and so the answer is to put it there hope the past tells us all we need to know about the future >> i hope climate never changes. >> you can watch in other programs on line, at booktv. org. >> good evening, everyone. we have another wonderful full house. dale gregory vice president for public programs. it is always a thrill to welcome you to spectacular robert h. smith auditorium. i like to ask how many people are members. i don't have my glasses on so. you can just shout but no, i, saw the blurry hands, looks like almost everyone is a member.

we're thrilled to have you here. if you're not a member, pick up a brochure to see all the wonderful exhibitions and programs we have coming up. so if there is one or two people here, who are not members, please pick up a brochure. tonight's program, alone, britain, churchhill and dunkirk is part of the bernard swartz speaker series which is heart of public programs. i would like to thank mr. schwartz for all of his wonderful support which has enabled us to invite so many. [applause] so i -- because you applauded right away. but, he has done so much for us. we are so thrilled. i would also like to recognize and thank our executive committee chair, rick reese, and trustees, barry barrett, susan danilow, glen louis. sy sternberg, ira and david and

all our chairman's council this evening for all of their wonderful support as well. let's give them a big hand also. [applause] the program tonight will last an hour include a q&a session. you should have received a card with a pencil. ifd not, our staff members will be coming up and down the aisles to hand awe card to write your question on. thenyo later on in the program, they will collect it. and our speaker, michael korda, will be happy to answer them. his book, alone, will be in our museum store. he will be signing the book in our museum store as well. join michael korda after the programpr for a book signing. we are thrilled to welcome michael korda back to new york historical society. mr. korda is editor-in-chief

emeritus of simon & schuster. he began his career assistant editor. five decade he worked with a wide range of authors, including presidents carter, reagan, nixon, charles de gaulle, henry kissinger, david mccullough, tennessee williams, and last but not least, among the many, laurence olivier. which he could do whole program on laurence olivier. britain, churchhill, dunkirk, defeat into victory which is why we're all here tonight. before i begin, if you have a cell phone or electronic beeper, device, earns please turn it off. please join me in welcoming the wonderful. michael korda. thankk you. [applause]

>> good evening. want to make sure that i am not the one whose cell phone rings. [laughter] i'm so used to speaking here when it proceeds a film, that i find myself constantly looking

up at the screen expecting something is going to happen there. but, nothing t is. why dunkirk now? i'm sure you are wondering, as i dom. i saw christopher nolan's stunning film "dunkirk" at 3:00 in the afternoon on a weekday in red hook, new york, a small town between pleasant valley and expecting the theater to be empty. instead it was packed. ias was lucky to arrive earlier than i intended. by the time the picture started, every seat was taken right down to the front row. there was not a sound during the picture. no popcorn crackling, nobody got up to go to the bathroom. the audience was totally

absorbed. when it ended, to my as ton -- astonishment the whole audience rose to their feet to applause, many with tears streaming down their face. over british military calamity that took place in 1940. in red hook, i said to myself, why? a small part of me also asked silently, where the hell were you when we needed you in may 1940? but that is unfair. it was not a young audience. hardly anybody except for myself was alive in may 1940. it woulding foolish, churlish to blame america for not ending the war in the japan bombed the in december, 1941, year-and-a-half

laters forcing america into a war it was trying to avoid. who, given a chance to stay out of that war, would not have taken it? the british had not been eager to come to the defense of poland in december 1939. still less than the french. after all, it was only 21 years since we defeated germany, what wass in 1939 called the great war. with casualties that today sore beyond our imaginemation, over 750,000 british war dead. 60,000 british casualties on the first day of the first battle of the sun in 1915. over one million, 350,000 french war dead.

