptoms experienced by u.s.ng diplomats and canadian diplomats, and ongoing investigation into the symptoms. the u.s. has drawn down our

diplomats from havana, and it's important to understand, issued a travel warning alongside about the travel warning in many respects is triggered bureaucratically by the drunken of our diplomats. -- expel diplomats in washington or to request sick 2% of the cuban diplomats washington leave. seems to be a bit of a step too far, or at least a step that begs the question why in the midst of an ongoing investigation did thehe use government asked the cuban embassy to draw down there diplomats. and do so in a way where they handed a list, reportedly handed a list of 15 specific dates to the cuban embassy, names that get it the commercial and the consular section of the cuban embassy in washington.

i mentioned that, , investigatin into the argument serious symptoms expressed by our diplomats is ongoing and we don't yet know what that will turn up, but i say that you know that while we have taken a step back or are on the downward path of the line graph right now, it's not quite as bad as it could be but there are some challenges on the horizon. >> thanks, thanks, emily. michael, let's go to you.do >> takes so much, good morning. takes so much to dialogue frenemy and for having this event. i was asked to focus my opening remarks on the cuban-american community, how they, we i should say as part of it fits into the present picture of the u.s.-cuban relations, how we're responding to or being affected by some of the things that we just mentioned. it's no secret there are vocal voices in the cuban-american community that are behind the

recent changes and use cuba policy that were just announced yesterday so that begs the question is there a constituency there supports these efforts or are there other voices? let me just start with some context. for the past i think approaching 20 years if i'm not mistaken university where i work, lord international university, has conducted a rigorous whole every year on cuban-american political attitudes and opinions. what that poll shows is there's a steady trend line to mention anotherct trend line of shifting cuban diaspora opinion on matters of use cuba policy. there are strong majority support in the cuban-american community for the right of all americans to counter the island. there is majority support for ending the embargo. but there is particularly strong support, almost universal i would say, forth the right of

cuban americans to travel to the island to see family whenever they wish. and so it's not surprising that of all the changes that it implemented in u.s.-cuban relations, u.s.-cuba policy, since june, this is one that hasn't been touched. i don't think that's a mistake or a coincidence. before the obama administration wrote instructions -- the obama administration got rid of that very early on before 17. those against engagement in miami have recognized it is a political use of the desert and their constituents when they can go see mom. and so there's a key way in which the cuban-american community is therefore not affected by some of the recent changes. their ability to travel to the island in theory remains free, unfettered. so i think that contributes to a

dynamic sometimes in which many folks in miami who are by no means single issue voters, the broader noise in u.s.-cuban relations might not register as much insofar as the own ability to go back and forth is not just impacted. but there are other clear ways in which the cuban-american relationship is affected. there are less u.s., a kindbu of rich transnational economy, flow of people, goods, money may also be impacted. cuban-americans to travel to the island don't only go to hug mom, they go to bring cash on the order of several billion dollars a year in remittances. that is both to his or their loved ones on the item but also i kind of rich transnational economy, a supply chainin by suitcase, if youse will come frm many sectors of the cuban economy.

and also the black market. we have to acknowledge. while cuban-americans in three can continue traveling in bringing all the stuff on planes that theys do, if we see u.s. airlines cutting back on flights, if we see less u.s. visitors can have an impact on small business sector generally, that might slow some of that transnational motion insofar as it is connected to take lisa tourist sector. the most important consequence though that i would argue that the cuban-american community is going to feel is a reflection of the reduction of staff both at the u.s. embassy in a van and the cuban embassy here in washington. the end of the wet foot dry foot policy in the waning days of the obama administration was a tough pill to swallow for think the cuban diaspora in general, although everybody saw it coming. coming. this was kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy. soon as a process of normal

station begin, a pretty nonnormal immigration policy vis-à-vis cubans was perhaps destined to eventually fade away. and so cubans begin to leave the island and really record numbers comprise them as we've seen in some 30 years, sort of attitude was if you're going to go you have to go now. that echoes on accelerated the speed with which the wet foot, dry foot policy would come to me. that was a bitter pill to follow. cubans had a tough time swallowing but they understood perhaps where it was coming from. what happen now with reduction of u.s. -- the fact there's no functioning consulate there, that closes yet another avenue of outmigration. not just outmigration travel. the number of of visitors visas cuba were getting in recent years was not unsubstantial. this has left a lot of people in limbo. i'm forgettingg the exact stats but i think i read that the u.s.

embassy or the u.s. consulate in havana had oneot of the largest numbers of pending visa applications come make something like 100,000 if i'm not mistaken. now it's totally unclear what's going to happen there. the state department has said issuing immigrant visas is going to be moved to columbia. not a very practical solution. -- colombia. for reasons of costs, for the reason that cubans need of visa to get to colombia to get a visa to prevent present a certain at the bank. in fact, when you apply for visa and go for an interview you don't get a decision right away. you might have to wait. what is ao cuban supposed to d, go back and neck and back with visa? this is a real setback. even for the immigrant visa fees this will lead to sharp declines of the net of cubans were come to the united states.

