we'll hear from education secretary betsy devine and ted cruz. that is the morning session thursday. 6:00 p.m. eastern, eric trump, second son of president trump will be speaking at cpac. >> the heads of the cia and the fbi along with the director of national intelligence before the central intelligence community about global threats. they threats. they answered questions on nuclear security, cyberthreat, trent national crime to meddle in russian politics. north carolina senator richard burr chairs the two hour 40 minute hearing. [inaudible conversations]

tran thanh [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> would like to call this hearing on worldwide threats to order. i would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses today, director of national intelligence, dan coats. director central intelligence agency, mike pompeo.

director of the intelligence agency, general robert ashley. director the federal bureau of investigation, chris rea. after the national security agency, admiral mike rogers. and directed the geospatial intelligence agency, robert cardillo. we've got along in front of us and i thank you all for being here. i know how forward-looking this one occasion on an annual basis. since 1995, this committee has met in open forum to discuss the security threat facing the united states of america. this has never been, nor will it ever be a comfortable conversation to have. the threats this country face are complex, evolving and without easy answers. exist in multiple domains. they are asymmetrical and conventional. they can be launched from across the ocean or be planned in the

heart of our homeland. nonetheless, this conversation serves a vital purpose and it's essential that it takes place in the public square with as much detail and candor as is possible. in my view, that is the true value in public service at this hearing that provides the american people with insight that they just don't normally get. those insights are about this for some we are up against defamation, but importantly, those insights are also about the work that the intelligence community does to push back on this thread. this is work that both time and labor intensive. it can be frustrating, heartbreaking and dangerous. it is often thankless, but because of the dedication of men and women who make up our intelligence community, he gets

done on behalf of the american people every single day. until this point, encourage other witnesses this morning to not only address the threats to our nation, that you talk about what their organizations are doing to help secure this country into the degree they can in an unclassified setting. director coats coming are tested for me for the record ties together the expertise, capabilities and wisdom of the entire intelligence community. anchorage ever want to familiarize himself with this content. it is lengthy and at detailed and it's a testament to the broad range of talents brought to the table. it is also a compelling reminder of why this country is substantial and it intelligence apparatus. director pompeo, when we held the series last year, and by the judiciary your assessment on the korean peninsula. i will ask you again for your insights on the state of north korea's nuclear and missile

program and importantly what is going on politically with north korea's leadership. perhaps you can help us differentiate between a genuine effort to reconcile with south korea and an opportunistic attempt to drive a wedge between washington and seoul. general ashley, the work just never seems to end for defense department. i would value your latest assessment of the battlefield situations and syria and afghanistan. last week we had u.s. advisers come under fire in eastern syria. this prompted a retaliatory strike that killed dozens of forces. and afghanistan, string of terrorist attacks in kabul left 150 death last month, suggesting to me after 16 years of work, the urgency is nowhere near folding in the government remains hard pressed to provide the security needed for its own people. i particularly value unfurnished appraisal of where progress is being made in afghanistan and where it's not. admiral rogers, cyberis the most

challenging threat factor this country faces. it's also one of the most concerning giving how many aspects of our daily lives in the united states can be hit by a well planned, well executed cyberattack. i appreciate your assessment of how well you are doing when it comes to protecting the nation's most critical computer networks. from the systems that guide our military to the networks that ensure the nation's energy supply, and they are all essential two-way functionality of a modern america and i fear that they are increasingly vulnerable to state and nonstate actors. director ray, i am keenly interested in hearing your assessment of the threat posed by the spread of foreign technology and the united states. this committee has worked diligently to sound the alarm bells when it comes to the counterintelligence information security risk that come prepackaged with the goods and services that certain overseas

vendors. the focus of my concern today is china and specifically chinese telecom that are widely understood to have extraordinary ties with the chinese government. i hope you'll share your thoughts on this and i also ask you to provide your insights into how foreign, commercial investment in acquisitions are jeopardizing the nation's most sent new technologies. lastly, i would like to spend a moment on the counterintelligence threat to our national academic research and laboratory construct. what is the scale of the problem and what is the fbi doing to fight it? finally, director cardillo, we've come to associate engineer with the modernization of the intelligence community. the adversaries of this country are investing in innovative fact there with fewer constraints than we are. the threats we face are multidimensional, decentralized and global.

nga is playing an essential role in pushing the envelope with new ways of tackling problems like having more dated than you can feasibly analyzed. has edges closer to automation and eventually artificial intelligence, the computer learning and computer vision mark and nga will be a bridge to help us get there. i look forward to your thoughts on how the intelligence community can and is a good intelligence disciplines that have not changed much in the past 60 years. our adversaries are going to wade for us to catch up. i will close there because we have a lot to get to. i want to thank you and more importantly those who are not here with you, and those who carry out the lion share of the work on behalf of the american people come in the intelligence

community. the folks who represent are important to this committee. we can't do our oversight without the work they perform according to the distinguished vice chairman, i would like to highlight to my colleagues will reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon in a closed session to hear from the same witnesses in a classified setting. i will ask members to please reserve anything that remotely gets into a classified question for the afternoon session with that, vice chairman. thank you, mr. chairman. let me also welcome all of you here and not for the chairman's comments. thank you all for your service and we hope you will convey back to all the brave men and women who look to you, that this committee will always have your back. this open hearing comes at an extraordinarily important time. our nation's intelligence agencies stand at the forefront of our defense against

continuing threat from terrorist groups, ideology, rogue regimes have a nuclear proliferation and regional instability. we all know and we discussed this at length. in recent years we've seen the rise of nations who lead themselves at least as competitors have not adversaries of the united states. they began to utilize new asymmetric weapons to undercut our democratic and two shams. to steal our most sensitive intellectual property. let me start with russia. obviously, certain questions remain with respect to the true extent of the russian interference in the 2016 election and we will continue to work through these in a bipartisan way. however, i think you will find a broad bipartisan situation on a number of critical issues.

first, russia engaged in a coordinated cap to undermine our democracy. that included targeting of state and local elections, electoral activities in 21 states. the russian effort in a new area utilized or social media platforms to push and spread misinformation at an unprecedented scale. we've had more than a year to get our act together and address the threat posed by russia and implement a strategy to deter further attacks. but i believe, unfortunately, we still don't have a comprehensive plan. two weeks ago, director pompeo publicly stated he had every expectation that russia will try to influence our upcoming elections. secretary of state tillerson just last week said we are already seeing russian effort to medal in the 2018 elections.

but i believe in many ways we are no better prepared than they were in 2016. make no mistake this did not begin in 2016 and certainly didn't end. we are seeing a continuous assault to target and undermined our democratic institutions and they'll keep coming at us. despite all of this, the president inconveniently continues to deny the threat posed by russia. he didn't increase sanctions on russia when he had a chance to do so. he hasn't even treated a single concern. this threat i believe demands a whole of government responds and that responds as quickly to leadership at the top. at the same time, threats come from right here at home. there has been some aided and abetted a russian internet controls have attacked the basic

integrity of the fbi and the justice department. this is a dangerous trend. this innuendo and misinformation regardless of our partisan affiliation. in addition to the ongoing threat from russia, i'm concerned that china has developed in all of society. not just all of government, but all of society approach to gain access to our technologies and intellectual property. i'm paying a great deal of attention to the rise china has kept separate. in particular i'm worried about the close relationship between the chinese government and chinese technology firms, particularly in the area of commercialization of our surveillance technology and efforts to shape telecommunication equipment markets. they want to ensure the i see is tracking the direction they are heading and especially the extent which they are beholden to the chinese government.

in recent years, we have seen major technologies firms who rise to the illicit access of u.s. technology and ip. these companies now represent some of the leading market players globally. most americans have not heard of all of these, but as they enter western economic market, we want to ensure they play by the rules. we need to make sure that this is not a new way for china to gain access to sensitive technology. there are a number of other concerns i hope you'll raise in the hearing this morning and this afternoon. let me just briefly mention two. first, how is the i see poised to track foreign influence that relies on social media and misinformation? just last week the chairman and i had a good meeting with their u.k. parliamentary colleagues investigating this issue.

russian trolls and bots continue to push divisive content both in the united states and against all our allies in europe. not only in the u.k., that's a top for france, germany, netherlands and we heard recent indications that russia not to believe that mexico. the i see needs to stay on top of this issue and i am worried that we don't have a clear line of assignments. we also raise another issue. i believe we need to do more to reform the broken security clearance system, which gao recently placed on its list of high-risk government programs in need of reform. we spent close to 700,000 folks now waiting in line, folks do need a her country whether in government for the private factor. we've been waiting way too long to get security clearances. it's obviously hampering your recruitment and it's costing us millions of dolla in a efficient day. again, thank you to all of you

for your service. please convey our best wishes the men and women who work with you and i look forward to our hearing. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i am going to recognize direct or code and he is the only one who was given official testimony all members of the panel are open for question. i will recognize our members by seniority for up to five minutes. with that, director coates, the floor is yours. >> mr. chairman, thank you. i want to start by apologizing for my raspy voice. i've been fighting through the crud that's going around that several of us have endured. i may have to clear my throat a few times, which i apologize for. but it strikes me listening to europe in remarks in the vice-chairman's opening remarks that, excuse me, do we have continued to have a very interactive presents with this

committee. issues that you and the vice-chairman have raised and others will raise issues that we talked about continuously with the u.n. we want to continue to work with you carefully by both sides of the aisle as we go forward looking too with the intelligence community can provide for this committee and the issues we find in common. vice chairman warner, members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today. we have changes on the panel since we were here last year. this'll be admiral rogers last visit and the threat assessment issue. he deeply regrets having to come before you in the future years as he's enjoyed this process very much considering the emeritus status. we have two new members. director ray in general should

who have been looking forward to this day with great anticipation. i say all that because what you are looking at here is a team. a team that works together in terms of how we provide the american people and o congress and policymakers for the intelligence that they need. it's an honor for us to be here and i think this team reflects the hard work the intelligence community and their testimonies in their answers to questions today. before i begin, let me take a moment to acknowledge and express our thanks to members of this community for support in the renewing of the authorities and the recent 702 authorization. this is, as we have told you, our most important legislative issue because it is our most important election issue with

threats to america and we appreciate the work the committee has done and others have done and particularly this team has done in reaching not gore. they will reach a complex threat environment. the risk of interstate conflict is higher than any time since the end of the cold war. the growing development with weapons of mass destruction by state. our adversaries as well as the other maligned instruments of power to shape societies in market, international rules and institutions and international hotspots to their advantage. we have entered a period that can best be described as a race for technological superiority against our adversa who seek to sow division of united stas and weakened u.s. leadership.

