we wrap up at 11:00 p.m. with bloomberg news senior editor who reports a college fraternity culture. that happens tonight book tv. >> good evening. we have another wonderful full house. vice president for public programs and it's always a thrill to welcome you to our auditorium. i was like to ask how many people are members? have my glasses on. so if you could just shout. no. i saw blurry hands. it looks like a list everyone as a member. thank you. we are thrilled to have you

here. if you're not a member pick up a brochure to see the wonderful exhibitions and programs we have coming up. . . a brochure but tonight's program is part of the distinguished speaker series which is the heart of our public program so thanks for all love the support. [applause] [applause] your product right away but he has done so much for us and we are so thrilled. i would also like to recognize and thank our executive committee chair, rick and trustees very, susan, glen, joel, and david and all her

germans counsel with us this evening for all their wonderful support as well. let's giveel them a big hand alo cut back program tonight will last an hour, include a q&a session and you should have received a card with a pencil and if not, our staff members will be coming up and down the aisle to do a card to write your question on it later on in the program they were collected and our speaker, michael will be happy to answer them. his book aloneto will be in our museum store in he will be signing the book in our museum store as well so please join michael after the program for a book signing. we are thrilled to welcome micah back to the new york historical society. he is editor in chief emeritus of simon & schuster and began

his career as an assistant editor over nearly five decades he hashe worked with a wide rane of authors including presidents carter, reagan, nixon, charles de gaulle, henry kissinger, david mccullough, tennessee williams and last but not least, among the many, laurence olivier. which he could do a full program on laurence olivier. he is the author of several books including his latest turtle, dunkirk, defeat into victory which is why we're all here tonight. before i begin i would like to ask if you have a cell phone or electronic paper, device, please turn it off and now, please join me in welcoming the wonderful, michael. [applause]

>> good evening. i want to make sure that i am not the one whose cell phone rings. [laughter] i am so used to speaking here when it proceeded to fill that i find myself constantly looking

up at the screen expecting that something will happen there but nothing is. why dunkirk now i'm sure you are wondering, as i do. i saw christopher nolan's stunning film, dunkirk, at three in the afternoon on a weekday in new york, a small town between [inaudible] expecting the theater to be empty. instead it was packed and in fact, i was lucky to have arrived earlier than i intended. other by the time the picture started every seat was taken right down to the front row. there iss not a sound during the audience during the picture, no popcorn crackling or coughing and no one got up to go to the bathroom and the audience was totally absorbed. but it ended, to my

astonishment, the whole audience rose to their feet to applaud, many with tears streaming down their face. over a british military calamity that place in 1940. in redhook, i said to myself, why? a small part of me also asked silently where the hell were you when we needed you in may 1940. but that is unfair. there hardly anyone in the audience except for myself had been alive in may 1940 and they would be foolish even churlish to blame america for not entering the war until japan bombed pearl harbor in december 1941, nearly a year and half later, forcing america into a war it was trying to avoid.

who, given a chance to stay out of that war would not have taken it? the british had not been eager to come to the defense of poland in september 1939, still left the front. after all it was only 40 years defeated germany and what was until 1939 so-called the great war. with casualties that today soar beyond our imagination, over 750,000 british were dead, 60000 british casualties on the first day of the first battle of the song in 1915. over 1,350,004 dead in front and

a war that cost a worldwide total of over 41 million lives and all of them apparently dead for nothing, zero, except the need to repeat the whole blood he thing a generation later. with more powerful weapons and facing an unapologetically fierce ideology that glorified war in germany. more sobering still it had taken the combined effort of france, the united kingdom, russia, the united states, belgium, italy and japan feet germany last time around in 1914 and 1918. even then by only the very thinnest of margins. nobody in france or the united kingdom could imaginene that the germans would be defeated by france and britain alone.

nor could anyone have imagined the chain of catastrophic evente that would drive the british expeditionary force over a quarter of a million men back to a strip of beach 12 miles long it only a few hundred yards wide. how? why did this happen is the subject of my book alone. from may 10th 1940 through june 10, 1940 just over three weeks hitler won the great victory he had dreamed of against france and lost the war. the phony war, phony between quotes for everyone between the poles and to a lesser degree the danes and the norwegians had dragged on from september 3rd