this has application were still important bilateral agreement between just and cuban governments dating back to the '90s with the u.s. is supposed to issue a minimum of 20,000 travel documents for people who travel to a part and figure out how viable without the will meet that mark. they've also still not made clear whether there be any process for issuing visitor visas and the slows down this transnational flow. so this does have serious impact. this is an area i would say kind of a political vulnerability for representatives from miami for defending this policy change but histh constituents are really suffering these practical effects. in miami it is completely possible to be a member of any political party to have voted for the current president or w t and still believe that you want to bring your sister over to come live with you.

and so i think it extent this drags on, this is going to be a real problem editing something that constituents i hope will tell the representativesev abou. so let me just conclude with a kind of question at a tentative answer, a set of answers. i've argued cuban-american opinion on matters of u.s. policy towards cuba has consistently shifted. yet we still have a scenario in which the cuban-american community is elected representatives reflect a different point of view. so why is that? the first thing i would say is that there's a difference between the cuban-american community in general, right, everybody regardless of your citizenship status, and those who are you citizens have the right to vote. i've often thought that as much effort and resources are put into courting support for engagement in washington, i'd like to see folks do a voter

registration drive. i think that would help the cause. i think as a set already cubans are not single issue voter is possible to have voted for trump and not support his move on cuba policy. i would also say this electoral picture may be changing. 2018 will be be really interestingng in miami. i'm sure many of you know the longtime representative congressional representative ileana ros-lehtinen is retiring oland that race is quickly shapg up to be a rather dynamic one practices when the democrats think they can flip. the field is already incredibly crowded. hard to predict with apple in that but if the seat flips, that could have pretty significant consequences towards cuba policy. so i would agree, last thought, the rollback that we've seen under the trump administration is significant. it's going of real effects but it's also nothing close to a complete cancellation of the deal quote-unquote. so i think for those of us who

believe in the valueal of engagement, that there still space to work and continue to push an advocate for that agenda. thank you. >> thanks so much, mike. jorge, please. >> i'm delighted to be back at the inter-american dialogue once again to chat about a topic that is familiar in many ways, the conversations of this sort have been going on for a very long time. i thought emily's idea of a timeline wasny particularly helpful in that sense. so the way i would like to use my remarks, perhaps not my usual mode but i think it's helpful. how can the president's policies advance the president's goals?

and so my own views, well i hope be clear to you along the way, but it seems to me that's a good way to frame it. because this is the president of the united states and we are thinking about the president's goals. so begin with the things that he has said vicki has said, including over the last few days, that he cares about the value, utility, the importance and thein rights of the u.s. bae near the cuban city of guantánamo. whether the role of the base as a prison will orth will not expand, it's a little unclear to me, but it would almost certainly continue as the prison for some indefinite period of time. and for that purpose, beginning with bush 41 and continuing under clinton, bush 43 and obama, and continuing now, there

has been an effective collaboration between the u.s. and cuban armed forces and the reason for that is both sides have similar interests. the u.s. doesn't want the prisoners to get out. that cubans don't want the prisoners to get in and, therefore, to advance the president's goals with regard to guantánamo it makes sense to sustain the policies of the president inherent. one ofdifferent topic, the signature questions during the trump presidential campaign on which he has continued to emphasize over the last several months of the first year of his administration is migration. and as you heard, therefore, the agreement signed in january 2017 fits perfectly with residents migration goals and, therefore, the continuation of those inherited policies did admirably well to the presidents of goals.

the easiest way to put it is cubans would be treated in the same way as everybody else under u.s. immigration law when they seek to enter the united states. the more pertinent point is that they are bilateral agreements indicating the joint interest and the joint consent of the two governments that include not only treating cubans in that way, but also for the u.s. to return cubans who have attempted to enter the united states without proper documentations to cuba. whether they're crossing the straits of florida, or whether they're crossing the u.s.-mexican border, and that cuba would agree to accept. that is a a better agreement thn the united states has with any of the country in the world. it is a lot more effective. it is much more professional treatment for the use coast guard and for other u.s. migration personnel involved in

this issue. so to advance the president's goals, the policies the president inherited on this issue area work very well also. law enforcement, with regard to a variety of topics, certainly violent crime but drug trafficking, the president has made it clear during his campaign and at various times during his first year of his presidency he cares about a basket of issues that one would associate with regard to law enforcement. cuba and the united states begin to cooperate informally but steadily on law enforcement issues through the 1990s. and last summer of 2016, they formalize an agreement to make sure that security forces in both countries could be especially effective. and for anyone who reads through u.s.s. government reports with