over two million french gravely-wounded or mutilated. a war that cost a worldwide total of over 41 million lives. and all of them apparently dead for nothing, zero, except the need to repeat the whole bloody thing a generation later, this time with more powerful weapons, and facing unapologetically fierce ideology that glorified war in germany. more sobering still, it had taken combined effort of france, the united kingdom, russia, the united states, belgium, italy and u japan to defeat germany lt time around in 1914, 1918. even then, by only very thinnest of margins. nobody in france or the united

kingdom could imagine the germans would be defeated by france and britain alone. look nor could anyone imagine chain of catastrophic events that would drive the british expeditionary force over a quarter of million men, back to a strip of beach 12 miles long and only a few hundred yards wide. how, why, did it happen is the subject of my book alone. from may 10th, 1940, through 1940.0th, hitler won the great victory dreamed of against france and lost the war. the phony war. phony between quotes but for everyone except the pols and to lesser degree, danes and

norwegians, went from 1939, to may 10th, 1940, embroiling germany, france, italy and, that the war would be settled by debt negotiation. by old-fashioned diplomacy. or even by a coup against hitler on the part of the german army or german conservative politicians, rather than fought out to the bitter end as it had been in 1914 to 1918. the chief problem for the allies was boredom. nearly half a million men of the british p expeditionary force, including a substantial contingent of the royal air force, sat idle and grumbling in france while over three million frenchman satat in a mood of

sullen resignation regarding the french frontier. almost a third of them in or behind the world famous maginot line, built for three million francs and enormous sum of the day. the british expedition airy force, or about ef as it is called today. were english professional soldiers needed to provide the backbone of the conscripted army as it was formed up. very slowly indeed as the french constantly complained. the french were overwhelmingly conscripts. every able-bodied french man was obliged to perform his military service then. two years in uniform. followed by annual year of

training, intended to produce a mass army, big enough to defeat or better yet, deter german aggression. keeping a large mobile immobilized for eight months is never a good idea. defensive strategy easily degenerates into passivity. as napoleon pointed out, the logical out come of a defensive strategy is defeat. a large army composed of civilians in uniforms, all eager to get home is particularly prone to lose whatever edge it possessed.e this unfortunately perfectly describes the french army in the spring of 1940. the french army devoted its time to making itself as comfortable

as possible. the british army devoted itself to spit and polish with occasion entertainment performed by ezesa, with would become in the united states the uso and occasional visits from the royal family and british politicians. neither army was well-equipped for modern warfare. the french, contrary to present-day assumptions had more and better tanks than the germans, but they were relegated to infantry support. even though the then relatively unknown lieutenant colonel charles de gaulle published a controversial book in 1934, advocating just the tactics that the germans would use to defeat poland and france, the blitzkrieg.

de gaulle's book sold less than 1000 copies in france but it sold many, many, times that number in germany where it was read aloud to adolf hitler and became the bible of the officers who would command the german armored forces. as for anti-tank weapons, france's venerable 85-millimeter field gun, it had been adopted in 1897, with its flat trajectory and potential for rapid fire, was more than capable of destroying any tank that the german army then possessed when fired over open sites, but little thought had been given to using it in that role. all the, although the french army had more than 4500 of the beloved guns or 75s, they were used for conventional infantry support instead.

the rapid german success against france is usually attributed to superior mechanization but this is a misleading picture. german artillery was horse-drawn in 1940, as it had been in 1914, and german infantry advanced on its feet, not with you can interests, with company commanders riding ahead of their men on a horse. there were over half a million horses in the german army in 1940. what the german army had together with a bold strategy for their attacks with the stuka dive bomber and use of radios to combined air, armor and infantry attacks. blitzkrieg was a state of mind intended to prevent a repetition of the static warfare on the western front in the first world

war. the allies were further hampered, as they had been in 1914, by their determination to respect the neutrality of belgium, unless or until the germans violated it. and by the commitment of the french army to its elaborate system ofrm system of defenses,s weeks turned into months, it began to seem to many that hitler would never attack. and of course, it became the aim of french and british policy not to provoke them into attacking. thus, the royal air force was limited to dropping propaganda leaflets over germany, rather than bombs. when it was suggested to the british secretary of state for air, sir howard kingsley wood, that the royal air force should bomb the black forest, which was then thought to contain ammunition dumps, he replied

indignantly in the negative saying, that is private property. the next thing you will be asking me b to bomb essen. so much more the aggressive mood in britain. on may 10th, all that came to an abrupt end. a debate in the house of commons may 9th over the conduct of the campaign in norway led the unexpected resignation of prime minister neville chamberlain on may 9th, in circumstances of extraordinary drama and tension, and to the even more remarkable political intrigue, that brought winston churchill to power as prime minister instead of lord halifax, whom chamberlain, most of the conservative party and the king would have preferred to so-called, rogue elephant as

