>> last week the atlantic council is a discussion on issues in maritime security and the asia-pacific region.among the speakers retired admiral dennis blair. a former commander of us forces in the pacific. >> good morning everybody and welcome. i am dennis blair directed at the atlantic council and also the chairman of the board of the peace foundation usa and i see a number of familiar faces in the audience. i know that there will be a good discussion. following the presentation of this wonderful set of panelists that has assembled this morning. it is good i think to bring our gaze load itself in east asia north korea is dominating a headlines these days and luckily is a for the region as

they piece phase of the north korean approach which seems to go in cycles. we need to keep our eye on the entire region. the maritime borders of china have always been matters of security and opportunity for that country. their attitude towards these only water space as is typical of land powers do they feel that this water is a defensive barrier. the chinese error in maritime forces are to be dominant there in case of conflict and foreign air in maritime forces are to be kept out in peace time as matters of law and practice. from the american point of view of course, that of a maritime seafaring world power all international one of the 12 miles is open in peacetime to maritime traffic and the forces

of any country. military surveillance operations of the cost of a potential enemy are routine, legal, prudent and not threatening conflict. beyond the basic approaches that are important national interests which are in these two different attitudes. taiwan, which is china's single greatest national objective lies off the questions in this maritime area. china has ambitions to extend worldwide its influence, beliefs and implicit has to extend his maritime power around the world to support those ambitions. and it was to overcome the restricted access to open waters by dominating the same area and the airspace of the coast out to open water and as it looks east, it sees what it calls the first island chain preventing that access. the american security position

in asia is anchored on allies and partners that it reaches by area and see in the area. it is essential to the strength of these alliances and therefore to the strength of the american position in east asia. that have unimpeded air and maritime access to south korea, japan, taiwan, philippines. that is what we call the first island chain. as well as countries for the south vietnam, singapore, thailand and other countries. the differences between the united states and china on maritime disputes in east asia are deep and real. there are likely to be resolved without fundamental changes and in domestic political development is either the countries or by major achievements and the relative military and economic performance of both countries. this does not mean the differences will lead to conflict between the us and china. i disagree completely with the logic. it is conflict of somehow

inevitable but nonetheless the differences will lead to a sustained period of diplomatic, economic and military competition between the united states, china and the other countries in the maritime borders of east asia. the east china sea for the moment seems relatively stable between japan and china with sort of understanding reached about the meaning and the type of military and paramilitary deployments in the area. but let's turn to the south china sea where there is the most for further activity, crises and hopefully some creative diplomacy. there are two levels of power in relationships that play in southeast asia. first is the tactical level, day-to-day activities influence the capabilities. second is their strategic level. the fundamental government policy of international alignment in the region.it is at this tactical level that we hear most of the media attention. china's approach in the

so-called cabbage slicing or gray area sets of activities and is sharply ramped up these activities from about 2010. china uses mostly nonmilitary forces backed up by military ships and aircraft. to advance its authority in the south china sea. he claims it intermittently enforces authority over economic activities, hydrocarbon resources and fishing. he claims intermittently or in forces -- ships and airplanes when they approach chinese occupied areas. and altering fortifications on the islands that it occupies and it has built infrastructure for military facilities on the seven islands -- 700 miles to the south. however at the strategic level the higher level china has paid a heavy price for these aggressive activities. from about 2002 until 2010

china emphasized economic diplomatic relations and overall influence with governments in southeast asia were strong and increasing. southeast asian countries exporting more and more products to china, relations with the us and japan while friendly were considered less important by these countries. then were those with china and it seemed only a matter of time before china would be able to fashion a settlement of territorial claims very much in his favor. but a series of reasons, it began a much more aggressive set of activities is 2010. and has alarmed all of the other countries in the south china sea. have formerly rejected this in their own sovereignty claims and have turned to powerful outside countries primarily japan and united states for support. he offered access to airfields and bases to the united states and japan. they've increased their own spending on military forces. the united states and japan have responded with increased deployments of their own

defense forces and other forms of increased civil and military corporation. china strategic position in the south china sea has in fact deteriorated even as his tactical situation has strengthened. as for the united states these last eight years have caused a reassessment and sharpening of america's interest in the south china sea and his activities there. the united states has said and acts as if they're willing to share -- for the provision of international trade and investment agreements such as those set up under the wto. the united states has decided it is not willing to see dominance to china and southeast and northeast asia based on china's physical location, economic development and military power which is the fundamental basis of chinese advances there. and china's actions in the

