c-span2. >> next john sopko the special inspector general for afghanistan reconstruction talks about your strategy for stabilization and rebuilding that country because it marks are followed by a panel discussion focusing on identifying lessons and recommendation for rebuilding afghanistan. hosted by the brookings institution in washington, this is about to one half hours. >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. welcome to the brookings institution. my name is john calvin and i'm the president of brookings. it's my distinct pleasure today to be joined by my friend john sopko, special inspector general

for afghanistan reconstruction, or segar as with shortened it to save time. john joins us as part of our event today entitled afghanistan, lessons from the u.s. experience, stabilization, lessons from the u.s. experience in afghanistan. this event happens to share the same title with the report just issued by sigar which will be rolled out today and you'll be hearing from john shortly on the reports contents, the findings and the recommendations. i fed honor of knowing this gentleman, john sopko, for many years and he was a vital partner to me in my previous role leading u.s. and nato forces in afghanistan. it's been a trusted advisor to many u.s. policymakers and leaders throughout the years. he and his team have maintained close and tireless oversight over our mission in afghanistan and a been a critical part of

ensuring we remain accountable for her efforts and equally as important in making sure we learn from our successes as well as our mistakes and, frankly, over the last nearly 17 years of this conflict there's been much to learn. to the audience for this hour, john will first provide us his own set of remarks link out the report and then will come together on the stage for roughly about 30 minutes of conversation which will be a short period of q&a between him and me. i think we'll have enough time in that hour to go out to the audience for a couple of questions. but we will be followed by a panel, a panel that will have a discussion on the report on afghanistan writ large, which given the caliber of the panelists that we have today will undoubtedly be an excellent discussion and not without some point of views, and it will be during that period of time or will have about 30 minutes

probably for audience questions and answers. and finally, i would be remiss in not noting that this event takes place just a few days before our most solid and important of american holidays, memorial day. and while over 2000 u.s. servicemen and women have made the ultimate sacrifice in afghanistan since 2001, it's often overlooked and sometimes even forgotten are the sacrifices by our many foreign service officers, usaid professionals and civilians of all stripes and forms, as well as our numerous coalition partners and allies who also gave their lives in the name of peace and security for the people of afghanistan. memorial day is about honoring each of these heroes, and we must never forget them and their sacrifices. those lives lost most mean

something. and, indeed, through the lessons learned, reports of organizations like sigar we can and we must find new and better ways to ensure that our missions are achieved with greater effect and with less sacrifice, less suffering, and less waste for all parties. so with that let me welcome john sopko, special inspector general for afghanistan to the stage for his keynote remarks. john. >> good morning, and general, thank you for this very kind remarks in the introduction. and more importantly, for hosting today's event, and the release of our fourth lessons learned report, which is entitled stabilization is, lessons from the u.s. experience

in afghanistan. this report is the culmination of two years of work by our office, and examines the u.s. stabilization efforts in afghanistan, detailing how usaid, the state department and the defense department tried to support and legitimize the afghan government in contested districts in afghanistan from 2002-2017. today's report is also available in an interactive format, and like all of our products, may be downloaded from our website at webmac sigar.mil. actually on the interactive format i think we're the only inspector general office that releases reports in such a format. sigar will be releasing its fifth lessons learned report on june 14 focusing on our

counter-narcotics efforts in afghanistan for those who are interested. we begin our lessons learned program in late 2014 at a suggestion by you, general allen, and also ryan crocker and some others. my staff has told me that i credited you enough times about our lessons learned program that we should probably start writing you some royalty checks. [laughing] but that would be wrong. [laughing] but in all seriousness, you made an observation that resonated with me during one of my first trips to afghanistan while you with the commanding general. we later followed up on that after you retired at a little breakfast meeting over in pentagon city. you noted that all the worthwhile audits and investigations that sigar was conducting, there was still a

question left unanswered. what did it all mean and what did it all mean in the larger context of reconstruction in national security? part of the reason you and others that the lessons learned program would be a worthwhile endeavor for my organization to undertake is due to our unique jurisdiction. of all the ig's, we have jurisdiction to look at all u.s. reconstruction programs and projects in afghanistan, regardless of their funding source and regardless of which agency is actually conducting those programs. we are statutorily unique in that fashion. since were the only federal oversight agency back and look holistically at the whole of government effort in afghanistan, which means we are not constrained agency stovepipes. i am pleased to say that there

is been great interest in our lessons learned report up-to-date, and today's report is really no different. while we were finalizing our report, the departments of state and defense, along with usaid, were finalizing their own stabilization assistance review, and they asked sigar to brief their staffs on that work. their interagency review was recently approved and is well aligned with the sigar report that we are releasing today. but before i go any further, i think with ask the question, what is stabilization? it is one of those terms that is rarely if ever precisely defined. while depredations have buried by u.s. agency, and even within a particular u.s. agency over

the last 17 17 years we have bn in afghanistan, earlier this year the u.s. government finally defined stabilization as, quote, a political endeavor involving a civilian military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. put simply, stabilization is the process of building sufficient governance to keep insurgents from returning, and condensing the population of that area that government rule is preferable to insurgent rule. sigar undertook this project for one simple reason. the stabilization effort in afghanistan was not the first the u.s. government has undertaken, nor will it be the

last. given the current security environment and the dangers of allowing poorly governed spaces to serve as launching pads for transnational terrorist groups, we anticipate future u.s. government efforts to stabilize those areas by clearing them of terrorist groups and helping generate sufficient governance to keep terrorists from returning, not only in afghanistan but around the globe. and i believe the panel discussion this morning will go into greater detail about that. today's report contains seven findings, identifies ten lessons, makes seven recommendations to the executive branch, and includes four matters for congressional consideration. rather than go through every one of these, i would like to begin with our overall assessment of

the stabilization effort in afghanistan, and then highlight some issues of particular concern. unfortunately, cigars overall assessment is that despite some very heroic efforts to stabilize insecure and contested areas in afghanistan, he tween 2002-2017, the program was mostly a failure. this happened for a number of reasons, including the establishment of a set of unrealistic expectations about what we could do and what could be achieved in just a few years time. the lack of capacity of u.s. government agencies to fully support those excellent efforts, and institutional rivalries and bureaucratic hurdles compounded this already difficult task.

every organization and agency we found that work on stabilization and afghanistan, from dod civil affairs and special operation forces, to state and usaid, suffered from personnel and programming deficits, born from rapid scaling, short tours of duty, and the pressure to show quick progress. no organization we found was prepared for these challenges and, unfortunately, it showed with the results. stabilization is unique because it an inherently joint civilian military undertaking. yet given the size and resources of dod, the military consistently determine priorities on the ground and chose to focus on the most

insecure districts. a logical decision on its face, but ironically one that had unintended negative consequences. why? because those areas often remain perpetually insecure and had to be cleared of insurgents again and again. civilian agencies, particularly usaid, were compelled to conduct programs in these fiercely contested areas that were not ready for stabilization. because the coalition focused on the most insecure areas and rarely provided enduring security after clearing them, afghans were often too afraid to serve in the local governments there. afghan civilians also had little faith that the districts would remain in the hands when the

coalition withdrew. implementing partners struggled to execute programs amidst the violence. and u.s. agencies were unable to adequately monitor and evaluate the projects. we spent a lot of time in a report on that particular issue. one of the challenges facing stabilization efforts in afghanistan, as i alluded to and as it is reported in our report today, came from institutional differences and rivalries that start writer in washington. while the military was focused on clear cold and build, those are tenets of the coin doctrine, state and usaid face challenges given the pressure from dod to quickly show gains on the ground. this led to significant tensions between usaid and the military

over aids reluctance or inability to work in the most contested at insecure district. the same areas the military believed to be the most important to reverse taliban momentum. often, the military would claim a district was cleared and thus ready for aid to start stabilization programs. yet, clear admit something very different to the military that it did to a.i.d., and the afghan contractors tasked with, for example, paving the road in insecure environment. the military may have deemed the area safe enough for them, but it made little difference to the contractor charged with executing the hold or build phase of stabilization effort were in danger or felt they were so. some senior aide officials told our staff that coalition that it forces pushed the agency into going along with clear, hold,

and build, and commanded that it implement programs such as cash for work on a large scale over objections. senior military officials likewise told us they had little choice but to do things quickly and focus on the most dangerous areas. again you have to remember the timeline, the short timeline that the military was given, particularly as it was drawing down resources. usaid officials also at a difficult time arguing against the military belief that stabilization would buy the support of the population, convince them to share information about ieds and thus save coalition lives. as one official told us, , quot, the military expected as to be bags of cash, unquote. prior to the surge, advisor often able to exercise veto power about where and how

military commanders use funds, particularly from the commanders emergency response program. but later usaid's influence over expenditures were significantly diminished as we were doing that drawdown in that quick exit from afghanistan. as one official noted when aid tried to stop implementing projects in areas where they could not be monitored or even how they waited come the military sometimes set aside the partnership model and used funding unilaterally. as a result, all types of stabilization programming were implemented during all stages of the clear, hold, and build sequence and even when aid you the sequencing was inappropriate and the programs would be ineffective. under pressure from the military, the aid built schools and plays with a could not be monitored, the government could not maintain and staff in and

students only attended sporadically, if at all, due to insecurity. military commanders likewise concentrated large cerp projects and less secure areas where they were less likely to succeed. in contrast to dod, stated aid the two agencies that provide the most personal for the civilian surge did not have sufficient staffing, especially built in staff redundancy to enable rapid mobilization in the field. ..

