unexpected. you can't predict this event will ignite and this will not. perhaps you don't understand it. but in a broader sense it's injustice. >> inequality. like this unbelievable deep sense of like lack of fairness and, of course, stagnation, economic stagnation of lack of jobs that it's really hard for people and you can write on those topics really well. .. >> i wonder if a question to

both of you, if you could dig down a little deeper into the kind of polling, obviously, we had the election, but, i think digging into what you alluded to-- >> now we take you to a live event in washington d.c., the peace foundation usa is taking place there, focusing on their u.s.-japan relations, north korea's nuclear program and security challenges in asia as part of their annual security forum. >> annual conference that they host every year in the united states on u.s.-japan security relations. today, our theme is deepening ties while confronting new challenges. and we very much hope that today will be a wonderful opportunity to assess the state of the u.s.-japan security alliance, but also to look at some of the challenges we face in the future and to assess how we might continue to strengthen our security alliance.

before we start, and before i introduce our keynote speaker, recognize three special guests, coming from tokyo, mr. tanaka. [applause] >> and also from the peace foundation usa president and executive director. [applaus [applause] >> and i wanted to recognize former secretary of agriculture, dan glickman who has done a wonderful job promoting congressional exchanges, i believe he's somewhere in the audience, too. [applause] >> and finally before we introduce the keynote speaker. for those of you tweeting we have a twitter handle #usjapansecurity. if you're tweeting about the events.

and i'd like to introduce the ambassador, ambassador extraordinary and plententiary. he has a long career in the foreign minister over 40 years and i think many of you have his bio and i'm not going to read everything he did because that would take a half hour. let me mention he has extraordinary expertise on a wide range of issues. he's served his country in seoul, in washington, in cairo, on middle east, u.s.-japan security and united nations issues. he served for many years as director general for asia where he was responsible for japan's relationships with china, north and south korea. and most recently, he was vice minister, foreign affairs at the foreign ministry prior to coming to this assignment. if you could join me giving a

welcome welcome >> everybody gathering here on this morning and ladies and gentlemen, well, jim, thank you very much indeed for your nice introduction about myself. jim and i spend quite a number of times, to begin with, i think i can tell you that among these times that we share, a really unforgettable moment was march 11th, really, the time that we had catastrophe and jim and i were discussing something

i can't discuss with you because that still is something we wouldn't be able to make it open. you know, no more so than things between the u.s. and japan kind of behind the scene secret talks, by the way. at the time i was, i think for asia and he was dcm deputy chief of mission in the u.s. embassy, but anyway, then after that was something did manage to see pm or something. we are just taken aback by the huge earthquake being felt, even in tokyo. so we stopped talking about what we did behind the scenes and then, and that is what started everything. so, i'm not here to tell you what was all about the operation and something that you guys helped us a lot, then

ambassador and the people like him, dcm and others. today i'm being asked by jim and others that i have to speak up something about u.s.-japan or something about what is going on in my region. i'm honored to be here following in the footsteps of t the-- my prime minister who gave a keynote speech, i think that was a few years ago or something. i was with him in my previous capacity. i think that was the time when i was deputy foreign minister or something. but i remembered that event very clearly. and i happened to know the top of the whole foundation.

i try to see him from time to time to be given some of his-- what's going on and books, which i have read, written by him. so, he has become a great partner for us in strengthening the foundation for the alliance and we're greatful to you and the whole team and jim is the ambassador and so thank you very much, and all of you gathered here this morning. it's only been a little over just a month since i became new envoy to the united states of america, being sent by my government. my wife and i have been warmly welcomed. indeed, i feeling the warmth you've given to us is really tremendous. and by people from all walks of

life and from u.s. friends and colleagues old and new. on my second day in washington d.c. i made my debut speech from the podium at the theater, the national cherry blossoms festival this year, which just ended just one week ago or something. you have no idea how many cherry blossom events there actually are. [laughter] >> it's really, really something astounding. i was-- as i am going to mention, i have been stationed in washington d.c. some 30 years ago diplomate in the general section or something, and yes, indeed, there were all of the cherry blossom festivities there at that time, i think i was working for the ambassador

or these people, but i think i can assure you that now that cherry blossoms festivities seemed that much going on, i didn't realize until i came here as a new envoy to the united states of america. it is really, really amazing and i'm very much stunned. another thing is that that was only on my thrd day on the job i was given to be received by your president, president trump to present my letter of credential which really, i'm told, is almost record time. you know, if you live in the world of diplomatic people and

dos, foreign services, somebody, it might take-- well, it normally takes two months or three months and some place in the kingdoms might take just one year or something so, mind you, that that was only third working day when i would be also given the privilege to see your president ahead of state to present letter, credential and the prime minister and foreign minister and that was again, a really astounding record. and then i headed to the states for preparation of meeting leaders in palm beach, mar-a-lago for the defense minister as well as deputy prime minister, finance minister. eager to start connecting beyond the beltway, i also did

a west coast tour visiting japanese-americans leaders and the national japanese-american museum in los angeles and going to go to join another cherry blossom festival in san francisco. therefore, i know road twice in nice open car, one was a 1948 really good gigantic american made open car here in washington d.c. in eastern side of this country and then newly made gorgeous convertible ford in san francisco so i think i can claim to you that i did twice, both in eastern side as well as western side ride in open car to say hello everybody in the coast of the cherry blossom festivities. somewhere in there i went to richmond to meet the governor

and to meet i.t. governor as well as their first ladies. and i also went to fredericksburg, texas for the rededication of the japanese peace garden at the national museum of the pacific war. i came back from d.c. just only two or three days ago, i only just stayed overnight there, but so i've been rather so busy going to see many people, not inside beltway, but outside from west to east and texas. of course, this is also the united states of america, i've never been all of the 50 states, but i am about to sooner or later. i'm convinced that the important function on the part of the envoy from japan to the

states. the point i'm leading up to, however, is that while still in japan i would say the u.s. relationship has never been better. imagine my great relief when they actually turned out to be i found out indeed that to be the case after i just came to washington just over a month ago or something. and after everything i did everywhere i went, the first months, i am happy to report, really, the relations have never been better. let me begin by talking a bit about some areas of common concern that came up during the recent meeting between president trump and my prime minister abe in mar-a-lago. generally, let me say that that the mar-a-lago meeting had a very good atmosphere to it. our leaders played, of course,

golf again and even had a cheeseburger to bite. i don't know whether you could call it cheeseburger diplomacy rather than golf diplomacy, but they spend a long time, seven hours or something, had a very, very good, indepth discussions of which i think i was involved. of course, i wasn't involved in their discussions it at the time, two leaders and their first ladies had nice dinner alone by themselves. only with interpreters and of course, i was not able to join when they played golf on the cart and on the green, but otherwise i think i was there with my prime minister so i think i can be in a position to tell how rich and how really

spontaneous and how their friendship evolved based upon all the relations between the two leaders. when the president was in japan in november, i was still vice minister of bureaucracy there was photos in the paper of him giving the prime minister a fist bump. i think that might be a good analogy of their relationship, a reflection of the trust and commonalty they have developed over the last year and a half. we believe the relation is positive and really, really productive. one example is the president trump affirmed that he would urge kim jong-un for prompt release of japanese abductees. you saw that joint press conference immediately after the mar-a-lago meeting, i think

the first evening, or on the second evening after working lunch or something. that was your president, donald trump, the president, saying at the outset that he should stand ready to do what he can do to urge north korean leader kim jong-un to release these abductees and my prime minister only natural felt very much thankful and he felt a deep kind of friendship and bond from the u.s. president. this is very important to us and so many people in this country don't understand how deeply the issue runs in japan,

but i do believe by that presidential statement, the understanding seems to become much deeper. but imagine the american citizens abducted from beaches in maine, oregon or kidnapped from their homeland, that would your people feel exactly what is happening. oh, by the way, yesterday and just before i came here, i was with the education science minister and today i'm going to host a dinner for minister who is in charge of the issue, together with the abductee families and their support -- now, two leaders i was about to say strongly agree that japan and the u.s. continued to be free and aligned on everything concerning north korea, which

seems to be the most immediate question now. we are in complete agreement in sync on maintaining the pressure against north korea and not rewarding them just because they accepted talks. my prime minister has been saying repeatedly that we have no intention to be engained in talks for the sake of talks. talks must be necessary indeed, but talks not to be done in such a way to achieve something that we must achieve. and you know, this includes keeping the pressure on to dismantle all of their weapons of mass destruction. i repeat, all of their weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological. and also, all ranges of ballistic missiles. i repeat, all ranges of

ballistic missiles, not only icbm type, or ilbm type, but by including all from short, medium and long. we would like to see the possible u.s.-north korean summit meeting be a truly historic one by resolving all these issues, such as put an emphasize on all of the weapons of mass destruction, all ranges of ballistic missiles and all of those who are somewhere in dpmk. after north korean leader met with south reason leader we saw happen a couple of days ago, i noticed that president trump tweeted that he had talked to

