[applause] [inaudible conversations] >> surgeon general jerome adams will give the keynote address at the national public health week which kicks off today. our live coverage begins at 1:00 p.m. eastern on espn2. now, a form on the maritime security challenges in the asia-pacific. china strategic and tactical actions in the east and south china seas and the response by the u.s. and its allies in the region. hosted by the atlantic council, this is an hour and 20 minute. >> well, good morning, everyone and welcome. i'm dennis player, direct or here at the atlantic council and

also the chairman of the board of the peace foundation u.s.a. and i see a number of familiar faces in the audience, so i know there will be a good discussion following the presentations of this wonderful site of panelists that magnus has assembled this morning. it is good to bring our a little bit south and east asia. north korea is dominating the headlines these days and luckily for the region it is the peace phase of the north korean approach, which seems to go in cycles, which is dominating things these days. but we need to keep our eyes on the entire region. so, the maritime borders of china have also been matters of insecurity and opportunity for that country. their attitude towards these island water spaces is typical of continental land powers.

they think of several hundred miles of the east and south coast of the defensive barrier to chinese air and maritime forces to be dominant in case of conflict and foreign air and maritime forces are to be kept out in peacetime as matters of law and to us. from the american point of view of course, that of the maritime seafaring world power, object of miles from the list of another country is open at peacetime to maritime sea and air traffic in the sea and air forces of any country could military surveillance operations off the coast of a potential enemy of routine, and not threatening conflict. but beyond these basic approaches, there are important national interests, which are enmeshed in these two different attitudes. taiwan, which is china's single greatest national object is lies off the coast within this maritime area.

china has ambitions to extend worldwide its influence, believe it has to expand its maritime power around the world to support those ambitions and it wants to overcome its restricted access to open waters by dominating the sea and airspace off to open water. and as it looks east, it sees what it calls the first island, having it in and preventing that access. the american security position in asia is anchored on allies and partners that it reaches by air and sea in that area. it's essential for the strength of these alliances in the american position in east asia that have unimpeded air and maritime access to south korea, japan, taiwan, philippines. that is what we call the first island chain. and as those countries further south, vietnam, singapore, thailand and other countries.

differences between the united states and china and maritime disputes in east asia are deep and real. they are unlikely to be resolved without fundamental changes in either or both countries are by major changes in the relative military and economic reform in both countries. this doesn't mean these differences lead to conflict between the u.s. and china. i disagree completely with this logic. the conflict is somehow inevitable. nonetheless, differences lead to a sustained period of diplomatic , economic tension between the united states, china and the other countries in the maritime borders of east asia. now, and east china sea for the moment seems relatively stable between japan and china was sort of understandings reached about the type of military and

paramilitary deployments in that area. but let's turn to the south china sea where there is the most scope for some creative diplomacy. there were two levels of power in relationships that play in southeast asia. first is the tactical level. day-to-day committees, influence and capabilities in on the strategic level of fundamental government policy, international and the region. it is at this tactical level that we share most of the media attention. china's approach is a so-called cabbage slicing her gray area sets of activities and sharply when up activities from 2010. chinese is mostly nonmilitary forces backed up to ships and aircraft to advance authority in the south china sea. it claims an intermittently enforces economic activities, hydrocarbon resources and fishing. it claims an intermittently enforces maritime access,

warning off foreign ships and planes with occupied features and sends into other areas claimed by others. it maintains military fortifications on the island it occupies and has built the infrastructure for military facilities in the southern islands it occupies 700 miles to the south. however, at the strategic level, china has paid a heavy price for these aggressive activities. from about 2002 until 2010, china emphasized diplomatic and influence with governments in southeast asia with strong and increasing southeast asian countries exported more of our products to china, while finley were considered friendly than windows in china and it seemed only a matter of time before they would be able to fashion a settlement of territorial claims very much in its favor. but for a series of reasons, he

began a much more aggressive side effect to the defense 2010 and has alarmed all the other countries with kos and claims in the south china sea. they formally rejected china's encroachment on what they consider their legitimate sovereignty claims an attorney powerful outside countries primarily japan and the united states for support. they've offered access to airfields and bases to the united dates in japan. they've increased their spending on military forces in the night dates in japan have responded with assistance with decreased employment to their own forces and increase civil and military cooperation. china strategic position in the south china sea has in fact deteriorated even as a tactical situation has strengthened. as for the united states, the last eight years have caused a reassessment and sharpening of america's interest in the south china sea and of its activities there. the united states has said and acts as if it's willing to share power with china so long as it

