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committee this is about two hours and ten minutes. >> i think everybody for being here today and i am sorry about the long lines outside. i hope my staff has accommodated some ways so they can participate in this. for many months now we have been aware the foreign actors have attempted to interfere in our democracy by spreading false and inflammatory rhetoric to the electorate and by trying to hack our electoral systems themselves. our hearing today will focus on what actions we can take to prevent that from happening again particularly what tools we can provide law enforcement to prosecute those who seek to

interfere with our elections and this great threat posed by foreign meddling has led to many responses from within our government and first and foremost we been on the front lines trying to boast state and local infrastructure and by 2017 dhs visited our electoral systems as critical infrastructure and that designation is supported to cyber security related purposes and one election officials upon request would be a top priority for the receipt of dhs services and election infrastructure would receive the benefit of various domestic and international cyber security protections and moreover a department of homeland security has worked to feed classified and unclassified cyber security risks information with state and local officials and dhs has

formed several working groups and tasks force to develop plans for election infrastructure security, working not only with state and local election officials but also the private sector to help generate best practices and solutions. the department has continued to work to strengthen partnerships with state and local election officials and nevertheless there constrained by states and this partnerships are completely voluntary and that puts the onus upon the states to seek help from and cooperate with federal government and if they don't, of course, it is impossible for the department to step in. other responses from government include president trumps decision sanctions against

organizations and individuals that participate in election interference. in march of this year treasury department targeted five entities and 19 individuals including the internet research agency and individuals associated with it and in april be and ministration opposed additional sections on seven russian oligarchs in top government officials for interference on the 2016 election and other aggressions among the individual sanction was an individual who had close ties to former trump campaign manager paul manafort and also on march 9th of this year. trump expelled 60 russian diplomats from the us and i am told from history that that is the largest expulsion.

on the criminal front this past february special counsel charged seven russian entities with crimes associated with an effort to interfere with our election process and congress is devoted substantial attention to the issue and some have complained about the alleged inaction within our own committee so you would expect me to say to the contrary in that judiciary committee alone we have held no less then five hearings addressing this issue and this will be our sixth hearing regarding russian or other foreign interference in our elections since our last election. on the legislative front there have been no fewer than 18 pieces of legislation proposed to combat different angles of the foreign election meddling

issue. in this body alone, meaning this entire senate, however only one is better for to the judiciary committee and i have cosponsored to disclosing a foreign influence act as well as the shell company abuse act and the senators white house, durbin and graham and the second bill is enacted in the law would criminalize concealing activities of a foreign national contributions or these donations to campaign hearings or medication. in addition to the bills offered by the senate 16 have been offered in house and have been many hearings and many other committees. the homeland security and our justice department have been working hard to formulate the best response to this challenge and to investigate and prosecute those targeting our elections and experts and academics have

also waited with thoughts of how best to protect our elections as we move towards this midterm election this year and we will hear from some of those people today. as i mentioned earlier, our hearing has focused very squarely on this issue and are there additional steps that we can take within the jurisdiction of the judiciary committee that will meaningfully assist law-enforcement to deter, prevent and investigate and punish foreign actors who seek to metal in our elections. it is important to note that the federal election campaign act which is not even within the jurisdiction of this committee is a comprehensive framework designed to address illegal

campaign in the election related activities and this act provides many of the answers to enforcement and in title 18 and as a mueller indictment suggest many of the existing statutes already address the behavior and we can name wire fraud, bank fraud, aggravated identity theft and the fair act and the computer fraud and abuse act. just to name a few. new problems sometimes call for new solutions and sometimes they can be addressed by existing law. ultimately the answer may be that no new laws need to be created or that only a few small changes are necessary. these are publicly accessible answers but that doesn't mean that we should not ask the questions so here we are today,

senator feinstein. >> thank you very much mr. chairman for holiness hearing. we know that russia orchestrated a sustained and coordinated attack that interfered in our last presidential election and we also know that there is a serious threat of more tax in the future elections, including this november. as the united states intelligence community unanimously concluded that the russian government interference in our election and i quote, blended covert intelligence operations such as cyber activity with over efforts by the russian government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries and paid social media users or trolls. over the course of the past year and a half we have come to better understand how pernicious these attacks were.

particularly, unsettling is the fact that we were so unaware. we were unaware the russia was going to vision their mass propaganda, cyber warfare and working with malicious actors to tip scales of the election. thirteen russian nationals and three organizations including the russian backed internet research agency have now been indicted for the role in russian vast conspiracy to defraud the united states. these defendants but political advertisements on social media and they staged political rallies inside the united states and they did this all while posing as united states persons and without revealing the russian identities. from special counsel dollars indictment we know that unwitting americans assisted in these efforts and we still do not know however whether any

americans knowingly help to the russians and this is extraordinarily sobering. our country is built on free and fair elections and we are a government of the people by the people and for the people. when our elections are called into question our government is also called into question. this was russia's goal , too attacked the very foundations of our democracy. as the intelligence community's report later stated and i quote, russian efforts to influence the 2016 us presidential election represent the most recent expression of moscow's long-standing desire to undermine the us-led liberal democratic order. so, we must do all we can to

prevent future attacks on our elections. we've got to be clear eyed about the threat we face and we've got to put aside politics and act decisively. to be clear there are already laws on the books to prosecute those who interfere in our elections and indeed as i mentioned a moment ago special counsel mueller has indicted 13 russian employees of the eye are a the internet research agency. these individuals were charged with defrauding the united states in violation of section 371 of title 18 of the united states code and this is a valid charge against those who interfere in our elections. in fact, there are questions whether this same charge can be brought against americans if they are found to have accepted

election assistance from foreign entities or coordinated with wikileaks about when to release e-mails stolen from the democratic national committee campaign manager, john podesta. i hope these witnesses today will be able to offer their own assessment but whether those charges could be valid. special counsel mueller has also charged former tram campaign chair paul manafort for fraud and violations of the foreign agent registration act commonly known as far up. it is to ensure that the united states government and its people are informed of the source of information and the identity of people seeking to influence the nights it's public opinion, policy or law.

by failing to register as a foreign agent mr. manafort allegedly concealed his effort to affect us foreign policy including was serving as campaign chairman for the republican candidate for president. in fact the special counsel's office has now charged mr. manafort with obstruction obstructing justice by trying to conceal the true nature of his work for the ukrainian government. to avoid conviction mr. manafort has allegedly urged past associates to lie about his lobbying for ukrainian government interest. this is yet another example of how there are laws to address laws with collusion. i hope the witnesses today can tell us how to make these laws better. in particular i am looking forward to hearing from the witnesses today about the scope of the problem, the steps that

are currently being undertaken by the government to malicious actors accountable and third, ways we can act prevent future attacks. mr. chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing and i know that several members of the committee have requested a hearing like this and introduced legislation to deal with foreign interference in our elections and i know that all of us on this committee have a very strong belief in agreement to act before our democracy is undermined against. i hope this hearing will lead to this committee and passing legislation and conducting the relevant oversight to help protect our future elections. thank you very much. >> thank you, senator feinstein. i will do a short introduction of our two witnesses on the

first panel. mr. hickey, deputy assistant for national asset protection in the department of justice. he was the acting deputy chief for cyber initial security division and before that he served as deputy chief of appeals in the southern district of new york. second witness is the senior cyber security advisor within the national protections and programs directorate at the department of homeland security and prior to this role mr. masterson service commissioner of the us election assistance commission along with several others positions in that agency and also he served as chief of staff for the ohio secretary of state. both of you probably know that if you have a very long statement beyond your five minutes that that statement will be put in record and we will