president moon and that he had also spoken to my prime minister abe to inform him of the ongoing negotiations. that is the way it is supposed to work. i have negotiated with the north koreans behind the scene or on the spot when i was directly involved. i once met with my opposite member and we are about to-- i mean, tentative agreement, but that was in vain. why? because after my meeting, i think na was only a fortnight or something they detonated nuke so we can't help, but to at least stop the negotiation, which was resumed after some time, but in vain. the -- i have to say that

you'll surprised how quickly surfaced, at least how it changed at least on the surface level. yet, indeed, when i was told by the prime minister that i should be heading for washington as the new envoy, maybe my prime minister and the leadership must have thought that something might happen because i was told that i should be in washington d.c. as the new enjoy by march or something, but i can assure you that no one did anticipate this much happening after the olympics and para olympics or something. so it's in that that i praise the south korean people as well as the south korean leader who is a person who has brought things up to this much. but and also tweeted last week

only time will tell. let me say a few years about alliance security which will require further-- japan for its part is at a critical juncture this year as we form a new national defense program guidelines and midterm defense planning. my prime minister abe has said the new guidelines will be based on an honest assessment of the aggravated security situation that japan finds itself in today and in my region. i see in there and on the ground, and even in new domain like space and cyber, we have ongoing cooperation between the two country's forces. i actually met with general

mattis when i met with the marine corps general and about to see everybody in these, and we are escorting u.s. air and marine assets in mission based upon the-- law which was approved some time ago, just quite recently. we are working together in missile defense. we're about to introduce the new system as soon as possible. we are conducting joint training and exercises as much as we can. given today's security challenges, the role of u.s. in japan, it's growing, it's really utmost importance for us to have it functioning. and every time i speak about such things, i try to express

my government's deep appreciation for the dedication for the security of japan and not only the security of japan, but the entire region in my theater. by the way, this is not only the foundations for the security policy of japan, but i do hope that the americans do feel that it is for your own sake for the role that the u.s. is able to play, for your own sake and for the sake of the region and for the sake of the whole, so the international community. given today's security challenges, the role of japan is really, really, important, as i said. and every time i speak, really, i try, repeat, that we are deeply for possibly u.s. and

usfj. securing the stable forces in japan is become more critical wr which is why the alliance must work even harder to reduce the impacts of those in the local communities. i repeat, on local communities. it's also critical that the development of a plan to realign the facility be implemented. i believe the abe government has proven its commitment to this plan through more than five years to work. in talking about security and alliance, let me say something about our biggest neighbor, china. as you know, china using its economic clout and military, have expanded its interest not only in east asia, but all over the world.

i told a group the other day that these islands they are building in international waters are really aircraft carriers made of sand. the bottom line for us, the alliance is to make sure that the existing world and region order be upheld. while inviting china to play a constructive role based upon the rules of international law. the vast oceans connecting asia to africa should enjoy a stable, predictable regional order with a free and open indo pacific strategy. and they will promote rule of law as i said, freedom of navigation, economic connectivity and security corporation. and we look forward to a cooperation with the u.s. and

of course, others like india and australians as well. now, foo inly let me touch on the direction of our trade relationship, which should be not something regarded as some link with security issue, but i agree that we have to see things in its totality, in-- when it comes to u.s.-japan relationships, so i don't think i can speak that side of the matter of the one coin. we believe, of course, that the u.s. should come back to tpp, and that the prime minister told the president and unfortunately, mr. president didn't say yes. i know that mr. president and the and others have been hearing us and as you might

know, at the region summit in mar-a-lago, both leaders agreed to start free, fair reciprocal trade deal talks. by the way, as you know, at the time, the president spoke up about the new kind of frame under the banner of number two's leadership, meaning deputy prime minister, and the vice-president pence, you know, one of the cabinet officers, mr. mullkay hee and they'll start to behind how, when and what we are able to find the way out between u.s. saying, very much important, the

japanese saying that tpp is the best solution. i don't know how we can find the way out, but we must and i will. we have taken careful notes and we hope through these talks we will be able to find a mutually beneficial way out i've been telling you. president trump is quite focused on jobs and last year japan was the number one foreign job creator in the united states of america. we also invested more money in the u.s. last year than any other country over 45 billion u.s. dollars. i don't want to go into details about the trade talks and trade secret or something, but let me just point out two symbolic figures. one is yes, indeed. you know, when i was stationed here some 30 years ago, something, as the first deputy

in charge of trades, two years or something, that time japan was number one. the trade to this country. always they say 50 billion, 50 billion and that was a time in kind of percentage ratio in terms of the number of sht u.s. trade deficit, our share was if my memory was correct, 50%. now, the figure is something like 68.9 billion, something like-- certainly less than 70. fortunately our place has become third exceeded bide mexicans and somebody, but i thought it was germany, but it

was not germany. but sometimes mexicans to be followed by germans. but the point which i really like to make is that yes, trade is something 70 or so. at the same time export from america by japanese made or by japan has amounted to something like 75.7 billion u.s. dollars, balance is plus 6.8 billion. i don't want to make any comparison with the numbers of what germans are doing, let alone what the chinese are doing. the numbers tell you, you can see the vast differences, i would say only germans, but if you can take a look at the numbers, in comparison to what

chinese are doing, the end result is obvious. another they think i tried to tell you this morning, yes, indeed, when i was here as a young diplomate dealing with so-called trade frictions between the two, that was a time, by the way after the deputy, the figurwilliams and t people, indeed, that was a time when we exported japan-made car as much as 3.5 million units cars, export. how much we manufactured at that time was only 620,000 units. so, slightly more than a half. had the figure is something

like one versus eight. now, take a look at the current figure. we make in the states, the companies, u.s. made by utilizing u.s. workers, by utilizing u.s. parts, the amount is slightly above 40 million. while the export number from japan as a car complete is just down 2 million. 1.74 million. so, the number shows that when i was here late 1980's, the number was 1.8. and now the number is the other

way around. 1-2-2. and yes, indeed, that does exist rather not small number, like something less than 70 billi billion, but as i told you at the time. ap i was here. the percentage ratio was something more than 50 and now the percentage ratio is something like 8.6 or so. so, i know jim is just waiting to tell me that it's time for me to wrap things up. ladies and gentlemen, i have have my first 40 days in a short speech that is harder than packing my wife up and my life up to the united states the america. i have much more to talk to you, but because of jim's here to tell me i have to finish, you can say i'm finishing for

this morning. just let me thank you for inviting me to this podium. i don't think i am the person who-- my prime minister was here at the podium a few ago or something, but i feel honored to be with you here this morning. thank you all. thanks very much indeed. [applause]. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> thank you very much. if i could ask you all to remain in your seats as we get the stage ready for our next panel on north korea. as ambassador sugiyama mentioned, we have challenges going forward and one is how do we work together to manage the challenges stemming from north korea's nuclear and missile programs and its recent diplomatic offensive.

and it's wonderful to hear the campaigns how japan and the united states leadership are working together to coordinate our position to make sure that we take advantage of the strength of our alliance to deal with these issues. so if i could ask for more one round of applause for the ambassador. >>. [applause] >> i'm sure when we invite him back in one year. and i'm told we'll get the stage set up for our next presentation. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversation [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> well, thanks, everyone, so much for being here today and we're delighted to kick off with the first panel. really glad to see you all and very glad to be with my esteemed panelists, thank you very much indeed. and i'm particularly delighted

by the topic of this morning's discussion which is called recent developments, which is really, what it had to be called because this was planned for a while and so much has happened since then. one of the sort of symbolic things that i've enjoyed seeing as i was at the dmz last year as i'm sure many of you have visited and i was subjected to that blare of music and already, the so-called propaganda music has been dismantled on saturday, the clocks are changing in pyong yang, and so we're seeing a lot of symbolic gestures and with the panel, perhaps we can discuss how real they might be and what they might be leading to, if anything at all. i have with me dr. sue mead perry who has been an analyst of the the cia, analyst on

issues and director for career on both the george w. bush and the obama administration. she's now at csis ch. and we have washington d.c. bureau chief, who is going to talk a little about how the japanese public sees the dimensions of so-called recent developments. and dr. the senior asia specialist for defense analysis who has lots of interesting things to say as well, particularly regarding the recent summit. i think we'll take each of you in order for a few minutes to layout how you see things and i'll have some questions and finally we'll throw it open it the floor at the end. please do catch my eye if you have a question. doctor. >> yes.

