priority discusses tax money. ronald truman formal enforcement attorney at the consumer forstmann. wrote about the bureau's future. in a spotlight on magazine segment people picture esquire writer christopher and his recent piece investigating the family kind of forgotten profits from opioid crisis. be sure to watch c-span's washington journal live at seven eastern saturday morning to join the discussion. >> next, a hearing on the president's authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. the senate foreign relations committee testimony on the procedures currently in place and legislation that would require congressional approval to use the. this is two hours, ten minutes. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> the senate foreign relations committee will come to order. we will do a little bit of the front end and hopefully will take care of the business quickly and i know people have other meanings and it will move to the hearing itself. we think our witnesses for allowing us to do this and were glad you're here. we have a number of items on the agenda today ander we will movea number of nominations and foreign service officer led and will also take up as 1928, multilateral act of 2017. i want to think senator coons for his leadership and hard work on this bill.l. i want to also recognize isaacson, rubio, young, cain and merkley for their contributions to thisct bipartisan important legislation for the committee..

this bill will establish a process for conducting injected reviews on how well multilateral institutions carry out their missions with our funding, the authorities after review. eleven years. through this process we will be able to evaluate their performance in an objectiveve wy and we will look at performance, management, accountability and transparency alignment with us foreign policy goals and efficiency. the us has been around $11 billion to support thesehe entities and we owe the us taxpayers good value for their money. these reviews will help us make better informed decisions about how to prioritize scarce resources and it will also provide solid grounds for advocating for changes in reforms. others such as the eye kingdom and australia have done similar

reviews of their multilateral contributions with good results, by the way, multilateral aid confusions with good results in a i urge you to support this effort will greater accountability for our spending on multilateral entities. senator cardin, any comments? >> yes, i do, mr. chairman. before i comment on the bill and nominations that are on our agenda i want to comment regarding information statistics regarding the foreign service that has been made publicly last week. ambassador barbara stevenson stated last week and i quote" there is no denying that our leisure brings are being depleted at a dizzying speed due in part to the decision to/promotion numbers by more than half foreign service officers at court state has lost 60% of its ambassadors since january ranks of the career administrators are three-star equivalent are down from 33 to 19 have fallen from 431 after

labor day to 369 today and are still falling. the master stevenson was the president of the governing board of the fsa is employing us to ask why. i have been asking why the administration and the state department and the personal budget and reorganization matters i am notot getting a lot of answers. just as one small example although the trump administration lifted the federal hiring freeze in april 2017 the state department and the usaid is elected to keep its own hiring freeze in place. why? my impression is that the morale is at an all-time low in the state department and thehe usaid causing a massive exodus of diplomatic andng development expertise. why is this happening? what is the performance leadership doing about it? our presidents recently said we

do not need to worry about the fact that many of the senior-level positions in the state department remain unfilled because when it comes to foreign policy his opinion is the only one that matters. why on earth say that mark for the thousands of fs owes around the world working to advance the ideals of the t united states ts was a verbal message. this is a high-level decapitation of leadership we are going on the defense department with three and four star officers resigning and off for suffering low morale leaving as well or not even signing up i can guarantee you that congress would be up in arms yet here there is silence. why? the state permitul and usaid i would offer is everybody critical and vital to national security as the department of defense. the intelligence committee, a lawot enforcement and myriad of others in thelu federal governmt worked tirelessly everyday protector security, extender prosperity, about our values. folks, the situation is

alarming. but our country in danger and we do not have adequate voice and resources to all of our country's national security tools. secretary madeleine albright once saidd the turbulent and careless world of men and women foreign service of the front lines every day on every continent for us. this committee needs to continue to suppress this issueil and its arsenal ability to make sure that you have the diplomatic assets in place in order to represent our national security. moving to the legislative volume i what to think senator corker includes further work on this bill. the critical part of our foreign assistance efforts to coordinate activities, leverageon funds and to look at our national interest does. if successful, multilateral aid review act provide us with clear metrics, reliable data, solid analysis of our multilateral investment.

mr. chairman, i hope you will read the bill because i think it does pull out what our expectations are in regards to carrying out the mission and the right use of resources. we review this over a periodic basis to make sure our multilateral efforts are our national security interests. think this is important bill and i applaud you for your work. one last point, if i might. when this point. we are y getting near the end of this work. and we e only have one work. remaining before we adjourn for the year. there is an extremely important bill that senator rubio has been working on which will require additional state farm and reporting on european government efforts to return or provide restitution for property wrong during the holocaust. i said this before but time is running out on this issue. people are getting older and fewer are surviving becoming much more difficult to deal with prostitution. i applaud the work that was done on this bill and i know there are many members of this committee that are cosponsors including johnson, menendez and i would urge the delicate staff

to get together with sponsors to see what we can move this bill directly this year. i paid the chairman that thank you. i'd like to ask him if possible, because i know we have conflicts taking place at 10:15 and move to the business and if people want to make comments "after words" i'm glad to hear it and obviously we will have a long hearing. let me say that had a very unsatisfactory meeting last week with state department -- i think the concerns for state department are bipartisan in nature and i don't think they are anywhere close to having a plan to prevent relative performance they make their. i do think that we need to be much focused on holding them because i think many of the things, if not all,

are true. with that, i understand that mr. or under dairy to the estate has been held over and he will be considered in the next meeting. i would entertain a motion to approve the remaining nomination and blocked by voice including ms. lisa johnson, mr. sean lawler and mr.ev steve goldstein and ms. rebecca gonzales into foreign service officer list. unless there is so moved and second -- all those in favor say i, opposed. any recorded nose that anyone would like on these obligations? say none. the eyes have it in the nomination for motions are greedy. next we will move to a s1928. first i would entertain a motion to approve the substitute amendment in the portland amendment and blocked by voice

vote. so moved. is there a second perspective so moved and second. all those inr. favor say i smart opposed, without the eyes have it in the amendments are agreed to. are there any of further amendments? >> determined. ... >>