one of the hired job because quote - i had a pulse and a masters degree of course. 2011, the demand for personnel so exceeded the supply, that state and aid were unable to hire enough people to fill all

of what they requested. even with hiring of temporary employees. now that i would like to say one thing. as i said, the use of temporary hires by eight and state actually positive and negative trade-offs.on the positive side, unlike permanent personnel, temporary hires could stay in afghanistan more than one year. avoiding the loss of institutional memory were what i and my step of the quote - unquote annual lobotomy out of the country after one year or

less. unfortunately, the same temporary hires have little if any experience or training in monitoring and project oversight and carrying out specific aid projects. as a result, we are astounded to find out that few of those civilians working at the local level had agency authority to oversee programming. at one point, usaid regional representatives who are the most senior us aid officials assigned to teach regional command in afghanistan, had no oversight authority over the programs in their area of operations. decisions therefore had to default to the embassy in kabul which had problems obviously of communicating quickly to the staff in the field. contracting also surged. at one point a high ranking aid official determined that in order to meet the us government average ratio of dollars to number of contracting

officials, aid would have to send nearly its entire overseas workforce to afghanistan. the number of contractor personnel overseen by direct higher state and aid personnel was extremely large. in 2011, there were approximately 18 contractors for every direct hire at state and ratio was 100 to 1 at usaid. even with the sufficient number of highly trained personnel stabilization operations in afghanistan would have been challenging. unfortunately as our report lays out, state and aid do not have the right personnel to effectively execute the mission in spite of efforts made years earlier to provide them with exactly that capability. now, despite all of this, and despite all of those other

challenges, the question ultimately we ask is, did stabilization in afghanistan work and was it effective? did it meet its goal? we talk a lot about input, output and outcomes. did it reach the ultimate outcome? as a report lays out, we try to answer that question. by looking at other experts who had studied the issue. an external research reviewed by sigar unfortunately found the evidence is inconclusive and sometimes contradictory. some research found that usaid and the state department programming actually did accomplish stabilization. some found no impact. other research ironically found that the program itself was destabilized. there are some factors that seem to be common among,

however, the most successful stabilization interventions in afghanistan. those are laid out in the report and actually, we have on the panel following us, a military leader who actually we highlight as one of the leaders who actually succeeded in stabilization and his district. but what did we find are the common lessons, the common best practices for stabilization to work? first we found out that stabilization was most effective in areas where the government had a degree of physical control. second, it was also more successful with implementers when they took fewer activities with a higher degree of oversight flexibility and staffing. third, stabilization cannot be done well on the cheap. successful projects were labor-intensive for donors in

implementing partners alike. fourth, we found at best, it results in small gains that require constant reinforcement to avoid reversals. the timeline that us agencies were operating under assumed that quick security gains will be matched by equally quick stabilization and governance games. the latter fails to materialize before security forces withdrew and instability returned to many areas were stabilization programs working. the research also found that implementing smaller projects help programs avoid some of the common pitfalls. avoiding these pitfalls of stabilization such as predatory officials, corruption and insurgent sabotage while still

providing tangible benefits to communities was easier for smaller scale projects. according to a 2010 us embassy assessment, it was also easier to ensure community buy in then it has for large ones. sigar previously identified research demonstrated that his superficial measures of success. such as sheer amount of money spent and outputs produced had no correlation in the eventual impact or outcome. as one senior us aid official told us, quote - if you go fast, you actually go slow. if you go slow on purpose, you actually go faster. with stabilization.

one area where us efforts seem to get it right was in -- province. the panel discussion will go into that example in greater detail. but a combination of capable individuals and key roles a willingness by individuals to collaborate and a heavy presence of us military forces in the area helped that initiative succeed more than others in the country. in conclusion, identified only a few of the major challenges the effort to stabilize afghanistan faced. the poor results of this particular mission may make it tempting to some policymakers to conclude that stabilization should never be undertaken again. i would disagree with that. given the security challenges that we face in today's world,

stabilization or whatever you want to call it is important. eliminating that ability or capability is not a realistic choice. rather the us government must address the challenges and capacity constraints identified in the report. given the lack of alternatives in stabilization and ungoverned space that has been cleared of insurgents and terrorists the best course of action may be for the us government to balance the importance of any stabilization with a realistic understanding and the level of effort required and what is achievable. additionally the government must prepare for, design, execute, monitor and evaluate stabilization methods. the needs for such expertise

will not diminish any time soon. the military historian max boot writes quote -, while the tools of warfare have changed, the challenges of small wars for the grants guerrillas and terrorists that remain constant. american soldiers struggling against al qaeda and the taliban could profitably study the past to learn how their ancestors dealt with haitian, philippine, nicaragua and other irregular foes. unquote. >> we cannot afford to fail in these lessons as we continue to contemplate such programs both there in afghanistan and in other countries in the future. let me conclude by

acknowledging the tireless efforts of those who worked on this. the sigar efforts were led by david young. he was supported by jordan kane, paul kane, jordan -- olivia peck and elizabeth young under the leadership of program director, joe --. have my thanks and hopefully, your thanks for issuing the report today. with that, thank you very much for this opportunity to speak. [applause]

>> i am sure some of you are seeing me on your phones there is a announcement that the white house just canceled the conversation with the north koreans coming up.we will see how that goes today. someplace i do not think we will have a stabilization effort. [laughter] in the near future. john, thank you for those comments. i really appreciate them. let me make a real quick editorial note. on the panel we have as john mentioned, will have an army officer by the name of -- who is a fellow here last year at brookings. kunar province was one of the toughest fights that we had. up against the pakistani border, sandwiched between nora stan and nakahara.

it is a tough place. if you want to see more about that there is an excellent document recalled the hornets nest. he is featured in it with his great battalion and it is worth taking a look at. john, when i retired from the marine corps in 2013, i never thought i would be concerned over these matters again. [laughter] or mention to the report. but 18 months later i found myself, the special presidential envoy to the global coalition. counter the so-called islamic state.with the onslaught of isis, with no real idea how this fight would ultimately take shape. the one thing we did know was that we would eventually have a massive stabilization effort. not just a rescue that populations but to keep out isis in the aftermath. but it was going to be big. across both iraq and syria. with that in mind and given the lessons that you were already surfacing from the afghan

experience, as you will remember, we worked to set up a network of inspectors general from the very beginning of this. which we thought was really essential to these kind of events. which would look hard at us and coalition efforts as they were unfolding. to get the most of the work we were doing. already john, you and your team, have had an effect on a future crisis that we would be involved in. what i would like to do is have a few minutes of questions. i will ask a couple then we'll go to the audience for a couple. and these will be forward-looking. the report obviously speaks for itself. there's a lot of detail in there. and there about the efficiencies and challenges that john and his team were able to see and document but this is not the end for the united states and the coalition. already as my reports implied, within 18 months of supposedly, the end of the conflict, we are now embroiled once again and

something in iraq and syria and it will continue. and it will continue. we need to profit and benefit from the work that you have done and others to ensure that we are better prepared as we go. again, thinking about the future, john, let's call this a hypothetical administration of the future. we have a crisis. it is one where we have the capacity not as the result of an emergency, but we have the capacity for some deliberate thought about how we will be involved in this evolution, how we will intervene or how we will be invited and how long we will be there and what we think the issues will be. you have been summoned to the white house. because of your work, to advise the president and his national security team on what they should be thinking about right now as the united states contemplates yet another effort which could result in a large

stabilization effort. if i could ask, what will you tell the president? keeping of course, in mind that you will probably be hired the minute that you are done talking. what would you tell the president, two or three things? >> the first thing and general, you and i chatted about this in the green room before we came on. get your staff to read the lessons learned reports that are already out there. i mean that was one of the things you discovered when you are leaving a team that you had no blueprint, no lessons learned and then you found a usaid report out there. which actually helped you. reports have been written. we discovered that in afghanistan. there was an accident report done by usaid on their involvement from 1950 to late 70s. and we found the report and it laid out a lot of the issues that we were finding right now.