start with mr. hickey and then mr. masterson and will have a round of questioning for anyone that wants to ask questions. mr. hankey. >> good morning. thank you. maternity to testify on behalf of justice concerning our efforts to combat election interference. the department appreciates the committee's interest and want husband has the tools we need and i know the committees have my testimony so will not repeat it but cover a few key points. first, the attorney general himself identified these as a priority when he created a cyber digital task force earlier this year. he specifically directed the task force to address quote, efforts to interfere with our elections and our report is due to him by the end of this month. anticipate the apartment

department will issue a report by mid july in the report will provide additional insight into how the department intends to apply long-standing policies in the sensitive context of foreign operations. when i say foreign influence operations i'm referring to covert actions by foreign governments intended to affect us political sentiment and public discourse. it was so divisions in our society or undermine confidence in our democratic institutions to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives. these can run the gamut from cyber operations to target election info structure or medical organizations that seek to alter the integrity of the data or influence operations to assist or harm political motivations or public officials. the department was role in combating election interference is first and foremost the investigation and prosecution of

federal crimes. foreign influence efforts extend beyond efforts to interfere with elections they require more than law enforcement responses alone. recognizing that we approach this national security threat the same as any other with an eye toward supporting, not only our own legal troubles for the toys and ability of others. first, as a threat driven organization and member of the intelligence community the fbi can pursue tips and leads investigate illegal foreign activities and share information from those activities with others to help them detect, prevent and respond complete her computer hacking for espionage. the fbi can share information with social media providers and helping them with their own initiatives to track for influence activity and to enforce terms of service the permit the use of the platforms for such activities. last fall the fbi formed a task force in large part to ensure that these information trinities are more humble and effective.

our investigation makes those contacts that wants, charges and when they do will use to hold them accountable. our investigations can also support agencies using diplomatic military and intelligence and economic tools. for example, several recent cases the secretary of the treasury has imposed financial sanctions on this dependence abroad. finally, in appropriate cases information gathered during our investigations can be used to alert victims while they are

affected individuals in the public to foreign influence activities. exposure of foreign influence operations ultimately may be one of the best ways to counter them. victim notifications, defensive counter intelligence briefings and public safety announcements are traditional department activities but they must be conducted with particular sensitivity in the context of elections to avoid even the appearance of partiality. in taking these actions we are alert to ways in which current law may benefit from reform. we welcome the opportunity to work with congress to combat in florence those aimed at our elections by clarifying or spending our laws to provide new tools or sharp existing ones if appropriate. the department plays a role in combating foreign efforts to interfere in our election there are limits to the department's role in the role of the us government more broadly in combating foreign influence operations. do so requires a whole of

society approach relies on coordinated actions by federal, state and local government agencies and support for the private sector and the active engagement of an informed public. one think the committee again for providing this opportunity to discuss these issues on behalf of the department and i'm happy to answer any questions you may have. >> inc. you. mr. masterson. >> thank you, chairman grassley, ranking member feinstein and thank you. need by on our efforts to help state and local officials with improving the resilience of elections across america. over a decade of work state and local officials to advance the use of technology to better serve american voters. for the last three years actors as commissioner and chairman of the united states election assistance commission working to modernize the standards used to test voting systems and provide best practices that support election officials and since 2016 respond to the threat against our nation's election systems. i serve as senior advisor to dhs focused on the work that apartment is doing to support

the thousands of election officials across this country and in the second work i can tell you the absolute best part is working the dedicated professionals that administer elections. in the face of real and sophisticated that's these officials have responded by working with us state and local resources in the private sector in academia to mitigate risk and improve resilience. election security is a national security issue and a top priority for the department. our mission at dhs is to ensure that elections for the system owners in this case the 10000 state and local officials across the country have the necessary information and support to assess risk and protect, detect and recover from those risks. this support can come in many forms whether offering no-cost voluntary assistance sharing of best practices or securing on online -- dhs stands ready to help and offer tailored support based on the state and local officials needs.

please collective efforts we made significant progress. state local officials and those private sector partners who support them are at the table where he with us to the resilience of the process. for example, we created government and private sector councils collaboratively to share information, promote best practices and develop strategies to reduce risk to the nation's election systems. we created an election info structure information sharing and analysis members from almost every state and hundreds of local jurisdictions and this is our fastest-growing sector. we are sponsoring up to three election officials in each state for security clearances which allow officials to receive classified that information if or when it's necessary with the increased availability across the sector and dhs is leading an interagency federal and this test was brings together a federal partners, the fbi and

doj, the intended trinity and missed the od partners and modeled in our work and other critical info structure sectors. the purpose of this test force is to ensure that information is timely and actionable he shared probably across the sector. progress being made as clear and as it traveled across country working with election officials it is evident. for example, as mother traveled to iowa to meet with secretary of state and at this event we provided a training for the county auditors and building a resilience election process. while there suppressed by the level of engagement inclination happening in all levels of government to secure their elections.

iowa serves as a model of the whole of government response. have seen firsthand the progress that has been made of the local levels as well. recently undersecretary chris krebs in cook county, illinois where he walked to the company as of defend, detect and recover framework for elections. the framework they systematically mapped every system, identified known ability points and built desert defenses and recovery plans. elections are run by states and localities across the 50 states and five territories. there are over 2000 election jurisdictions in the united states and the systems and processes and procedures used very greatly but what works for the voters of florida may not work for voters in california. the local administration will engage gently with the process and those who run it which brings me to my final point. for those voters who have questions or concerns regarding

the security or integrity of the process i implore you to get involved and become a poll worker and watch the auditing and check your decision information before elections and engage with your local election official and most importantly, go-go. best response for those wish to undermine faith in our democracy is to participate in the votes. before i conclude i want to think congress with the legislative address for strengthening dhs cyber security and critical info structure authorities specifically with to support final passage of legislation great cyber security and if a structure security agency which will rename and reorganize. i look forward to further outlining our efforts to work with the state and local officials across this country i look forward to your questions. thank you. >> thank you. we will now have five rounds of questions. let's start with mr. hickey. title 18 already includes several times to target

individuals or groups attending to illegally influence the election including, but not limited to, wire fraud, bank fraud, identity theft, computer fraud and abuse, federal agents registration, acts, violations, money laundering, our overview does not suggest any glaring holes in authority available to investigate and prosecute these crimes and two questions for you. in your opinion what, if anything, needs to be fixed or added to the criminal toolbox

and that was specifically referred to title 18 to allow law enforcement investigate and prosecute those who would attempt to influence our election systems through fraud or cyber attacks? >> thank you. as you pointed out we have a fairly robust set of tools and we are committed to using all of them as well as we can and address the start. at the moment i'm not here today to call for any additional tool but it is important that on an ongoing basis the department in all its investigations consider the limits of those authorities and so we are always looking at in this context or examining whether there might be statutory gaps and if we identify them we will be pleased to work with congress in your attention and work with this committee and the members with staff as you seek to explore additional authorities. >> second to you, what are the specific authorities that typically guide these investigations? >> senator, it will depend on what we mean by these investigations. as alien to admire in testimony foreign influence or interference activities can run the gamut from a cyber

operations computer hacking in which we would look to the computer fraud and abuse all the way to covert influence efforts which would implicate the foreign agents registration act if they involve undeclared political activities in the united states and campaign law violations or the like. it depends on the flavor of four influence operation or foreign interference operation. >> mr. masterson, march of this year congress approved 380 million to help safeguard us voting systems participation in the program offered by the department of state is completely voluntary and depends entirely on cooperation of state and local governments. two parts to this question. what level of collaborative effort and cooperation are you receiving from individuals secretaries of state and maybe