south china sea constitute a challenge to one of its vital interests, maritime access and freedom of maneuver and taking action to support those interests. as for the countries of southeast asia themselves, their interests are and continued economic development to raise their national standards of living. and in autonomy and security and diplomatic relationships and in preserving the territory in the south china sea that they consider to be rightly theirs. their actions will be based on these aspirations, tempered by their estimate of the prospects for assistance from the united states and japan and other outside countries. estimates of the willingness of china to punish and coerce in the general expectations about futures about the power of balances in the region. it is this fundamental clash of interest that is plagued in the south china sea and other areas of east asia. it is a good time to consider the next phase in southeast asia as we are at the start of one third phase of activity in

the region. china's aggressive activities that i described began in 2010 wound down last year in the run-up to the national people's congress. with the recently announced consolidation of the president xi jinping. there consider the next phase of activities along the maritime borders. my guess is that we will see continued aggressive activities but probably at a lower level. always accompanied by soothing assurances and willingness to talk in a peaceful intention. china i think will attempt to blend the two approaches that it has tried over the last 20 years attempting to regaining lost strategic ground while slowly enhancing a tactical advantage that it can achieve. let's turn to our panel who discusses their views do we have an excellent group to talk to from quite different points of view of where future developments will lead. i left the panel to come to the stage, please.

[multiple speakers] of the atlantic council to introduce and lead the discussion. >> thank you. >> thank you for that wonderful introduction. and painting a rich picture of what we find ourselves and the broad issues that are related. first of all good morning to everyone and welcome to the atlantic council. i am magnus nordenmann the deputy director here. it is great to see everyone for this discussion on maritime security. also this is an important topic that is never too far away from the headlines. i think the admiral did a wonderful job describing the environment and setting up the challenges that we must consider. i will not delay any further.

i would simply add that i think the naval competition and maritime agent and the future that global consequences. and therefore should be of interest to the entire world and certainly to the european allies and other places around the world for certainly there are implications that go brief -- go beyond this. before i introduce the panel i have one administrative note. as you can see we have -- up which is an opportunity for those in the audience and watch a noninteractive with our discussion and our panels. please go to our website listed and type in the quote -. it will give you an opportunity to answer questions and will draw from this during the discussion. i will likely draw on some of these things and poke the panelists.

with that said, we have a wonderful set up a panelists today to discuss these issues. the first we have doctor sarah kirchberger, she is director of asia and pacific security. she is a noted expert on chinese maritime affairs and chinese in particular. second we have tetsuo kotani with japan institute of international affairs. he is an expert on maritime security and us-japan alliance. third, we have john watts, a senior fellow at the atlantic council. an immigrant from australia. he has a foot and on both sides of the pacific. it is also a noted expert on asia-pacific security. i think we have a great lineup that will offer three very different approaches. with that, let's launch into

discussion. i would like to start with you sarah. he spent a lot of time studying and thinking about the chinese approach and in particular the south china sea. how does this all up for me chinese maritime perspective? >> well i cannot speak for the chinese, i met chinese. but thank you very much for the opportunity to present some ideas that i gathered from reading chinese analysis. talking with chinese experts. i was hoping specifically to focus on chinese perceptions and how this might be tied to their deterrent. and how it relates to the east china sea. i think my first point is we should look at the different levels of their perception that we can see floating around the influence chinese maritime

behavior. i should perhaps add a disclaimer understanding this perspective does not mean endorsing it. it just means trying to understand the other side and where they're coming from. i think that is very important to do. imagine there are three important perceptions i mentioned that we should consider, one is the political ideological perception. the general one between communist party and capitalist. it is seen as a challenge for the other is strategic or geographic determined. and the third one is a military technological type of threat perception. i would elaborate on these three points in a minute. first, the first one, the political ideological rift between china and the west. it is something that we in the west sometimes i think tend to underestimate its impact because the communist party above all it seems to me at least three years infiltration

and what they call peaceful evolution of china. china leaders always have many different tests and speeches to so-called hostile western forces that are trying to split the party and the country and change the policy. this is why the regimes have huge rights and huge resources to control the way that the chinese can think and express themselves. there is a lack of trust in the stability of the system and from that point of view, the very existence of a liberal -- on taiwan. ed is seen as a massive challenge. the existence of taiwan has a political ideological threat perception. the second as i mentioned,