but no one had ever read it. we cannot find anybody in the embassy or usaid who actually had seen it. the first thing is read what's been out there. the military will have lessons. the problem is the state and aid to lessons learned and incorporated into their training, teaching. the second thing is before you go in, know where you're going into. as a military commander you know you have to know the terrain. that applies to stabilization also. no how and why the people in that region supported the terrorist groups. what was the issue or issues they were doing? i think in afghanistan, we decided to duplicate norway in each one of these districts. we try to provide schools, highways, etc..what we should have looked at is what were the services that the taliban of the terrorists and insurgents

providing with me the people relatively happy. you do not have to give them everything at the start. the other thing is, despite your inclination to do it quickly, announce the success and declare victory, go home, it will take a long time. let's be realistic about this. let's be honest to the american people and the american congress that none of these things can be done quickly and successfully. those would be some of my advice. >> okay so the president is dutifully impressed with this. and then lays the bombshell on you that we always expect these days. this will be a coalition effort, not just the united states. please advise the niceties on how he or she should be thinking about how a community of nations effort for the stabilization effort might be

considered. we had 50 nations engaged in the coalition. >> in all 50 nations were sometimes going at cross purposes to each other. -- >> how do we solve that? or how do we think about it in ways. >> first but we have to realize we are dealing with the coalition allies all our sovereign nations. they have their own political reasons for doing what they are doing. they all have parliaments or congresses. they are officials, their generals have to respond to. you're never going to eliminate the fact that every country has their own prerequisites, their own -- so knowing that, let's assume the germans cannot go into a certain area, take that

into consideration. it is not a fault of the german parliament or they got a restriction or the japanese have a restriction. realize that and come up with a plan that utilizes each one of those countries best capabilities. that is the first thing. we have to be humble enough to realize that every other countries like ours i have political answers they have to come to. the other thing general is, if you know you're going to have a coalition of approach, realize that what's promised isn't always what's delivered and i think you probably face that with nato. you would go out and recruit the troops. nato promised x thousands but it turns out only have showed up. how do you then go forward with that hole in your approach? i think that is something to take into your consideration. >> okay, you're hired! [laughter]

one of the things that was an issue associated with -- which i experienced in iraq and elsewhere, is and i think you have touched on this. how should we be thinking about the stabilization and ultimately the reconstruction effort? because they should be bland. one should lead logically to the other and sometimes they can go on concurrently. in avoiding additional -- as you well know and forward-looking, we did leave quite a bill for the afghans each year for the maintenance of roads and infrastructure and buildings, etc. how should we be thinking about that? >> i think first, just thinking about that is important. i don't think we did think about it that much. particularly on the civilian side. part of it was a problem i think that comes back here to washington. we tend to think in appropriation cycles.

may we all think that way. we get in appropriation cycle one year, two years, we have to show success that justified. if we do not spend it we lose it. and that is the problem. i have commented before. i think you and i have said it is not that anyone we sent to afghanistan was not as smart and not as brave and not as honorable. we gave them a box of broken tools. we give them a personnel system that was broken. a procurement system that was broken. your rotational system that you had to face was broken. how you could get the people you wanted and have them stay long enough was broken. we need to look at those issues first. and i do agree with you about the afghans. i feel bad when i go over and talk to the afghans and we are putting new conditions on the afghans. but we realize that all of the

coalition are also putting new conditions and they are not coordinated. and each one of the programs from all of the various countries had their own requirements. documents have to be filled out. meetings that have to be made. and you wonder sometimes, what must the afghans be thinking on their side? here is another guy who is going to help me and another burden that i am putting on him. and i think if we can somehow get the allies together to think on a common platform, let's not overwhelm the afghans with filling out paper. you know, paper reform. paper reduction act which was passed years ago we ought to apply to the coalition development. >> i think to your point, the personnel rotation processes of all of the agencies, use the term broken, perhaps we would use different terms but they were certainly challenging.

remembering that while eunice came in for a year at a time, and they didn't always come in at the same or at the same time, there was overlap. an echelon. we have often heard this war was shot this 14, 15, 16 year war, when you're at a time. i think many of the rotational issues had they been better coordinated from the beginning across all of the agency and across all of the coalition partners, could have given us an operational perspective. and longevity of perspective which would have been helpful. in my first meeting with -- the new commander, he pointed out to me that i was 1/4 four-star general commanding in four years for him. this just creates her own institutional inactions and make this very difficult. >> we are 15 minutes left on the session. what i would like to is again, thank mr. john sopko for his questions and remarks.

when you get the microphone, and about 30 seconds after you get the microphone i will be looking for a question and what you are saying.and we will move very quickly to that question if i do not see it. this shaman right here in the front.then i will come over. >> hi, thank you so much for coming to speak today. my name is jonathan and i'm a student. >> please identify -- you are about to do that. please identify yourselves. thank you john. >> i am from connecticut and -- >> good for you. >> i'm wondering if you can speak a litt bit about pakistan. because i think pakistan has been a key variable that has impeded any success or stabilization efforts. and so, moving forward with our

stabilization approach with afghanistan, what type of approach should we take with pakistan? >> can i quickly answer that? i will defer to the general here. i look at just afghanistan and just reconstruction. pakistan is obviously an important player. the new strategy from the administration has a key component on pakistan. i will defer to the general because i think he spent a lot more time dealing with the pakistan issues than i did. i'm sorry i'm not avoiding this i just do not do pakistan. >> i will give you 30 seconds. the relationship between the united states and pakistan is not divorced from the relationship of pakistan from afghanistan. getting the pakistanis to see that their vested interest over the long-term are best served by stable afghanistan. one that does not affect benefit from other taliban elements. it is in their long-term best interest. there was a long time and i

believe that peace passed through there but many respects i think long-term stability of pakistan passes not just through islamabad but also through kabul as well. they have a similar view of a stable afghanistan.when the has a stability, and a viable reinvigorated economy. it is not just important to afghanistan. it is important to the long-term stability. thank you for the question. over here. the gentleman in the shirt please. >> thank you. general, first i would like to thank you for your comments on the retired vietnam veteran. >> thank you for your service pair. >> i am jack siegel, i made frequent trips to afghanistan.

when you began the discussion, you said that stabilization is keeping insurgents from returning. in my conversations with general carter, general richards, even general nicholson, i got the impression that in places like kunar and other places that they never left. they just went underground when we left there. that they were simply part of the society. so the objective is stabilization, have wepicked out the wrong party ? >> that is a good question. maybe by saying they always stay, i think we're indicating this problem is an afghan problem. and it is not like the people are going to run back to pakistan. but when the area or district is unstable, those people,

whatever the terrorist group is, have to be taken out of the way. eliminated in one fashion. if they decide to go underground, they decide to join a reconciliation group and become part of the government, that is another way. but you have to provide a service which in many of these districts, they provided ... >> the problem also as he saw in this report was that the afghan

government at times reviewed very negatively by the local people and what you need is to insert a government that the people support, a government that is not predatory. a government that is not a bunch of lawless warlords and that is the key thing. that was one of the things that i didn't talk about but i'm sure the panel will talk about that when we put so much money into these unstable environments we contributed to that problem of creating more warlords and more powerful people basically took the law into their own hands. in essence, the government we introduced particularly some of the afghan local police forces which nothing other than warlord militias some uniforms on were just as bad as the terrorists that were there before. >> let me add to this. if i were also summoned that a

to the white house one of the things i would tell the president is something we learned not just in afghanistan but have seen it in iraq but we sought in columbia is that some days there's a distinction without a difference in the insurgent and the criminal patronage networks. i don't think we got a figure from that in afghanistan. in my mind, there was a triangular threat to afghanistan's future but also in a military context. for the ideological insurgency which we would call the taliban and you had the drug and ice which fueled an awful lot the py views on how we get ready to go my first comment that the to the

president would be you must assume there will be an inherent inextricable link in criminality and corruption in the insurgency. you got to give the civilian agencies and got to give the military commander capacity to bring to bear on movement and drug enforcement capabilities in the right numbers to assist in the dealing with the insurgency. were not properly mix away we will ourselves into believing it defeated the television in a particular area only to find out now have the criminal patronage network in and there will fueled with the drug enterprise. we have to think of those individually will take two more questions. >> my name is jess, i used to work for an investor and i have

spent a few years now think about the relevant consulting. my company has done more products in afghanistan than anywhere else i'm headed back there with a un contract in a couple of weeks. my first question has to do with one of the elephants in the room to the afghans themselves. i imagine that you gentlemen a lot of people here might agree with something, an observation along these lines, we've all met a lot of afghans who are pretty darn good, are what troubled, speak a lot of linkages, who have great skills and a lot of them are young. if they could only get the leaders on top of their organizations tend to be corrupt from their own complaints out of the way there is a lot of capacity already there in cities in afghanistan to make use of my first question is would you agree with that? second would have to do with the

donors, mr. sopko, that you mentioned and of earmarks. i remember meeting eu police working on a long-standing product and they obviously had to spend most of the time coordinating with the us. a much bigger police training program. their observations are very much in sync with yours and they been there for years and some of the additional complaints that they would make for that they were seasoned detectives and essentially sergeants and captains and what have you that american counterparts were hired from all over the us and did not have a lot of training and of course we got into and if we are honest with ourselves a period of eight militarization of our police training and that was something that the eu was sensitive to. one last thing about the eu.

