>> [inaudible conversations] we are thrilled to have you all here today to discuss the administration's review an important document that just came out on groundhog's day of this year following the earlier national security strategy of december and defense strategies of the administration is doing a nice job keeping its work running smoothly on issuing the guidance prior to now the unveiling of its budget request. we are thrilled to have decent beginning our discussion today.

he has one of the longer titles but one of the more important titles, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, a job that jim miller also had and we will talk about in the table that follows, but for now i want to introduce david who has been one of the most important authors and voices on the conceptualization and training in the writing of the document that we now have available in all of you can access as you are aware on the internet. it is about a 70 page document much longer than the unclassified version and has a lot of elaboration you are going tyou'regoing to hear about that. david will give some short remarks and then we will swap out a little before the 11:00 mark for the panel discussion than i will moderate and introduce the panel when we get to that point. let me say a couple more things

about david. this is his second or third or fourth time in government and he was also an important figure in the bush administration working on the policy which gets you thinking a lot about relations with nato and other allies into the nuclear posture review and he's also an important contributor. he hails from california by way of college and studied foreign service at georgetown, was involved in a number of jobs in washington as we mentioned earlier including shortwave or consulting a job he held just before joining the trump administration last summer when he was confirmed for this job so without further ado, please welcome david. [applause]

thank you for making the trek out here to participate. it is good to be here and it's been a while since i've been here and i always appreciate the opportunity to come back. one prediction i would note in a very generous introduction and that is my title which was the principal deputy undersecretary for policy has now been changed thanks to the national defense authorization act that was signed in to law a couple of them is a goer so. now i have a better chance so as

the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy began it is my pleasure to be here and talk about this very critical issue in the nuclear posture review. as you all know, each post-cold war president has in his first term conduct a review of u.s. nuclear policy posture programs. president trumps first memorandum issued one week into the new administration and secretary to undertake such review of the nuclear policy. the aim of the review was to ensure the united states nuclear deterrent is robust, flexible,

resilient, ready and appropriately tailored to detour 21st century threats and reassure allies. the department of defense conducted this review along with the departments of state and energy and in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside of the government. the resulting 2018 nuclear posture review establishes the department of defense priorities as maintaining a safe and effective nuclear arsenal that can effectively contribute to the key goals deterring nuclear and non- nuclear. assuring the allies and partners in achieving u.s. objectives should they fail and hedging against an uncertain future. it also emphasizes the policy will continue to contribute to

u.s. nuclear nonproliferation goals. these are consistent with past priorities of the policy and indeed the 2018 maintains the nuclear policies adopted by both democratic and republican administrations for example it recognizes the need for the nuclear triad and sustains the previous administration's plan for modernizing the aging nuclear triad of the land-based and breathing delivery platforms as well as its supporting nuclear infrastructure and command and control. consistent with the 2010 npr conducted in the administration,

it declares that would only consider using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to the u.s. vital interests. in addition, it also reaffirms the commitment to the arms control and nonproliferation while maintaining support for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and by extending the deterrent that is critical to their security and promotes nuclear nonproliferation by checking the need to acquire their own nuclear weapons. each of the previous has rightly emphasized it must be responsive to the threat environment of its time. it addresses the reality that

while the cold war has been over for decades, a much more challenging nuclear threat environment has developed since the previous 2010 posture review. this is the duality that confronted the new administration when it began its nuclear posture review. accordingly, the 2018 is grounded in a realistic assessment of the contemporary security environment. one that recognizes the return of great power competition and the increasing salient of nuclear weapons in the arsenals and thof the doctrines of potenl adversaries. for example, since 2010, the russian leadership has made repeated and explicit nuclear threat to the u.s. nato allies and others brandishing nuclear

weapons in any way we really have not seen since the height of the cold war. russia is actively modernizing and expanding its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons and doing so in continuing intermediate range nuclear forces. like russia, china is pursuing a the moves at the expense of its neighbors including the key u.s. allies and doing so also through the threat of force. china also continues to expand its nuclear capabilities in both quantity and quality. since 2010, china announced the development of the field into the orange plastic vessels. the new ballistic missile submarine and strategic bomber.

china's intentional lack of transparency regarding scope and scale of its nuclear modernization serves only to magnify uncertainties about its future intent. also, since 2010, north korea has rapidly increased the pace of its nuclear testing and of the intercontinental and ballistic missile launch vehicles. at the same time north korea has made explicit nuclear threats to the united states and our allies in the region. while it remains uncertain, the maligned activities and hegemonic aspirations in the middle east are not coming in contrast to these developments over the past decade, the united stateunitedstates has built no f weapons were delivery systems other than the 35 for the past two decades.