>> and cutting a lot of diplomatic relations and have not done that yet as much asme possible. >> suppose international organizations to make sure we stress the importance of diplomatic isolations and with the significant contrast someone that is a partner that abides by and respects the rule of law that cannot participate in the international organizations that north korea and then they should be a full part of the diplomaticni community so that country that is violating the sanctions possible so i

will withdraw these two amendments but it is important we continue this conversationon. > so to pass the meaningful piece of legislation in the banking committee so you are working very closely with us with your leadership of that committee to work constructively so is there a motion?. >> is there a second?.

>> all in favor? all those opposed? the legislation as amended is agreed to that completes the committee's business. so with that we are adjourned exactly at 1015 as we said. >> briefly i want to say thanks so for everybody who hass been a co-sponsor spending 10 billion per year that makes that much of it -- methodology more transparent and the opportunity to work together. o >> and people understand it

gives us the ability with the data too strongly support the vacancy that should be supported. >>. >> we now move to the end. >> the hearing itself will come to order. and to see through the business meeting as members of bothra sides of the aisle have raised questions of the authority with the use of nuclear weapons from terminating the agreements and as i have mentioned this is one in a series of hearings but today it is my

hope we will remain focused on the authority and the of the process of nuclear weapons. day progressed general research service tells us that foreign relations committee meeting since 1976 makingbi the decision to go to war was the most consequential of all the atomic energy act so with the use of nuclear weapons must me subject to political control. so toolhouse horror that authority on the the political leader has this authority. the nuclear arms race to put it during with the risk of

conflict so to deliver the of the united states we planned for the unthinkable of how to get our missiles in the air in those few minutes before the warheads could hit us and destroy our ability to respond and in that scenario having such forces and we are grateful. and the president has thehe sole authority. cut but didn't responding to a attack. i would not support changes and end of the realities of

the system to thank the distinguished witnesses and to hope that they could have a productive and a leading discussions so now i turn to the ranking member. >> aisle is the key for holding these hearings but it is a critical discussion in the united states senate with the american people. i am always amazed most of them deal with the local economic domestic issues you don't normally get foreign policy questions by getting

more and more questions can the president really have a nuclear attack? that question is asked more and more by the american people. and of course, fueled by comments made by president trump quoting the of president does not make any more threats to the united states that the world has never seen. and the president's comments have no choice but to totally destroy north korea. many interpret that to mean it is actively considering the use of nuclearl weapons to deal with the threat of

eritrea. -- northth korea. there are no checks on the president's authority. the system has set up to day with the sole and old authority toth use nuclear weapons. that was b developed because of the realities of the security of our country. the first was the particular threat of the cold war and for decades the united states faced a nuclear armed adversary in the soviet union to enlarge capable nuclear force. we have a strategy of destructionde to place distinctive commands and data related factor of the

law ofsi physics the icbm launch from russia to the united states would have a 30 minute flight time time to convene a special session in congress with consultations to infringe upon our ability to have a deterrence. said to have to identify and the nuclear force. no time for cabinet meetings for consultations with such a scenario based upon the needs with little or no time is the driving force behind the current command and control architecture.sy so nuclear weapons ever since their development is not like any other military record so under tremendous

point was made crystal clear that the white house was in charge of the atomic bomb. it was not a military weapon and controlled by the armed forces with a strategic control of elected officials. so the commander in chief with a weapon the president has that seoul and unchecked power you have got to and the steel and this is used to wipe p out women and children and not for military uses a half to treat this differently. nuclear weapons remain unique that is different than in the question of the cold war and given today's

challenges we need to revisit this a face single individual should have the sole and unchecked authority to launch a nuclear attack including as the first break. because thech vote attack is not a surprise but a conflict springing from escalating conflict from smaller nuclear forces such as north korea. with this circumstance and the united states does not face to use them or lose them with the profound decision so to tell my constituents who have a system in place with the impulsive and irrational decision i unfortunately today of a cord to hearing from our distinguished witnesses

as a former counsel senator biden is nice to have him back. >> the first witness today with the united states strategic command thanks for being back here today and for your service to our country the second witness of political science from duke university and also mr. mckeon acting undersecretary with the obama administration and thanks for coming back if you are familiar the year, five minutes we would appreciate that and any written materials without objection will be entered into the record if you could proceed.

