written by ted sorensen to speaker alber labeled personal and confidential, but it lays out what should alber do if he becomes president. you can look at step one. take the oath of office. step two, physically taking over the office. step three, resigned from the house. this is another thing oliver would've had to have done. he would've had to resign the speakership if he moved up to the presidency. i think this is a really interesting piece of history that many people don't know about. we think about nixon and impeachment. we don't think about the other things that potentially could have happened during that time period. >> now, it conversations in the

atlantic council in washington on maritime security issues in the asia-pacific region. among those will hear from come retired admiral dennis blair, the former commander of u.s. forces in the pacific. >> good morning, everyone and welcome. dennis blair, director here at the atlantic council and also the chairman of the board of the peace foundation u.s.a. i see a number of faces in the audience so i know i'll be a good discussion following the discussion following this wonderful set of panelists agnes has assembled this morning. it is good i think to bring our day is a little bit south and east asia. north korea is dominating the headlines these days than likely for the region it is a piece

days of the north korean approach, which seems to go in cycles, which is dominating things these days. but we need to keep our eye on the entire region. so, the maritime borders of china have always been matters of insecurity and opportunity for that country. their attitude towards these are the water faces as typical continental land powers. several hundred miles of water off of china's eastern south coast of a defensive barrier commensurate its air and forces are to be dominant in case a conflict in foreign air and maritime forces are to be kept out in peacetime as matters of law and practice. from the american point of view of course that of a maritime seafaring world power, up to 12 miles from the coast of another country is open in peacetime to maritime sea and air traffic in the sea and air

forces of any country's. military surveillance operations up the coast of a potential enemy are routine, legal, prudent and nonthreatening conflict. beyond the basic approaches there are important national interests which are enmeshed in these two different attitudes. taiwan which is china's single greatest national objective lies off the coast within this maritime area. china has ambitions to extend worldwide its influence, believes it has to expand its maritime power around the world to support the ambitions and it wants to overcome its restricted access to open waters by dominating the sea and airspace off the coast out to open water and as it looks east, and sees what it calls the first island chain, having it in and preventing access. the american security position in asia is anchored on allies

and partners that it reaches by air and sea in that area. essential to strengthen alliances in the american position in east asia that have unimpeded air and maritime access to south korea, japan, taiwan, philippines. that is what we call the first island chain. /in those countries further south, singapore, thailand and other countries. the differences between the united states and china and maritime disputes in east asia are deep and real. they're unlikely to be resolved without fundamental changes in domestic political developments in either country or by major changes in the relative military and economic performance of those countries. this doesn't mean these differences will lead to conflict between the u.s. and china appear to disagree completely with the logic that is somehow inevitable, but nonetheless these differences will lead to the same.

diplomatic, economic and military intention between the united states, china and the other countries in the maritime borders of east asia. the east china sea for the moment seems relatively stable between japan and china with a sort of understanding reached about the meaning and the type of military and paramilitary deployments in that area. but let's turn to the south china sea where there is further activity crises and hopefully some creative diplomacy. there were two levels of power in relationships that play aphasia. the first is day-to-day duties, influencing capabilities. second is a strategic level a fundamental government policy, international alignments in the region. it is at the tactical level we hear most of the media attention.

china's approach to so-called cabbage slicing her gray area and sharply ramped up these activities from about 2010. chinese is mostly nonmilitary forces backed up by ships and aircraft to advance the authority and the south china sea. it claims the men are mentally and forces hydrocarbon resources and fishing in claims and intermittently versus authority of a maritime and air access with occupied features and sends other vessels into areas claimed by others. finally maintains military fortifications on the islands it occupies in the carousels and is built the infrastructure for military facilities on the southern island of occupies and straightlaced hundred miles to the south. however at the strategic level, and a higher level, china has paid a heavy price for these aggressive entities. from 2002 until 2010, china emphasize economic diplomatic

relations and overall influence of governments in southeast asia with strong and increasing southeast asian countries exporting more and more products to china what were considered less important by these countries than those with china and it seemed only a matter of time before china would be able to fashion a settlement very much in his favor. for a series of three, it began a much more aggressive fed about 20 cents 2010 and alarmed all the other countries in the south china sea. there formally reject the what they consider their own legitimate sovereignty claims turned a powerful countries primarily japan and the united states for support. they've offered access to airfields and bases to the united states and japan. they've increased their spending on military forces in the united states and japan have responded with increased deployments of their run defense forces and other forms of increased civil

and military cooperation. china strategic position in the south china sea has deteriorated even as the tactical situation has strengthened. as for the united states, these last eight years of constant reassessment of sharpening of american interest in the south china sea and its activities there. the united states says it is willing to share power with china so long as it shared and are commonly observed limits the provisions of international agreements and maritime regions such as the provision of international trade and investment agreements such as those set up under the world trade organization. do not take decided it's not going to see dominance in china and southeast and northeast asia based on china's physical location, economic development and military power which is the fundamental basis of chinese advances there. china's actions in the south china sea constitute a challenge

to one of its vital interests, maritime and air access and freedom of maneuver and is taking action to support those entries. for the countries of southeast asia themselves, and continued economic development to raise their national standards of living autonomy and security and diplomatic relationships and preserving territory in the south china sea that they consider to be rightly theirs. actions will be based on these aspirations tempered by their estimate prospects to assistance from the united states and japan and other out that countries to punish and coerce general expectations about the future power balances in the region. so what is this fundamental clash of interests at play in the south china sea and elsewhere in this maritime regions of east asia. is a good time to consider the next phase in southeast asia at the start of the third phase of activity in that region.