>> perhaps we can start by asking you if this summit with president trump is really going to happen and if so, what do we expect from it? >> oh, my god. yes, it will happen because i think both president trump and kim jong-un want to make this happen and i think that kim jong-un has shifted his tactic and see if it's a true strategy or not at least tactically and he's meet with xi jinping and now, there are a lot of questions in terms of what's going to happen beyond the fact that they're going to go to meet. when you look at the korean summit it's going to happen and as someone who grew up in south korea, who is a north korean analyst and spent my career watching north korea. when i saw the north korean

leader stepped to the south, it was emotional and moving and i grant him all this. but again, what after? there's a lot of symbolism and when you look at the piece, the document, the document that i'm sure that katie is going to talk about it, it's interesting because the order was to improve korean relations and then it was lost, kind of reverse order. when you look at the denuclearization part we don't quite have an agreement on what that means, but obviously from the u.s. perspective, denuclearization is complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament of the north korea nuclear program. but traditionally and historically north korea has always said, you know, nuclearization, we're committed to the denuclearization, if the u.s. policy has ended and so on and included south korea as a part of that.

the indication is if there's answered of your south korea alliance and end of your troops getting out of south korea and extent that the u.s. has over south korea and japan, that's the way the region feels secure so that's how we give them security, and then they will talk about denuclearization. so, again, i don't think that's clear yet. i think the south koreans are saying, yes, kim jong-un is-- but that's not clear until president trump sits down with kim jong-un and of course, there are all the past pledges and declarations, like 1972, there's 1992, 2000, 2007, so it's not overly new, i don't see anything that's-- so that's why i say there are more questions raised about what's going to happen with trump and kim summit. there are several scenarios, i could just, i think, that we can look at. i think the first scenario, obviously, is sort of the

toughest scenario, if president trump sits down with kim and sort of says, you know, this or we go home. and i think something in between. the challenge would be what happens if north korea offers something that does protect u.s. in a way that president trump can sort of come out and say, to his supporters, i accomplished something that no other predecessor was able to accomplish. so, what if north koreans offer something like a stopping the missile program, the missiles program, but not on the medium or short range missiles, and japan and south korea are not protected, but still president trump can sort of say that's-- he can still spin it as something that he was able to deliver. and then there's some-- there are sort of a lesson that a little bit of modeled outcome. now, i do think the key

question here is kim jong-un a changed man? did he wake up one day in 2017-- since he came into power six years ago, he did 90 tests, and he did nuclear tests including hyd hyd hydrogen bomb, three icbm tests last year and he said repeatedly that they have completed their nuclear program. so i think another concern is that north koreans are coming into this meeting thinking somehow they're coming into this meeting from position of strength because they have completed their program, because they've shown icbm capability and reach all over mainland united states whereas the u.s. are coming into the meeting, maybe it was maximum pressure, sanctions, all of this talk of limited strike, bloody nose. there's a different perspective

from washington and pyong yang about this meeting. i'm concerned about that and i'm concerned that kim jong-un didn't wake up one day, now i'm 95% done with my nuclear program i'm going to truly give it up. i will be shocked if that's the case, but we'll see. but my concern is that, and just going to wrap it up now, but my concern is that both parties have an incentive to meet and they will be able to walk out of the meeting and call it success. and i'm sure those most likely what's going to happen, but what would happen afterwards. and i think the important part is, also, the timeline, right? i think from washington's perspective, because there's a concern and skepticism that kim jong-un is trying to buy time or wait out the trump administration and have incentive to drag this out in a long process that our incentive is to have a more kind of expedited time frame. so if they are saying, okay, we

are serious about denuclearization, okay, when does the verification begin and when do we go into north korea, two months, three months. and it's at least successfully. whether it's long-term successfully remains to be seen. >> thank you. well, do we have an even more cynical view than that from the japanese public? >> okay. >> can i ask you to-- . [laughter] >> thank you, first of all, thank you very much for ambassadors kathleen and everyone. and it's been an honor to join the discussion with so many distinguished experts on east asia to look at these issues. but i am the only participant who is not an expert in east asia securities, but also, they asked me to share my view on the japanese public views in recent development with north

korea. so i'll provide my-- my point is i am the only person who is a citizen, which is by the north korean threat. please bear in mind that by my speech, the consent of my speech are my personal reviews and do not represent japan and it's a sensitive subject matter and might conduct in japanese. and so-- okay. sorry, okay. thank you. so according to the opinion polls conducted in april, where

asked if they expected a positive outcome of the u.s. north korean to take place and the japanese person said yes, and 44 said no. it was a poll if the international committee should emphasize dialog for pressure in order to get north korea to give up nuclear testing. in favor of 46% saying they prefer the dialog and 45% saying they prefer-- so over the expectations and the dialog, the responses outnumber the no expectation. the polls, most of the japanese public are not so much enthusiastic about the announcement, but found it more

confusing. but people were hopping hoping things would get better and watching the situation with a skeptical eye as well. and saying that a lot of problems, even made by north korea in the past 25 years have been broken and the negotiation was-- so my colleague who regularly for the japanese-korean issues expressed their concerns. one was the-- towards the south korea and moon government. and they say that north korea is too naive to conduct with-- that it's exploited by north korea, but by time, and that's by the trump organization, and the point that mr. abe took

advantage of achieving the political goals. a and-- the elections, the main reasons they were victorious, rather, of course, their parties and mr. abe's description of north korea and the nationalistic-- and -- i fear that japan would carefully observe and onlylize events. though i am not in the position to defend japanese government, i have to say that the japanese may have foreseen the development on the korean peninsula. i remember to-- last december that japanese officials had a meeting that

north korea toward dialog at 2018. so, if indeed with he can-- according to my colleague to wrote the article those who attended the meeting were not enthusiastic and seemed inditch. so homeland, a lot of things have happened, and things are changing. for now, divided between that was over and japan being left behind or we should-- north korea, japan should keep being-- and it seems that north korea is looking to fly and good view from japan. i think the argument is not a bad they think, but we have to conduct discussion on how japan would be able to contribute to the peace process and what is at risk.

of course, the most risk of failure that eventually meet conflict. the second is an agreement, for example, a disaster if the u.s. had had north korea only giving up icbm. but this would be an issue of the denukization and the-- it means not only the-- these led by north korea would continue and the power of east asia. so the third and finalisting is that the whole process and frame work of the nuclear organization would be designed only by the u.s., south korea and north korea. so if occurred. japan would be abandoned to

make financial contributions toward denuclearization, but i'm not sure that japan would willingly accept having to pay money, but not having say. so it's not easy for japanese public to accept the changes taking place because it might effect the environment including japan. what should we do to an avoid? i think there's time for japan for a different strategy if it's involved in the process and contributed. and it would be part of it concurrently with continuing pressure. so one of the ideas which is worth trying for japan is proposing a frame work such as budget talks and long-term consideration, the trump administration does not seem to be a favor of mar-a-lago due to the previous favor and the

instinct in favor of taking to one negotiation. so, japan would also make-- is japanese proactively involved and japan makes financial contribution in the area of human resource as well. japan and north korea have a joint declaration by the deputy prime minister, and kim jong-un. and there's a crucial part of normal-- and how do you get the public to accept the process and japanese political involvement. first of all, japan and south korea have a good healthy relationship, but you know, there is serious disputes of opinions regarding the past history, so both countries should not exploit history for

their own, but it's important for japan to have public discussions about the-- how you're able to take the program for prosperity and division. so we should -- there was some thinking such as denuclearization is not possible or peace will be very easy. so, japan has got to be able to engain constructtively and not just asked to pay money. that japan would lose their confidence getting through the threat over the venture naturally. so that's why i have big expectations of prime minister abe. ap based in japan, how money is naturalized is important for leaders in japan and other

asian countries. the mic. >> thank you very much. speaking of the new order, we've had the north-south korea summit and i know you watched that very closely. i wonder if you could talk a little about the significance of that and some of the other things we've seen closing down the nuclear testing site. is is this just an empty one? and she says we can ask her anything, including kim jong-un's shoe size. if someone of you is brave enough to ask you that will be later. >> i was travelling from northern to southern ireland and i wonl check the e-mail at night because wi-fi is not very good in new zealand. there are a lot of sheep and cows, but not much wi-fi. [laughter] >> and at the hotel i checked the e-mail and my most beloved

and respected colleagues and center sends me an e-mail, we have a meeting and we have a panel in north korea, would you say yes? i never say no to him. so that's the reason i'm here even though i'm jet lagged. and let me put it this way, the euphoria from south korea baseded on the survey, 70% just absolutely respect and adores president moon and they think of 60% north korea's kim will denuclearize the entire country getting rid of all the nukes. and from the u.s. mostly, including very smart and, he did the heavy lifting for me, talked about a lot of important points that skepticism is quite strong. and you watched it, you

observed it, you youtubed it and no one can regurgitate what you saw, what you read. my consideration was only five minutes, but i'll be even shorter. what's new? what's new? can you tell me? number one, of course, smile and charm diplomacy from north korea, now the south korean youngsters started creating the fan club of kim jong-un, can you imagine? and said, is he changed from like a prior to april and post-april he's a new man, do you believe that? it's not happening very frequently unless you have a life threatening experience....

ever since he came to the political stage, two policies, military advancement including achievement, by nukes and missile development, and then economy development. so side-by-side we go together. they dumped it. now they say we achieved the goals. now we have a one policy, one strategy. that is economic reconstruction. lastly, so-called new changes, moonshine government. do you know the meaning of

moonshine? the so-called reconciliation dialogue embracing between two koreas, the moonshine was sunshine policy. and sunshine policy successful for mr. moon and koreans are very good in making statement and is now called moonshine policy. actions of moonshine more than sunshine, but nonetheless the moonshine policy is not receptive to north korea strategy here it is great new change because prior before the present moon, they were strong against north korea. what's not new? north korea's multiple threat including nukes has not changed at all.