we have instead sustained our nuclear deterrent with life extension programs keeping systems and platforms decades beyond their designed service life. former secretary of defense ash carter rightly observed that if there is an arms race under way, the united states is not a participant. it is clear that our attempt to lead by example in reducing the numbers and salience of nuclear weaponthe salience ofnuclear wed have not been reciprocated. since 2010 for the prospect fora military confrontation have expanded while both china and russia have increased the number of their nuclear weapons programs. the intentional restraint in the

policies did not leave the rest of the road t world to follow te path. this isn't a conclusion reflected in the 2018 nuclear posture review. the u.s. national intelligence council recognizes differences in the u.s. and russian approaches to nuclear weapons in 2012 that nuclear ambitions in the u.s. and russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions. reducing the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. security strategy is a u.s. objective while russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strate strategy. the 2018 npr response to this threat environment not by

changing the tenets of the nuclear policy that have bipartisan support, but by emphasizing the maintenance of the capabilities needed to detour the war in the current environment. it also seeks to clarify the policies to help remove the potential for the mistaken calculation on the potential adversaries that limit the threats were escalation and provide them with any possible useful political or military advantage. correcting such calculations is a key to maintaining the deterrent of nuclear war. in this regard i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 npr. in the policy committee recommended supplements to the deterrent capabilities all of

which have been subject to considerable news accounts in what i would consider to be a mischaracterization and much of the public commentary. first let me say the 2018 npr returns the nuclear attack against us, our allies and partners to the top priority of u.s. nuclear policy. given the security environment and the changes in the environment that i've highlighted, this is a prudent, realistic and i would argue necessary change to. second, the nuclear and non- nuclear attacks, the 2018 npr clarifies the u.s. declaratory policy regarding nuclear weapons. doing so does not expand the

circumstances for nuclear use or lower the threshold as some commentators suggested. rather, while maintaining the measure of ambiguity it provide some clarification. it would lead to the u.s. consideration of a popular response. this clarification enhances deterrence in the raises the threshold by reducing the potential for adversary miscalculation. as potential long nuclear capabilities continue to become more and more lethal, the u.s. policy must make clear non- nuclear strategic attacks that would have catastrophic effects of the american people and our allies must also be deterred. finally, in addition to prioritized and the deterrence,

and adding some clarity to the extreme circumstances, the 2018 npr also recommends the programs to strengthen u.s. capabilities to detour attacks and assure allies. first is the modification of the existing sub marine launch ballistic missiles to include a low yield option. second is the pursuit of a cruise missile. despite the capabilities of the existing nuclear triad, russia is actions indicate that moscow may hold the mistaken belief that its numerous and diverse nonstrategic arsenal provides useful options for limited first use nuclear threats or employment. we believe this to supplements

represented in the npr are important to help protect the misconception and convince russia and any other potential letters. that the united states and its allies will not be coerced by the threat of limited nuclear first use. the other point i would make is a meter of the capabilities is a new capability and the ballistic missiles and vaults relatively minor modification to an existing warhead. in addition, neither of the capabilities will require underground nuclear testing

individual u.s. treaty obligations. these capabilities are intended to strengthen the deterrence of the war and the assurance of allies, thereby helping to ensure that nuclear weapons are not employed or proliferated. the most recognized effective deterrence is about tailoring our capabilities to a potential adversaries calculation regarding the use of nuclear force to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. we must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats and behavior of potential adversaries. the capabilities recommended by the 2018 our table to raise the

use and to do so with minimal changes to the u.s. nuclear posture. we believe the policy announced in the npr is a reasonable response to the changes in the current security environment. now let me be clear, the goal of our recommendations into the goal of throle of the recognitis contained in the 2018 npr. modernization of the nuclear deterrent option of the tailored defense strategies with flexible capabilities and clarification on the role of nuclear weapons all send a deterrent message to the adversaries while also reassuring our allies. finally, the 2018 npr helps ensure that our diplomats speak.

russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously without a robust and ongoing modernization program. the russian leaders have said as much, and the secretary recently testified russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. criticcritics favorite eliminatg u.s. systems in the face of an extensive u.s. russia modernization effort are undermining america's greatest bargaining leverage and the prospects for the future arms agreements. the nuclear posture review is one of several important reinforcing national security documents meant to guide the u.s. policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world.

much as we might prefer otherwise, the u.s. nuclear weapons are the bedrock of the american and allied security. security. as colin gray has said, nuclear weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world. after the slaughter of the two world wars, they have presented large-scale cover power conflicr more than seven decades. in the competition from adversariesforadversaries, allie american people should know they have the will and the flexible resilient nuclear force is needed to protect the peace. before turning things over to the panel discussion, let me take this opportunity to thank the brookings institutio institr the opportunity to come here today to briefly present the

departments work and engage in a discussion on these issues that are tremendously vital to the nation's security. i appreciate you being here and your attention and i look forward to your questions and site. thank you all very much. [applause] >> questions, comments, suggestions. recommendations? yes sir.