>>. >> with the distinguished members of the committee. and with mike's colleagues to write command-and-control i applaud you for taking the time to understand that better. belongs represent the department of strategic command and the respective of four decades of militarynd service much of that was nuclear related with the most closely guarded secrets with some aspects of this

matter with the interest of time as this committee knows as we face more complex security problems nuclear weapons it doesn't look like there will be done anytime soon. and to modernize those forcese. to extend their positions and then makes it specific nuclear threats to include their threat of nuclear first use and china will deploy. in those regional allies with the capability north korea also has threatened

and long-range conventional weapons and those have the merged and they arrived at the doorstep quickly in nuclear weapons are important and the ince force was a forswore -- far smaller. in that remains crucial to the strategic stability there is is that old saying i have used many times with the adversary believes they cannot achieve theirl objectives the u.s. nuclear weapons with the primary purpose to strain the discrepancy of those actions

before they act with the need foro additional alice to acquire their own. the weather weapon can have that deterrence value of nuclear weapons with the abilitys to command and control of nuclear forces under all conditions with the credibility of the deterrent. u.s. nucleart forces operate under strict civilian control only the president of united states can order the deployment of nuclear weapons and to exercise that authority is insured by a people and capabilities to comprise that system is controlled by humanan beings. that system is designed to do very important things, first to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons with the unauthorizedse use or the accidental or inadvertent

use of them. and also to do so with a face of of a wide variety of including a nuclear attack. and the short notice massive attack w ended still exist that said looking at capability and it intends. and retain that capability to do so. and then not to deter that capability. and with an implementation by those forces themselves with those surrounding the nuclear weapons the

safeguard and it is important to remember the united states military does not blindly follow orders to deploy nuclear weapons must be the goal principles of distinction of proportionality just as they do to every other weapon. it was my job bin of the job of other senior leaders like a secretary of defense with combat commanders of those that were applied to nuclear orders have want to urge caution as you consider these matters for those conflicting signals before the confidence of the men and women of the nuclear forces i appreciate being here today and i look forward to your questions.

>> to the distinguished members of thesc committee thinks the opportunity to discuss this topic with nuclear command and control in the past to play a vital role to strengthen command-and-control and the time is another close look netted is complex to unintended consequences but at the heart of nuclear command and control the always never dull of a for that nuclear deterrence to work we must have a high insurance to always present day strike capability to our adversaries even the most dire scenarios however even with that definition is so

consequential it could trade your a battle we must also have a high insurance there never be an accident or unauthorized use. the challenge is those that are designed can compromise the negative side and to lower the echelons with strike planning to increase the risk that could be used in the unauthorized fashion in the fog of battle so debating that properit balance in the history of occasional discoveries on the other side of the ledger in the history of improvements some like the permissive action

without inserting the pin code with the congressional advocates these improvements they have helped to forestall disaster. this brings me to my second major point be willing to invest funds to keep technology update butted that nuclear command and control business hardware is trump by software and software is trump to buy what where part where refers to the technologies that software refers to the rules and procedures that govern how with issues to such as the code managementod system and what where is the human element of reliability of those enforcing the rules to those relations that the software and hardware

operated so with that moment to be in a position that shaped the president's decisionsci and that nuclear use order and deeply training and then to do what they are supposed to do more or less but this cannot be overemphasized it has been technically possible to build a nuclear command and control system to eliminate the human element altogether every generation has understood they would be foolhardy and the extreme the human element introduces h risks but also the opportunity to mitigate risks the best

reforms to nuclear command and control to maximize the opportunity to mitigate risks to maximize time for deliberation and assessment. and then to those times must not run afoul and i conclude with my fourth and final point the time is right for a fresh look changes in communications technology with rapidly evolving cyberthreats that were warned about five years ago that raise new doubts of the effectiveness that it review of nuclear command-and-control that

those that are worth considering of those certifications of those with those circumstances and they raise constitutional questions about usurping the president's authority because of those actual operations are exceedingly complex i would recommend a great caution before legislating any particular facts. to recommend diligence and perseverance and oversight to reassure our friends and enemies as it is intended. >> members of the committee thinks your invitation to be here today with his bid to be back mr. after spending so many years of my life working with this committee

norm pressed how quickly you muster the quorum after spending numerous hours waiting for the magic than the senator to show up. so i will address the three questions. first who has the authority to employ nuclear weapons? the president. with the constitution with an executive branch and some authority is delegated s to the secretary of defense then further delegated to combat commanders with the authority to use nuclear weapons is as it should be the republic given the gravity of the situation. it bears emphasis the president would not make this decision by himself it is designed to ensure the president himself with the national security council

and other senior civilian and military advisers ever expect that to e occur as that was contemplated. the authority to employ nuclear weapons is intertwined with who has the authority to take the country to war? article one of the constitution gives united states the opportunity to declare war and those to regulate those forces into the president article ii the constitutional structure in our history provides congress in this sphere it is not limited to those formal declarations but to authorize most use of military force to be sure that constitutional authority to preempt the imminent attack it does not give carte blanche to take theak country to war.

and then to take military action without prior authorization in ang manner the framers would not have recognized of the last we may not resolve the debate with those adversaries russia and china aneurin their possession is to have that conflict of any of those states with nuclear weapons use direct conflict would undoubtedly in the constitutional sense would require authorization by the congress so by the office of legal counsel supports this conclusion indicated the

analysis nifty used for military force is required with the nature scope and duration of conflict and that would be with those military engagement over a substantial period of time that it is hard to a imagine a scenario that they would not meet the test the rapid rand said north korea up missile program and the escalating rhetoric to the president and north korean leader are foremost in your mind to it in that context congress would need to authorize the war by the vice director of the joint staff we are admiral. he stated the ground invasion is required to locate and destroy all components of the north korea program given those penalties occurring in any conflict let alone duryea ground invasion the there

would not bee war in the constitutional sense. and then to suggest the possibility of a preventive for. that is from the pre-emptive strike is also requiring congressional authorization for crossover context what is the current policy of the use of nuclear weapons? i highlighted several elements with the presidential employment guidance issue that remains in place by the trump administration completing the posture review j. gary. most important the 2010 set forth the goal to reduce nuclear weapons and they nuclear strategy it is important to understand why nothing in the current guidance compels the use of

