>> i propose action instead of words and action now. i propose it for the sake of a better world when i say again and again and again i propose it for our own self-interest. >> vandenberg finds himself in that position when fdr is elected in the early 30s and that means to get anything done which actually means resisting those initiatives, there needed to be a coalition to reach across the aisle

>> welcome. thank for making the effort to get here on this snow day. not really but that qualifies her in washington. needless to say i don't think any of us expected here in the first week of 2018 the iran story we are focusing on is the story of protest and the mystic unrest with the biggest

demonstrations we have seen since 2009 on the contrary was the question of sanctions and waivers of the jcp away and efforts of congress to amend that legislation. that is in play but now cast in a different light. so now we have our experts for the implications for u.s. policy from different angles. i will introduce folks the order i will call them. patrick is the morningstar senior fellow director of research at the institute and will look at the background of these protests.

what is happening inside iran economically to his the unrest. then return to our colleague that is one of the most skillful interpreters where they might be going in the future. then return to my guys instead as the director of military and security studies in looking at those securities services. what that might mean with iran and inside and outside then finally so how those protest could reverberate and in places where iran is spending those millions of is part of

their grievances. so as part of all of this we will talk about what u.s. policymakers should be doing about all of this. so far the trump administration has tried to demonstrate its support through statements of u.s. officials and has tried to rally an international response or pressure to complement the u.s. statements so far they have been relatively mild compared to american statements and i'm sure we will see this develop as days and weeks unfold may be more sanctions or human rights abuses and inevitably those big decisions coming next week with sanctions or

waivers or that decertification of the t2 t2. >> my former colleagues make reports about iran's economy and what they would say about the economic situation is it is pretty good. iran's gdp will grow more than the u.s. the budget deficit will grow according to the size of the economy, they are running a healthy current account surplus unlike united states which runs a deficit so the future looks decent so i thought it was telling when

there was a nice article the other day about iran's economic situation and the novelist about the situation better than my colleagues while those numbers may be pretty good but the situation for ordinary iranians have not been. in fact in the annual survey iran does with the living standards it is shown that they are still 10% below where they were one decade ago. unemployment is rising at 12.5% and as more jobs are created more people are coming into the labor force those who have always wanted to have jobs but they got discouraged but now they are coming back.

in particular inflation is back up again and that was one great accomplishment of brew honeys first-term to bring inflation down from 43% but now it is back up again now the price increase is heavily concentrated but those items consumed by ordinary welcome -- people bread prices rose by 15% the iranians by the way he 353 pounds of bread per year. and egg and chicken prices are up sharply. and the rich are flaunting their well i recommended a instagram account that is called rich kids of tehran. you can see the lifestyles of

the ostentation's like a nice maserati a good selection and the parties and the close. i know enough to say that's expensive. doesn't look so much but the feel like what happened in the days of the sean 1971 with the coronation ceremony with thousands of foreign guests and they all drink 2000 bottles of wine. and the shah's government concentrated the good times and that is increasingly what the islamic republic feels like.

that is the overall picture behind the protest. so now let me focus on two specific issues. one is the foreign activities. we often say we withhold support in the nuclear program really isn't that expensive. that could be true in absolute numbers but not particularly true compared to the size of iran's economy. we don't have precise numbers on supporting the syrian governmen government. the u.s. government likes to use its internal thinking and with that program it would be billions of dollars but there

is roughly half of that junk but at four or $5 billion that is 1% of gdp. by comparison in the united states is $180 million. i think anybody would say $180 billion is a small amount of money that is real money. that is a minimal estimate furthermore that is the direct cost with indirect cost there is a higher number. the next budget that was proposed by president rouen he that will be $12 billion. but that is not necessary

because of their adventurous foreign policy. at least 1% of gdp is due to foreign policy. with that 12 billion-dollar estimate some have said he tries to inflated to embarrass the revolutionary guard actually that brought the estimate of what it spends on the military like those international institutions it says spending is 12 billion per year. so first the destabilizing activities are real money and indeed it is instructive the amount of money iran is spending on these activities

