it's a scandal. the chapter on johnson, i won't speak beyond that. it should be expunged from every library in the country. it focuses on a fellow named edmund ross casting a single the vote saved johnson's tale. and it cost is about the most heroic moment in american history. i think that his boat was purchased. and saving johnson i think was not. >> federal and state officials protect u.s. elections from

tampering, fraud and hacking and discussed efforts to influence and disrupt the electoral process. the congressman chairs the oversight government reform committee. this is three hours. the committee on oversight government reform will come to order. residing members authorized to reassess at any time. i recognize myself and then the gentleman from maryland and recognize each of today's witnesses. the right to vote is fundamental in a functioning democracy intact the ability to pick our own leaders to find democracy. it's the essence of

self-government. everything we do in congress or any remediaforany remedial bodyl passed with hearing conducted, any witness summoned, every document acceseverydocument accs and as power and legitimacy. so they're legitimacy of what we do this with the underlining the election. the power to vote is likewise counted no more or no less than anyone else's and the legitimacy to govern their four flows from the reliability of the underlining process. further adding to the uniqueness of this idea called america is the duality that elections were principally governed and conducted by state and local officials and sometimes volunteers even though many have decided national implications, the stakes are national, the threats are sophisticated and international, the process of

state and local driven but the states can and do ask for assistance particularly given the nature of the attacks we seem to face. today's hearing is focused on security, accepting and advancing our intellectual beliefs and legitimacy of the work into the wor and the work o elected office is a direct proportion to the reliability of our own elections. today's hearing is broader than what happened in 2016 but what happened must be addressed because the malefactors will attack us again. i personally am convinced beyond any burden that russia interfered with the 2016 the election and i'm convinced he attempted to undermine the fundamentals of our democracy and view the reliability of the 2016 election and so the support among americans our intelligence community both past and present included this as did the house intelligence committee report as i am quite certain the senate

intelligence committee report and equally importantly as the powerful americans who served on the two grand juries which returned to build just ten days ago the deputy general announced russia is engaged inside the patience to interfere in the presidential election. they hacked into networks and installed malicious software that allowed them to spy on users, captured keystrokes, took screenshots. they also discussed the timing of releas the release in an atto enhance the impact. this wasn't just his opinion, it was the consensus of average everyday americans were called into service on what we call the grand jury. there is no allegation this interference changed the vote count were affected any result

thabut that was likely not for a lack of trying. what better way to undermine confidence in every derivative function of government and to cast doubt on the results of the whole. last week many of us were in a safe meeting with the inspector general michael horowitz. there were no cameras, it was just us and our colleagues in the judiciary and my suspicion is all of us who were there left with a renewed understanding of what happened both in 2016 and before that. we left fully cognizant each would be subject to an attack and we must be prepared not as partisans but as fellow citizens. russia attacked many institutions in the country. some were successfully attacked the dnc and many others were targeted. i'm sure my colleagues were distraught as i was last week that again, and i'm struck every

time i have access to relevant information by the reality that all of us are actually victims, some infected more than others but the target was america which is why those indictments alleged united states of america versus it's not a political party or group or individual, it is the united states of america persons. i'm sure someone will correct me as they are kind enough to do from time to time. i think it was none other than the greek philosopher who said come and i will get this partially right, the place we want to live is a place where even those of us who were not victimized by crime, even those of us who were not injured and even those o, eventhose of us wd deal the team at the injustice juspain of the injusticejust ass

ourselves. 2016 was one political party that was accessed with materials disseminated. those who seek to do us harm will be back at it again in 2018 perhaps with a different target so we must take every precaution to save the process and we are here today to explore ways to ensure no vote count i count asa project and discuss how to protect the entire process from start to finish. it's our responsibility to ensure that no election is interfered with and it's our responsibility to ensure when our fellow citizens placed their ballots in the ballot box by whatever means the vote is recorded accurately and counted correctly. there will be efforts to effectt us and a tax cut efforts to save the seeds of discord and discontent and efforts to call into question the legitimacy of the electoral process that americans are good at coming together in the aftermath of a tragedy or a loss or a tack or

at least used to be. it's one of the most unifying qualities. the challenge is can we come together even in an environment like the one we find ourselves in now and attack - -- refill before it happens. we need and want to have confidence. nothing interfered in the will of the american journey. americans are free to quarrel about who should be elected. we will have a hard time sustaining this gift of self-governance that we've been given if we begin to quarrel about who actually was a elected and with that i will recognize the gentleman from maryland. >> i want to first thank the chairman for this hearing. as he was talking i couldn't

help but feel chills because one of the last things my mother said, a 92-year-old woman who fought for the vote and who had seen people lynched and harmed trying to get to vote one of the last things she said on her deathbed is don't let them take the vote away from us. chilling. so this hearing means a lot to me personally and i know it means a lot to every member of this body. after all, we wouldn't be here if people didn't have the right to vote so i dedicate these words to ruth cummings. this is a very important hearing.