and let me add to it the second part. how does it compare to cooperation received in previous elections? >> thank you, mr. chairman. the level of collaboration, cooperation is fantastic. it's a high level and were engaged with almost every state in some way and we have the ability to share information with all 50 states should we need to with points of contact available. the secretary are skeptical of a sterile role in this space is incumbent on the department to continue to engage with the secretaries and engage with local election officials so they see the value of the services and information we are providing and i will in the process. >> i don't thank you touch on the comparison with previous -- >> sure. thank you, in my prior role at

the eac certainly we experience the same skepticism from secretaries of state but again secretaries state and local election officials across this country appreciate those support and bring value to the process to put them do their jobs. the secretary and prior iterations have expressed their will and respect for federalism but also engage with us. >> my last question will be to master hickey. every of the sheer the special counsel indicted the internet research agency and others interfering in last election and the charges in the special counsel's indictment what about the united states, wire fraud, being fed, identity theft and these are the nuts and bolts that we would see in garden-variety and is the nature of election interference conduct that we have seen and asked unique or different from other criminal investigations and in other words is the contract such

that we really need to think about a new way to prosecute these cases and design a completely new framework to do so? >> i see my time has expired but i will answer briefly. if you look to leverage the framework that exist now it's a fairly robust one but we should always be alert to raise that framework could be improved. the election interference by foreign governments has a lot of investigations of that and a lot of the same challenges as are other national security cases. to take one example, the evidence is located abroad as our targets and they are in jurisdictions who are unwilling to assist us with the investigation. investigating and getting evidence is a challenge in apprehending the dependence can be a challenge. but we work through it and a number of our cases across the spectrum of cases we handle. >> senator feinstein, inc. you for answering my questions.

>> thank you very much, mr. cha. mr. hickey, like to talk with you about your department of justice is doing now to prevent and or investigate so that the upcoming elections will not be affected by wrongdoing. >> thank you, senator. one of the most important things we're doing is ensuring that there is connectivity within the department and other departments and the private sector to make sure we identify the information that matters an open and investigate cases where we learn of potential threats and that we

others in a position to defend and protect themselves and we have done that in part by setting up -- >> you have any open investigations relating to the upcoming elections? >> i cannot confirm or deny if we did. i'm speaking problematically to what were doing to ensure there were posture to react properly. >> are you working with the intelligence community in examining this and looking out for it. >> the fbi has an ongoing relationship as a member of the intelligence community to that. i would say that the type of information you are referring to the types of that information one of the highest priorities we could be watching out for and ensuring that we are postured to act on it, share it as appropriate high priority for the department. >> okay. three months ago the directors of the cia, nsa, od and i and fbi warned the american public to refrain from using products and services from the chinese telecom company the te. fbi director chris ray stated, we should be deeply concerned about the risk of allowing companies beholden to for

governments gaining positions of power inside our telecommute occasions network. he said doing so and this is a quote, provides capacity to exert pressure or control over our telecommunications infrastructure and provides capacity to maliciously modify or steal information and provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage". do you agree with this assessment from three months ago regarding the threat provided excuse we posed by the de products? >> i agree with the characterization of supply cha chain. yes. >> what can you tell us about what the department is doing? >> we have a pending matter involving the te that is public

in texas and more generally we are alert ways that are authorities like cfius or team teleconference to investigate transactions or licensed applications and i can make recommendations or recommendations to the president to private the transaction so those are the ones that we have at our disposal to address supply-chain threats. >> senator cornyn and i happen i happen to have been his cosponsor and let an effort to change cfius to make it more inclusive, as you know. will that be helpful? >> yes, the department supports that. >> can you tell us any more about this one situation with the te? >> there is a pretty matters i don't want to characterize it outside of the record. >> let me ask you. do you think justice should be involved with any trade negotiations that have a direct

bearing on the te? >> i think they seek to exercise our enforcement authority according to the law and independently and we seek to enforce the laws that is written and hold folks accountable based on the evidence on the facts. >> is justice involved in these negotiations or discussions? >> i can't comment on that. there's a pending prosecution and they pled guilty some time ago and was all that case but it is an ongoing matter so we are involved in that obviously. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here. any interference with our electron process is a matter of great concern to all americans and it seems like the russians

have been attempting to interfere with our elections for some time and this is not new. they've attempted to do that presumably in an effort to undermine public confidence in our electoral system and in the voting process of america. we should be concerned about that and always looking for appropriate ways to guard against it. as i see it, there are a few important questions before us that we need to address. one involves the concern the integrity of our election info structure or the machines that we are using in the agreement we are using and are those secure. second, foreign bad actors seeking to disseminate false information in an effort to affect the outcome of elections is also of great concern and there's a question of remedies and what we do about each of these things. first, let's talk about the integrity of our election infrastructure and we will start

with you, mr. masters. were there any known breaches of our election info structure in the 2016 election? >> thank you, senator. yes, there was some publicly discussed breaches of election and projectors specifically involving rota database. >> any confirmed instances of votes be changed from one candidate to another? >> no confirmed instances of that. >> were any individual machines hacked? >> no, not that i know of. >> at a preset tire to the twin cities election cycle at least there to the auction itself the department of homeland security separations be made up operations for hacking by the russians and can you explain to us what procedures the department of homeland security hundred takes once it has identified a potential threat to a state election info structure.

>> sure. thank you for the question, senator. the department of human security perspective our number one goal in that instance is to ensure the timely and actual sharing to the system owners and operators. in the case of 2016 and moving forward we ensure that we got the indicators specific tactical information down to those owners and operators to look for possible incidences and respond and recover from that. >> in your opinion, how best can the federal government help here? elections are primarily a creature of states and local governments and typically of the federal government that is running elections but honestly there is a national interest in protecting the integrity of our system particularly as against those who try to interfere from outside and foreign powers would certainly be cause for concern.

how best can the federal government try to help state and local governments to ensure the integrity of their systems? >> from the permit standpoint there are three primary focus is for us. one is that timely sharing of actionable information so ensuring that what we get information from states or locals of activity there or from the intelligence committee to the fbi and others were able to share that information in order to allow the system owner and operators to protect them. to is to provide services across the spectrum. we provide free services to allow identifiers to improve their resilience and identify risks. the third is to coordinate the federal government's response to the targeting attacks on election infrastructure so there are election task force and helps to coordinate fbi doj, eac and others in order to ensure

that other information we have at the federal level is used and provided to those who have to run elections. >> what approach to the threat and the possibility of election infrastructure or voter machines been hacked from the outside to go low-tech and some states have gravitated toward that. for example, some states have started making moves back toward paper ballots so that they can be hacked. is this something that is helpful or something that is necessary that more states should consider. >> yes, senator, the auditability and having an audible voting system for paper records is critical to the security of the systems. in the states that moved in the direction have been amended means by which to audit the vote in order to give confidence to the public the results of the election in the states that have non- paper systems have indicated a desire for in pennsylvania to move to audible systems at this point resources are necessary to help them with

that direction. >> paper about system or system that simultaneously creates a paper trail -- seems my time has expired. >> senator lee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i agree with senator feinstein about having this hearing. i was worried with as many people from vermont are that the president refusing to criticize president been on just about anything with the invasion of crimea or what concerns us as the plane attack on our elections. instead of their been attack on our elections that the problem is the 5 million votes that were cast in election election according to president trump and you have a national security division and doing have a threat