is more than the budget cuts rouhani proposed cutting in half the expenditure in cash giving to ordinary iranians. that was not necessary except for that expenditure. my second point is things could get a lot worse. there has been an explosion of credit institutions that are kind of like credit unions only 25% of deposits connected with the revolutionary guard and also profit lyrics who claim they are collecting

islamic taxes and they pay little attention to the central bank and that when you charge 35% per year some of them fail in november with the street but if they fail in your mind. the banks are not in much better shape. they are desperate for equity and have been barred from these institutions the central bank of iran has put a cap they can pay in interest 90% are not valid as of last june and the central bank has been

trying to get iran's banks to report under iran's general practices not internationally but the banks that have done that have gone that from reporting profits to massive losses. there has been no action on proposals to modify the bank law and this is a classic recipe for disaster. if you think i am exaggerating let me just quote from rouhani speech discussing the budget quote 25% of percent of the money market is in the state institutions to interfere with the gold and real estate market i raise the issue in detail with urgency from the supreme leader.

three or 43 or four to see those fraudulent institutions. i have gotten pressure from all sides would not believe that pressure is starting to get from all over the state. the banking system could collapse honestly. and there is no deposit insurance by the way. by the way this is why keeps the mice related. independent of what happens with u.s. sanctions or financial action task force that will evaluate how the action plan is going this keeps them away. finally how we like to seal

one -- steel and they tell us young people go out to the streets to protest and that is what you see here. there is a general rule of thumb revolutions but their population the age is slightly higher than this room are eight years higher than egypt or pakistan or ten years higher than iraq or india and 11 years higher than afghanistan. with the average age being 31 the revolution is really occurring they are 26 that

does not give us a basis for optimism. within the decade the average age of a man would be 36. >> bank you patrick i feel like everything in 2017 and 2018 we all feel we are rapidly aging. [laughter] so now we will turn to my colleagues joining us from video. >> we cannot hear her. one moment.

>> should we move onto the next speaker? mac while they sort this out we will move to mike. >> thank you. first the reactive in closing down it is hard enough with the flow of information and developments to read those events thousands of miles away but potentially violent and revolutionary situations. but even the videos getting

out have been very low quality and it is hard to judge who is involved and exactly what is going on in the streets. so my comments are somewhat tentative but there is a number of things rooted in long-term trends the way the regime has responded to previous acts of violence to create a framework of analysis. so the first thing to talk about these events is to understand the founder of the islamic republic are revolutionaries and nothing they fear more than counter revolution because first of all they know they can hurt. they had made a revolution once in their youth. also with that style that is rooted in a world view which

and there have been disparities in the past so that informs the regime's response. and finally many of the event or acts of violence through the mid- 90s were in cities with the urban middle and upper middle class and now we see a series of protest involving the provincial working-class and while those recent events have exposed that regional cleavage that does not bode well for the future. they said if only the people of tehran or other large cities was to get the working

class involved then they would be in trouble. they are involved now but the urban class is more revolutionary in reform that you show at least one element another thing they are concerned about historically iran has been invaded a number of times. world war ii with the brits and the russians and then iraq 2003. but then with the counterinsurgency campaign

those have diminished somewhat in iran is more concerned about the software fair node has great geographic depth because they have mountains around the perimeter of the country but every iranian citizen is full herbal two messages from outside of the country brought in by satellite tv that is why they put a lot of them fitted mom --dash focus on jamming the signals. those who rule iran today these lessons learned have been modified from their own experiences first the need for

strong decisive leadership the shaw first of all he was suffering from health problems and cancer and was on medication constantly fearful the united states would abandon him and conspire with the opposition against him he did not show the necessary resolve when push came to shove to do what needed to be done from the regime point of view to save powers of the islamic republic has been very quick to respond to opposition of the regime. but in this case because of the social base they were a little more hesitant than in the past.