churchhill's new private secretary called him. churchhill's long political career had been marked by tremendous ups and downs. he was widely distrusted by his own party and the royal family. he had been stubbornly long about a whole range of things, including, but not limited to, independence for india, finance, the gold standard, the strength of the french army, and the marriage t of former king edward the 8th to wallace warfield simpson. but from 1933 on he was right about the one and only thing that mattered. adolf hitler. churchhill had been against appeasing hitler. he had been in favor of rearming britain. he had constantly pointed out

the dangers of nazi germany and the fact of german rearmment which few people in or out of the government believed or wanted to hear. his had been the only voice of alarm, crying out almost alone in the wilderness, and now he had been proved right. everything he had foretold with such eloquence had come to pass. poor people, poor people he remarked as he returned from buckingham palace after having accepted the seals of office from the king. they crushed me and i can give them nothing but disaster for quite a long time. he left the car to stump up the steps of the ad mirty where he was -- admiralty where he was still in tears. in fact he would give them only

24 days later the most astonishing of good news. that the british expedition airy force, cut off and surrounded by thet germans, stranded by the rapid collapse of the netherlands, the sudden surrender of belgium, and the retreat of the french army on its right, had fought its way to dunkirk, the only channel port remaining which the germans had not yet captured, and from there had been ferried back to britain by 1100 ships of all kinds ranging from lifeboats and motor yachts, captained by their own owner, to to destroyers and pleasure steamers. grand total of 336,266 men. enough to preserve the core of the british regular army and insure theirrv presence behind e

beaches of southern england if the germans ever attempted to invade. wars are not won by evacuations churchhill warned the british people. but in fact this one was. hitler with the british army within his glassesp, delayed the final attack on dunkirk by two days, and allowed the enemy to escape. it was his first and biggest mistake of the war. snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, in abraham lincoln's word about general mcclellan's failure to pursue lee's army after antietem. in the same speech as the british soldiers evacuated from dunkirk were being returned to theire regiments and regrowthed

and rearmed,. even though large tracks of europe and l many old and famous states have fallen into the grip of the gestapo, and all of the odious apparatus of nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. we shall go on to the end. we have shall fight in france. we shall fight in the seas and oceans. we shallce fight with growing confidence and growing strength? the air. we will defend our island, whatever the cost may be. we shall fight on the beaches. we shall fight on the landing ground and we shall fight on the fields and the streets. we shall i fight in the hills. we shall never surrender. even if, which i do not for a moment believe, this island or large part of it was subjugated

and starving, the now empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the british fleet would carry on the struggle until in god's good time, the world with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and liberation of the old. after he finished that broadcast, the prime minister after insured that the transmitter had been turned off, turned to his aide and said, when they reached the beaches, we shall hit them over the head with beer bottles because i do not know what else we have to fight them with. [laughter] the french had merely given a weary shrug to the news of the successful evacuation of the

british expeditionary force. their attitude was from the paul renot, who remarked acidly, the moment a british general faced battle in france the first thing he thought of was the quickest route to the nearest channel port.ha but the british by contrast experienced an astonishing and sharp rise in morale. that was increased by the bustling energy and self-confidence of the new prime minister, who not only warned of the battles ahead but it seemed look forward to them. unlike chamberlain, whose spirit was one of resignation, church hill, not only had an overflowerring out tray of orders, demands and suggestions to meet the new threat aggressively by land, by sea, and by air, but wider and more

far-reaching strategic goals. his bunk schuss spendthrift son randolph, home on leave as an officer in his father's old regiment, the fourth queen's, recorded a brief conversation with his father about how he intended to fight the war. in randolph's words, i went up to my father's bedroom. he was standing in front of his basin and was shaving with an old-fashioned valet razor. he had a tough beard and as usual he was hacking away. sit down, dear boy, read the papers while i finish dressing, he told me. i did as i was told. after two or three minutes he half turned to me and said, i think i see my way through, resumed shaving. i was astounded and said, do you

mean that we could avoid defeat, which seemed incredible to me or beat the bastards, which seemed incredible. he flung his razor into the basin, swung around and said to me intently, of course i mean we can beat them. i said, well i'm all for it but i don't see how you can do it. by this time he has dried and sponged his face, turning around he said to me with great intensity, we will fight on and i shall drag the united states in. [laughter] that eventuality was a year-and-a-half away, and would seem an even more remote possibility, until the japanese