geographically determined threat perception is related to the idea of containment that has quite often been an idea and containing this and asia. if you read the text by chinese naval -- you will find the admiral has a ready elaborated a little bit on that china is almost in circles by the us and allies on the first -- one has to concede that this perception, if there is this political ideological perception it is not without basis. the allied militaries have fantastic opportunity to conduct surveillance operations against the chinese military

for example. this is all located on the eastern coast and my exposed in a very vulnerable with threats coming from the sea and air. the step perception is of course, one of the driving factors of this idea of having -- at the same time the naval expansion card to hep was also notes the domain because all the chinese territory basically a continental shelf without direct access to the deeper oceanic waters. all of the chinese vessels including summaries have to have heavily guarded and narrow pathways. it is hard to achieve a credible -- for china's military. this would be related to the terms. controlling taiwan, would of course change the situation from the chinese military point of view. controlling taiwan would give

china's navy a springboard to the pacific and it would change the overall situation for china. and the south china sea, strategically it is important information. i don't know if you have the map in your mind but this island is at the northern rim of the south china sea. there is a strategic submarine base located near there where china's nuclear ballistic missiles are located and then there is also a spaceport the launch center which is to become the chinese cape canaveral, you could say. both located on this island and they seem to require the chinese secure perimeter guard these installations against threats coming from the sea, the air and mainly from the south end of the east. the third, the threat perception i find interesting due to having worked in the

industry before, military technology. the chinese of course are abreast of some technological developments that they seem, they are directed which is a system that allows operations that the united states have shared with the allies in korea and japan and australia and some nato countries and of course, ballistic missile defense and also discussions about possible -- it seems you can often in chinese writing a concern the chinese strategists. so in theory all of these technological and ambitious programs actually succeed which is of course, don't forget this would in theory, end up making the american vulnerable.it could threaten the validity of china's nuclear deterrent and this would of course, be a problem.so the idea in china

is to develop a nuclear -- including a seaborne deterrent and conduct their own version of these programs. like a chinese version that they already had happened and also to develop a global strike program. ... >> it could be made into a sanctuary for the nuclear submarine. it's basically a concept that hasn't been discussed widely. i think there's much to be said for the logic behind it and it supported by the chinese

measures on the surface domain. and last i think the space program should be seen as a driver behind the whole thing. it's notable in the south china sea it picks up speed when the center was first planned on the plan was executed. in 2010 the plan was determined in 2013 the center was finished. you can see almost the same timeframe where you see rising tensions. so looking at the military strategic importance of these goals that china is pursuing, i am very doubtful that china

would be willing to compromise much less back down on what they've already done. i think legal and other considerations will not be considered as a important. that would be my point. thank you. >> thank you so much. next let's get a perspective from japan, an important u.s. ally and major country in the region. how does it look from a japanese perspective? >> it's good to talk about maritime security in asia. and since i came from japan let me focus on the situation. the opening remarks these it

seems, and i think that's what china expects the world to see. their provocation still ongoing on a daily basis. what is really happening right now i would say the situation continues to be evaluated. the chinese coast guard maintains its presence on almost a daily basis. there is a certain patdown of chinese intrusion into -- i caught the three, four, two. mean three times every month for four ships go for hours. this is a fixed pattern after 2016. previously it was three times

three ships times two hours. the frequency remains the same but the number of ships increase. the ship is armed and also the average tonnage of the coast guard ships are now 3000 pounds whereas the japanese are 1000. so they are becoming bigger. so although the frequency remains the same the challenge is increasing. and just recently the people of congress the chinese coast guard is now under the commission so we have to expect more cord mission with the coast guard.

and i don't know if this shift but earlier this week we saw a patdown on the chinese coast guard. they always move together. but earlier this week they spread into two groups and made a different vacation. it makes for the coast guard to monitor and follow the chinese coast guard ships more difficult. basically they maintain three ships all of the time. they came from the china coast guard ships are full. they now spread into two groups.