nuclear weapons and finally i would note the obama administration did not adopt formal policy of no first use but of the final months vice president biden gave a speech saying given the nuclear capabilities and the threats is hard to envision a scenario in which the first use is necessary. >> guest: don to say we could defend ourselves against non-nuclear threats by other means. thank you for the opportunity to be here look forward to yourre questions. >> i will reserve my time for interjections. >>. >> so i will preface my question with my a there's not a military solution with

any military option carrying unbelievable risk fast factors whether unconventional or the use of nuclear weapons i hope the president's trip to asia has produced the diplomatic surge to recognize china and the united states should be looking for the off ramp to the crisis and they have a lot in common. so i hope that is where we're heading because the use of any military option has extreme risks. it is not bin extreme hypothetical discussion about what concerns me is the president may be getting military options that could lead to the extreme number of casualties in japan and

the discussion if a nuclear first-rate it ended is not a hypothetical discussion. to beon impressed by your statement that says in addition in the of the goal principles with proportionality also apply to nuclear plants operations and decisions so how is the of president the believe restrain the federal on the nuclear first-rate? with those orders under command that must be proportional or there is a distinction that requires military necessity? is there any real restraint on the president for a

nuclear first strike in north korea?. >> senator i think there are. there are legal constraints when any military option is considered. there hasld ben a longstanding debate about nuclear weapons and legality and where they fit and all of that that things change and there has been a longstanding policy view that nuclear weapons are not inherently illegally used. but under what situation? what i can tell you is when i was involved as the commander of stratcom to preplanned the president has

a directive and more as time has passed leak involve the legal advisers. >> i am sorry to interrupt you but there is a discussion taking place the national security council level with military visors and the advice is under the guidelines that this is not appropriate for use of a nuclear first strike. t this action taken by those of pfizer's that says no we go with a nuclear attack?. >> other than to state the view of the legality of the move, the r president retains constitutional authority to order militaryar action.

the military, in the interesting constitutional situation because they are obligated to follow legal orders but is not obligated to follow a legal order. >> who makes that judgment under the dod?. >> that is what is on the plate to of the strategic command i believed that was on my plate but is very difficult. >> so if you believe this does not meet the legal test of proportionality even if ordered by the president of the united states to use a nuclear first-rate you believe because of legalities you retain that decision to disobey the commander in chief?. >> yes if there is the illegal order the military

is obligated to refuse. but what you describe is to that determination and i wouldti concede that would be a very difficult process and conversation but in that scenario your painting i would argue there is time for that kind of a deliberate conversation. >> part of these protocols have been established under section - - executive order requiring that proportionality others are that inherent responsibility ?. >> yes. >> you may very well be getting opinions from the

commander in chief they have to make your own independent judgment based on history and following legal orders. >> yes. >> in the event someone in your position received an order that you knew were not vettedou through the national security council and discussions have not taken place but you got a call out of the blue, things were tense and you receive the order do you consider that to be legal or not? beckon never felt i had to put them through the national security council i felt as a senior leader i had three obligations and one was to vicede military and vice, raise concerns that were the goal and

third, related to the legality of the order. i had legal of pfizer's myself fully expecting we would involve the secretary and chairman but where dod did that from there that is their issue but certainly it would have been in consultation with the secretary of defense. >> so to continue down the line of questioning some of the scenario under eminent attack the attack is imminent and then one more is pre-emptive. >> i did not mean to suggest that there is always time. >> saw with the president would i determine the threat

of imminent attack he has absoluteer authority. correct?. >> yes. the context matters its. >> is there any process to assess evidence at that moment?. >> i am a former commander, not a lawyer. so let me say to shed some light on this the context matters. and a range nuclear weapon used was possible or potential, u.s. policy helps clarify over the years what circumstances we could expect to use itir so in 2010 extreme circumstances of vital national interest but

as a commander that was in my mind as a context if we had tactical warning the attack was under way than we were into it playbook that wasbo feted for the of legal liability. >> we have somewhat defined imminent? if you see radar obviously. what if it is right before?. >> also strategic warning with solid warning that something will happen. >> it is not precisely define this certainly under consideration tactical carries withit it some time urgency either for the

survival of the decision maker or about what to do but strategic planning as more time is introduced into these scenarios going from the of most extreme back to the left. >> so now it is more strategic if you get the presidential order to launch you know, you haven't followed the process. in that case you believe it is the illegal order? iraqi believe that is your responsibility? it is a legal because we didn't go to the process. >> i would say i have a question about this and say

i am not ready to proceed. >> then what happens? [laughter] >> i don't know exactly fortunately these are all hypothetical scenarios. >> we're holding a hearing ons. this. >> this is the human factor in our system there is that human element and at that point as with any military it doesn't matter really the consequences are higher but it is the same principle it's been a terrorism lot of humanma intervention but it isn't evident to last of questions we have not gone to the process it is not

well thought out or proportional to have comfort even though the president has the authority there are limits. >> i believe that is true even if time is compressed there are circumstances i could envision i would have said the same thing. rate. stop. we need to resolve these issues are addressed this question and the process provides for that and that ultimately is an interaction of human beings but that decision presides. >> thinks for your service. >> the person who is it your position, it typically the

person put in your position is put there by the military? how does that work?. >> for read, secretary interviewed a number of candidates and decided on a candidate to recommend to the president there was a process that some level i became the president's nominee. >> so most people in this position that they have been through the defense mechanisms solely is not a political position but based on merit?. >> it is not a political position is based i believe based on experience and i would like to think merit as

well but certainly experience with a lot of factors going into selection that is a great question to pose both witnesses that have been elected senior commanders are was the beneficiary. >> from my vantage point from the chief of staff that process he describes is the process but they do look at the various candidates from the four-star even president of of the person interviewed most of those candidates that were recommended for selection.nd >> and typically a recent years the commanders of some of those combat commanders were typically four stars on there second or third assignment was not the first time four-star that was my second time.