regard to whether other governments in other countries do or do not cooperate and advance the policies with regard to drug traffic interdiction anh punishment two criminals associate with the light of work, cuba shows up amazingly well. it's not just a policy commitment of the cuban government, but the effectiveness of the cuban government at doing exactly what president trump's goals indicate cuban government policy and cuban government goals to be. so in this issue area as well, confirming theen inherited policies that the trump administration has received serve best the president's goals. onto a different topic. the president has indicated that there are times that he thinks with regard to international trade the u.s. should enjoy surplus. and if you apply that to cuba,

beginning at the start of the te 21st century, early in the bush administration, authorized by congress, the unitedd states became an agricultural exporter to cuba. and that created, but almost any calculation of percentage standards, a sensational, albeit in terms of monetary worth, only a few billion dollars. but a sensational trade surplus for the united states. those policies of agricultural exports continued under the obama f presidency, have contind in 2017 under the trump administration. the numbers, the amount for calendar 2016 was in the neighborhood of $245 million. the civil aviation agreement negotiated during the obama administration also fits well

with the president's preference for a symmetric agreement, that advance the economic interest of the united states. the agreement on paper looks like any normal civil aviation agreement where there is the rights established for both sides are in practice cuba has only one airline, and it does not apply to the united states. so that all the traffic between the united states in cuba necessarily adds to be one-sided economic advantage of the united states. and even the regulations that went into effect yesterday as you walk through it, the closer you get to use business interest, unless adversely they are effective. it's important to bearin in mind that even this element of asymmetric economic relations has two consent of the cuban government. because for the cuban government -- has the consent -- this is

not an optimal deal but it is a much better deal than not having this. because it is what makes this possible to increase the number of visitors as emily indicated it is what makes it possible to develop other areas of economic activity in a country where the best functioning, one of the two best functioning economic sectors happens to be tourism. the other one is the -- [inaudible] but that also tells you is that on all of the issues that i am touching, the cuban government may not like some of the new regulations that have gone into effect, or the words that accompany these regulations, but it does not really have a better way. what's interesting about the cuban government response, beginning early in 2017 but particularly since june, is howt

remarkably tame it is. how remarkably moderate it is. because it does not have a better response, and this is what makes the continuation of these policies possible. president indicated in his remarks in june that he also cared about fostering market economy openings in cuba. and there are various ways in which there may or may not be a use relationship with the cuban market economy. the four pillars of our visitors, flights, remittances, and permitting the kinds of economic activities such as airbnb to which u.s. visitors may go. a lot of the things that is noteworthy about the regulations that went into effect yesterday is they affirmed all for. you heard first from emily and then from michael. visitors can visit.

flights may continue. remittances may be sent, and people are being steered into private bed-and-breakfast agreements, whether managed or not by airbnb, it does not matter in this case. the cuban private economy particularly in the city of havana thrives under these arrangements, will function better under these arrangements. and to the extent that the president truly does believe in the goal he has articulated his or a market economy in cuba, then the policies that yesterdays regulations reaffirmed advances the president's goals as well. beare in mind the cuban government may be somewhat unhappy about elements about its private sector economy may have been growing. there is some public evidence of that, the cuban government does not have a better alternative to grow its economy and to prevent

these activities. so once again in this area it can sense to its evolution. worth remembering, not in regulations, but with removing that the president's budget proposal to the congress may be dead on arrival because havana -- because ros-lehtinen has not yet stepped up at the office of management and budget proposed 20 out the $20 billion usaid money out of -- and highly consistent with the preferences of the cuban government. political changes, the event of the two already if the president both by his words and vice actions and the secretary of state, by being more explicit in his words to career force service personnel at the state department indicate a regime change is not ant top priority,n general, although foreign-policy of the united states. the secretary of state in

particular has described it quite clear. with regard to cuba, that seems to be different. what is interesting is when one follows the logic of the remarks of the president and the secretary of state it is because there's not that much at stake in u.s.-cuban relations that the administration believes that he can afford to pursue a policy that has the components of regime change. but it is even in the context not pushing it enough to undermine or even to undercut the other presidential goals and policies that i have summarized. but to thete extent that monitoring the presidential succession scheduled to take place in cuba at the end of the month of february, it does make sense, continue diplomatic relations as the trumpsi administration continues to affirm, to monitor process of succession that may include that

only president raul castro but, of course, many other members of the leadership. it includes affirming cuban cuban-american travel. it includes affirming study abroad programs and the like, aller because they are among the relatively few instruments of the united states has to try to facilitate, to encourage, to motivate possibilities of political change in cuba, as it does that segment of the president's remarks in june of 2017 were president trump indicated that he would like to continue to negotiate with cuba, in particular with regard to fugitives of justice but more generally in regard of providing a variety of motivations and topics to be confirmed. the issue then with regulations advanced yesterday, nearly all of which were anticipated by the president's remarks last june

could beme put in the following way. the political news from yesterday as opposed to the regulatory news from yesterday, the political news from yesterday is how much of the inherited policies has been reaffirmed. down to the credit cards that you and i know we cannot in use, but they were part of the old regular and have remained in the new regulations. it is noteworthy that some of michael's representatives in congress found that decisions yesterday not could've gone as far as it would've liked, and if you follow the lightew of argumt i am trying to present to you, it is because this more modest version of the regulations injures less the presidents stated goals. that is my take on the regulations. regulations yesterday for the most part advanced nut of the

