we have to be the contact layer. someone has to do the job and the rest of the subsurface navy and air, cyber is going to deny the adversary the initial capabilities. we will buy time and space for decision-makers in washington and then make a decision whether to surge the force so

you will see magtf in the blunt layer and the third layer coming in and the fourth layer is homeland defense more geared to toward norad and the ballistic missile defense of the united states primarily. so you will see magtf that has to be survivable and lethal, disruptive and denying force and the rest of magtf coming from camp pendleton or camp lejeune or okinawa assembling at the right place to then serve as part of the war winning force the army will be deploying. >> i want to turn to the navy and the navy's plan for 355 ship battle fleet that would build 238 but even 38 isn't

enough to meet all the demands on the invidious forces and it is going to take quite some time to get there so i wanted to ask first about the navy shipbuilding program and the fleet developing it and how that meets the needs of the magtf. the second part is asking about use of auxiliaries and non-amphibious ships particularly as they have done in the pacific to meet some of these amphibious demands when there aren't enough amphibious ships to go around. >> i will go ahead and start with that. the increase in money we have got, the funding we had in 19 with a 7% increase, certainly

before structure assessments determining 355 ships was the right plan. how quickly we can get to that requirement is the challenge and how long funding will be consistent. if you look at the 30th shipbuilding plan, capacity of the shipyards, where we can increase capacity, where we can build more ships if we get more money to accelerate at a faster rate. of congress can help accelerate that, that -- we would be fully in support of that but we are on a path now moving towards our lha class ship with america, tripoli coming online now and also our lpds coming online in the 30th shipbuilding plan on pace to get towards the 38 ship requirement we are looking for. the last few years prior to the new influx in modernization money we have been focused on

the readiness. and as the marines have been operating very hard, so have those navy ships so focusing on readiness, getting readiness of the ships in first focus affects capacity, the number of ships we need and closely behind that is part of the equation, the capability on those ships so we talk about distributed maritime operations and if it floats it fights. part of that is the ships being part of that from a power projection standpoint and a c control standpoint. talk about dynamic force employment, part of this is how do we use auxiliary ships, different ships in different ways. one example that i thought is very exciting is the fifth fleet with task force 51, we have a marine general in charge of that task force. they took the expeditionary

staging base and gave it over along with the epf, a joint high-speed fast transport, put those two together and put that in the equation with the other naval ships we have got in the fifth fleet. that was the first time i have really seen an operational commander bring those auxiliary ships in and use them in different ways for operational missions in the fifth fleet a or which we are watching closely how that could operate in the pacific and the mediterranean. >> i think i will carry the auxiliary idea a little further. we should be careful how we characterize these ships and

rely on them and operationalize them so we will spend a lot of time in norfork looking at these platforms because just because it has that does not mean it is capable of doing the things and amphibious ship can do. the options that it gives you is the exciting part and opportunities that are available when you have more options are always a good thing but i will be careful not to characterize these ships as more than they are or less then they are for that matter, any time you can spend time with our navy brothers and sisters and learn more about their platforms and capabilities is always good and i would complete my remarks in this piece about relationships, that is the strongest part of this current time we are in, the

relationships with our navy brothers and sisters in the book have not been better in a long time, we are looking forward to continuing that. they really have an operational mindset and wants to enable the naval force. given the things general walsh has talked about with funding a plan and some options, we again look at great opportunity going forward. >> it seems with a 355 fit ship navy we have a hard time breaking a 10% threshold relative to the size of the fleas, moving towards a 600 ship navy we are at 355, moving toward 38. i'm confident we will get there but then it is a matter of what is on them.