so japan also used to spread into two. in this to in one ship combination. smarter difficult for the japan coast guard to deter the chinese coast guard from entering. so although the situation seems calm, china is continuing the increase of the china in the sea. there we announce the activities are becoming more active. previously the chinese navy maintains separation inside the east china sea. most recently they go to the east china sea to the pacific into the sea of japan. the chinese have aircraft that show the same pattern from the

east china sea to the sea of japan. sometimes the aircraft seems like testing their capability to launch a cruise missile. it is showing a further threat coming. perhaps behind those i think the taiwan situation is key. pla shows now they conduct almost daily and sometimes they come from east china sea to the western pacific in to the south china sea so they are doing the

special campaign and as a result the pattern is changing and it affects both east china sea in the south china sea. and they have already operated drones inside then drones and perhaps in china will also try to introduce the underwater vehicle but that would pose a different threat to japan. so currently one chinese ship has launched their drone we are scrambling for the f-15.

but i don't think that's an effective way to monitor the chinese i think we have to come up with other countermeasures. the submarine would continue to pose a threat as you may know, this year in 2018 is the 40th anniversary of the japan china treaty of peace and friendship. both governments are trying to celebrate this year. we're trying to stabilize the relations. in january of this year the chinese submarine appear. we wonder why china did this

when we try to stabilize relations. perhaps for chinese on one hand maintaining and on the other hand continuing the provocation in the east china sea are not contradictory. perhaps inside the beijing it is totally logical. so we have to expect as we improve that china will conduct further provocations of the east china sea. so the basically what the japanese government is trying to do is to deny the chinese activities by maintaining coast guard and making protests.

we try to impose costs on chinese activities. we try to expose what china is doing. which i to increase the alliance. we have to expect anything can happen, so we try to establish management with china. as reported in may hopefully japan and china will sign a maritime and air that will help the practice management in the east china sea.

in japan will continue to stabilize the situation in the east china sea. >> thank you. joan will finish us off here. you're an in-house expert on specific security. >> the last two speeches are excellent and very detailed i think they stand on their own that i don't need to go into it. i want to refer to what's behind me because the freedom of navigation has been up since the very start is both interesting and telling. we in the west focus heavily on the freedom of navigation and the response style and building

freedom of navigation is an action, it's important and has great symbolism but it's a tactical action. one way that we are losing out is through strategy. to have an effective strategy must have an idea of the challenges you face. we have the capability but were not really clear will come to the challenge. i would argue we don't have an understanding of what that really looks like or understand the wheel grit of where the problem is.

when we talk about security we can talk about how many times we conduct freedom of navigation operations. we can look at the action through vietnam and australia declared they were going to increase actions in the south china sea. britain is going to. the west has symbolic action of being present. meanwhile were playing a game. china is clear in its strategy for the region. the three warfare's in the hybrid approach. they cannot separate security from economic and political. to use an imperfect metaphor a police car to patrol a

neighborhood all weekend long but if it's not intervening in crime is that having an effect? we go through the actions but the question is if it is assisting our allies and our network of partners throughout the region and resisting the influence and regression. if not what is the object. when we would tend to get hung up on simple discussion. one is the arms race. earlier this week in southeast asia when he broke it down the arms races really less than the sum of the part. there's an increase in urine year. but a large part comes to personnel.

there is very little that has to do with capability. you can go towards the obvious things but their own capabilities. so how these are. it's important and valuable but the narrative around it were having the wrong conversation. two other parts we haven't seen in physical form. australia will walk a very fine line between being with china and then also not impacting economic relationships. when britain went to send ships

it wasn't necessarily a deliberate action or message it was symbolic. china approaches going to be never intended to cross the -- is not soft power. there are hard elements to it but never meant to be so hard it provokes a physical or conventional response. meanwhile he continues to push away recognize just more than describing it. another example is in vietnam the deal with -- was canceled.

from economic and political pressures, not from conventional military pressure. from a norms point of view is that more important than freedom of navigation? which one will be important to the country in the region and to our partners and allies? when they look at that and they have to decide if they're going to invest in the country or the region. that will have a bigger impact. we need to have a normal cover station and realistic. we need to understand the things that are happening. it's not necessarily getting

headlines. it's constant action not a single action or once a month or twice a month activity where you fly the flag. you can argue we have already lost so much. it's not just an issue in the south china sea, it's redlines and syria should lack of shooting down the plane. it's something the west is feeling to do. so long as we failed to do that countries such as china we use things like autonomous systems that push the boundaries as much as possible. meanwhile we could be losing entire gains.