candidly however, it is not enough. the it's not enough. words are cheap. this is the first time since donald trump was elected in 2016 that the oversight committee has held a full committee hearing on russian interference and the election. it took a year and a half to finally hold today's hearing. this comes less than four months before the 2018 midterm elections and most states have already held their primaries. in addition, the chair and denied our request to invite the office of the director of national intelligence to testify

today. .. we try to do it more effectively the next time. dan coats, the director of national intelligence recently warned, listen to what he said, the warning lights are blinking red. he compared these warning

signs to what we saw before 911 let me repeat that. president trump's own director of national intelligence compared our situation now to the month leading up to the attack of september 11, 2001. the chairman would not send an invitation to ask anyone to testify. we understand we may get a classified briefing at some later date, but a closed-door briefing is no substitute for a public hearing to inform the american people about what is going on. we have dhs here, we should have the intelligence community here as well. we held a subcommittee hearing

in november on elections ever security, but it was also inadequate. he was hear from dhs, also testified in november and at that hearing we asked them for documents showing how russia attacked our state. during our duty as a check on the executive branch, at first he gave us only a single document. later he gave us 50 pages, much of which was already public, thank you very much. we sent a letter asking the chairman to subpoena the documents dhs withholding but he ignored it. we sent another letter asking him to let us vote on a

subpoena, but he denied our motion. because this issue is so important, we join with the ranking members of other key committees and sent a letter to speaker paul ryan. we employed him to help us get from the trump administration these documents about how russia attacked our state, but all we got was silence. silence. radio silence. it was not until special counsel robert muller indicted 12 russian military officials on july 13 that we finally learn something more about the attacks against our state we

should not have been forced to read about it in a press release. dhs and other agencies should have provided that information months ago. that is our job to check the executive branch. we have worked with states to help secure their election systems. it's clear that the house republicans do not want information about russia. it seems like a pretty basic first step. it's basic information.

even worse, the house republicans are taking active steps to hurt state efforts to affect the election systems purchase last week house republicans blocked all agendas to provide additional funding to secure safe election system. they argued that states do not need more money because they could cover the security upgrades on their own. i have a letter here that we just received yesterday completely contradicting that republican talking point and asking unanimous consent to make it an official part of the election. this is from a bipartisan group of 21 states attorneys general, both republican and

democrat. they expressed grave concern with the american election system. they ask for additional funding. many states lack the resources and tools they need to protect the polls. additional funding for voting infrastructure will not only allow states to upgrade election systems will also allow for comprehensive security risk assessment. let me conclude with this. some republicans have recently begun to issue more critical statements about president trump and russia. german heard wrote an op-ed in the new york times indicating that our committee must

conduct vigorous and public oversight, and this is his quote, i didn't say that, german heard said this. i believe that lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty as well as keep the american people informed of the current danger. as a member of the house oversight and government reform committee, i strongly believe in the importance of congresses oversight responsibilities and will work that they are taking the threat seriously. i agree with every syllable the chairman wrote. i think he's telling the truth. but it would be much more powerful to back it up.

we need all of our republican colleagues to conduct oversight not just use strong words. it is withholding about the russian attacks. support i request for the director of national intelligence to testify in public, vote in favor of additional funding for saf states that need it. we don't need talk. we need action. this should be a bipartisan issue and mr. chairman, you're absolutely right, this must be a bipartisan issue but this must be an issue where we put our party hats to the side. we have less than four months to help our state before the next election. with that, i yield back. >> the gentleman yelled back.

i'm pleased to introduce today's witnesses. i will introduce you in a group and then individually. maggie to house, i knew i get that wrong. my apologies. i think i just go with oliver and not even try to pronounce it one more time protector of state from new mexico the honorable ricky hatch, county auditor in utah. welcome. i will have to administer and also ask you to please stand and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give is the truth, the whole truth so help you god. >> please indicate all answered in the affirmative. there is a lighting system that may help you.