>> quickly. >> yes, they set up a project in kosovo where they set up built a justice ministry and the adjoining office every top official there had an eu advisor. the question is given that the eu does not have a great nation in this town and even more so in the election are we also able to learn lessons from some of our allies and friends and you brought up at the end even you said the donors are all there and we are putting on contingencies and things who coordinates all of that. is it always the us because we fund the most and had the biggest presence postmarked or should be the un on occasion? >> first to your question about the afghans. my personal experience is they are remarkable people. while i met a few that i probably wanted to take from time to time. [laughter] but the vast, vast majority from

the most senior from the most modern to the most traditional were extraordinarily admirable people i got great commitment ultimately to them till i take my last breath. with respect to the eu when i was the commander there which is getting to be a few years ago i think i can speak knowledgeably about it. i felt that the eu is a good partner for us. they did good work. in some areas where, as you remember, i'm sure you're permitted or familiar with this we had potential we contraction teams that were nationally owned. there was limitations and he used the term row use the term caveats and there was a national caveats associated with stabilization where there were gaps in between with a hug arians or the germans and what they might be doing the eu

worked hard to fill in those gaps. the eu remains, i think a credible there. is it the perfect outcome? can all do better but the eu has been a good partner, i think, in this regard we may have a different opinion in some places in washington but i think the eu will be in patent partner. and the un will continue to be independent partner. when we look at the most iso thing will discover is one of the heroes of that is a woman by the name of elise grundy in the undp report together a stabilization fund which came in immediately find the clearing of a [inaudible] someplace like that cable deflation funding in immediately ultimately to the rescue of the population to create the environment where the insurgents cannot or will not want to come back in the un is a great partner and has to be the

right moment for them in the eu is a great partner and we should bring in their strengths and play to their strengths and recognize the have caveats as well. this is a matter of ultimately us having the capacity for strategic planning in the start. we should not try to put together on the ground but it's too late when you put together on the ground. if there is anything you'd like to add. >> i agree general but the one thing i would add about the eu in afghanistan. i view them as the canary in the coal mine. as long as the current government is still surrounded by these young, honest, honorable, well-educated and they're taking a lot of risk in the government and i meet with the president almost every time i go and i see his top advisers as long as we see them i feel good. i feel optimistic. when they disappear then you problems. then we have problems. issued in report on security sector assistance we talked about in great detail the issue of police training and that was

one of the problems we saw were sending too many of the us military helicopter pilots, and other people to do police training. these should be doing it. >> one final point in the room and evaluating the president of the united states the key pieces we must give is the process of stabilization has to leverage the full potential of women of that civilization. the women of that culture. have to support their civil society and the role and in the stabilization and those efforts that can capitalize accelerate the role of women in the society but leverage a powerful influence in the society as we well. will break and go to the regular panel. >> gail from the us naval academy. very interesting i believe this short because it doesn't dovetail the previous question and some of your answers but that is taking your comments on coalition a little further. how do we actually accomplish

then addressing those problems with the coalition? do we do that at eight oh or do we do it or does the un take it on? does the united states taken on what do you suggest we learn these lessons and how do we do that? >> you take it. >> go ahead, i'll jump right in. >> i think on our security sector assistance lessons learned at the came out we talked about having having to take that into consideration early on. that was just in the security sector have not either in this report or in art lessons learned report, i think, private-sector element really looked at that issue yet. that is something have a lessons

learned called divided responsibilities that we are working on right now which tries to look at that whole issue of authorities and responsibilities and it's that gap between them. i don't have a better answer. i know as a petitioner is to deal with this on a daily basis. >> was go to the iso campaign. that was an ad hoc coalition in which nato hadn't interest in nato was formally a partner as was the eu. we are going to have to be organized we organized diplomatically to determine where those priorities are and establish those priorities in that coalition. as a matter of instance ad hoc coalitions don't get you so far for a certain period of time and from the moment you form a camp you need to see how johannes off to if you don't, was the mission in the period of time in this it for that coalition. it might be that a coalition will get handed off to nato for

their security purposes and headed to the eu for stabilization process but i will tell you as he began to build the counter isil coalition could find lines of effort. one of the earliest of the fine lines of effort we established early along into germany and the emirates took the lead on the planning with that line of planning civilization. the rescuing of appellations and from the beginning of the isil effort assimilation was important. we envisioned that and more capacity to do it in iraq and elsewhere start of the fight and we also had a government we could deal with. it was much more difficult and we had one last address this. is much more difficult to undertake coherent stabilization in syria have to think about areas were conduct stabilization where were in opposition to the

central government or central government can't reach that area and what kind of flexibility in that regard the grand strategic meeting of the nations has to occur early along in the process whether it's a us coalition or a nato-led coalition or un coalition. process of early leadership to determine from the very beginning began where stabilization plays in the process. it cannot be an afterthought. it can be something we think about is a clear the first health has recently we think about. i'm sorry we went over a couple minutes. my apology to the next panel. john, thank you for your comments and contributions morning ladies and gentlemen let me think our friend mike. >> thank you

. [inaudible conversations]

>> good morning. my colleagues are getting themselves microphones up, let me welcome you all to the second part of our conversation. this expert panel on [inaudible] in our foreign-policy programs here at the brookings institution. really delighted to lead a conversation to a fantastic group of people. you have their full biographies so i will give them very brief introductions. immediately to the left is [inaudible] my colleague and

senior fellow here who is a deep experience in afghanistan and many people who are terrorism, conflict as major challenges to security and stability. next to her is colonel who is currently the lidded as executive offer to the secretary of the army but i think is most important affiliation with the brookings institution is alarmist of our fellows program and he was here in 2016, 2017. he comes to this day with three comet tours in afghanistan and one in iraq. therefore a lot of relevant experience and familiarity stabilization challenges on the ground. you've heard a little bit about the province where he was

operating and we will discuss that more today. to his left delighted to welcome francis brown and she is a fellow next-door at the carnegie endowment for international peace. she joins carnegie after doing quite a bit of work in the us government and at the nst and is now writing a work on stabilization in syria which is a topic i'm sure will spend time on over the course of our conversation. finally, not last or least but it will be first in our discussion this afternoon or this morning is david young. david is the sigar team lead for stabilization for the report that you are holding in your nd. that is his baby. i think it is fair to say or at least one of them. he's an experienced analyst of governments and of stabilization issues both inside and out the us government. i am going to turn it to david

first to coalesce us into the other findings and especially forward-looking lessons for the us government on stabilization issues coming out of this report. david, inspector general sopko laid out one central finding in his remarks this morning that urgency and intensity that imperative to win control and heavily congested areas and led in many cases where the precondition were not there. there was still too much silence and contested. i am curious first of all for their cases of success and what were the conditions for success and then we can talk a little about the integrated military civilian kit that seems so

critical. >> thank you for muttering and having us. we found that some of the critical ingredients for success included a willingness to collaborate among civilian and military officials, both afghan and coalition, a willingness for those individuals on the ground to provide robust services, including what in preventing partners submitted with direct implementation. you had to have the right people in the right places. it is mostly what we found was stabilization efforts across the country mostly failed and we trace that back to critical decisions. the first was that we prioritize the most dangerous districts of the country first and there was considerable debate about this throughout the campaign but some believe that the best way to sequence stabilization programming was filled out and

work your way gradually toward the more insecure areas and in doing so in a sense the momentum to that effort. this was tried in 2006 and seven but mostly failed due to a lack of resources. the idea was that these were tipping point districts that if you went after the easier places first it be the way to getting to much more, and places a much harder places. by 2009 the model was flipped on its head and for the bulk of the rest of the campaign the idea became going after prioritizing the most insecure parts of the country first with the hope that if you take the worst places out

and mitigate in the worst places it would create called a cascading impact into the lower hanging fruit areas and the rest of the areas would help out if you took care of the most difficult places first. instead, we got bogged down in the extremely insecure areas and the inspector general highlighted that the civil servants were afraid because widespread campaigns and supports the did work had trouble moving around in the country because of the danger of doing so and inputting partners and projects et cetera et cetera. some of the areas were so dangerous that we had hoped to convince the proposition that they would be able to be protected when the drawdown occurred. i want to empathize of these were areas that they were so dangerous that many of them had seen little to no governance in years and they needed more time to come around and to accept and adjust to new sense of normal but there was no time which brings me to the second critical decision which was we threw down

forces and civilians on timelines unrelated to conditions on the ground. if you remember there's a surge from an 18 month search from about 2010-2011 in the three years transition. from about 2011-2014. the obama administration had good reasons for instituting the time-based timelines and we had the financial crisis and every dollar -- there was a sense that the prolonged search would give senior us military officials more room to request the more extensions and more escalations on the road. finally, there is a sense that these open-ended timelines will allow a exacerbate afghan dependency on american aid and while these reasons. we found them that they were

just not good enough. it cannot be reformed on the timelines and the scale that we had envisioned. believing that we could do so let us to make a number of critical comprises on programming, planning and staffing the nearly guaranteed the effort would fail in our eyes. francis, military planners in kabul had to change and had to come up with new objectives for the campaign plan to accommodate these new timelines. usaid had problem with staffing but they were not alone. the time and events had a shortage of civil affairs so they converted chemical warfare companies into civil affairs to implement their programs using four-week long training cycles that were entirely powerpoint. stability operations another dod grams failed glee, unsustainably

fast because there was a pending sense of this suppressed at the end of the drawdown that would have to come in there was a sense that the clock was ticking we had to make as much progress as good only had forces to do so. i want to highlight one less thing regarding the service delivery model. we talked about the service in the hope that the way stabilization worked in afghanistan was that you provide services in order to convince the population the government role was better. unfortunately, the services we try to help the government provide far more ambitious than they needed to be in place suited to the afghan environment in the context. for instance, the taliban and mostly secured the support of the population through coercion, simple, forced cooperation under threat of death but in theory it should not require a great deal of social service delivery to

win the hearts and minds of a population that is being terrorized by the television. the bar should be below in the circumstances for winning them over because they're looking for a state alternative. they're looking for essentially rudimentary law and order and prerequisite that we might provide them. it's not clear that it is robust service delivery model was necessary in many cases where coercion was the main method for securing the publications port. in other places securing the taliban and went beyond coercion and divided limited service delivery specifically security resolutions. instead of us using that as a model instead of us competing on the terms of the television we try to provide a diverse array of relatively advanced services ranging from agricultural guidance and insight to agricultural equipment to health

care and education that went well beyond the telemanagement provided. in some cases but the taliban had used two accrued legitimacy. for instance, instead of doing dispute resolution or programming along dispute resolution like the television was doing we built courthouses and trained prosecutors and there's a contested districts because even though afghans found them unfamiliar, slow and corrupt and so we did this despite the fact that 90% of afghans resolve disputes through informal means because according to one senior eight official we talk to wanted to give them something they never had before. this was a chronic mismatch to what afghans find effective and