>> i'm eager to take questions and comments. we'll go in reverse order. for john first, i want to go back to where you started and talk about strategy and the nature of the challenge. it's not a philosophical question because if we get around we invest in the wrong capabilities and we emphasize the wrong elements. we have not done great things so it is for very long time. so in your estimate to understand how close we are to understanding and how does that try with our partners and allies in the region?

>> i think we understand it in an abstract sense. we talk about it a lot and understand the contours of it but not sure it really resonates when it comes for me personally comes down to the lowest common denominator and its individual decision-making. what change the action. and if i could just real for a moment an interesting policy in recent years was in california and the ability to use hybrid cars in the commuter lane. if you're going to buy a car and the option of a car that's $5000

more but will shave 20 minutes off your commute time, the hybrid sounds more attractive. you can talk about climate change in those big marketing things. the individual has a choice to make it what's the trade-off. for our partners in the region we have to back to the basics. if the u.s. says the alliance is important to us and you need to reject the overtures that works well at the high level marketing strategy point of view. what does it matter to the person or the collective individual? that's what were not thinking about. were not doing a good job of understanding how it links.

to understand how these elements get us there. >> you effectively laid out the policy in some of the testing going on of the japanese territorial waters and airspace and what some special forces are currently doing. you hinted that more could be done another countermeasures could be considered to more effectively save those. in your mind, what would some of those countermeasures be? >> we need to increase our coast guard ships. this is not the only problem for

us, most recently the north korean fishing boat appeared in the sea of japan in japan coast guard picked up the issue in also in the western pacific in the japan coast guard needs that issue. we have more challenges there's more accidents other all the responsibility of the coast guard. when the chinese are increasing the challenge also one of the big challenges today for japan is the increase in the number of scandal in the aircraft.

as the air force conduct scramble every day that will cut the time for training in our readiness. so we're wondering we have to make a scramble to every chinese approach or we have to choose. or we're wondering if there is any room for the u.s. air force to enjoyed with u.s. airbase in okinawa. there may possibly be certain possibility. that's what were discussing.

plus some people know that our counter measures are too much different. some people say maybe you have to take a more proactive countermeasure. so when china enters our borders in japan may have to do the same to the chinese water. by doing so maybe we can send a strong signal to the chinese. but were still discussing options and have not reached a consensus yet. >> i want to go back to a point you raised of chinese interest in the south china sea. the back to basics question. but i think this is underappreciated, why they are

in my not somewhere else and why now from a chinese perspective? >> i'm working right now on a project in word studying the chinese space program with a view to the south china sea. what's important to know that's basically valid for every country in the father from the equator you can get the higher the payload you can launch. the other advantages it has a watcher mask. he launched toward these because of the movement with the earth. there's less risk of accidents if something go on. you don't have debris falling down on people in villages. you also have a chance to eat

recover if there's a mission failure which can be important. you don't want your computer falling into the wrong hands if it falls into the wrong hands. there's an interest in having a launch pad located on the coast of facing water to the east. as further south as they can get there's also a civilian base program that's ambitious and they want to land on the top side of the moon and send a mission to mars. when you look at their plan they're talking about ideas like having feasibility study for a space elevator in place.

this is highly unlikely to do something like that. the only location if you're going through this would be the south china sea. it would have to be almost on the equator. these are the reasons why it is part of the sea area is important. so i the space program. if you want to have global capabilities you need the launch vehicles that can reach and the only launch pads that they have the others are north can only

launch missiles of maximum diameter 3.5 meters because they need to be transport ported out overland. there's many physical reasons why it makes sense. if you look at cape canaveral and with the french do it's natural that when there's a launch attempt they tried to close off part of the area to inhibit others for interfering with the launch or gathering information to pick up stuff that might fall down. >> one more question from the group. i want to we didn't talk much

about cyber during this it's connected and interrelated to the other domains of operation. mention space. but cyber is vital to communication. what are the cyber aspects of the competition in the asia-pacific? >> a key aspect is that you have a concentration of some of the most important technology developers. a lot of the production of our computing equipment happens in that region in addition there is research and development going on. you're likely to see some high-end capabilities first administrated there.