is shared under commonly observed limit, provisions of international agreement such as the u.n. convention of the log to see your provision of international trade and investment agreements such as those set up under the trade organization. the united states decided it's not willing to see dominance in southeast and northeast asia based on china's physical location, economic development and military power, which is the fundamental bases of chinese advances they are. china's actions constitute a challenge to one of its vital interests, maritime and air access freedom of an uber and option to support those interests. as for the countries, their interests are to raise the national standards of living and do not taunt him in security and diplomatic relationships and in preserving the territory they consider to be right in there. they will be based on their

aspirations by the prospects for assistance from the united states and japan and other outside countries. estimates of the willingness of china to punish and coerced and the general expectations about the future power balances in the region. so it is a fundamental clash of interests at play in the south china sea and elsewhere in the maritime regions of southeast asia. it's a good time to consider the next phase in southeast asia as we are at the start of the third phase of the committee in that region. china's aggressive at committees began in 2010 wound down last year in the run-up to the national people's congress with the recently announced consolidation of president xi with progressive act committees, but probably at a lower level, always accompanied by soothing assurances of willingness to

talk and peaceful intentions. china will attempt to blend the two approaches over the last 20 years, attempting to regain while slowly enhancing tactical advantages that it can achieve. but let's turn to our panel to discuss their views. we have an excellent group to dr. phaedra points of view about what future developments will lead. i asked the panel to come to the stage. magnus noorda meant to introduce them and lead the discussion. thank you. >> okay, thank you for that wonderful introduction and for a painting that rich picture of where we find ourselves in the broad issues related to first of

all, good morning to everyone and welcome to the atlantic council. then the deputy director for those scope obscenity at the atlantic council. great to see everyone for the discussion on the maritime -- and the important topics that are never too far away from the headlines. admiral did a wonderful job describing the environment and setting up the challenges and factors we must consider. i'm not going to belabor that point further. i would just simply add that competition in the future rules of the road there actually have global consequences and therefore should be of interest to the entire world and european allies in other places around the world. certainly they go far beyond the region that we should all care

about. before introduced the panel and launch into the discussion, i have one admin note. as you can see we have a redirect, which is an opportunity for you in the audience and those watching online to interact with our discussion with our panelists. so please go to the website listed and that will give you an opportunity to answer our questions and we will draw from this during the discussion. i will likely draw some of these things and coax the panelists with some of the things that emerge. but with that said, we have a wonderful setup of panelists today to discuss these issues. first we have dr. sarah hirschberg where she directs the center for asia-pacific securities. she is a noted expert on chinese maritime affairs. second, we have the japan international is to to this

international affairs, maritime security in the u.s.-japan alliance. and third, we have john watts, who is a senior fellow here at the atlantic council. in the grid from australia, has a foot on both sides of the pacific. and it's also a noted expert on asia-pacific security. i think we have a great line up the law for very different perspectives and approaches to the challenges in the east and south china sea. so with that, but i'll launch into discussion. i want to start with you, sarah. he spent a lot of time studying and thinking about the chinese approach, in particular south china sea. how does this all look from the chinese maritime perspective? >> well, i am not chinese and can't speak, but thank you very much for the opportunity to present some ideas that i've gathered from reading chinese

analysis when talking with chinese experts. i was specifically focused on the chinese give, perceptions and how this might be tied to china's deterrence and how it relates to the south china sea, east china sea. i think the first point is we should look at the different levels of threat perception that we can see a floating around the chinese pronouncements that influence china's maritime behavior. i should add a disclaimer. understanding this does not mean endorsing it necessarily. it just means trying to understand where the other side is coming from. that is very important to do. in my view, there were three important threat perceptions i mentioned that we should consider. one is the political ideological threat perception, the general one between the communist party and capitalist with that is seen

as a challenge. the other is geographically determined. in the third one is the military technological type of threat perception. i will elaborate on these three points in a minute. the first one, and the political ideological rift you can say between china and the west is something we can do is underestimate in its impact because the communist party above all is subversion, infiltration and what is called peaceful evolution. so chinese leaders point to many different speeches to so-called hostile western forces that are trying to split up the parties on this assault why the regimes have so many huge funds, such

huge resources controlling the way that the chinese can think and express themselves. there is a lack of trust in the stability of the system. the liberal democracy on taiwan must of course be seen in china as a challenge to the legitimacy of this regime. the existing as political ideological element to it. the second dimension, geographically determined and containment that has been brought forward as an idea against containing asia. if you read the text by chinese naval if, you will constantly find what authority then elaborated on, which is also encircled by the u.s. and its

