this is just, you know, some smart folks who care a lot about the country who are offering their opinions, and one can turn the channel quite easily. >> you know, actually with, i i think -- i know people want to get to lunch, and this has been such an interesting session, but i want to just close by once again saying about jamie and what's happened to this writers' festival. it's become an ideas festival in which we have some of the most intelligent and interesting people in the audience and in the panel. please join me in thank this terrific group. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> post a comment on our facebook page, facebook.com/booktv. >> good evening, everyone. my name's liz, i'm a member of the event staff, and i would like to welcome you all this evening to politics and prose at the wharf. just a quick note before we get started, now would be a great time to silence cell phones, feel free to take flash-free photography. tonight we're here to welcome hendrik meyer for his new book, arthur vandenberg, the man in the middle of the american century. when arthur vandenberg assumed his seat as a republican senator from michigan in 1928, he was an outspoken opponent of the new deal and a staunch isolationist. by the end of his life, he was one of the key architects of the american postwar foreign policy. in this comprehensive biography,

meij is er charts the course. reporter, editor and executive producer of the documentary america's senator: the unexpected odyssey of arthur vandenberg. he'll be in conversation with a journalist, brookings fellow and the author of "the end of europe." please help me welcome them both to politics & prose. >> wow, thank you all for coming and thank you for that nice introduction. i'm flighted to have hank here with us tonight because this is a surprisingly very relevant book. written about someone who i, have to admit, i knew not a lot about. and i'm glad that i read it because art vandenberg is really, i think, one of the unsung heroes of 20th century american politics and also foreign policy. and when you think of or you

hear the expression quite a bit over the past year or two liberal world order, and we think about the institutions that comprise that liberal world order -- the u.n., nato, transatlantic alliance with europe -- and art vandenberg was there really playing a crucial role in all, the development of all these institutions. so as someone who writes about and studies foreign policy, i'm very happy that this book has been established and that you've written it. so i don't want to, you know, just lecture all night, but why don't you, fist, tell us -- first, tell us why it was you decided to write a book about art vandenberg. i know you're from michigan, so he's the hometown boy, but surely there's a lot more going on. >> thanks, jamie, and good to see you all. this is -- this was a hometown character. i'm from grand rapids, michigan, who even in his hometown is

largely forgotten or had been until very recently. and that was irresistible as someone who likes international affairs, foreign policy study that, to find someone of such consequence for whom there was no complete biography really created a sense of mission. here was a story worst telling, someone very consequential in the early years of the cold war and largely forgotten. he died in 1951 in office before he could write his own memoirs, and he was a longtime journalist and had anticipated doing that. two other would-be biographers died before completing anything past 1945 when his most influential years were just beginning. i have so far managed to avoid that fate -- [laughter] and so had a chance to fill a gap in history. >> and what was the process

like? what did you -- what were the sources of your work? was it paper collection? was it interviews? how did you write book? >> there was a professor who'd done his ph.d. at the university of michigan who, in 1970, published a book called "the evolution of a modern republican: arthur vandenberg," taking his life up to 1945. i had assumed when i began thinking about vandenberg in the late 1980s that the world didn't need two biographies of this guy, and is one was well underway. but a friend of mine who's an historian in michigan was putting together the program in 1989 for the annual meeting of the historical society of michigan. and it was one of these things where he had to fill out a program, find a dozen speakers on various state-related topics. and so he said, well, you're interested in arthur vandenberg,

you don't have to write a book, but we talked about him at our meeting. i think there was an audience of about six people, and i spoke about the debate of the appeal of the arms embargo in the neutrality act when vandenberg is leading the isolationists fighting roosevelt's efforts to come to the aid of the british. and i gave that talk in october of 1989, and in january of 1990 -- unbeknownst to me -- the professor what had written this first volume and was presumably doing the second died. and his adult daughter, he was a professor in chicago at that time, and his adult daughter was trying to sell her father's house in willmet. turned out he had a very difficult life and a lot of health issues and emotional issues. she didn't know what to do with his lifetime of research on arthur vandenberg in his basement. it had no monetary value, this was pre-digital age when it's