we need to build amphibious differently than in the past was we can't count on mber of destroyers and cruisers, those warships in and of themselves need -- defensive and offense of systems, vertical launch systems we may need to place on them that we don't have today is important. to make sure they have resilient command and control systems. all of that is required to be part of the larger force. everything from defensive systems, it is not preferred. and m for gives more control than auxiliary but by necessity the demands of training we use the auxiliary. but best suited for a low end operation than high end more

fighting, they are great platforms for staging a force to counter violent extremists, wonderful here for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or a force to bring evacuees back aboard for some time but they are not an lpg or lha and we recognize that the take every advantage to training opportunities like command and control, and looking at our connectors that operate with these ships. the other part we haven't talked about beyond auxiliaries is what do marines differently aboard cruisers and destroyers? what capabilities can we put aboard an lcs we haven't explored? if we get some small craft on destroyers and cruisers, capability we can put on those, not always high end enough to

give the adversary something to think about when you see marines on the deck of a ship, we will get creative with everything that floats and continue exploring that with the navy. >> i agree completely with that. all the work i have done, the combination of command and control and transport capability and other platforms, that unique combination has a unique role to play. the maritime operations. and optimize across the fleet, those responsibilities that you can get in those roles and that gets built out.

and changing both forces and thinking how you get the most leverage out of the full capabilities, the increase naval capacity around the world. many friends are growing in response to the same challenges that we see and i was able to do some work a couple years ago with the australians, there are lots of opportunities that bring real synergies. looking hard at that as well. >> one last question about modernization and acquisition when you think about innovation

and magtf, new systems come it is a more narrow way to think about it but it is an important component, new systems coming in to the fleet, and comment about what is going to be in the magtf of the future. >> i want to talk about priorities we had in 19 as -- if we look at marine corps operating concepts, we are focused on information warfare side. when it comes to funding, and all domains, marine corps and maneuver force, we see lots of advantages in that area. and the funding increase,

electronic warfare, and iw on the organizational change, and the math information. and modernization, significantly to move in that new operating concepts. in the range of everything we have, and the midterm or long-term perspective. and we are talking about air defense capability or anti-ship missile capability, and integrate into the command and control system. things like the gate radar,

aviation command and control systems, we have fifth-generation sensors, we start talking about integrating into the joint force, and the capability to focus on. air defense being the third priority. the degraded environment putting an investment, formations of the future and with the intellectual capital with our marines, high end capability tied together with technology is we are real advantages, allows them to operate and sometimes in autonomous independent manner they operated before. it could be a reconnaissance unit, it has the opportunity to maneuver on its own, and it is

a constant vehicle putting money to develop in the future. to conduct enhanced maneuver, the vehicle protection systems just like the aircraft have, fifth generation systems, we need those capabilities to enhance our protection of mobility systems. i would say those are the capabilities we are going after in the defense budget. we got a 7% increase in funding and increased our modernization accounts by 32%, and a lot is going toward the information area and long-range precision in the sea 2 capabilities.

>> a little bit more about the proximity of camp lejeune, we get to -- quite often being discovered out there. and get after experimentation into all of our exercises to make sure there's a chance to put the ideas to work but for those not so steeped in marine corps organizational standard, and other capabilities to magtfs and train and work together, and the transition to the information group, most of those enabling capabilities, is

pretty important. we begin to sort out through a couple exercises, day today learning, you can't take a lethal capability or nonlethal capability and expect them to play well with each other by being in close proximity. the planning that goes to an information environment that is lethal to adversaries and protective of those we want to protect has to be built on the ground up, has to be baked in, sewn into the fabric, not added as i think, looking forward to opportunities coming up in the fall to continue to build on this work but for one small example the signature management, a signature management wargame as fall approaches, has really worked, used to be good at signature

management when the threats up against the cold war were real and we had not had to worry about that as much in recent years. a signature management is a big deal. relearning or coming up with techniques, in the air, etc. is an important part of what the expertise will help us with going forward. >> just the last part on this one, any technology has got to be sustainable. exquisite equipment to make sure the parts are there, the people at the end of the day

and they put their technology into action, we know how long it takes, clearance requirements, back logs cleared to get into the training. the capability is coming. there are things like what gen. walsh had with the subset. one would be an armed us, and could operate from a ship so we are pursuing the technology in that way. and into 18-19, logistics modernization. if we had a concept of expeditionary bases, with logistics distribution, and