bombed pearl harbor and brought about the one thing that can insure an allied victory. but the conversation with randolph captures both churchhill's intensity and his glassesp of what was -- grasp of what was needed. the british would have to hang on somehow, mercilessly bombed, their army unable to defeat the germans in north africa or intervening in greece, depending on grit, the air force and the royal navy until such time as history, aided by careful diplomacy, and by churchhill's deft handling of president roosevelt, finally brought the united states into the war. from september 1939 to december 7th, 1941. it was churchhill that courted

roosevelt. after pearl harbor, it was the president who swiftly dominated the relationship and expertly soothes the prime minister's ruffled feathers over many different strategies and difference of warrings. this despite the churchhill's comment after pearl harbor, until then he had wooed the united states, and quote, now that she is in the harem we shall talk to them quite differently. [laughter] churchhill's persona, is very much at the center of this book, and there is much that we can learn from it. he said famously, and it is better to draw, draw, draw, than to war, war, war. and that part of his nature, of his strategy, and his thinking

is seldom remembered. his wise advice to pursue negotiations and diplomacy, so long as there is still hope, remains true today. but he also said, speaking to the schoolboys at harrow, his old school which he had detested as a child, never give in, never give in. never, never, never, never, never. nothing great or small, large or petty, never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense. never yield to force. in the balance between these two wise statements lies the whole art of statesmanship and of character, of governing, which saved britain in 1940 when she was alone, and would still mark

our leadership at home and abroad today. the month of may 1940 crushed many illusions but it was a huge turning point. france was defeated. the british army was rescued. winston churchhill assumed power, exerting his full authority and his gigantic personality over the british war effort. and making it clear as he put it in the house of commons on june 18th, 1940, that hitler would have to break us and this island or lose the war. . .

>> in a letter to his mother, queen mary, the day france surrendered. personally, he wrote, i feel happier now that we have no allies at all to be polite to and to pamper. he spoke for the whole nation, perhaps thinking of brexit, he still does. [laughter] thank you. [applause] >> [inaudible] >> this, i have to read these questions. more important, i have to answer them.

[laughter] what is your favorite korda family motion picture. that, of course, is a question i had not expected and is -- [laughter] is difficult to answer. the kordas made many, many movies. my uncle alexander made his first movie in august of 1914 when he was 21 years old and never stopped making movies all of his life until his death in 1956. i think that there are corps that movies -- korda movies, many of them, but that there's a big difference between the movies that my uncle alex produced and those he produced and directed. and an even bigger and more important group of movies which had the contribution of all the three brothers; or that is to say, they were produced by my

uncle al section. my -- alex, my other uncle worked on them as the directer or the cutter, and my father did the art direction. so that's a smaller slice of the pie than the whole pie. and i like to think of the movies on which all three brothers worked as the ones out of which i would pick my favorite. having said which and allowing for my fondness for the third man which was produced by my uncle alex and my father did the art direction, but my uncle xalton had nothing to do with it at all. i am enormously admiring of things to come in which all three brothers were involved and which is an amazing, futuristic film. and it has an enormous range of extraordinary performances by great actors. i am always delighted to see the

private life of henry viii which dates33 from 1933, the year in which i was born, because all three brothers worked on it, and my mother was in it as well as my aunt. so i feel that's a particularly familiar picture. if i had to pick the all time movie of theirs which i would most like to see again, i think it would probably be either the thief of baghdad for which my father won an oscar in 1940 or jungle book which was directed by my uncle xalton and produced by uncle alex and art directed by my father. having said which, i do not spend a lot of my time viewing films of my family -- [laughter] because that seems a strange thing to do.