for escalating into the more conventional sized nuclear weapons? >> i don't think of it in terms of getting involved in an exchange. the way we look at this again is what we are trying to do is prevent in exchange for not engaging one and therefore it is incumbent upon us to think about how do we do that in the world has changed dramatically since the last was done and reflects developments by russia and other states that tend to suggest

increased reliance on the possibility that nuclear weapons even in a limited way might have a degree of political or military utility so the recommendations we are proposing to include a low yield ballistic missile and a nuclear armed cruise missile are intended not to engage over box to fight a nuclear war or even suggest one could be thought anyway that is limited however one wants to define the term amid, but that is going to try to convince adversaries and to potential opponents that they should not feel that they have some exploited advantage by using the capability for which the united states has no counter. so, the very purpose of what

you're doing is more prevention, not fighting. and i understand the characterizations, many of the characterizations i've seen tend to suggest what we are looking to do is engage the kind of limited strikes that your question suggests. i suggest looking at it differently. what we are trying to do is prevent an opponent for believing such a course of action is actually useful or beneficial. >> [inaudible] >> what we believe in is having flexible nuclear capabilities tailored to specific circumstances to make the most

sense for deterrence and assurance. obviously, no two states are alike. we have multiple threats that we are trying to detour. to do that, it may take flexible capabilities. in some cases, certain types of military capabilities sufficient for other cases. there is a robustness in terms of the capabilities we have at our disposal in order to detour. it's to initiate the conflict would escalate conflict.

for the dimension of the agreement if it can also promote on the arms race. sputnik i don't see it as a contradiction whatsoever. in fact, i mentioned our extended deterrent that we extend to 2,000 plus allies overseas. i would argue the nuclear arsenal that serves the function

is quite possibly the most successful nonproliferation tool we have had in our toolkit literally for decades, because it has dissuaded friends and allies from feeling the need to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own so from a nonproliferation standpoint, i think it's very much supports u.s. nonproliferation objectives. in terms of the question about an arms race, i have seen that commentary as well a number of times. i go back to the statement i read from a former secretary of defense ash carter. the united states hasn't been participating for quite some time if you look at the details of the russian federation has been doing with its own nuclear

modernization program if you look at the russian military doctrine and the exercises of the strategic force exercises that russia has conducted which have been unrivaled since the days of the cold war. a number of which involve the exercise of strategic nuclear forces and the first use of nuclear weapons. if you look at all of the systems that they have been engaged in modernizing in recent years it is difficult to understand how what we are proposing to do in this nuclear posture in maintaining the efficacy and developing the supplemental and modest capabilities i mentioned in any

way, shape or form, we are not looking to match what russia is doing what and for weapon or looking to build up the thousands of non- strategic nuclear weapons that the russians have in their arsenal. what we are trying to do is convince potential adversaries whether it be russia, china, north korea, whomever that there is no benefit perceiving the course of action that might lead to their actual use of nuclear weapons first or some kind of a so-called limited way. we want to make certain that the cost to an opponent and an aggressor of any nuclear use far outweighs any perceived benefit

that they might think it occur to them. that is the essence of what we have recommended and again i would argue it is consistent with the sort of traditional policies as they have evolved over many decades. so, again i think there is much more continuity to its conclusions and recommendations than the differences. there's a lot of continuity and it has been occasionally overlooked. i come from a country that decided the security would be

better if we were not a nuclear target, so h we withdrew from tt relationship. would you be supportive of other allies in the united states is fightincited for the national it there would not be in a clear tr alliance handles assigning the treaty for the nuclear weapons? >> it is up to the individual states and allies to decide what approach they want to take. i will tell you we have had similar discussions and debates in this context for many years. it remains a nuclear alliance and i don't see that changing them in your future. there is a general recognition among allies that nuclear deterrence remains important.

i think that there is also a general recognition that because of some of the changes that i alluded to but have taken place in the world and the environment in recent years, the issue of preventing nuclear conflict has taken on a growing importance. it's also generally recognized by allies so i don't want to speak for the other countries should or shouldn't do, but i think it is clear not only to the united states, but u.s. allies abroad as well many of whom share our threat perceptions and understanding of some of the dean jurors that we see posed by others and share our recognition that it's critically important perhaps more so now than ever before to make sure we have the

wherewithal's and capability and presold to ensure potential adversaries do not miscalculate or believe they have some kind of advantage that is exploitable that they can take advantage of. again i think that is in a sort of mainstream u.s. tradition. i don't see anything odd or unusual about that. whether we like these who like the nuclear weapons were vetoed or we wish we lived in a world without them we also have to recognize that reality that they do exist. some states have gone i in a direction, quite opposite direction that the united states has gone in terms of size of its nuclear arsenal in its attention

