>> coming up on c-span2, members of the senate intelligence committee hold a briefing on your selection security. there is a firm that took and kept data and 50 million facebook users. >> next, report on the security of the election infrastructure. senate intelligence committee members including chair richard burr took questions for reporters at this briefing. >> good morning to thank everybody for being here my colleagues are with mark and i this morning.

is safe to say the senate committee has been focused on completing investigation since the beginning. we have not set artificial timelines and made promises. what we said is that we will go wherever the facts lead us. were now at a point where we wrapped up one piece of our investigation that deals with election security. our team has done an unbelievably thorough job. they have spoken to nearly all the affected states. they've interviewed high-level officials from the white house, the nsc, the department of homeland security, the fbi and other intelligence community agencies. they have secured and analyzed

products, both raw and finished products. i say this with great confidence, it is clear that the russian government was looking for the vulnerabilities in our election system. and highlighted some key gaps. there's no evidence any vote was changed. russia attempted to penetrate 21 states. we know that eric's successful in penetrating at least one voter database. the department of homeland security alert estates, warnings did not provide enough information to go to the right person in every case. alerts were actionable they alerted officials but no clear reason for states to take more seriously were given.

russia was trying to undermine the confidence our of our election system. were here to express concerns but also confidence in our state local governments. it's important to understand is that tomorrow we will have an open hearing specifically on election security. mark and i will be joined by four members for taking the lead on the recommendations that we will post they will officially be public today. we very much support state controls of the election process. we think there ways the government can support those states clearly we have got to get some standards in place that assure every state that the end

of the day they can certify their vote totals. what members will shares the recommendations we come with, not recommendations that you should expect legislation. jurisdiction within the congress is probably the rules committee in the senate and we will work closely and share the information so they can process the recommendations add to it. but also with the agencies most important that they bring the resources and partnerships to states localities and individuals that are single most important to the election process. we need to be more effective in deterring our of a series. we should partner with states to secure systems that will also be impossible grant funding. dhs and fbi has made great strides but they must do more.

dhs offers a suite of cyber assistance but they do not have the resources to fill the requests. we will work with appropriators to see if we cannot control that gap. we need to look at the equipment that records and reports votes. we agree that all votes should have an audible paper trail. in 2016, five states used electronic machines with no paper trail. nine use some of these machines. we realize this all cost money we want to make sure the federal government not only says were partner, but we are partner. i hope that will be expressed. >> thank you. i also think it's an indication

-- the me think the members are being here. though this committee has performed today and will continue to perform. it here for four members who worked on this issue i think that's consideration as well i think one of the consensus we came up with is that we we were all disappointed that states, the federal government and department of homeland security was not more on their game in advance of the 2016 election. the chairman indicated there were 21 states that were

attempted to be -- and there is one that got through the protections. the one of the things in the aftermath of the information coming out it actually took the department of homeland security nearly nine months to notify the top election officials that their states had been messed with. and again i think the chairman and the committee. i think our hearing last june was an impetus to the department to communicate better with the states. and the reason they did not have appropriate security clearances come i don't believe in an era where we have to communicate more quickly are wholesome i think some of the legislation being proposed will help you with that. the truth is, in the coming

months i think dhs has picked up its game. but there is much more to do. there were still 40 states operating with election equipment more than a decade old most of that equipment had outdated software that you cannot operate even if you chose to. fourteen states had equipment with no paper trail. in the aftermath of a hearing i discovered that my state, virginia did not have -- system we had at quickly because we had to change out machine/year for an election but that was appropriate to try to get

virginia's the confident that our system would be secure in our state elections last year. the problem at this point is in 2016 it was the russians and we have seen evidence of russia interference and other systems around the west. this is a tool now available not only to russians but other potential adversaries as well. the recommendations of this committee and i look forward to those who brought cosponsorship. i think it's very important even with the snow coming. we ought to be there because maintaining the integrity of our voting systems and more importantly the public's faith that these votes will be counted in apparent accurate way is critical.