[laughter] but every once in a while i will pull out one, and generally speaking, i'm astonished by how much i like them. and particularly by the sense of humor that runs through the scripts because my uncle alex had a wicked sense of humor. i like to see that reflected in films. and by my uncle xalton's shrewd use of camera and of cutting which was always extraordinary. the films that he made by himself are alone extraordinary if you think of it, the fourer feathers, drums, sahara and most important all, crime of the loved countryry which gave sidny poitier his first role in films. so i can't see them, any of

those films, without in some way seeing something of three brothers reflected. and often something of other members of my family. what do i think was the most significant battle of world war ii.. well, i suppose logical answer to that is stalingrad and possibly the combination of stalingrad and the battle of the -- [inaudible] in 1943 which is the largest land battle and the largest tank battle in the history of the second world l war. betweenis those two battles, it clear that germany was going to lose the war.

on the other hand, i think the most significant moment of the second world war was june 5, 1944, when eisenhower made his final decision that the invasion would take place despite the weather on june 6th. i think that that remains to me perhaps the most courageous decision of the war and the one that came the nearest to failure had rommel not gone home for his wife's birthday and had he been present up near the beach of normandy and had hitler been willing to release to him the four germaniv divisions that wee being kept in reserve. the invasion might have been

stopped on june 6, 18944 -- 19 1944, and the war would have taken onnt a very different cast and would have gone on for very much longer. so i would have to say that while my reason tells me that the most important battle was stalingrad, my heart tells me that the most important battle was the invasion in 1944. what effect did churchill's scholarship and eloquence have on his leadership capacity? well, i think that eloquence and scholarship have an enormous effectn on every able politician in every culture and in every language. [laughter] [applause] the ability to synthesize and sum up what we ourselves feel

and to tell us frankly what we are facing and going to face is what we want from any major political figure. and certain political figures have always managed to deliver on that. fdr is certainly one of them. i have always thought that bill clinton's ability to give a good and sensible and smart speech is almost unrivaled among living american presidents. and these qualities have been lacking -- [laughter] in british leadership and maybe lacking in american leadership, but i think they are important. scholarship is also important because, frankly, those -- to repeat a nevertheless true

cliche -- those who do not study the past and learn from it are condemneded to repeat it. we know that. and yet stubbornly and strangely, america produces one president after another who is unable to look backwards and understand what happened at all. andth those who think that life might be better in the middle east had somebody read the seven pearls of wisdom before plunging into warfare there would probably feel with me that it helps if a president at least knows what happened previously since then there's at least some possibility he might not repeat it. but not much. [laughter] don't you think the producer of the current film dunkirk was

remiss in not providing more historical context; ie, referring to the germans as the, quote, enemy, unquote? >> leaning the one side -- leaning to one side, a natural function of my own age is i always think of the enemy as the germans. [laughter] once when i was a young man in british army of the rhine as it was then called, i attended a full scale briefing on nato maneuvers that was given by the then-commanding general of the british army of the rhine whose name i b have forgotten but whih will probably come back to me. and they pulled down a great map for him and a pointer, and he was demonstrating what our side would do, what their side would

do, what we would do, and i must say that he was shakespearean in his view of what this maneuver would demonstrate and what that battle would be like if it ever took place. but whenever he pushed his pointer towards where the russian attack could be expected to take place, he would say and whatever you do, jerry will attack here. [laughter] and one of his aides would pull on his sleeves. sorry, the ruskies. [laughter] and throughout his speech he kept saying -- and even if you hit it there, jerry will reinforce. sorry, ruskie. certain generations of englishmen, i cannot speak for french, americans, belgians or dutches the enemy is always

dressed in gray with that peculiar helmet. having said which, i think dunkirk is not only the best war film i've ever seen -- and i speak as one whose family has made a lot of war films -- but it's a breakthrough in that it shows you the event through the eyes of four people when never meet each other and don't know that they even, the others even exist, through the eyes of a royal air force fighter pilot, the eyes of a senior naval officer on the beach at dunkirk, the eyes of a young british soldier and the eyes of a middle-aged man with his son and his son's best friend attempting to steal the family boat to dunkirk to pick up british troops off the beach. that's all we see. they tell us at the beginning of the film just that there are

hundreds of thousands who have been on this beach, and that's it. it's one line, and then we see them. after that i found it refreshing that the movie does not grind to a halt with scenes of officers, general officers looking at maps and saying jerry is here, we are here, german armored divisions are there. you see what people saw, what these four people saw. and from that you get an impression of the whole event. i p liked that. i'm not saying that it's the only way to make a movie, a war movie or the right way to make a war movie necessarily. but i found that that captured for me what the event was like in a way that nothing else could have without ever descending into becoming a docu-drama or having the producers say, well, somehow we need to show