china's aggressive activities described in 2010 wound down last year in the run-up to the national people's congress with recently announced consolidation of president x xi. probably the lower level always accompanied a soothing assurances of willingness to talk and peaceful intentions. china will attempt to blend the two approaches over the last 20 years, attempting to regain luster t.j. ground while slowly enhancing tactical advantages that it can achieve. let's turn to our panel to discuss their views. we have an excellent group to talk from different points of view about where future developments are lead and i'll ask the panel to come to this page, please. and madness at the atlantic council believed them and start

the discussion. >> great, thank you for that wonderful introduction and for painting a rich picture of where we find ourselves in the broad issues that's related. first of all, good morning to everyone and welcome to the atlantic council. i am magnus norman, executive director at the school cross here at the atlantic council. this is an important topic that is never too far away from the headlines. i think admiral blair did a wonderful job describing the environment and setting up the challenges we must consider. i'm not going to belabor that point further.

i would just simply add that enable competition in maritime asia and the future rules of the road there has consequences that should be of interest to our european allies and other places around the world. these implications go far beyond the region that we should all care about. before introduced the panel much into discussion, i have one admin note. as you can see we have our meter up, which is an opportunity for you in the audience and those watching online to interact with our discussion and panelists. please go to the website listed and type in the code and that will give you an opportunity to answer our questions and we will draw from this during the discussion. i will likely draw some of these things then poke the panelists with some of the things that

emerge. with that said, we have a wonderful set of panelists today to discuss these issues. first we have sarah kirchberger, director of asia-pacific security and an expert on chinese maritime affairs and in chinese debut in particular. the japan institute of international affairs who's an expert on sea power in asia, maritime security and u.s.-japan alliance. third, john john watts, senior fellow at the atlantic council come proud american immigrant from australia. he has a foot on both sides of the pacific and is also a noted expert on asia-pacific security. i think we have a great lineup double off for three very different perspectives and approaches to the challenges of the east china sea. so with that, let's plunge into discussion. i want to start with you, sarah.

you spend a lot of time studying thinking about the chinese approach and in particular the south china sea. how does this all up for the chinese maritime air? >> quite obviously i'm not chinese and can't speak for the chinese. the thank you very much for the opportunity to present some ideas that i've gathered from reading chinese analysis and talking with chinese experts. i would specifically focus on the chinese perceptions, threat perceptions and how this might be tied and how it relates to the south china sea, east china sea. i think the first point is we should look at the different levels of threat perception that we can see floating around in chinese pronouncement, that influence china's maritime

behavior. i should perhaps add a disclaimer. understanding this perspective does not mean endorsing it. it just means trying to understand where the other side is coming from. i think that's very important to do. in my view, there are three important threat perceptions i mentioned that we should consider. one is the political ideological threat perception, the general one between the communist tidy and capitalist west that is seen as a challenge. the other is geostrategic, geographically determined. the third one is military technological type of threat perception. i will elaborate on these three points in a minute. the first one, the political ideological rift you could say between china and the west is something we in the west sometimes tend to underestimate an impact because the communist party above all it seems to me here subversion, infiltration

and what is called peaceful evolution. so chinese leaders always point to many, many different texan speeches to so-called hostile western forces that are trying to pull it up with the country, change the policy and this is also why there's so many huge funds come huge funds, such huge resources controlling the way the chinese can think and express themselves. it's a lack of trust in the stability of the system and from that point of view, the very existence of a liberal democracy on taiwan must be seen in china as a challenge to the legitimacy of this regime. the existence of taiwan as a political, ideological threat perception element to it. the second dimension, geostrategic geographically

determined receptionist related to the idea of containment that is quite often been brought forward as an idea in asia. if you read the text by chinese flavorless, you will constantly be finding what the admiral has already elaborated a little bit on that china is almost 10 encircled by the u.s./and allies on the first island chain. one has to conceive that this perception, if there is this political ideological threat perception is not completely without a basis because the proximity of the first island chain as the allied militaries. very good, fantastic opportunity to conduct surveillance operations against the chinese military for instance. also, chinese strategists point out the major population centers of china all located on the eastern coast and are very

vulnerable to threats coming from the sea and from the air. and so, this threat perception is of course one of the driving sect errs of this naval expansion and at the same time, makes naval expansion hard to achieve. also note the subsurface domain in a sense because other chinese territory watchers are basically the continental shelf without direct access to the oceanic waters. submarines have to pass through heavily guided narrow pathways. so it's hard to achieve china's military. this could be related to deterrence. controlling taiwan, to return to taiwan would massively change the situation for the chinese military point of view. controlling taiwan would give china's navy a springboard to