and nonstate actors including terrorist and criminal groups are exploiting weak state capacity in the middle east, asia, latin america causing instability and violence both within the state and among states. in the interest of saving time, i will not cover every topic in my opening remarks. we are submitting a recent statement for the record with additional details. let me turn to global threat and i'd like to start the cyberthreat, which is one of my greatest concerns in top priorities. frankly the united states is under attack. under attack identities using cyberto penetrate virtually every major action that takes place in the united states. from u.s. businesses to the federal government, the united

states is threatened by cyberattacks every day while russia, china, iran and north korea pose the greatest cyberthreat other nationstates, terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations are ever more technically capable groups and individuals use cyberoperations to achieve strategic and maligned objectives. some of these at yours, including russia are late lead to do even more aggressive cyberattack would cyberattack with the intent of degrading our democratic values and weakening our alliances. persistent and disruptive against her european allies using elections those opportunities to undermine democracy, undermine our values. the cyberattack capabilities will continue to support china's national security and economic

priorities. iran will try to penetrate u.s. allied networks for espionage and lay the groundwork for future cyberattacks and north korea will continue to use cyberoperations to raise funds, launch attacks against the united states. terrorists will use the internet to raise funds. criminals will finance their operations. by next topic for you as weapons of mass destruction, wmd. overall, state efforts to modernize development are required wmd delivery systems or the underlying technologies constitute a major threat in the united states into our allies. north korea will be the most volatile threat in the coming year. in addition of the nuclear

warhead for these missiles, north korea will continue its long-standing chemical and biological warfare programs also. russia will remain the most capable wmd power is expanding its nuclear weapons capabilities china will continue to expand its weapons of mass destruction and diversify its nuclear arsenal. the joint comprehensive plan has extended the time to develop a nuclear weapon in several months to about a year provided iran continues to adhere to the major provisions. pakistan is developing new types of nuclear weapons short range tacked to go weapons and state and nonstate actors including the syrian regime in jesus, the remnants of vices and syria continue to possess and some

cases have used chemical weapons in syria and iraq and we continue to be concerned about some of these actors pursued a biological weapons. turning now to terrorism, terrorism threat is pronounced in the sectarian spectrum and al qaeda to lebanese hezbollah and other affiliated terrorist organizations as well as the state-sponsored activities in iran. u.s.-based homegrown violent extremist, including inspired and sought radical individuals represent the primary and most difficult to detect sunni terrorism threats in the united states. isis claimed having a functioning caliphate that governs is all but forwarded. however, isis remains a threat and will focus on regrouping in iraq and syria, particularly

portions of those countries enhancing, planning international attacks and encouraging members and sympathizers to attack their own countries. meanwhile, al qaeda almost certainly will remain a major actor in global terrorism as he continues to rise in long-term approach in the organization remains intent in the united states and u.s. interests abroad. now, movie not as if we don't have enough threads here on earth, we need to look to the heavens, threats and space. the space industry will expand the naval capabilities and situational awareness to nationstate in commercials say that there is in the coming years. russia and china will continue to expand their space-based reconnaissance, communications and navigation systems in terms of numbers or the capability and

applications for use. and both russia and chinese counter space weapons will mature over the next few years as each country pursues anti-satellite weapons as a means to reduce u.s. allied military effectiveness and perceptions of u.s. military advantage in space. the final functional topic is transnational organized crime, which poses a growing threat to u.s. and allied interests. these criminal groups will supply the dominant share of illicit drugs fueling record mortality rate. they will continue a tragic and human life double-dip lead national resources and siphon money from governments and the global economy. i would like now to briefly go around the world on regional

topics starting with east asia. if you went out and hired a private plane and launched it from los angeles, he went around the world and stopped at every hot spot that you would make multiple dozens of stops. that is the kind of threat we face. let me start with east asia. north korea continues to pose a number were increasing threat to the united states and its interests. pyongyang has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to negotiate its nuclear weapons and missiles away because the regimes use nuclear weapons are critical to its security. kim also probably sees nuclear icbms as leverage to achieve its long-term strategic ambition to and souls alliance with washington and eventually dominate the peninsula. in the wake of its icbm last year, we expect to see north korea press ahead with additional missile test this

year and the foreign minister has threatened an atmospheric nuclear test over the pacific. pyongyang is committed to fielding a long-range nuclear armed missile capable of posing a direct threat to the united states. and modest improvements in north korea's conventional capabilities will continue to pose an ever greater threat to south korea, japan as well as u.s. targets in those countries. .. >> john intends to use it one belt, one road initiative to increase its reach to due strategic regions across africa and the pacific.

in afghanistan, kabul continues to bear the brunt of the taliban and insurgency is demonstrated by recent attacks in the city. afghan security face forces face unsteady coalitions. complicating the afghanistan situation is our assessment that pakistan -based militant groups continue to take advantage of their safe haven to conduct attacks in india, afghanistan, including u.s. interests. pakistani military leaders continue to walk a delicate li line, ongoing military operations against the taliban in groups reflect a desire to respond more proactive in our

response against these groups. the actions taken do not reflect a significant escalation of pressure and are unlikely to have a lasting effect. the administration has designated a militants affiliated with the taliban, and other pakistan militant groups. we assess that pakistan will maintain ties to these militants while restricting cooperation with the united states. next is russia, president putin will continue to rely on assertive foreign policies to shape outcomes beyond russia's borders. putin will resort to more tactics to remain control with respect to russian influence efforts the russians utilize this tool because it is cheap,

low risk and offers what they perceive as plausible deniability and has proven to be effective in sewing division. we expect russia to continue to use propaganda, social media, false like personas, sympathetic spokesmen and other needs to influence and build on the wide range of operations at his aspirate fissures in the united states. no doubt russia perceives its past efforts were successful views the 2018 midterm election as a potential target for russian influence operations. from rush l turned to the middle east and north africa. this region will be characterized by political turmoil, economic fragility and civil wars the coming years. iran will be made the most prominent state-sponsored terrorism an adversary in the

middle east especially in iraq, syria, and yemen. iran will try to expand its influence and solidify partnerships and trends late battleship gains into agreements. iran will continue to develop military capabilities that threaten u.s. forces and allies in the region. for example they have the largest ballistic missile force in the middle east. the islamic guard corps and it's unsafe and professional interactions pose a risk to naval operations in the persian gulf. hezbollah with this word of iran has deployed thousands of fighters to syria and provides director to other militant and terrorist groups. they're provocative and assertive behavior as we saw most recently this past weekend

increases the potential for escalation. turkey will seek kurdish ambitions in the middle east and it is complicating ongoing counter isis activities in the region and increases the risk to forces located in the area. syria will face unrest in fighting through 2018. even as violence decreases in some areas. iraq is likely to face political turmoil and conflict. the social and political challenges that give rise to isis remain. iran has exploited those. to deepen its influence in political arms. the war in yemen between the satellite coalition is likely to continue and will worsen the already tragic humanitarian

crisis for 70% of the population of about 20 million people in need of assistance. the situation is emblematic of a far larger problem. the number of people displaced by conflict around the world is the highest it has been since world war ii. turning to europe, i went to look at two developments that are likely to impact foreign policy in the coming year. the continent center of gravity appears to be shifting to france for president mccrone has taken an assertive role in addressing european and global challenges. results of the recent german election enforce that assessment. recent efforts by some governments in central and eastern europe to undermined judicial independence and parliamentary oversight are

weakening the rules of law. these steps could look at further democratic decline and offer chinese and russian influence. many other topics i can discuss. i like to close with a discussion of one additional threat, this one internal and somewhat personal. i'm concerned are increasing political process with respect to federal spending is threatening our ability to properly defend our nation both in the short term and especially in the long term. failure to address her long-term fiscal situation has increased the national debt to over 20 trillion. the situation is unsustainable. it represents a dire threat to economic and national security.

former chairman first identified the national debt is the greatest threat to our national security. since then he's joined by numerous leaders of both parties including madeleine are bright and henry kissinger our current defense secretary, jim mattis agrees with this assessment. many of now i've spent a lot of time working on this issue and the problem continues to grow. i urge all of us to recognize the need to address the challenge and take action as soon as possible before fiscal crisis occurs that undermines our ability to ensure national security. with that i'm happy to take questions. i appreciate the opportunity to be here today. >> thank you for that overview of the world. and what's at play.

i will recognize members based on seeing yorty. i recognize myself. emma rogers, according to the statement the intelligence community assesses most chinese cyber operations use private industry are focused on clear defense contractors or communications for his product and services support government and private sector and networks nationwide. rate the performance when it comes to private sector actors about malicious cyber activities on their networks. >> first i don't have responsibility or day-to-day explanation but i'll give you my opinion. this is an issue that i try to work aggressively is a tremendous concern at the

department. we are not where we need to be. the challenge i think is we have multiple areas of knowledge and insight within the private sector and how do we bring this to an integrated team? that's not where we are today but that's where we have to get to. >> are we doing enough to in the private sector of the threat that is out there? >> where informing them as we become aware of it. were only get to see one slice of this picture. i'm interested from the private perspective, if we can bring these together will have a broader perspective and more in-depth knowledge of what is happening. it's not just one side needs to do a better job. >> you seen the difficulty this committee and others have had communicating with tech

companies about a way forward that is an commonality, are you concerned about the increasingly challenging landscape for both congress and the intelligence community working as we see new tech firms? >> yes, how bad does this have to get before we realize we have to do something fundamentally different. if you look at the internet of sit things in the security levels folks, if we think the problem is a challenge now, it's going to get much worse from a security perspective. >> pic assesses that north korea is likely to press ahead in 2018 noting that north korea's foreign ministry indicated an atmospheric nuclear test might be under consideration.