you can rest assure your opening statements are in the possession of every member and they will be read so to the extent that you're able to summarize your remarks in five minutes that would be great. with that, you are recognized. >> chairman, ranking members, members of the committee, thank you for today's opportunity to testify regarding the department of homeland security ongoing effort to assist state and local officials. those who own and operate election systems with improving the resilience of election security across america. today's hearing is timely as primary elections are winding down and election officials have time to reflect and get ready for the november elections. in fact, less than two weeks ago secretary nielsen and the dhs leadership team met with officials as they gathered in philadelphia for their summer conference. let me state plainly and clearly 2018 midterm election remain a potential target for

russian cyber and influence operation. as described in the assessment , we know they engaged in a multifaceted campaign to meddle in the last elections. that includes some influence tactics they have used for decades. based on this prior demonstration of capability and intent we are planning and preparing as if they will try again this fall and beyond. in terms of current activity, the intelligence community has observed to influence operations into 2018. all these recent activities are designed to exacerbate, there does not appear to be an effort at the same scope or scale directed at the midterm. nor have we seen russian cyber operations directly targeting state and local election systems infrastructure.

having said that, there's little doubt that some adversaries in nonstate actors view elections as a target for cyber and influence operations. having been given a roadmap we are certain some cyber actors are interested in identifying potentially exploiting vulnerabilities and election systems. some driven by prior malicious actions and global dialogue about risks to a infrastructure. additionally malicious activity from various actors is regularly observed infrastructure. often common activity. due to that threat landscape we remain vigilant to maintain our democracy. but as i traveled, it's clear to me that election officials are not sitting back.

they take the security seriously. our mission is to help our stakeholders better understand and manage their space. we want to establish trust and understand what it takes other stakeholders need to manage their risk and we have made significant progress over the last year end half. with strong partnerships, we are working with state and local officials as well as private sector partners to support them. we've created council to work to share information, probably best practices and develop strategies to reduce risks to nations election system. we have created the election infrastructure information sharing and analysis after with almost 1000 members including all 50 states. we are sponsoring security clearances from a multiple election officials in each state, we have increased the availability and deployed free technical assistance and offered cyber security and physical security training and exercises.

in fact later this morning we conducted a tabletop exercises with a number of election officials. we continue to refine and update our services as the requirements mature. this will take time and a deliberate effort on both sides across the 50 states and five territories there over 10000 jurisdictions that are responsible for elections. the systems processes and procedures used very greatly, what's works for the voters of florida likely does not work for the voters of california. we are focused on engaging those many jurisdictions by each state and territory. this effort known as a last mile initiative is focused on tailoring awareness of the threat, security mitigation, best practices and election security guidance checklist to the individual county or local level. we understand the only way to deliver a resilient election system is to work collaboratively with those officials including our partners at the eac as well as

those on the front line running the process. before i conclude, i want to take a moment to thank congress for legislative progress thus far in strengthening dhs and cyber security authorities and we strongly support the passage of the cyber security and infrastructure security agency act. i look forward to further outlining our efforts to enhance the security of elections, our progress to date and our strategy moving forward. thank you. i look forward to your questions. >> good morning chairman. i'm pleased to testify before you today to discuss the u.s. election assistance commission's work that supports state and local election leaders in their efforts to conduct efficient and secure elections. when congress passed the help america vote act of 2002 it established the eac as an independent bipartisan commission charged with developing guidance to help meet requirements adopting voluntary deadlines and certifying election systems

serving as the national clearinghouse of information on election administration as well as dispensing and harboring funds. we continue to fill this mission day in and day out. election officials across the country constantly affirm our work does indeed help america. the eac is the only federal entity focus solely on the administration of elections. we serve as a central hub for other federal agencies that's bee spend only part of this time working on the same issue including those who specialize in technology and cyber security. our partners range from dhs and the fbi to the u.s. postal service and dod, relying on the eac to provide the knowledge about how elections work and a clear line of communication to those in the field to administer the vote. this is not new to those election officials and administered of staff

members. that said, you can see from this diagram it is not our only response billy. the work described for the election officials encompasses everything from the ada compliance and voter registration to management and human resources. this is why it's so vital that congress and federal agencies, especially the eac provide election ministry does with resources and tools they need to help succeed. the establishment of election systems as part of the nations critical infrastructure and it's one way the federal government thought to improve the mechanisms it uses to accomplish this goal. following secretary johnson's critical announcement the eac worked actively to provide state and local officials with the voice of the table during discussions about how the sector would function. dhs has often stated that the gcc was formed faster than any other similar critical