1939 to may 10th 1940 and lolling of britain france and even germany's allies italy, still the neutral, into the belief that the war right settled by negotiation and by old fashion diplomacy or even by a coup against hitler on the part of the german army or german conservative politicians. rather than fought out to the bitter end as it had been in 1914, 1918. the chief problem of allies was boredom. nearly half a million men of the british expeditionary force, including a substantial contingent of the royal air force, sat idle and crumbling in france. while over 3 million frenchmen sat in a mood of sullen resignation guarding the french

frontier, almost one third of them in or behind the world-famous maginot line which had been built in the 1930s at a cost of nearly 3 billion umfrench frank, an enormous sum for the day. the british expeditionary forces or as it was called and still is, the pes represented the bulk of britain's regulars and the irreplaceable soldiers who were needed to provide the backbones of constricted army as it was performed out and very slowly indeed as the french constitute complained and the french were overwhelmingly afraid as every able-bodied person was obliged to perform his military service for two years in your, followed by an annual period of training.

it was intended to produce a vast army big enough to defeat or better yet german aggression. keeping a large army immobilized for eight months is never a good idea and a defensive strategy easily general degenerated [inaudible]. as napoleon pointed out, the logical artman of a defense strategy is defeat. a large army composed of civilians in uniform all eager to get home is particularly prone to lose whatever edge possessed. this unfortunately is what happened to the army in the spring94 of 1940. the french army devoted it's time to making it itself as comfortable as possible and the

british army devoted itself to spit and polish with occasional entertainment proffered by the british equivalent of what would become in the united states the uso and occasional visits from members of the royal family and politicians. neither army was well-equipped for modern warfare. the french contrary to president the assumptions had more and better tanks than the germans but they were relegated to infantry support, even though the relatively unknown lieutenant colonel charles de gaulle had published a controversial book in 1934 that advocated for tactics that the germans would use to defeat poland in france, the blitzkrieg. de gaulle's book sold less than 1000 copies in france but so

many, many times that number in germany where it was read aloud and became the bible of the officers would command the german army forces. as for antitank weapons rinses venerable 75 millimole in your field guns had been adopted in pt1897 with its flat trajectory and potential for rapid fire was more than capable of destroying any take the german army possessed one fired over open sites. but little thought had been given to using it in that role. although the french army had more than 4500 of the beloved [inaudible] they were used for conventional infantry support instead. the rapid driven success against

france is usually attributed to superior mechanization but this is a misleading picture. german artillery was first drawn in 1914 at it on. 1940 as a have been in 1914 and in advance on his feet, not in trucks. complete commanders road ahead of their men on a horse and it was over half a million horses in the german army in 1940. whatad the german army had hower was a strategy for using their tanks. the ubiquitous dive bomber and for the use of radios to coordinate combined air, armor and infantry attacks. blitzkrieg was a state of mind intended to prevent repetition of the static warfare on the western front in the first world war. the allies were further hampered

as they had been in 1914 by their determination to respect the neutrality of belgium unless or until the german violated them. by the commitment of the french army to its elaborate system of defense and as weeks turned into months it began to seem too many that hitler would never attack and of course, it became the aim of french and british policy not to provoke it into attacking the, the royal air force limited to dropping propaganda over germany rather than pumps. when it was suggested to the british secretary of state for air sir howard kingsley would that the royal air force should bomb the black forest which was then thought to contain ammunition dumps he replied indignantly in the negative saying why that is private

property and the next thing you will be asking me is to bomb [inaudible]. so much for the aggressive mood in britain. on may 10 all that came to an brabrupt end, a debate on the house of commons on may 9 over the conduct of the campaign in norway led to the unexpected resignation of prime minister neville chamberlain on may 9. in circumstances of extraordinary prominent content, and tension into the even more remarkable political intrigue that brought winston churchill to power as minister instead of lord halifax chamberlain and most of the conservative party tand the king would have preferred to the so-called rogue elephant as churchill's privatel secretary clinton called him.