>> thanks to the witnesses to be here today the first use of u.s. nuclear weapons would appear to be a clear declaration of war certainly the recipient of the attack would perceive it that way under the u.s. constitution only congress can declare war should congress require president to seek authorization for the first use of nuclear weapons mr. mckeon?. >> certainly if they were to initiate a war with another nuclear state we could see that in the constitutional sense congress should authorize but if we are under attack using nuclear weapons from a nuclear state

thepresident does have authority to respond but the hardest question is the in between question from senator johnson wears you define a minute on the continuum. it would be very specific but the most obvious case is the missile on the of launch pad with good intelligence they intend to name those that the united states that seems pretty clear case of an imminent fed you move down the continuingg where looks more like it is preventative. >> i would say distinguishing between scenariosen of the of military weeks of the president for

the president wakes up of military. but if the military says there is about to be an attack and the said a the presidentt has a very limited window to make a decision he alone would have the authority and i think we all believe they would carry of thete order that he gave the electorate doesn't the electric chose him to make that decision but if the president is waking up of military to say i am angry and i want something done done, and then setting he requires the cooperation of a lot of people asking the questions you have outlined what is the context? why? and the president alone could not effect the strike by require lots of people cooperating with him to make the strike happen and ask

the of questions that would slow down the process so the context matters greatly so the president has asked for authorization when he is initiating and that is what bush did in 2002 and if there was there that kind of context he would expect to go to congress for authorization of that style. >> her the you foot -- u.s. air force instruction but it is designed and by the single individual and then it does do not make sense and then to launch the first

break. such as the vice president. >> senator?. >> this is a hard case. but then to go to another constitutional officer i am not sure this is the wise course but it would be a rare case when the of that but to have that considerable time that would occur will be very? to reckon i do not disagree but

also the biggest school to implement major you to propose a. >> there are two different questions one is the current traditional authority and what the commander-in-chief is allowed to do in the other is of principle with the process in a procedure that insure that the unauthorized use that to

indicate though legal principles but also applying to nuclear plants in the operations there usually involved so with that decision stood to give you but to have that opportunity to respond. but the legal standard for a person to determine whether or not those principles are satisfied if is a standard no reasonable person concluded it was

proportional but if in fact, a military person decided not to move forward with these b orders based on principle for reasons that are grounded in the of legal principles of proportionality and necessity what does a military person who regards the order as a legal but

we're all part of the discernmediscernme nt trading of the military personnel to apply the of the goal. >> going through were few if it were end with those who will soon to comment:any of those elsewhere with of

course, herstory b-2 order could efface still resisted but to avoid that, to show her office zero and the distinction and not litigated very often really be familiar with these cases

because i am not a dod lawyer. of long to have of military service but the trio per

serrate sow with this before thed illegal foreign live here is a city i cannot describe that off the top of my head but nuclear decision making elijah highest level is a consultation process. there are senior people involved in the process whereby a exhortations was if there was a question and

those were the say you to be through of that i always assumed faith to the mr. chairman and said he

could order a nuclear weapons strike so to recognize is fictional major but we have been talking about the ways and reasons but to evaluate data were

comes back to new context of

an allegis is estate the with this issue of strategic

but the chain of command is being announced to carry that out but to move to the riverside the telephone there is a larger group of writers this is a real

genius is states in los sure if seed is a greater threat to to require but to take the mere possession of the estate to the to our allies rely on u.s. but the to have

that twitter in chief towi affect expeditious the heat in her chimu thin -- but

then to this his roots

unless destruction but that ambiguity is still useful andul operative in this set of threats and now face. >> senator i believe if he wants is our deterrence in melendez the adversary what

conditions for use a nuclear weapon. >> i agree ago further to say president obama and dauphin of nuclear weapons and move to us back with the 2010 posture review in to the every rating of this means you cannot threaten countries attacking us with a non-nuclear weapons but a close reading deciding what was left in place and that is from a president openly hostile aisle to nuclear weapons. >> yes. >> sova it is legal you have a right we interstate and what that means just you

going to a of village killing everybody that violates the law of armed conflict but there is some danger we cannot have a bunch of bunker lawyers activist to decide they will disobey any order they disagree with for the allegiance could be on of control and ultimately we have elections and one of the things voters think about whether or not they want to entrust them with the capability. >> we have to be careful we don't want them to feel with

their ability too make decisions that if they are acting against us are taken away. >> thinks for having this. >> but a few are important to national security natalie to detour and defend kelso to start a nuclear war. weapons are a deterrent with the acts of oppression and in the first youth but no

human being should have the power to unleash the most destructive forces ever in without provocation but this system insurers the president does not have sole power tola make but even the

chief of staff and his bed any restriction of president without congressional authorization. fleurs and twos and and her, but mr. mccain, is the president is there a

protocol changes if he put the president would have the authority to defend the country and there is no distinction between his authority to use conventional or nuclear weapons. >> is there a formal process anybody of the chain of command from secretary of defense down is initiating the launch sequence that day object or. >> those officers in the

chin in hand period but that was under the threat of military justice of this run news said in a year with an inch but what was made by the president use

nuclear-weapons cuts the be small tactical but they hit the system but that is what most are concerned about the question of of president actually using their own behalf but the rise and that