and then political consideration as well. second they must be adequately resourced. the shaw has converted to a regional power projection force. so in the event it was prepared for internal security they do not perform well in this role with excessive or insufficient restraint resulting in casualties but not enough to counter the opposition and also the shaw's response prevented the military from operating. the security forces are

thought to be properly trained and equipped and employed. iran has spent a lot of money and you see the equipment. special units with riot gear i am not sure the training is so great that is one issue i think they could use more work but with their experience that when there are people killed at the end of the 40 day mourning. there are more demonstrations with more people killed and then there is a snowball effect and then to prevent that type of dynamic. so they tend to rely on face to face violence. some cases i think firearms

have been used in the current round of violence but they are very careful not to engage in lethal overkill. during the shaw's rule a lot of the junior ranks of the militar military, the junior officers with college degrees and as a result had opposition is much as the social background and this has been a constant problem for the islamic republic. may not so much of a problem 99 or 2009 with the security forces who are not from major

cities but dealing with upper-middle-class people that during that current round this is a real problem because in people those that the revolution was made for are now protecting those people and representing them and not learning from that part of society. it is also a factor with their careful response. that said so that art and science of social control and try to avoid legal force there

is no tiananmen square moment but without protest the army went out with tanks in streets you will not see that in tehran because the fear it would fracture the military but they don't want to set this opposition against the regime. so face-to-face problems from previous rounds of violence that would count those who are less out hearted face to face violence is very intimidating and has an effect on the opposition. so we put them under house arrest along with confessions and then to demoralize the opposition. then we saw other protesters

were brought in with humiliation or sleep deprivation telling people to go home with a experienced which was extremely humiliating. so that is key to how the iranians do it. they mentioned a capitation but then when they do a leader with authorization but patient attrition and demoralization and pushing back gradually over time is the preferred way to do things. a newsweek correspondent to cover the uprising talking

about the islamic republic. so the problem with the secret police but what our brothers have masterminded how to break his soul without using violence against his body. that encapsulates their approach to deal with these kinds of problems. first of all we have no idea that future trajectory of violence and opposition these are impossible to predict as a function of how the regime handle that. we could see a dramatic increase that black sunday 78 several hundred. which further revolutionize the revolution so it adds a

new impetus to the opposition. long-term, in the past iran devoted more resources for the invasion force. there is more marked to internal security or close have a port and those that also forward but has never been a fraction of 1% as part of their regional activities. i don't think it will have a major impact of their

activities in syria. actually see that winding down. especially over the previous month. people are demanding an end to the intervention but we are pulling back and retrenching syria in december it was way down compared to before and all they have to do is use the afghan he fighters and they will be okay in that regard. finally by and large iran is affected most by what's on the ground but we do certain things shield the iranian people from the potentially harsh actions by the regime to create a space for the

opposition to continue to protest the longer these go on and there is no reason to snap back on nuclear sanctions just because people will stay home because of the security situation and any company thinking of investing in iran i think those numbers were less than expected because of the fear of threat of sanctions and will only further chase potential investors away. there is no need to not waive those nuclear sanctions now but continue that policy don't pullout of t2 because the attention from the regime to solve their financial problems

that we should make united states the issue here now. i conclude. thank you. >> i think we are ready to go now. we will turn to him once again. >> we can still not hear him i hear that normally he is audible when he speaks. [laughter] >> he can hear us but we cannot hear him. >> now we will move on with playing musical chairs take it away.

>> what we are missing today -- >> apologies. [laughter] >> can you hear us? let's just move forward. thank you. >> the discontent and that anger that i see today is not really restricted to iran from the lack of the regime's operations in the region. the military operation also

faces its own and similar challenges meaning lebanon. so the signs of discontent are very similar to what we see today in the background and with the context, accumulating anger we have seen within the community in lebanon. this has decreased drastically with has the laws involvement not only because the war with syria has more death or losses in those combined but it has affected the economic situation. he only two institutions are

the lebanese government. the rest are private sector except for international companies. . . . . the rest are facing problems. this is the context. like budgets and i ran

hezbollah's budget has changed very drastically. in fact before the war in syria that committee was benefiting from hezbollah social services. this circle of beneficiaries started to shrink to hezbollah's constituency not all of us. because of these budget cuts they are a only catering to hezbollah sponsors and their immediate families. so what we have today is hezbollah paying for people to go fight and people are going to fight because for these people it's not really about the same, they are not deciding for the