and if we see it millions of fraudulent votes or do we have a threat of interference from hostile foreign actors? >> somewhere? >> -- from where i sit we focus on terrorists from foreign states. from my perspective the department and i know the attorney general has indicated that election security is a priority and that is why he test the cyber security digital test force -- >> to consider there is a threat hostile and foreign actors? >> i think dni recently said as friday there are reasons to be concerned. >> can be not seen evidence of the millions of noncitizens? >> that is not within my portfolio. >> let me ask you this. if millions of noncitizens had voted would not the department of justice be investigating that

and bringing prosecutions? >> i expect it would violate laws and it would be for them to investigate it. >> if there were millions and it is easy to say there were millions but there were millions at least a few hundred thousand would be prosecuted but we have not had 2000 or few hundred or a dozen or four or two oh one so this is where we are with 5 million. now, it does appear that everything we have from the intelligence community is a threat to foreign interference in our elections and the election assistance commission currently has only to commissioners and other spots think it. until recently you are a commissioner recommend by the former republican house speaker

john weiner and i believe you brought cyber security experience to this position and [inaudible] the secretary of state of vermont has been there with you and it's been a very professional and nonpartisan. but your seed remains vacant and [inaudible] is facing unprecedented challenges and how does the election assistance commission have only to commissioners [inaudible] >> thank you, senator. i refer you to the eac for specifics but from my experience they are able to carry on many of the functions without a forum including the certification of

voting systems with the funds that were recently appropriated by congress as well as sharing best practices information with state and local election officials. the key item that i know i worked on it worked at the d ac was a continues to progress and we need a quorum is the approval of the new voluntary voting system guidelines. >> the private homeland security believe to be linked to russia targeted 21 state voter legislations in the 16 and they successfully penetrated most of them had no idea they had been penetrated until dhs notified them and we have another major election coming up in five months and are you concerned that they're not fast enough to protect their -- >> senator, i am not. in my experience every state i traveled to the state official i

talk to says they are taking it fiercely and working collaboratively with multiple levels of government as well as the private sector and other resources in order to respond so it is incumbent on us at the department to build those partnerships and ensure they have the support they need to do that. >> i've made the comments made about the paper trail and of course we do that in vermont in the voting machines but i hope that you use some of the money and more the money that i cut through the operations committ committee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for the witnesses that are here today. if i were in moscow thinking about engaging in more election interference in the united states and in the coming election i might consider the following factors. it has been 19 months since the last election which russia interfered in. it has been 17 months since every major intelligent agency of the night states reported on

this interference. it has been months so there was a payment of special counsel and i understand you promised two months from now that the task force will give us a public report on what they recommend in terms of this interference. the question i would ask is how seriously are americans taking this threat and is it worth it to go after this coming election that is 19 weeks away, 19 weeks away. we do know that special counsel mueller has aggressively gone after russian interference and he has indicted 13 russian nationals in the russian corporations in addition to seven others that might been complicit in this effort. we look at the money given to states, $380 million, for the night states of america i think alan illinois share something

like [inaudible] million dollars and we were hacked by the russians of can we point to record what we have aggressively gone after russian interference and set up defenses and deterrence so that we cannot do this again in november. mr. maggie, are you confident we have been under this administration aggressively pursuing this russian interference in our last election? >> senator, i think we been trying to raise cost on russia for range of its malign activities worldwide and here and in so doing we are brought charges against officers not related to election interference but in connection and individuals and entities habitation by this administration and diplomats and dozens of the prophetic officers have been kicked out of the united states and russian facilities have been closed and we have been clear and public in attributing malicious cyber activity to the russian government and we have done so

in a coordination with our allies so we continue to look for ways to raise cost of malign behavior and include operations that are legal. >> for the record we have a president of the united states whose them bird to this investigation as a hoax any witchhunt over and over again and just this last weekend called for recognition of russia to give them full partnership back into this organization. it's a mixed message at best. let me go to a specific. i agree the chairman that it is our job to produce new laws when current laws are insufficient but in one area i joined in on a bipartisan bill to deter russians who are seeking these as at the united states for malign purposes. >> we will briefly break away from his hearing in the u.s. senate gavels and next for a

brief pro forma session, live coverage here on a c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., july 5, 2018. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i here by appoint the honorable marco rubio, a senator from the state of florida, who will perform the duties of the chair. signed: orrin g. hatch, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 3:00 p.m.

it would discourage the next generation to know that we are serious in terms of deterrence and prosecution were serious in terms of defense. $387million in its elections. we have some $38 billion that was given to help america vote we made that investment a few years back. i just don't think we have shown an intensity of focus and purpose to let the russians or any other country know that we are serious enough when it comes to this next election and were only a few weeks away. thank you mister chairman. thank you both for being here i concur that there is a risk

with the actual election and voting mechanisms. the primary vector the influence came through information operations rather than through technical fiber election hacking i agree that this information is one of the principal threats one of the ways in which the russians or any other foreign actor could obscure their role in information is by updating through corporate shells that don't look like the government of russia is that not also correct. that seems fair senator.

i just want to make sure it's on the record. >> honestly i don't have enough background on that to weigh in. i would have to refer to the doj on that one for sure. >> when we have facebook's ceo here we discussed there authentication procedure for determining who was buying political advertising time on facebook and the ceo disclosed that there were only going to one half with authentication. so that if a delaware llc or a nevada llc was the nominal buyer of the political time they would have no way of looking behind it to see if it was the fsb were poop or someone associated with foreign elections and manipulation. how big the liability is' are

present and ability to know who the actual truth beneficial owners are of shell corporations when those corporations engage in election influence operations. >> i think the perspective i take on that has been responsible for the fair enforcement we are engaged in trying to determine whether they are a legitimate determination for the industry. that's which makes it more transparent makes it easier for us to apply that. that only applies to specific activities would you not agree that it is a u.s. vulnerability that foreign

actors are able to take advantage of particularly american shell corporations and effectively obscure their hands in information or campaign finance operations. >> i would agree that transparency and ownership is certainly helpful to me. >> and that is in part why the department supports the grassley white house bill to provide for more shell corporation transparency. >> unfortunately i'm not in a position to take a position on legislation today. with any pending legislation. it is a serious vulnerability whether it is to money laundering, to international criminals been able to hide their resources in the nine united states of america behind their view. law enforcement's need to understand who stands behind the corporate entity.

at the moment it is far from adequate. >> i don't know if i know the answer to that. you ought to. thank you very much mister chairman. so thank you for being here today. and obviously we have learned that we were not prepared for the last election and we were not prepared for what russia did. you believe following what we saw in 2016 the administration is prepared for what could happen in 2018. >> i think we know a lot more now and i think we have organize ourselves better to respond what we know now. or they can continue to see this foreign interference and it may not just be from russia but from other countries? >> i would defer to the intelligence community. he is specified that there's

reason to think that they will continue. in reference to russia they have said russia would even get bolder in the next round of elections. they have introduced the election act. they were also very involved in this. and cosponsors and we were able to get 380 million in the last a budget and the money is now going out to the states to help them to shore up their election infrastructure and both leaders supported this and were able to get this done. we have a number of states as you know that don't even have backup paper ballots. and we will be that can change. illinois has had issues in the past and the hackers got as far as their voter files. do you think those resources will be helpful.