and focus as part of the national security strategy. that is a disquieting developing db2 development in my view and one that we need to be forthcoming and straightforward. >> i appreciate your presentation and i've learned a lot from it. but i wonder whether your approach may withhold some of the things you warn other people about particularly thinking about how other countries will be our strategy when we decided to build these weapons liable

that appear to russia and other countries to be a ratification of their strategy of escalation to de- escalate and acceptance of limited nuclear war and why is it the administration decided to focus only on predominantly upon the nuclear responses to a possible amid nuclear attack rather than looking to the area of conventional response in which we have such an overwhelming superiority remembering of course that in the old days when we thought the russians had a conventional superiority.

>> there is nothing in the nuclear posture review that assumes an automatically be clear response to any contingency. there is an element of strategic ambiguity that does not rule out our ability to respond in other ways as well in choosing appropriately to the nature of the threat that w threats that . that could be response to the conventional armfor theconventie of response. there is nothing in the npr that says the united states under this or that circumstance will respond with nuclear weapons. there is no authenticity.

so your point about other types of responses is valid and it isn't negated by anything in the posture. why is the focus on nuclear weapons, because it is a nuclear posture review. and the tasking was to review the posture. in terms of the possible reactions of russia and china and other states, i have no doubt that it would generate reactions on the part of those that would pay for the united states not to take any action at all to bolster or improve its capabilities, so it's not surprising to read or hear

statements from russian officials or north korean officials that are critical of the posture suggesting it does the opposite of what it is intended to do but i think the document itself has to be taken as a whole and i think the context that is provided in the review itself in terms of our assessment of the overall nuclear security environment provides a realistic framework rationale for understanding why you come to the conclusions and recommendations we have come to. i realize people can have reasonable disagreements over this or that recommendation or the rationale behind it.

that is what makes this debate so robust that i would encourage everyone if you have not read the document take a look how the environment is described in process the conclusions and recommendations to see whether it holds it makes sense. i think it is a rational approach likely to confront the future so regardless what some

opponents might suggest i think we hit it hard and this review. i think that's tailored to different threats that we face today. thank you for joining us today and making the case for the npr. to achieve the objectives into the modernization of the triad into the nuclear complex and supplements that you mentioned

and so, these are expensive high price tags associated. you are going to need strong bipartisan support in the u.s. congress presumably you and other officials have engaged in consultations to make the case for the npr and to get their support. how have those consultations gone and are you confident that you are going to have the necessary domestic consensus for this ambitious program and what are the potential challenges

i believe the most important is to educate any future problem with the submarine. don't sit today. could see 2020, 30 years down

the road. a hedge program that includes research and development of potential mobile options for future icbm to me makes more sense than putting up a bunch, hundreds more silos in the near-term. >> bob? >> having a sustainable deterrent requires very broad domestic support. this npr, the trump npr, builds on what president obama did. president obama actually had a very robust modernization program, and the trump administration follows of that. where the trump administration departs, where it's less continuity and change in some areas that i think will raise questions about the ability to sustain that national consensus.

the idea of new nuclear systems, declaratory policy that suggests that uses proper to use nuclear weapons and the wide range and circumstances. i think he's great, will create challenges for building that kind of national consensus. and i think it's important that the administration do more to build that broad support, including a number of analysts have suggested arms-control in particular. there are things that could be done. agreeing to it the russians have apparently proposed which is a five-year extension of new s.t.a.r.t. dave talked about this earlier in the administration will have to try to keep this consensus together but it will be a challenge with the current npr. >> james? >> as some of you may know of pre-decision draw leaked in the

"huffington post" a few weeks ago, you can compare the original draft to the published version. the second most interesting change in my pain was in the letter from secretary mattis at the beginning. in the draft of nuclear modernization was quote the top priority of the department of defense. and in the final version it is a top priority of the department of defense. you don't need to be the government to understand the difference between the top priority and a top priority is a very significant difference. and the fact that this change was made in the letter from the secretary of defense himself i don't know who made the change, but i would have it against those of the secretary of defense himself who made the change given it was within the one, the letter that was signed by him. if i'm right about that, i have no idea if i am or not, that suggests to me that your assumption, you know, they will have to be trade-offs made in

the nuclear budget, i think is exactly right. if there are trade-offs made i agree with mike with weather should be made. let me say one thing about nuclear command-and-control which is an area i'm worried we're shortchanging. for me it's kind of balmy to be looking at a third and fourth low yield nuclear option, and that's what the low yield slicker, the third and fourth low yield option. when we have acknowledged. the fundamental challenge with command-and-control debate is so much, so many of his assets of command-and-control use both conventional and nuclear commissions. the advance extremely high vacancies have communication satellites are used, would be used to transmit execution orders. they use by special operators.