president's goals. they get in the way market openingla activities. they make it more difficult to advance the tactical objectives that are in element of the component of a presidential statement in june about fostering entrepreneurship in cuba, in the private sector. they are for the most part annoying. the impact on the cuban government will require some relatively modeste readjustment at the margins. more annoying they will be to u.s. travelers and to student groups or universities and colleges that wish to establish a there. what is most adverse for the president's goals, what is truly counterproductive to almost any view t of president's goals as e has articulated them, and at this point i ended, is shredding

the consulates in havana and in washington. people need to move. to accomplish the kind of objectives that the president has articulated, preventing the issuance of these is a gross mistake. the sooner it is corrected, the better. but i think we are better off if we try to think through and argue the kinds of lines that i try to sketch to you. for those who, like me, i've just made clear disagree with the regulations that went into effect yesterday, formulated in a way that tells the administration we do understand a lot of what you are doing and a lot of what you are not doing. stop there. >> terrific. thank you so much, jorge.

so we've got a rich set of issues on the table. i will take the prerogative to throw the first question out to all of you. ifae we take emily's line graph metaphor and try to extend that out into the future, i think i heard from all of you that we are certainly on a downward slope at the moment, that the relationships at the moment are going to a rocky period but also heard reasons for perhaps cautious optimism, some factors that point to underlying strengths or resilience in the relationship, whether emily's references to congressional support or trade and travel, whether mike's discussion of the attitudes of the cuban-american itmunity especially as pertains to strong operating consulates in both countries that allow the movement of people that the community has

become accustomed to come or jorge's i think very salient discussion of narrowly interpreted u.s. interests and how those are best advanced in many cases by a policy of continuity rather than one of change from the prior administration. i guess being a little provocative, does that mean that you are alle optimistic that a couple of years from now we will look back at this as sort of a low point and that these underlying factors will, over time, put us in a better place in the bilateral relationship, or to see a continuing kind of deepening of this current freeze? if i could ask all of you in answering to make reference to what's happening in cuba, especially the leadership change. change. i think many of uspe saw the vio of vice president diaz-canel that circulated recently .2

certainly no immediate change and some ofth the more hard-line policy from the cuban government. government. the wayould reflect on in which events in cuba itself may sort of shape this timeline if we extend it out, say, 24 months. let's start made with jorge this time and we will work backwards. >> let me take where your question-comment justt ended. so if you dial back to president obama's visit to havana, in retrospect it was too successful. it scared the cuban leaders. and beginning with fidel castro does last public act of defiance, he publicly criticized his brother for how the obama invitation was handled.

and' it led to a time which had not ended by the time of the u.s. presidential election, and has continued since at that time. that has constrained what might have been further consequences of opening of use cuban relations in terms of cubans politics and freedom of expression, the kinds of concerns vice president diaz-canel articulated in that set of remarks in the video. there is a cuban election coming up, not just a presidential succession that has been scheduled. cuban elections have not received a vast amount of attention from the international press because the national assembly elections, as i suspect all of you know, it is an ideal electoral law if you're a

politician. the number of seats is equal to the number of candidates and so you will win. the interesting feature, less well known about the cuban electoral law, is that it has nevertheless, retained free voter.for the i'm not counting at positions. these people who shop to vote. one is you can vote blank. second one iss you can annoy yor ballot -- annul. the third is selected. the cuban government decided to cluster candidates. so in any district you are collecting between two and five people to a national assembly. and so you can vote for candidate a and not for candidate united states even though you know both will both become members of the national assembly. but nevertheless, it is also clear that what they cuban communist party and the mass

organizations want you, dear voter, to do is to vote for l vote illegal, the united slate. so you could sum those three votes blank, null and selective, and call them, they are not dissident but you can call them nonconforming. and in in the 2013 national sie election, between one-fifth and a quarter of the votes were nonconforming votes. 1.8 million cubans choosing to vote t in ways that are at odds with the preferences of the established political organizations. that's not a small matter. it was not a tiny number. it is one of the reasons why they municipal election process that is now underway, the government is much more alarmed about who might be candidates that might be their case before. suppose the cuban electoral law

said something such as of this, that in a district with two to five candidates, a candidate with the fewest votes would be defeated. what a radical idea. i mean, i candidates, four of them get elected, one loses. if that rule had been applied in the 2013 national assembly elections, one-third of the political bureau would have been defeated. that's part of the political process. it's not just a change of pace. and if i were a vice president trying to become president of cuba, i would do what politicians in any country would do. assume that those would like an opening are already forming. the ones who i need to win because that's where the median voter in the selector or so, 1000 people or so who have an