>> absolutely, i think they have already been helpful. the department worked with our government correlating counsel to create guidance for state and local election officials to use to help inform the use of that money both on the short and long-term basis. focused on addressing possible non- vulnerabilities as well as long-term important issues like auditability and training for straight and -- state and local officials. i think the money is an important step. we had put put him in a form of an amendment. i am the lead democrat on that. we worked very hard with the secretary of state. we've gone some agreement to get this through. it allows for and it makes clear the sharing. but puts it into law about the clearances for local election officials and the like.

and just wondering your thoughts about that. this is right now on the floor. it is currently being blocked. he and i are trying to work together for that. i've met with both of your staff. as well as the rules committee to talk about that department's role. and we will continue to do so two contribute to the bill. moving forward the department is focused on some of the provisions like establishing communication protocols and having a means by which we can ensure the actual and timely sharing was state with state and local officials. we are moving forward and certainly will continue to work with the staff on your bill. the honest ads act is something or were trying to get done. we are getting increasing

support. especially after that major hearings that they have along with commerce. i think -- i think the two leaders for that. it was spent on online ads in 2016 and do you think there is a need if you look at how bad actors can use a system where there is no transparency and no disclosures or disclaimers do you see a way where more transparency would be helpful to catch that. >> they are responsible for fair enforcement. understanding who is controlling and directing an actor in the united states is critical. that's helpful. nonetheless he does bring up his that they had mentioned. the way what has happened. they have we're back in business.

i'm very pleased that we will start to work on that. and so senator blank and blank and i have introduced this. the strength and disclosure by re- firing with that but if verification policy. they come directly from the u.s. can you come on issue senator white i can't comment on pending legislation. i know we would be happy to work with you in your staff. the last, i would make. they are the only one right now. the secure election act which is set of dirt langford election and i. we haven't ideal opportunity.

as you see people moving other countries are moving towards us when they are faced with warfare. we cannot update our laws to maintain those. it seems like a very big loss of opportunity. i hope we can get this amendment on the bill. senator they did a terrific work on this election act. i want to commend her for the hard work on this. for authorizing the statute. i also worked with senator langford. to ensure that the 380 million in grants got out and is now been distributed. given your former role as chair understand what are the most urgent reforms that they should be implement them.

there is a need for additional resources. every state will get $3 million. we have some of the oldest election machinery in the country. and we have dozens of states that i think aren't fully prepared for an election to as we pointed out is less than six months away. i'm concerned about a lack of the lack of a sense of urgency. how do you think the grants are being distributed and whether you think there is more resources needed. and what you would put with those resources. this was the work that we have done with the council and looking at the council. we were asked by the councilmembers state and local election officials to help provide as far as where the money could be used. to address risks in the process. we focus first on addressing those common it vulnerabilities across the systems things like patching in training for fishing campaigns as well as just

manpower. several states, florida and illinois as well have looked at the cyber navigators. on it support. and sometimes that's not available and those are short-term improvements that several states are looking at it was included in the gcc guidance. ensuring auditability. and ensuring the defensibility of the systems through a variety of mechanisms. the long-term investment in training and it management. one of the things i do regularly is travel the country to do training with state and local officials on it management. do you think $380 million from the federal government is sufficient and how big of a

gap do you think there is a given assessments by the director of national intelligence and other leaders in the icy community that russia and other foreign actors will interfere again in our pending elections. rather it be money or expertise or support their hard to come by for state and local officials. an investment at the local level. elections are run and it's necessary. i know the 380 million was viewed by state and local officials as it important step by the federal government as well to continue to support. i look forward to following up with this. mister hickey forgive me for that. we know that the trump campaign officials failed to register that. the trump campaign manager.

given russia's interference in the presidential election of 2016 in the statements of several senior intelligence officials they will attempt to interfere again. are you concerned about undisclosed foreign agents going forward and if so what steps are you taking to make sure that the department has the tools that they need? >> the increased enforcement as been one of my priorities. we had been more aggressive in educating agents and prosecutors about how to investigate we had stepped up our efforts to identify potential registrants to open criminal investigations where appropriate to compel or urge the registration of entities who should have registered one example i think valid tend to this is the agents and the russian sponsored media organizations who recently registered as agents of a foreign principal. >> i appreciate your focus and urgency on this. i only wish our president can

have a similar level. the last question if i might. make. in your prepared remarks. you know how the department of justice maintains relationships it is those providers who i think of that. they are the primary responsibility for securing the platforms. do you believe that they are doing enough are they still vulnerable and do we need to provide the probe department with more tools to combat that. i would describe it as a evolving relationship. our relationship with them is trending and in the right direction. at the moment given the authorities we have. i think our focus we are following a little bit of that model we follow. i think we as a society are comfortable with social media and making decisions about the content. what we are trying to do is identify situations where we think the users are violating

their terms of service and bring that the information to their attention for them to take the action that they were -- view appropriate. my concern and closing. we fail to grasp how big of a potential threat that was. what we have heard testimony from leadership. about their response. i'm concerned with the next election six months away we have some unresolved work to do here together. >> in regard to the last point that senator coons brought up. we have legislation before this committee improving the foreign agent registration act. and we are running into some. we are running into some

opposition i should say from some business groups that i don't think have a legitimate reason for opposing it. i wish would take a look at that bill. and see if you could help us move them along. i don't know whether the administration is there. there is a lot of shortcomings. how most of most of it has been a lack of enforcement. going way back to 1938. i know you said it was a top priority of years. we need to get some additional legislation passed. let me just second the express -- the consent by the chairman what has been lacking. you've said you don't need new tools i would submit that enforcement has been abysmal.

this is a bipartisan failure and it's not is not meant to be critical of you as officials but i think the chairman is right. enforcement has been sadly lacking. let me begin by asking just very straightforwardly there is no doubt in your mind. that russia interfered or sought interfere with the 2016 elections. in fact russia attacked the united states. in my view it committed an act of war. along with the chairman of the armed services committee. in this area and others.

is not only a matter of protecting our systems but also deterring that attack by proactively making russia pay a price. i think you have to raise the cost of the behavior. the presidents defense lawyers they would assert that it would have corruption within the fbi and the department of justice which appears to have led to the alleged russia collusion investigation. in march president trump also expressed similar view when he tweeted there was no collusion

between russia and the trump campaign. many are now finding out that it was tremendous leaking, lying and corruption at the highest levels of the fbi justice. president trump also tweeted that the probe was based on fraudulent activity are you aware of leaking, lying and corruption within the fbi and the department of justice. >> are you aware that those options led to that russia collusion investigation. no senator. president trump has alleged that james comey knew about the lies and corruption going on at the highest levels of the fbi and they have said within the fbi at the highest level".

is it accurate so far as you know to say that mister cummings buying -- firing led to the discovery of corruption. i have no knowledge of that. there had been statements about there being no evidence of any collusion between the trump campaign in the russian attempt to interfere. but aside whether collusion has been proved on the question of whether there is evidence would you agree with me that there is some evidence that has been elicited and presented so far by the special councils investigation.

as you had recognized as an ongoing investigation. it's not appropriate for me a comment on what evidence may or may not had been discovered in the course of it. let's just talk about facts whether we characterize it as evidence or not. we know that candidate trump called for russia to hack his opponents e-mails is that correct? >> i'm familiar with public statement. which in fact involved his calling for that. we are aware that his son in anticipating and asking for a meeting with the russian agents said he would love" to get dirt on hillary clinton from vladimir putin is that correct? >> all i know about that is from your reports are. i'll head that in front of me. if those facts were true when

it be evidence of collusion between the trump campaign and the russian interference. >> and i think it's appropriate for me to comment. you're the last one. thank you mister chairman. i appreciate that. good morning. mister masterson. the sunday dni director said it's 2018 and we continued to see russian targeting of american society in ways that could affect the midterm election. you may have discussed this already. russia obviously attacked the democracy in the interfered in the 2016 election. this is why the secure election act we are working on. and we believe it is important you may be familiar with that.