the pacific and would change the overall situation for china. as for the south china sea, the strategically important and deletions in the map in your mind right at the northern rim of the south china sea. there is the strategic submarine base were china's nuclear ballistic missile submarines are located and also the new spaceport, which is to become the chinese cape canaveral you could say. both located on this island and they seem to require the security perimeter who guides these installations against threats coming from the sea, from the air, from the south and from the east. the third dimension to the chinese threat perception that i find interesting due to having worked in the shipbuilding industry before his military

technologic did the chinese of course our access to some technological development that they see directed against their own capabilities such as the combat system that enables operations that the united states have shared with its allies in korea, japan, australia, some nato countries. and of course ballistic missile defense and also discussions about possible global strikes that you can often pick up that concerned the chinese strategists. so in theory, if all of these technological ambitious programs which actually succeed, then this would in theory end up making the american mainland vulnerable. it could threaten the validity of china's nuclear deterrence and this would of course be a problem. the idea in china is of course to develop a more robust nuclear

triad including a seaborne deterrent and to conduct their own version of these programs such as verity happened and to develop a global strike program of their own. so these deterrent goals related to controlling the south china sea. as they are dimension, the thing about controlling the security perimeter around the island. the second point would be that the south china sea bd only deeper seat area that's accessible from the chinese coastline could be made into a sanctuary for the nuclear submarine force, a concept that has been discussed widely and there is much to be said for the logic behind it is in the chinese measures that are being

taken to gain a maritime domain awareness in the subsurface domain and also in their domain. alas, i think the space program should be seen as a driver behind the whole thing. the tensions in the south china sea must pick up speed when the launch center was first planned and when the plan was executed. in 2010, the plan was determined and in 2010, the center was finished. so you can see it's almost the same time frame where we see rising tensions. looking at the military strategic importance of these goals that china is apparently pursuing, i am very, very doubtful that china would be willing to compromise, much less back down on what it has 30 to in the south china sea.

legal and other considerations will not be considered as important hard-core security implications. that would be my point. >> thank you so much. that was wonderful in the great tour of what is at stake for china, especially in the south china sea. next to bring us a perspective from japan, obviously an important u.s. ally in the major country in the region. how does this look from a japanese perspective? >> thank you to the atlantic council for having me. it's great to have an opportunity to talk about security in asia. since i came from japan, but we focus on the east china sea situation. as admiral blair said in his

opening remarks, it seems calm, but i think that is what china xbox. you know, their provocations are still going on a daily basis. so let me explain. what is really happening? the situation continues to be deteriorating. as you may know, the chinese coast guard ships maintain its present on an almost daily basis unless the weather is not ralph. there is a certain chinese intrusion into the territory waters. a call at the 342 remaining three times every month, for ships enter the waters for two hours. and previously, it was three, three, two.

three ships, three hours. the frequency remains the same time but the number of ships increase. the additional ship is the naval brigade and it is harmed. also, the average tonnage of the chinese coast guard ships are now 3000 tons whereas the japanese coast guard ships per 1000. so they are becoming bigger. so the frequency remains the same. the challenge is now increasing. also, recently, under the people's congress, the chinese coast guard is now under the commission, so we have to expect more coordination between the pla and the coast guard. and i don't know whether the

ships in friends, but earlier this week, we saw new chinese coast guard. they always live together. the four ships always stick together previously, but earlier this week, they suddenly spread into two groups intimated different navigation. it makes for the japan coast guard to monitor and follow the chinese coast guard ships more difficult. basically japanese coast guard ships maintain three ships, but the chinese coast guard ships are now spread into two groups. so, the japan coast guard is also into two and of course it

is said to have one chip combination. so it is more difficult for the coast guard to deter the chinese coast guard from entering the territory water. so, the situation seems calm, but china is continuing the increase of the challenge in the east china sea. plus, we witness the pla activities becoming more active. you know, previously the chinese navy maintained the operation inside the east china sea. more recently they conduct operations from east china sea to the western pacific and from the east china sea to the sea of japan. and also, the chinese military aircraft also showed for the east china sea to the western

pacific to the sea of japan. sometimes, the pla aircraft seems like their capability to launch cruise missiles vis-à-vis the mainland japan. so you know, showing a threat is coming from the pla. perhaps behind the change in the pla activities, i think the taiwan situation is key. pla, as the recent taiwanese defense papers shows, now almost surrounding taiwan and sometimes they come from east china sea to the western pacific into the south china sea.