opinion, may be in. those are the ones who are afraid of the opening, and so if i were advising diaz-canel, which i assure you i am not, i would advise them to do exactly what he did. >> thanks. mike. >> on not particularly optimistic at the moment about this dip just being a temporary thing. i guess it depends on how we define temporary, but certainly over the course of this administration i don't see any real strong incentive for this administration to try to figure out the consular issue in particular. i think there's an element of the administration that would just as soon not issue as many pieces too everybody, to be

frank. -- visas. there's an element, that kind of results whatever we think about the measures that were taken to reduce the personnel and whether there were justified or not, the result is sort of even more consistent with the policy to immigration then the wet foot, dry foot is. so ipe don't think that's particularly encouraging. i would also say that in terms of cuba's internal dynamic, i mean, i think some of what jorge just described predates the trump administration coming in. there was a way in which a manner which the obama administration was trained atf times really wrangled the other side. politically it had to be framed i think as an argument of well,

if the old policy didn't work, let's try something else. the problem is worked to what end, and that as the is defined to, republican or democrat, is not one the cuban government really liked. and still feels that way. i think the notion, a nice eu's policy would be a kind of a trojan horse, that's something that was in the rhetoric and the cuban authorities have begun to react to. maybe counterintuitively a policy even ifa it's mostly rhetoricallyly aggressive and mt engagement has remained for there still a lot of avenues for that, the harsher rhetoric is something is easier to deal with i think on the other side. i think there might be an element of cuban political society that knows how to deal with this. i would say there's another, thati there isn't a new variab, and that a variable, there are several newbie poster i think cuba's economy is not doing

great. they have not been able to meet the projected targets for growth. there was positive news this past week about foreign investment, but that demographic problem is real. the sort of stalling of the internal economic agenda, things haven't moved, right. august there was a freezing of issuing of new licenses for small business people. these are things i think reaction to some of things having under obama, and don't help the scenario going forward. so i don't really know what the relationship is between the internal interim and extrovert it's a complicated question, but i've got to be honest i'm not particularly optimistic. i think there are important avenues to keep engaging, to keep some of the travel going. this will not be like falling off aal cliff. but certainly the next year or two i think we may be in for

some ownership. >> emily? >> i think over a ten year period the trendline will continue to be positive. over two years i don't know. i'd like tomi think positive. as i articulated in my remarks, that there's been a lot of momentum on travel, on business ties, on government dialogue. that will i do think continue, but as with all mentioned, cuba is getting ready to it into a leadership transition. we right now are acutely aware that during leadership transitions there's a lot of rhetoric. there is a lot of uncertainty. there's a lot of posturing, and it's unclear how that will affect the bilateral relationship. but i but i think i'll focus foa second on congress and becausei think it's really remarkable that despite the negative rhetoric from the trump top administration and despite the

june announcement and despite the departments and agencies spending the last several months drafting a roast restrict trade and travel, that there is been a concerted effort in congress together cosponsors to bills to either lift the embargo entirely or to erode elements of the embargo. among republicans, and i think that's really worth mentioning. because some of the folks in congress, and it's not just senator flake who has positioned himself publicly at odds with the administration, but some in the house who were among the first supporters of candidate trump during the primary, are the leaders on these bills to promote engagement. they are the ones who are advocating to their colleagues the need to change our policy, and they have, over the last six

months, gathered more republican cosponsors during this uncertain time and i think that bodes well for a continued positive trendline. >> perfect. okay. that was a great introductory session. we already for your questions and comments. we will take three at a time and then hopefully have time for a few rounds. i seely a couple hands here. dan, start with you. >> thank you. dan erickson with blue star strategies. i want to come back to the point of cuban entrepreneurs. it's possible listening to the panel printer to print this possibly being good because it will push more of the visitors into that sector. or it could be really negative. i want to know what have you heard from entrepreneurs on the ground? how are they interpreting this? a second question is kind of cuban civil society and was the civil society reaction?

>> thanks. go right here. >> good morning. alex sanchez, defense analyst. one question for emily. you talked about, do you think, worst-case scenario, the trump administration would consider shutting down the embassy and going back to intersection, or is this just a red line? is this something that could happen -- [inaudible] another question will quickly, i think maybe michael can talk about it. you talked about places they cannot go into cuba. kenyon mention which ones they are? you mentioned airbnb. are the restaurants and stores they cannot go to, and how is this enforced? >> a question up here.