allies on the first island. one has to concede that this perception, if there is this political ideological threat perception, it is not completely without a basis because it gives the allied militaries very good fantastic opportunities to conduct surveillance applications. the chinese strategists always point out the population centers all located are very vulnerable to threats coming from the sea and the air. the threat perception is of course one of the driving factors of this idea that the same same time making naval expansion high to achieve. the threat domain in a sense because other chinese

territorial watchers are basically without direct access to those deeper oceanic waters and all the chinese vessels including submarines have to have guarded pathways, so it is hard to have a second straight capability with china's military. controlling taiwan would massively change the situation from the chinese military point of view. controlling taiwan would give the navy springboard to the pacific and would change the overall situation. as to the south china sea, and the important installation and you have the map in your mind, right at the northern rim of south china sea located near china's nuclear located, which

is to become the chinese cape canaveral both located on this island and they seem to require the security perimeter coming from the sea, air, from the south and from the east. so the third dimension to the chinese threat possession which i i find interesting due to having worked in the shipbuilding industry before, the military technological. the chinese of course with some technological developments that they see directed against their capabilities such as the system that enables network-centric operations that the united states has shared with allies in korea, japan, australia and major countries and of course ballistic missiles and

discussions about strikes and you can often pick up in concerned the chinese strategists. if all of these technologically ambitious programs would succeed , then this would end up making the american mainland vulnerable, it would threaten the nuclear deterrent and this would of course be a problem. the idea is to develop a more robust nuclear triad including a seaborne deterrent and to conduct their own version of these programs, which have already happened and to develop a global strike program of their own. however these goals related to controlling the south china sea? as i heard you mention, there's

the thing about controlling the security perimeter around the island the second point would be the south china sea is the only deeper sea area accessible than could be made into a sanctuary. that is basically a concept that has been discussed widely and i think there is much to be said for the logic he hanged it and supported by the chinese measures being taken to gain a maritime domain and also the era domain. last, the space program should be seen as a driver behind the whole thing. it is notable that the south china sea must pick up speed when the center was first planned and when the plan was

executed. in 2010, the plan was determined in 2013 was finished. so you can see it's almost the same timeframe with rising tensions. so looking at the military strategic importance of these goals that china is apparently pursuing, i'm very, very doubtful that china would you willing to compromise what it has dirty done in the south china sea and i think other considerations will not be considered as important as the hard-core security implications. that would be my point. >> thank you so much. that was wonderful and a great tour of what is at stake for china, and especially in the south china sea.

obviously, important u.s. ally and major country in the region. so please, how does this look from a japanese is? >> okay, thank you to the atlantic council for having me. it is good to talk about security in asia. since i came from japan, let me focus on the east china sea situation. the situation in the east china sea seems calm but that is what china expects the world to see. there are provocations still ongoing on a daily basis. so let me explain what is really happening. i was the situation continues to be deteriorating. as you may know, the chinese coast guard ships maintain

presence on an almost daily basis unless the weather is not wrath. there is a certain pattern of chinese. three times every month, this is the fixed pattern after august 2016. previously it was three times, three ships, two hours. so the frequency remains the same, but the number of ships increased and it is actually armed. and also, the chinese coast guard ships are now 3000 pounds, whereas the japanese coast guard ships are 1000.

they are becoming bigger. so the frequency remains the same. the challenge is now increasing. and also, just recently under the people's congress, the chinese coast guard is now under the commission, so we have to expect there will be more coordination between the pla and the coast guard. i don't know whether this ship, but earlier this week we saw a new pattern of cheney's coast guard. they always move together. they always move together previously. but earlier this week, and they suddenly split into two groups and made a different navigation. and it makes the japanese coast

guard to monitor the cheney's coast guard ships and more difficult. you know, basically they maintain three ships all the time. but they are full and they are now split into two groups. so, it's some of japan's coast guard is split into two and it is a two in one combination. it is more difficult to deter the chinese coast guard from entering. so, the situation seems calm, that china is continuing the increase of the challenge in the east china sea.

and plus, we witnessed the pla activities becoming more active. you know, previously the chinese navy maintained its operation, but more recently they conduct operations from the east china sea to the western pacific and from the eastern china sea to the sea of japan. and also, the chinese military aircraft also showed for east china sea to the western pacific to the sea of japan. and sometimes, the pla aircraft seems like testing their capability to launch cruise missiles vis-à-vis the mainland japan. so it is, you know, showing the threat coming from the pla. and perhaps behind those new

changes, i think the taiwan situation is the key. pla as it shows now could not almost daily surrounding taiwan. and sometimes they come from the east china sea to the western pacific and to the south china sea. so, they are doing this campaign vis-à-vis taiwan and as a result, they are -- they're operation is changing in east china sea and south china sea. and also, syria has already operated drones inside the territory.