their use by ground forces, use by naval forces. the other side may have an incentive to attack those in a war to undermine our conventional war fighting ability. that would have huge implications for our command-and-control system. as an analyst in a think tank i can come up with ideas for rectifying this problem cheaply. every time analysts and think tanks come up with cheap ideas that i was worked out that was when implemented in practice. it's so easy to implement these ideas and practice. my sense is in the current security environment, particularly in the face of development of the at the summit weapons and cyber weapons, actually building a resilient and redundant command-and-control system as potential to be an extraordinary expensive prospect. to my mind that is the single biggest priority we as a nation faced when it comes to nuclear forces at the moment.

>> but go to all of you. wait for a microphone and will take about three questions at aa time if i could. start here in the third row. >> no one mentioned this armament. so nonnuclear weapon states would argue the nonproliferation treaty has at least two legs and one is nonproliferation and the other is disarmament. the npr explicitly rejects disarmament in the context of the penn treaty. >> nto. go to the woman in the red shirt and then we will come over here for the gelatin on the far

aisle, and send back to the panel. >> this is a question about low yield. as someone who is a veteran of multilateral multi-nonproliferation negotiations, this will be a really hard sell to the international community but there seems to be a focus on low yield as if that somehow better, and i just would like some sort of comment on that. i've seen low yield as a hiroshima type bomb. do we know what we're talking about? is a semi-better? that's a suggestion that's going on a social media and so forth on what exactly is meant. >> thank you. bent over here, please. >> thank you very much. my name is rafael from the brazilian embassy. we've heard a lot on the

rationale for the npr regarding other nuclear powers of american allies, but i would like to hear pleas some comment on impact of npr on other countries and on the future of the nonproliferation regime. trying to understand the nuclear power countries are upping their bet on the nuclear arsenal. what does this message conveyed to the countries? and lastly regarding the stability explicit in the apr that united states will not pursue its ratification. what do you think would be the future of this structure that we have from 20 years and is not enforced? thank you very much. >> we've got a couple questions on warhead or related issues and a couple questions on broader disarmament strategy. i would ask madelyn to begin, whatever question you wish. >> let me talk a little bit

about the ctc be and how it relates to our commitment to article six. the one good thing about this new npr is that it does commit to continue the moratorium which is good. i don't think it was a surprise that there's no interest in seeking ratification from this administration but to me to the thing that was most aboard and which is been swirling for a while is is a stated commitment to the ct po and also do you national monitoring system. that is usually important in terms of making sure that the foundational abilities to monitor, to monitor testing will remain in place and will continue to grow. there's also a comment about support to the iaea as well. that at least i think in many respects tempers what isn't, what is frankly something those expected in terms of not seeking

ratification. the two other big issues on article six really get back to the change and emphasis on this npr and the lack of significant focus on further reductions or where the working to achieve zero, you know, with more emphasis on securing nuclear materials and making sure others don't continue with any terrorists or other development of nuclear weapons. so i am concerned about this but i think from a u.s. perspective the most important thing we can do is get that five year extension to new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> let me start by strong agreeing with metal that imports of extending the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and then that should be an easy, straightforward decision for the trump administration. it should be a priority the united states has benefited not only from the reductions that we

would have an russian strategic forces without a treaty but from the data exchanges that occur on a constant, on an ongoing basis every year and on the 18th annual inspections we were able to undertake significantly reduces the prospects for worst-case planning, really on both military sites. on the question of disarmament, and it's worth noting that this npr does say that the administration continues the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, what it says is that that goal looks further away, not closer than it did. i took it as a positive it still conclude that goal. and what does concern me, , and bob einhorn articulated this well, this subtle appearance of the expansion of the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. strategy. it's below the top line. it's not the fundamental points of declared terri policy but it

does appear that the elements of an expansion -- declaratory policy -- to declare additional attacks relative to what serving the 2010 nuclear posture believed or asserted. that's important but the bigger deal again today is not the difference between the 20 to nuclear posture review in the 2010 nuclear posture review. it's whether the 2018 nuclear posture review reflects the view of the president of the united states was sole authority to direct the employment of nuclear weapons. on the question of yields, of the low yield soviet warhead particular susan, there's question my mind is going in the being much larger than the largest conventional weapon. the u.s. is modernizing the so-called massive ordnance penetrator, the mob, 30,000-pound weapon it were talking about, i would guess, the lower yields that they would contemplate something that is