the original reaction to this. >> thank you. i've been doing the seer and i want to express my appreciation for this committee for helping the cia do what we do we put a lot of effort into this and you bennett supportive of that. my team thanks you for that. a test like that was certainly further unite the region, having said that our sense that we have built a global coal coalition pushing back against kim jong-un with respect to what each country may to come i prefer to keep that conversation to a close session this afternoon. >> what is the assessment of north korea's willingness to

employs expansive conventional military capabilities? >> one thing director coats referred to as kim jong-un remains intent on staying in power. all dictators prefer to do. he has a mission that is a long-standing north korean idea of reunification. their capacity to use a nuclear umbrella combined with their conventional forces to exert course of behavior inside their country more broadly something our analysts continue to look at, we can see is a ratchet up their nuclear capability their capacity to do harm in the region as a result of their conventional capabilities increases. >> according to statements for the record, artificial what

artificial intelligences quick to produce security concerns? how's the ic county of these new national security concerns? or was seen indications that our adversaries are working to harness technologies like artificial technology is cac looking to maximize emerging technologies in our own processes and analysis of data? >> thank you for the support this committee provides if you look at the corner should those four militaries of the operational environment. is looking at doctrinal audits developing. artificial intelligence is like

commercial technology available. when you look at the volume and big data and what's available the ability to pull that information in artificial intelligence will be entered into that. you can look at video and slow-motion video. you'll never for the workforce that can go through all the material. whether it's video or intelligence so artificial intelligence machine learning can get them to digest information. >> i would agree with the general.

we are attempting to do this. when i look at potential adversaries to see them going to the same challenges. there clearly is a national strategy designed to harness the power of artificial intelligence to generate strategic outcomes feel like at the research you look at how it's affecting the data they're going after. i remember ten years ago looking at data covered and thinking that is so much information in it that it would be difficult for an opponent to generate knowledge from it. with the power of sheens earning artificial intelligence data concentrations are targets of attraction to a host of vectors. you watch others access these.

>> this is an area available at the commercial industry. you see others pursuing this. there's a key piece which is how do you operationalize it? so the fact that their planes, radios and tanks was not unique to the germans in world war ii but they came up with a concept that allow them to leverage that. and peter singer is a futurist and it was interesting when i asked him as a look at the things emerging the things coming out what you see in the way breakthrough that give someone a marked advantage and his comment was it's who's able to harness it, operationalize it

and put it to effect. what are the technology will be available. >> can i ask your permission, roberts agency is taken a significant lead on this given the volume of the inflection they take in the ability to process the i've asked robert to be prepared to answer that question because i think they're taking some efforts that could be helpful. >> it's important to know what hasn't changed, this whole table to provide you with precision advantage, what has changed is the world around us and within us. what we used to hold exclusively because we had capabilities others didn't is now more

shared. the more rogers have said, this is something we lock arms on because it's not the access that's exclusive, it's the use. the concepts of operation. of the same concerns you do about getting the same cooperation. at the end of the day we can advance the american economy and entrepreneurship and our understanding of a world that gets back to that first step. >> rest assured process of data will come up in her session. >> i take with some note the fact that we started the discussion was cyber. it's telling in terms of how we view threats one question on the record we know it's been over a year since the russia intervention in our elections. we have seen russia intervene and other western democracies.

like each of you to reconfirm to the public that are intelligence community understands this threat. last year those of you on the panel express confidence in the january 2017 assessment that russia interfered in the elections. i like each of you today we from that and also with a simple yes or no to agree with director pompeo that we have not seen a significant decrease in russian activity? and we have every expectation they will try to continue to intervene in 2018 and 2020 a simple yes or no will do. >> no change in my view. i support that. i agree with director pompeo's assessment about the likelihood of the occurrence as well.

>> i stood by then and i stand by it now. i agree, this is not going to change or stop. >> it is not going to change or stop. >> throughout the entire community we have not seen evidence of any significant change from last year. >> i agree one that i think we're caught off on card on is how the russians used social media. i realize this is a new area for all of us. there are legitimate issues among civil rights that need to be balance. we need to have an organized

plan going forward. this question will be directorate director ray, but i'm under the notion that these companies will may be located here, operating cyberspace and when we have someone masquerading as mike pompei but is actually someone in st. petersburg doesn't fit neatly into a particular flowchart. who is in charge of addressing the threat posed by foreign nationals in terms of their missing the use and misuse? there is no agency in charge. there are several throughout the federal government that have equities in this.

we are working to try to integrate the process. it needs to be addressed as quickly as possible. we've had discussions about that. we are keen on moving forward in terms of identification in relative response and things we can do to prevent it from happening. we are gaining more support from the private sector who are beginning to recognize the issues that are faced with the material that comes through their processes, as a government we can track them what to do over spending every effort we can't work with them to provide answers.

>> i would agree. i think it is a team effort. one thing that has jumped out of me is how much more of a team the intelligence community is the last time i was in the space. of one of mike's people who sits in my entertainment vice versa. were dealing with each other every day. so it's teamwork and the partnership with the private sector there's more forward leaning engagement with the private sector in terms of trying to what raise awareness. at the end of the day, we cannot please social media. we have to work so they can police themselves. >> i think the company themselves were slow to recognize the threat. the fact that we don't have clarity in terms of who is in charge i believe we don't have a full plan. one more question, the chinese

text companies my fears that some of these chinese text companies might not even have to acquire an american company before they become pervasive in our market. how do we make sure we send a signal to the private sector before some of these companies totally our market because some are back by the chinese government. >> is not only sending a signal working together, sharing information with the private and public sector it also involves the whole of government issued a particular legislative has been looked at. we need to go beyond what the current processes. we will cornet are intelligence to provide policymakers and those making the decisions with

the best intelligence we can relative to the situation. we view this is a top priority. it's ongoing because as i mentioned earlier the chinese are pervasive on this and we have seen it happen throughout the public and private sector. we have tried to be more out and about the private sector in providing defensive briefings to some of the companies among other industry members can recognize the threats coming their way. i have been gratified by the response once we've been able to try to educate them. bigger challenges because of america is the land of innovation we have exciting

stuff that's happening. a lot of them are a lot less sophisticated. it's a continuing challenge. the chinese have turned more to creative avenues using nontraditional collectors which i think we recognize but the private sector is not used to spotting. so it's trying to educate them on what to be on the lookout for. >> want to associate myself with remarks of the vice chairman when he said this committee would always have your backs. for those of you associated with committee u.k. seem like part of

the committee that we see so much up there and we know that's the case. we sincerely appreciate that. i would say and everyone of us knows what a tough job each of your agencies have. we have 100% confidence in your ability to have a very neutral, dispassionate fashion deliver to us the facts we need. one of the things that rears its ugly head and winds up in the media more than a show this one your jobs intersect with domestic political affairs. mr. ray you probably end up with this more than anyone else. it gets messy and difficult. we need to recommit what were doing to reach the right facts. i would respectfully disagree

with my friend from virginia that we are no better to prepare and handle the russians. this happened 16 those of you on this committee were not surprised to find the russians were attempting to meddle in our affairs. and one of the best hearings this year was the open hearing on how they use social media we saw how disjointed and effective and cheap it was. after that, with all due respect, i think the american people are ready i think now they're going to look a lot more at the information that's attempted be passed out through social media. the american people are smart when they realize there's people attempting to manipulate them.

and i agree that this will go on. it's the way they have done business. we sought more so in france and germany this past year. i think the american people are more prepared than what they were before. thank you for the analysis of syria. i doubt it has made it any clearer for me and the american people. it's very difficult. after this past weekend it got more complicated. cyber something at the top. the financial condition this country is of critical importance. want to ask a specific question to four of you regarding korea. i think that's the most excellent potential threat we

face is at our doorstep. a year ago we talked about it that was then and this is now. the movement of north korea has not slowed down. if anything i think we agree it has picked up. this'll need to be dealt with in the near future. we have talked about trying to engage in conversations. were still in the process of refining that. we've all watched for smile campaign north korea has inflicted on the south korean people. the south korean people are charmed by by some degree, some are captivated by it. i think it's nothing more than a stall by the north koreans to further develop what they're trying to do. my judgment i think we need to be very cautious of this.

tractor coats, i would like to hear your view of the suppose it or the last couple of weeks by the north koreans. >> this is an excess dental threat. potentially to the united states but also to north korea. kim jong-un views this is a type of attack or effort to force him to give up his nuclear weapons is an existential threat to his nation into his leadership in particular. it's a very hard topic given their secrecy and so forth. but we know it is a one-man decision. we're processes in place in the

united states to have multiple engagements with agencies relative to the decisions the president makes. that does not appear to be the case. the provocative nature and instability that kim has demonstrated potentially is a significant threat to the united states. i agree that it decision time is becoming closer in terms of how respond to this. our goal is a peaceful settlement. we're using maximum pressure north korea in various ways which can be described by my colleagues in a close session. we have to face the fact that this is a problem for the united states. >> the last party of question

this past week at the olympics we should all remember that they had the head of the propaganda and education department. there's no indication there's any strategic change in kim jong-un to retain his nuclear capacity to threaten the united states of america. >> i would say they think they can split the relationship between her cells and the south koreans he is mistaken. >> will change to strategic calculus. we see a more deliberate effort in terms of readiness. they train in a deliberate fashion. the strategic calculus is not changing. >> thank you. senator feinstein.

>> thank you very much. i want to associate myself with some of the comments of senator wish. weust had a securriefing last week and i think it was difficult and harsh. i harken back to the words of the secretary of state on the four nose. one that we do not seek regime change. two, we are not seeking the accelerated reunion of the peninsula. finally, we will not bring u.s. forces north of the to militaries zone. if the korean peninsula is reunified.

let me ask you mr. pompeo, you just spoke with some certainty, this kim jong-un really understand and believe our goals are not regime change? >> i cannot give you any certainty about what kim jong-un subjectively believes. there it's a difficult problem anywhere in the world and i have expressed this before, i analyst remain concerned that kim jong-un is not hearing the full story. those around him are not suggesting to the tenuous nature of his position both international and domestically. the breach with china the deep relationship with the united states.

were not certain leaders around him assuring that information. >> in a recent op-ed victor shaw who was recently under consideration to be the ambassador to south korea warned of the dangers of a military strike against north korea. he cautioned such a strike would not halt their nuclear weapons program and could sparking uncontrolled conflict in the region that could kill hundreds of thousands of americans. number of experts on the area have also said that. he argued to press for multilateral sanctions to provide japan and south korea advance weapons training and intel and other things. has the intelligence community has assessed how the north korean regime would react to a preventive united states attack.