and i think china will also try to introduce the underwater vehicle into the theater. the doubtful cause a different threat to japan. so currently, once the chinese shape launches the air drug, we have the f-15. but i don't think that is an object of way. so i think we have to come up with the 1760s to resolve this. ..

in january of this year, we wondery they did this when we are trying to stabilize relations. perhaps for chinese, on one hand maintaining military relations and continuing the provocation in the east china sea are not contradictory. inside beijing it's totally logical.

we have to expect them as we improve, china will conduct other provocations in the east china sea. basically, with the japanese government is trying to do is continue to deny the chinese activities such as the invasion and territory waters by maintaining coast guard patrol and making the diplomatic protest and we also tried to impose costs on chinese activities. we first try to name and shame and try to expose what china is doing and we tried to increase the alliance corporation. plus we have to expect anything can happen so we tried to

establish a management mechanism with china. as they reported, when they visited tokyo in may, hopefully japan and china will sign maritime and air or convocation. that will help the east china to the. through those measures they will continue to stabilize the situation in the east china sea. >> thank you so much. >> john kenny you can cap us off by bringing your perspective on the region, urine in-house expert. will turn it over to you. >> a minute be off script because the last two speeches were so excellent and detailed

and i don't think i need to go into it in depth. i want to refer to the freedom of navigation and it dominated what people are thinking about all along. i think it's interesting but also very telling. we in the west focus very heavily on the freedom of navigation and response to island building. freedom of navigation is inherently a tactical action. it's important and has great symbolism but it's a great tactical action. if there's one area that the u.s. and the allies are losing out is strategy.

to have an effective strategy must have an idea of the challenges you face, the objectives you want to achieve in the capability to enact those. we have the capabilities but were not really clear exactly of the challenge. we have an idea of what we think it is but i would argue we don't have an understanding of what it really looks like or understand the real grit where the importance is. we certainly lef lack the will n many ways. we haven't articulated our objectives. when we talk about security we should talk about how many times we conduct freedom of navigation operations. we can point to the visit in vietnam which was a symbolic action, australia recently declared they would increase their actions in the south china sea, britain declared it's going to, the west is making great

symbolic action of responding and being present. meanwhile we are playing the wrong game. china has been very clear on it strategy for the region, the hybrid approach, this idea that you can't separate security from economic and political and i think that's where were really losing out. to use an imperfect medic for, a police car can patrol all night long but if it doesn't go where the activity is if it's not intervening on crime is it really having an effect? were going through the actions of this activity and the question is whether it's having a deterrent effect or whether it's assisting our allies and partners throughout the region and if it's not, how we go about it. >> the other thing, we talk

about it, we tend to get hung up on very simple when he breaks it down, the arms race is really less than the sum of its parts. there's a 10% increase year on year on spending for the large part comes from personnel and the question of whether it has to do with rising incomes and the cost of personnel. you can point obvious things like vietnam has a new combat aircraft, et cetera the question is is a just a modernization of capabilities larry had or is it a step change in deterrent effect. it's important and valuable but

i think wearing wrong conversation to early points, we have actually seen in physical form, we haven't seen indications that there gonna walk a very fine tyro and also not impacting relationships with other partnerships. britain declared they were going to return from an exercise in it wasn't necessarily a deliberate action with a deliberate message, it was symbolic but less of the sum of its parts. meanwhile china's approach is never going to make its way across the open conflict.

their hard elements but is never meant to be so hard in which it provokes a physical or conventional response. meanwhile, it continues to push and recognize and go beyond just describing it. i don't think will be very effective in countering it. another great example from earlier in the week in vietnam, the deal was canceled around the red emperor gas deal that was from economic and political pressure, not from military power. from the north's point of view, is that more important than the freedom of navigation operations that we do? which will really be important for the country in the region and our partners in our allies

when they look at those in the private sector. when the private sector see that happen and they decided to for the country of the region that will have a far bigger impact on whether or not we send us destroyer through a certain area. we need to have a more realistic conversation and recognize the actions that are happening in the real danger is the changing of international norms. that's happening on a daily basis, it's not necessarily getting headlines and it's really important. it's not a single action for once a month or twice a month activity where we fly the flag. that's not stop. you can argue we've already lost so much. i should point out this is not just in the china sea, it's syria, it's the lack of response