it has been marked by tremendous up and down and he was widely disgusted by his own party and by the royal family. he had been stubbornly wrong about the whole range of things including, but i not limited to, independence for india, finance, the gold standard, the strength to the french army and the merits of former king edward the eighth to wallis simpson. but from 1933 on he was right about the one and only thing that mattered, adolph hitler. churchill had been against appeasing hitler. he had been in favor of rearming

britain and constantly pointed out the dangers of nazi germany and the fact of germy rearmament with few people, in and out of the government, believed or wanted to hear. his had been the only voice of alarm, crying out alone in the wilderness and now he had been too bright. everything he had foretold with such eloquence had come to pass. poor people, poor people, he remarked as he returned from buckingham palace after having accepted the shield of office from. they trusted me and i can give them nothing but disaster for quite a long time. he left the guard to stump up the steps of the admiral where he was still living in tears. in fact, he would give them only 24 days later the most

astonishing of good news that the british force cut off and surrounded by the germans, by the rapid collapse of the netherlands, the sudden surrender of belgium and the retreat of the french army on its right had fought its way to dunkirk, the only channel remaining that the germans had not yet captured and from there had been ferried back to britain by 1100 ships of all kinds ranging from light foot vote and motor yacht captain by their own owners destroyers and pressure steamers and an astonishing grand total of 336,266 men. enough to serve the core of the british regular army and ensure

their presence behind the pages of southern england if the germans ever attempted to invade. wars are not won by evacuations, churchill warned the british people. but, in fact, this one was. hitler with the british army within his grasp had delayed the final attack on dunkirk by two days and allow the enemy to escape. it was his first and biggest mistake of for and they snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in abraham lincoln's famous words of art general mcclellan's failure to pursue the army after antietam. in the same speech, as the british soldiers evacuated from dunkirk for being returned to their regiments to baby clothes and we armed, churchill added

the words which were to find a moment for all time even though large tracts of europe and many old and famous states have fallen into the grip of the gestapo and all the odious apparatus of a nasty rule we shall not flag or fail. we shall go on to the end. we shall fight in france. we shall fight on the seas and oceans. we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air. we shall defend our island whatever the cost may be. we shall fight on the beaches. shall fight on the landing grounds. we shall fight in the field and in the streets. we shall fight in the hills. we shall never surrender. even if, which i do not for a moment believe, this island or large part of it was subjugated

and starting and our empire beyond the seas armed and guarded by a the british fleet would carry on the struggle on till god's good time the new world with all its power and might step forth to the rescue and liberation of the old. after he finished that broadcast the prime minister, once he was assured the transmitter had been turned off, turned to his aid and said and when they reach the beach we shall ship them over their heads with beer bottles because i don't know what ever we have to fight with. [laughter] the french had given a weary shrug to the news of the process for the evacuation of the bes.

their attitude was that [inaudible] which remarked that the moment the british general based scaffold in france the first thing he thought of was too quick route to the quickest channel but the british by contrast experienced an astonishing and sharper rise in morale. that was increased by the bustling energy of the new prime minister who not only warned of the battles ahead but they looked forward to them. unlike chamberlain's spirit was one of resignation churchill not only had an over flowing of demands and suggestions to meet thee new threat aggressively by land, by sea, by air but wider and more far-reaching strategic

goals. his spend their son, randolph, home on leave as an officer and recorded a brief conversation with his father about how he intended to fight the war. in randolph's words, i went up to my father's bedroom to standing in front of it was shaving and old-fashioned razor and he had a beard and as usual he was hacking away. sit down with your boy and read the papers probably finish dressing he told me. i did as i was told. after two or three minutes he half turned to me and said i think i see my way through and he resumed shaving. i was astounded and said to you

mean that we could avoid defeat which seemed incredible to me or beat the masters which he seemed incredible. he slung his razor into the basin and swung around and said intently of course i mean we can beat them. i said i'm all for it and i don'tdo see how you can do it. by this time he had dry his face and turned around he said to meet with great intensity we will fight on and i shall drag the united states in. [laughter] that was a year and a half away and seemed an even more remote possibility until the japanese bombed pearl harbor and brought

about the one thing that could ensure an allied victory. the conversation with randolph captured the intensity and grasp of what was needed. the british would have to hang on some. persistently, bombed, their army unable to defeat the germans in north africa or greece, depending on grits in the air force and the royal navy until such a time as history aided by careful diplomacy and bite churchill's handling of about finallye brought the united states into the war. from september 1939, to decembel who courted roosevelt. after pearl harbor was the

president who simply dominated the relationship and an expert to soothe the prime minister's ruffled feathers over many differences strategy and for aids. despite churchill's comment after pearl harbor that until then he had with the united states and i quote now that she is in the harem we shall talk to her quite differently. [laughter] churchill's persona is very much at the center of this walk and there is much that we can learn from it. he said famously and it is better to job, jaw, jaw then to war, war, war. and that part of his nature of strategy and his thinking is seldom remembered.