hundreds of times, has more explosive potential ban the largest conventional weapon that we have. and if that is the case i certainly don't see that it reduces the nuclear threshold. it may be a a more credible response to nuclear use and to the extent that this nuclear posture review focuses on the role of nuclear weapons the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear use by others i think it goes in the right direction to the extent that it in any way to expand that role relative to where it is, or what has been in the past, i think it goes in the wrong direction. >> thanks. bob. >> there was a question about the international response to the npr. it will be next, i think. many u.s. allies and partners around the world will like the npr. the idea of enhancing extended deterrence, you know, calendaring possible russian

interest in initiating the use of limited, -- limited use of nuclear weapons, i think our baltic allies, eastern european allies and our northeast asian allies will find a lot to like in this npr. japan is an interesting case. japan is the only country that's been the victim of nuclear attack and it's been a strong proponent of nuclear disarmament. but the day after the npr was issued, the japanese foreign minister came out with a very strong statement of support for the npr. the japanese relied heavily on the nuclear tomahawk, the nuclear sea launch cruise missile, and were upset when it was retired. i think they will be very happy with the resurrection of this capability. i think the south koreans also

will see a lot to like. there will be at least relieved that the administration retained the negative security assurance, the assurance that u.s. will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states party to the npt in compliance with her nonproliferation operations. they will be relieved by that but i think they will the concern about the implications u.s. may be increasing the role of nuclear weapons in its strategy. the non-aligned have been unhappy with the slow pace of disarmament. nothing in npr will change that but i don't think it will qualitatively change that figure will get stronger support the nuclear ban movement, but i don't think it's going to fundamentally affect the prospects for proliferation.

countries don't pursue nuclear weapons because they don't believe that having them is essential to the national security. i don't think this is going to change that very much. >> let me tackle both questions that brought disarmament into the fray. the npr does reject the ban treaty as did the obama administration before it as any use of administration would have done. it does endorse the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. i think that was not a foregone conclusion that that statement would be in this npr. nonetheless, there's clearly a big difference between the trump administration position on disarmament and its predecessors. the logic of the obama administration, , let me say ths with some modesty because the three people to the right were deeply involved in crafting the language and i wasn't. but when president obama in

prague renewed the use commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, my interpretation of what that strategy was is building upon the argument made by many nonnuclear weapon states. if you want us to do more on nonproliferation, you guys, the weapon states have to do more on disarmament. a hard-nosed security driven logic but i do more on the obama administration, by doing what on disarmament the obama administration's tried to catalyze a coalition to work on nonproliferation. it was as if sometimes claimed the obama administration thought the u.s. gave up the good weapons that north korea would do so as well. it was that the practical towards we need to do with nonproliferation. the more widespread adoption of enhanced iaea safeguards, the more rigorous enforcement of export control, the sanctioning countries that break the rules. doing that required a political

quid pro quo between disarmament and nonproliferation. let me talk about implementing that strategy in practice. the first one is the efforts to abolish nuclear weapons can be led by the use but it can be done by the u.s. solely. the obama administration was absolutely willing to continue negotiations with further reductions with russia. the russians had interest in doing so. china would even enter into a serious dialogue with the u.s. about nuclear weapons and for the reductions. other barriers to disarmament in the u.s., absolutely. are there also varies in other countries the sometimes get ignored when criticisms get heat on the u.s.? yes. and secondly i was really disappointed by the reception among many nonnuclear weapon states to the prague speech. not one single head of state, summit of an equivalent statue of obama stood up and welcomed

that speech and pledged to work with him. not one. standing up alone as opposed to the security council. so it's not my job to tell nonnuclear weapon states how they would respond to the npr. i would love to more from nonnuclear weapon states about their response to the npr. all i would say is if any future administration you want the u.s. to take disarmament more seriously, the more there is public support for efforts made by u.s. president on disarmament, let's not forget how lyrically brave the prague speech was, the more that kind of effort is endorsed and welcomed by other states, the more chance there is to make it sustainable. >> we will do one more rent in the second. first i have to clarify or additional points. one, you heard this reference the prague speech. for those of you and may forgos was president obama's april 2009 speech early in his presidency really articulating a vision of

a nuclear free world at a time when it still seem conceivable we could make near-term progress towards that. obama didn't have any utopian views this could happen fast. the question whether it could n happen in his lifetime but a more thinkable concept back in and that's why you for people refer back to it, just for those of you who may not follow the steps quite as much as some of us do. secondly my own personal speculation on the low yield warhead, without having been read into the security glitches on the subject that would enable me to know the real answer and not be able to say it. so i'll give potentially wrong answer but i will say it. this is based on a lot of what's come out over the year somewhat we know about nuclear weapons design, writings from others that attracted about over my career. i think the simplest way to understand this, you knew the modern american nuclear weapons are essentially two-stage. they are two were nuclear hydrogen bombs. the first nuclear detonation sort of in spirit like a hiroshima or nagasaki bomb goes