to crime area and ukraine. this is something the west globally is failing to do. as long as we fail to do that, countries like china will exploit the gap and they will push the boundary in the envelope as much as possible. meanwhile we could be losing the entire game. >> we can open us up and were eager to take your questions and comments that i do have a question in my own for the panel. we will go in reverse order to keep it interesting. i'll go back to what you started talking about strategy and the nature of the challenge. it really is first order business. it's not a philosophical

question because we get it wrong and invest in the wrong capabilities and emphasize the wrong elements and so forth. in many ways were in uncharted waters. in your estimate, do we understand the nature of the challenge, how close are we to understand and how does that jive with our partners and allies in the region. >> i think we understand it in an abstract sense that i don't understand it in an emotional sense. we talked about it a lot. we understand the contours but i'm not sure it resonates as to how important it is. when it comes to strategy and military operations, for me personally it always comes down to the lowest common denominator which is human decision-making

and collective decision-making. what changes a person's actions. if i could just reoffer a moment, one of the most interesting policies decisions i've seen in recent years was in california and the ability to use hybrid cars in the commuter lane. if you're going to buy car, if you option between a car that's $5000 more but will shave 20 minutes off your commute, the hybrid suddenly seems more appealing. you can talk about climate change and marketing appeals but when it comes down to the decision, what are the trade-offs. use that analogy because of our partners in the region we have

been go down to basics. what are the trade-offs. if the uss the alliance is important to us and you need to do read him of navigation and invest in infrastructure, that works well at a high-level marketings but what's the matter to the person with the collective individual and that's what were not thinking about. we do a good job of talking up here that we don't do a good job of how it links down here to understand where we go and how these elements got us there. that's where we really fail at the moment. >> you very effectively laid out the state of things in the east china sea and some of the testing that's going on in the japanese territory waters and airspace.

i'd love to hear section 342. i will keep that one in my pocket. you also hinted that more could be done or other countermeasures could be considered to more effectively save that type of prodding. in your mind, what could some of those countermeasures be? we have to increase the number of postdated ships. recently the north korean vote appeared in the japanese area of the chinese illegal fishing vote also appeared in the western pacific islands and japan coast guard needs to address this issue. we are more challenges, oil

spill, accidents and they are all the responsibility of our coast guard. when the chinese are increasing we have to increase our coast guard capability. one of the big challenges today for japan is the increasing number of chinese aircraft. as our air force conducts crumble almost every day that will cut the time for training and our readiness for actual combat. we are wondering whether we have to make a scramble to every chinese approach of military

airspace or we have to choose some approaches only or we are wondering if there's any room for the u.s. air force to join this scramble. the u.s. air force is based in okinawa. possibly there maybe a set of corporation between the two air forces. that's what we are now discussing and plus, some people argue and some people say maybe we need to take more proactive. whenever china enters our waters then japan may have to do the same to the chinese water and by

doing so maybe we can send a more strong signal to the chinese but we are still discussing many options that we haven't reached any consensus yet. >> think you. >> finally sir, go back to something you raised, the space bar enter aspect and it's a little bit of back to basics but i think it's worth it because this part is underappreciated. why there. why not somewhere else and why now? >> thank you for asking that. i'm actually working on a project together with an aerospace engineer and we are studying the chinese space program in the military implications with regard to the south china sea. what's important to know the

father to the equator that you can get with your launchpad the higher the payload you can launch. the other advantage is you launch toward the east because of movement of the earth if there's a water mass there's less risk of accident if something goes wrong and you don't have debris falling down on people and villages which happens often in china and also have a chance to recover instead of equipment if there's a mission failer. you don't want your super quantum computer falling in the wrong hands as this happened in july 2017. there is an interest in having a launchpad that is located on the coast and facing water to the east as far south as china can

get. [inaudible] they even talk about ideas like having a feasibility study for a space elevator in place by 2049. this is highly unlikely they will be able to do something like that, but the only location if you were going for this sort of thing, the only location would be the south china see because it would have to be almost on the equator. so these are the reasons why

this part of the sea area is important for the chinese space program. obviously, if you want to have global strike capabilities, you need to launch vehicles that can reach as far and the only launchpad that china has that can launch superheavy missile. [inaudible] the others being further north can only launch maximum diameter of 3.5 meters because they have to be transported overland. there are many physical reasons why it makes sense. if you look at cape canaveral, it's natural that other times there's a large attempt they try

to close off part of the area to inhibit other actors coming to close and interfering with the launch or gathering information or picking up stuff that might fall down. basically that would be the reasonings. >> fascinating. >> one final question for the group and then open it up for your question. i do want to drop them back he here. we didn't talk much about cyber during the panel. obviously it's connected and interrelated to the other domains of operation. we certainly mentioned space but cyber is vital for communication and maritime industry and so on. what are the cyber aspects of the competition in the asia-pacific?