what the surface connectors, in what volume. it will be the ch 53, could lift 91,000 pounds gross weight, lift loads up words, and has three independent sling loads that can supply and sustain 12,000 pounds each. that is ammunition, fuel and whatever we need. that is just one piece of several things we are looking at in development that help us get through logistics challenges of resupplying and sustaining, quickly setting up, breaking down and relocating, maybe 24 hours, breakdown in moves, 72 hours, and we need a log system that can support the

concept. >> i'm going to ask maren about the think tanks, and what should the marine corps be thinking more about. >> i completely agree with the general themes in my mind, focus on information, spectrum warfare is overdue and well warranted, the critical enabling capability that has to be considered. i don't think they are not thinking about the right things. and fundamental challenges if you are able to leverage the

other services, more significant s and t investments, but you don't to pursue new capabilities, new capabilities in ways that other services do, and one of the challenges the marine corps had is a lot of concepts, with bigger services. within the constraints that you face, the focus is in the right areas. i would also say that the magtf arguably is relatively unchanged. people can debate how many decades you want x to be but it

is a lot. there is a fundamental question. if it is explored fully enough, given the dependence on the other services, a broader investigation will get you anywhere differently, the problems and challenges and the real question will be collectively come up with joint answers. and the proof will be in the putting. >> open it up to your questions? wait for microphone to come to you and i also add there should be a question mark at the end of the question. you get the first question.

>> pete daly, naval institute. thanks for this opportunity. do we run the risk if we go to this dynamic force employment, and we will have magtf going forward in the highest meal group that has been able to train to a higher level. do we run the risk that we have to compete assets to move those marines and be more dependent on land bases forward onto that concept and does it blur the brand? >> thanks for the question. i would say no. i don't think we have to wait on lift. the dynamic force employment of

the marines will be tied to the navy. global force management decision, how forces get allocated, and how that works in the future. in terms of the drivers will be the readiness back in the us, and are already most ready. the key is combat credibility. a small unit in south america with security cooperation at the platoon level is not combat credible but there for specific reason, and the west coast view with command and control arrangement that could go over

the top. and a significant combat credible force to do part of this dynamic force. and they may go forward. >> the question that comes to mind is the surge force and blunt contact force, able to operate when the balloon goes up. and the bifurcation, the surge marine force, and patrolling

marine force, perhaps 3-way bifurcation of all those guys offering up larry ships might not have the same level of hardware. to what degree, different flavors of magtf, how do you change the interchangeability? >> not to try to make this simple because it is not, the marine corps is a one mco force. if something breaks around the world, the forces you described are the ones where we are going to go. for instance in the korean theater there are forces that have trained specifically, if it really comes to a full-blown

-- have not trained specifically for that mission. they have done very well, the core essential task in their mission but they may not be steeped in the knowledge of a peninsula, same goes for that force that almost every conflict in recent history the marine corps is associated with, we did windows on the way to and on the way back from the conflict whether it was desert storm, a stopping point on the way back from the conflict that was a little more serious. i would agree the perfect solution would be those three forces you described all know

each other and train together, the opportunity to combine arms together, that is optimum. we don't always have that luxury. things like a well-known operating concept that has been tried out and exercised and experimented with across the force is valuable and if you have to put these forces together you at least have a common ground with the knowledge that being able to do that, the exact forces that might be called to do it is going to be very very difficult. i don't know if that needs some embellishment from the other panel members. >> it gets to the deployed force on its assigned mission,

focusing on ct support, or personal recovery, quick reaction force, primary missions but it will be combat credible. and in and of itself, may not be enough to do what is necessary so it gets to the training focus and training focus of those back at home, should be on major combat operations fighting at the mess level and higher. that is a different kind of training workup than it is for a marine expeditionary unit doing 19 things in support of a combatant commander. when we talk about the surge force we can't just think about the marine corps or the navy, we are talking the nation is going to go to war before surging from the homeland to go forward, there's going to be bomber presence, army units