nukes, missiles, chemical, biochemical convention, cyber. nobody talks about cyber because cyber is kind of strange creature. because it's there but you don't really actually contact. you will not believe it, money is gone from your bank, your entire account is gone. why we don't know much about it, because bankers investment of all these people keep their mouth shut. and so what's not new? north korea declared in the third committee meeting of the seventh, in april before the summit, that we now achieve and we now own the treasure, powerful pressure, what he said. with our new country. now, another important point, he

secured security concern. have you seen that 12 guys running next to the mercedes-benz? i think that's most eye capturing moment of the entity and reality and essence of north korea. my god, the large guy sitting in the cushy cushion in the mercedes-benz, that car cost more than $1 million from germany special order, right? and 12 guys running. security control and concern will be paramount. because of that in the priest meeting at april 24, they declared security control, social control will be over all much more present unenhanced. north korea has not changed. lastly, this is maybe the most important point for you to think about, whether nuclear negotiation is the only solution to get rid of all these

problems. i will just give you a can't. last change of north korea is there. erosion of north korean society continues, erosion. that is, growth of illegal capitalism and activities, including military elites, and corruption. to think soviet union ruined because of start talks and because of arms confrontation against the united states? give me a break. was not the case. social erosion and corruption. today with bribery you can take out the person in the gulags for $50,000, you can take him out. so the social erosion is continuing. so i'm just hinting to you teresa interesting question, that's all -- to raise.

>> who would like to ask a question when the come to that, quick show of hands. great, thank you. you've met north koreans before and just met north koreans recently, and we obviously detect from you quite a degree of cynicism. what can you tell us about your meetings, your recent meetings with north koreans, , the way ty are trying to convince you? and how you are assessing what they are telling you. >> actually their behavior is different. there is something, a change. first of all i since north koreans themselves the role of

officials, they are not in the loop. they haven't got to the talking points. a lot of it is being to site by kim jong-un. like here, too it was really president trump and pompeo and the intelligence that it just been doing the negotiation. so they don't know quite what to make of this to situation because six months of whatever they told me never ever we will never give up. this is desperate now don't like what's my talking point? this is very confusing. it's hard to go by that. i do think can jump on is very shrewd, very astute, very smart. i think it's better not to underestimate him. and you think is not going to necessarily come here and blow up this summer. he's not. not come here but meet with president trump. he has an agenda. when you see he has turned to diplomacy after years of provocation, he's doing an amazing job. look at is in terms of image makeover. it was 100%. it was so good the world

outreach, sending the children. just the way it was conducted. look at his meeting with xi jinping. with this modern attractive white. looking like a normal leader, having normal summit. having this whole image makeover. he's on a path. what i'm afraid of is it's easy when north korea ask bad because then it's easy for us tonight and have a response. it's hard when north korea -- i believe they're going to come to a summit prepared to give up something. or even blow up something, dismantle something. it's going to get i think more complicated and more confusing editing it requires deft policy,

use policy and we need to decide in advance what are we, what is it ultimate goal works. his 60 confetti% solution good enough? knowing the probably north korea is not going to really do it but is a good enough to take us to some -- disturbance the weather were just a couple months ago when speed is the administration is very aware of those choices. where do you think they are? >> i'm not sure. i'm not sure what they decided. i think maybe they are leaning towards, because i do think president trump rudy wants to walk out of his meeting and call it a success. so if there's two parties that really are incentivized to other successful meeting, they will. again, part of my earlier point, whether that's a long-term success -- >> but you could have success just on a handshake and a foot

above what you're talking about is -- >> more than that. >> 60% is a real shift. do you think the administration is considering privately saying that's okay, we can make steps, we don't actually need complete a reversible verifiable denuclearization? >> i would be the last person to speak for president trump, what he's thinking. i really am. i truly don't know. some of this, it does concern me, like whether he said or not that that would be okay to pull out troops from u.s. -- south korea. i think it's hard to say what president trump will multiply do when he sits down with kim jong-un. >> what i'm saying is kim jong-un will come to meeting and prepared to offer up something that would appear to be good. i think we need to be prepared for the possibility.

i seen the last of months have shown me that this guy is very astute. and by the way north koreans have been completely focus on us, united states. it's 100% policy why we're divided think about million different things. i think we need to be prepared for that possibility. grand bargain or some sort that north could offer and what we do in response. >> let's do an easier question and let president trump -- >> there's no easy question when it comes to north korea. >> let president trump speak in his own words. yesterday he tweeted, it's always good to be aware of his tweets, but this one said numerous countries are being considered for the beating, capital letters, but would peace have freedom house on the board of north and south korea be a more representative, and lasting site of a third country just asking, escalation market. now, who is he asking? is asking the american public? is he asking cam?

where are we on what is a a meeting could be? >> my money is on -- he's been watching tv and he so happy with the korea some and look good to him. his comment, it has symbolism in random country like singapore. places like switching in sweden, there is an ancient north koreans don't have a plane that can reliably fly long distance. they do have a pilot at flight longus in. think about it, kim jong-un has never flew. there are actual logistical concerns that kim jong-un feel comfortable. what i i mean is when you're st of, do you want to fly a plane? there's issue with going to longer distance. i do think i understand it's down to now singapore and with pushing singapore, the

officials, , administration officials are pressing for singapore because we think the u.s. thinks we're giving north korea too much to even do it at dmz but understand president trump is leaned towards dmz on the first tweet. >> originally we were told there were five locations. what were those five? >> switzerland sweden mongolia singapore, dmz, even south korea, even vietnam, how do i think was considered. >> great. >> that was an easy question. >> katie, what you think, in the summit the phrase was a nuclear free korean peninsula and what does it imply that south korea has to give up, that the u.s. has to give up in terms of the alliance, extended deterrence? what does it mean that they've agreed that, as opposed to north korea's denuclearization? >> do i have to use this?

maybe my microphone was broken. anyway, i always try to learn something from north korea and specialist board in north korea, lived there and maybe worked there and there are a bunch of them, including the former -- who was actually ordered to keep his mouth shut during the peace summit that was going on. and there are also a lot of strategic good thinkers out of the 25,000 north koreans, some, some of them in canada, , some f them in london, some of them in copenhagen. and i been in contact with them, and they all came out and sent me actually nice document saying that north korea's so-called in korean word -- [inaudible] no nuclearization or

denuclearization, means specific meaning. that is, we are nuclear power and all nuclear powers will do the same thing, means give up or clean up, and we will be part of it. so that is most amazing consensus among these people, and basically south koreans just in such euphoria. by the way, i had to sit a little bit about south korean politics, just two seconds. the current south korea is not unified solidarity country. it is divided by the two different ideological groups. i'm talking about the really ideological division. that is, more globalized, speaking english, love the western civilization, and tried to be part of oecd or global

culture. the other side is about we are the branch of the great source of confucian civilization which is the china. so we're kind of like part of china. we don't like japanese. we don't like any english speaking handsome man or woman trained in overseas, and we don't like americans. we like north koreans better because they are my brothers and sisters. out of this to ideological divisions between south and south couplet, the current government is the latter one, the pro-china, north korea, and maybe a don't say much but they are very anti-american and anti-whatever western association and culture. so when they accepted the north korean denuclearization, they never asked what's the meaning of it.

so that is basically back in line. north korea kim jong-un, as sue said anybody said, strategic about what to achieve when he meets trump. maybe not on the first meeting but at least his team working as a solidarity for the day and night, and they came up with some itemized points. number one, mr. t and they come to understand the denuclearization? i hope president will answer very prudently and very nicely. and number two, when you get rid of all the nukes, possible aircraft from guam or japan or okinawa, whatever, all strategic assets flowing, flying to korea, if you get rid of them, yes, we will be very happy to go in tandem with you.

and will you guarantee our peaceful existence forever? and guarantee the survival and longevity of north korean regime? and if you like it, please get out of korea. that's north korea's long complaint as indicated. so very unfortunately i found to be a very bad woman who is representative of skepticism, this is not ideology. this is based on how much you know, how much you are really, really pragmatic. >> how big a deal is the future of the 28,500 u.s. troops? we've seen a bit of disagreement played out in public among south korean racing officials about whether it immediately implies then staying or going. is this going to be a key part

of the debate and future months, and do they stay or go? >> well, as sue and everybody said, kim is well-trained. nobody can rule a country more close to seven decades without much trouble than kim, dna. he's like good dna. got a lot of training. basically it's really sitting there with his strengths and -- what was the question? >> the troops. >> i am on jet lag right now. now the u.s.-korea relationship, i've been working for rand corporation and defense institution, my middle name is defense, you know? i'm not really of military expert but i do know a lot about alliance. and one time i did u.s. alliance

rejuvenation task with prominent scholars in d.c. at the time even though it was about several years ago, basically our conclusion is that it's like a long married life. romance is out, children are all grown up, the old man, old woman. i mean, there is no sparkle, just marriage of convenience. i put it this way because there is a lot of sour skepticism towards americans, and americans are also frustrated with the koreans. i give you one very sad example. when the missiles were developing and south koreans nervous about it, and japan very wisely join the missile-defense program with the u.s., south korea, no, no, no, we are okay. but then when the missile testing continues, they finally decide to allow americans to

deploy the fat system, high altitude special system that has a battery-powered back and look at chinese territory. thaad system. that is now deployed. there are about 250 american military specialists, basically working around the thaad in a town, very famous. so although sweet melon guys are protesting. they are the house prisoner because of anti-americanism and demonstrations against the american, and thaad are so fierce. they've been eating the ration food and can come if there deployed in the kandahar in afghanistan taliban fighting places. this is ally, right next.