his wise advice to pursue negotiation of diplomacy so long as there's still hope remains true today. he also said speaking to the schoolboys at his old school whichol he lived as a child nevr given, never give and and never, never, never in nothing great or small, large or petty never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense and never yield to force. in the balance between these two wise statements buys the whole art of statesmanship and of character and of governing which saved britain in 1940 when she was alone and still marked our

leadership at home and abroad today. the month of may 1940 across many illusions but it was a huge turning point for france defeated, the british army was rescued and winston churchill assumed power exerting his full authority in his gigantic personality over at the british war effort and making it clear as he put it in the house of commons on june 18, 1940 that hitler would have to rake us in the island or lose the war. it wasy the fact that is not lot on hitler or on fdr and which gave the british now that they were alone and last a curious and surreal kind of confidence best expressed by george the

sixth in a letter to his mother. mary the day france surrendered. personally, he wrote i feel happier now that we have no allies at all to temper. he spoke for the whole nation and perhaps thinking of brexit he still does. thank you. [applause] i have to read these questions.

more important i have to answer them. [laughter] what is your favorite emotion -- that is of course, it's a question i had not expected and is difficult so the court has made many movies and my uncle alexander made his first movie when he was 21 years old and never stopped making movies of war until his death in the age of 62 and 96. i think there are many movies and there's a big difference between the movies that might uncle produced and those who produced and directed and an even bigger and more important group of movies which had the country up all the three brothers that is to say they were produced by my uncle alex,

my uncle dalton worked on them and my father did the are directing so there is a smaller slice of pie than the whole pie and i like to think of the movies on which all three brothers worked as the ones out of which i would pick my favorite. having said that, and allowing for my fondness for the work, the third man, produced by my uncle alex and father is our director for my uncle dalton had nothing to do with that at all that i am enormously admiring things to come in which all the brothers were involved and which is an amazing futuristic film and an enormous range of extraordinary performance by great actors. i am always delighted to see the private [inaudible] which dates

from 1933, the year in which was born because all three brothers workeded on that, as well as my aunt and i feel that is particularly familiar picture. if ipi had to pick the all-time movie of theirs which i would most like to see again i thinkth it would probably be [inaudible] whfor which my father won an osr in 1940 or jungle book which directed by my uncle and produced by my uncle alex and are directed by my father. having said which i do not spend a lot of my time doing the films of my family because that seems a strange thing to do but every once in a while i will pull out

onend and genuinely speaking i'm astonished by how much i liked them and particularly by a sense of humor that runs through scripts because my uncle alex had a wicked sense of humor and i like to see that reflected and by my uncle dalton's shrewd use of camera by the films that he made a loan, the four feathers, drums, sahara, most important of all [inaudible] which gave [inaudible] his first role in films. so i can't see them, any of those films, without, in some

way, seeing something of the three brothers elected and often something of other members from our family. what do i think was the most significant battle of world war ii? well, i suppose the logical answer to that is stalingrad and possibly a combination of stalingrad and the battle of the [inaudible] in 1943 which is the largest land battle in the largest tank battle in the history o of the second world w. in those two battles it became clear that germany was going to lose the war.

on the other hand if you think the most significant lowest point of the second world war was june 25th, 1944 when eisenhower made his final decision that the invasion would take place despite the weather on june 6. i think that that remains to be the most courageous decision of the war and the one that came the nearest to failure and had rommel not gone home for his wife's birthday and had he been president near the beach in normandy and had hitler been willing to release to him for german panzer divisions that were being kept in reserve the invasion might have been stopped

on june 6, 1944 in the world war would've taken on a very different path and would have gone for much longer. i would have to say that while my reason tells me that the most important battle was stalingrad my heart tells me that the most important battle was the invasion in 1944. what affected churchill's scholarship and eloquence have on his leadership? well, i think that eloquence and scholarship have an enormous effect on every able politician, in every culture and language. [applause] the ability to synthesize and sum up what we ourselves feel

and to tell us, frankly, what we are facing in going to face is what we want from any major, political figure and certain political figures have always managed to deliver on that. fdr is certainly one of them. i have always thought that bill clinton's ability to give a good and sensible and smart speech is almost arrival among living american presidents and these qualities have been lacking in british leadership and may be lacking in american leadership but i think they are important. scholarship is also important because frankly, to repeat and true cliché those who do not