>> let me begin by commending the chairman and the vice chairman for leading a bipartisan investigation into interference in our election. while our investigation is still ongoing, one conclusion is clear, the russians were relentless in attempting to metal in the elections and, they will continue their efforts to undermine public confidence in western democracies and the legitimacy of our election. the leadership of the intelligence committee is unanimous in their assessment that the russians continue to

undertake sophisticated attacks to exacerbate the division center, country. the 2016 election the russian scandal election related systems of at least 21 states. we may never know the full extent of the rush of malicious attacks. to counter this challenge i want to discuss some of what happened in the need for better communication and intelligence sharing between the federal and state government. there were several problems with the approach taken in 2016 as the chairman and vice chairman have outlined. although the fbi sent out a warning to state officials, the alert was not clear in specifying vulnerabilities were being exploited by foreign

adversary, nor did it specify just how serious threat was. another problem was that state officials were deeply concerned that public warnings might promote the impression that they were trying to dispel, that voting systems are insecure. thus, helping the russians achieve their goal of undermining public confidence in the election result. yet in france, and germany, we have seen that greater public disclosure has benefits. a third major problem was the lack of security clearances for top state election officials. as of june 2017, nearly eight months after the election, not a single chief election official at the state level had received

a security really security clearance, that's unacceptable. while dhs recently sponsored a declassified briefing, he received mixed reviews from state election officials. we must assist states and hardening their defenses hence foreign adversaries including passing much-needed legislation providing funding and authorizing security clearances to top election officials. we must ensure robust communication and information sharing in both directions between the federal government and state election agencies on cyber security threat. we are ready and an election

year, the need tech now is urgent. >> thank you. that i want to start by saying how proud i am of our entire committee in our leadership of chair member of vice chairman warner and how they've taken on the task of getting to the bottom of russians influence and interference in 2016. we recognize that our democracy hinges on protecting america's to fairly and accurately choose their own leaders. until we take the necessary steps to prevent future foreign intervention we will remain vulnerable to attacks. i have to it senator collins said about the importance of ensuring our state election offices that they are equipped

to respond and to keep our voting system secure. we all agreed of the importance of the leadership of the state level in regard to these elections. as we work to address election security i found helpful the consultation i've had with the new mexico secretary of state. she runs the state elections and has been a leader. state election officials like her should have the security clearances and support from federal agencies they need so they can respond to these threats in real-time, not months later.

the federal government needs to attribute several attacks and with more confidence. foreign adversary some bad actors engage in attacks precisely because they are easy to deny. we cannot allow that to shield these actors from accountability. we have no doubt that russia and other malicious actors will continue to target our elections try to undermine our elections. we must call them out and make clear that this is unacceptable. i believe state should consider implementing or widespread audits of results. america's need to be confidence their votes and only their vote is what counts. audits go a long way to make sure our systems are working as they should, that the integrity of our election is protected and it also creates public confidence in the vote, the very quality that others seek to undermine. as we approach the midterm election in the next

presidential cycle we need tech quickly to pass bipartisan recommendations into law to protect the integrity of the entire voting process. >> think you. i think what you'll hear is a commitment to several key facts. there's no question the elections were trying to metal and no question that states operate their own elections. there requires a partnership we worked on legislation along with other members to try to put together some basic recommendations. today i what tomorrow's hearing will focus on is trying to get that information out to help articulate these issues.

last time it was the russians can. it may not be the russians next time. it could be the north koreans, the iranians, could be a domestic activist group to try to see chaos. the key thing is not just protecting it for future russians but it's protecting our elections in general. it's entirely reasonable to close those vulnerabilities and work with states. >> i echo the comments of my colleagues in particular think the chairman of vice chairman for conducting this committee and its work in such a bipartisan way. it's not only about bipartisanship, certain issues

are nonpartisan and this is one. terms of recommendations, there's two i want to focus on. one is outdated equipment. technology has changed the way the world works. we always need to be aware of the best practices and equipment available we have found that many states about tainted equipment. one recommendation is to figure out how to audit in which states are using what kind of equipment so it's helpful to them and doing what we can to give them supportive funding to update equipment. what we know for sure is that we have to provide this support to states. many cannot afford to update their equipment. an updated in a way that we know they can audit their elections when necessary and do that through paper trails. it's one of the best practices

were talking about. is best practices in terms of making sure voter registration websites and poll workers and other folks negotiating the election process are doing it in a way with best practices based on research we have done. for example we talked about the need for leading experts to provide guidelines and assistance to the states so they can implement these best practices. the urgency is clear. the work this committee is doing is looking at what happened in the past and also about addressing the fact that we currently have an election upon us. the past tells us the future will hold another set of threats if were not prepared. thank you. >> i think my colleagues and i called them back to the podium to take questions.

i remind you that this press conference in the report we will put out is on election security. i would ask you to limit your questions to election security. were not prepared to talk about any other investigation. we do have a schedule to close out the series of the investigation we feel we have exhausted both the staff and the members needs. we have identified for those areas we should be about one month apart as we launch the next three. that is taken a lot off and allowing our staff to finish interviews and more importantly to finish the investigation. members are hands-on. so i'd like to turn the podium back over for questions.