>> on the cuban desk in 1968, when you shake aurora died -- number two, p any intersection, 701980, so doing a great job. i'd like to ask a leadership question raul castro is a a grt guy that open up cuba into the 20th century. in my day, old days, he was a bad guy. he didn't get eight hour speeches but he ran the army, the intelligence service and the police. he protected his brother from the bad guys, probably killed, sent che guevara on great nations out of the country to keep them away. sent into angola, sent him to

bolivia, how ridiculous. so he's a bad guy. he made money for the army, the police and the intelligence service. so in my book, and i'm old-fashioned, he's a bad guy. so, you know -- >> question. >> is he changed? is he going to heaven? what happened to him? >> we don't get a lot of easy going to heaven questions around here. [laughing] that's good. emily, let's start with you. >> i will take dan's question. i was in japan in june during the presidency announcement, and i was on, my itinerary was to meet with a number of cuban entrepreneurs to get their assessment of the u.s. policy debate in advance of the announcement. i happened to be there when the

announcement was made. president trump in his remarks said that its policy toward cuba was designed to support the cuban private sector, and it was designed to divert funds away from government, certain government coffers and intoor te cuban private sector. the folks i was meeting with were pretty clear that that was not, they did not think that the policy would have that effect. a month later we brought a number of them up to washington so that they could make their voices heard in the d.c. debate. they met with state department come with commerce come with a number of members of congress and presented some policy recommendations as to our u.s. policy can best support the cuban private sector. but in that month interim between announcement and their advocacy tour, that all experienced a number of cancellations. and their overarching sentiment was that negative rhetoric and

ambiguity in our policy deters travel and deters engagement. and in the short term had seen the impact of that. and now fast-forward to present day in the wake of travel warning, they had seen a further reduction in cancellations. the cuban private sector is not all hospitality focused here we had a couple of folks on advocacy delegation who served cuban clients, but the cuban clients who they serve are, many of them come in the hospitality sector and have an extra resources because of the increased travel primarily of u.s. travelers can increase resources to be able to contract an event planner for their wedding or to post ads in a private magazine or two higher a

fancy photographer to come and do some ads for the hospitality business. the hospitality sector had experienced acutely the short-term impact of the and the duty of the policy and the negative rhetoric. the secondary market, i will call it that, was starting to feel the impact and i fear that's going to be felt more in the coming months. that said, i've also heard from the travel industry that there's a sense of relief that the rules have finally come out that what was really hurting the travel industry from the perspective was a months long drafting process and the fear of what was coming and the uncertainty, and the rules listed if you bought your ticket before theen announcement or was it before the implementation of the rules, or was it before president trump

was elected? differentthe goalposts, and the average traveler from the united states would just as soon wait until the dust settles before traveling i think from the travel industry's perspective, yesterday the dust began to settle .. view on there will be a clearer the path, on the ways to travel still to cuba legally and that will have an impact supporting the cuba private sector down the road. michael b.: i don't have much to add to emily's response on the small business side. i would just say that one of the weird regulatory things that we have to figure i think the travel industry will figure out individual people do people travel will now group again, and this support for the

cuban people looked a lot like what people do people wise. whether there is enough momentum to sort of funnel people into bad and convince people it's okay or get on board that train, that is seen in addition to the fear of leading up to the regulations commend the other thing that may impact things goingg forward is this negative news around us. i think people often aren't as into the weeds of treasury department regulations as i was yesterday in a here i can't go anymore and that's the end of that and they decide to go somewhere else. there may be a tip further in the small-business sector i've interacted with their very concerned about it. i don't see how decreasing overall numbers, even despite adding confusion helps that

sector. this sector of enforcement is a good question. the list of enterprises i think is 180-ish. most of that list is comprised ofn various hotels that are joit ventures between not all, but joint ventures between a foreign company or another branch or estate company that is accused of lang to the cuban armed forces. but there's also some really strange things on there. you o can't engage with a produr of soda, but doesn't list another brand of soda that is also made. also their son listed but not others. so as far as getting rid of the mantra this administration is stripping away useless

regulations, this seems to find the face of that. but the cuban economy is basically a catch economy from the tourist perspective or at least the u.s. tourist perspective, so how to figure out how to audit which brand of coke i drink, i don't really know. i also don't know if that's the point. to create sort of regulatory not-too-distant and advice people from potentially going. i have not heard of any dramatically increase budget. i would like to think they have more important things to worry about, so we'll have to see if there's any enforcement follow through auditing. i do think the enforcement piece might fall disproportionately on some folks. there's the wording in their time trying to figure out about educational travel, study abroad programs that has experience with dealing with the bureaucracy on those matters and i think the u.s. university study abroadit programs may be n

easily identifiable conspicuous target. in terms of civil society, that's a loaded term as we know in aa complicated one. if there's a sector of civil society that is germanic way on board with the trump administration policies, they don't speak for the vast majority. i would includei civil society everyday people and this is not being seen favorably. i think there's incredible, the normalization process habits up and down about what it would bring from the average cuban's death. there were some clear winners in that process. others not soe r much. the idea that we would go back come even if just half that and still get back on track 10 years later, that is just incredibly disappointing thing,

particularly for young people have made a conscious decision to stay in summit had the opportunity to be financing most of their friends growing up and up or i in miami or elsewhere. to now be going back to this kind of old story it's a really tough pill to swallow and i hope it doesn't last. >> to our take on the question of raul castro's legacy? >> at the very good question and you are quite right to focus. it is noteworthy that there are many and has long been many biographies of fidel castro, but not one good one. moreover, it is analytically important still today given that it will remain as first after the february transition it remains pertinent to think about it. so, first point is the contrast if one takes a long time span.