off that creates the necessary temperature and pressure that ignites the hydrogen fuel in the secondary. you need a small nuclear burst to make a big one. the simplest way to take one of those weapons and turned from a big yield weapon into a small yield weapon is to get rid of the secondary or to contaminate the hydrogen filled with something that's not going to ignite as much and not it is as much yield. what i don't know, i don't claim to speculate about is how much you can dial down the yield of that secondary sort of as you wish without particular new design or testing. but but i do think it's fairly predictable you could simply eliminate the secondary or render it inert in one way or another and, therefore, he could wind up with yield that are probably somewhat smaller, and jim was talking about scaling up from the malala factor by hundreds probably in the one kilowatt range is what you could fairly confidently produce as

readily available weapon out of this kind of approach -- moab. that's my hopefully informed speculation not based on classified information, not speaking friendly else on the panel or the npr. by the way one last thing. a person that to thank steve was in the audience today, a person of brookings has been a lot of nuclear weapons issues over the years. he will continue to do so but from a sunnier perch in california where we thought he might already be today which is part of what is not up on the panel. when we get to the end i'll ask you to not only think the panelist but thank steve but we hold off on that until the last round. yes, sir, in the back. >> jeff price at johns hopkins. first on the lower yield. i think bob was quoted in the fence news is talking about primary only. so that's unclassified. my question goes to the crisis stability implications of effectively using a strategic

delivery system for a nonstrategic warhead or a mission. there's a lot of ways to deliver lower yield warhead in a regional crisis, and some of the questions that arise with the trident in particular this is some way using your in game, second strike capability at the beginning of a limited nuclear confrontation and there's certain questions, the discussion needs to be had whether that, the wisdom of that and the implications of that in a crisis which is by definition a nuclear crisis. >> thank you. one or two more. women in the very back of the room in the aqua shirt, please. >> i'm a nuclear policy specialist. i have a quick question for madelyn and a question for jim. madelyn, d.c. in the future interoperable warhead lep that would require modification of the physics package knowing right up there focusing on the

nonnuclear components? jim, you mentioned road icbm in future turned his. they cancel that option. could you gauge qualitatively the hunger for a road mobile option knowing of course that russia just slash that because they are broke as usual? thank you. >> one more before we finish up with the panelist. >> question for jim are others who want to answer. you put forward a reduction in the overall size of the icbm force and wondering if you envision that as part of long-term arms control or you would do that unilaterally? >> so in this round which will also be a concluding statements let's begin with james and will give jim the very last word because questions were for him. >> let me just say, talk briefly about the low yield option.

i'd much rather spend the money on bolstering the conventional deterrence around the baltics. there are two issues i think with using a low yield. the first what is your risk giving away the position of the severing that the missile is fired from. russia is rebuilding early learning satellites. those who detect a missile very shortly after launch which would been russia would know where the u.s. trident was fired from which would presumably be significant aid to russia in huntington u.s. if we are actually in a conflict where nuclear weapons are being used, not just a nuclear crisis, we are actually nuclear by that point, i would think keeping our most survivable forces survivable would be an incredibly high priority for u.s. decision-makers. i think if we were really in an nuclear war, the use of this option will not be an attractive one for the decision-makers

because there's such a high percentage of them really survivable warheads. the second issue so-called discrimination problem, which is russia could not distinguish between the launch of the low yield trident and normal trident. does that increase the chance that russia would respond with the high-yield nuclear weapon before or multiple high-yield nuclear weapons, even worse, before hours trident exploded and russian it was low yield if indeed it does pascagoula to determine that rapidly after detonation? this is a complicated issue which are not going to church about your because time is short. all i would say it's just a proposal about ten years ago called conventional trident modification. i know one person on the panel a particular, has multiple scars from that experience. all i would say is that wasn't the idq takes a nuclear warheads off trident complacent with

conventional warheads. congress decided not to do that because of the discrimination problem. and that was that even a capability that anyone is talking firing at russia. the issue with using this against iran, north korea, may be. no one was arguing using it against russia but the discrimination problem wasting so sigar even though we wouldn't be firing this of russia, that congress didn't provide money for it. i think now we are talking a low yield capability specifically for use against russia. i think where to take this discrimination problem seriously, even if the question would russia respond with multiple high-yield warheads as soon as it detected the launch of one of our trident, that's a complex question to answer, one i'm not going to try to do in five seconds. >> thank you. bob? >> i'm going to give my time to jim because i want to his answers to the question about

discrimination and about exposing the location of u.s. ss begins. >> madelyn first. >> i don't emphasize everything that james has said. as hard as it would be to modify a low yield option, may be a primary yield only, the operational considerations are going to be much, much harder. james has only touched on them. so that is a huge issue with respect to deployment. i'll add out there, right now our d5 missiles on multiple warheads, when you think about it by going to have multiple mixing with other high-yield warheads? the operational issues associated with this our extensive and extraordinarily complex. more so than the complexity of the warhead itself. so let me go to the iw.