john, maybe we will start with you. >> one of the key aspects is the fact that you have a concentration of some of the most important technology developed there in production so there's a huge amount of development happening in the u.s. but a lot of production of computing equipment happens in that regent. there's a lot of research and development going on there. i think as much if not more, you're likely to see some of the high-end capabilities first demonstrated their. one of the interesting things is we haven't really had a. to. naval conflict in a very long time. it's either fishing vote or a north korean spy troller or whatnot. or libyan ships in the mediterranean. we haven't really seen a. to. battle where forces are using everything at their disposal to

advance their aim. i think there's a lot of unknowns because we don't know what people will bring up when they need to. what we are seeing is a lot of irregular activity. cyber activity is difficult to track and difficult to defend against. as china continues to increase their operation throughout the region and they up the ante, i think cyber will become more and more possible action and economic pressure and political pressure and more. there's a huge risk and were already seeing the tip of the iceberg as to what could actually occur. >> over to you on the role of cyber in this competition. >> i'm not as familiar with the cyber aspect, but one thing i want to say is when the uss john

mccain collided with the ship in southeast asia there were speculations that this might because by the gps system cyber attack. there's no evidence that the attack happened, but it is a possible scenario and that may happen anywhere in the east china sea. that is something i think we have to prepare for. >> picking up that point as you just mentioned, i had i agree that the dangers of shipping should be taken into consideration. we are ready have evidence of cyber spoofing in the black sea area that was gps spoofing involved that was probably

caused by russia but there's no guarantee something similar might not happen elsewhere. about the ship collisions, i don't know if you've seen the animated version of the second collision of the mccain in the singapore street but it was moving steadily at a slow's bead and the destroyer was coming up from behind and cutting into the container pathway. the investigation is probably still ongoing and cyber attacks are very difficult in any case that it's not necessarily the first case of such an attack but it could b become a tool for attacking taiwan, one of several tools that would be employed at the same time. we know from chinese writing that they highly approve of what

did in crimea so there's actually an article by a chinese strategist commenting on crimea and coming to the conclusion that we should do the same thing in taiwan and that we would 68 and tran16 just like boudin did because the others will realize too late. furthermore it's not a court interest of nato to defend taiwan. in my view, cyber is definitely something that needs to be watched just as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence needs to be watched back one of the things that we don't talk about enough is the significance of the increasing industry across asia and the pacific space. i'm no cyber expert but my

understanding is that the vast majority of attacks happen in the industrial and commercial sectors so from the stealing of secrets to the sabotaging of ip and production facility, again it's not in the conventional space, it's not how we generally think of security but when a large portion of the high-end cutting-edge military capabilities are being produced in the region specifically, i think we need to think downstream about that as well as to what effect is that have in the capabilities before they even get there. i think that's an idea that needs to be explored, it's not exciting, it's not ships crashing in the night but it's a really important aspect that is really important and needs more attention. >> with that we want to open up for questions. here at the atlantic council we believe in the rules -based order and rule-based events. first, wait for the microphone

for asking your question, make sure it is a question and please identify yourself with name and affiliation before asking your question. >> thank you very much. i have a very simple question. this is about japan and south china sea. as for this freedom of navigation. [inaudible]

[inaudible] [inaudible] >> john, wedding you start us off. >> the japanese government has already stated that we will never conduct freedom of navigation as americans do, but already japan has conducted an operation in the south china sea. some think japan should join and some americans are a little cautious of it because that may trigger a possible japan china confrontation in the south china sea. during the operation.