infrastructure sector counsel to date. the eac takes pride in its role that we played to make that happen. it is proof of how state, local and federal governments can effectively work together for common goal in protecting our nation's infrastructures. i serve on the gcc executive committee which has worked diligently to ensure the critical infrastructure designation has tangible meaningful impact across the nation. we all know many of the solutions to security challenges take resources and we are pleased that members of this committee and your congressional colleagues recognize this reality when supporting the consolidated appropriation act of 2018. that legislation contains $380 million in security funds for state and territories to improve the administration of federal elections. just four months after the appropriation bill was signed into law, i'm proud to report that we have received disbursement request for one 100% of the funds. it demonstrates eac's

responsiveness and the states territories urgency in addressing ways to improve election systems. less than two weeks after president trump sign the appropriation bill into law the eac personally notified each eligible jurisdiction and issued notice grants award letters to every state and territory just one week after that. the first date misery requested funds of the week that followed the eac conducted a webcast, public form to explain the funds and work directly with the national association of secretaries of state. the eac also conducted webinars, published faq and other resources on the website. the team help states navigate hurdles.

nearly 75% of the money was spent on cyber protection, new voting equipment and registration systems and audits. they have ongoing work to complement our vital role they bring together many others to discuss the approach. the commission continues to

release new resources and training and participation of the series of events including initiatives focused on security. they've traveled to nearly a dozen states as it management trainings for state and local officials. the training is ongoing and we work with dhs to put these trainings online. credits another layer of security. the eac appreciates the support of our efforts and commitment to provide resources in territories that we serve. we look forward to providing additional details about the commissions work and answering any and all questions.

thank you. >> good morning. thank you chairman, ranking member cummings and members of the committee. i am the new mexico secretary of state. prior to serving as secretary of state of the county county cler clerk. i'm also the treasurer. it's a nonprofit professional organization founded in 1904. the organization provides secretary of state, chief election officials and other public officials from across the united states to share

public policy ideas and best practices. this is important because it gives election officials access to information beyond what's available in our own state. helping us find innovative solutions to common issues. over 80 the set sessions revolved around cyber security. election officials like myself are taking the possible threat of foreign actors meddling in the election very seriously. secretary nelson emphasize the fact that election security is national security. she also highlighted the positive relationships between dhs and the states to protect election infrastructure.

while state and local officials have always been focused on election security, the focus of our national organizations and the federal government has increased significancsignificantly since 2016. it's clear election security will be a top parity for state, local and federal officials as well as the general public. what is also clear is that local election officials must keep the line of communication open and must continuously work together to hardener nations election system. now to a little bit about my state. new mexico is a leader in election best practices, i am proud to say. we utilize paper ballots in all elections and have robust pre-and post election testing, accuracy and auditing processes just to name a few. in fact, new mexico was one of the first day to the nation to conduct postelection audit. additionally, the vote tabulation system that we use are never connected to the

internet and include other important security mechanisms that reduce the ability for a bad actor to change a vote. these practices are important safeguards that are being adopted all across the country. in regard to specific state preparation, i would like to thank you and your colleagues for appropriating the remaining help america vote funds to states of the recent omnibus bill. according to the u.s. election assistance commission, as of july 16, 2018, all of the funds have been requested by the states and eligible territories as we just heard. in new mexico we recently requested our portion of over $3.69 from the u.s. election assistance commission. we plan to use these funds to ensure new mexico's election systems continue to be resilient and secure. part we also launched a

brand-new election security program within our bureau of election with a portion of the funds earmarked to fund a full-time staff position to manage this program through 2023. the program administrator will be responsible for in fermenting best practices for the election data and to provide training on cyber security issues. this is particularly important in the smaller more rural counties. we will also allocate some of funds to assist system upgrades that they cannot afford on their own. we are excited to have the opportunity to put this program into affect and appreciate congress and dhs in these efforts. thank you for inviting me and my colleagues to testify before you and speak about