>> we have. i would prefer to talk about that in a close session with you. we have analyzes certainty and uncertainty around the and what we think happens in the event that we decide not to do that and allow him to continue to develop his arsenal. >> have you explored what it would take to bring them to the table. >> we have. also that in a close session. thank you. >> thank you for being here. i have to the same words people have shared about the import worker agencies do. rational, prudent particular efforts around the world are important. the biggest issue on my view and

i guess most members of the panel is china and the risk they pose. not sure in the history of the nation we've ever faced a competitor and potential adversary of the scale, scope and capacity. they're carrying out a well orchestrated patient long-term strategy to replace united states is the most powerful employees on earth. this means a retreat to the western valley of freedom open is set another model that benefits them. the pursuit seems to be part of the information and media. everything from hacking companies and critical infrastructure everybody can imagine to using the immigration system and our universities.

as in your view the united states today, the government is prepared for the scale, scope, magnitude of the challenge presented by the plan china's carrying out? >> we have full awareness of what the chinese are attempting to do. there's no question that what you have articulated is what's happening with china. they do it in a smart and effective way. they're looking beyond their own region. it's clear they have a long-term objective to become a world power. they're executing through government ways in which they can accomplish that. we have intensive studies going on relative from a-z and what china is doing.

others have asked us to provide that. warner called me last week and we had a discussion on the. i assured him we are pulling all of our elements of intelligence gathering together to provide a very deep dive into a china is doing now and what their plans are for the future and how it impacts the united states. >> to highlight the ways in which there pursuing this what could you say is the counterintelligence risk posed to u.s. national security from students in the sciences and mathematics. >> in the setting i would say the use of nontraditional collectors in the academic setting whether professors, scientists, students, we see in

almost every field office not just in major cities, it's in small ones and across every discipline. the level of naïveté like the upper academic center creates its own issues. they're exploring open research and development that we have and revere. one thing were trying to do is you the threat is not just a whole of government threat but a societal threat. it's not just the intelligence community, it's raising awareness in her academic and private sector. >> last week i wrote a letter to higher education institute that

are funded by chinese government dollars at your schools. it's my view there complicit to influence public opinion and teach half truths. to share concern about confucius institutes as a way to exploit the purpose of what these institutes could be. >> we do share concerns about the confucius institutes. it's one of many tools we take advantage of. there's a new commitment to that program. >> vice chairman warner highlighted the importance of a security clearance process.

so i have a question for you. is the fbi aware of new allegations of domestic abuse and it's so was the white house informed that it could affect his security clearance? >> there is a limit to what i can say about the content of any particular background investigation. i would say the background process involves an elaborate set of guidelines and protocols that have been in place for 20 plus years. i'm confident in this instance the fbi followed protocols. >> so was the white house

informed this could affect his security clearance, yes or no? >> i cannot get into the content of what was agreed. >> i can tell you the fbi submitted a partial report on the investigation in question in march and then a completed background investigation late july. soon thereafter we received request for follow-up inquiry. we did the follow-up and provided that information in november. then we administratively close the file in january. earlier this month we received additional information and pass that on as well.

this affects the politicizing of the classification. the first was the public release at the newness memo. the second involved report congress required on russian oligarchs, the relationship on president putin and indications of corruption. the secretary of the treasury released nothing but rich russians pete taken from public sources. my question, did any of you take a position on either of these two arbitrary classification decisions? did any of you have any communications with white house about either of those classification matters?

>> i will start, the answer is no. >> no. >> i raise concerns on the issue with the dni. >> now. >> the cia was not us to review the classification. >> [inaudible] the second, the oligarch treasury we did have interaction about the memo for chairman newness. >> is there anything you can say that protects sources and methods in an open session with respect to that matter? >> as we said publicly we had grave concerns about the memos release. >> on encryption, this was a surprise because i indicated i would ask you about this. you have indicated that companies should be making their

products with backdoors in order to allow you to do your job. we all want you to protect americans. at the same time sometimes their policies that make us less safe and give up our liberty. that's what we get what what your advocating which is weak encryption. this is a technical area. and there is a field on it that i'm not an expert on. think there's a clear consensus among experts in the field against your position to weaken strong encryption. i've asked you for a list of the experts the you have consultant. i have not been able to get it, can you give me a date when you give me a sense of when we will

will be told who are these people who will be advising you to pursue this route? i don't know of anybody respected in the field who is advising this a good idea to weaken strong encryption encryption. >> i be happy to talk more about this this afternoon. my position is not to weaken encryption. we should be working together, government and the private sector to find a solution that balances both concerns. >> i'm on the program for working together. i think we need to be driven by affecobjective facts in the posn you're taking is out of sync with what the experts are saying. i would just like to nuclear consulting with. >> thank you mr. chairman. director pompeo, last week the new york times published a

report that alleged that u.s. intelligence officials have paid $100,000 to a source for forming secrets including potentially compromising information about the president and information certain tools allegedly stolen from the nsa. first is as it is it accurate that the caa has categorically 29 the assertions in the story? second, if so, what would be the motivations of a russian who peddled the story to the new york times and author western media? is this part of the campaign to undermine faith in the western democracy.

>> reporting on this matter has been inaccurate and ridiculous. the suggestion that we send that to james rison and -- indeed it's our view the same two people who were put in for the information to these two reporters, the central intelligence agency did not provide resources, no money to these individuals who proffered u.s. government information directly or indirectly at any time. the information we are working to retrieve was information we thought was stolen from the u.s. government. >> thank you. director ray, the president has

repeatedly raised concerns about current and former fbi leaders and has alleged corruption and political bias in the performance of the fbi's law-enforcement national security missions. i want to give you the opportunity today to respond to those criticisms, what is your reaction? >> my experience, now six months and with the has validated my prior experiences which is that it is the finest group of professionals and public servants i could hope to work for. every day, many times a day when confronted with examples of integrity, professionalism, and grit. there 37000 people in the fbi

who do unbelievable things around the world. we actually have more than two investigations. most of them do a lot to keep americans safe. >> thank you. that's one of the reasons i wanted to give you an opportunity to respond. director cuts, we've had discussions about russian attempts which are ongoing to influence elections in western democracies and to undermine nato to try to destroy institutions in our country and elsewhere. this is an election year and it's frustrating to me that we have not passed legislation to help strengthen the state voting

systems. there's also going to be election the sheer lot be a. one of our nato allies. what is your thought on how they russians are engaging that and how concerned is the intelligence community that is very sympathetic to russia's form policy objective. >> the 29 nations of nato are concerned as well. return not that long ago and all 29 students, the topic was addressed on russian meddling in elections and trying to undermine democratic values. at the end the new director

asked for a show of hands any verbal response from any representative of the 29 nations if they thought russia had not interviewed with their processes particularly their elections. not one person raise their hand. so he said to understand we are unanimous in assessing what the russians are trying to do to undermine our coordination with united states and relationships with each other and to undermine the very basic principles of sharing with their european countries, everything that has been accomplished through this. you all see this for what it is? he said i take silence to be consent. i think that says this is

pervasive. the russians have a strategy that goes well beyond what's happening in the united states. while i have historically tried to do these things they have up their game to. they took advantage of social media to throughout europe and elsewhere. i think that sends a strong signal that any election, not new to assume there might be interference with that particularly from the russians and other actors. steps need to be taken to work with state local officials because many of these elections will be state local. governorships and members of certain houses of representation within the states themselves. this clearly an issue that is

whole of government. the more transparency we can provide to the american people, two nations that see this threat coming, the better off we will be. obviously we need to take measures but we need to inform the american public this is real and will happen on the resilience needed for us to stand up and say were not going to allow some russian to tell us how we should vote or run our country. there needs to be a national cry for that. >> thank you chairman. director ray, the fbi has been accused of political bias against the president and he said the fbi's reputation is in tatters. do you think the rest fbi's reputation is in tatters?

are you confidence in the independence of your agency? >> there is no shortage of opinions about our agency just like the other agencies in the congress, i can only speak from my experience. >> my experiences been every office i go to, every division has patriots people who could do anything else but they have chosen to work for the fbi because they want to serve others. the feedback i get from our partners in the folks we work with other private sector in the community, office after office has been gratifying and reassuring to me. i'm a believer in the idea that the fbi speaks through his work

through its victims it protects. encourage our folks not to get to follow up on the noise on to be in social media. >> you haven't seen evidence of inherent bias in the agency? >> no. >> how to statements like that affect the morale of agents? they are all individuals and they all think in their own way. people are mission focused on our custom to the fact that we do some of the hardest things there are to do that are folks are pretty sturdy. think of a woman i met who had a bad accident, 12 stitches in her face in the next issue is back at work. i think of folks in the san jn fice. todd about people going through a real storm.

they're out in the community. the community values what they do on the island. >> an op-ed by former intelligence officer" one of the worst crisis of politicization of intelligence and modern -- he said he had concerns about that memo. i know you can't get into the details of that, can you thing your view whether or not one of those concerns is that may have selectively tray picked information without presenting the entire facts that led up to that fisa warrant application? . .

document that were very sensitive and lots and lots of briefings, , and it's hard for anybody to distill all that down to three and a half pages. >> director pompeo, have you seen russian activity in the lead up to the 2018 election cycle? >> yes. i paused only, i'm trying to make sure i stay on unclassified side. we had seen it. >> director coats? >> yes, we have. >> anyone else? admiral rogers? >> yes. i think this would be a good topic to get into this afternoon. >> according to news reports, there are dozens of white house staff with only eight of the security clearances still. to include jared kushner until last week to include white house staff secretary rob porter who i

would assume would have regularly reviewed classified documents as part of his job. director coats, it someone is flagged by the fbi with areas of concern in the background investigations into white house staff with interim clearances, should the sta continue have access to classified materials? >> let me first speak in general, relative to temporary classifications. clearly with the new administration in particular we are trying to fill a lot of new slots, and the classification process and security clearance process has been mentioned -- >> i'm only speaking with regard to folks it may lead issues raised as opposed to just being in the matter of course of going through the long process. >> well, i'm not in a position and we can talk about this in the classified session but i'm not in the position to discuss what individual situations are

or specific individuals. i might just say that. i think sometimes it is necessary to have some type of preliminary clearance in order to fill a slot, but i publicly stated if that isn't the case, the access has to be limited in terms of the kind of information they can be in a position to receive or not receive pics i think that's something we have to do as as a part of our secuy clearance review. the process is broken. it needs to be reformed. as senator warner has previously said, it's not evolution, its revolution. we have 700,000 backups soviet situations where we need people in places but they don't yet have that. >> your specific question i think might take up in a classified session.