all xerox copies from the truman library, the british foreign office, but she hated to just chuck her father's lifetime of research in the street. she calls the historical society of michigan and says do you know anyone with an interest in arthur vandenberg. well, i'd spoken eight weeks earlier at their conference, and i was the only name they had, and i ended up bringing a vanload of boxes and files back to grand rapids. and suddenly instead of the world not needing a second biography, i had a sense of mission that if i'm not going to do it, who is? and that was the beginning. his papers are at the bentley library at the university of michigan, and i was able to spend a lot of time there working through the primary source material there. and then beginning in the late, in the mid '90s was able to interview people who were still alive who had worked with or known arthur vandenberg from william fulbright to gore

vidaling to a lot of journalists who had covered him during his years in the '40s. >> so up until really pearl harbor, arthur vandenberg was one of the leading isolationists in the united states. can you talk about how he came to this particular world view? what were the main shapers, the influences that made him an isolationist? >> as a senior in high school, he won an oratory prize talking about 1900 on the peace conference at the hague. so this was a guy who had, as a teenager, an interest in foreign affairs, and one would argue even an impulse to internationalism. but as with so many americans, he was a young newspaper ed editor at the time of world war i and really bought into the wilsonian crusade to make the world safe for democracy. the moral overtones that we gave to our intervention in europe in

1917. and when the treaty of versailles failed to create that lasting democracy, democratic reign that everyone had hoped for and, in fact, sowed the seeds of discontent that would result in the rise of the dictators in europe a dozen years later, vandenberg like so many americans was disillusioned with that experience. what had we, what had been our reasoning for getting into the war. and so that led him to be a part of the nye committee hearings in the mid 1930s exploring the causes of the war. was it bankers, was it armaments makers, what led us to intervene. and that led to the neutrality act in 1937 binding, preventing united states from trading with any belligerent in a war. and that, and in his defense of that and in seeing neutrality as

the best way to protect the interests of the united states, he really, in effect, isolated -- he merged as the strongest voice. william bora, the lion of idaho, was the senior isolationist in the senate. he died in 1940, and by that time vandenberg was really the acknowledged leader of senate isolationism there. and he really maintained that position up until pearl harbor. in fact, i'm going to read a quote from your book which is fdr to his treasury secretary, henry morgenthau. i think we ought to introduce a bill for statues of vandenberg and taft to be in berlin with a swastika on them. >> and that was the same speech for those of you who know, he had railed against martin, barton and fish who were the congressional leaders, the house leaders of opposition.

and these, boston and taft and vandenberg were in the senate. and they were blocking every attempt of fdr, fighting him on neutrality, fighting him on selective service, fighting him on lend-lease, right up to pearl harbor they were trying to tie his hands from committing the u.s. to war. >> you talk about pearl harbor and the effect that it had on arthur vandenberg? >> vandenberg claimed that pearl harborren inned isolationist -- pearl harbor ended isolationism for any thinking person on that day. that's too easy the say, and we know it certainly didn't end isolationism, but it certainly muted the debate during the war and was also a wake-up call that the sort of psychological notion that our oceans were barriers that would insulate us. and vanned isen berg always, didn't like that notion of

isolationist. he'd always try to play language games to protect himself from being -- >> the new ordeal as well. >> exactly. and so prl harbor was a real blow to the isolationist position. but for him in many ways it was the beginning of rethinking what america's role in the world should be. >> talk a little bit more about that rethinking. did he, did he regret the positions that he had taken up til pearl harbor? did he think he was wrong to take those positions? did he think it was fdr's policies that led to pearl harbor, but that once the united states was attacked it was irrelevant because the country had to defend itself? there's a lot of nuances there, i think. >> i think you've summed it i well, but he was innately suspicious after a decade of being on the outside looking in in terms of foreign policy planning in a decade of fighting roosevelt's efforts in the new ordeal, the second new deal.