occasionally legitimizing and what we wanted to buy them and if it's due to this need to pinpoint what the government should be based on what had been provided to them in the recent past and allow them to accrue that legitimacy. >> david, thank you. i think it's important to highlight here that sigar mandate is brought and in this lessons learned report and it's very good to say that you're not looking at just in fermentation but what you identified here sounds to me that yes, failures of implementation but primarily the theory of the case of stabilization as applied in the circumstances. i want to turn to you for comment on precisely that it. one of the findings that david just laid out is is the idea

that the us set the bar too high and was trying to provide governance at a level beyond where it should've been trying to compete with the television which is basic security and basic law and order. do agree that. >> not fully. i think it's a more committed mismatch of expectations and various promises. fundamentally i agree with david that it's part of the televisions entrenchment was fundamentally by order and also brutal order but nonetheless in order so in my many trips to afghanistan i encountered similar narratives of people about the television and the relationship of the television to the populations. people would inevitably say if you don't like the telemanagement we didn't like it

but then the telemanagement is in power [inaudible] no one would rob you. the brutality is universally far more easier to develop coping mechanisms and adjust to and unpredictability. what happened with us intervention was not just provided more ambitious governance but we promised far more but we often provided a miss governance by the afghan government and associated officials. the tremendous amount of corruption and unpredictability that was actually conditioned by the fact that we often take as our security partners [inaudible] to be applied because of us troops and international troops and capacity to delegate anti- television gains and they often through territories highly

abusive and highly unpredictable in their predatory behaviors. with often minimizing access to markets to local populations, not simply imposing rules but becoming exclusionary as to how it could go about the everyday livelihoods. i would also say that a crucial element however and the device in afghanistan is that people, local people, have expectations of what a government should provide and what an insurgent group should provide and that is the classic rise of expectations with a different kind of entity to you and so my view is not that we gave them too much but we gave them far less than they

got under the taliban and but we promised far more. >> excellent summary. i have to ask you and we heard john allen and john sopko talking about this earlier how much of the problem is the afghan government? >> i'm sorry but it is a fundamental part of the problem. this goes back to the relationship between pakistan and afghanistan. they will often tell you that if only pakistan is not the problem there would not be problems in afghanistan. indeed, pakistan has been a tremendously destabilizing conflict and completed actor. no doubt about it. however it is never good government in afghanistan than the stabilizing effect of afghanistan would be far more limited in the effects they have been. clearly it's a new government and its four years into the

government but [inaudible] people had high expectations of how much the government would deliver on to beat up on corruptions in delivering better more protectable governance including good governance. it has been a tremendous struggle for the government with lots of disappointment and once again high animate expectations and because of troops continually reliance on highly problematic warlord problematic military powerbrokers with deliveries of land governance. i'd highlight one [inaudible] there are more probably the afghan politics which would be an appropriate to the blame solely on the afghan government. a large part of afghanistan's continuing troubles is the fact

that the politics continues to see its role as constantly engaging and rocking the vote of the state to gain a narrow and engage in very narrow politics competition for economic spoils and never coming together and even at times of great crisis and potential infection points to put national interest in some sort of basic unity and capacity for governance to take place. instead no one in afghanistan ever governance but people constantly engage in politics. >> thank you. jb, i want to come to you on this question of expectations. everything about this as well because iraq just to parliamentary elections and very soon after the territorial scene of isis and iraq although there's quite a bit of work to do. one of the striking outcomes of

that election was that in the areas that isis held the hardest for the longest around mosul that was the least secretary and voting, the most interest expressed in an active government and service delivery. curious whether what rhonda is describing about expectations, does that ring true to you based on your experience? >> absolutely. first off, thank you for having me. it's apparent that i'm successfully treating an academic fraud. >> we all are, man. that's what we do. >> it spot on with expectations and management as a challenge. and the service delivery or political framework. my particular case study in 2010 in afghanistan works there for a

couple of reasons. i won't say it's a model for everywhere but i will close in a minute or two with a salient lessons learned when we look at potential syria stabilization or other places that the military and civilian apparatus would be involved in. i will go over the entire case city and you don't need that and thanks to david's great work but in 2010 we came in at the start of the surge in the strategy and mission was to do counter insurgency of which the center of gravity are the people and winning them over and the people gravitated to the side or sides that are winning and at that time to paraphrase a former speaker of the house, all politics is local. you want to have a district government and i think everyone in the audience gets her driver's license and most interact of government with the local elephant yoga bang on the

white house everyday or maybe do but in any other country you want the connection to happen to you on that interaction apparatus. when you 13 districts in the province all of which three were trained districts because they had most of the publisher. well, another important districts that to away and was in a key district word and have anything going for it for services. by the way, is a major transit route for [inaudible] and had been historically both those provinces [inaudible] in the 1980s those were the places that [inaudible] fought off the soviets. in 2010 very similar situation. every three or four insurgent group was up there for al qaeda and little detail of the taliban and t-uppercase-letter telegram the operational leadership was in the area and all that was up there and all of it wanted to

take cunard because you have this capabilities entering. we came in with lessons learned and afghanistan previously and iraq and in the unit that had learned this is a whole a government problem and not just military problem. a thousand people in the task force cannot sell this. we can enable but in the month we were there before what you read about in the book that happened in june i lost nine soldiers. the conditions were that bad. there was a giant red arrow. if i could show you an arrow, we broke up 606 suicide honors in that month and there was pressure everywhere. this will come in and try to win over the people was not going to work and if you accept the conditions that. it was pretty bad. we were so lucky to have them

embedded with us. >> usaid. >> it was called a military [inaudible] and they are in there and doing stuff precision and surgical and they can make quick affects by synchronizing the tactical things on the ground. the time is good so it's an advanced regard and very effective for us. [inaudible] you could integrate the provincial and district government capabilities. i put this later on that we had to go into morrow wara because we had to clear out significant trends to not only the district but the provincial capital and the military side of that was pretty effective because we were able to pull insurgents away through combat actions and the main effort and the integrated planning from the beginning was the ability for stabilization efforts contracts to own the

problem immediately and once still is ended and we cleared the we had contracts prewritten and work that out with the district government ahead of time and looked at where he could have employment and work for abatements the printed flooding or fire minerals to get vaccinations for their animals. it helped also that the district governor was a former [inaudible], this gregarious red bearded hated the soviets and fought there so he not only knew everybody a new the players besides but knew the terrain which was helpful. he knew and gave great advice on how to the expectations by under promising and over delivering. that is a key point. it was all about integrating people and we are lucky in a

couple of ways. in the army we say things are always about people, leadership and mitigation between. the political will was there and coming up to the operation we had talked to elders in the valley surreptitiously and we got them to come in and i was looked at in the face by members of the delavan that said do not ask us to help you, we are television and this is our government. that's shocking, isn't it? that was a cry for help. they were getting some of the dispute resolutions in the upper valleys and that's my land and no it's not and you will pay me a thousand reviews and i'll solve it right now. it's done. the afghan government cannot compete with that. the brutality aspect of it and the beheading of the elders in the villages was too much. they were basically hostages we had to free that up. some of the lessons learned are applicable in that whole

integrated political military plan is key and consistent plan over time that is not going to wax and wane because political will waxes and wanes. you got to have willing partners and you have to. you can have someone who will pull out and have someone who has one toe in the water. everyone has to be on. we were lucky in that way. this might not be applicable in other places but it was for us for those reasons. you cannot on success more than the people do. you cannot want success more than the people you're trying to help. you can't do that. i could go on for days about some examples of that but i believe that bumper sticker there for you persistence, come to dialogue, i said before that there was a book called three cups of tea and i argue that it's incorrect, it's 3 gallons of tea. socializing in talking to everyone all the time is part of

it. the discussions before and after operations that when the military dies down we go to efforts to stabilize in continues. he will not create a government and the enemies out and you got it. it requires assistant but they have to want it, too. seek out the true spheres of influence. the powerbrokers knowing who they are locally is key and essential. sometimes they are very [inaudible] we have a hard time understanding the cultural differences in aspects but those who can understand can pull the people when they want to. we have to find the motives and incentives. that is human mapping with what we do in our business and it was very difficult. measures of performance and mr. sopko mentioned this earlier. measures of performance does not equal measures of [inaudible ef.

it's an incorrect evaluation. this could spend a thousand dollars on the trashcan district no, you're not, you don't answer that. if you put men out of a village during the nazis and so the looks great but there's pumpkins rotting in the field. road to hell is paved with good intentions sometimes. you are dealing with an open dynamic, human interactive systems and a system of systems and you cannot predict how this will end. you have to constantly be there to see the changes and be persistent. you can't come in and drop in projects and leave. not just from a security standpoint but to be there with the people you're helping to stabilize in the afghan government and your partners have to be the lead in that.