so, they are doing this pressure campaign with taiwan and as a result, it is changing and it affects both the east china sea and the south china sea. and also, pla has already operated drones inside the territory. and drones and i think china will also try to introduce the underwater vehicle among underwater vehicles into the theater. but that is a different threat to japan. currently, once the chinese ships launched their drones, we have the f-15s. i don't think that's exactly the

way to monitor the chinese drone. i think we have to come up with effective to this. and also we witness beyond increasing. so you know, the submarine going to impose a threat. as you may know, this year, 2018 is the 40th anniversary of the treaty of peace and friendship and the government are trying to celebrate this year, this anniversary. but in january this year, chinese submarines for the first time appeared and we wondered why when we are trying to

stabilize. perhaps for training as, on one hand maintaining, stabilizing variations and on the other hand, continuing the east china sea are now contradict area. perhaps inside beijing is totally. so we have to expect as we improve by this year, china will conduct positive provocations in the east china sea. so, basically the japanese government, what the japanese government is trying to do is continue to deny the activities such as the incursion by maintaining coast guard patrol in making the diplomatic protest. and we also tried to impose cost

on chinese sec committees. we tried to expose what china is doing it and also we tried to do that by your own capabilities and try to increase the alliance cooperation. plus, we have to expect that anything can happen, so we try to establish a practice management with china. and as is reported, when they visit tokyo in may, hopefully japan and china will sign throughout the communication reconnaissance that will help the crisis management in the eastern sea and japan will continue to stabilize the

situation in the east china sea. >> thank you so much. john, you're going to cap this off year. you bring an interesting perspective from the region. ewart in-house expert on civic security. over to you. >> probably just because the last six pages were so excellent and so detailed. i think they just stand on their own and i don't need to go too in depth. the freedom of navigation has been since the very start dominated the word causes people are thinking about and i think that is really quite interesting, but also very telling. we in the west focus heavily on the freedom of navigation is being a large metric of operations and success in the south china sea or east china sea in response to iowa building

but a mean come the freedom of navigation inherently is tactical action. it's important. it has a great symbolism to it, but it's one area i think we are collectively the west, u.s. and its allies in both the south china sea and east china sea strategy. to have an effective strategy, you must have an idea of the challenges you face of the objectives you want to achieve and the capability to impact those. we have the capabilities, but we are not clear exactly the contours of the challenge. we have an idea what we think it is, but we don't have an understanding of what that really looks like or understand the real grit of what the report says. we haven't articulated letter object czar or find a way to it.

when we talk about security, we talk about how many times we can not freedom of navigation operations. we can point you to visit by the uss carl visit to vietnam, which was important symbolic action. australia recently declared they were going to increase actions in the south china sea. britain has declared the west is making a great symbolic action responding. meanwhile, we are playing the wrong game. china has been very clear on its strategy for the region, with the free warfare is, the hybrid approach. the idea that you can't separate security from economic and political and that is where we are really losing out. a police car can patrol the neighborhood all night long, but that's not going going where the activity is, is it really having an effect on policing and that

is our problem as we go through the actions of these activities. the question is where it's actually having an effect, whether it's assisting our allies and our network partners throughout the region in resisting the influence in the aggression. and if it's not, how do we go about it? the other thing when we talk about asia as we tend to get hung up on very simple discussions. one is the arms race in asia. an excellent piece earlier this week in southeast asia. when he breaks it down, the arms race is really less than the sum of its parts. a 10% increase year on year in southeast asia military spending, but a large part of that comes from personnel. the question whether that has to do with rising incomes and the cost of personnel.

very little of it has to do necessarily with capabilities. you can again point to obvious things like vietnam has bought combat aircraft and submarines, et cetera. but they are replacing old capabilities. the question is are these just the modernization of capabilities or is it an actual change in deterrent effects? it's important, valuable it needs to happen. the narrative around it, we are having the wrong conversation. to the early points about the decoration, we haven't seen not in physical form and increase operations that estrada will walk a very fine tightrope between being sent to china, but also not impacting its relationships, economic relationships with other partnerships. britain declared it was going to send ships through from an

exercise. wasn't necessarily a deliberate action with a deliberate message. but less than the sum of its parts. china meanwhile, their approach is going to be -- it's not intended to enjoy the conflict. they have the hard power, so in the soft power is kind of assumed power. there certainly hard elements to it, but it's never meant to be so hard that it provokes a physical or conventional response. meanwhile, he continues to push it must be recognized and go beyond just describing it as symbolic responses to it. i don't think you'll be very effect of encountering it. another great example earlier in the week in vietnam, being canceled around the red emperor gas field. again from economic and

political pressure, not from conventional military pressure. from a normal point of view, is that more -- more important than how many freedom of navigation operations we do by a fortified island. it's really important to the countries in the region, to our partners, allies and prospective partners when they look at those into the private sector and they decide whether or not they will invest in a country or the region. they'll have a far bigger impact on decision-making and whether or not we send a destroyer to a certain area. we need to have a more nuanced conversation. we need to have a more realistic one. we need to recognize the actions that are happening in the change of international norms happening on a daily basis. not necessarily getting headlines. it's really important. it's constant action.