he first appears in the public arena in 1958 foreign troops under his command, rebel troops kidnap a whole bunch of u.s. systemsle and subsequently available archival information made it clear that the time has thought he was extremist and nearly crazy, so there was a real difference of opinion between the two brothers. jump forward to the mid-1960s, and it is his ministry that is responsible for and it is 10 as minister who most resist ending the program known as [speaking in spanish] military unit production that were in effect for labor camps where a variety of people were sent, most notably, thousands of

those accused to be. homosexual. it is the daughter affirming that being gay and adopting a number of practical policies including police retraining to make sure that this is affirmed. in 1968, cuba's mini version of a cultural revolution called the revolutionary offensive, rural castro publicly affirmed we did not make a revolution to protect the right to trade and lead to the expropriation of the clearly salient fact of it is like barber shops and beauty salons and hot dog stands all of which now becomes enterprises. it is fidel castro in 2010

announces that comes to be known as the policy to update the a cuban e economy that opens up a significant growth for all of the small private activities. two very different kinds of behavior. the first time i noticed a split into two brothers is in the early 1990s in the middle of a severe economic crisis went ruralic castro publicly gives an interview, hen had his favorite journalist give him the question, what is the greatest threat to cuban national security today and raul castro plebeians are with beans. cubans have to eat and it is only after that you have caster authorizing policy changes in the private sector. the interesting question is what

today's views always does use which he suppressed them to suppress and see her views at a moment in time? so.n't think that's when i mentioned the decision to kidnap a bunch of u.s.s. citizens. this is a man who genuinely learned to learn a meaning changes substantive views on important questions. he changes substantive views, not just read because the world has t changed in the unlike his brother was prepared to adjust to these changes. and that might not get into heaven, but at least purgatory. [laughter] >> what i've heard so far is

what the u.s. reaction to trump is going to be, how the u.s. may or may not perform, what kind of relationship. the cubans have a role in this i presume. they have to make choices about their reaction to the new policy agenda trump administration. we see some countries have gotten angry, some politicians have not america or get angry at the united states and call for assistance and others, perhaps the white majority are ready to accommodate the term presidency and try to find ways of continuing. is there any debate, discussion about how the cuban government ought to respond to try policies

that say. >> good morning. -- [inaudible] my questions really revolve around theev macro level as the policies continue to shift, there is a conversation about eliminating thebo 10% tax nine u.s. dollars at the exchange level. how is that impacting or continue to impact going forward? secondly, the question around the currency and how is that going to impact moving things forward and lastly commit three, four, five t men's dialogue on both sides of the aisle, democratic and republican about a real serious discussion about the blockade. has that died completely or do we see some of that continue to happen behind the scenes then expect what will happen?

>> schneider. >> mark snyder, c. sis. >> this goes to the question of leaking trump goals and policy decisions and to some degree it goes to the question of where raul is. this relates to venezuela. from the standpoint of the trump administration, this is one of the few areas of latin american policy where he spent very outspoken and clearly opposed to the direction of events in venezuela thursday morning to the toyota regime. and in that context, obviously one of the few nations that seems to have some influence in venezuela is cuba. the question is, does the recent policy decisions have any effect on cuba's willingness to play a useful role or is it simply unrelated and there's unlikely to be any shift in the cuban policy with respect to

venezuela? >> let's startha they are if you want to take that question and move backwards. >> so, to peter's question, i would say the cuban government has by its action and more recently by its words signaledor very clearly how it is thinking about this. it is prepared to continue to go down the list the list guantánamo litigation coming cuban government is all set with that. the response to the regulations, the self-discipline with which cuban government officials have responded is noteworthy that a

minimum. this is as highly professional theme, long in office all the way down and this is their view. i think honestly the reason is better not have a alternative. it is not better than to tear off these things to retaliate against the united states. my assumption as much as they dislike having to accommodate, but they will likely continue to do so. >> mark, to your question on venezuela, very good questions on the cbc, let me just say my first conversation in just a few months we will have exchange

rate unification with the 1997 with an economy minister who thought -- ha[inaudible] the 20th anniversary of that conversation, so i remember. i'm venezuela, i have thought for some time the cuban government would be willing to be part of some international arrangement with regard to venezuela. i don't think this takes an enormous amount of mental effort. the cubans to come back from service in venezuela, the tens of thousands who have done so, do keep saying this is not a competent government. moreover, it's also not a revolutionary government. they may not then take a logical step, what the heck are they

doing here. this incumbent president, unlike hugo chavez as the predecessor? an additional array of skills. so it's not inconceivable to say that our main interest to save our partnership in venezuela of which this particular incumbent, with the trump administration prepared to engage the cubans as an administration in the past prepared to engage with president duterte inti negotiations it's not unreasonable to do that, but that remains to be seen. even in the context of what would be -- are there any cuban -- let me rephrase it. not specifically on venezuela. that's the just cuban willingness on the trump