what are the interesting things about this npr is i'm not sure there is any discussion of the obama three plus two strategy. there is a small discussion of interoperable warheads but it has kicked it out for the future because under the obama three plus two strategy sort of the next life extension up for ballistic missiles was going to be the iw one, and it was ostensibly going to be a warhead that could be used on it icbm and an s.o.b. m m and it would look like something that would replace the air force 78 and the navy 88. the 88, the w88 which is a a warhead of the navy is going through sort of a rehab. it's not a real life extension but it sort of less than that. they call it alteration but think of it as rehab but it is

extended the life. as a result of that the language in this npr really talks about doing life extension on the w78. in my mind that means we may have walked away from the initial three plus two strategy and we will retain four for a while before going to three. one of interesting think i would throw out there for general discussion is may be, , if thers real seriousness about thinking on low yield, maybe something that could be explored would be an iw down the road that would have variable yields so that you're not giving up, if you will, a strategic delivery platform, but maybe you look at something that looks like an iw with variable yields for both the sl and the icbms. again way out there, way long-term but i do think that

this npr walks away from the iw for the enough of warheads any near-term thing and is probably walked away from a three plus two strategy. >> jim, over to you. >> i have not seen a great clamor in the land for low icbm. and, indeed, i'm not arguing for that approach. what i do believe is that if you believe that the single most important role of the icbm in the world will be of large numbers of weapons on our strategic submarine leg, then the most important role of the icbm like is to serve as a hedge against any problem with the survivability of that sea-based leg. if that happens 20 years, 30 used in the road, and i would not expect it to have any real prospect of it happening in early the net but it could in that timeframe been answered to deploy more silo-based icbms or putting more warheads in this

icbms would not serve strategic stability because of that i think about a program, even today would be to go to a life other than a heavier icbm. the minute and replace looks like will be about the same 70,000 on missile at the minutemen free. the old icbm was roughly half that weight, which gives it less throw weight, less capacity, less efficient of a single word plus decoys and a more attractive candidate for going to road mobile. and to answer the question on this topic, my recommendation which also has not been met with, you know, great clamor in the land including from the defense department would you go unilaterally to a lighter icbm, to display perhaps a couple hundred in silos to have them as necessary and when necessary to retain an icbm leg, i think of a

research and development program and demonstration program for road mobile. my guess is that would cost about the same as going for with 400 icbms in silos over years. the cost would be somewhat later which is useful most importantly it would provide a hedge that we otherwise will not have and would be a stabilizing hedge in the event that is as ibm's or strategic submarines became vulnerable 20, 30 used more down the line. on the question of crisis to building that you asked it's a good question. my gut is a low yield warhead on a trident, on a d5 missile is a nuclear warhead and a strategic warhead. and that one should not imagine that because something is lower yield, that is going, that will be known immediately by rush or by anyone else. nor that it needs it's not a strategic asset. there would be significant and

would be of a significant hurdle even about the hurdles we should write have ended up limit of any nuclear weapon because it's a strategic system. my guess is it's for that reason that the administration decided they would also go for with a longer-range program to have a c launch cruise missile that's again nuclear tipped. let me just say that from my perspective and as a person involved in the obama nuclear posture review, the reason for eliminating the c launch cruise missile nuclear tipped at that time was not that it was either destabilizing or inappropriate to have, it's that it was past its end-of-life and the question was at that point in time, eight to ten years ago, should be a priority investment of the united states nuclear posture to reinstate that capability over the far more important things?

at that point in time the judgment of the president and recommendations from the joint chiefs, what this is was not necessary and did not feel, was not needed to fill a gap in the extended deterrence in particular. i do think that calculation has changed with respect to north korea and with respect to russia. and at the same time it's a ten year program so secretary mattis has said it also provides an opportunity for the united states have dealt -- development program going forward with russia to stay within imf and to put its tactical nuke weapons on the table for series negotiations, something the obama administration attempted and the russians did not agree to pursue. i still believe that would be a valuable next up and the united states should continue to pursue extension of new s.t.a.r.t. and

to pursue negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. >> fantastic. thanks, you all, for being here. let's thank steve and the panel. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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>> c-span's history series of landmark cases returned this month with a look at 12 noon supreme court cases. each week historians and experts join to discuss the constitutional issues and personal stories behind the significant decisions. beginning monday february 26 live at 9 p.m. eastern and help you follow all 12 cases where the companion guide written by veteran supreme court journalists. to get your copy go to c-span.org/landmark cases. >> next, several african american women journalists about