we recently also actually help a demonstration for my colleagues. we brine folks who before our eyes hacked election machines. those that are being used in many states. as a former eac commissioner and based on your current role do you agree that it should be prioritized for the states to upgrade their systems based on need rather than based on the size of the population of the state. >> thank you senator for the question, i think there is a decided need for resources across the state and a variety of ways. in the way to prioritize that funding can be done based on the risk-based decision-making. to help inform where the largest areas of risk are.

and where to best identify that. can you identify some of the risks that you review and analyze to this need. as we had worked with state and local officials across the country. we've looked at a variety of what i would call paradigms or structures that states use. the election night reporting systems. items like that. certainly had a broader threat profile. but the risk to the actual integrity of the process may be less. identifying those risks. to mitigate them from the broader vulnerabilities. have you published the list. we had worked with the government coordinating

council. the state and local officials. they have that included the risk in motivations. i believe there is something on the website regarding that. but i can get additional information on that. >> if it's not there please follow up and actually publish the list. with the hacking and other kind of manipulation. if you can get that done by the end of this month if it's not already there we would appreciate that. thank you senator. and then in march as you may have known congress passed a spending deal that is $380 million in grant money to help the states protect their infrastructure. do you know what is the status of getting the guidelines that they came before homeland security homeland security and said that that would be produced and guidance for the

states on how that money should best be spent. can you tell me what the status is of that. it approved that guidance. two weeks ago. and release it to the states and locals. it has been distributed through those channels. >> is that available to the public. >> yes it is. >> will you talk a bit about what you have seen in terms of the risk assessment that you had been doing around the country. i believe 14 states have been completed. >> i believe 17 states have been completed. and what what generally had you seen as been the vulnerability of the assessment. generally speaking within the election infrastructure we are seen in the same typical issues. as well as general the need to take place for what

confederate configuration management was. the resilient. thank you senator. this sector is no different in what we see in the work we are doing with them. we are done with this panel. but a lot of members don't come. so the record will be open for a week. and you had questions in writing. so please answer them as soon as you can. i just want to reentry. we have this opportunity when you go back to the office to get this in as part of the amendment to the naa.

in some other work that we have talked about today. i want to correct something that the foreign agents registration act. your department is helping with that legislation. you are dismissed. thank you. now why the other group is coming i will start to introduce mister weinstein. in 2008 he was named homeland security advisor by president george w. bush prior to his white house service.

it was the first assistant attorney general. before that he served as u.s. attorney in washington dc. he has served as general counsel also of the fbi. mister goodman is the founding coeditor and chief a publication justice security. an online form focused on u.s. national security and that form is based at new york university school of law. new york university. prior to this he served as special counsel to the general counsel of the department of defense. ms. jankowski is a global fellow at the wilson center in washington dc she focused on eastern europe and focuses on eastern europe and russia.

previously she served as a public policy fellow. and worked in government relations at the national democratic institute for international affairs. we very much appreciate the invitation today. they are holding this hearing in pursuing this issue. there is an impressive threat to our growing cetaceans here and around the globe. the intelligence committee assessed that the government have a multifaceted campaign.

it included a cyber intrusions. penetrations of the dnc. to influence the election in the use of internet trolls. the russians were propounding. with the intelligence community and several ensuing investigations having those established that we face serious and growing threat the question now is how we can most effectively respond to that. it has a number of tools they can use. with the fisa court. in the national security letters as well as the full range of tools they can use to investigate influence activities. second and has the ability to bring a criminal prosecution for the example.

for hacking into protected computer systems or under the foreign agent registration act. on behalf of a foreign party without registering themselves as foreign agents. they could also be achieved through the application of economic and trade sanctions such as when president obama and trump and they can also be achieved for the objective of a country's official staff such as when both presidents suggested that. enclosed russian facilities in the country. another option is the enforcement of the campaign finance laws to prevent foreign nationals to contributing to the global campaigns. last year's report for the french far right party. allegedly in part as a reward for supporting the activities. raises the concern that they may make similar attempts. with campaign funding and contributions. in finally. it is on the protection of the systems themselves the

election process will be designated as critical infrastructure. and other critical sectors that receive federal assistance. so this is the tools and capabilities been used to meet the threat today in light of recent events we need to think of ways we can strengthen those tools. the first is to get the justice department statutory authority to give a junction against operators they take over networks of computers and lots of disruptive attacks. a second proposal was to enhance it. by getting the justice department attorneys the authority to compel foreign agent to turn over records that show whether they are or not although it is addressed

in the earlier panel. they provide a basis for much of the russian misconduct. congress had considered the foreign election. thereby highlighting both the recognition of the severity of this threat in the company condemnation as well as providing prosecutors a way to be in effectively used. i would be only more prevalent. and they use new technologies to these purposes. another proposal is in the 2016 election. when the obama administration struggled with the information. to provide the public about that rational -- russian interference numbers. in the need to refrain from public announcements.

they have passed legislation with that intelligence committee. with the upcoming election. thereby ensuring that voters are on notice and on the lookout. in the run-up to an election which is the most effective way to neutralize the foreign influence campaign. to conclude we have a number of effective tools and capabilities which can be there with the threat. at the real question for today is whether we also have the focus in single-minded will to do so. all too often we as a country had been slow to mobilize. such as we were with al qaeda in the 1990s. it is my hope that we will not be slow in responding to this threat.

the action that is a sustained. the threat is not an overstatement. there is a lot at stake. i look for to answering your questions. >> thank you mr. wing steen. now professor goodman. thank you for hearing such an important issue. to testify before you. to use that tool. like the terrorists of 911 they used our systems against us. al qaeda used our commercial air transportation systems. the kremlin used our transportation systems. moscow hijacked platforms.

in the attack on the united states. the russian operations had wreaked havoc. long before donald trump or hillary clinton announced their runs for the presidency codenamed or referred to begin around it was initiated with a stated goal. to spread distrust towards the candidate. they have the operation with the cyber espionage operation. although this dissemination of stolen e-mails during the general election is highly salient it is vital for the public to understand that the kremlin began to espionage activities during the primaries to bring some candidates for president. and both major political parties. russia's cyber espionage operation collected on some

republican deleted targets but did not had that disclosure campaign. they debuted as white policies. included top republicans and staffers at a certain point the russian operation also included the objective of favoring the trump campaign and undermining candidacy. those objectives also began before the general election. a special counsel and the criminal investigation. in 13 russian they engaged in that. with hillary clinton to denigrate other candidates such as ted cruz and marco rubio". in addition the former fbi agent clint watch also

identified that. of senator graham and florida governor. it is not simply hope to shape the outcome of a general election. they also hope to shape the outcomes of primaries thereby denying americans the right to choose with their own political leaders free of interference. the kremlin is interested not only in a candidate who stands the best chance of winning it would be valuable for moscow. what direction a party takes in formulating its platform. and undermining public trust in those who win the election. it is of course not limited to russia. if americans are willing to encourage, support or conspire with these foreign agents. being willing is not a crime.

but acting on that willingness could be. raises the question whether they did coordinate or conspire with the intellection. we can be placed on the spectrum. two strong evidence to prove. with my written testimony. of the many pieces of information that are now publicly available. part of that is there in current law. and where we may still need to fill in some gaps. i did not use the word collusion anywhere in the analysis the real question in my mind is where there any americans engaged in the conspiracy to work with the russians who intentionally supported the operation in violation of campaign finance laws. from the trump tower meeting. and an operative for the fbi has active ties to russian intelligence. i think it is fair to say. there is evidence of violation.