cause. they don't feel they are doing this because seriously -- damascus and aleppo. they are doing it because the salary is available. for the rest the economic process has increased and the class divisions are very clear today. if you go to bosnia today you have very rich neighborhoods. these neighborhoods are starting to disintegrate. part of it today is very poor and the rich are benefiting from the war in syria and the poor have no options but to fight in syria. they are not only getting the salary but whatever is left. what you have today is a huge gap but also a huge culture gap

between this fighters in the non-fighters and this is creating serious tensions between the two communities within the shia community. this had been expressed several times in lebanon or there have been protests in the stronghold in beirut. the protests were not really reported because they were not considered important and because they were contained very quickly but one of them was probably more important than the other. the poorest nation was the highest in beirut. not the first time they went to the street the street but the first time into the street and actually has the lead to war in syria. this has never has never

happened before in this happened a few months ago. there have been economic problems against escalation and social services but for the first time there have been problems by hezbollah supporters against political issues. this has been the case. only last year during the municipal elections in lebanon and some of hezbollah's headquarters which is mostly shia 45% of the shia's voted against hezbollah and hamas combined and this is only one example of many places in lebanon where they voted against hezbollah so these are some signs of concern similar to what we are seeing in iran today. the people who badmouth hezbollah have apologize in front of the camera and they

apologize because of fear not because of regret. it doesn't mean the intent has gone because nothing can really change. we are looking today at 2018 as the next step for hezbollah and the lebanese and general where we have the parliamentary election in 2018. in 2018 it was the authority when it was 70% a party in lebanon. they will also keep on having decreased social services. which means that i will not be surprised to see more progress within the shia community and if the protests continue in iran

and in lebanon this will forever berate. there are ready there. the discontent hasn't gone away and it's not treated as a coincidence. there was a video that went viral of a woman badmouthing that he has forced her and other women in lebanon to sell their bodies. it essentially marriage only among the shia encouraged by etiology. basically it's prostitution encouraged by hezbollah. this woman basically was selling his war in syria forcing them -- and it's not a coincidence that one of the first videos we saw in iran during these protests

also were women in iran saying the same thing. the grievances are the same in the context is the same. thank you. >> thank you hanin. dare i ask if we can try one more time with eddie? are want everyone to have a chance to hear from eddie. do we have the audio? >> we can hear him a little bit. can we turn him up? we are trying to increase your volume. go ahead and say something.

>> is that our right? can people hear him? >> okay go ahead. speak as loud as you can. >> good afternoon everybody. >> speak as loud as you can. thank you. >> okay. the protest and iran are the expansion of protests that started three months ago and protest for those who lost their money in institutions. the whole thing is not new and it's obvious to me. [inaudible]

[inaudible] many of these were people in -- so i think the whole thing was not that. >> i'm sorry i'm going to cut you off because it's just too quiet. i'm afraid the folks here are not able to make out what you are saying so apologies for that. i'm going to instead move to the question-and-answer period. i apologize for the audio issues there. i want to move into q&a and discuss especially as i said the implications to u.s. policies and how we see things going for it. i'm going to give folks in the audience a chance to ask their questions but i want to start with one question which i think will increasingly be on people's

minds as these protests develop depending on what happens over the next coming days. if they don't decide that has profound implications for iran and the region. assuming those protests are either suppressed or fizzle out on their own i'm curious as to what our speakers think will be the longer-term implications for iran and for the region? one thing we saw for example after the 2009 green movement was even after people have been cleared out of the streets you had suddenly this coalition between reformist forces the more pragmatic forces and it ultimately led to the election of hassan rouhani so any thoughts on what the longer-term implications of what you're seeing today might need? >> the big question is what's going to happen when common needs eyes.