>> let me -- >> 28,000 is at the kind of momentum of either staying or going away. >> let me throw this. i love the marriage and the 20,500 troops. i don't know if that's the wedding ring of what could happen -- tony blair and visible have a lot of spark. i will not say all is lost. 28,500 vital thing kim jong-un -- again, i think he's going to be very, very savvy about this. he knows this is effective topic. he's going to talk about normalization, relations in return, all sounds good did you set it up. do you think it will come up later because when have normalization, this stuff comes up naturally because the rationale behind it it will eventually erode, even if it's not right away. i would say no, i'm talking a a normalizing relations with the united states.

i do think when you to give him more credit that he does not come in an act totally idiotic. >> what are the steps that north and south take in the process of this extra day prospect of reconciliation, reintegration of the comic one country again? is that really what is on the cards, and how long does that take? >> if the current moon government continues to retain the power and the kim jong-un b hayes politely with a lot of smile -- behaves -- a president messing up the situation only holding the nuclear card, the koreans would be much more toward korean solidarity, , and emma as between you and me, let's resource and try to follow the steps that was prepared by this court korean government for the long-term implication.

means that i wanted to retire but i think basically use a lot of drama evolving in killing young and washington, d.c. i'm going to open up the floor interest moment. want to ask a very big regional question. if any of these proceeds what is the application for the idea that there would be a united korean block that is ally to the u.s. and where would that leave china? and what we japan make of that? >> actually, i think the united -- [inaudible] i have concerns about japanese

public opinion that anyway -- [inaudible] feeling, emotion, but also your strong view of nationalism. in japan they are feeling we also have history that destroyed the country in 20th century. if you have -- but still having trouble, that could be -- making, , the public will be nervous on that. the question earlier about the charter. in the long-term, japan, our

concern is the rise of china. so lots of direction is going to take the policies you've got for the china. [inaudible] >> thank you. >> i think there's a microphone running around. >> report from voice of america. i have a question for doctor terry. you just mentioned that both kim and president trump had incentive to claim the summit successful saunters wonder, would you elaborate on that? what if a successful summit would be like, and use any risk of that? thank you. >> well, as long as it doesn't blowup been president trump says this didn't go well, it'll be a and going to walk out.

if he doesn't do that and they have today's meetings and do have some sort of joint statement, so very minimal some grand statement about north korea is going to pursue denuclearization and for normalization. all sounds great. what about the details? how do we get there? that will come later. for now we have agreed to have this kind of joint declaration. not so different from the inter-korean inter-korean summit declaration, right, that all sounds great. it's all into details. has to be worked out. up. initially, that's why say initially they can both turn it around and say, look, i was able, we were able to meet each other and agree on some general principles, and it's successful. it is certainly more than what my predecessor was able to accomplish, the first u.s. city president will meet with a north korean leader.

>> i'm an intelligence analyst and a former diplomat. [inaudible] -- will never be denuclearized. there is, of course, and weapon of mass destruction far more destructive than biological, chemical or nuclear, and that is the prison camps. the very prison camps are all nuclear technology can be moved without fear of inspection. if we are not leading this charge against the most lethal weapon in korea, what's the point? is our mentor neville chamberlain? what's going on here? >> that was a statement. >> all right. i think your image in a very important point, what's the point, and a lot of things we're

actually missing. as i said, i didn't elaborate very much but basically north korea is the same as before, other than diplomacy, smiley diplomacy. they have prisoners but we never know. and then sean young is a different republican of part of korea, , having the same miserae life -- pyongyang. all this nuke, nuke, newcomb. nobody is asking a series question to me but i said social erosion, option, illegal activities and creating the foundation may be fundamental changes. i've been are you for the last 30 years information in truth will make them free but nobody

listens. >> independent consultant. i director this question to sue me or perhaps i should say dr. sue. i'm try to get some insight into the thinking of a north korean analytic people. i've heard so many times the statement, we're familiar with the kim from the playbook. didn't all this happened back in the \90{l1}s{l0}\'90{l1}s{l0}? what of these agreements made? for enough. but it would seem to me, is anybody in that committee thinking wait a a minute, thiss not 1992. china is 25 years ahead of what they were back then. so make things have changed. i can easily see argument in the community saying look, kim is a young guy, he's aware of what's going on around the world. he sees a certain world leader saying the first country that masters and i will take over the world. why will i be seen on a pile of nukes which is totally useless,

therefore, is a by thinking along these lines? >> there's active debates. the playbook is very simple. north koreans have learned a lesson. that's even for kim jong-un. it pays to provoke but pace in more to placate afterwards. but there is that debate but even if kim jong-un is a special kind said we are tired and no escaping the wind of 98 ranked economy in the world. i want to bring korea to modern world. he seems to be different from his father. he tends to like modern things. so we see that at the pub is as he pursues this path he's going to run into the same challenges his father has faced. what were going to do about human rights? what we're going to do but information getting into north korea? the danger for the north korean regime is they open up our something moves on with the united states. it's going to come like a tsunami. maybe it's that right away but eventually what about human rights? what about political prison

camps? this transformational leader that will really take north korea and that means they may have to give up succession for north korea. you see that guy? nobody knows. we can make a guess. >> the gentleman in the corner. >> david lowden, a policy analyst. my mind tends to work in abstracts and the comment about the prisoner camps and so forth can of diced into my question, which is threat factors sometimes they can be hidden under the surface. so in my mind i'm thinking about is there a presence or an ongoing or unlikely potential

for north korea to develop a tolls like china has done and then to weaponizing those which could be used as a offshore of the peninsula to either exert influence, disrupt trade, et cetera? i be interested in your thoughts on that, please. >> do you have a sense of that? the question was if i understand correctly, might north korea develop an weaponized a tolls in the same way that -- >> what? >> a tolls in the same the south china sea has been built up and turned to mildred basis. is that -- >> north korea has enough. >> one thing south korea north korea agreed in the declaration, but there's unspoken part which we don't have a fulltext is that the west coast where there were

neighbors skirmishes happen, there are a lot of small islands just like already exist natural atolls, are there. now it's included and basically water, air, ground, all the confrontational manners and behaviors should change. so there could be an interesting deploy of our post, but not like china. because north korea kim has a focus in word to make every angry elites and people to be satisfied with the economic development. >> thank you so much, everyone. we are out of time but wataru, katie and sue, thank you so much for being on this panel. [applause] >> you get to speak again after the summit. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> this fors and asian securityn a short break on another panel of speakers gets set up. while we wait for that about ten minutes we will show you some of the speakers from earlier today at the forum. >> it's only been a little over a month since i became envoy tonight states of america being sent by my government. my wife and i have been warmly welcomed. indeed, i am feeling the warmth

you have given to us, it's really tremendous. from people from all walks of life and from u.s. friends and colleagues, old and new. on my second day in washington, d.c. i made my debut speech from the podium at the warner theatre at the national cherry blossom festival this year which was one week ago or something. you have no idea how many cherry blossom events there actually are. it's really, really something astounding. i will, as i was going, i'm going to mention, i i happen to have been stationed here in washington, d.c. some 30 years ago, something -- yes, indeed

there were all the cherry blossoms festivities there at that time. i think i was working for the ambassador, but i think i can assure you that now cherry blossoms seems that much growing up which i did realize until i came here as a new envoy. it is really, really amazing and i'm very much stunned. another thing is that was only on my third working day on the job, i was given the privilege to be received by your president, president trump, to present my letter of credential which really i'm told is almost

record time. you know, if you -- it might take, well, normally takes two months or three months, and someplace in the kingdoms might take just one year or something. so mind you, that was only third working day when i was given the privilege to see your president ahead of state to present that credential being given and mr. prime minister and mr. foreign minister, so that was really, really, again, outstanding record. then i headed to states for preparation at meetings with leaders in palm beach,

mar-a-lago, followed by the defense ministers visit as well as deputy prime minister visit, finance minister. eager to start connecting beyond the beltway, i also did a west coast to worth visiting japanese-american and the national japanese-american leaders in los angeles and going to go to join another cherry blossom festival in san francisco. therefore, i now rode twice in nice open car. one was a 1948 really, really good, gigantic american-made open car here in washington, d.c. in eastern side of this country, then newly made gorgeous convertible ford in san francisco. so i think i can claim to you that i did twice, both in eastern side as well as western