we haven't really had a peer-to-peer naval conflict in a long time. even stayed on state, a north korean spire or what. we haven't seen a peer-to-peer battle with forces using everything at their disposal to advance their aims. there's some unknowns there because we don't know what people will bring up. what were seen as irregular activities. difficult to attribute difficult to defend against. as china increases, i think

cyber will become a more possible action for political pressure. were already seen what may actually occur. >> send out on the role of cyber in this. >> there was much speculation that this might because by the cyber attack on there is no evidence is that happened. it's one possible scenario. we have to prepare. then i have them anywhere in the

east china sea. it's something we have to do better. >> picking up that point that you just mentioned i agree there is gps spoofing involved there is no guarantee that something might happen elsewhere. i don't know if you seeing in animated version, the container vessel was moving steadily at a slow speed and this was cutting into the pathway of the container. it looked really strange. of course the investigation is still ongoing and cyber attacks

are difficult in any case. it's not necessarily the first of an attack. it could become a tool for attacking taiwan one of several that would be with the hybrid methods. we know from chinese that they approve what putin did in crimea. we should do the same thing in taiwan and we would succeed just like putin did. because they would realize what's going on i would not have time to react.

this is the reasoning. so in my view cyber is definitely something that needs to be watch in artificial intelligence needs to be watched. >> one thing that will talk about comes in an increasing -- on the cyber expert stealing of secrets is not in the convention state of what we think of security. this is specifically to be deployed into a region is not

ships crashing in the night type thing but it's an important aspect. we also believe in rule space and we have three. wait for the microphone before you ask questions. we'll go to the back.

>> this is about japan in the south china sea. [inaudible] are they not happy that japan is there think that it's desirable that japan showing or what if japan does not join it? >> japanese government has already stated that they will never conduct the freedom of navigation.

some would like to pancit join in some are little conscious about it. that may trigger the possible japan china in the south china sea. during the operation this should be appropriate way. if the situation in the south china sea becomes -- then not only japan but other nations may have to consider taking a stand. >> i cannot speak to the americans perspective but i'm sure that some feel like they

should be doing it. and others would be sympathetic to why they wouldn't concerned it could trigger something else it might have more downside than upside. i'm sure the u.s. and a quit and a segment of policymaking community would welcome allies to participate. one who understands the region they also appreciate the reasons some countries do with decision-making as i said earlier, my bigger question is if they did what it have a big difference? how does it change? it doesn't demilitarized the island doesn't change vietnam's decision or the degree to which

indonesia -- it's an important action but my question is what effect does it actually have on the region? i think the downside outweighs the upside. >> can we look at what a chinese reaction would be? >> very negative reaction. it would probably increase pressure on the islands to retaliate. it might not be very good as it would draw more resources. i'm not sure that's a good idea given the domestic political climate in japan. it also might not be something they would support. it be an opportunity for china so i'm not sure whether this

would be a win situation. however it might be possible to not just do it but may be better at option because the shift that china would find negative and try to remedy somehow maybe not cost japan so much so maybe sometimes it's better not to do something but signal a shift in thinking. >> a more important is what japan is doing a maritime cooperation.

there be a far more important action that might change decision-making in the region. it's not the action itself. >> my comment or question is about the proportional system. [inaudible] had to find the prices a problem. my idea, how about this if we

can visit taiwan when the government because we need to talk about taiwan and they are part of the territory so i'm radical but as long as the idea about this is my question or comment thank you very much. >> it depends on what can ship you sent to taiwan. coast guard ship.

the u.s. government the trump administration is not considering naval worship to taiwan and there's a strong reaction to beijing. we expect more harsh criticism that's one thing. but i think we can take more indirect way to engage with taiwan. in 2013 the agreement with taiwan, i think that was very effective approach we would take it could send a political signal to beijing so rather than make it for taiwan i think we can find a more indirect approach

with taiwan. that would be my answer. >> thank you. i could not look at morris in this is indicative of problems around the debate, last friday, the day we had the announcement we also did the third -- in the year. we have a giant underscoring of our asian partners of how good were doing. what are the tools that we should be doing that can bring pressure on the chinese. if in ten years no one else can operate and that's a win for

beijing. >> it's a complex thing on the response would need to be calibrated to each country. i go back to the old saying of politics is domestic. if you look at the modernization of the arms race domestic factors are more important. you can point to ship building and say that australia is in an arms race really have to sustain the industry. it had more to do with domestic and political support by maintaining jobs in certain

regions. the bigger the debate they have to do with the industry side of things. i think that's true in most of the countries if you look around the region. look at vietnam, obviously visiting vietnam shows the countries there want them to be engaged and be a part of the solution of the issue. but when it comes down to it the question is, to what degree to make a symbolic action which may be hollow. or to take an action that may be less savory but has economic implications.

we need to look at why they're canceling. is it because they're worried about the investment and is at something we can do? can we fill that void so we don't have to rely on china for that the second individual cases and say what is driving decision-making and we want to provide them a critical -- to change their decision-making? frankly we'd all be out of a job so here's a list of things. i think we need to take a harder look at understanding what's driving that decision-making. what could we provide to make sure our partners are able to make decisions they want to make income comfortable with.