that's going to be a real -- and whoever takes over will have an opportunity to have a reset and the question is what will that reset look like? i would say what these protests have done is shaken the conviction on the part of the islamic republic's leadership. do they really have the hearts and minds of ordinary people and with all the noise you hear in big cities especially tehran when you get down to the hearts and minds, they can't be sure of that and a longer and they can't be sure of just how much the ideology really matters to those people. this is a regime built on ideology so if the ideology is wobbly at the knees that's a big problem. there bartik been lots of commentators who have said unless the years that iran feels more and more like brezhnev soviet union wherever one goes

through the motions of the ideology. of course iran's success abroad which have indeed led to quite a bit of pride in iran and let the regime reinvent itself as the iranian nationalist but it turns out ordinary iranians while they may be proud of iran's accomplishments abroad they do want to pay for it. and they would really rather see the money used elsewhere. that's going to be a big problem for the regime. >> if i could just dovetail with those comments. many people including myself have thought as a result of the activities in syria and iraq against isil, the irgc has

gained a kind of new degree of respect in the iranian society and civil money was kind of a rock star. what's interesting is the degree to which the hostility of many of the protesters are not just against the clerics but against the irgc. this clerical military system that is deeply embedded in the economy so there was a lot of people who assumed if there were to be a post-clerk overseeing or even if the clerical regime would continue after how many is dead it's even stronger in the follow-on regime and that might still be the case but a few months ago it looked like many people would accept that our word except that he would run for president. it's not clear that that's going

to be something that would lead to a more stable -- after his death. >> just one thing. i think a lot of people in the region lebanon syria iraq yemen and especially in lebanon and iraqi feel a lot of people are surrendering to the idea that iran is winning and iran this there tuesday and is not going anywhere because every thing is a bit of a fiasco. in a sign of weakness and iran in the regime and quds force. any sign of weakness that will push people to reconsider and i'm thinking mostly of lebanon with the quds force is in lebanon today. so far they are not there but at one point if this goes on they might reconsider the recent compromises from hezbollah

regarding the system and how things have changed recently. the compromises of the coalition and the sense of surrendering to the status quo after the change and reviving the forces. it's time to take a stand where no one is taking a stand. >> that would be good news at the point of u.s. policymakers. with that let me open the four to questions from the audience and those watching from your snowbound pumps have a question feel free to tweet those at us. yes, sir. wait for the mic just one moment moment. >> before you start let me remind everyone that we are on the record and we are being broadcast live. >> can anyone offer and the valuation of the size and significance of the pro-government rallies that event taking place?

a quite as impressive is how long it took the government to organize them. usually they regime engages mobilization of people on a regular basis. they have a highly honed apparatus and they usually turn out hundreds of thousands of people and yet here we are a week into the protests, a week it has taken them to get people out there? i mean that's not very good. and furthermore it should have been. easy because in fact in the big cities it's not where the protests were taking place. so i'm impressed by how slow the government has been in their usual efforts to bustin on thousands of people. it suggests to me that the usual places that they go to round up

people for free lunch of that sort of stuff they were scared that people might not show up. and it wasn't as easy to round people up and they have to be fast. i'm assuming the government is going to pull out all the stops for the usual kinds of demonstrations that they have and we will see some really impressive ones but the fact that it took them a week to even get going. today's demonstrations, government demonstrations, of course the protests were surprised that they weren't the massive ones we have seen in the past. >> questions in the second row? >> mike you had mentioned you don't leave the jcp a should be allowed to basically break debt deal on sanctions would be good

policy but i wanted to ask the panel about that. given the economic problems that are clearly a major part of what's causing the demonstrations people were opposed to jcp a argued the economic problems would be worse if the jcp a head opened up investment so i'm so i just like to throw that out and ask a question more broadly. the second part of that is europeans and russians. they have been reacting to this in different ways and some of the statements that are being made and so one. could you describe what you see the europeans in russian government doing regarding what's happening now in iran? >> the iranians do a wonderful job stopping people from protesting in their own country and the biggest barriers inside of iran has been the opposition we have seen from people inside of iran to the deals. many of the deals were signed with foreign companies and were

going to be propositions. that's threatening the judicial way in which the well-connected made their money in iran and they didn't like it. there've been a lot of complaints, why are you signing a deal with naipaul when we could do that. i would say the biggest problem of discouraging, the biggest problem with discouraging foreign investment are the uncertainties in the poor business conditions in the internal fighting in iran. makes it so difficult that after all we are talking about government which when it came to power five years ago said within months it was going to be open to negotiations with foreign oil companies for an estimate inside of iran. it didn't happen. in fact it's still not happening and so that's really what slows