this important matter. i look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> thank you madam secretary. >> chairman gary, ranking member, members of the committee, thank you the opportunity to testify this morning on how we can ensure the safety and security of our election system but my name is ricky hatch and i am the clerk auditor in utah. i'm here on behalf of the international association of counties which represent all 3069 county governments across country. in addition to running elections in my county, i serve as an appointee to the election assistance commission board of advisors, i am on the government correlating counsel for the election infrastructure subsector. as elections are the foundation, election officials embrace our duty to make sure

they are secure, fair and trustworthy. all elections are local. i'm here today to underscore the importance of including counties in federal and state discussions to see strengthen our national efforts to secure elections and offer suggestions to improve collaboration among all levels of government. counties play a key role in our nations election system and work with states to ensure the integrity of the process. in virtually every state, counties run the day-to-day operations of elections. there almost 9000 dedicated local election officials like me throughout the country who oversee the allocation of voting machines, manage polling locations, print and mail ballots, recruit and train poll workers and insure the integrity of the entire voting process. during the 2016 election, counties of all sizes managed over 100,000 polling locations and hired and trained over 800,000 full workers.

elections are not just a one-day event for counties. from the cyber security standpoint alone we work year-round to protect against direct hacking attempts that seek to improperly accessed voter rolls, remove election information from county websites or alter voting data. we also worked to protect voting machines, computers and other equipment used to cast, record, tally and certified votes. the integrity of the elections process is our main goal. security is a key component of that goal. fortunately coronation between the federal government and localities has improved dramatically in the past 18 months. these partnerships have been invaluable to help protect us from cyber security attacks. these include the establishment of the government correlating counsel by the department of promiscuity which has been open and refreshingly responsive to our frank and frequent feedback during this process. it also includes $380 million in 2018 omnibus. many states including utah are coordinating with their local governments on the best ways

to use this funding. throughout this whole process, the eac has been the glue in coordinating and promoting all of these new efforts. while all of these are positive changes, we suggested three items to further improve our collective efforts. first, we encourage congress to support a dedicated, predictable federal funding stream to help local governments protect elections. as you can imagine resources often gets duck at the state level which can be problematic for those of us on the ground. we upgrade equipment at great cost to county governments which often do not have the luxury or ability to increase revenues to offset these costs. while the funding was helpful, we need more at the local level to combat these cyber threats. second, we recommend additional core native federal and state outreach to local jurisdiction, especially those that are more remote and rural. for a variety of reasons such as limited staff, we are

utilizing the valuable resources. we urge our partners to help reach these jurisdictions. finally congress and federal agencies should undertake a robust federalism consultation process with state and local governments when considering any changes to cyber security protocol. local election officials have the most complete understanding of the election process and we want to share that understanding with lawmakers, to help ensure that any federal legislation our programs are fully effective on the ground. ultimately, the best way to safeguard our election the shore up our cyber defense is to communicate and work together. we stand ready to work with you, with federal agencies and with our states to strengthen our nations elections process and return retain the public's confidence. thank you again for inviting

me too testify in this concludes my testimony. i'm happy to take any questions. >> thank you very much. >> mr. chairman. >> for what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition. >> i have a motion. >> reserving a point of order, the gentleman is recognized for five minutes to state his motion. >> i think the chair. >> mr. chairman, like so many of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, i was very concerned by the presidents statements last week in helsinki with his one-on-one meeting with governor pruden. president trump capitulated with him on nearly every point of contention in the bilateral relationship with russia. he publicly cast doubt on the election, he praised an unprecedented proposal from him to hand over american officials including the former u.s. ambassador to the russia for russian interrogation. according to the russians, president trump even made agreements with mr. pruden on

syria and russian aggression in ukraine. president trump refused to allow his staff to attend the meeting and the president has so far declined to provide congress or the public with any details about what occurred in the private meeting. our committee must act to determine what would cause president trump to act in this way and to what extent president trump is being manipulated by mr. feldman pruden. we must immediately hold a hearing with the director of national intelligence and others who can inform the committee and the public about the extent of the russian threat to our country. i am joined my concern by subcommittee chairman mr. hurd who wrote an op-ed stating that he had seen russian intelligence manipulate many people as the cia undercover officer, but he said he never thought he would see the day when american president would

be one of them. they want to ensure they are taking the russia threat seriously and to fulfill our oversight duty and keep the public informed of the current danger. he even, even you mr. chairman said on fox news sunday that the evidence of russia's attack on our country is overwhelming and that the president needs to say that and act like that. i couldn't agree more. in contrast, so far they have declined our request to invite the director to testify during today's hearing on election security. we appreciate your agreement to have a classified briefing but we think the briefing, albeit helpful needs to be accommodated by a public hearing. closed-door briefings are simply not a substitute for