mobilizing, reserve mobilization depends on what the crisis of the day is but this is bigger. where does marine corps formation fit into the larger campaign being put together in terms of a joint effort but that is the level of capability we are talking about. a large marine corps that plugs into a larger joint fight. >> those questions alluded to the one i tried to raise at the beginning of the session and the other implication of that, the blunt force has to leverage the elements, they would likely be some. how do you do that depending on geography? that will vary and the partners

wherever that may be. i won't call it a gap but a greater scene between forward and surge or the different nature of the scene what does that imply for the scenes we allowed to persist to some degree in the forward force, how to get closely, the faster that blunt force can be effective, the quicker the surge forces can reinforce. it is a different way, slightly different lens but not fundamentally different. we have to think our way through that. >> another question? right there. >> thank you.

my name is veronica cartier, and i work with strategic defense issues. most recently, as a matter of fact last month, national defense authorization act. there are three provisions in maritime defense mandating a new program to intercept capability including kinetic while continuing these efforts to develop energy solutions. my question is how crucial it is for strategic speaking, this program. what would you elaborate?

thank you so much. >> it is not directly for the marine corps on that but when you get into great power competition you have to have incredible force. as you look across today we are focused on that. for national capability you have to have credible capability so looking at the nuclear force, we are putting a lot of funding into that for many years. we have determined capability, incredible nuclear capability, looking at that capability, looking at directed applications all the way to all those capabilities that come into play, things we have not putting resources, we had not been focused on strategic competition, the threat is driving us to new capabilities, we look at conventional training, we have to increase

that against higher end capability and so also we have to do with nuclear capabilities. don't know if you want to touch on more. >> you are referencing space, is that correct? going to the strategic investment, something comes off the top to pay for the common good. i won't get into any of the things we are looking at but it is a recognition in the last couple years, space is now a war fighting domain and we need to protect our assets and be cognizant of what the adversary has and can do and what is commercially available, to augment our own efforts but has the laser focus of the united states air force, it is well made and i will stop there. the fact that we recognize it

as a war fighting domain and not just everything is peaceful in space in terms of exploration, those days are behind us as far as our ability to operate. >> good morning. that was a great segue into my questions. space is not only a war fighting domain but in the last few years since 2011 we recognize it is competitive, congested, contested. so with that, my field is in commercial satellite communications was a lot of commercial systems are coming online that are geosynchronous

but we are looking at other orbits. we have constellation in medium earth orbit so with low earth orbit and medium earth orbit these systems are inherently more resilient to connecticut tax, jamming things of that nature. let's talk about incorporating that into magtf, ship to shore communications. marine corps is really good at recognizing space is a contested environment. these new systems will help us work through that. >> the joint force, one of the top modernization priorities was command and control, looking at space it is going to be contested. if it is going to be contested, a small number of military satellites, relatively, for leveraging commercial capability or put more of them

up there, or the other things we are currently doing, developing networks of our own capabilities. and moving in a new direction. and in space, a lot of opportunities here. and leveraging off of those, and smaller satellites ourselves. a lot of technologies we can do with building capabilities that we can put up for long duration and the capabilities we currently have. >> i had an opportunity, i had a chance to talk with general bolden, nasa astronaut, saturday night, about the manner in which commercial space industry is taking off.

where space x and others are going to take us, and part of this is a training issue. if we do lose our ability to have satellite communications along those lines and a force prepared for that, do we operate in a degraded environment and figure out mesh networks or loss of pnt, how do we work around those things? some of this is inducing friction into our training and try to overcome and have a better realization how dependent we are in some areas, some use of radio and manual workarounds or are we comfortable going back to that if we have 2? >> on the end. >> thank you all.