>> chairman, i'm over my type. thank you, director coats. >> senator blunt. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director coats, director pompeo, admiral rogers, i think you all talked about evidence that the russians would intend to do things to be active in our elections. really seems to me to divis of that activity. one is information that's put on the record that misleading, false, trying to develop that level. the other even more sinister might be the level of dealing with the election system itself, the voting day system, the registration system. and of those too clearly the voting day system, one when you get the most concerns about that critical infrastructure. this committee has been working toward both of those goals of trying to shore up critical infrastructure on election day as well as all people to and decide what might be done about

misinformation on the other side of the ledger. voting against in march. that's next month. if were going to have any impact on securing that voting system itself it would seem to me we need to be acting quickly. i think a great part of the strength of the system is the diversity of the system, different not only state to state but election jurisdictions within the states. that's the strength not a weakness in my view. what are some of the things we can do to be more helpful to local election officials and encouraging them to share information when you think their systems are being attacked, getting more information than we have? there was a lot of criticism in the last cycle that we knew that some election systems were being attacked and didn't tell them they were being attacked. and so the three of you, in any

order, let's just to the order i started with, director coats, director pompeo, admiral rogers, any thoughts you up upon what e can do to protect the critical infrastructure of the election system in a quickly we need to act if we intend to do that this year. >> the intelligence community, all elements of it are aware and we want to provide, collect and provide as much information as we can so we can get those warnings and alerts so that we can share information back and forth with local and state and election processes with the federal government. department of homeland security, department of fbi, obviously were involved, given these are domestic issues, but we do look to every piece of intelligence we can gather so we can provide these warnings. it is an effort i think the government needs to put together at the state and local level, and work with those individuals who are engaged in the election process. in terms of the security of their machines, cyber plays a

major role here and so i think it is clearly an area where federal government, foreign collection, potential threats of interference, warnings, and then processes in terms of how to put in place security and secure that to ensure the american people that their vote is sanctioned and well and not manipulated in any way whatsoever. >> director pompeo? >> i was referring to the former, the first part of your question, not truly to the letter, the things we've seen russia doing today are mostly focus on information types of worker, things that senator warner were speaking about order. with respect to the cia, admiral rogers will say his come with two missions. one, , identify the source of ts information, make those here domestically aware of it so they can do the things they need to do whether that's fbi or dhs so they had that information to we are working diligently along

mindy many threat factors to do that. the second thing, we can talk more about this this afternoon, we have capabilities offensively to raise the cost for those who would your challenge the united states elections. >> and after admiral rogers, director wray, i may want to come to you, sharing that information with local officials or any reason we what to do that. >> the only other thing i would add and this is also shaped by my experience of cyber networks is one of things we generally find in that role, many network and system operators do not truly understand instructions and systems. one of the things is part of this is how do we help those local federal-state entities truly understand their network structure, what its potential one of those and hardest this information that the intelligence structures and other outlets are providing feedback it's not necessary and intel function but it's part of how it would work our way

through this process. >> director wray. >> i think that's what are the areas that's been a lot of discussion whether we are doing better. this is one of the areas i think we are doing better. we together at the fbi, together with dhs recently, for example, scheduled meetings with the various election, state election officials. normally the variable declassification concerns whether someone had clearances. we were able to put together briefings appropriately tailored and with nondisclosure agreement with those officials. there are ways people are creative and fullwood lane to educate the state election officials which is of course where elections are run in this country. >> hopefully we will be graded and formulating and we want to keep track of what we're doing. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator king. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first statement i want to make is more in sorrow than in anger. i'll get to the anger part in a minute.

the sorrow part is director coats, in response to question senator collins you gave an eloquent factual statement of the activities of the russians and the fact that they're continuing around the world and that they are a continuing threat to this country. all of you have agreed to that. if only the president would say that. i understand the presidents sensitivity but what his campaign was in connection with the russians, and that's a separate question but there is no question we've got before see entire intelligence community that the russians interfered in the election in 2016, they are continuing to do it and they are our real imminent threat to our elections in a matter of eight or nine months. my problem is i talk to people in maine to say the whole thing is which and it's a hoax because the president told me. i just wish you all could persuade the president as a matter of national security to separate these two issues, the

collusion issue is over here, unresolved. we get to the bottom of that but there's no doubt as you all have testified today, and we cannot confront this threat, which is a serious one with a hole of common response, when the leader of the company continues to deny that it exists. now, let me get to the anger part. the anger part involves cyber attacks. you have all testified that we are subject to repeated cyber attacks cyber attacks are occurring right now in our infrastructure all over this country. i am sick and tired of going to these hearings, which have been going to for five years were everybody talks about cyber attacks and her country still does now a policy or a doctrine or a strategy for dealing with them. this is not a criticism of the current administration, that

prior, i'm an equal opportunity critic. the prior administration didn't do it either. admiral rogers, until we have some deterrent capacity, we are going to continue to be attacked, isn't that true? >> yes, sir. we have to change the current dynamic. >> we are trying to fight a global bound with her hands tied behind her back. director coats, you have a stunning statement in your report. they will work to you cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives unless they face clear repercussions for their cyber operations. right now there are none. is that not the case? there are no repercussions. we have no doctrine of deterrence. how are we ever going to get them to stop doing this if all we do is patch our software and try to defend ourselves? >> those are very relevant questions, and i think everyone, not only at this table but in

every agency of government understands the threat that we have here and, in fact, already been made through these cyber threats. our role as the intelligence community is to provide all the information we possibly can as to what is happening so our policymakers and take that, including the congress, and shape policy as to how we're going to respond to this and deal with this and whole of government white. >> it just never seems to happen. director pompeo, you understand this issue, do you not? we are not going to be up to defend ourselves and cybertek for simply being defensive. we have to have doctrine of deterrence. if they strike is an cyber they are going to be struck back in some way. it may not be cyber. >> i i would agree. i would also argue, i can't say much in the setting, i would argue your statement that we do nothing this will reflect the responses that frankly some of us at the table have engaged in and the united states government has engaged in both before and

after, excuse me, , both during and before this administration. >> but deterrence doesn't work unless the other side knows it. the doomsday machine in "dr. strangelove" didn't work because the russians have not told us about it. >> it's true that it's important the adversary know it but is not required the whole world know it. >> and msa does know it, in your view? >> i prefer to say that for another forum. >> i believe this country needs a clear doctrine, what is a cyber attack, what is an active or, what will be the response, what would be the consequences. right now i -- >> i agree with you. we -- it is a complicated problem given the nature of -- >> i i would include us by the way. >> i would, too. i take responsibility for not having sole part of that. there's a lot of work to do. we need to government strategy and clear authorities to kochi

that strategy. >> i appreciate it. i just don't want to come to maine winters a series cybertek it's a we never really got to. we knew was a problem but we have four different committees of jurisdiction and we couldn't work it out. that's not going to fly. thank you for your service. >> i might just add that we don't want to learn this lesson the hard way. 9/11 took place because we were not coordinating our efforts. we are now coordinating efforts, but we didn't have the right defenses in place because the right information was not there. our job is to get that right information to the policymakers and get on with it. because it's just common sense if someone is attacking you and there's no retribution or response, it's just going to incentivize more contact. right now there are a lot of blank checks, a lot of things we need to do. >> director coats, thank you. i appreciate that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator lankford.

>> director coats come you and i talked last year about this same issue that said to duking was bringing up about cyber doctrine and a point person on who that would be and edifying person that would give options to the president and the congress if the a response is needed and is warranted. this is the person, this is the entity that would make those recommendations and 11 president to make decision to with the proper response is. has that been completed? is there a point person to give recommendations on appropriate response to cyber attack to the president? >> that has not yet been completed. of course your understanding of the stanford cyber command and the new director that will be replacing admiral rogers, the decisions relative to whether it would be separation between the functions that are currently now nsa and cyber has yet to be made. general mattis is contemplating what the next best step is. they involve the intelligence

community in terms of making decisions in that role, but we at this particular point cannot .21 sort of cyber czar. various agencies throughout the federal government are taking this very, very seriously and are individuals that we continue to meet on a regular basis the odni something called ctiic and that is a coordination effort all the cyber that comes in so that we don't stovepipe like what we did before 9/11. so things are underway but in terms of putting i finalized, this is how we're going to do it, together is still in process. >> with respect to responses to that, these are title x dod activities, unless they are granted to some other authority, a title 50 authority. so that is a person responsible. secretary mattis has that this module does to advise the present on the appropriateness of responses in all theaters of

conflict with our adversaries. >> thank you. i want to bring up the issue of the rising threat of what's happening south of our border, mexico. mexico homicide rate went up 27% last you. c to 4000 americans die from overdose of drugs, the preponderance came through or from mexico. with a very rapidly rising threat it appears to me and what i'd be interested thing all is on a national security level in which are saying what are we facing, which changing in mexico versus ten years ago mexico and our relationship of the threat that are coming from there? >> i would defer to director wray, relative to what is agency is doing. clearly, we had a continuing problem and the mexican government has a continuing problem relative to two gangs and organizations. there have been some high-profile arrest lately. we've taken down some labs. mexico is cooperating but, and they themselves will admit that

it's almost overwhelming. the army has been participating. it's almost overwhelming for them to control the situation south of the border. we have our own issues on border protection and as well as consumption in the united state states. >> director wray? >> in many ways what we're seeing is just more of the same but one of the things that's just because i think those at the heart of your question, i think we're saying one of the things were watching in particular is more black market that no being shipped to transnational criminal organizations -- retinal that d they're taking advantage of the pricing advantages and that is being then delivered in large quantities to our streets. certainly the mexico relationship is from a law-enforcement perspective and fully domestic security perspective one of our most important i think the fbi office in mexico is our largest in the world. pretty sure about that.

or pretty close to it if not. that's a reflection of much activity there is. >> let me ask you a specific local of a question a national question. there was an individual that was picked up in weatherford, oklahoma, just a couple of weeks ago the fbi. his fingerprints were identified from a terror training camp in afghanistan. he had been in the country for multiple years, and what i'm trying to be able to determine is the coordination of information to local law enforcement and from data that's gathered some of the work happening overseas and against any and such, how are those to being married together that we can identify individuals are a threat to our nation, based on their participation in a terror training camp overseas now coming to the american shores? >> we have become better at looking at biometric information from overseas and mary it up with potential threat subjects here in the u.s. as well as in

some of our allies. the individual in question of course turned out to have his fingerprints on information from the alfred camp. it's just to us that awl of people went through those camps and while the civilized world, intelligence community, law enforcement, military, our allies around the world made a major dent on those people, we are kidding ourselves if we think that awful lot of them are not still out there. if she's reminder that we need to stay on the balls of her feet. >> if i could get one additional point that you asked what has changed in mexico. what is also transpired the last couple of years is you had five principal cartels. we alluded to a number of captures taken place over 100 those five cartels have kind of devolves into 20 20 a part of t growth seen an increase in the level of violence.