testimony from the top federal official on how states were attacked by russia in 2016 and the current threats to our election security. he again said, lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty as well as to keep the american people informed of the current danger. certainly, a public hearing would help accomplish that goal. for all these reasons i hereby move to subpoena the director of national intelligence mr. dan coats to testify in a public hearing before this committee about the extent of the russian threat and make this motion pursuant to house rule 11, clause two k-6 and i believe the motion is in order. a written copy of my motion and the subpoenas at the clerk's desk. i asked that we dispose of this motion immediately. >> i second the motion. will the gentleman yield? >> yes.

>> i want to second the motion and associate myself with the eloquent words that mr. connolly said. >> i asked you to invite a representative of the office of the director of national intelligence to come testify here today so that our committee members and public could hear directly from the experts about the threat that russia poses to our country and our electoral system. director coats warned recently the warning lights are blinking red. he compared these warning signs to what we saw before 911. our country is under attack and we must understand that attack in order to protect ourselves. we must make sure that the public hears directly from director coats about the attack. we have to ring the alarm bell and we need to ring out loud. i know mr. chairman that you

believe that director coats, because i have heard you say it and just as we heard a quote from you, it says the evidence is overwhelming. it can be probe proven beyond any evidentiary burden that russia is not our friend and they tried to attack us in 2016. you said, the evidence is overwhelming and the president needs to say that and act like it. i just might have one unanimous, the simple fact that he is not saying that and he is not acting like that and that makes it all more important that we keep ringing that alarm bell they make it clear that we make the evidence public and we put our

money where our mouths are. i join my distinguished colleague and his motion to bring him before this committee on another day to testify about the threat that russia poses to our national security and our electoral system and i want to thank the gentleman for yielding. >> the gentleman from maryland yields back. for what purpose does the gentleman from north carolina seek acknowledgment. >> the motion to table is made in the motion to table and the underlying motion are held in advance until sufficient form is present out of respect for our witnesses, i would suggest that we move on and proceed with hearing until such time

as that. with that. >> may we be heard on the motio motion? >> i understand the lack of a quorum, but the members are her here, i think would help greatly if we were allowed to discuss the merits of the motion. >> i do understand the germans concerned. since the motion to table is made, i would ask, you're welcome to discuss it, but we want to vote on it later on given the fact that the motion on the table has been made and given the fact that we have our witnesses here, but i will be happy to give you a chance to speak on it at the proper time. with that the german from north carolina is recognized for his five minutes of questioning. mr. walker. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. just for record notice, the secretary of state, would you

mind pronouncing that name one more time? i will try one more time to get it right. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it's maggie toulouse oliver. all right. will come back around and i'll see if i can remember that. congress appropriated $380 million in grants for state election expenses that were intended to update security practices overall. how many of these funds have been disbursed to states? >> all the money will be going to states. >> would you say all the money will be going to state. >> about 335 million has been disbursed right now. one 100% of the money has been requested. >> to have a timeline for the other 50 million or so. >> we should have that money within the next couple weeks. >> so, secretary and mr. hatch, how much did your

state request and how much have you received so far. - we will start with the secretary of state. >> mr. chair, mr. walker, our state requested the full amount of 3.6 million to which we are entitled based on population. we did request that full amount and we have received the full amount. >> utah requested the same full amount, not the same amount but it came to about 4.14. to million dollars. >> and you received this as well. >> yes. good to hear. what election security priorities are the majority of states using these funds to pursue? to have any information? >> yes or. most of the state are looking to either do cyber security or purchase new voting equipment. money is going toward voter registration or cyber security or purchasing of new voting equipment. from your experience what is the importance of the federal government plays in maintaining the integrity of

elections? and you zoom out, without taking 30 or 40 seconds and give me an overview of what you see that role as. >> secretary nielsen has said several times election security is national security. dhs plays a supporting role and it's important that we provide our expertise to help fill in some gaps that the state and local level where they may not have in-depth ever security expertise. what we can bring our broader learning throughout the critical infrastructure community, we can help at the local level. >> let me follow up with that please. what do you see from your perspective, congresses role supporting electoral administration. would you speak to that? >> yes sir. so it continues to enable me too my job and provide, if necessary additional support including resources. mr. oliver and mr. hatch, sam question to you guys. what do you seek congresses