they have to. everything is hard and hard all the time. many things are simple but the simplest things are difficult. persistence pays off. we had a great set of leaders and partners who are persistent and wanted to see that outcome. those operations you read about like the soldiers that i lost, the first month, nine soldiers and i lost another eight between the two operations keeping the districts stable. memorial day is coming up and we remember those hard things. there will be a cost enough to assess and analyze the stabilization in an area. have to ask yourself how does this end. >> thank you. i want to come back to this issue of integrating the military civilian target and how that is here in washington. we set that up for success and i think that is the key policy question for the future. i want to bring this to you now and i know you've been thinking

a lot about serious stabilization and it's something i've been working on is well with colleagues at the world bank and i think one lesson they have taken away from their previous experience is less emphasis on physical info structure and more on the him human that you are talking about and the problem is they don't they are not well set up to do that kind of work. i think one of the greatest challenges in these environments is that human terrain is so shaped by the conflict. you essentially have a politics and an economy of the civil war and in afghanistan after decades of civil war in syria after nearly a decade of civil war this gets pretty entrenched. how do -- especially when you're not working through central government but a central government that is not your partner in a syrian case how can

the united states or other outsiders come in and do this work without reinforcing that warlord is him and thereby setting the conditions for relapse as soon as we are gone. are you essentially rewarding the guys who one with the most brutal tactics in their own local areas and they set up their own system to sustain themselves and you are essentially saying i now give you legitimacy and authority with my money and investment and that is the deal the computer part as soon as our money and investment are not here. >> that is important. it's a lesson that comes through the experience and loud and clear in this report on the afghan experience. if you are thinking about a stabilization we need to think about it in terms of a realistic political and state and that realistic clinical and state

needs to be local and also to the extent applicable to the national government. in the afghan case as made clear in the reports the afghan reports made it transparent with and state of mind and it was a clearly stated political and game but had no bearing on the realistic timeline that they would take the government's willingness to reform or decentralize and as you say local powerbroker willingness to see the responsibility and accountability to local levels. is a real mismatch. a political desire to the in-state was real mismatch. in the syrian case there's a different mismatch ongoing on the realistic political and state. very much exasperated by the economy. in the syrian case a problem has not been both the we've not had realistically stated political and state clearly stated

political and state there were trying to stabilize towards but programs need to be in service of a broader goals and i say in the syrian endeavor it's been a remarkable progression of not clearly stated and states so, as you know very well, in the early years we had an op-ed statement that was not backed up by security choices and in that sense it wasn't a realistic political and sacred in the years starting from 2013-2014 became increasingly unclear what are stabilization programs were stabilizing ports. we had a stated policy of [inaudible] must go and at the same time when the us standpoint we prioritize militarily the fight against isis so are revealed preference in that direction. we saw this come through on the confusion on the ground within

our stabilization programming at that point. are we empowering these local actors to be more accountable in order to be responsive and advanced a post view or empowering these local actors to enforce a counter isis objective. >> or are we empowering the people who are good at fighting isis. >> yes, precisely. there was a real lack of clarity and i think we learn time again is unique clarity of objectives from every level in order to achieve the impacts we effectively want. password to the current day is a stabilization programs are underway we have a less clear political and states that we are driving towards. there has been from a trump administration revealed preference for the counter isis fight or even a declared one and former secretary tillerson

stated a much more ambitious going back to the lack of realism ambitious objectives but since it's departure it's unclear as to what our objectives are at this point. meanwhile were sending mixed signals and the president himself called into question our forces in eastern syria as well as the actual stabilization programming. without a realistic and clearly political objective i don't see it any way of getting around some of these exact challenges you mentioned of confusion and averse incentives on the ground. >> i want to turn to this question of how to build a better effort. i think one of the big issues raised by the report is the insufficient capability on the civilian side but also the primary liquidation of the

report to the executive branch in congress is to compel the state department to take the lead across the interagency and develop a conference of whole government strategy that somehow someone has to direct. there's a capability problem but also leadership problem. i was discussing this integrated challenge with colleagues last week and one of them challenge us to say what is a successful example of the united states ever fully integrating the to get on behalf of of a major stabilization mission. you know? i think when we add to that the political will question a lot of people in the american public and folks in congress question whether this is something we can effectively do. i am curious for thoughts on

that. is there a successful mission that you would point to? and is this something that you can't fit nearly by developing a strategy but someone who is given, perhaps, congressional and allocated authority presidentially invested authority across the interagency to direct that strategy and design it. in particular i think of the efforts that was put into play after the fall of the berlin wall and it's a different circumstance but congress and the administration mobilized the freedom support act and those new authorities and investments were directed by someone who had congressional authority and presidential letter to bring the

interagency together. that office still exist in the state permit today although not necessarily follows original authority. we need a stabilization czar and i don't just mean that in terms of title but legal authority as well. >> thank you. if the fundamental question. i guess i'm not fully comfortable with the german example and the reason i'm not comfortable is that our fundamental problem is not simply the lack of our coordination and the illusion of the whole of government approach but far more i would say the crux of the problem far more is the cross this workings of our counterparts. when that was not an issue in germany the german leadership has a strong vision of what they

wanted to achieve in a strong commitment to integrate east germany and a vast amount of resources and is still what we are three decades now past is the disparity between east and west and the level of disparity everywhere else. to me the crucial problem is not our deficiency although they are a problem for the crucial problem is the local counterparts and their view is often highly mobile and one of getting spoils that rather than building [inaudible accountablee estate. we have not really dealt with adequate roadmap as to how to go about it. in the obama administration and it happened terribly in afghanistan but the obama and

ministration portion of that picture and they would fall back because they would constantly be afraid if we lose any kind of collectivity or work. frankly there have been real limitations with the government and what they have had to perform. that is the crux of the problem and how do we get our local partners despite all the rhetoric that you are building local partner capacity to embrace the same political vision of good government, inclusion and equity. the more we pulled up warlords in the more we hand over military agreement ironically the more we have insight undermined. >> thank you. i take that point but i'm not yet going to let go of the question of authorities and

washington decision-making. let me ask you did you consider as you develop the recommendations here whether congress whether congress might assign these authorities legislatively? >> sure. in 2004 and five these authorities specifically looked at the civilian response court was already established and peter out because of a few other comprises talk about in the report. to you issue of can work ever i have not seen evidence that it can in these specific areas and places like vietnam, iraq, afghanistan but for the issue of should be in the lead in the interagency that the station be in the lead and in the recent stabilization they should be the lead in the us [inaudible] it's interesting that what is on paper is not always what is in

practice. even while we recommended on paper is important to note that the stabilization strategy came out in 2009 was drafted by [inaudible]. in theory they were the lead after of the strategy the reason they are reinforcing it again and again is that once a strategy made it down the channel to a country the state was in control and cobble in dod was in control outside of kabul. what that meant was in what is inherently a political mission the defense department is in charge of determining what areas need to be stabilized and how to go about stabilizing it. that is one of the things that cause the enormous risk that it comes back to resources because how can we and sigar included how can we recommend the state be in the lead of an effort that is poorly resourced to execute.

that is why we also recommend the revival of the civilian response with the necessary modifications because no credible state department levered to be led on the ground especially outside of kabul if it's thinly resourced with personnel, training the brand and stood up the strategy rather than in the operations where we feel it's important to establish these institutions so that we are prepared so that nuclear state and aid are prepared in the military is accustomed to be prepared for the worst inconsistencies state and aid are not given the program and with what resources to do anything. >> db, from a military perspective yes, these are inherently political missions and i think everything you're describing about the work you are doing on the ground is politics and you doing local politics. but the militaries mission is the counterterrorism mission in the national interest that drove us there was counterterrorism and if you look at the syria case that is even more prominent in the ways that francis was

same. is there a way that we can get past that dictation to think about this in a broader way? >> short answer is yes. the counterterrorism mission of going after transnational turn of so in the away games they don't come to our home game is of course but the broader application of force in stabilization against insurgents who have kept that region so unstable that those transnational terrorist groups continue to have that affect their violent extremism and places. from a military perspective there's a role that we have to play to enable the stabilization to happen. ...

there are 120,000 multinational soldiers on the ground so it gravitates towards the resource and security. we have to be better at that when we planned. how do we use consistent strategy over time wherever we are? there's a great description. there is no military officer. first identify the problem and it's important that military people have stabilization. it was not fully rebuilding but bosnia kosovo and ongoing mission. a good aspect of that there are some things that don't pertain to the model.

we haven't done the stabilization effort since japan >> and even bosnia. a lot of combustible elements. >> although one must always think of judgments in relative terms. i want to come back to you velda but france is first on the issue of integrating the focus. such a challenge and i agree with david that the assistance review provides a really valuable if long overdue definition of the state should be in the lead for the stabilization strategy. dod in suppo on what the department would like to do. think the challenge is in most of these environments we have to ask the question say there's not

a unitary actor as we all know and is in many bureaucracies we have a break down between regional and functional entities when you conceive of the stabilization mission you have the ambassador and the chief commission. he is devising a strategy and which heroes back in washington supports stabilization folks are the regional folks. sometimes there is restriction there. additionally from the nfc perspective stabilization functional perspective i think certainly the functional person of the afc in every single country and are which we are undertaking stabilization. >> i think we are making progress on this thanks in part to this and i think it's going to be challenging in that regard. >> vanda you made a very worthy point that one of the key challenges here is persuading

the government of these places to embrace a different model of government. that seeing the government and the spoils is a recipe for continued instability. i guess number one i want to challenge that a little bit. bury per the division of spoils works very effectively to get all of the parties incentive. it's not great in terms of delivering government services. civil society has developed an alternative mechanism including that patronage system but it works. number one is that so bad to get to that place from warlord

division to a peaceful division of will. but the second question is we are sitting in front of the afghan political elite. what is the case he made to them that persuades them that this is worthwhile? >> that's what u.s. foreign policy is struggled with throughout the engagement. the case that i have tried to make is that the level of instability is to high for it to remain stable. in fact the conversation that i have had for my interlocutor pointing out -- look at nepal but nepal has a civil war and the country is deeply troubled. it's penalized but you don't

have a very potent insurgency. you can extract and it's very different than the insurgency. nonetheless to me at crucial inflection point was when could this province including the taliban look like taking over the province in the north. but many people there ready to go out of the country and ultimately i've heard the

taliban was pushed out from colin does and the taliban took a captive so long and kept it for several weeks. by this moment, there was a moment when the afghanistan was really shaken up. that moment was an opportunity to say it will all come out. very quickly the moment that be have hit the brink in the same bad behavior has said then. this is the point. i would identify one of the most distressing ones. the other aspect i would highlight is that the polls are shrinking in afghanistan. with the limited presence and

international presence the amount of money to be handed out and otherwise is far smaller. you have an economy year ago but it's nowhere what it was in 2010, 2011 and 2012. if you take -- out it's not simply the taliban that is critically involved. it's just about everyone including political almonds and the government. if you get rid of the international money and economists more broadly -- my final point is a crucial problem is unfortunately in places like afghanistan it's not just the taliban owns large houses and property.