>> senator manchin. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first let us a map of the people of west virginia what you think you for the job you do in keeping us safe. professionalism and we have all the utmost confidence in what you doing i hope to be able to support even for the but thank you. people really do appreciate and we appreciate the service you are giving. director coats, i think you are i both were in the senate at the same time when mike moeller, then admiral mullen said the greatest threat we face. i was just on armed services, you on intelligence at the time and we'll try to find up with the greatest threat to the united states faces. i was thinking of another country, whether it be russia, china, whatever. he didn't hesitate when he set the threat of our nation, the greatest threat if the debt of our nation. i think he reiterated that in your opening remarks. he didn't mention -- i was in bitterness about the report, the worldwide threat assessment come you didn't mention the debt in here. it wasn't in the report as a threat to the nation. i did know if there's a thought process behind that because he

made a tremendous effort to put that in your opening statement. i appreciate that but tell me what you thought process there was. >> my thought process is i'm getting a little out of my lane entrance of what i'm supposed to do, but i felt that -- >> you do think it's a threat. it's that in this assessment. >> it's something that congress needs to do with anna did want to come back and preach at you but i thought at the very end, a fact just yesterday look, i think i have responsibly to raise this issue because it does affect the military significantly. it affects the intelligence community which is tied to the military in terms of intelligence. it's going to have a serious effect on this. >> use it on both sides of the out. only thing that seems to be bipartisan is spending money. both sides agree to spending more money without any accountability. i'm glad to hear your remarks on that. if i could indulge all the witnesses i sure what senator

lankford set of our concerns about what's killing more americans than any of the threats we discussed today, and it's with drugs. west virginia has been hit harder than any other state. i have more deaths per capita than any state. it's been ravaging as far as my communities, my hose, my schools and the families. unbelievable what we're going through. i think in a nutshell what i would be asking all of you all are responsible to do everything can to keep a safe and you've done a commit his job resource from foreign attack and things of that sort. director wray, i appreciate with the fbi does and has a strong presence in west virginia and we are very, very appreciative of that. what type of efforts from each one to agencies have you spent as far as drugs and fighting the drug infestation, highest on your fiery lipscomb one of your greatest dangers or is it just part of the overall scheme of things? >> just speaking for the intelligence community, it is a high priority for us.

we mention it in our threat assessment. we are the collectors of foreign sources at transnational organizations, et cetera. whether it's coming from overseas, from afghanistan, whether it's coming from colombia. when it is come how it's going and then of course it is all of government because once it penetrates the united states, we then use our domestic agencies to -- >> as far as in the fbi because the frontline, you hear on the homeland, what do you think? what can we do to help? >> well, i think under good new side in a country that's often very divided, this is one issue as far as i can tell everybody agrees about what a major, major threat it is. koppers communities from north to south, , from red to blue, fm rich to poor, from urban to rural. i think that's the good district the bad news is it's grown to a

point where there's no one agency or one approach that's going to solve the problem. we are doi our part. some of the things we're able to do we are focusing on gatekeepers because a lot of this is coming through medical professionals and pharmacies. and so we're using intelligence driven operations there, various initiatives. we have prescription drug initiative that focus on that part of it. we are partnering with our foreign counterparts in working with dea, state and local law enforcement, et cetera. we're also trying to do things to raise awareness. we did a video with dea called chasing the dragon which is kind of been shown in schools around the country, but this is a multidisciplinary problem. >> if i could just ask his question, when once it answer this one. based on what we know, and the way we distribute money to foreign aid to different countries, knowing that a lot of

the country we distribute a do is basically allowing, permitting this type of scourge coming to our country as far as in the form of drugs, have you all thought and considered and made recommendations that we hold them hostage, if you will, or liable basically to the money they received from the united states with the best of intentions but that best of intentions is their fight of drugs come into our country when we know is coming from whether it be china, afghanistan, iraq, whatever, mexico and all the south american countries. we should hold that. i mean, i've never seen it,, there's a whole generation in west virginia. i have 10,000 jobs i can't feel. united states has 33 million jobs we can't feel. most of it is around drugs. this is what we're asking for. this is going to be all hands on deck. i don't know if anybody wants -- you all had that as a high priority? does anyone believe we should withhold foreign aid to countries have basically no have a list of drugs coming into our

country? >> senator, i'll answer this. i think the united states should use every tool, whether that's foreign aid or other tools. >> money talks. >> to get these, that's exactly right, to get these nations it's coming from to put it as a party for the country. some don't have the capacity to fix it. it's a problem bigger than their nation but we ought to, we should be unafraid to use the leverage that comes with our generosity from the american taxpayer to ensure that these countries are doing everything they can to prevent drug some coming from the country to ours. >> thank you. i appreciated. >> as you did know we do provide efforts within countries to help them eradicate, it hasn't been totally successful, , but that s one way in which we use some of that aid, it is directly contributed to the ratification of drugs. >> thank you. >> thank you for your appearance and thanks to all the men and

women who you represent and the work they do for our country. mr. wray, are you aware of the gentleman by the name of all that there bhaskar? >> i've heard the name. >> is it fair to call him a putin's link russian oligarch? >> i will leave that kirk relation to others. serving not this setting. >> chuck grassley the chairman of the judiciary committee last week sent a letter to a london-based lawyer who represents mr. geer darrell bhr and asked if christopher steele was employed either directly or indirectly by him at the time newswriting the so-called steel dossier. do you know if christopher steele work for oleg deripaska? >> that's not something i could answer. >> could we discuss it in a classified setting? >> there might be more we could say there. >> thank you.

jim comey testified before this committee in an open setting last summer and he referred to the steel dossier a salacious and unverified, as our main the fbi's position? >> i think maybe there's more we can talk about this afternoon. >> thank you. i'd like to turn my attention to the threat posed by china specifically chinese telecom companies. send it to rubio spoke earlier and i agree with what he said about the threat of a rising china, also the threat of centers, the threat telecom company specifically you know, and telecom posed to our country that's why produce legislation with senator cornyn and senator rubio to save u.s. government can't use them and that u.s. government can't use companies that use them. i'm glad some companies like verizon, at&t among others have taken this threat seriously. would you explain what the risk is that we face from cte and

while waiting use in the united states? especially in a public setting, the risk of the companies comes take a risk local governments might face if they use while way or cte products and services. >> which probably the simplest way to put it is this that he would be weird to the concern about the risk of allowing any company or entity that is beholden to foreign governments that don't share our values to gain positions of power inside our telecommunications networks that provides the capacity to exert pressure or control over our telecommunications infrastructure. provides the capacity to maliciously modify or steel information that provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage. so add a 100,000-foot level at least in the setting those are the kinds of things that were yes. i will say like you, we've been gratified i think to date by the

response of the large u.s. telecommunications providers, who are trying to raise awareness on this issue. but i also recognize that the competitive pressures are building. and so it something that i think we have to be very vigilant about and continue as you all are doing to raise awareness about. >> admiral rogers, would you care to edit anything about the threat? >> i would agree with his characterization. this is a challenge i think it's only going to increase, not less in overtime for us. >> so you would suggest to mayors, county judges, univsity presints come state legislatures to look warily it e comes bearing gifts to been? >> i would say you need to look log and hard at companies like this. >> all the witnesses i would like to address this question to you. please raise your hand if you would use products or services from while way or zte? none of you would.

you leave intelligence service so that something of a vice question. raise your hand if you recommend private citizens use zte products or services? none of you to get a raising her hand. thank you for that. finally i'd like to turn to question, director pompeo, that's been in his in the last few hours. there were reports that over 200 russian mercenaries were killed eastern syria. can you confirm or deny those reports? >> i leave it to the department of defense talk about what transpired there. i can say this from an intelligence perspective, we get seen a multiple instances foreign forces using mercenaries in battles that would begin to approach the united states. >> general actually, since you represent the department of defense would you like to confirm or deny? >> if we could take that to a closed session, i think we can lay out an interesting fabric of what is syria and what transpired over the last meeting we can address that in the afternoon. can ask, is massing and

maneuvering forces against and location where you was personal are present in syria a good way to get yourself killed? >> i think i'll defer that to the the department offense as well. >> general ashley, which elected to the question? >> that does make you more susceptible. i would be that also did operational operations commander but you are at greater risk when you start to mass in a situation. >> not a good idea if what a long and the like. thank you. >> senator harris. >> thank you. i want to echo the comments of my colleagues in thinking the men and women who serve in your agency's. i am concerned that the political attacks against the many women of agencies may have had an effect on your ability to recruit, retain and also the morale of your agency's. so i would like to emphasize the point that we all i think share in making, which is we thank the many women of your agency's for their selfless work. they do it on behalf of the