had a fundamental distrust of roosevelt. and so with the -- we had, as roosevelt was trying to tamp down japanese ambitions by restricting sales of oil and things like that on the eve of world war ii, vandenberg was suspicious that fdr might have been inviting conflict through a reluctance to negotiate a new trade treaty with the japanese. so he didn't blame him for pearl harbor. he wasn't conspiratorial many that way, but he felt like roosevelt may have hastened that day by his attitude toward dealing with the japanese. >> and then once the united states enters war, what is his finish how does his relationship with fdr change? because these are two very colorful personalities, let's say. >> well, he's -- that suspicion lingers, of course. he talks about when george marshall comes to testify before

the foreign relations committee in 1942 and talking about some of the early allied offensives and going to north africa and things like that, that marshall brings a credibility that he hadn't seen before from the executive branch. he just doesn't trust roosevelt. but then in 1943 as the tide is beginning to turn and some of the areas that had been under axis control are liberated, the first -- before there's a formal united nations there's something called the united nations relief and rehabilitation administration. or and this was a convening of the allies to try and figure out how to get aid to liberated areas that were destroyed, impoverished. ..

re recognizes the need to do something. he's not about to relinquish congressional authority and cede it to roosevelt, but said it's not going to be an executive or but doesn't need to be a treaty. it can be something that the white house can swallow and get a majority vote in congress. when you talk al super majorities and simple majorities today, he argued for a simple majority which distances him from some isolationists who said, no, no, it's a treaty. in his eyes he won a degree of congressional oversight over the executive. that was in early -- in doing so, he is getting a compromise between sides on foreign affairs

and that begins to characterize his experience after that. >> what role is his being from the midwest played in this? people think of isolationism, prewar, the think of the midwest and it's the coastal elites who are he internallist is. as do you think the regional role or geographical role played a part? >> i thinked did in the early days. it did in the aftermath of world war i, which the committee in many ways is investigating. was it this coastal elites who greater vested interest in the intervention than the midwesternes. by the time world war ii comes look it's let's domestically

driven. he begins as a generally an ally and supporter of vandenberg and regards vandenberg is a benedict arnold when he begins to veer from a pure isolationist part. >> host: above world war ii is over we see arthur vandenberg being the folder cold war soldier. we talk about the beginning of the cold war and how that affected this record would you? >> sure. the generation of disk make -- digs decision makers who came of age after world war 1, and

that's truman and roosevelt and vandenberg and that's the failure of the league of nations and that failure may or may not -- the success of the league of nations may or may not have altered the course of history and changed world war ii, prevented world war ii, but certainly was a disaster in and of itself. and so one of the great criticisms of wilson's efforts at versailles was that he picked an american delegation which he chose to lead but which otherwise was nondescript. we don't remember who the del delegates were, particularly no prominent republicans. he comes back to washington with the covenant of the league of nations and not making any changes to its, and the republicans, in particularly in the form of henry cabot lodge, said, we want to make a few

changes in third. we weren't involved and would have done certain things to protect american sovereignty in this new organization, and of course it falls apart and the lying -- league is not approved. roosevelt was keenly conscious of wilson's error that and knew he could not make the mistake. so he had to basically hold his nose and vandenberg is the leading republican spokesmanphone policy, roosevelt has to appoint vandenberg to the u.n. conference of international organization in san francisco in the late spring of 1945, which is the first meeting of the u.n., creating the u.n. there had been some preliminary work here in washington prior to that, but this is the delegation's from all of the sovereign nations meeting in san francisco to perfect and approve

the charter, and roosevelt names vandenberg and his democratic counterpart on foreign relations with whom he traded the chairmanship, tom connally of texas, and two house members, one of each party and the president of the barnard, and harold stassen from the navy. they're the six person american delegation. the -- then roosevelt dies. roosevelt really not to say the least, work closely with the state department. the secretary of state and his successor were not in the loop very often with roosevelt.