this problem that they can meet in the people cannot technique an app policies all of the time thinking it's not going to fall it's not going to go into a civil war again. perhaps it would encourage good behavior. my last comment -- is going to be in next year's presidential election. >> okay it's time for me to open up this conversation to all of you. i'm going to follow my bosses lead which is to ask you please if you'd identify yourself briefly before you ask your question and i did post that word in the singular so please restrict yourself to one question.

you can deliver to one member the panel or the panel in general. right appear in the front. >> thank you very much. i'm -- an african-american journalist who has covered so many aspects of this. i guess i will start with the notion that i heard about afghans believe having the opportunity to leave. your commentary really summarized what was earlier termed. i'm going to speak to you as an afghan now not just as a journalist. having watched the saga unfold at nine years old watching the palace being bombed while the west is on the brink of a new

rivalry with russia that democracy is trying to survive in the midst of portrayed at least by your opponent staged to look like it is -- we are now in the context of afghanistan talking about a situation and spelled out in parts of the flaws are in the way that engages rivalry. this elite democracy rivalry is well and alive and continues. >> your question. >> my question is it makes more clear afghans are glad to have a

little more commitment towards afghanistan. they are very anxious about what will become a country and with new reverie people are even more anxious about what this means when the u.s. reduces its involvement there especially when we are talking as experts about how much we should talk the problem over. >> we will have to leave it there. thank you. okay so look we are a political system that tends to prioritize the short-term and the long-term there's a need for long-term points for persistence, for strategic planning and the sustained effort so number one do you think that there is today

in the u.s. government in the last 15 years will within the government recognition within the government of the need to keep her hands on the power in afghanistan. number two how do we make the case to the american people that we need to sustain that effort? >> who wants to pick that up? >> i think as you say what we have learned from the last 15 plus years is a sense of predictability. reports like this. a strategy did lay out a commitment to afghanistan. i did not work on that strategy but that is out there for all to see and i think it's a striking

long-term commitment. i do think we need to continue to push on this issue because what we have learned in the aside case in the syrian case in the iraqi case we need sustainability. doesn't matter if we have where democracy seems to be doing better and security seems to be doing better. people make accusations based on what they think the game will be next year in the year after that situations in which they are not sure about that question they will hedge and they will hoard. that undermine stabilization. it undermines it in syria and elsewhere. of course implementation is the hard part. >> like me look -- make this forward-looking. given the lessons from

afghanistan experience should the u.s. government think a lot harder before taking on new missions in new places? >> i don't have those opinions but. our secretary of defense and secretary of the army has the cost of doing business because we are constantly engaged. we are totally engages people and that's good. stabilization is good across the globe but every time something flares up somewhere else are

those decisions reason for the long-term view or target right there. i would argue that the armed forces military doesn't have a great track record of getting the next conflict right. probably because we don't have that long-term view. [inaudible] that comes at a constant in what we do with that said we have to weigh the cost benefit on will will we be there longer than participated and what will they cost the? >> that other's? >> in undertaking the support we sought to accomplish two things specifically.

we started realizing these were the two critical objectives and that was the first to raise bright red flags for the enormous investment necessary to even consider making progress in these kinds of environments so that there would be sort of a one-stop shop on the document that we could look at in 20 or 30 years from now. when considering maybe the next big one. in the event as the deliberations unfold they can see better the principles and the national security council and policymakers can have a better sense as to exactly what it would take and whether it's worth it not to be able to ask that question is it worth it even though if everything goes well and all the things that are currently in control were able to effect that in an officially there's still uncertainty at the end of that. with those risks if and when they decide to pursue another long-term stabilization mission

like iraq or syria like iraq and afghanistan than the second objective comes into play which is how do you go about doing it to what are the boxes you need to check and what are the best practices in the ways in which everything from the strategic level of considering the will of the government whether they are on board all the way down to watching how the dominos fall two how do you cluster projects to make sure the service delivery isn't just a collection of one offs and there's a real sense of a service being provided with the government. the report we hope serves the purpose of the giant red flag for caution as well as if you decide to pursue this here are some ideas. >> there's a framework for thinking it through. do you have anything to add

vanda? >> i'm not persuaded that the white house is as committed to long-term persistence in afghanistan. i think the white house was deeply conflicted last summer and how the decision would be made and i see various signs of relationships and as i mentioned it's a very difficult situation that will require a lot of thinking on our side about how you would handle that. do you want to have a replay of 2014 including the role of u.s. intervention at this point so those are all the problems that followed. what does that mean for u.s. engagement? >> thank you. right in the middle the gentleman and a blue tie.

>> i'm james brody and active army officer. there seems to be a reoccurring theme of the need to synchronize or redefine the roles of the triad and usaid the state department and the army. what are some of the lessons learned about things we can do to redefine working better together? >> i will start off. my personal opinion is that they have done a good job of collecting lessons learned. we are here to train. it's open. you get a take-home package of stuff that you learn from and take back home again. when you prepare for deploying either prepare for war. specific to afghanistan stabilization there are several

things that i think are helpful. what i see inside the military now as we have challenges in the four plus one. the strategy articulates differently to the same types of threats. but the military is not running away from the middle east and south asia completely, just to focus on that belief inculcated other lessons learned and i say that because we didn't do that so well. we didn't take some of the original experiences we had. we were cracking open the books. we cracked them open and went wow. from a military perspective was done a better job at that. if you go to the training centers now there's a lot more

platform of cyber and that's great. they are still somebody tried to integrate. it's not just action combat. there's a whole human network and that's part of the lessons learned in iraq and afghanistan. then very quickly from a civilian stamp what i served with usaid in afghanistan as well. at the textual level of coordination and integration goes really well. i think the challenge is further up the chain there's a divergent chain of command. there many people who coordinate about that and that often leads to confusion with no ill will. there's also for the many fewer civilians to do the coordinating in its level compared to our military colleagues. i think there a lot of organizational challenges. >> thank you.

>> my name is karen johnson. the moment i met franklin's fellow and the operations through. i'm very happy to hear the discussion about the stabilization system which was quite a challenge anyway because of a particular division of labor but the real challenge now in trying to implement it. that's going to take a lot of time to congress and trying to rebalance a cemetery and the state department the civilian response corps. you obviously know the history of csl but my point in question is this will take a very long time in trying to redirect the sources for that division of labor in our coalition

arrangements and everything. i know there has been discussion sometimes very small exchange of resources from the state department to do stabilization efforts. for example they could try to see whether the division of labor happens in our coalition for example what limitations would say the danish government and other governments don't have those kinds of legal limitations or authority so what can we do in the interim very specifically while we try to work on the heavy lifting of getting congress to give more money. >> so how do we do this sort of stopgap work on the civilian side while making the case for bigger civilian capabilities and is there a role that coalition partners can play and not?

>> i think you very well laid out the challenges and for the interagency efforts it's now moving to the implementation plan. i think they realize as well. i think you always need context and i think your idea is helpful. we need to look at the aspects in which the division has been tried or is being tried. the other thing i think we need maybe a relatively lower hanging fruit. we need to rethink how we monitor and define success on stabilization. because as we all know metrics or how we operate in the u.s. government. what i mean by that is in the stabilization setting in afghanistan and syria also we have edged towards eight --

rather than durable communication. we also grabbed anecdotes rather than the systemic evaluation of how we are doing on stabilization the stabilization endeavor pair will give you a couple of examples bring that in the stand we saw a couple of districts that really turned it around of the stabilization front and we would hear about these things constantly. not only in, higher and not only in helmand come these were areas in which there was genuine success in the government stabilization process. the problem is these areas didn't always generalize in a broader effort. they also didn't necessarily last beyond a couple of rotations who may been assassinated or reassigned. we gravitate to these anecdotes. we look at a lot of indicators.