american people without any expectation of award or reward,, and we cannot thank them enough for keeping us safe. director wray, chairman nunes memo included sensitive thighs information regarding a person who worked on the president's campaign. according to the white a statement, the president was the one who authorized the memos declassification. do you believe there is an actual or at least the appearance of a conflict of interest when the president is putting charge of declassify information is that could complicate an ongoing investigation into his own campaign? >> well, senator, as we've been very clear what our view was about disclosure accuracy of the member in question, but it do think it is the president role as commander-in-chief under the rule that was invoked to object or not to the declassification. so i think that is the

presidents responsibly. >> regardless of whether there is an appearance or actual cultic of interest? >> i leave it to others to character is whether there's appearance or actual concert of interest but i think the president was filling his responsibility in that situation. >> if the president as you tomorrow to hand over to him additional incentive fbi information on the investigations into his campaign, would you give it to him? >> i'm not going to discuss the investigation in question with the president, much less provide information from that investigation to have. >> and if he received that information and wanted to declassify it, would he have the ability to do that, , from your perspective? >> information from the -- >> however he received it, perhaps from members of the united states congress. >> i think legally he would have that ability. >> and do you believe the president should recuse himself

from reviewing and declassifying sensitive fbi material related to this investigation? >> i think recusal questions are something i would encourage the president to talk to the white house counsel about. >> has the fbi done any legal analysis on these questions? >> happily, i'm no longer in the business of doing legal analysis. i now get to be a client and blame lawyers for things instead of being the lawyer who gets blamed. >> have you blamed any lawyer for their analysis of this issue? >> i have not yet, no. >> okay. is the fbi getting the cooperation it needs some social media companies to counter foreign adversaries influence on our elections? >> i think the cooperation has been improving. i think we're continuing to work with social media companies to see we can raise their awareness so that they can share information with us and vice

versa. i think things are moving in the right direction, but i think there's a lot of progress to be made. >> what more do you need some social media companies to improve the partnership that you would like to have with them to counter these attacks? >> we always like to have more information shared more quickly from there into, but i think from their perspective, it's a dialogue. to looking at information from us about what it is we see so that they can give responsive information. i think we're working through those issues. >> do you believe the social media copies have enough employees that have the appropriate security clearance to make these partnerships real? >> that's not an issue i've evaluated, but i'm happy to take a look at it. >> please do and follow-up with the committee. director coats, one of the things the mix guarding against foreign intelligence threats on social media so complex is that the threat originates overseas and so that would be within the jurisdiction of the cia and the

nsa, and then it comes to our shores and then passes on to the fbi and also the social media companies themselves. i'm not aware of any written i see strategy on how we would confront the threat to social media. that such a strategy exist in writing? >> i would have to get back with you on that. i'd be happy to look into it. my perspective right now, a written strategy specifics energy is not in place by want to check on that. >> please do follow up. also last year congress passed bipartisan rush of sanctions bill. , the administration has not imposed those sanctions. from an intelligence perspective what is your assessment of how russia interprets the administrations in action? >> i don't have information relative to what the russian thinking is in terms of that particular specific reaction picture or other sanctions as you know that are being imposed

on russian oligarchs and others through the united nations and two other things that have been done. but specific on your question, i don't have an answer for that. >> senator, may i comment? i think we ought to look at that in the broader context, that is how russia views all the actions of this administration, not just a particular set of sanctions or the absence thereof. so as we've watched russians respond to this administrations decision to provide defensive weapons and ukraine, to push back against russian efforts in syria, sanctions placed on venezuela we're directly in public with russian interest. the list the place of russians are feeling the pain from this administrations actions are long. >> but director pompeo, i'm sure you would agree in order to understand the full scope of

effect, it is also important that we analyze each discrete component, including what is the interpretation of this administrations failure to enact the sanctions as has been passed and directed by the united states congress in a bipartisan manner? have you done predecessor? >> in closed session i will tell you what we know and what we don't know about that discrete issue. i'm happy, i agree with you it is important with each one into someplace but what we most often see in terms of russian response is to the community of activities in response to russian activities, have united states response to those in a cumulative point. >> i look forward to our conversations. >> director coats, you alluded to the activities of transnational criminal organizations, and unthinking particularly as regards our neighbors down south of our border. recently i i heard somebody

referred to the cartels, these transnational criminal organizations as commodity agnostic in other words, they will traffic and people, , trafc in drugs and other contraband, all in pursuit of money. >> whatever brings in the most dollars. >> senator manchin i know and others have alluded to the concern about, and certainly we all share the concern about the deaths and overdoses caused by drugs in america, much of which comes across our southern borders through our ports of entry. this week were going to be considering border security measures as part of a larger package that the president has proposed while addressing the so-called daca recipients. but do you believe that modernizing our ports or providing enhanced technology and other means to surveilled and follow and identify illegal drugs coming across our ports of entry would be a good thing for

us to do? >> i do. i do think that a layered approach is necessary, it's clear this one specific defense in place is not going to solve the problem. it needs to be a layered interest of not only physical facilities but also border patrol, also how those who arrived and perhaps dissipate in waiting for their court appearance, tracking them, there's a whole range of things that i think are going to be needed to stop the flow from coming in. >> i know it's been alluded to let me just emphasize my concerns with the demand side. maybe we've given up, i hope not, in addressing the demand side which of course provides the money and the incentive for these cartels operate, and something i think deserves full attention and focus of the

united states government. i've heard general kelly in his previous job at dhs talk about that, and i hope we will return to that focus as part of this layered approach, the demand side, because it's something i think is may be the hardest thing to do with but perhaps might have the greatest impact. >> the supply depends on the demand, and the demand drives the supply and provides the capital in which to take extraordinarily methods that bypass our defenses to get drugs and to the united states. and on the demand side, this is a whole of american people process, it's ptas, you know, growing up, got these videos of driving in drivers training and the rent is look at crashes and so forth and so on. we need to let every student know. we need to let what the

consequences of these drugs are to their lives into the future. we need to get parents involved, parent-teacher associations involved. so whether they pick up their values from church or from the neighborhood or whatever, this is a national crisis. all of us here represented or are from states which are staggering through the process here of watching young people and others die from drugs more potent than they've ever been. >> let me just i doubt a couple of markers here in my comments, but then i want to end on the committee on foreign investment in the united states. i will join senator rubio and senator king, senator lankford and others concerned about the failure of the u.s. government again to have an all of government strategy to do with the cyber threat. i have no doubt in my mind that we have superior capabilities,

but they are still fight. i don't think the policymakers are doing a good enough job. i think it's incumbent upon us to try to provide policy guidance so that you and others in the intelligence community, the national security apparatus can address this threat in a way that needs to be addressed. our adversaries don't suffer from our lack of and all of government policy. they are all over that. and china i agree with senator rubio about their strategy. some of you have responded to that. but one of the strategies that china and other countries have adopted is to avoid some of the review measures the committee on foreign investment in the united states when it comes to direct investment, buying those dual use technologies, start up companies and the like, and then using that to gain strategic advantage against the united states. i wonder if maybe, director

wray, could you address that, did anybody else in the time permitted, i'd be glad to hear what you have to say about that. >> senator, i think you're exactly right that reform is particularly relevant to the china threat, although not exclusively china threat. there's a degree to which as it currently stands is susceptible to much to the kind of round pegs only go in round holes kind of thing and it's not hard to come up with other shaped pegs to get around that process. the obvious example being joint ventures but there are other ways as well so that's one of the significant problems. another poem using the time that is built into the process to do a thorough review, which is too short. another problem is the inability to share information, other countries, our allies according to the same thing to build a share information so when they go through their own versions of

this process they have the benefit what was attempted in our country and vice versa. i think in general we need to take a more strategic perspective on china's efforts to use acquisitions and other types of business ventures as opposed to just a tactical looking only within the four corners of one particular transaction. >> so if i could, the director laid out a bigger issue at the strategic level and for us at dia would take on the tactical so we are ready to predicate the light is look supply chain risk management, we won the threat analysis center that is hooked into it. we bring the services together and look at supply chain risk management for ci issues associate with whomever make it a contract and ties back to china, other nations but you look to the fact every case for united states comes back would take a look at it, we get about three days with it and we could use more time to make a really more thorough scrub. >> thank you.

>> senator reed. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i apologize for being late. we had a simultaneous hearing on so. all morning we've heard -- socom. the story of a rush influencing our campaign in a deep in the current campaigns for the midterms. so let me begin with mr. wray and say has the president directed you and your agency to take specific actions to confront and blunt russian influence activities that are ongoing? >> taking a lot of specific efforts to blunt our speedy with a directed by the president? the president? >> not as specifically directed by the president. >> director pompeo, have you received specific presidential direction to take steps to disrupt these activities? >> sorry, i'm not sure how specific, i mean, the president has made very clear we have an obligation from our perspective from the foreign intelligence

perspective do everything we can to make sure there's a deep and thorough understanding of every threat including threats from russia. >> but has he singled out the russian threat, which appears to be critical to this election coming up? i know there are threats from many different vectors, but have you received a specific -- >> i think the president has been very clear that he's asked our agency to cooperate with each of the investigations that ongoing and everything we can to ensure that we thoroughly understand this potential threat. >> director coats come have you received a specific directive to take specific steps to disrupt and understand first and disrupt russian activities directed at our elections in 2018? >> i would echo what director pompeo just said. we worked together on this. agency has full understanding that we are to provide whatever intelligence is relevant and

make sure that is passed on to our policymakers, including the president. >> passing on relevant intelligence is not actively disrupting the operations of an opponent, do you agree? >> no. we passed it on and they make the decisions on how to are permitted. >> director of intelligence have you, are you aware of our leading an interagency working group that is tasked with countering russian activities, not only reporting on it but cast with countering those activities? are you aware of any interagency group, any intergovernmental group in state elections that are critical? >> we essentially are rely on these investigations that are underway. >> so the answer -- >> both with the committee as well as the special counsel. >> so you're not taking any specific steps based on the intelligence to disrupt russian activities that are occurring at

this moment? >> we take all kinds of steps to disrupt russian activities and truth of what they're trying to do. i think bolton over to director pompeo to -- >> let me finish with the rest of the gentleman. is that your -- are you finished, director coats? >> yes. >> thank you, sir. >> we have a significant effort. have to talk about in close session. it's an all of ic effort. or maybe is spreading to do our best to push back against this threat and is not just the russian threat. it's iranians and chinese. it's a big broad effort. >> i understand. we have mutual threats but one threat that has been central, and you testify to this publicly, the last election there was russian influence. this election, they seem to be more prepared. they've learned their lessons. simple question i pose is, has the president directed the intelligence community in a

coordinate effort, nightmares report but to actively stop this activity? the answer seems to be, i'm hearing, is the reporting is going on as we reporting about every threat coming into the united states. let me get back to, quickly, to any any of the other panels have anything to add on this point? >> for us, , i can't say i've bn explicitly directed to quote blunt or actively stop. on the other day and it's very clear, generate knowledge and insight, help us understand so we can generate better policy. that clearly come that direction has been very explicit, in fairness. >> but i think again, you may agree or disagree, collecting intelligence, and acting on any court native fashion are two different things. >> yes, sir. i'd also argue what's our role as intelligence professionals. >> let me just, i have a few moments remaining. we talked a lot about china,

cfius, their involvement in trying to buy companies in the united states. what i think has to be pointed out is they are undertaking a significant national investment in artificial intelligence and quantum computing. that is dwarfing anything that the administration is proposing or suggesting. if artificial intelligence has even have the benefits that it's claimed it will be disrupted. quantum computing, has the capacity to undercut cryptology as we know it, and the expert can correct me if i'm wrong. some of the mechanisms that quantum computing can generate good, based on infinite measurements of gravity, detect devices underground and under the water, which for anybody who's a submariner, you got to be wondering.