so steynus, a young steel company executive and now new secretary of state was really more of a manager than a diplomat. he is leading the u.s. delegation, truman had had hurricane once with roosevelt between their election as vice president and roosevelt's death, and so knows nothing, of course, going ton, famously nothing about the atomic bomb, and they get to san francisco, state department, president, are out of the loop, president unschools in foreign policy and the american delegation is in the penhouse with the french and british and russians and seat across from molotov and the soviet delegation, and vandenberg was the strongest character, the strongest personality, the most forceful figure and the one that the --

even the democrat news they needed to win approval of any kind of charter in the united states senate. and he is the -- well, he -- they each got to choose an adviser to bring with them. he he chose john foster dulles, whos thomas dewey's shadow secretary of state and significant figure in foreign policy, and the latin americans had a disproportionate share of the votes at the u.n. because so much of the rest of the world was either colonies or axis powers, and the assistant secretary for latin american affairs was nelson rockefeller, who is close to vandenberg. it's those three republicans led by vandenberg who have the votes in the senate, the votes among

united nations countries, and the gravitas, if you will, and ran denberg is facing down molotov in debates of who should get the veto and how many votes you get on what in the u.n. and that sort of thing. the war is still going on. doesn't end until later in the summer, and for the american public at large, the soviet are still our allies. they have been enduring great sacrifice, fighting nobly and hands reaching across the river in elbow, and wendell wilke wrote a book about how we can all be friends and that's the general public perception of the soviets. well, down here -- soldiers are linking arms in germany, down

here they're wrestling over the future of the world. the first blows of the cold war are coming in the opera house in san francisco. >> he has no illusions about the russians. i'll read some of these quotes from his -- he says, we need to stop the reds immediately. he's reporting back to truman, basically saying we can't give an inch. he use the word appeasement, which the last time we heard that word used was in munich and presumably his view on munich was not what it was in 1945. could you talk more about what were his attitudes toward this russians. why was he so quick to see them as not really allies anymore but enemies? what was happening in europe at the time. there was a large polish community michigan. did that play a role on his world flew.

>> yes, indeed he fought diplomatic recognition of the soviet union. his would an arch anti-communist early on and he was sense to of that both -- sensitive politically but also it raised his sensitivity to how stalin was treating poland, and so of course at yalta, famously, promises were made and not kept, and i think even in this last days, roosevelt was confiding to vandenberg that i need you in san francisco precisely because you recognize the soviets are going to be more of a problem than we thought. promising elections and not delivering them from poland and that sort of thing. so he is knee-jerk anti-communist from his history. he is alarmed at what is happening in russian -- soviet

occupied poland and that's really raised his antenna that molotov may be trying to get away with some things that are not our interest. >> so, are vandenburg plays a rural role in the founding of nato, the united nations, orienting american foreign policy to be leader of the free world, you could say, of world war ii. really charting the path for where american foreign policy has been bipartisan -- on a bipartisan basis for the past 75 years, whether it's being continued after this administration is a different question. how much was contingent in this period, 1945 to '50? we look back on it and it seems to obvious that of course we should establish something like nato, we should have a u.n.,

a -- all these things we now take for granted. how -- was it inevitable or did a lot depend upon a handful of individuals who were really the right place at the right time? >> two things somewhat in conflict. one was there was the dawning recognition the we were the only super power and certainly the only democracy intact and prosperous at the end of the war, and so that forced us to suggest -- face new responsibilities, but this is the end of the war. our soldiers want to come home. we have not suffered the way the europeans have, but we had rationing and we had controls on the way people were living here. people wanted to see that end. so that enormous impulse to, as harding's campaign and the

pointage that vandenberg created after world war i, people wanted to return to normalcy, and here you're talking about things that entail not only the maintenance of the united states military presence overseas but significant contributions in foreign aid -- >> marshall plan. >> marshall plan. and so that sense that america couldn't simply become isolationist again was strong, but when george marshall proposes the marshall plan, that is when vandenberg's talents were called into being because he is now chairman of the foreign relations committee and he reacts at first blanches at the staggering cost, because the marshall plan had begun by inviting the european nations to propose what kind of aid would be required for the reconstruction of their economies. of course their wish list was billions of dollars more than