how to improve the system for our elections. from foreign adversaries. we have a robust system of loss in my written testimony i highlight some of the areas opportunity for legislative reform. some of the most promising pieces of legislation are coming out of this. they both remove the loophole that currently allows foreign agents other measures could also enhance our law enforcement regime by bolstering the authority. and using the mechanism of transparency. legislation introduced in the house last week. takes an important step. with agents of foreign powers. offering illicit support. it is another significant step forward to address future and

national security risks i want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak about these matters and i look for to answering any questions that you may have. thank you senator. distinguish members of the committee it is an honor to testify before you this morning and heartening to see the bipartisan interests. as it is truly a challenge but knows no political party. i had worked on the front lines of the war. to work with the national democratic institute as its strategic institution. and most recently as a work on up about the development about the responses to russian intelligence operations. even if we were to walk out of this hearing today and secure beyond a shadow of a doubt the infrastructure even if we were medically field. and even if the social social media companies finally put

forth a good fourth effort. even then we would still not successfully do our faces. if our democratic processes are to remain secure we must think beyond knee-jerk reactions. european countries that have been most successful head in common one key point. their governments recognize that they cannot simply spot check or label their way out of crisis. for example in estonia despite a large ethnic population in a near constant barrage it would be fighting fewer footholds than did ten years ago this is

partly because the government is conducting a proactive outreach to the ethnic russian population including language educational initiative. similarly there has been a growing demand for media literacy training in response they trained 15,000 people in critical thinking and a source of valuation and emotional manipulation. they measured a 29% increase in battles with russian interference. these long-term investments will be the cornerstone. the responses to election interference they must work in concert with that. in addition to the stipulations that divided. which i support. congress must pursue citizens based. both in the sears.

social media companies had played control. they should be required to they have no idea what they are signing up for. this ignorance as well as emotion is what russia asked his exploits. second, terms of service should be easy to understand clearly defined and should be actively enforced. this is costly of course and will require human content reviewers in the establishment but civil discourse in democracy are priceless. third social media companies had near ubiquitous access.

to that end the investment that will best protect democracy is decidedly more low-tech. education. first we must invest in broad-based media literacy civics and critical thinking programs to fight election interference. they understand how government works and less likely to buy into the falsehoods and conspiracy that are harmful to democracy. congress should encourage cooperation across government. into departments of education both at the national and local levels. finally, adults should only be a target audience moscow will continue to influence our democracy as it has done for decades and now that the kremlin has written playbooks. they will imitate russian tactics. we must think beyond russia.

for the key actors. the american people. i will start with mister winston. is there anything in 18 u.s. 71. and they have a prompt to it. it provides that the government can prosecute someone if they defraud the united states. people and entities that lead the government. for their own advantage. maybe mislead the government about taxes and the like. it is one of those used by the

special counsel. they have the disclosure requirements. that is an effective tool to go after foreign policies you are pretending to be americans. i can't think of a person's specific change to that. it goes to my earlier comments. this might be an occasion. i understand the concern with that overcome lysing things with the federal law. the severity of this threat the threat and the fact that we will have this threat increasing form for years to come. it might be an area where you might consider a statue specifically on foreign election interference. and i can think of a number of different areas. it can be retooled to make it

easy for prosecutors to go after foreign parties. we understand the value of the criminal prosecution. with their foreign government. and when we do get our hands on individuals. can you describe the limitation. i can do it briefly. one example is to go back to 2015 when doj indicted several uniform members of the pla over in china. for trade secret violations. that actually helped to put each the chinese where they scale back some of this.

some of the problems are just chronic. you go after foreign actors. on foreign government. they are not incentivized to get those people. you can get some of the evidence because it is in the hands of the foreign government that doesn't want to be helpful. it's a problem because a lot of this activity takes place over the internet and attributions. that are resulting in the activity. miss jankowski. from your studies and other countries about russian disinformation.

we have the estonia example. it was there by the government outreach. the civil society groups launch fact checking. in terms of equipping these. what approach has it led you to believe might be effective in our country. it has to has to be a whole holistic approach. it's not just about media literacy or teaching people to second check forces. i think sadly the social media has polarized. we are not doing anymore. i was a member of the debate team in high school. i think it led me to the work we have today. we need more stuff happening like that. an understanding of the system is trickle to trust in

government. thank you very much mister chairman. these are excellent witnesses. some general agreement here. i think it just shows how important it is to act meanwhile i just learned that they deadlocked again. possibly going forward with some legislative changes. for reasons i do not understand. given that intelligence committee. we've had several here with the chairman of leadership. i just think we need to get this added to the bill. do you want to talk about why it's so important that we see this.

that is what professor goodman suggested. putting it there. it is so important to me. both of the bells are important steps. to this point i don't think the united states has done enough of. i've heard conversations in europe. they are conversations that we are having now. they sent a signal to the american people. and that rebuilds the trust. we have always been such a leader on elections and free elections across the world. and we need to get that back. he is now picking up support for some reason. by that social media companies and i think what we are seeing

is a patchwork of laws. but you simply can you talk about that. without any kind of action on the federal government and only having voluntary measures which creates another patchwork. we are glad you are doing does. they decided not to do ads in washington dc -- washington state anymore. you have social media companies having different standards and you have washington doing nothing when it is projected that they are going to be plant -- spent on online political ads. as a great point. i would say not only had that. with that dgp.

the social media companies are responding in different ways. i think they are doing it and we have already seen some ads that are not political at all. others are allowed to go through. it is still being there. again, this enforcement is not uniform. we do need that leadership at the federal level. with allowing users to opt out of having their data shared and how you can see that as being helpful. i am i'm happy to comment that as well.

i would like to see more informed consent among users from social media companies. when you see a commercial on tv that you don't want to watch. this is just putting power in the hands. this is an important area for the future. in the sense of the prior information. in take it up. and if they self regulate i think we can not trust what they will necessarily do. maybe they are even under rate leadership and his ever in charge of their corporations now. especially when there is not political pressure on them. one relationship is the cambridge at atletico using the facebook information.

in the idea was they were going to be fully transparent but it's interesting. the reports from the guardian said that they actually tried to threaten them before they publish them. in congress been at that area. i think that companies our realizing that. .. .. and then you have all this going to one thing leading to ask about voter suppression efforts. in the hearings we've had in judiciary without a number of apps displayed with african-american faces say hey,

text this number during the trump/putin election and you will be able to vote without stand in line. to me that was clearly criminal. voter suppression. and how maybe the russians have used this in the past. >> senator whitehouse. >> i was asking a the question. that's okay. >> i thought it was a statement. >> i can go back after senator whitehouse is done. >> senator whitehouse. >> thank you very much. first of all i'd like to welcome ken weinstein back. he was a very distinguished public servant also very helpful witness before this committee before. in addition to the csis criminal playbook which is a very helpful and authoritative source on election and other interference by the kremlin and the kremlin trojan horse report, the atlantic councils parallel effort, there is a new report

called moscow's gold, russian corruption in the uk that was put up by the house of commons foreign affairs committee and a like to ask that report be put into the record. >> without objection it will be. >> i want to thank mr. wainstein for focusing on the botnet civil injunction legislation, we've been working that for for a log time. where hoping to get into ndaa the also. it seems pretty obvious to try to shut these damn things down in the way that's been proven to work. but what of what to talk about in my time is the problem of shell corporations. because for all of the emphasis that the witnesses have put on policing and prosecuting foreign influence in our elections, you can neither police or prosecute what you cannot find. and at the moment we have both a shell corporation problem, which was emphasized by mark zuckerberg in his testimony when

he said their political advertisement identification program would only go to the first shell corporation and not seek information about who was actually behind it. i don't think putin is stupid enough to call it -- llc. it's going to sound more like americans for puppies and peace and prosperity. but it's a front group and it's got putin or whomever else behind it. until we can know that we cannot enforce effectively, into story. similarly with our election system has these colossal channels for dark money, if you can find out what special interest is behind anonymous money, you can find out if there is a foreign interest behind that money. darkness is darkness is darkness and it hides maligned activity both foreign and domestic. i'd like to ask each of you to comment on that. i think you are concerned about trolling. that's facilitated by shell

corporations. you talked about general propaganda campaigns. obviously facilitated by shell corporations. campaign-finance laws you called out for a need for effective disclosure. you can't have effective disclosure if you think your disclosing is a front corporation and you don't know who's really died. if i could ask each of you on that and then that will begin to my type. >> thank you for the kind words. >> we were good adversaries. >> we were. adversaries who are working for the same golf. >> yes. >> book, as a prosecutor, former prosecutor, looking at this issue, of course you want to know more about the corporations than less. the first amendment issues and other concerns in the election context, but absolutely, there is no way to resist your logic, which is leasing the use of corporations in a variety of contexts whether it's money laundering or otherwise.