>> to your committee and others have the tools to fight back or have they not specifically been asked to do so by president trump. what should president trump be doing? >> there's a number of committees working on these issues. there is an awareness and a bipartisan awareness that we need and more transparent cyber doctrine that will leave it there. >> you talk about assisting the states. the number were talking about was 380 million and i heard you

send this was not enough. so can you lay out where you think the next step is to go what the figure is. >> elections are state responsibilities. most states have election systems. some states have chosen not to have audible set systems. it is not our desire to fully fund the elections during individual states. if there is a incentive to put in place the people going to their state leaders say we want our election to be secure would be the primary piece. not enough funding we could or should provide to every county, every state in america to

oversee all their election equipment. some equipment is very old but still very reliable and consistent. just the age of equipment is not appropriate. we have to find the balance on what can be audited and incentivize them. >> you said it's not about it necessary about russia could be north korea activist, do you think the white house gets that urgency? >> i do think so. i'm saying it's not only about russia, they could come back and do it again. the department of homeland security has stepped up significantly. helping with critical audits and engaging in whatever way they can to be better prepared. there's been a lot of back and forth. states have to be able say to us when they see interference have to say to homeland security and

trust them to get that out. i would also say when robert mueller did the indictments 13 russian individuals and organizations the administration have put sanctions on those so they seem to be paying attention. >> can you comment on the idea that the president today called val vladimir putin took congratulate him. >> you stress the urgent need -- given midterms around the corner today, the systems any safer now than they were in 2016? >> were working on that. we received an update from dhs. i do believe through the course of at least this last year have increasingly prioritize this is an issue that requires their

immediate attention and reaction. we have seen improvements in resources and thoughts they're putting into account the creative works around prevention and detection. much of the work has to be focused on various pieces. also detection leads to another issue which is there have been systems that are hacked what can we do in terms of resilience so we can share that information if we have it at the federal level with the state so we can respond quickly and mitigate possible damage. the port part of the work has happened has recognized the needs to be greater communication between the intelligence community in the

state. that's why you see the focus has been a what we need to do to get clearances for state officials so they can have access to classified information that will allow them to prioritize what they need to do to set up systems to audit and what they need to do for best practices and machinery. were talking to them about the fact that it's probably best you don't have your election system connected to the internet. that will create greater vulnerabilities. and right now were talking about paper ballots. it might be one of the smartest systems. going back to a day when we could have something tangible because russia cannot hack a piece of paper like they can a computer system connected to the internet. >> what level of confidence should voters have?

>> i think it's important to underscore that we have discovered no evidence that votes were changed in the last election. but it is, nevertheless troubling that the russians made such efforts to probe the election system. also in the beginning there was such mistrust between the states and dhs that information that should have been shared that would have cost states to act more aggressively was not share. i agree that has improved. i still think we have a long way to go. i believe there is far greater public awareness and awareness the book state election officials about the need to be alert to the vulnerability and

allow for cyber security hygiene scans of their equipment that guidelines need to be established in a common way as well so everybody knows what parties are talking about. >> this is about maintaining the confidence people have in their vote. they should be confident given what they shared about 2016 with regard to paper trail and audit it's been able to match up your physical record with your electronic record. as science they continue to match up you can have every confidence that your vote is accurate. >> let me say in conclusion because you raise the question of what else could happen. if you have intents and capabilities any have a threat. rush is not the only one who has

capabilities. probably not the only one who has intent. but clearly the russians had intent to cause chaos in the election system and the capabilities to do it. it's all very about. to work with states to implement with the federal government to look inside the cyber system when attacks take place. . .

i'm not sure if there's a platform we could present that would give a clearer picture of whether our assessment are writer recommendations are right and the hearing we are going to have tomorrow will be followed up at some point with a report first as a declassified overview of our report in depending on how long it takes for the report to be declassified and we would make it available for the public entire report. c just two quick points. one i want to thank the four members who have spoken senator

kaine and senator manchin and senator rubio is well. this is an all hands on deck effort. i think tomorrow you will see we will have three panels. rarely do we have three panels on the hearing but we are going to try on this effort and i would echo some of the earlier questions. i can tell you in my state even though it was a scramble to make sure that every voting machine in 2017 elections have that audible paper trail led to a credibility we did hear the concerns that have been raised frankly in the past so a good job to everybody and some of these recommendations i do hope will be turned into legislation. we need to act on it.

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