sycophant place of diplomacy

to the present their aura and the to oversee the diplomatic commanders in recent years this committee started a pull to get some of the of one who raises the hint when but the current administration tried to fullback i was engaged within the effort but to go

against other non state terrorist in died he this is a new way to my but the question is is the legality starts with a constitution. you take those not to do but if thetu order violated that would assume that is incorporated but what is

your thoughts of the interval protocols? if you use one that violated in turn go private schools but the differenceee between the lawful and the unlawful order. >> excuse me. the issue of legalities issue but in an order for our military to follow the orders of the civilian leaders said those orders

but the of his the way that works best second many indeed is issues are in military decision making, i always had a legal adviser by my side -- aside they have legal of pfizer's of by their side the secretary of defense have part of a conference about so they may

not be at the tips of every commanderd beded is discussed in the profession. i was never concerned there were that have the appropriate legal adviser p and those that come through with chain of commission in our legal this simultaneously with the legal of pfizer's.

but as senator rubio pointed out that does not mean every ordert that comes down is an opportunity to discuss and debate. there is a perception those orders are legal. when there is the extraordinary order to launch nuclearwh weapons that wouldex require attention it with galvanized attention. made you want to have the lawyers back to talk about the legal authorities now with a conflict on the crimean peninsula we're still in harvest -- armed hostilities from the first korean war all that provide a legal basis i am not a lawyer to adjudicate the name sure they are looking.

>> one more thing that if i was not get a legal and what i was asking for it. my obligation and responsibility from strategic command was to clear up any of those concerns on behalf of the operating forces they are not in a position to make a legal determination with an order given to them. i spent time that missile launch control center to try had no way to know whether the target i was told to strike was legal or not of is relying on people above me to carry that out and my view that was my responsibility. >> which are last admonition to the american was a

suggestion. [laughter] there were many questions of the legal authority for u.s. militaryni action on north korea with regards to nuclear weapons and of the president goes to congress to get new authorization for hostilities iso possible what is that legal basis that is existingng that authorized the first korean war that is not over bin the ceasefire. >> i could just comment briefly the four-star generals i can recall a

circumstance where combat commander sees a scenario he saw he would get an order wondering if that would be legal and started to ask questions one month advance from the office of general counsel. obviously it is a human system andn can break down but people don't get to be four-star generals of less they are strong individuals. >> thinks to all period you for your thoughtful analysis i do want to stay for the record every single word will be analyzed in p'yongyang there will look carefully at how we view this and for those doing the analysis i want to

underscore that our discussion here today is not as practical as it is academic with a first branch congress the constitution was written in the day when things are much different movie much slower. every time the president used force backed by the american people and congress. i want to make sure they understand talk about standard stand proportionality is not a discussion that will take place these decisions have to be made in moments not by

employers ors. congress but the commander in chief of the american forces and he will do that but nonetheless he will make that decision and peon game needs to understand they're dealing with the person who is commander-in-chief right now who is very focused on defending this country and he will do what is necessary lest anybody be confused with the scores of hours of the power of congress, from a very practical standpoint the president of the united states will make his decisionte and make it quickly

if he has to. i want everyone to read understand how this works where lawyers will get involved arguing about proportionality, unfortunate ly we live in the world that is flush lull of realistic decisions that have to be made and they will beti made. >> that is the reason we have the hearing. >> i've a few minutes left i agree and we should but the problem is there are legitimate disputes over the t power of the of president with the sort of thing so these are p pragmatic decisions that have to be made and they will not be clouded by arguments of an

army of lawyers on each side you can argue that is writer ron but those of the facts. >> and think that is correct title page there is any question. . . years, with it as i ran view act, or the russian sanction bills that we just passed. through the years, there's no question that there is a tremendous tilt to the executive branch and certainly still is and will always as related to work, there's no question. but that is the purpose of the hearing and i think it has been a good one to think more fully about what happens during these periods of time. senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. doctor, i believe that you said

something to the effect that indicates we have time to consider in response, corporation may strategic commanders is required to execute an order. is that more or less accurate? >> does that essentially sustain the vision that there has to be a person between the president and the nuclear briefcase? incorporates in order for that briefcase to be utilized? >> i cannot speak in open session about the particularities but i will say that the system is not a button that the president can accidentally lean against on the desk and immediately cause missiles to fly. as some people in the public i think are fear it would be. it requires the president to work with military aid to attending him and have possession of the materials that he needs and it requires personnel at all levels of command of the redoubts of the

missile silo to carry out an order.the president by himself cannot press a button and cause missiles to fly. he can only give an authenticated order. which others would follow and then cause missiles to fly. >> in the context, you put the condition when you have the time to consider a response. so when you do not have the time to consider a response there has been a lot of conversation here today about reacting on the short order of an assault. is it still the case that you have to have the corporation of strategic commanders to execute an order? >> yes. but in the settings, that is where the military is waking up the president. because they are the ones who had been monitoring the intelligence picture. they are the ones getting the warning that a missile launch against the united states is about to happen and so they are already incorporating buying waking up the president,

advising him or her of the situation and presenting them the range of options. i would code that is cooperating with the president in order to give the president the options of making a decision. >> those are the types of scenarios that really give people nightmares. in the have been overdone since of scenarios of false alarms where there were folks on both sides, russian and american sent have been extremely worried that a major attack was underway. i would like to enter into the record, an article that details more than dozen such events. there is the famous moonrise incident in 1960, a training video in the next 79, in case when transport response a nuclear research being watched by the norwegians. it is those cases that give people great worry. part of the point of a nuclear triad this has not been