we've seen them in the election in interference and disinformation context. a lot of that -- >> in fact, they are widely used in the criminal context for money laundering purposes and to hide the proceeds of criminal activities, correct? >> absolutely. >> to the extent that what putin is running is essentially a criminal enterprise of himself and his oligarchs why would they not look at to what the do as a model? >> no question. all intended to hide the fact of the source of this maligned activity. >> professor goodman? >> i agree. i was struck by the opening, spy senator feinstein who said for the 2016 election, we're so unaware. mr. hickey said quote exposure is but one of the best ways to counter the threats. i don't see how we get at those issues before operating with shell companies. as you said i think it affects all law enforcement across the board, including four and

legislation proposal and with a loophole, it accentuates that problem but even if we close the loophole we will still have problems. >> it's incredibly easy to get around it by not hiring a lobbyist and simply setting up a shell corporation and now you're operating as if you are an american corporation. ms. jankowicz? >> i would agree. the advice of canada justice department yesterday about our key presenters although rg was not named in the advisory, said presenters were exempt from it because the fact party itself is registered in the united states. that's a clear the legislation. regarding shell corporations and advertising online i would also put forth the idea in my written testimony about creating through third-party or perhaps social media companies could do this themselves although i have some reservations about this, a better business bureau type of list a registered trusted political advertisers. then we would kind of get around these issues of sloppy enforcement of political ads that are just say no, this has

to do with president trump, therefore it is political and we will reject this after if there are trusted advertisers listed, that could be weighted circumvent these issues. >> shell corporations is a real problem. >> absolutely. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. i'll finish with one question for professor goodman and then i'll call in senator klobuchar. it's my understanding that in addition to the federal elections campaign act, use a need for another change in title 18, particularly section 371. can you explain why you think a change to that session is necessary, and what about the existing statute is insufficient? for example, are the cases that cannot be prosecuted unless the law is changed? >> thank you for the question. so i also agree with ken wainstein that in this area might be better even if it's for

symbolic purposes to have a new offense which about for interference a foreign government interference in our elections. in some sense that would be redundant with the existing statute. this existing statute is robust as we're seeing with a special counsel indictment of the russians. i also think it would be a question as to what are the acts that americans might take that would expose them to liability for being involved in that conspiracy? that's an area you could imagine it would be beneficial to have law that updates it to technology. so what would be the act that would expose an american to liability for coordinating or supporting the russians came to interfere in the way which they're being alleged or indicted for by the special counsel? that could be also hopeful to prosecutors who would have something more specific as to whether not they are going to bring charges rather than something that is broader. but otherwise existing law still handles that. >> senator klobuchar. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i was asking about the voter

suppression efforts and what you've seen historically with that. >> sure. i would do all 350-0500 ads that were released by the house democrats a couple of weeks ago, and i can see the trend among those ads is certainly as it is with all russian disinformation, to divide along suicidal seizures. of those that are targeted the african-american community and as you said clearly attempting to depress turnout. i think the way they did this is interesting by putting forward positive messages first, things that were not disinformation, things about blackett unity and things like that to create immunity, create a trusted messenger and then the irate pages would go for big asks such as signing petitions or then putting through these disinformation messages about not turning out to vote or other types of voter suppression and things like that. so it's hard to regulate that because it starts with things that are not disinformation.

>> but when it ends up with ads that are criminal -- >> yes. >> and when you don't know about it because there's no disclosure and so you can't immediately see it for what it is, and the other campaigns don't see it, , whethr you're dealing on either political party. i've always believed that the campaigns that have the most vested interest in winning, basically on both sides, i believe in competition, if they don't see that kind of stuff they are going to know what's what better than anyone, in addition to the press being able to sit. >> i would agree. also it worries me about what mr. zuckerberg said about ai doing this enforcement and early detection of these types of issues. because how would artificial intelligence gathered these positive messages and put out an identification that this is good to be a problem? i see that as a possibility and the think that's what you really need to invest more in human content reviewers.

>> exactly. and he can campaigns tend to say where is this positive message coming from? what is this group? spatial if you disclaimers on it. they find out the group is a fraud. again, disclaimer, disclosure immediately i think would be really important. i have a bill with senator blunt cosponsored by senator feinstein and warner the stop for donations to require verification protocol to help verify that online credit card donations come from u.s. sources. so could you talk just again about the importance of this, the people going to start trying to find ways to get around this? >> absolutely, senator. they already are, and the russians are. i mentioned in my earlier statement that the pretty late example of that was a major nations to the french far right candidate a year, year and a half ago.

it was a reward for her supporting their actions in crimea. and so that was a blatant examples in trying to find their chosen candidate. no question they're going to cut every avenue to do that here and they probably already are. >> one of the things, mr. chairman, i'd like to buy the street that has always come out of the other traits is sometimes it's just about the general election, and what was going on with the hillary clinton versus donald trump campaigns. but the way that professor goodman and read all of you have directed some of your comments about the long haul here where they're actually getting involved in primaries. it was senator rubio who once said this isn't a one party or when election, and the extent going to be but the other part in the other election. if you intraparty involvement when you're trying to certain republican candidates to help others. i think the more we make sure the public understands that that is going on, the more this becomes what it should become

which is an effort to protect our democracy and just he said/she said and one side versus other side. so i i really appreciate you calling these witnesses and the content of the testimony. thank you. >> i say thank you for this panel, and then to remind you that several members were not here so you make it questions in writing. seven day to submit those questions, and hopefully you can get them responded quickly. thank you very much for a very important hearing that we've had, very good information from this panel. >> thank you, mr. chairman. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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>> sunday night on q&a, freelance journalist tom dunkel on his "washington post" magazine article, locked and loaded for the lord, on the sense of the late reverend sun myung moon and the church in newfoundland, pennsylvania. >> what is going on at st. george church in pennsylvania is a co-mingling of a lot of undercurrent in the country of religion, politics and guns. to a degree we haven't seen before. it's still a a small church, no question about that. shawn has a worldwide following, my guess would be maybe 200 people in the congregation, total up in pennsylvania, and

500, 1000, 2000 worldwide. these days you can follow church on youtube come all the sermons are webcast every week. but it's that commingling of passion in america and what does this say about us as a culture, and what, is this any, is this any precursor what we might see down the road? when you get a genie out of the bottle of mixing guns and religion in almost any society, it's usually been problematic. >> sunday night at eight eastern on c-span's q&a. >> necks, hearing on uniform anti-doping and medication control programs in horse racing. representatives andy barr kentucky and paul talk of new york talk about their bill on the issue, and horse training and horseracing officials share their opinions on the legislation. this is two hours 15 minutes.

>> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. i like to call the subcommittee to order this morning. welcome you all here this morning. at thiim