anybody in america could swallow. so state department pairs that back a little bit and comes to congress, marshall proposes the marshall plan, and vandenberg has to pare it down more. we'll just do it year-by-year, instead of x billion, it's y billion, and trying to find the sweet spot that would still make it effective, while winning congressional approval. that was the balance he was after. congress would be willing to pass resolutions but would we really be willing to undertake vast expenditures in and so he made that dejestable but still effective, and so in hindsight, some sort of marshall plan would have still happened, but had it been a fraction of the size that it was, it would have been eeffective? the same thing with nato.

robert love -- lovette stops by and they type out the vandenberg resolution which this authorization of the united states participation in this new organization, the north atlantic treaty organization, and the senate passes that. not with a great deal of controversy because there's a recognition that it's in our interests to have -- be allied with these democracies, although for ran den berg it is an entangling alliance. he was a die seeple and worshiper of alexander hamilton who used the phrase in washington's farewell address, but then comes time in 1949 to provide aid to those devastated european militaries, and at that

the isolationist wing of the republican party, people like robert taft, it's bunking there to approve nato and another thing to give it teeth. vandenberg is looking at the red army ranged across europe and saying, it's not good enough just to say, we'll support these other countries. they need to have -- rebuild their defenses. that would have been a real struggle had vandenberg not led the way in fighting in this case more of his own party to get funding for nato. >> what lessons do you think from his life most important today? >> the -- i turn to the manuscript into the publisher about a week before the eflex 2016, and it felt like i was working in another age. i guess maybe it still does. but the two related lessons would be, of course, he becomes

an icon for bipartisanship and that's the notion that it's important to work with the other party. the -- and we all crave that, i think, but the other extreme compromise was an art form. it was -- the notion that you would stick to some principle which meant you would never change your position when the world was changing or circumstances were changing, ultimately his own experience approved was un -- proffered was uncontinue e done untenable the marshall plans hearings were some of the most extensive conducted in congress, and he wore down the opposition. he wanted to listen to everybody's opinion, and waited out the opposition, very patiently, and then he would write language where in fact one of his colleagues, he phrasees

something in the legislation, one of the colleagues situation that done make any sense? what does its mean? he says, don't worry about that. i can go to ten different senators and tell them i've included in here what you had in mind and that willingness to say, compromise is a great thing in the way democracy functions, i guess is inescapable novel that we long for. >> thank you for that. think we'll open it up to the audience for questions. so, young lady in the back. >> you said something about started out being isolationist and then you said he -- [inaudible] -- we were unaware of what he accomplished, and i was wondering if we could say that international affairs were -- -- complex, it's very, very hard to understand what is

happening unless you're part of so it that would have two implications, one, i think, would be that certain people -- [inaudible] -- also why so hard to resist people that it's important -- convince people that it's important to do the things he came back from europe thinking needed to be done. >> the question is did his experience being on the foreign relations committee -- called that? >> complexity. the extremely difficult for our people to understand -- >> no question, and i think that's part of the challenge in a way that wilson had with world war 1. one of the hazard or democracy is we want to simplify things into a crusade. make the world safe for democracy, when there may omar not have been plenty 0 good reasons to get involved, but

weren't really going to make the world safe for democracy, just going to kind of keep the germans for being more hegemonic in europe, and so i think that temptation to simplify -- one of the famous "often attributed to vandenberg, nor there is no evidence that he said it but it may catch some of the temper of the times, was with the truman doctrine so in 1946, the british who had been helping the greeks resist communist insurgency from yugoslavia, and the turks, would who feeling encircles bid the soviet union relloyds on aid from the british and the british came to the u.s. and said, we can't afford it anymore. so truman then first comes to the aid of greece and turkey, giving them supplies and arms,