[inaudible] if the situation in the south tennessee becomes increased, then japan and other allies may have to consider taking formal follow-ups. >> i can't speak to the american perspective. se, i'm som sure some feel it is critical and others are sympathetic to why they wouldn't and also consider could trigger something else and the action could have more downside than upside. i'm sure the u.s. policymaking community would welcome allies to participate but i think anyone who understands the region there also appreciates

the reasons that the factors in the decision to whether they do or don't, my bigger question is if they did, would it really have a big difference. sure it would send a message but it doesn't he militarize the island. it doesn't change vietnam's decision on whether or not they cancel the contract or the degree to which indonesia. [inaudible] it's an important action but my question is what effect does it actually have in the region and i would argue it probably doesn't therefore the downside outweigh the upsides. >> sarah, can we guess what a chinese reaction would be to japan participating in efforts like that. >> of course, very negative reaction. they were probably increased

pressure to retaliate and that you just said it may not be very good because it will draw more of your resources so i'm not sure if that is actually good idea, especially given the domestic political issue in japan that still debating what to do so it might not also be something that the population supports and this would then be an opportunity again for china to also exploit the internal divisions and countries. i'm not sure whether this would be a win situation. however, it might be possible to not actually do it but start the debate. maybe there would be better options because it would signal a shift that china might try to remedy somehow but not cost japan so much in resources.

sometimes it's better not to do something but signal a shift in thinking so the other side sees maybe we've gone too far. >> for me, far more important aspect is what japan is doing. to me that's far more, and may not be as flashy or get as many headlines, but that's a far more important action and activity that may change decision-making in thinking of countries in the region. to me it's not the action itself, it's what are we trying to achieve and what's the best way. >> in the back. >> thank you very much. my question is about

proportional to sponsor. when china entered territory water, how to find the retaliation we can enter is the problem. my idea. [inaudible] we can visit taiwan under the permission of the chinese government. we need the support of taiwan and china want some part of the territory. i am radical but the idea, my

question or comment. [inaudible] thank you very much. >> it depends what kind of ship you would send to taiwan. a coast guard ship, actually the u.s. government sending naval warship to taiwan and there was a strong reaction from beijing so i think we have to expect more harsh criticism from beijing. that's one thing. at the same time i think we can take more indirect way to engage with taiwan.

for example, a civil fishing agreement. i think that was very effective approach we take, although we could send a political signal to beijing so i think rather than making port calls to taiwan, i think we can find a more indirect approach to strengthen our ties. that would be my answer. >> a question appear in the front. >> thank you very much. i couldn't endorse more john's point that by far the biggest word up there is indicative.

last friday, the day we had the announcement of the red ember cancellation we also did the third one in a year, we have a giant underscoring for partners how little good, by themselves that they're actually doing. what are the tools that the u.s., australia, japan and other partners should be doing that can actually bring some real pressure to bear on the chinese because if in ten years we are able to sell destroyers to the south china sea, that's a win for beijing. thank you. >> let's start with john and work our way down. >> obviously as you know it's a complex thing and it needs to be calibrated and each country faces their own circumstances, go back to the old saying, if you look at the modernization of

the arms race, there's domestic factors that are far more important. you could point to the building in australia you could say they aren't in an arms race but really what it has to do is the industry with jobs and domestic and political support at the next election by maintaining jobs in certain regions then other capabilities. [inaudible] australia has more to do with the industry side of things and capability and i think that's probably true with most of the country as you look around the region. let's look at vietnam. if you look at vietnam or the philippines for that matter,

obviously visiting vietnam shows that countries in the region want the u.s. to be engaged. they want them to have a presence there and have them be part of the solution or part of the issue. when it comes down to it, the question is to what degree do you make action which may be hollow or do you take an action which may be less favoring but has economic implications. we need to look at each individual and say why. is it because they're worried about losing investment in this structure, in which case is that something we can do, can we step in and fill that void so they don't have to rely on china for structure investments are an area or are they worried about capability. we have to look at each case and say what is driving the decision-making in that case. what we want to achieve. to want to provide a credible

alternative #then that's what we need to do and frankly we would all be out of a job. here's the list of things we need but i think we need to take a harder look at understanding what is driving the decision-making in each of these countries. what do they need and what can we provide to be sure our allies are able to make a decision and one that we are comfortable with rather than something that's only a benefit to one group. >> i think the u.s. freedom of navigation operation, on one hand you have to do it but as you do it china will justify and the difference between 2017 and