administration. if you move a little bit or prepare to move a little bit. given their response to president trumps june speech was you want to negotiate over fugitives, let's negotiate over fugitives. it didn't go anyy further becaue there was noth subsequent respoe to the u.s., but it was not saying no. sonic attacks. there's more than both governments could do, but one thing that the cuban government did, which it had not done, which was to invite the fbi to come repeatedly. yeah, one could imagine undertaking additional activities, but it's not as if they had been grumpy. it is sustaining agreements and a willingness to pick up the conversation that requires both

sides. >> i wanted to build on the answer to pierce question. you know, i would agree that the response from the cuban government has been quite measured throughout the lead up on the sonic attack issue. but the tone has notched up a little bit. i sense a kind of degree of annoyance that some of those signals that you have just sent -- yeah, exactly, that the offer hasn't been taken up so to speak. so we will see whether that continues or is a momentary thing. i do think there were things that the g cuban government cano to respond directly to some of the inconvenience and hindrances that are going to be the results of whether the announcement the other day for the diplomatic

personnel. i mentioned that cuba's embassy is up with one counselor officer who has to process a difficult amount of paperwork. cubans come it's worth noting if you're born in cuba you will visit, you cannot enter with a passport to say another country where you've been naturalized. he can cross the border if you left before 1970 i believe. so it's aot lot of paperwork. the cuban passport is valid for six years, but it has to be renovated or renewed every two. it's an expensive proposition . the cuban r government did recently take an important step in getting rid of somege team called the passport, which the best way to translate assertive and activation of the passport, which they issue a passport of a wise and attack it? that's an important bureaucratic thing stripped away. other things one could do, renewed every two years theme. get rid of that can reduce the workload and maybe help more

cuban americans go more easily and more c frequently. that needs to be really in their interest to do that. but on the other hand, there is a way in which i hope that the cuban government weather on matterser of the economy or politics or society won't raise its decisions entirely on the dynamic bilaterally. cubans featuree does not depend on its relationship with the united states is not just they are based on intimacy and always will become other issues at stake with the function economy internally and political system that are going on in cuban society that don't have much to do with the bilateral dynamic and what i worry about is the downturn in tone kind of shaping that conversation or inhibiting it. in a way i hope the cuban government keeps tending to its

business, the business of itss people. obviously the context bilaterally that's more context it, but many pending issues that aren't about a that and i hope that whether it is the current seeping from the many others that want to mention i hope they keep their eyes on the price so to speak. >> emily, final word. >> offers to answer your question about conversations when the barcode which being democrats. what we've seen recently is more of a constituent driven effort to advocate for the end of the embargo and it's common in the last two years when businesses that travel down to cuba and discovered what opportunities theye have when there have been more opportunity for travel, educational exchanges, the farmers can all but taste the increase in their sales if the u.s. government were to allow for these financing and agricultural sales.

using these constituent groups advocating for their members to do something, to change the way with cuba and ultimately let the embargo. guess is the answer to your question of conversations are happening in continuing and i think they will continue even despite the current chill in the bilateral relations. i neglected to answer your question about embassy closing. i think it's important to bear in mind the process behind the ordered departure that we are in right now. it is my understanding that no departure can last longer than 180 days and when that clock started is a bit unclear, but i think we are coming up b. at february or the month following on an up or down decision by the state department whether to reinstate her diplomat.

i do not think it down will be a the embassy and i can't speak for certain i'm not, but again, my understanding is that we are the department to determine that it is safe to send her diplomat's back. we would return to status quo wouldn't have diplomats back. were they to determine that there is still a risk to our diplomats and that the departure must remain in place in the post would revert to unaccompanied, which means no family members could move back down in that staffing levels could remain as is a skeletal levels are l gradually picked back up. but i think that is an important decision point. in conversations with the state department, i've tried to tease out what the criteria are used to make these determinations

about whether it's safe and not the conversation we had in the next several months, but i do not anticipate. i don't anticipate the embassy would revert back. >> this has been an incredibly rich and informative discussion, clearly a lot on the table and a lot of things will be tracking this dynamic time in u.s. cuba relations. i want to thank jorge dominguez, bustamante and mendrala. thank you for sharing your thoughts and mornings with us. thank you for being here and your excellent questions. hope to see you all soon thank you for the dialogue. [inaudible conversations]

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>> kongo thing political unrest under the president who sought power for the last 16 years for the government's been accused of inhibiting election since 26 teen as an independent commission recently sent a boat for december 2018. here is a house hearing with witnesses testifying on humanitarian conditions in the congo. [inaudible conversations] >> thank you so much good ranking member for organizing this hearing. my name -- [inaudible] mvemba phezo dizolele over the past two years release diplomat politicians have focused mostly on the crisis around the election and on the struggle for power in contest. we are so preoccupied with the