it is not a single action or once a month or twice a month activity where we supply the flag. you could argue that party lost so much in that form. i should point out this is not just in the south china sea or east china sea. it is red lights and syria. the lack of response from a lack of a response to crimea and ukraine. this is something the west globally is failing to do enforcing international norms and so long as we fail to do that, countries such as china will exploit the gap and they will push the boundary of the envelope as much as possible. we continue to do or conventional military operations and freedom of navigation. meanwhile, we could be the entire game. >> thank you. we are going to open this

conversation. i'm eager to take your questions or comments but i do have a question if i had for the panel. we will go in reverse order to keep it interesting. so for john first, go back to where you started. talk about strategy and the nature of the challenge. and it's not a philosophical question because if we get it wrong, we invest in the wrong capabilities, posture the wrong way, emphasize the wrong element and so forth. and in many ways we're in uncharted uncharted waters. we've not done great competition in the pacific. so this is for a very long time. so your estimate, do at this point understand how close we are to understanding and also how does that jive with our partners and allies in the region? >> i think we understand in an

abstract sense in an emotional sense. we talk about it a lot. we kind of understand the contours of it, but i'm not sure it really resonates just how important it is. when it comes to military operations, for me personally, it always comes down to the lowest common denominator of the most basic element which is human decision-making, collective decision-making. what changes the person's actions. the second story off for a moment, one of the most interesting policies -- one of the most interesting policy decisions in recent years with california and the ability to use hybrid cars in the commuter lane. this was five or 10 years ago this started happening. you are going to buy a car. if you've got an option between a car that's $5000 more bubble

shaped 20 minutes off your commute time in his more conventional, what are you going to take? the hybrids suddenly seems a lot more. you can talk about climate change, features of the car, all of those big marketing rings. when it comes down to it, individual has a choice to make. i used that analogy because we have to go back to the basics. what is the trade-off? if the u.s. as the alliance is important to us, do freedom of navigation, don't let them invest in this infrastructure, et cetera. that works well as a high-level marketing strategy point of view, what does it matter to the person with the collective individuals and october not thinking about. we do a good job talking appeared and not necessarily a good job down here and how the actions have to translate and understand how these important elements get us there.

that is where we really fail. thank you. >> onto tetsuo. he very carefully laid out the detesting and frothing that is going on a japanese territorial waters and airspace and also at the coast guard is doing in the defenses are currently doing. i'm going to keep them all in my pocket. but also more could be done or other countermeasures could be considered to face those incursions. in your mind, what could some of those countermeasures be? >> first of all, we have to increase the number of coast guard ships. it is not the only problem for

rest. more recently, the north korean fishing boats appeared in the sea of japan and the chinese fishing boats also appeared in the western pacific and the japan coast guard needs to address this issue. we have more challenge is. oil spill, accident and they are all the responsibility of our coast guard. so when the chinese increase the challenge in the east china sea, we have to have the coast guard capability more. and also, one of the big challenges today for japan is the increasing number of scandal vis-à-vis the chinese aircraft. and as our -- as they scramble

almost every day, that will cut the time for training and that will cut our readiness for actual combat. so we are wondering whether we have to make a scramble to every chinese approach where we have to choose certain approaches only. or, we are wondering if there's any room for the u.s. air force to join. so, possibly there may be between the two air forces. that is what we are now discussing.

and plus, some people argue that they are two different and some people say, maybe we have to take more proactive. for example, whenever china enters our waters, then japan may have to do the same to the chinese water. by doing so, maybe we can send a more strong signal to the chinese. but we are still discussing many options that we haven't reached any consensus yet. >> thank you. the space aspect in the south china sea and this is perhaps a bit of a back to basics questioned but i think it's worth it because this part is underappreciated. why there?

why not somewhere else and why now from a strategy perspective? >> yeah i'm actually working now on a project studying the chinese space program and its military implications that the south china sea and what is important to note for physical reasons that are basically developed for every country come the furthest this to the equator you can get, the higher payload you can launch. as just one of the advantages. the other is to launch towards the east because of the movement of the earth and if there is a watermark, there is less risk of accidents. if something is wrong you don't have debris falling down on people in villages which happens often in china, by the way. you also have a chance to

discover equipment, which also can be important. you don't want your quantum computer falling into the wrong hands if it falls into the water as happened in july 2017 for instance. so there is an interest in having a launch pad located on the coast with water to the east as far south as china can get. it's the only possible place. then if you look at the chinese ambition, there is of course a civilian space program is very ambitious to land and send a mission to mars. if you look at the whole mission, the plan that they have laid out, they are talking about the idea is that having perhaps a feasibility study for a space elevator in place by 2049 or something like that.

this is of course highly unlikely. even the materials don't exist it would be needed to do something like that. but the only location if you're going for this sort of thing, the only location for could be physically realized as the south china sea because it would have to be almost on the equator to be on the same basically. so these are the reasons why this part of the sea area is important. some of the reason for the chinese space program. obviously if you want to have global strike capability is, you need to launch vehicles that can reach as far. the only launch pad china has but can launch the super heavy missile is also on high land because these others being far north can only launch missiles

at maximum diameter of 2.5 meters because they have to be transported overland where it can be supplied by the sea on ship. very many physical reasons why it makes sense. if you look at what the u.s. does at cape canaveral, what the french do, it is of course natural every time there's a launch attempt they will try to close off areas to inhabit other actors coming too close and interfering with the launch of gathering may be a formation and pick up stuff that might fall down. so basically this would be the reason. >> fascinating. one final question for the group and then we will open it up for your questions. one mentioned a cyberfamily didn't talk much about cyberduring the panel.