this down. i think a lot of european companies that were so enthusiastic about going into iran including the companies that signed these deals with hezbollah and then nothing happens are realizing that you know iran is a good-sized marker where you can make some money and this is not the savior for the iranian economy either. my biggest reason for saying it i don't want to see the jcpoa sanctions or the pre-jcpoa sanctions, to want to see them change the topic. i don't want to make the whole focus the jcpoa. the problem inside of iran is the centerpiece of national intervention.

>> any reaction? >> i will give my own thoughts on the european and russian reaction. what we have seen so far is predictable from the russians but what the russians have said is basically supported the regime which is these protests are somehow inspired or the work of foreign agents. this is frankly the similar explanation that russia would give for any protest within russia itself so it's not surprising. it's also one of iran's major external allies outside of the region. again it's perhaps i would expect. salsa reason why dumping will see any u.n. security council action because russia would veto such action. it might be advantageous to veto such an action. europeans are more complicated i think because the united states i believe really would like to see some sort of joint statement statement, joint sentiment that

we could spread between the united states and americans but national pressure on the iranian regime. hasn't happened so far and the europeans don't lame anybody for what's happening and call on all sides to refrain from violence as if there was any equivalency between the largely peaceful protesters. why do we see that? i think they are probably two reasons and i should say those reactions are milder than the european reaction of 2009 after the rate the election could one of my colleagues is erica who is sitting behind me. i think there are a number of possible reasons. first is of course the poa itself of the new economic cooperation which patrick is talking about the twin europe and iran. i think the europeans bristle at the idea that this is what determines their policy actions towards iran and they would say no that's not fair. the second factor at inc. is

that europeans have a tremendous amount invested in their relationships with rahimi and zarif and inclination is probably not to take the side of the street protesters and try to work in dialogue with rahimi and i would hope that this episode would strengthen those allies inside of iran. third i think it's probably the instability in the middle east in general. obviously since 2000 mind a lot as happened in the middle east and europe has borne the brunt of the quill of refugees that have come out of the middle east as well as the terrorism and i doubt they have an appetite for a more instability and i'm sure they are worried about that instability. finally there is concern about the united states. there has been obviously serious questions about the american commitment to the nuclear deal so you already start with a gap between the united states and

the positions on iran which is quite different than 2009. i'm sure the europeans are eyeing those and they are probably careful, trying to be careful not to do anything or say anything which could fold in the united states to move away from the sanctions waivers and away from the jcpoa. personally think this should be an occasion for the u.s. and europe to join our voices together and put joint pressure on the regime in an area where we may not wholly agree on iran's regional behavior but i think we'd be able to agree on human rights in iran. so far that has not been the case. more questions? yes, marc ginsberg. >> an excellent panel. mark ensberg counter extremism project and is a further point i was in the white house and state department during the 1979 decisions about how to deal with them iranian revolution so it's fascinating to sit here and watch. >> you were quite a bit younger mark. >> i was a mere kid then.

the obamas administration officials such as phil gordon and susan rice urging everybody in the editorial op-ed writing to be quiet. don't do anything. don't so it say anything to rock the vote in patrick was right and i agree with him about the issue on sanctions. where do you all come out as a policy for the united states were the obama administration in its infinite efforts to get the poa pass to put the regime change off the table? it seems the trump administration would like to put a regime change back on the table. where do you all come out on that issue? >> let me just ask hanin on this is supporter silence better? you are coming from the region itself. the trump administration has been careful to say explicitly

that they are not -- of a regime change. i think they have been. explicit on that point. do you have thoughts on that? >> no it's definitely not a good idea. simply knowing how iran functions and iran moves in a vacuum always. vacuums in syria and iraq, everywhere where there bears an unsettling event. so it's very easy. the absence of any american policy in syria led to a stronger iran and it's happening because there's nothing being done. iran doesn't want any complications with the u.s.. a couple of confrontations in syria you want to avoid confrontations with the u.s.. silence by the u.s. at this