i had a question, you mentioned multi-domain battles and i wondered about the joint force. what role the army plays in that. >> i find it interesting, we are working with the concept we are working on with the navy and when i take that across the multi-domain battle with the army a lot of the concepts across both, almost identical in the maritime domain. what i think is as you look at that, what we are trying to do is try to have the ability to maneuver where and when we went, have over match where and when we went and much more distributed fashion than we

have today. i will work with the army and that, we may be that contact or blunt force as we envisioned but they are going to be with us in many cases because they bring a lot of joint capabilities we wouldn't have but how do we enable them to come in more quickly and interface with us. as you drive joint concepts and develop things like multi-domain battle it really is bringing in a lot of joint staff to make this more joint capability and all these different services capabilities come together. >> the third try, gentlemen in the second row. >> good morning. see power magazine, we are reorganizing lower level what you are doing with infantry

squad, and the magtf information groups but distributed apps and things like that are you looking at other reorganizations of your magtf? are you going to change the unit you are ready to deploy. the company landing teams, working on battalions, inside ops, low visibility, are you going to have to look at smaller or different organizational levels for your magtfs. >> i will start on that one. the comment earlier had changed in many decades, only part of the story. magtfs that we deploy and eventually employ are constantly evolving. the marine expeditionary unit today is not the marine

expeditionary unit of the past. capabilities they have with them, information, operations, intelligence, signals, all at the appropriate level and appropriate mix, changes each deployment because the world changes each deployment. the other part of that is we do believe how we task organize these other concepts, can be almost as big or small as -- task organize. we can't kill all the bugs with a sledgehammer, and precision,

with certain problems. we will experiment with all the organizational structures, which one might be best to get after a particular mission, and on the leading edge, to do the right job for the right reason. >> at the end of the first row? >> i have a related question. and new technologies push to lower levels of the marine corps organization whether unmanned or information warfare, and another way of asking, platoons, and companies

doing old missions, and at that level. >> new methods, infantry minutes about locating, and destroying the enemy. and it closes on that enemy, there is something that will locate, or repel his assault in close combat. and to enable those marines and soldiers and operators to have and cross pollinate all of it. to the cognitive skills of

those individuals. and to execute that motion at less cost to the human is really what we are after. >> two examples are really different. trying to give infantry more capabilities, we gave the third battalion, fourth marines a lot of electronic attack capabilities. what we noticed with them is they absorb it fairly quickly, a new mission for them, back in the cold war we had a lot of electronic attack capabilities and been to a specific unit that conducted that mission. in this case we push that to the infantry, marines, and they

used it differently than i could ever have imagined, how they embrace the technology and use it and they were maneuvering the electronic -- the electromagnetic spectrum. they were operating on kinetically, talking about putting up walls at different phase lines. this is not something i had seen infantry do in the past. they took a tool, put it into task organized unit and used it effectively. that was at the small unit level. going back to auto's question, are we organizing different, they reversed on the mlg side, we had really over the years become more decentralized, more direct capability to lower levels. kind of brought that back and got more functionally organized, back to the way we did things in the past, with our maintenance supply,

transportation, that was a reversal to functionally organize and push those detachments back down which is the way we are doing it in the best information group. if you look at that, a new domain, new capability, i look at it a lot more like air officers or facts at lower levels to augment those capabilities at the higher end with the electromagnetic spectrum and those capabilities. >> to the back. one of our own here. >> good morning. i am a fellow at csi s and the naval institute. discussions between the navy and the marine corps moving to the east coast, specifically mayport. where are those discussions and what risk does it bring to the marine corps and its deployment and operations?

what are you doing to mitigate those? >> the discussions, i think, going to be there is a common desire to do it. the year in which we can execute, it is up for further discussion. we wanted to start sooner. there are valid reasons the united states navy would like to postpone that by a few years. that is where it is. we went to do it in conjunction with the navy's overarching plan, that won't happen in the next year or two. the idea of why we want to do it which would increase presence and close, reduce the number of days required to

aggregate a force against any of our plants is there. without waffling too much on that question, we have an agreement that yes we would like to do it. realistically it has to wait a couple years. what was the second part of the question? >> what about force deployment and operation gaps? >> it is constantly evolving. it was really driven by trying to posture the force and get the optimal amount of trans regional effectiveness from any deployment where we want to put it. you can service them from the eastern med. why do that based on where we