lieutenant general sir harold alexander. why? you see what is happening as those who were there saw what was happening, and i found that refreshing and a different way of making a war film. i'm notot sure it would work for every battle, by the way, but i certainly think it worked for "dunkirk." it is said that hitler admired the british empire. does this admiration help explain why he didn't invade written when prospects -- britain when prospects for an invasion were best? there's really two answers to that question. one of them is complicated. yes, hitler admired the british empire in the sense of admiring it as an enduring, almost two-century-long exercise in power. i'm not sure how much he

understood about the british empire, but, yes, i think he probably did honestly admire it. and he did also think that the british would come to their senses. and in that he was ruthlessly reinforced by his foreign minister whose understanding of britain was conditioned by his own experience as german ambassador to the court of st. james,ma who when being presented to the king gave the king a nazi salute and a loud heil hitler, much startling king george vi and displeasing him. and who later complained bitterly that the king had not replied to the nazi salute with one of his own. so his advice on the british mind was not to be taken

seriously since he was nearly always thinking of those upper class people, and backstairs british politicians who were more afraid of stalin than of hitler. and hitler thereby developed the opinion -- that can't be my phone. [laughter] it is, but -- [laughter] that's very disturbing, because it's supposed to be off. [laughter] he thereby developed a mistaken opinion that the british would notop fight. and that had tremendousfects on history -- tremendous t effectsn

history because chamberlain has always been regarded as craven, the man with the tightly-rolled umbrella, spineless, but he was not. he was a forceful, smart and very, very unforgiving politician. you would have to try and imagine a middle class birmingham version of lyndon johnson to get at the character of neville chamberlain. [laughter] and turn that over in your mind. [laughter] and he gave way over czechoslovakia because he thought it was right to give way over czechoslovakia, and because he knew that nobody in britain -- still less anybody in france -- was prepared to go to war in 1938 to save czechoslovakia. inadvisedly, once that had

happened and chamberlain became a world class hero, "the new york times" lavished praise on him for saving us all from war in 1938, he gave an uncautious guarantee to poland to protect them if they were attacked by germany even though it was already apparent that poland was theen next place on hitler's li. and hitler was convinced that chamberlain would never go to war if he attacked poland. he said once in between discussions in 1938, political discussions in munich, chamberlain attempted the make small talk with hitler by talking to him about try fly fishing, a major interest of neville chamberlain's and not

something about which hitler knew anything or cared. [laughter] and he came back from that meeting saying i know these people now. they're spineless worms. worms in his mind because of their natural connotation with fishing -- [laughter] he probably never got the difference between dry fly fishing and fishing that uses a worm.er [laughter] but he was wrong about chamberlain. he was even more disturbed because lord halifax, when he first met hitler in 1937 as british foreign minister, arriving at, in berlin at hitler's -- i was going to say headquarters, but it's not. it's his official residence. gotis out of the car and assumed that the f turks -- fuhrer was a

valet and started to happened his hat and coat -- [laughter] and only with great difficulty was it finally explained the lord halifax that this was the fuhrer. [laughter] hitler, therefore, convinced himself -- because all politicians are good at convincing themselves as well as other people -- that the british would not attack if he attacked poland. and he was also sure that the french would not, and the french did not want to attack, in fact. but chamberlain's view was different. he had tbiive a promise to the poles -- he had given a promise to the poles. we had made no promise to the czechs. that was a french concern and one which they were eager to run out a of and did, and we along with them.

but chamberlain had given not a promise, but a written document saying that great britain would go to war if poland was attacked. and when poland was attacked, however eager chamberlain might be the discuss it, to negotiate with it, he went to war. and i think that that was probably the first great deception for hitler. he had always assumed that that was the one thing that wouldn't happen, and he woke up to find that germany was now at war with france and with great britain just as it had been in 1914. and with results which, fortunately in the end, turned out to be the same. as for the invasion, nothing in any document would convince anyone that hitler took seriously the prospects more an inveighs vegas of -- for an