the maritime domain is getting related to the other domains of operations. you certainly already mentioned space. cyberis one of his for the maritime industry and so one. so what are the cyberaspects of the competition in the asia-pacific? john, maybe we will start with you. >> one of the key aspects of the fact you have a concentration of some of the most important technology developers of production. a lot of their production, computing equipment happens in that region and the amount of research and development going on there. i think as much if not more than any other region in the world, you're likely to see some of the high-end capabilities realize it demonstrated they are. one of the interesting things is

we haven't really had a peer to peer naval conflict in a very long time, even state on state with fishing boats, north korean spy troller or whatnot. you know, are confronting libyan ships in the mediterranean. we haven't seen a really peer to peer battle with using everything at their disposable to advance their aims. there's a lot of unknowns or just because we don't know what people bring up when they really need to. but what we are seeing is a lot of regular activities. difficult attributes, difficult to defend against. i think as china continues to increase the fairness of its operation throughout the region, a tnt, cyberwill become more and more of a possible action to

complement the economic pressure and political pressure in the other tools. there is a huge risk their we are only seen the iceberg at the moment as to what will actually occur. >> thank you peered over to you on the role of cyberin this competition. >> i'm not so much familiar with the aspect, but one thing i want to say when the uss john mccain collided with a commercial ship in southeast asia, there was some speculation that this might be caused by the cyberattack vis-à-vis the gps system. there is no evidence that this actually happened.

shipping should definitely be taken into consideration. we already have evidence of cyber spoofing in the black sea area. there was gps spoofing involved. that's probably caused by russia but there's no guarantee that something similar might not happen elsewhere. about the ship collisions i don't know if you've seen animated version of the second collision of the mccain in the singapore strait. it really looked like it. the container vessel was moving steadily at a slow speed, straight course, and the destroyer was coming up from behind and was really heading into this pathway of the container vessel. it looks really strange. of course the investigation probably is still ongoing and cyber attacks are very difficult to attribute any case, including

an accident and it's not necessarily the first such case of such an attack. it could become also the tool for attacking taiwan. one of several tools that would be employed at the same time. so these types of hybrid methods. we know again from chinese writing that they highly approve of what putin did in crimea. so there's actually an article by a chinese naval strategist commenting on crimea and coming to the conclusion that we should do the same thing in taiwan. we would succeed just like putin did because the others which is realize too late what's going on and he wouldn't have time to react. furthermore, it's not in the court enters a needed to defend taiwan just as it was not in the core inches of nato to defend crimea. this is the reasoning. in my view, cyber is definitely

something the next be watched just as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence needs to be watched. >> one of the things we perhaps have taught you it is increasing significant of the industry across asia in the defense of space. i get i know cyber expert at my understanding is the best winter of cyber attacks happen in the industrial, commercial sectors. the stealing of secrets, sabotaging of ip and production facilities, again, it's not in the conventional spaces on how we general think of security but with a large portion of some of the most high end, cutting-edge military capabilities are being produced in the region specific to be deployed in the region i think we did think downstream as well as to what effect affect t have on the capabilities before the even get there.

that's an area that needs to be explored. it's not exciting. ships crashing in the night type thing but it's really important aspect and i can't speak into a death but it's important needs more attention. >> with that want to open up for questions. here atlantic council we believe in the rules-based global order and we also believe in rules-based events. we have three. first wait for the microphone before asking a question. number two, make sure it is indeed a question. and three, please identify yourself with name and affiliation before asking a question. in the back please. >> thank you very much. i have a very simple question

this is about japan and south china sea. as for this freedom of navigation, has not joined it -- [inaudible] how u.s. -- [inaudible] that u.s. is not happy -- [inaudible] [inaudible] john, why don't you start us off? >> the japanese government has already stated that we will never conduct freedom of navigation as americans do, but already japan has conducted the present operation in south china

sea. some americans should work on japan joining the foreign ops that some americans a little bit cautious about it because that may trigger a possible japan-china confrontation in the south china sea. so during the present operation, should be the appropriate way at this moment. of course if situation in the south china sea becomes more -- [inaudible] then not only japan but also other allied nations may have to consider taking a step, formal follow-ups. >> i can't speak to the american perspective per se. i'm sure there are some that you feel it's critical and they should be joining i'm sure others are highly sympathetic to

why they wouldn't, and also concern it may trigger something else or escalate an action may have more downside that upside. i'm sure the u.s., any segment of the u.s. policymaking community would welcome allies participate. but i think anyone who understands the region, understand the nuance, they also appreciate the reason that some countries do or don't join the decision-making, as to whether they do or don't. as is the earlier my biggest question is if they did we really have a big difference? it sends a message but, i mean, how does that change anything? it doesn't demilitarize the island. it doesn't bring, it doesn't change vietnam's decision on whether or not they cancel the contract it doesn't change the degree to which indonesia -- [inaudible]