mentioned today so want to make sure it is mentioned. part of the point was to have forces that could survive an initial attack, submarines and bombers that carry weapons. so that we did not have to make a decision within a couple of minutes. he had a short retaliation with at least two letters of the triad that were more survival. can i just get a response as to whether that is a reasonable analysis? >> i think it is tender.it is precisely why no previous strategic leader decided to put in place an automated response. he always wanted a human in the loop and in the case that you mentioned, and others, it was a human assessment that concluded this was not real. we have time to wait. and that is why i would support and advocate for anything that can be done to extend that time. whether through better missile

defense, more hardened communications technologies, so more people can be brought in time updating other aspects of the command-and-control system. so that there's time for the human element to make the assessments necessary to reach the right decision.there are too many close calls over the course of the cold war. but they were avoided in the end by wise human decision. >> in some cases, yes. i will not go into details. in the 2010 nuclear posture review, is it not the position of the united states that we essentially us and we were not using nuclear first strike against a non-appropriation treaty participant who does not have nuclear forces? >> i written in the new york times about this. this is how it was covered in the media but when you read it closely, i believe it still leaves little room in particular because it says, those countries in compliance with their nonproliferation

treaty obligations and it leaves opaque, who determines whether they are in compliance. i inferred from that that it was the white house would determine whether they were in compliance. which is a loophole that gives the president the strategic ambiguity that he might wish for deterrence purposes. >> part of the reason for the discussion over no first use is because it creates more companies among other nations that are nuclear arms. not to perceive a false attack by the united states as occurred in the case in 1995 in which yeltsin activated the nuclear briefcase. do you see any value or any value in strengthening the perception that the us by policy would not utilize nuclear weapons in a first strike? >> i do see some value from such insurance but i also see

some cost. i think that is why every previous administration, including president obama who might have been expected to adapt in no first use policy, chose not to at the end adapt a blanket no first use policy. i doubt that this administration would either. president obama couldn't be convinced that it was worth the risks, i doubt that president trump would be. >> there's a lot of conversation at the pros and cons of that but that i am out of time. >> thank you. >> thank you for being here today. doctor, in your written testimony said that even a single nuclear detonation would be so consequential and can trigger an escalatory spiral that would leave the civilization threatening outcomes. can i just ask everyone on the panel agrees with that? >> i would agree with it in principle i think.

one of the, one of the deterrence features of course that has been with nuclear weapons since the beginning, is the high-risk that any nuclear use will not be controlled. or could not be controlled. >> absolutely. and that is what helps contribute to the deterrent factor. >> it does. but we have emplacements to try and control it if deterrence ever fails. x mr. mccann do you agree with that? >> i agree. >> i think it is that statement that is so concerning and certainly gives me pause and others pause and i think it's one of the reasons for the hearing. we have an administration where the national security advisor has suggested that we can have a preventative war on the korean peninsula when the president has said that he has asked our military leadership

to come up with plans to address the north korean regime. it suggests that we are talking about is a nuclear war, a first strike. and certainly, the potential for that to escalate as everyone has suggested, is very difficult to even contemplate. and i think one of the challenges is that we are dealing with a president as the senator cardin has said that has not seen or has not seem to be willing to accept advice on an issue, many issues affecting power. while i agree with the sinners comment that they know states

is threatened, love the president to act, what the president to act in a way that acknowledges input from a lot of experts. and not to act based on a twitter post and the anxiety that that produces, i think contribute to the concern about whether we are in a situation where we need to look at in congress, a first nuclear strike policy in banning that. >> so, you talked about the importance of calculated ambiguity. senator rubio raised that. and the importance of that and enhancing deterrence and making war less likely. can you imagine a policy that would both limit the presidents authority to use nuclear weapons and at the same time, not weaken the deterrence value of our nuclear arsenal?

>> thinking about this hearing, sender we struggle to come up with constructs that make sense and it is hard to develop a principal way to constrain the commander-in-chief power within the executive branch is this an earlier time i think our cases make bad law and i think if we were to change the decision-making process in some ways because of a distrust of this president, i think it would be an unfortunate precedent for a future president msa that some who worked in this chamber for 20 years. i feel strongly about congressional powers and in this sphere. >> doctor. >> i think there are proposals that are floating out there that are worth looking at. there is a group of academics like myself who study this issue and we have been kicking around various proposals that would limit the scenarios so it

would not set aside the reprisal, the launch of your tax scenarios and then just where there's plenty of time then specifying various protocols for authenticating in order for validating that the orders legal and things like that. each of these proposals raises important questions about article 2. answer they would have to be closely vetted. i think they're proposals like that that can be examined and might improve. however, there are some things that unambiguously would help. that is, modernizing the technology in the command and control system which is overdue in some areas for upgrade. these are very expensive but precisely before the reason that you sent center that an accident of an unauthorized use would be so catastrophic it is in investment worth making. >> general. >> we talked about a lot of potential scenarios this

morning. my view on this is, it is not possible to envision all of the scenarios in advance. we try to come up with ways to place limits on various scenarios, my concern would be that we are creating some detriment to the oral deterrent as unfortunate as it is, the big paradox of the nuclear age is still here. i said that in iran testimony. in order to prevent the use, which is the objective care. we have to be prepared to use them. and for us to propose all the scenarios under which we would want to somehow limit the power of the commander-in-chief, i would just urge you to be very cautious here fro the reasons that were raised today. it has implications for the deterrent it has implications for extended deterrent and it has implications if these just remain unresolved issues, it