study the past and learn from it are condemned l to repeat it. we know that and yet stubbornly and strangely america produces one president after another who is unable to look backwards and understand what happened at all. those who think that life might be better in the middle east had somebody read t lawrence was done before plunging in for further would probably feel with me that it helps the president at least knows what happened previously sense some possibility that he might not repeat it. but not much. don't you think the producer of the current films, dunkirk, was

remiss in not providing more historical context, i.e. referring to the germans as the enemy, "leading to inside a natural function of my own age which is that [-left-square-bracke[-left-squas in this army and i attended a full-scale briefing on nato maneuvers that was given by the then commanding general of the british army whose name i have forgotten but probably will come back to me and they pulled out the winter and he was demonstrating what our site do and what their site do and how we react to what we would do and

i to say that he six. in his view of what this maneuver would demonstrate and wwhat it would be like and in n effort to place but whenever he passed his pointer toward where the russian attack could be expected to take place he would say and whatever you do jerry will attack here and one of his aides would pull and he would say sorry, the rockies -- [laughter] and throughout his speech he kept saying and even if you back there jerry will reinforce and -- sorry, for certain generations of englishmen and i cannot speak for french americ american, belgian or dutch but the enemy is always someone dressed in gray with that helmet

and having said that dunkirk is not only his best work i've ever seen and i speak as one who has made a lot of poor films but it's also a different breakthrough kind of war film in that it shows you the event through the eyes of four people twho never meet each other and don't know that they even exist through the eyes of the fighter pilot in the fighter of the nina pilot senior and he loves her on the beach of dunkirk and the british soldier in the eyes of middle-aged man with his son and his son's best friend attempting to steer the family vote to dunkirk to pick up british troops. that is all the. they tell us at the beginning of the film just that there are

hundreds of thousands of men on the speech and that is it. mind and then we see them and after that i found it refreshing that the movie does not grind to aal halt which scenes of general officers looking at [inaudible] and saying that jerry is here, the german army divisions are there and you see what people saw what these four people saw in the format you get an impression of the whole event. i like that and i'm not saying that is the only rated war movie or the right way to make a war movie necessarily but i found the fact that capture for me what the event was like in a way that nothing else could have without ever sending into becomingr a docudrama or having two producers say somehow we need to show general alexander

why and you see what is happening as those who were there and i found that it was refreshing in a different way of making a poor film. i'm not sure it will work for every battle but i certainly think it worked for dunkirk. it is said that hitler admired the british empire. does this admiration explained why he didn't invade britain when it was best? there are two answers to that question. one of them is complicated. yes, hitler admired the british empire in the sense of admiring it as an enduring, almost two century long exercise and power

and i'm not sure how much he understood about the british empire but yes, i think he probably did honestly admire it and he did also think that the british would come to their senses and in that he was restlessly enforced by his foreign minister ribbentrop whose understanding of britain's is the german ambassador to the court of st. james who would been presented to the king gave the king a nasty salute and allowed i'll hitler to the king george the sixth and displeased him later complained bitterly that the king had not replied to the nasty salute itself. ribbentrop advice on the british mind was not taken seriously sincet he was nearly always

thinking of those people and backed conservative politicians who made a deal with britain and who were more afraid of stalin and hitler and hitler thereby developed the opinion -- that can't be my phone. it is. [-left-square-bracke[laughter] it was supposed to be off. well -- he thereby developed a mistaken opinion that the british would not fight and that had tremendous effect because churchill and dylan had always

been as craven the man with the tightly rolled umbrella but he was not and he was a forceful strong smart man and very, very powerful and unforgiving politician and you have to try and imagine a middle class version of lyndon johnson to get at the character of neville chamberlain. in turn it over in your mind. he gave way over to the flock if he thought it was right to give way over to the stock yet and he knew that nobody in britain still liked anybody in france and was prepared to go to war in 1938 to save nokia. in advisedly ones that had happened and chamberlain became a world-class hero "the new york

times" lavished praise on him for saving a sophomore in 1938. he gave an unconscious guarantee to poland to contact them if they were attacked by germany even though there was already apparent that president clinton is the next on hitler's list. hitler was convinced that tubulin would never go to war if he attacked poland and he said once in between discussions in 1938, political discussions in munich, that tubulin attempted to make small talk which was talking to him about dry fly fishing and a major interest of neville chamberlain and not something about which he knew