for example in afghanistan we have made great progress on tracking local attitudes but none of that is the fundamental question which is the karzai government ready to reform and make lasting progress? and serious where we seen a tremendous amount of research and atmospherics monitoring on local dynamics and power the process is working. it's a very granular level. and these have been meaningful indicators during the stabilization effort but tragically they don't necessarily affect the outcome of the stabilization effort and ultimately it is military factors on whether local council gets to stick around or not. we are going to start on the implementation side we need to

relocate how we are measuring it. then the bureaucratic so move backwards from there. >> i will just add to someone who ran in the state department and has made that case to congress look i think the development is a long way. it has come a long way and there is monitoring and evaluation that can make a persuasive case. if a lot of it does tell a narrative, the grade anecdote. that shining example of a provincial governor who is the best partner ever so we pour a lot more money into that place. part of the problem here is how to persuade congress. what will be the story that brings them? >> just add to that because we lack the unified u.s. government

or codified u.s. government political end state we often have different components of the u.s. government persuading congress in different ways. i think some of her own bureaucratic -- their critics exacerbate that. >> exactly. >> thank you very much. i probably would have said hard lessons learned. that's enough. if we were having this in kabul, if we were having this meeting were mainly in afghanistan so what do you think the reactions would be to the report and i'm actually curious have you discussed it with them?

i would like to hear your feedback. >> among many interviews we interviewed 10 to 20 senior and mid-level afghan officials ranging from ministers to provincial governors to program managers involved in the stabilization effort. their feedback and insight are littered throughout a report. in the process of interviewing them we essentially socialized or findings that may resonate very well. the main perspective is 20 people sprinkled across the government. their perspective was often that the u.s. government did not listen or pay enough attention to their concerns that they overestimated their ability to perform and that they misunderstood afghan capacity for willful bad intent. i will give one example. the program it was sort of meant

to be the program that deployed civil-service to the key district so they could than half the people there to provide the services necessary. the core concept and of stabilization. there was a process that ddp was using that meant that when for instance the district government official needed buy a cable for the office or something the receipt for that wasn't distributed and as these hand receipt processes built the there was a $700,000 shortfall and usaid interpreted this as ms. allocation of funds and it shut that program down after two or 3 million were dispersed out of 40 million. and this is one example and probably the most egregious in

misinterpreting poor capacity for willful corruption. it was hard in fairness it's very difficult for foreigners coming into country even government employees to discern the capacity for corruption. this is one of the casualties in that battle. the afghans i think at that point there was a significant gap in the expectation of the people who are implementing it on the ground and in kabul with the afghans who support was absolutely vital to that effort. >> do you want to chime in on that at all? all right, we have only got a few minutes left and i see a lot of hands. we will collect a few questions and come back up to our panel. >> just wait for the mic if he would.

>> from late 2010 terry tonko by working kabul as government policy chief. my question is directed to david as the author of the report. it could really be called operational from strategic or tactical. i think chapter 5 of the report provides an excellent case study of a couple of key challenges you face the stabilization first and initial focus on levels of government on focusing on our strengthening efforts. namely districts that were not sustainable medium term. secondly the problem. credit inertia that prevented all of the different parts of the u.s. efforts and elements of

civilian efforts from focusing on it. making a shift away from districts which might have been from a stabilization perspective. my question is is the difficulty making a clear and coherent policy decision on what is. straightforward question on whether we should be focusing on the governance efforts at the district level for the provincial level which has giant implications. are difficult to make any coherent decision like that the argument is stabilization as a whole and if not is there something more that could be done to strengthen our ability to coherently make policy issues like back? is suspected or likely at the headquarters in the embassy kabul. >> thank you very much and just hang on to that question. we'll ask a couple more on the side.

>> shone with the bog's office. you mention in syria the involvement in the state and how that affects what you are stabilizing. what is the end state in afghanistan? what is it being stabilized towards? is it realistic and how do you walk back promises and expectations that are unrealistic and achievable? >> thank you. b the contractors you will find out a lot of the problems but going back to what the colonel mentioned in terms of vietnam and we did have a stabilization czar bear. i wonder if -- in many ways is

very successful. >> and qm let's take one more in the aisle right there. >> my name is edward and i'm a retired former vice president of the world bank. i know nothing at all about afghanistan. the lesson i had this morning was. [inaudible] it wouldn't be the least bit surprised if i heard them 10 years ago but very surprised hearing these lessons and 15, 16 and 17. something must be terribly, terribly wrong. my question is if you had one or

two things that you wanted done in five years time what should they be? >> that is a fantastic question and i'm going to go straight down the line here and let david take that at the end. i think that will be a great way to wrap this up. >> one comment about the end state in afghanistan. i don't leave the other strategies. there was an announcement on the timelines in the process of u.s. engagement with very little articulation of it. president trump during the announcement made many statements to the effect you will not tell the afghans how to run their stay. our goal is to degrade the

taliban which were notions that the george w. bush administration and the obama administration frequently talked about that and forth. is it enough to --of the taliban? many top u.s. officials walked to backing up his eyes the need for good governance and society for politics and on the -- nonetheless the message was heard loudly and had consequences with us today. also what we have going back and forth all the time on is what is the importance of the taliban being part of the negotiations? in recent months we have gone back and forth over the purpose of military efforts in afghanistan to drive the negotiations. again the president of government officials made

statements or the taliban itself is making contradictory statements. my cases our strategy in afghanistan is waiting for the taliban to make a mistake. if we go out full scale civil war takes place however we don't really have a strategy. we are holding and hoping that over time the taliban will make another mistake. it's not impossible. militant groups make mistakes. critical mistakes were made in columbia at its height of power. they are not sufficient without changes taking place on the part of the colombian state but nonetheless we are in this mode

which will shake up is what happens with the political situation after the presidential election? >> thank you. >> on the stabilization, bizarre -- be czar my opinion is it could be a structured representative or something like that but the challenger will run into strategically as you have 50 nations suthers and international multinational command of nato command is their right now and of course you want that. to have one person integrate that is a challenge and the way we set up this byzantine command and control architecture and it has evolved over time. that alone is a spirit -- challenge for one person to pull

together through a calmer did in vietnam was to set stabilization zones to the country. sanctuaries in cambodia and sanctuaries in pakistan. this urgency that had a bunch of support from outside control. until he can control some of those outside factors stabilization is a lot harder. it's an open dynamic system. i think fundamentally somebody could and the congress gives them the power the capability to pull that together. i would be irrationally optimistic that you would get a better synchronized approach because that person is empowered to do so. >> thank you. francis. >> jeremy thank you for the focus on the district level

focus on what could we have done to alter that? the focus came from an analytics composition which is that afghans empower their government mostly the local level hoping the local level will undermine the insurgency. our folks in the district level came from a romantic notion that similarly things are more traditional on the local level. i think that perpetuated some of the reasons. as you rightly point out the right focus would have been at the middle level of government. there are 34 of them and almost 400 so getting that level 1 and authorities right on that level would have been a much better way to go. why couldn't we i'm glad that calmer -- i wrote a piece on

afghanistan because i do think a lot of our inability with many sure people around government were pointing out some of these problems how to walk to their own beer critic structures so i think there is a lot there. and what lessons? in 2018 what should we take away i think a key recommendation, read the report. there's a lot of good in their and in this area context in relation to supporting afghanistan i'm struck by the fact that these are really different paradigms. the afghanistan conflict put a stable -- stabilization campaign under surgeon see. we were getting -- the serious stabilization effort is a counterinsurgency effort. we are extending an opposition

to the afghan government. there's also the government versus the insurgency. in syria we now have -- and the assad government we have armed extremist groups. you want to marginalize iranians and want to marginalize the russians so it's a more complex dynamic. what i really take away from this report is the huge similarities within her own ability within the u.s. government to address these efforts. i think in that sense our best lesson is to focus a little more on our own organization in their own beer critic resources. >> with that we are going to turn to david and as they were discussing cigar has been there from the get-go. this is one that's getting a lot of attention like francis just

highlighted. what can you tell us about this particular in sigar's work and getting the lessons early. sin a lot of lessons learned coming out early on and we document them through private problem was that the nature of the war changed so much that any revenue you might want to impose on the effort came because of new agendas and new strategies and how they made the reconstruction effort. i also want to touch regarding stabilization's role we feel it's very auspicious people are coming out now because of syria

and the u.s. government's new concerted effort to delineate roles of stabilization. so it allows us hopefully to be able to provide admittedly an enormous case study of what implementing stabilization looks like on a larger scale wealthy stabilization assistance we can provide on a small scale and small-scale stabilization focus. it provides, provides that balance. one thing jeremiah said if i could finish with those, for those of you who have gotten to chapter 5 yet at the provincial level was often bypassed in terms of budget assistance and the reason a couple of interesting reasons for that was as francis mentioned the district level became the focus but the districts themselves only had 15 to 20-dollar monthly

budget and it would be a real stick to try to push assistance down to the district level. but one of the most difficult issues with doing that is the officials we spoke to the best part about pushing the resources down at the district level was enabled the government to bypass the political entrenchment at the provincial and national level. while it's understandable bypassing the issues were the obstructions are happening is the wrong way to go about it if in fact those are instructions are where the most reform is necessary. and there were many instances in a campaign working around structure problems to accommodate whatever priorities were on her plate on a given day. sin david thank you. i want to thank you for bringing the report to us today and

giving us the opportunity for what i think was a good conversation. folks i hope you will join me in thanking our panel. [applause] earlier today today we talk to missouri reported to get an update on yesterday's resignation announcement by governor eric greitens. >> host: joining us on the phone to talk about missouri's governor announcing his yesterday brian lowrie at the "kansas city star" their political reporter. mr. lowrie good morning. >> good morning. thanks for having me. just to show our viewers the headline of your paper this morning and how reads missouri government eric greitens resigns for those who have not been following the story closely set this up for us and what led to the decision? >> so this is the