side ride in open car to say hello to everybody in the coast of the cherry blossom festivities. somewhere in there i went to richmond to meet virginia governor and to meet its governor as well as their first ladies. and also went to fredericksburg, texas, or the rededication of the japanese peace garden at the national museum of the pacific war. i came back from d.c. just under two or three days ago, just it overnight there, but so i've been rather so busy going to see many people, not inside that way but outside from west to east and texas. of course this is after all the united states of america. i've never been to all of the 50

states but i'm about to come sooner than later. i'm convinced of the important function on the public envoy from japan to the states. the point i'm leading up to, however, is that while still in japan i would often say u.s. relationship has never been better. imagine my great relief when this actually turned out to be true. i found out indeed that, found out that to be the case just after he came to washington just over a month ago or something. after everything i did, everywhere i went these first months, i am happy to report really that relations have never been better. let me begin by talking a bit about some areas of common concern that came up during the recent meeting between president

trump and my prime minister abe in mar-a-lago. generally let me say that the mar-a-lago meeting had a very good atmosphere to it. our leaders played of course golf again, and even had a cheeseburger to bite. i don't know whether you could call it cheeseburger diplomacy rather than golf diplomacy, but they spent a long time i think altogether seven hours of something together and had a very, very good and in-depth discussions about which i think i was involved. of course i wasn't not only involved in their discussions at the time, the two leaders and their first ladies had nice dinner alone by themselves, only with the interpreters here and, of course, i was not able to join when they played golf on

the cart, on the green. but otherwise i i was a with my prime minister, so i think i can be in a position to tell how rich and how really spontaneous and how their friendships evolved based upon the relations between the two leaders. when the president was in japan in november, i was still vice minister of the bureaucracy. there was a photo in a paper of him giving the prime minister a fist bump. i think that might be a good analogy for the relationship, a reflection of the trust and commonality they have developed over the last year and a half. we believe the relation is positive and really, really productive. one example is president trump

affirmed that he would urge kim jong-un for prompt release of japanese abductees. you saw that kind of joint press conference immediately after the mar-a-lago meeting, i think the first evening, or on the second evening after working lunch or something. that was your president, donald trump, mr. president, started to say at the outset that he should stand ready to do what he can do to purge north korean leader kim jong-un to release these abductees here and my prime minister, it was only natural, felt very much thankful, and he felt a deep kind of friendship and bond from the u.s. president.

[inaudible conversations] >> ladies and gentlemen, please take your seats. we will get started momentarily. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [applause]

>> well, take you. is the mic on? thank you for joining us for the trilateral cooperation segment of today's program. i am david shulkin former assistant secretary of defense for asia-pacific security affairs, for ambassador to vietnam and lifelong northeast. with us are admiral dennis blair for pacific commander and now chairman and distinguishing a fellow at sbf usa. lieutenant general in boehm shown, retired from rok army in 2016 after distinguished military career, and -- with the peace foundation in tokyo and the popular commentator on foreign-policy in japan. thank you for joining us, everybody. something tells me that trilateral cooperation is not going to melt away just because he's is breaking out on the korean peninsula. we're going to need it when or maybe if the piece breaks down.

we can feed the trilateral exercise during the first week of the olympic games because all of us believe that it's quite possible that the piece may someday breakdown. however unlikely that may be. and that we wanted to continue and build on our trilateral cooperation if we are going to face the prospect of another cycle of tension after this apparent cycle of relaxation on the korean peninsula. so it like to ask our speakers, going to turn to our speakers, and i like to ask them to speak for about seven to ten minutes, and i'll start with admiral blair who will give us a summary of the exercise. >> thank you, ambassador. i think sue terry said on the last panel that it's easier to deal with north korea when it's acting badly than when it's acting well.

well, in our tabletop exercise which we brought former retired japanese, american republic of korea officials and officers together, with north korea acting badly, and we will tell you what happened. because even, even when we're dealing with north korean provocations, the importance of trilateral cooperation is high and it's not that simple. so let me quickly just to bring everyone up to speed, play what happened in this tabletop exercise which were conducted in february of this year. could you bring up the first slide? and there we go. the first set of conditions we had our shown on this slide. we created a situation in which there was a crisis that had to be addressed by all three countries, the united states, japan and republic of korea because all of the mad forces

that were within range of this set of refugee boats that was coming across the sea of japan headed for japan, and the three countries had to decide what to do about it. here's what they did. each independently agreed to make sure that the refugees made it safely, that they were not harmed by north korean ships and airplanes that were chasing them and they reinforce their forces. north korea brought its forces out. they had orders to recapture the refugees, but when they saw the large number of ships and aircraft that the united states, korea and japan had brought, they stood off and wait for further orders. they received those further orders which was to make an

attack and then retire. the three countries agreed that those forces still posed a threat, and it turned out that american forces were in the best position to deal with them and ended the game. the korean frigates were soft and airplanes were shot down. -- sunk. the second, this was an example of an incident that sort of came up as a surprise to everyone and see how the countries dealt with it. the next day was a set of deliberate north korean provocations to achieve political ends. and it started as shown here.

north korea began with these political demands and decided to take a number of a provocative in order to reinforce them. north korea made attacks on the japan coast guard ship or korea frigate. when they didn't give results, when north korea did not give result in a first attack they decided that they needed to up their game again to make furthr demands as shown here on this slide. and they didn't have any more luck with the gaining political concessions than they had earlier.

they then decided to take another step in provocation which the north korean team still judge would be below the level of starting a war but would cause enough concern in japan, the republic of korea and the united states to gain the concessions they sought, and they fired missile volleys at american bases in the republic of korea and in japan with the results that are shown on this slide. the missile attacks killed both military and civilian personnel in korea come in south korea and in the united states. the reaction of the three allies consulting together was strong, as shown here. they made a combined attack,

korean forces attacking the united states forces attacking, and interestingly japan self-defense forces accompanying the american ships and planes as they made their attacks,, although japan did not have the capability or the authority to actually participate in missile and bomb attacks. we are part of the american formations that did so. -- they were part. the final move of our game was north korea using its nuclear capability. it fired a nuclear missile at -- in the philippines see, uninhabited and renewed its political demands. we ended the game at that point, but none of the three national teams, the american team, the

japanese team or the korean team was interested making political concessions at that point. there was a robust discussion of what sort of reaction should be made against north korea for this egregious use of its nuclear forces. so tabletop exercises are not really set up to try to predict the future. they're not set up to give exact answers. they are set up to stimulate thinking about the kind of hard situations that come in the future, and what you learn from them is the real understandings of how reactions in those kinds of situations would be helpful and would not be helpful. here's what we learned from the american teams point of view. the first thing was that the relationship among the united states, japan and the republic of korea is really different now

in 2018 from what had been in previous years. when as commander in chief of command back in 2000, the relationship, the way the crisis would be handled would be the united states would decide what it wanted to do, and then we would convince the koreans and the japanese that they should support us. this game should a very much more equal consultation among the three countries, both at the political level and in the military level. it was really a palpable difference the way they gameplayers consulted among themselves in order to decide on a unified response from what we've been involved in years before. a second insight was about the communications that have been set up by the american alliance system in the past, which basically was one chain of

communication going to the pacific command to japan, another communication system that went through the combined forces command in korea, and these chains of command becoming more and more separate as the level of hostility increased were not going to work, and had to be very rapid and continuous three-way trilateral communication among all three countries both at the political and at the military level. and the players in this game very experienced recently retired officers and officials did that very well. and then i guess the third lesson we learned is that if the united states, japan and korea stay coordinated in responded to north korean provocative behavior, north korea doesn't win. my job in the game was the director of the control team, and i was really trying to cost splits in the lines to cause fissures were north korea could

make advantages, get political concessions from one country, played off against another country. and to my frustration as the game director, the three country teams stay together very, very tightly. and as you saw at the tactical level, north korea lost. their ships were sunk. they lost the political level, no concessions were made to them, the alliances were as talk at the end of this exercise as they had been at the beginning. i think another final strong lesson is about trilateral coordination and cooperation leads to being able to handle these sorts of contingencies very well. let me stop there. >> thank you, admiral blair. i remember as a much more junior officer in 1993, as the political military unit chief on the japan desk participating in a tabletop exercise with the japanese on what their role might be in a korean contingency, particularly and

neo, and it was a revelation. we have been, it was great at helping us define the question we faced and we have been trying to answer those questions ever since. hopefully this kind of tabletop exercise done trilaterally will form an excellent basis for track one partners to move forward on trilateral cooperation with that in my i like to turn to lieutenant general chun to give us a korean perspective. i know there was some sensitivities with regard to rok participation in this exercise. we are glad you're able to overcome them and we were delighted to have you in the exercise. ..