anything about or cared and he came back from that meeting saying i know these people and their spineless worms because their natural conversation with fishing he probably never got the sense between dry fly fishing and fishing that uses a warm but he was wrong about tubulin and is even more disturbed because lord halifax when he first met hitler in 1937 as the british foreign minister arriving in berlin at hitler's i was going to say headquarters but it's not it's official residence got out of the car and assumed that the furor was a ballot and handed over it to

hitler and only with great difficulty was it finally explained to lord halifax that this was the furor. hitler therefore convinced himself because all politicians are good at convincing themselves as well as other people that the british would not attack if he attacked poland and heol was also through the -- in the front did not want to attack in fact but chamberlain view was different and he had given a promise to the polls and he had made a promise to the checks that was aan french concn and one which they were eager to out of and did it as we along with them. chamberlain had given not promise but a written document

in the great britain would go to war if poland was attacked and when poland was attacked however eager table and might be to discuss it in to negotiate with it and he went to war and i think that was probably the first great deception for alhitler. he had always assumed that that was the one thing that would happen and he woke up to find that germany was now at war with france and great britain, just as it had been in 1914. and results that turned out to be theev same. as for the invasion nothing in any document would convince anyone that hitler took seriously the prospect for an invasion of great britain. he was willing to compare for it

was willing to have people discuss it and it is notable that although he had a passion for standing and moving things around and behaving in general as if he were a general rather than the leader of this country he never took any interest in the plans of the invasion of great britain for the sensible reason that he thought it was unlikely to happen. he was willing to go halfway on the entire battle of britain it was an attempt to get them to put them in the position for terms of peace rather than an attempt to prepare for an invasion byha the germans and te fleet that hitler assembled rather reluctantly and slowly for invading britain was not one in which you can place absolute confidence because there were canal barges told by tops which

they should have been able to take care of and would have taken care of, i suspect. he believed that the british would come to their senses and that they would get rid of churchill in that board halifax or a group of people like lord halifax would ask for peace. peace can be made on the basis that they would keep their fleet which mattered to them and their empire, which mattered even more, and he was wrong. once the battle of britain had failed by october 1940 the whole notion that if it had ever been entirely and [inaudible] it was taken seriously and it was one of the main goals are provoked the bright flame of resistance inro great britain in the summer

of 1940 was the police, much encouraged by churchill, that at any moment the germans land and that was [inaudible] if there is one thing that would unite everybody in england, whatever they thought of churchill in whatever the political party they were of the left or of the right and whatever you want to you can guarantee that they would be united if the germans for one soldier on the beach at dover. nothing would be more guaranteed to provide unity in england and it been a german invasion except possibly a french invasion. [laughter] how did churchill know that hitler was a menace before anyone else did? part of the answer to that is on

earth would not have imagined a menace. i think that other people's eyes were clouded by the desire for peace and the desire not to have to fight the first world war, and understandable desire. by the very strong feeling among the middle class and the upper class in all countries included in the united states that stalin was possibly a much worse man than hitler and that communism was much more dangerous than fascism. anybody who followed events, the occupation of the rhineland and the german rearmament in the

creation of the liftoff of and the onslaughts with austria and even following those events working with hitler with, and it sends in the cold light of day would have recognized that he was a very dangerous man indeed. and a very clever one. we probably don't help our understanding of it by looking retroactively at it because the holocaust, for example, had not yet occurred and was not at that point realistically threatened except to p those who bothered o read mein kampf. we tend to exaggerate the qualities of hitler which appeared more sharply in 40 and 41 and reached their full flower

in 42 and 44 when the holocaust went into full gear. but seeing that he was a menace, as opposed to somebody intent upon mass murder and unrivaled scale, is something that everybody should have been able to foresee had it not been for a passionate desire not to reach the obvious conclusion. he was a menace and to europe and that we would have to fight it and didn't want to fight the world war over again in the answer to that was aas resoundig no. most of all and most loudly from the united states was the one country that we would have needed in order to from the germans on equal basis. so, yeah.

have answered enough questions. [applause] ... will be presenting it as part of the classic film series

on friday december 1 when he will come join us and to speak about a film that great britain in 1936 took the message that they should build bomb shelters before they were bombed. that is one of her favorite authors she will be with us. ron fineman who often those wonderful films with us will be with us and i will moderate. i don't know who is going to be doing most of the talking that night, but you ought to come just to find out. so thank you again.

good afternoon, everybody.