again it's an important action but my question is what effect does it actually out in the region? i would argue it probably doesn't and, therefore, the downside probably outweighs the upsides. >> sarah, can we guess what a chinese reaction would be to japan for participating in efforts like that? >> of course. very negative reaction, i think. they would probably been increase pressure to retaliate for it. and as you just said it might not be very good because it would draw more of your resources. i'm not sure if it's actually a good idea, especially given the domestic political climate in japan that still debating what to do. so it might also not be something that the population wholly supports, and this would then be an opportunity again for china to also exploit the central divisions and countries. i'm not sure whether this would

be actually a win situation. however, it might be possible to start the debate, not do it but start the debate here maybe actually the better option because it signals a shift that china would perhaps by negative, we tried to remedy somehow, but would not actually cost japan so much in terms of resources. sometimes it's better not to do something and then live with the consequences but just signal a shift in thinking so that the other side sees oh, maybe we gone too far. >> going back to that, for me far more important aspect is what japan is doing in maritime cooperation with asia. to me that a far more, it might be a flashy, might not get as many headlines but that's a a r more important action and activity that may change decision-making and thinking of countries in the region.

to me it's not the action itself. it's what are we trying to cheat and what's the best way of achieving it. >> next question. in the back. >> thank you very much. my question is -- about proportional assistance. when china enter the territorial water, how to find the price of the retaliation we can enter is the problem. so my idea, how about this, is the idea. when china enter territory water

with japan, we can visit taiwan under the permission of the taiwan government. because we need support of taiwan and china what part of the territory. this is -- [inaudible] i'm hawkish, radical, but as one idea, how about this? is my question or comment. thank you very much. >> well, i will say, it begins, you know, what kind of ship units into taiwan. if it's self-defense ship, that would be too much. coast guard ship, still, provocative. actually the u.s. government, the trump administration is not

going to send naval warship to taiwan, and there was a strong reaction from beijing. i think we have to expect more harsh criticism from beijing. vis-à-vis japan. that's one thing. but at the same time i think we can take more indirect way to engage with taiwan. for example, in 2013 at civil fishery agreement with taiwan. i think that was, you know, very effective approach we take, although it is not so much -- [inaudible] but we could send a political signal to beijing. i think rather than making pot calls to taiwan, i think we can find a more indirect approach to strengthen our ties with taiwan. that would be my answer.

>> we have a question up here in the front. >> thank thank you very much. great holden with csis. i couldn't endorse more of john's point, by far the biggest word up there is indicative, or maybe the problems around the debate in washington. last friday today with the announcement of the november cancellation we also did the third one in the year. we have a giant underscoring for our asian partners, a little good by themselves they are actually doing. what are the other tools that the u.s., australia, japan, australia and partners could be doing, economic, diplomatic et cetera they can bring real pressure to bear on the chinese? it been ten years and were able to sales to but no one else can operate. that is a win for beijing.

>> let's start with john and work our way down. >> obviously as you know it's a complex and nuanced thing and the response will need to be calibrated to each country within the region, each country faces its own circumstances. i go back to the old saying is, all politics is a must if it is at the modernization of the arms race, domestic factors in each case are far more important. the domestic one, yesterday perspective, you could point to the shipbuilding industry, new frigates, destroyers and say australia is in an arms race with china. really what has to do with sustaining the industry within australia and jobs. it has more to do with domestic political support at the next election by maintaining job in certain regions that it does with any strategic media capabilities.

what i'm saying is that bigger debate ostrow has come the more to do with the industry side of things that does specific with confrontation or capability itself and to think that's probably true in most of the countries as you look around the region. let's look at vietnam, for instance. if you look at vietnam or the philippines for that matter, obviously carl vinson visiting vietnam shows that countries in the region will be used to be engaged. they want them to have a presence that they want to have them a part of the solution or a part of the issue. but when it comes down to it, and again to go back to my point about decision-making, the question is to what degree do you make a symbolic action which may be hollow, or do you take an action which may be less savory but has economic implications? we need to look at each individual and say vietnam, the case around -- is it because

they're worried about losing investment in this infrastructure? in which case is that something we can do? can we step in and fill that void so that rely on china for infrastructure investment in a certain area, or are they worried about certain capability? we have to look at each individual case and say what is driving the decision-making that case? what do we want to achieve? is if you want to provide a credible alternative so changes the decision-making? that's what we need to do. it takes a long time and, frankly, would all be out of a job if we could come up with it that easily. here's a list of things we need and the boxes we need to take. i think we need to take a harder look at understanding what is driving the political decision-making in each of these countries. what individual to the need and what can we provide to show that our allies and partners of potential partners are able to make decisions that they want to make and that were comfortable with, and are not forced to take an alternative they really is only a benefit to one group.