[laughter] so i just want to point out that sasakawa u.s.a. did a great job in getting us together although some of us did not know we are getting into. secondly, about the scenario. to those on my team who did not understand that the tpx is basically a game that generates not an idea, they were really uncomfortable with the scenario and these are the reasons why. of course we did not want to see missiles flying overhead and bombs exploding, so they were very uncomfortable with what they termed a scenario.

some of our team members were concerned that it was just before the olympics. we were trying to farm and a couple hundred miles away, talking about a full scale crisis brewing and said they were uncomfortable about that as well. admiral blair made sure that we did not know what the scenario was indeed asians, we are very uncomfortable at the fact we did not know -- [laughter] what was coming up next spirit this situation caused the korea team and i saw the same thing in the japanese team and this

generated cooperation which is what we needed for making this happen. so those are the main reasons it was a comfortable situation for some of the koreans. not me, but i think it is attributed to the overall realism and the purpose of the tpx. during the 2.5 days, which was very dynamic, some trends occurred within the korean team the first trend with the korea team was swift and strong against all north korean military provocations. some in the group found not to be surprising because they had expected the koreans would be a little bit reluctant to be strong. but the team i can assure you what the fact no matter what ideology you had, the north

koreans were going to use force or what north koreans should we would do that. secondly, although the team also tried their best to make sure it did not de-escalate. i think all of you can understand that is where we live for families lived and that is why we want to make sure the situation was managed. third trend was as the scenario progressed, we understood that we needed cooperation. was going to be in our best interest to talk to our neighbors. here is where we again were able to realize the role of the united date in the region. it came from very fundamental reasons. we wanted to call the japanese and i'm exaggerating a little, we need the americans to make the call for us. i think it emphasized the

importance of the role of the united states in the region. so my conclusions or teams conclusions during the tpx is number one cooperation between the three countries as important and it is unavoidable. number two, realistically we have a lot of challenges in the survey in the first session are very cautious between the north and south. in 50% of the japanese people don't want unification which is not what that survey meant that can be misunderstood and so there's a lot of challenges they are. because of these challenges, i think it emphasized to us that

1.5 activities is so important because we just can't do the 1.0. that was the second lesson. third lesson is we still have a long way to go. this is the first step. the first step was great and i hope other organizations will try to do things like this so that we can get people, especially the koreans and japanese together to talk about peace and further cooperation. thank you. >> thank you for a much, general chun. one thing i was impressed by his assist the first i participated in since we adopted the new u.s. japan defense guidelines in 2015. and i was surprised and delighted by the extent to which the japanese had formed an interpretation of the guidelines that could be applied at the

operational level very quickly and very affect the play. i was very happy with the extent to which the japanese stepped up and supported both the u.s. and our allies. with that in mind i'll turn to the next. >> the sasakawa peace fund and tokyo peninsula is very was very happy to join tpx. i think that the one important lesson we've learned is we can do more than before in japan hybrid mail diagram for the u.s.-japan. but a big change of

interpretation and the constitution -- [inaudible] actually, i was the public testimony guy who explained how important and other times that was not so popular. surrounded by the many demonstrators for securing japan in the asia-pacific region, too. i think it is very important for the korean in case. and there was a good test for the participants actually to experience the government with the new capacity of japan.

but still there are many lessons possible since japan can do more illegally and politically. but that is not the united states senate not so well shared so i think it's clearly the same conclusion. the more information sharing is crucial. i think in the case of contingency that as admiral blair asked aarons, so many things are happening. very fast contingency was not a serious case. but spelled big trouble. japan was a very puzzled with

which concept we should ally. and our alliance coordination between the japanese military forces and the u.s. forces in japan was excellent. good communication. however, you should realize how complicated the command of the united states in the case of the korean contingents. eventually u.s. had the combined command with the south korean and u.s. military. basically the theater in east asia. one is korean theater population and the other one is the command is basically at the pacific command.

however, what u.s. forces in japan can tell to the japanese concept is very limited because of the u.s. forces in korea and the general security of the agreement between japan and the republic of korea, but was not previously prepared. japan has contingency from time to time and was so frustrated that we don't get to direct information from the south koreans and also even the u.s. forces in korea. so, such a dilemma.

[inaudible] perhaps it means the defense ministry and foreign ministry was planned military heads. and between south korea and the u.s., i'll effect there. over two plus two was not to formalize the active moment. however, we asked. i'm sure it was easy. but they had a huge experience that was very helpful. however, i remember koreans say

the spokesperson said over public opinion. the big challenge in serious case of korean government can cooperate with japan. i think that is a big lesson. if the contingency is getting more difficult, so there is a big lesson. but again, two plus two plus two. get help for setting up and sharing the information sharing the strategy and tactics and also sometimes very good to creating to trust each other. that is a big achievement in the tpx.

so again, i'd like to say some negative feeling to the korean government among japanese people. korea -- means that korean and south korean government believes on issues such as compensation. however, the south korean government pushed in remade agreement. so, they are now of the public opinion. the japanese political leader is over public opinion. so, some labor things have been and it is very difficult for japan and the united states and south korea to coordinate and appropriate action.

i think even in peace times, too, but more serious in the contingents times. again, during the winter olympics, you may remember the japanese escape -- [inaudible] and she cried. and. beautiful story, such a beautiful story was not made without communication. ms. kim keep communicating and keep competing in the world cup

and a very deep friendship. that is my thought. >> thank you very much. thanks again to admiral blair for setting up such a great tt acts. it ran very smoothly. i'm going to ask a few questions on three of the recommendations in the report. before i do that, i would like to see how many people propose to ask questions at the end of the session. it's before lunch. okay. recommendation one in the report is to develop a high level two plus two plus two trilateral coordination mechanism. i am wondering on what you would base this mechanism, admiral

blair. >> i think the weakness now with the trilateral communication among the three countries is that they are between counterpart. so the foreign ministers will meet for sometimes at a trilateral level, more often and then three or four months later the chairman of the joint chiefs will need to either bilaterally or try laterally. progress is made in those meetings, but the kind of forcing function of getting the diplomatic policy, military and security levels altogether in one room in deciding how we are going to do it on the basis of the shared interest of all three countries is something that we need. the multilateral alliance like

nato have these published for seizures and although national interest come to play and sometimes their attention, at least there is a rhythm of getting the important questions considered and addressed and hopefully solved on a regular level. so, i would like to see the three countries get together and say we need to establish this mechanism to meet in peace time and to be ready to consult quickly and contingencies. i think the best way that i know about is the one that's been developed between the united states and japan as a result of the last defense guidelines, which was the alliance coordination mechanism, acm aired a secure video teleconference capability that goes out and forth between washington and tokyo and it is

flexible. it can have meetings at all levels. they can have multiple state department, defend department, ministry of foreign affairs meeting and it's quite effective in handling these problems. i think of something like that can be extended or developed separately for korea, the united states and japan to develop habits of trilateral cooperation at the same time when issues are important, we can build that into the sort of cabinet level meetings that we have in this game in this trilateral level. >> i think this is have one proves that level of coordination is very important. and it was interesting to watch during the exercise that self out naturally and how quickly it evolved. it got going very quickly and it worked very effectively. general chun, now that peace has broken out on the korean pendant

give up, do you see any appetite on the rok side for actually moving forward to a two plus two plus two or to a formal coordination mechanism? >> i think it is hard to say right now. but i think if the koreans are smart enough and i think they are, it is in our best interest to talk to our neighbors. and i think we have seen that already because right after the north, south summit, phone calls were made to president trump and prime minister abe and president ms. is visiting japan next week and this is the first time a korean president has visited tokyo at like four and a half years, which is really surprising. i think these are indicators

that we will see that kind of two plus two plus two. but that will only happen if we work out of it. it's not just going to happen. i think that the korean will have to be -- we need an atmosphere and an environment where the koreans realized that it is in our best interest to overcome our emotions and have these kind of efforts. >> do you see any political constraints on the japanese side to including senior-level japanese military officers in this kind of format? >> i don't think the limitation for going two plus two plus two trilateral. the one thing japan needs to see i forgot to mention is noncombatant serious concern in

japan always. during the exercise, and it's very difficult for japan to have the korean concept apart. so i think that's a very good reason. so i don't see any -- [inaudible] >> thank you. the second recommendation in the report is to incorporate japan's capabilities more fully into deterring and defending against north korean provocations. in the first scenario, i had to remind myself that japan and the rok do not have a security

treaty. their cooperation appeared to move forward so effectively. but they don't. they have no defense obligations to each other. in that regard, i'm wondering in the first stage scenario if u.s. forces had not been present in that part of the japan sea or the refugee boat was, where there were just rok and japanese forces, would it have played out in the same way? mr. watanabe. >> that is actually the trouble, with the u.s. somehow we can ordinate the operation. if not, it is a risk to be with north korean by japanese forces. [inaudible] >> in other words, there could've been no u.s. forces present, but as long as the u.s. is in their communicating with

everybody, it could've worked. >> yeah, if it was not completely lost, the really big situation is gaining much less than dod. that is very crucial. >> general chun. >> are not a naval officer, that humanitarian operations in search and rescue operations are routinely conducted between the republic of korea and the japanese self-defense force. so, in this scenario and when i refer to this scenario, with north korean refugees trying to escape north korea. they were being pursued by north korean warships. korean, japanese and u.s. warships were in the vicinity and that was the situation. so if you take out the american

ships in that scenario, i think the koreans and the japanese would have been smart enough to figure out not to kill each other. this is a serious problem because when u. r. s. e., missiles usually have a bs hating thing, but not always the right target. so, the koreans and the japanese would have been smart enough to communicate that kind of information and that they would have been able to successfully rescue them. the real question is what would've been the order to the ships? the technical side i think is no problem. the communications commend the guys and gals would be smart enough to figure it out. but what would the korean government and the japanese government has told the crew men to do. i think that is where the real national level of cooperation would've been required. >> one more question on this recommendation.