and then does the truman doctrine saying to the chagrin of vandenberg and people, we'll come to the aid of people fighting for freedom anywhere, which opened up a whole new world, but it was that -- but vandenberg is said at the small meeting with congressional leaders, where truman is outlining his plans for the truman doctrine, van bender is alleged to have said, mr. president, if you take this to the country and scare the hell out of the american people, i religion support you. in other words, you can explain the complex advertise of it to us and put you have to make a sales pitch to the country and put flit terms of good and evil and we're fighting communism. that mail be what you're talking about. that trap we fall into of simplifying it so much when it is infinitely complex. i would say on -- in the history

of it, the history of that era was in many ways, in terms of first-person account issue think described most eloquently by dean atchison in his memoir, present at the creation, talk about the first years after world war ii, and he was brilliant guy and a wonderful writer and a fine secretary of state, but he also puts himself at the center of that history, and so if you read that, his boss, george marshall, one of the great american heroes, didn't do a very good job of selling vandenberg and the leaderses on the work in greece and turkey. and van ben degree asked if you mind if i anytime and explain the domino theirry and to how that works? and he talked about vandenberg and said we would draft these resolutions and then we'd sent

them to vandenberg, and he would have to put his stamp on is, making it sound as if is was vandenberg's ego that had to make tweaks but that's true but he was taking the state department proposal and making its saleable, digestible to congress, and ache this son -- so atchison sort of treats people like marshall and vandenberg as sort of -- they were important, good guys, but i really was figuring all this stuff out. i interviewed clark clifford, who was an aide to truman, and clifford said, part of truman's skill was, he said, with -- was sort of not trying to put himself in the middle -- famously called that european recovery the marshall plan -- but also said, atchison and

vandenberg were big eeg goes and truman was willing to step back and let them figure it out. >> i think also you have seen with president trump, said a lot of things on the campaign trail and is not exactly perhaps -- realized the world asia bit more complicated place than it was when he was campaigning. sir. >> how about the -- [inaudible] -- was he funny [inaudible] >> he was very earnest that way but was a much -- well, he was not an intellectual. he had much more interesting life than the average politician. he became the editor of the local republican party just before his 22nd birthday, and he was at that time actually --

he would write an editorial and send its off to henry cabot lodge during the league of nations debate, and lodge writes back to him and says, i don't know if you are the first to propose reservations along these lines but he was posing them, and may have been the first, but the -- i'm going to steal a line you use dish like a line you wrote, unshared idealism is a menace. this guy is influencing the league of nations debate as a young editor in grand rapids, and then the -- but he -- that capacity to change goes into the personal life, too. so, sinclair lewis publishes babbin1923, he is a tout towerrerring hit rare figure of the time, and for those who hasn't arrest babbit it's the

study of the middlebrow, middle age, midst mid-westerner in a middle size city and being caricatures by sinclair lewis for all the status quo things he favors, good rotarian and a local booster and so the name babbity is taken up by hl american win as short hand for everything that is immediate ochre about the marry e american culture, and vandenberg writes an editorial sat says -- save the best of babbi. a guy who carolina about his community and a good god are fearing soul and this is in the 1920s. in 1935, vandenberg and hazel, who traveled a lot, are sailing back from england, and sinclair lewis has married dorothy

thompson know, important female constant of her age -- >> the first american journalist be expel from naz germany. >> yes, and the first one to get the interview from adolph history explore coming home and saying this is a real menace. she goes home early to file her stories on speaker interviews with history explore mussolini, and lewis is on the same ship back as the vaccine denbergs. sends a node up to vandenberg's stateroom saying, would you like to have a drink? and they meet him in the lounge and hazel says in her diary, sl tight, already been drinking a lot. but they become fast friends on that trip, and later on lewis is writing to vandenberg, telling him he should run for president, and they were hosting book parties for him. one college league said the only

senator who could strut sitting down. so he was a picture of the pomp pows senator -- pompous senator bud hat a wit about him. wrote short stories, little post tri, never enough to make a living, but those culture impulses and you'll get. >> entirely different pictures of him if i talk to younger reporters, he wouldn't give them the time of day, but older reporters he was one of them, and e.r.a. himself as a sort of ink stained wretch, and was somewhat beloveds by his colleagues in he senate and a stiff demeanor to the outside world. but he gave off a larger than

life aura. he when he died, edward r. muir row did a radio testimony to him saying he was somewhat larger than life in his influence, in the way the came across. ...