>> well, i think the u.s. faces a dilemma in terms of freedom of navigation operation. yes, on one hand you have to do it. but as you do it, china will justify its -- [inaudible] the difference between 2017-2018 is u.s. to longer confirms whether they conducted ops or put any case defense of ministry, defense ministry analysis that use conducted and they say they have to take further safety measures. so yes, you have to continue, but we have to be realistic that they cannot change chinese

behavior. i think what is needed is a redline in the south china sea. although obama's red light in syria failed, i think obama's red light and south china sea was successful. the red line was -- [inaudible] china didn't do it and obama administration was quite clear, although it was too late. but today there is no redline in south china sea. perhaps u.s. and its allies need to discuss what should be the realistic redline to send, and we have to discuss it china crosses that redline, what should be our collective response. >> final word from sarah on this. >> well, i think it may not have such a dramatic effect, but

stopping them would definitely have a negative affect, like signaling okay, we give up. so that is perhaps not really an option. another thing i sometimes what about the real purpose of -- [inaudible] apart from just didn't see that we sailed past your artificial island, in some cases i think look at the timing and location of where the ships actually conduct. i think they may be there also to do surveillance on the chinese activities. for instance, when the last launch of the long march five missile in july 2017 failed, for some reason the same day there was freedom of navigation operation very near the island that has to come has the satellite station that tracks these launches. the ship may have been there to gather data on the launch or

whatever. this is also an aspect we need to consider. it's just not a signaling and symbolism. i would argue for keeping it up because nobody else can do them, even one british ship once every blue moon won't make much of a difference there. actually not an alternative keeping them off. >> the point is not that we should it but shouldn't be central to the conversation. we look at them as a silver bullet. another metric, and again it's not a sexy topic but another metric is a type of how much capability countries by from china. in d.c. we talk about how that shows us an indication that they are siding with china. it may just be the capability keeper. you look at the decision-making in each case relevant to the situation or maybe that the restrictions of what we will sell the countries, but something we need to look at as

alternative. how do we provide a viable practical alternative, either more expensive and has been more expensive, why wouldn't this in more expensive capability, look at a much more calibrated scale. >> i think with time for one final question. the lady in the back has been the most patient. >> jeanette young from channel taiwan. i'm quite interested and struck by what sarah say that chinese government actually highly prove what russia has done in crimea. and then you link that with taiwan. as we know the taiwan strait actually is quite different compare with russian and crimea. so i just would like to hear more about what the link about, thank you. >> i was actually reporting what -- [inaudible] very notorious, famous ablest in

beijing has been writing. so that was his argument, that is basically the same situation from his point of view, that for instant crimea is considered a traditional territory of russia, link to russia through history, and should be russian territory again. so that was the reasoning, just like taiwan from their point of view of china, from their point of view. this is one of the parallels we are seeing and then there's a crucial difference that he doesn't mention. crimea those actually a proportion of the population was actually in favor. so the were many people actually helping the russians invasion attempt. there were many who were opposed but there was a sizable, yeah, i mean, loss of military people even, even took part in it. the situation in taiwan is the course for different. it's a tiny minority of people on taiwan who would collaborate or help or even approving it.

so there is a crucial difference that he doesn't mention. but from the point of view with the western reaction would be, he said that is a parallel because from the western point of view, crimea was not with fighting for, in the broadest sense, like we won't send soldiers to defend this peninsula, and from his point of view, the same would apply to taiwan. this is also questionable. of course i hope this is not true. i hope the western countries would not see taiwan similarly to crimea. i studied on taiwan so i consider taiwan of course very important country to preserve its freedom. the problem is, the reasoning of some of these chinese strategists, the cases may look very similar, and the western countries, of course, by not doing nothing about crimea until

it was much too late and maybe even contributing to the situation in some ways by acting unwisely before, being non-consistent, we had signaled that maybe there's a chance for china to do similar things and get away with it. so this is the reasoning in the article. if you're interested in that article i can give you, it's in chinese. i can give you the article if you want and read for yourself. this is what i was saying. not that i agree with it but this, i i was only reporting wt i read. >> i understand this is not your perspective. i think it's highly problematic for bunch of reasons and i think the calculation he is making in is wrong for a number of reasons. but i think there is an important element in that, and that is countries learn from other regions. we can to look at than a little bubbles around the region but that's not what it is. countries i'm serve actions ofr countries elsewhere and they

take lessons from it. i think that's the point is our actions in syria, libya, and western europe, wherever they are, you are being observed and lessons are being learned. al-qaeda developed a plan for 9/11 in part based on its understanding or reading of u.s. actions in somalia, , a "black hawk down" incident. it observe the way the americans acted. it learns lessons on what that meant for american perspective in its operations and it felt a plan based on that. we think that china is not watching the ukraine and donbass and of the place and learning lessons from the western perspective, that if think we're extremely naïve. similarly if we think rush is not observing the south china sea, exactly why we americans ablaze the importance of a network of u.s. alliances around the world being involved in supporting roles-based orders and values everywhere and being

consistent, particularly for that reason. countries and other regions will learn lessons and develop their actions based on that. so that's all the time we have today. i apologize we didn't get all the questions. i think we have a little bit of time to harbor around if you want to ambush a panelist, go right ahead. first of all, thank you to our panelists for faceting conversation. please join me in thanking them. [applause] >> questions, until next time i think succumbing to the atlantic council. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]