invasion of great britain. he was willing to prepare for it, he was willing to have people discuss it. it'se notable that although he had a passion for standing at maps and t moving things around and behaving in general as if he were a general rather than the leader ofn his country, he never took any such interest in the plans for the invasion of great britain. i think for the very sensible reason that he thought it was unlikely to happen. he was willing to go halfway on the entire battle of britain, it was an attempt to prod the british by bombing them into the position that they would is ask for terms of peace rather than an attempt to prepare britain for invasion by the germans, and the fleet was not one in which

you could -- because it consisted of a lot of barges which a the navy should have ben able to take care of and would have taken care of, i suspect. he believed that the british would come to their senses, that they would get rid of churchill, that lord halifax or a group of people like lord halifax would can ask for terms of peace and thatal peace could be made on te basis that the british would get to keep their fleet -- which mattered usually to them -- and their empire, which mattered even more. and he was wrong. once the battle of britain had failed by october of 1940, the whole notion of invading england -- if it had ever really entirely been taken seriously -- vanished. the british, however, took it seriously, and it is one of the main goadsn that provoked the bright flame of resistance in

britain in the summer of 1940, was the belief -- much encouraged by churchill -- that at any moment the germans would land. and that was shrewd of churchill. because if there was one thing thate would unite everybody in england whatever they thought of churchill, whateverng political party they belonged to, whether they were of the left or of the right and whatever class they belonged to, you could guarantee that they would be united if the germans put one soldier on the beach at dover. nothing would be more guaranteed to provide unity in england than a germann invasion. except possibly a french invasion. [laughter] how did churchill know that hitler was a menace before anyone else did?

well, i think part of the answer to that is who on earth would not have imagined he was a menace? i think that other people's eyes were clouded by the desire for peace, the desire not to have to refight the first world war, an understandable desire, by the very strong feeling among the middle class and the upper class in all countries including the united states that stalin was possibly a much worse man than hitler and that communism was much more dangerous than fascism. but anybody who followed events -- the occupation of the

rhineland, the resumption of german rearmament, the creation of the rough waf that, the -- [inaudible] ing with austria, anybody following those events and looking at hitler with common sense in the cold light of day would have recognized that here was a very dangerous man, indeed. and a very clever one. we probably don't help our understanding of it by looking retroactively at it because holocaust, for example, had not yet occurred and was not at that point realistically threatened except to those who bothered to read "mein kampf". and so we tend to exaggerate the demonic qualities of hitler which appeared more sharply in

'40 and '41 and reached their full flower in '42, '43 and '44 when holocaust got into full gear., but seeing that he was a menace asac opposed to somebody intent upon mass murder on a hitherto unrivaled scale is something that everybody should have been able to foresee had it not been for a passionate desire not to reach the obvious conclusion. he was a menace to peace to europe, to the world, we would have to fight him, and did we want to fight the first world war over again? and the answer to that was a resounding no. most of all and most loudly of all from the united states which was the one country that we would have needed in order to confront the germans on an equal basis.

[laughter] so, yeah. [laughter] we've answered enough questions. [applause] >> [inaudible] michael, michael korda, thank you so much. this is my -- >> [inaudible] [laughter] >> thank you so much for joining us. this is the film we're going to do. we just want to remind everyone that michael korda will be signing copies in our museum score of his book, "alone," and is we want to thank you again for a great talk. let's give him another great hand. [applause] >> thank you very much. >> so if you're interested in more of michael korda and the film he mentioned, things to come,fi we will be presenting it as part of our bernard thwart

classic film -- schwartz classic film series when michael will come and join us and speak about a film that great britain in 1936 took the message that they should build bomb shelters well before they were bombed. isn't that -- that's in his book also. that's where i found that out. >> yes. >> so the film had a great influence on great britain as hitler was taking over. michael korda will be with us. the book "things to come" was by h.g. wells, and that's one of annette gordon reid's favorite authors. she will be with us. the senior curator of the paley center for media, ron simon -- who often does wonderful films with us -- will be with us, and i will moderate. i don't know who is going to be doing most of the talking that night -- [laughter] but you ought to come just to

find out. [laughter] so thank you again and good night. >> thank you very much for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> booktv is on twitter and facebook, and we want to hear from you. tweet us, twitter.com/booktv. or post a comment on our facebook page, facebook.com/booktv. [inaudible conversations]