are heading on dynamic force deployment and what is being regularly scheduled for global force management? at the end of the day though we would like to see them come to the east coast we will get much of it based on what the secretary is thinking about. not a lot of additional risk being accepted or anything like that because it won't happen to me either. >> one last question, the lady there who had her hand up first. >> we have talked a lot about multiple aspects that are changing. do you feel the department's current readiness metric serves you well with all of this change or do they need to evolve and modernize as well? >> first we like the current trends in our readiness profile

across the board. it has taken us a while. it is going in the right direction. as far as metrics, whether or not they are useful and helpful in the way we described our readiness posture, there are challenges with any snapshot of readiness. the change of a flag from one hand to another can change the readiness profile from one day to another and move your readiness needle in a direction that may be good or bad. if we are going to entertain readiness metrics or readiness reporting or readiness discussions, we have to acknowledge it is the

commander's assessments piece of that that we really need to pay attention to, the overtime trends and what that communicates to the institution about need. if i have as an operational commander the confidence that my readiness reporting is being received and acted upon by the institution, then i am happy with the readiness reporting regime. the point at which that no longer helps me communicate my readiness concerns, we need to talk about whether to change it at the surface level and above, potential concern or challenges with readiness reporting but the discussion that it generates is really important. my opportunity to engage with my commanders about where their readiness is is one thing. where it is going is the more

important discussion. >> as the guy who is responsible to the commandant to the secretary of defense for readiness of the marine corps in our reporting my view is it has been very collaborative, and how the needle is moving based on funding we are receiving. we had a lot in the metric that is viewed for the marine corps in terms of what are the obstacles that need to be left over and where to apply funding, and to enhance the readiness. it has been very collaborative and very fair, whether it is moving the noodle on combat

operations, or major defense operation. it is collaborative, have no issue and had a huge say in what those metrics are. >> marilyn encouraged me to one last question, the midshipmen patiently waiting, and a quick question, we will break. >> the internship program, from the live stream. where do you see the future of land-based special-purpose magtf, while stages quick reaction forces become a menu of capabilities that are picked apart with adjacent forces the

radio the inherent magtf aspects of the unit is it realistic to maintain the whole magtf unit for land-based environments? >> i planted that question. [laughter] >> are you on your phone? >> that's right. a great question that was covered broadly earlier on about how we deploy the force, posture the force, prepare the force and what for. i would say at the time, the idea that we would need a special-purpose magtf on a particular part of the planet to tackle problems is absolutely to this day still fulfills great function for what happens to be allocated to. they have, we have over time

kind of default those special-purpose magtfs to be very fine tuned to what they are designed to do with a keen eye toward guarding against mission creep. the point at which you prepared and deployed a force for somebody else's use, the mission begins to change, you will always be a little disappointed with what the end result is from readiness perspective or what the unit is doing. and the marine corps is able to put them out, then they are important. if you look at the nss, those types of things are being deemphasized. if you need to recoup equipment aircraft and people to build

readiness for a higher priority mission, those special-purpose magtfs, where are we going to get them back, a different force for a different crisis. >> we have three to put down in south america during the storm season primarily, different purpose organized differently in the central command region. and it is also different in its own right in terms of organization and challenges in terms of time, distance. i want to reinforce the point that we work these elements up, and designed to be combat credible or humanitarian

purposes for security engagement. the rest is combat credible but will need augmentation from the joint force with fixed wing support and it is the real world. the idea we would need to employ it in total would be desirable but the real world gets in the way of having to provide small elements and detachments to us personnel and facilities and making an enormous difference in all 3 locations. the one in south america recently but the one in the central command region was incredibly and vitally important, and conversely to ensure we don't have any additional been ghazis through the effort, region, vitally important, what has been up there for some time.

there is the ideal and the real and the real has been of tremendous value. >> >> thank you for joining me and thank the panelists. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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