point will throw the demonstrators under the bus. i don't think this is a good idea. a lot of things can be done. many, many things can be done in order to make sure support is provided for these demonstrators are people in the region as a whole. >> iran's narrative is that we support the united states. that's a very strong narrative. so if the united states government are not the people who are protesting in iran then the united states doesn't come to anybody's help even when you think they might or as iran does. not a good idea. she described in 2014 the

actions in 2009 is being a mistake. i am with her. on the question of regime change the supreme leader spent 20 years warning the united states objective is to use cultureless nation to undermine the islamic republic. this is a man who many queries much more about hollywood than he is about washington. his idea of u.s. efforts for regime changes arco. michelle obama is up there -- they make you are talking about a movie. >> when michelle obama is giving this award for this movie that feeds their image that the united states government is coordinating with hollywood. many of us know the director of

the woodrow wilson center. when faced with both noam chomsky and george bush issue an appeal for the release the regime put on a program on television and they had animation of george soros' weekly meetings with george bush in the white house and plans on how they were going to undermine these meetings. not all of us knew mr. soros was meeting with mr. bush. we certainly didn't realize they were planning together to overthrow the islamic republic. they really believe this stuff, people so you think that refraining from saying the word regime change is going to change

his mind when that's what he thought for 20 years and speaks about it all the time? , on, give me a break. >> i would add just two points. with regard to our public diplomacy i would argue for a very calibrated approach to our use of language that i think first of all if we are to full-throated in our support for the people ultimately if the protests fizzle and you only highlight that the regime is able to crow for success. it's important for us to come out on behalf of the protest and the right to protest and the right for their human rights to not the hit at the regime. ..

>> regime change and we will

not have a bigger impact on here. but it can in certain context that i would argue we shouldn't do this now but in the context of that geopolitical competition with iran in the region if they start attacking american interest or soldiers directly then we will bring the conflict home if there is a conducive context to the battle more so in the past that gives us the ability to enforce resources with internal security. that is the way i tend to look at this with the geopolitical competition i just don't know about that regime change from washington. but we can impose cost if they

do things against us in the region. >> center for american progress. to notice those early demonstrations if somebody wanted to comment whether there is a meaningful minority convention affecting the course of the protest? but second, yesterday there was an article saying one of the early triggers of the protest was relieved of a budget with the islamic shins

or clerics that were never previously revealed. is anybody familiar with that document? there wasn't a lot of detail. >> i will start with the second question. the president's speech brought no articles whatsoever. that speech is much longer than usual long -- i quoted what he had to say about the banking system. but he did lay out a much more realistic number the only

reason is the budget was nine pages. that was it give me authority to what i want to spend but this years budget speech is extremely blind and much more honest than in previous years. so that will provoke demonstrations? i don't think so. to take that whole diplomatic approach with transparency and flesh things out more. it wasn't a protest and regardless of tradition they spend what they feel like it. but he says no. you have to get the allocations of that is my

comment. with minorities we put out a piece and what it says half of iran is made up of nonpersons. if you have those provinces demonstrating, although increasingly finding minorities in the cities. so one study he was completing for us where the demonstrations started there are over well millions sunnis living that they are very unhappy and isis is doing a successful job in recruiting. iran is beginning to have a serious isis problem because of the way it treats.

so with those minority problems the heartland starts you demonstrate and that comes out with a fair number of demands and in effect also with nationalism. the big thing of the azerbaijani nationalists those that are marching four hours up a mountain top. it is snowy that time a year how you get people to march up the mountain of snow? god only knows. >> can i ask you as a follow-up, with how much it spends on foreign adventures is noticed a law in the western media so how does that

reverberate in lebanon for the decimation? now suddenly iran spending is a political issue? you mean recently? >> so far everybody has been very careful. some are excited that some are afraid. and said do not comment but this issue of budget has been a big issue for a very long time it is not recent but the community that has been affected by the budget cuts and changes but has the law and lebanon is the resistance