has implications for our own military men and women. and the confidence and trust that they place in the chain of command. so certainly, i believe we always get better by having these conversations and debating and doing all the things that we've done throughout the cold war and beyond. i would urge you to be cautious about suggesting changes to this particular system. again, my perspective from my view was that the process accounts for the kind of scenarios that we have been talking about today. certainly accounts for tactical warning that attack is underway and we have preplanned options and the vetting has been done. it accounts for the potential for using before -- >> i certainly hear the caution

you are giving us. but doesn't it also suggest that it is important for the commander-in-chief to also be cautious in how he talks about this issue. so there's not a miscalculation on the part of our aggressors who would do us harm about what the real intent here is. >> fully agree with you on that senator. the statements the president makes to his twitter account, no doubt cause concern and confusion on the other side of this. they do not have satellites to see where we are moving our forces. he says in our mind is coming, obviously it has to give them some pause. he says on the twitter account of the matter, we have

leadership of the national command authority. secretary and the chairman. they will take care of it. it doesn't compute in conjunctions mind and with the president says doesn't matter. so i would be very worried about a miscalculation based on continuing use of the twitter account regard to north korea as i understand you are.>> thank you, mr. chairman. >> let me understand, from my perspective of a great hearing from a very balanced and informative, 41 years of not having a hearing on this topic. i understand all of those including crs that somewhat encouraged us to do so. if in fact i may feel that you did. i think that mr. mccann and the general basically, you're saying you don't see legislative changes that ought to be made at this time. i think that is where you both

are and doctor, think what you are saying was really not legislative changes as it relates to the power that the commander-in-chief has. you are talking to other types of more pragmatic changes as it relates to just the decision tree, is that correct? after the command has been given? >> be wary of legislative fixes because there second and third order effects are hard to anticipate.and the history of the nuclear command and control system is discovering that changes that had been made and well-intentioned at one level producing an unexpected result and another aspect. so do wary of legislative fixes but it doesn't mean i wouldn't review them. i think there could proposals out there. part of the value is reassuring the american public that they have a nuclear arsenal that is well-maintained and well guarded against unauthorized

use. i think the senders are channeling some concerns that the public has about this and reviewing and then decided not to make a change legislative fix would go some distance reassuring the public. >> there's another component but go ahead. >> i am wary of the legislative change on the decision-making process. but the larger conversation we have had in this hearing about the war power, really falls on you and your colleagues here in this body that continue to step forward and make the case for the constitutional imperative. in both the gulf war in 1990, 91 and the iraq war in 2002. the executive branch is rather -- in acceding to a congressional vote and authorization. george h. w. bush you do before and after said something disparaging about some old goat and congress going to war against iraq. the institutional instinct the

-- we can do this under article 2. you will need as a political body, to continue to serve your rights and make the case that we discussed. >> thank you. >> i agree with the point that have been made. i would not recommend any legislative changes at this point as well. but i would recommend some things that i know are being openly talked about. by my colleagues were still wearing uniforms. one of those is, we can always do a better job i think in training our people involved in the processes in terms of the, where the safeguards are. the fact that the point of trying to make this morning about raising the legality issue is to remind everyone that the military does not blindly follow orders. that is true with nuclear orders as well. i think that should be a reassuring piece for the american public and it ought to be reassuring to our allies and our adversaries as well.

the final thing i would do is, it is time to invest. none of this committee does not have jurisdiction but it is time to invest in nuclear command and control and communications system that has been, it has suffered from a lack of investment for too long. i think it is very important that congress be on board to modernize that system as a high priority as well as the forces. ... >>

>> woodall preview agree that continued to honor the nuclear arsenal is something that insurers that what is necessary to have that capability to deliver?. >> people should be in favor of those measures with greater safety and security. >> i would use the word recapitalization with the of platforms of the triad those are ag now simultaneously and there's no plans in place to replace those of the decade that would be an expensive proposition with that decision is made in those investments will need

to be made. and the guidance systems that have been an existence but not more sophisticated they of the tubes on the black-and-white television. we need to continue to invest using the proper technologies. other countries are the need to modernize. so to talk about the imminent attack on the united states of the president having the authority to attack and that should be the case with the

late president launching a pre-emptive against day other country but that is concerning so given with general mcmaster said about the potential so with those plans in place right now in the white house given to the president to launch a pre-emptive launch against north korea with american nuclear weapons without consulting or informing congress whatsoever. this is in clear violation of united states shouldn't -- of the united states constitution and to ensure

that congress asserts its authority to ensure that the nuclear war has not been begun in the name -- of the name of the united states by this president or any president this is a legitimate constitutional prerogative. i don't think we should be trusting the generals and with this protecting so those resisting those illegals is the decision making process.

it does offer real resistance that is just the reality of it have to declare a nuclear war with those assertions made by the national security adviser that if there is a pre-emptive nuclear war to have that constitutional responsibility with the ambiguity with president after president would defer to our authority.

i am glad you are kicking this soft but and i think the assurances i have received today will be satisfying to the american people. i think they can realize that donald trump can launch nuclear codes as easily as he can use the twitter account without the checks and balances of the united states congress without that constitutional exercise. this is a historic hearing and i hope there's more to follow. >> thanks to each of you for being here for i cannot imagine having a more balanced federal we think you for your service it with

those of follow-up questions and have those submitted by the close of business on thursday and a user those probably we would appreciate it for a you have contributed greatly to the national debate and the dialogue today and we thank you very much. the meeting is adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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