2018 is the u.s. no longer confirms whether they collected but in any case chinese defensive ministry announces that the u.s. collected and they say they have to take further defense measures. so yes you have to continue but we have to be realistic about chinese behavior. i think what is needed is a redline in the south china sea. although the redline in the south china sea. [inaudible] china didn't do it and it was

quite clear they were too late but today there's no redline in the south china sea. perhaps the u.s. and the allies need to discuss what should be the realistic redline and have to discuss if china crosses the redline what should be our response. >> in the final word from sarah on the. >> i think it may not have such a dramatic effect but stopping them would have a very negative effect so that is perhaps not really an option. the other thing i sometimes wonder about the real purpose and apart from demonstrating your apart of the island, in some cases they think you should look at the timing and location

of where the ship actually conducted. i think they may be there to do surveillance on the chinese activity. for instance, when the last launch happened in july 2017 failed, for some reason, on the same day there was a freedom of navigation operation very near the island that tracks these launches and this ship may have been there to gather data on the launch or whatever. this is a also something we need to consider, not just the symbolism behind it. i would argue for keeping them up because nobody else can do them, even when's british ship won't make much of a difference there. that's really not an alternati

alternative. >> i think the point is that maybe they just shouldn't be central to the conversation. another metric is we talk about much capability countries buy from china and in d.c. we talk about how that shows an indication, it may just be the capability. [inaudible] you need to make at the decision-making relevant to that situation or maybe that the restrictions of what it's been but that something we need to look at. either it will be more expensive and it has been more expensive but why would investing in a more expensive capability. [inaudible] >> i think we have time for one final question. the lady in the back has been the most patient. >> my name is jenness from

taiwan. i am quite interested and struck i what sarris said about what russia had done in crimea and then you linked that with taiwan. as we know, the taiwan is quite different compared to russia and crimea. i would just like to hear more about what they think about. >> i was actually reporting the naval list in beijing and what he's been writing. that was his argument that it's basically the same situation from his point of view that crimea was a traditional territory of russia, linked to russia through history and should be russian territory again so that was the reason from their point of view.

>> this is maybe one of the parallels they're seeing and then there's the crucial difference that he does not mention, crimea was actually a proportion of the population that was actually in favor. there were many people actually helping the russians in the invasion attempt. there was many who were opposed and lots of military people who took part in it. the situation in taiwan is very different and only a minority of people in taiwan that would collaborate or even approve of it. that is a crucial difference that he does not mention. from the point of view of what the western reaction would be he said there is a parallel because from the western point of view, crimea was not worth fighting for in the broader sense and from his point of view, the same

would apply to taiwan. of course, i hope this is not true, i hope the western countries would not see taiwan as the same as crimea. i studied this and it was a very important question to preserve its freedom but the problem is that in the reasoning of some of these strategists, the western countries, by not doing anything about crimea until it was much too late and maybe even contributing to the situation in some ways by acting unwisely, we have signaled that maybe there's a chance for china to do similar things. this is the reasoning in the article. if you're interested in that article, i can give you the

article so you can read for yourself. this is what i was saying. not that i agree but only what i read. >> i understand this is not your perspective. i think it's difficult for many reasons in the calculation he's making is wrong for a number of reasons but i think there's an important element in that and that countries learn from other regions. we tend to look at them in little bubbles around the region but countries observe actions of other countries elsewhere and they take lessons and i think that's the point that our actions in syria and libya and western europe, wherever they are, they're being observed as lessons learned. al qaeda developed their plan for 911 in part based on its understanding or reading of u.s. actions in somalia so it observed the way the americans

acted in lessons on what that meant for american perspective and they develop the plan based on that. we think that china is not watching the ukraine and other places and learning lessons from the western perspective, we are being naïve and this is exactly why it's important that we have alliances around the world being involved in supporting rules -based orders and values everywhere particularly for that region. countries will develop their actions based on that. i apologize we didn't get to all the questions. i think we have a little time, if you want to ambush your panelist, go right ahead. please join me in thanking them.

>> thank you for coming. surgeon general jerome adams will give the keynote address at the national public health week which kicks off today. our live coverage begins at 1:0. >> tonight, on landmark cases, griswold connecticut challenged

a connecticut law banning the prescription and use of birth control. the supreme court ultimately ruled the statute to be unconstitutional and in the process established a right to privacy that is still evolving today. our guest to discuss this case is law professor at george mason university law school and rach rachel, associate dean for research and law professor at temple university. watch landmark cases tonight and join the conversation. the # islamic cases and follow us on c-span and we have resources on our website for background on each case for the landmark cases companion book, a link to the national constitution center's interactive constitution and the landmark cases podcast as c-span.org/landmark cases. now former agriculture secretary

dan discusses trends in the food industry and the supplemental nutrition program also known as food stamps. he is focused on the annual food conference. this is 35 minutes. [applause] >> good afternoon. i hope you had a great lunch and you're feeling nourished and ready for a full afternoon of great contents starting with secretary dan who i have the high honor to introduce here today. i don't think there's many of you in the room have not had some opportunity to work on issues that are near and dear