which is no longer a priority or social services and three is the only thing is the identity connecting to has the law has been law. that is the only thing but everything else is the issue. that what publicly love people -- love publicly and talking about the budget cuts. >> there is a question in the back. >> from the hudson institute. so to point out with that sense there is a departure from the playbook so from michael's remarks there were

traditional actions. they did not do the same from 2009 they take those to three separate provinces so my question is do you feel there is considerable uncertainty or division potentially damaging the leadership affecting this particular crisis? >> the talk about the of labor and security forces it is hard to get a handle as i said because of the poor quality of the video coming out. the impression i get on

iranian officials law enforcement is the first line. backed up by the disease all the way haven't seen the hezbollah type the vigilantes and that might be in part there is a process of professionalization of security forces? who knows. we had some statements by officials saying those law enforcement forces reinforces the need to be supported by the seas and the commander said the units have been employed with those central provinces. but let me say it is hard to

get our arms around this. but in the past iran has devoted resources to creating internal security capabilities and in iran you have the space of operations or headquarters. they have exercises, and videos and on motorcycles now if they were planning a nationwide protest in the small cities and towns they need time to redeploy them they were set up to deal with a protest movement the infrastructure was in the big cities. that is where we will see

investment in the coming years. with the diversion of resources from regional defense and power projection one area we have to focus we have this infrastructure built into the city but now it also has to be small towns. >> from the russian embassy listening to a thoughtful discussion i just have a few minor remarks regarding russia we never said it was inspired from outside but what we said was over the speculation of what was going on.

we have used as an internal matter and the reunion lung -- and the iranian people could decide. they were finding remedies and solutions and secondly so what kind of relations we have with their lawn? and to defend the country for us. with a different kind of relationship with them bilaterally so we believe the best way for the security of peace in the region to it here to these principles. >> the russian reaction is

much more restrained and she thought that was quite interesting. more questions? one more in the back. >> i was wondering patrick's response to my earlier question but about the internal order also a question for patrick is the country that you describe looks desperate with that economic situation. do you think that will collapse or what happens then?

>> economic situation has not been great in 2017 but was worse before. and they have been for a long time was spending on priorities so to supplement the question i may add what makes today different and today they can resolve the country's problems in spite of ahmadinejad's best efforts, as far as we can tell it is still a smaller road of gdp than the united states and the deficits are smaller. deficits are in bad shape but nothing compares like cyprus. it is like ordinary or italy or spain and we have a lot of experience and a lot of people

could provide good advice about what to do but it is impressive dithering about the modest changes of the central bank authority. they're not talking about setting up a bad bank with bad loans when doing those things that you have to do with the serious banking crisis. that isn't the scale that we saw in cyprus or iceland. they dealt very effectively with their crisis. it is the inability to take tough decisions that is the fundamental problem and it is quite possible and similarly one can imagine policies that

are directed at ordinary people or see the rainy and government is looking out the funny ways to cut spending and hitting the poor with no trickle-down. it isn't necessary. quite frankly to come up with a different set of policies to address an awful lot of concerns the deposit insurance system for the banks? excuse me very few countries that don't. that is not revolutionary it would be possible to implement that then instead of having those people in the streets because they lost their entire life savings you could address that problem it isn't that hard.

i have to say i am impressed by the economic incompetence. clearly there is a deadlock in decision-making of partisan deadlock which is much worse than here in washington. >> that brings us to the end of our time. thanks to our panel b-17 and our staff around the room who assisted and thanks for coming. have a good day. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> as a judge of 45 years having gone from that active life to make decisions and going to court to judging, was not a difficult edition and did you ever miss the life of advocacy? >> it wasn't difficult it has been some some have become judges and so disliked the decision-making process they left the bench. i was glad to be an advocate. i found the process although different, enormously challenging and satisfying. i liked being u.s. attorney i liked being judge because the opportunity to resolve disputes large and small because they all matter to somebody they have public

significance that is a satisfying role. >> i propose action instead of forwards, now before it is too light lung -- late to say again and again and again that i propose it for our own american self-interest. >> vandenberg finds himself in opposition with fdr in the early 30s to take majority in the senate and in the opposition for the next one dozen years and that means to get anything done, that often meantes