>> >> and he was the first working for the democratic

national committee and the first person to really develop scientific polling but that book was just done in the last year or so. >> between radio and television. [inaudible] >> can people be effective without those connections across party lines, you do get

that sense when they go home every thursday coming back on monday, that it is so different. the washington marriott today, there were so many people living there congressmen and senators from both parties or supreme court judge and henry wallace when secretary -- signature loan -- secretary of agriculture lived there and then and then showing each other how to use a boomerang but at the same time vanderburg is railing against the agricultural adjustment act and wallace is a symbol of the new deal access to problem crops to drive up prices so that interaction was so

continuous it certainly allowed them to bond. talking to one congresswoman when her husband was going through divorce jerry and betty ford would have him over to dinner they built those relationships that so few congressmen have today it has to be more difficult. [inaudible] >> and operating in a cocoon in those respects. >> for the next election. >> yes.

>> is there any hope? >> part of the challenges compromise gets you in trouble today. like we say about our political leaders could they get elected? yes but then could they get nominated to the primary? >> who is the democratic senator you have the closest relationship with? do you make just because they spend so much time together maybe connolly although that was an awkward rivalry. he was on very friendly terms with michigan democrat friend who came in on the late 30s he was on very friendly terms with truman but because of the

recognition of his weakness and he also was a child of the senate the day after roosevelt dies he goes over and has lunch with congressional leaders and to be shut out for a decade that spoke so profoundly and sent vandenberg the last box of cigars. that relationship went along ways. that meant vandenberg had more confidence. [inaudible]

>> go to henry ford it was a scandalous election campaign that was taft secretary of the navy he and henry ford spent so much money and was never allowed to take the seat but henry ford's isolation during world war i was to be very critical of the government and basically he had a famous

remark of the sinking of the lusitania they should have known better so at that time buying into wilson's arguments he would have out henry ford into revised tax law ford was still a privately held company and the inheritance taxes would force ford to go public which they did but it also could have jeopardized the state of the company so he tried to help ford in that way. so father coughlan -- coughlan

famously moves into the anti- somatic role and is doing that in league with another congressman the flame throwing evangelical minister. and i don't have any records they were so busy attacking roosevelt that vandenberg would have been somebody they would nominally support and with minimal interaction. >> and to remind you.

[inaudible] >> first of all he contributed to it in a sense has as as fighting for greater appropriations for the military and nato allies that aids in the development of the military industrial complex so they are budget hawks restraining the spending with the military industrial

complex at the same time eisenhower was his guy. and to view eisenhower to embody his approach to the world that understood the need for american leadership in the united states could be no longer isolationist to happily endorse his caution because he was very leery of the growth of federal power. the air force base in california isn't named for him but for his nephew who was one of the rising stars in the air force and air force chief of staff and later the second director of the cia.

they would go on the kitchen and who knows about what that vandenberg was certainly singly from isolation that he knows about the reality and how isolationism was no longer strategically possible to the security of united states also may have made them more sympathetic to appropriations. but they were so much in sync with their approach to the world he would have shared his cautio caution.

[inaudible] >> the korean war actually breaks out right after vandenberg has gone home diagnosed with lung cancer half of his lung removed and makes a brief return to washington in the 50s but really he is on the sidelines. he deals with it theoretically because people come to him to say should be support truman or not? of course he isn't asking for a declaration of war but he never really resolved in his own mind that perpetual debate

when does the executive come to congress and ask permission? so to say if you have an emergency but beyond that display yourself to congress. and he was engaged in that debate from the distance but really no longer a part of deliberate lung -- deliberation deliberations. >> thank you for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good morning.