so where is our national manhattan program for ai and quantum computing that will match the chinese? director coats, you seem to be anxious to answer that. >> i think there are some things that we ought to talk about in a classified setting here we are treading very narrow lines here relative to discussing this in an open meeting. >> i don't want to tread that line, but we do have to recognize that, again, the chinese activity to appropriate our intellectual property is obvious. they are generating their own intellectual property at a rate that could be disruptive and we are not matching them. again, this manhattan analogy might be a little bit out of date, but when we saw the potential effects of a

scientific development back in the 40s, we spared no expense so that we would get it first before our opponents. the chinese seem to be making that type of commitment very publicly. they'll use dollars they have said publicly they have a plan and they're working on a plan. >> and we provide that information to the extent that we can collect that information, but just that -- just like the manhattan project would openly share what steps we're taking to address it. >> i respect that. thank you, mr. chair. >> i do hope you'll come back to the close session it again this afternoon. i want to turn, we about to wrap up. everybody can look up. there are no more questions, so you don't have to lose eye contact with us, hoping or not the guy they're going to ask to answer. [laughing] you can tell who the newbies are. they stayed focused on the

members entire time and the one submitted before have been like this. i want to turn to the vice chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we look for to seeing you all this afternoon. robert, we hope to get some overhead questions to you this afternoon. echoing what with all said, appreciate your service. but i think we are against a lot of commonality as we think about cyber information, misinformation. it is really symmetrical. one of the things that have struck me is that if you do a rough calculation and add a the costs to russia in terms of their intervention in america, elections, a dutch elections where the hand count it all about us, the french elections where facebook adults taking to 30,000 sites. you at that altogether, it's less than the cost of one new f-35 airplane. pretty good bang for the buck. i'm a member -- i remember a

year or so ago langley, look at some still technology and the colonel showing us around, bemoaning the fact that the chinese have gotten the skin on the cheap mycelia a lot of the intellectual property that underlies that technology. and echoing what senator reed said, and again this is what we all need to put our heads together, we just made a massive additional investment in dod. we're roughly 10x the size understand purses are near. adversaries like china and russia. i do feel not from a christian standpoint but for from just forgot if you think about going forward that we may be buying the best 20th century military that money can buy, when we see our new peer adversaries making these massive investments in areas like ai machine learning, quantum computing and i think we all need to kind of think

through this from general strategic standpoint. i worry we got certain low hanging fruit as we think about chinese tech companies and how we get cfius right. you look simply at iot connected devices, we're going to double the number from about 10,000,000,000 to 20.5 in the next three to five years yet we have no even de minimis security requirements for the federal government purchasing of iot devices. i know i've talked with general ashley on this. i don't believe there is even across the ic and dod prerequisite before buy some of these connected refrigerators for sensors or, consumer goods that there be that patch ability or knowing that its past. i think there's a lot of work to do but if we don't have the luxury of short time. senator blunt raise some of the

questions recollection secured an end of the chairman will make this comment in his closing remarks. i think this committee has done some very good bipartisan work on a series of various that arose out of the russian investigation to its our hope that on election security we can come forward with a set of recommendations very quickly. because we are primaries coming up as early as march and my hope is there will be able to be bipartisan legislation to start addressing this issue. so thank you. look forward to our session this afternoon, and without out turn it over to the chairman. >> thank you, vice chairman. admiral rogers, i can't member with as you or someone else at the table said we had a close session about investment. it's not how much we spend, it's how we deploy the capital that we are devoted to a particular thing. i think as a general statement we get much better at the way we deploy capital, and i think we deploy with a measurement tool

today on return that's totally different than it was ten and 20 and 30 you 30 utica and i thins important. .. trying to portray that scope of

. not sure anyone in this room knows. here is what i do know. i know the senate intel investigation continues. we're hopefully wrapping up some important areas we focused on the vice chairman alluded to fact it is our hope and our belief before the primaries begin we intend to have an overview of our findings that will be public. we intend to have an open hearinging on election security. and it is the committee intent to make recommendations will enhance the likelihood that the security of our election process is in place. in addition to that, our review of the ica, the intel community

assessment, done in december of '06 -- 16, we have reviewed in great detail and we hope to report on what we found to support the findings where it's appropriate to be critical, if in fact we saw areas that we, found came up short. we intend to make that public. overview to begin with, none of these would be without a tee classification process, but we will, have a public version that we air as quickly as we can. a third piece of review when we learned of russia's intrusions into our system. what we did or we didn't do. again with the intent sharing as much of that with the american public as we can find through open hearings and through an oh view.

lastly, we will continue to work towards conclusions related to any cooperation or collusion by any individual, campaign, or company with efforts to influence the outcome of elections or to create societal chaos in the united states. i want to thank each of you at the table for an unprecedented access to intelligence products, legal documents, and other materials that were needed for us to do our job. we have a very talented group of individuals who have conducted this investigation. the remarks of every individual who has come in before us has commented on their professionalism, and the fact that the end of eight hours they tell who was a democrat, who was a republican. so the effort to be bipartisan

has not just been public, it is private as well, and permeates all the way down through our staff. they couldn't do this in a timely fashion if it wasn't without the access that each of you have provided us and your agencies. and, let me just reiterate again. we understand that this is an unprecedented access to this information. i promised you when we started a year ago that the sensitive nature of that material would in fact be protected. the vice chairman and i have done everything in our power to do that. we think we have maintained that promise. there have been times where information has found its way out, some recent, where it didn't come from us, certainly people betrayed a bit, that is okay, you know and we know the

security measures we've got in place to protect the sensitivity of that material. we have also protected the sensitivity of the individuals that have been interviewed, voluntarily. the individuals who have come in, what they have shared with us. to date we have not released any interview notes, because that's not for public consumption. we asked people to come in apshare with us things that help us understand what happened. it's our responsibility to take that information and to put it into some form that furthers the mile-per-hour people's understanding and assurance that we have thoroughly reviewed this we will continue the promise that we made to each of you, until the conclusion of this investigation. and on. there are no expectations that everything you have shared with us is now a precedent that you

have to continue. i have said publicly and criticized before, that our committee was created to operate in secrecy. i think that is where we perform our best work. we're given the opportunity and need for american people to have better understanding and provide that forum in as controlled atmosphere as we do. today is an example of that. we can move from a public setting to a more private and closed setting to continue to get clarity on some of the issues that our members need. i want you to understand the takeaway here. the takeaway this committee has and will continue to focus on answering the question given to this committee from an investigation standpoint what russia did to ininfluence the 2016 elections.

there are efforts to expand our efforts. they are not internal. we have to answer to the mile-per-hour people what did russia do to mess with the 2016 elections. like many of you on some of the questions we were specific about it in public and private, we find it is multijurisdictional. we have to begin to sort that out for us, for us the american people. so i thank you for the your willingness to be here today. i thank you for the performance of your employees who have worked tirelessly with very little thanks of late with a lot of criticism to keep this country safe. i might say to keep other countries safe, and i know we are generous when bad things are

happening. the committee is appreciative of the relationship we have. we will continue to work to earn your trust because that is the only way we can perform the type of oversight we believe the committee is mandated to do and for the cooperation that each one of you provide us. we're grateful for that. with this, this hearing something adjourned with closed session until 2:30. >> [inaudible]

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[inaudible conversations]. >> while the u.s. senate is in recess, booktv is in prime time each night this week. tonight it's a look at the digital world. beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern, brian deere talks about the impact of early computer programs on modern technology in his book, the friendly orange glow. and then, silicon valley historian leslie berlin, describes the growth of personal computing, videogames, biotechnology. her book is called, troublemakers. forker "new york times" tech columnist, noam cohen. in his book the know it alls.

all on booktv prime time on c-span2. monday on c-span's landmark cases, we'll look at the supreme court case, mccullough v. maryland, solidified the federal government's ability to take actions not specifically mentioned in the constitution and restricted state action against the legitimate use of this power. explore this case and high court's ruling with university of virginia associate law professor and mark killen back, author of mccullough v. maryland, securing a nation. watch landmark cases live monday on 9:00 eastern, c-span, c-span.org or listen with the free c-span radio app. for background, order a copy of the landmark case's book. 8.95 plus shipping and handling at cspan.org/landmarkcases. for additional resource there is link to the national constitution center interactive

constitution. health and human services secretary alex azar testified before the house ways and means committee last week about president trump's 2019 budget request for the department. he answered questions about rural hospitals, the opioid epidemic, prescription drug costs and future of medicare and medicaid. this is about two hours. >> the whit tee will come to order -- committee will come to order. today the committee is on in order to welcome secretary alex asars to talk about president trump's fiscal 2019 budget proposals for the department of health and human services. secretary azar, congratulations on the recent confirmation. thank you for being here today. we know you're only two weeks into this job so we expect you to know everything. we're still reviewing the effects of recent reforms and budget caps adjustments included in lastee