>> i think the u.s. now faces a dilemma on one hand you have to do it but as you do it, china will justify and the difference between between 2017 and 18 is that u.s. no longer confronts but in any case the defense ministry announces that u.s. collected and they have to take defense measures. so you have to continue the we have to be realistic that we

cannot change china's behavior. what is needed is a red line in the south china sea. although the obama redline and syria fail the red line was -- in china didn't do it. and the administration was quite clear on it. today, there is no redline in the south china sea. perhaps the u.s. and allies need to discuss what should be the redline we have to discuss if china crosses that what should be our collective response.

>> i think for it not to have such a dramatic x effect for stopping it but perhaps that's not really an option. i sometimes wonder about the real purpose and apart from just demonstrating it in some cases you look at timing and location i think they could be there for surveillance on the chinese activity. when the last in july 2017 fail there is the freedom of navigation operation very near that tracks these lunches.

the ship may have been there to gather data from the launch, this is also an aspect nudges the signaling and symbol behind it. i we keep them up because nobody else can do them even one british ship every blue moon won't make much of a difference. >> not that we should into a but should be part of conversation. another metric is how much capability the country buys from china. we talked about how that shows syndication with china. could just be cheaper. you need to look at decision-making in each case.

or the restrictions that we need to look at as an alternative. either it will be more expensive or for investing in this responsibility. >> we have time for one more question. >> hello i'm jeanette. i' that basically the same situation from his point of view aggression is linked through history and should be russia territory again so that was the reasoning. >> this is maybe one of the parallels he is seeing. there's a crucial difference he does not mention a proportion of

the population in favor many people in crimea actually helping with the evasion attend. lots of military people even took part in it. the situation in taiwan is different. so it is a crucial difference. but from the point of view of what the western reaction would be there is a parallel. from the western point of view crimea was not worth fighting for in the broader sense. and from his point of view the same would apply to taiwan. of course i hope this is not true in the western countries would not see taiwan similarly to crimea.

i studied on taiwan. so i consider that a very important country. the reason some of these strategists and cases may look similar. the western countries by doing nothing about crimea until it was too late maybe even contributing to the situation by acting not consistent we have signaled maybe there's a chance for china to do similar things and get away with it. if you're interested in the article is in chinese i can give you the article. this is what i was saying not that i was agreeing only i was reporting what i read.

>> i think it's a highly problematic for many reasons. there's an important element in that countries learn from other regions. but that's not what it is, countries observe actions of other countries elsewhere and i think that's the point that our actions in syria and libya and western europe are being observed and lessons are being learned. al qaeda delivered their plan in part because of the understanding or reading it up serves and learns lessons on what that meant from atkins developed a plan based on that. if we think china is not

watching and learning western and if we think that rush is not observing in the south china sea that's why the counsel believes in the importance of a network of u.s. alliances around the world been involved in supporting rules -based orders particularly for that reason. countries will learn lessons based on that. >> thank you to our panelists for a fascinating conversation. please turn me in thanking them. [applause] thank you for coming.

[inaudible] [inaudible] >> next week, facebook ceo will testify before the senate and house committee on the user information data privacy. tuesday at 2:15 p.m. eastern on c-span three. in a joint hearing and wednesday at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span three before the house energy and commerce committee. watch as c-span or on the free c-span radio app.

>> book tv, television for serious readers. >> tonight, recent books about politics. first former white house official talks about his book, damage democracy followed by the rise of populism in the u.s. after 11:00 p.m. we look at the future of the republican party and the influence of newt gingrich. that's followed by opting out of congress. the book broken takes a look at the state of the u.s. senate.

>> welcome. i have the honor of serving as the jonathan director of the roosevelt house of public policy institute. it's a pleasure to welcome you. were thrilled that you joined us impact the house tonight.