on the u.s.-japan bilateral side, we've not only established an alliance coronation mechanism, it would've established a planning mechanism. i am wondering if it would be useful or possible for us to establish a trilateral planning mechanism to go with a trilateral coordination mechanism. do. i think initially it would have to be appended to the meetings that now take place, so when the ministers of defense made, spend a couple of hours on bilateral planning. if you put that on the agenda, the staffs will work on it ahead of time and you can make a lot of progress. i think that would be the path then towards establishing a formal schedule ahead of time, brute teen trilateral

planning -- planning session. i think this kind of behavior is more active, more natural for military organizations than it is for political organizations. as general chun said, there was a sort of cognitive dissonance in conduct a tabletop exercise with a very hostile crisis scenario. at the same time back in our hotel rooms there with a combined north and south korean hockey team was losing every game in the 130 odd cheerleaders were doing their little dances. military organizations are used to that. the better you are the less likely they are to happen, but they will lose fewer lives and be successful. it is harder to push that through the political process the first time.

and so, right now we are going to get through this frenzy of symmetry. i don't think it's going to be anymore successful than you heard from the panel earlier this morning. hopefully after that, that can generate momentum for trilateral cooperation in the full number of areas. you served in both southeast asia and northeast asia. it is not a big deal to schedule a meeting. people go back and forth and northeast asia is sort of a major policy decision whether you're going to attend the meeting, much less work out an agenda. we need to get that more natural rhythm of trilateral coordination rather than making each individual meetings subject to a big logical decision. where do we meet, who has to travel? is it timed just right? we've got to get beyond that.

>> i agree with both general chun that we have a long way to go and hopefully we continue after this series of summits. one more recommendation before i turn to the audience and that is it is recommended that we develop a more effective approach to noncombatant evacuation and we've been thinking about this since the 1990s and is it looks like we've got a long way to go. but reports suggest we think about planning for a staged evacuation down the korean peninsula as the crisis develops. general chun, i am wondering how you think that might help decision-making on the rok side. >> i'm not sure whether it will help decision-making, but it will sure be a catalyst for decisions to be made. as you can imagine, a noncombatant evacuation would be

catastrophic for korean stability. we are not just talking about a couple hundred thousand americans and japanese. we are talking about another couple hundred thousand europeans, other countrymen million chinese trying to leave the country. so, naturally it is a great challenge for the korean government. having said that, i am sure the korean government will provide the assembly areas by the transportation, the legal basis and security protection for these kinds of operations to occur. but we are talking about millions of people and it's going to be very difficult. i also think that another thing we need to think about is the message that we are going to be sending north korea. they will think that an attack is imminent and when you are in

a situation like that, there's only two options. either surrender or attack first. that's another thing we need to think about. this is a very complex issue and this is where i sing real open and honest discussion is required. during this step three, the scenario that was provided by sasakawa u.s.a. touched on an issue that can be a springboard for further cooperation and that was very good. >> thank you very much. let's turn to the audience now. yes, sir. [inaudible] >> is this working? hi, my name is chris martin. i'm in the u.s. army. a great opportunity to serve in south korea and japan over my career. just thinking about the

trilateral cooperation. we've actually been doing a lot of trilateral teleconferences for some years and north korean crisis situations. but to make it more regular and give it a framework, why not use the united nations command as a structure to do that on? it would perhaps deluded. we'd be inviting other parties, but it would also make it less sensitive and provide a framework for planning. just a suggestion and your thought on that. >> well, as you know from having served there, there are u.n. command members, a so-called contributing members who send troops, the ones who put flags in the headquarters. and then you have to think about what countries will really be important if a current contingency occurs.

i think it is worth pursuing whether that unc structure can be turned into a sort of a regular consultation. i think my thinking is that perhaps is a construct of the past in the construct of the future should be the country's better in the region with interest under threat that has have capability to bring to bear, which have a mystery countries would need to work out new structures for working together. i think i would be more in favor of trying to build this trilateral communication on that basis rather than trying to resurrect some sort of u.n. structure. >> another question?

yes. [inaudible] the comments about the noncombatant evacuation just brought back to mind. i've heard other discussions about this. isn't there a fundamental lack of reality, the idea that the south koreans would sit there and wave as millions of foreigners, hundreds of thousands of foreigners are leaving? isn't the real chaos going to be with the people remaining behind as their country is about ready to get kids seriously or blown up? >> general chun. >> yes. [laughter] >> there is a question over there. >> if i could just add one thing, it would be the largest

noncombatant evacuation ever done. the ones that everybody has experience with our relatively small numbers of people in african countries or places like that. i think this would be -- it would have all the worst features of the major award in which people are trapped in countries that are at war underneath an artillery barrage with trying to get organized. i think the smart foreigners who are living in korea and make sure they have their water in their food and they are not counting on a first-class ticket within two hours of noncombatant evacuation being declared to take them out. yes, it would be a cottage

difficult situation in which i completely agree with general chun at the government realizes its responsibilities to move noncombatant even while it is organizing to defend his own country and it will do the best he can. when you look at the distances involved, it would be a difficult, chaotic situation. >> maybe 40,000 or 50,000 japanese in korea, south korea. the big issue with the south korean government would allow chat and news sources -- [inaudible] over south korea. and the third is the ttx, some discussion with the korean side and maybe only would be allowed.

so, that is really bad for the population issue with the south korean government. that is not only but also the military population of the u.s. and korean forests. [inaudible] >> thank you. chris. >> thanks so much. great discussion. ttx sounds really fascinating. right at the end of the north korea per se discussion, a good question is asked about china but they never got around to answering it. this discussion brings to mind the chinese role if any of the coordination needed, if any with china in the event of one of these crises on the payment to the period was this part of the

background of the ttx? did you all find yourself discussing doing this or doing now. and in general, even if not from what you've been thinking very hard about these things in recent years. what do you think we should be thinking about and talking with our chinese friends about on the korea crisis contingencies like this. thank you. >> we did not have a separate chinese team in this exercise, so we in control chinese specialists. in general, china was taking i think a realistic approach of trying to tell everybody to quiet down. let's negotiate this. let's not resort to force. let's not escalate. we assumed in the game we had china trying to restrain north korea, but it wasn't successful. north korea was escalating in order to satisfy its demands.

the noncombatant evacuation question is really a good one because as you heard, china has far more of it citizens in the republic of korea than the two other countries, japan and the united states. china is becoming sensitive to taking care of its citizens. it had the largest single evacuation of its national citizens from libya, for example, when the chaos lead in that country. there will be pressure on the chinese government to safeguard citizens who live in what could be a war zone. and of course the chinese connections with north korea are in many cases sicker than are those of the other countries involved. i think china noncombatant

evacuation will be to tell the north koreans, you're going to kill a lot of chinese than that is going to be a bad thing for supporting you. so i think that will be a politically stable factor in all of these people trying to get to a seaport, get to an airport, get out of the country. but she's thought about this also, general chun. how do you think it will play out? >> i think during this ttx, if we were to find one piece that could've been better was maybe the chinese influence that might have on whatever situation would have occurred. so, i must admit i've found that the chinese influence during this ttx was not represented. but i think that is what we will

be improving in the next ttx. having said that, china is going to be an influence in whatever happens on the korean finance whether we like it or not. the system being that is part of the korean comment that i have to live with. you are lucky you live far away from that. >> is about one minute left. but take one more quick question. yes. >> thank you. [inaudible] i have a question for admiral blair. you once said it normal for the united states to accept a nuclear armed north korea.

[inaudible] could you give us an update on this? thank you. >> i'm sorry, i didn't catch the whole question. can you repeat it? >> admiral blair, sorry, once said so it is possible for the united states to accept the nuclear armed north korea. so it could be possible. and i wonder how you think about it currently. thank you. >> my idea hasn't changed. i think a nuclear north korea is containable. i learned from this ttx at a

demonstration use of a weapon did not gain political -- did not have the political game for north korea and that had the north koreans used their weapon in a way that killed japanese-americans were south koreans that the players in the game were ready to retaliate so i think that extended deterrence works and strategy over the long term is to isolate and put pressure on north korea, but a lot more information into north korea than we've had in the past and wait for crumbling from within, which i think will happen in that country. you heard in the previous panel about the growing erosion and i

think like other tater ships eventually it will destroy itself. >> thank you very much, gentlemen. hopefully this will be the first of several futures ttx that have a real influence on the course of u.s.-japan and rok policy and cooperations. [applause] >> ladies and gentlemen, we will have a 15 minute rate. we will be back in the ballroom, so the next session will start at noon. thank you.

>> deputy attorney general rod rosenstein now on the rule of law. towards the end of the conversation, reporters in attendance were invited to ask ti