role as far as assisting this process? >> mr. chair, i concur that the continued provision of tools and resources for state and local jurisdictions to utilize particularly as we get down the road with regard to our local entities, for example, state utilize central registration databases so while i am managing that and overseeing it for my office, it is being utilized by 33 counties across the state of new mexico some of which may not even have it staff. it's really important that we are able to conduct risk the assessments and provide the rules that have already been provided at the state level. we will continue working with dhs and we would love to have the assistance of congress with regard to pretty want to follow up with that. >> i agree with secretary oliver. the best way the federal government can help is to provide assistance or resources, consulting as well as dedicated and protectable funding so we can identify

with our needs, how much we will be able to meet those needs financially. >> the first two years i was here, i was amazed at how many times on a daily basis there are times from the russians, their cyber hacking, it's the non- stop it was all the way back in 2012 when i believe a former presidential candidate pointed out the concern as far as the geopolitical threat that russia is. mr. hicks, i have a question for you, what advice is the election assistance commission, your area provide to state and local officials when evaluating vendors for cyber security? >> we operate under the voluntary guidelines. that is a voluntary system. if a vendor wants to submit a system for certification that we would give them guidance on that. >> thank you. i yield back.

>> the gentle lady from new york is recognized. >> thank you. inc. mr. chairman for calling this really vital, important hearing. this past weekend i went on a faith in politics pilgrimage, a bipartisan led by tom reed to upstate new york. the home of two of the vital human rights social justice, civil rights movement in our country, the right to abolish slavery, the fight to abolish slavery in the fight to grant women the right to vote. we went to the graves of harriet tubman, frederick douglass, susan b anthony, all people who dedicated their lives to freedom and the right to vote for american citizens. i cannot think of anything more important than this hearing and i must say it is a national scandal that we have been asking for it ever since

the election to find out what happened with the tampering of trying to interfere and prevent people from having their vote. the evidence is absolutely clear that the russians tampered with our election, nothing is more important and i hope, mr. chairman, this is the first of many hearings focusing on preserving the integrity of our votes and our election system. i don't think anything is more important in our country. i would like to start first by asking, have you read the indictment for mr. muller? yes or no. >> yes, ma'am. the indictment, the object of one of the russian conspiracies was, and i'm quoting from the indictment, to hack into the computers of u.s. persons and entities involved in the 2016 u.s. presidential election, steal documents from these computers

and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere with the 2016 u.s. presidential election. you believe there is any reason to doubt this statement and this indictment? >> no ma'am. >> okay. also, the indictment goes on to say that in july 2016 the russians hacked the website of the state board of elections and stole information related to approximately 500,000 u.s. voters including names, addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth and drivers license. do you have any reason to doubt the. >> no ma'am and also they hacked into the computers of u.s. vendors, not just voters but the vendors that supplied software to verify voter registration for the 2016 u.s. election. you have any reason to doubt this information?

>> no ma'am. >> furthermore, the object of the second russian conspiracy was to hack into those charged with the administration of the u.s. election in order to access those computers and steel voter data i'd like to ask every member of the panel whether or not you doubt any of these. you doubt this in any way? any of this information? >> no ma'am. now many people have called this, including the president of the united states, a witchhunt, just within the last few days.

do you consider this a witchhunt, this data or information. >> ma'am, this is a duly authorized investigation and overseen by the attorney general. >> to have any reason to doubt this information, you call it a witchhunt? >> no ma'am. >> no ma'am. >> no. >> well, nobody really and i have no reason to doubt either. we need to take this threat seriously and the committee needs to take the threat seriously. no fight was harder, no more blood and suffering was shot in this country than the fight for liberty, independence and the right to vote. i would like to give to the great state of new mexico the last word, miss oliver, i have just a few seconds left, your statement on this, how does your state feel about it, how do you feel about it?

>> i am deeply concerned and that is why we are taking this seriously and working so closely with our federal partner. >> thank you mr. chair. i'm concerned about some of the members of the committee talk about how there's been no hearings on it. we had a hearing in 2016 election. was there any evidence that the votes were altered? we have multiple states there, not one. none of them were altered. there's no quarrel outside entities including russia attempted to interfere. it gets in the way of doing the job are trying to do. we need to identify the resources we need to protect the integrity of that system.

i'm appalled at the ongoing conflating of those two and suddenly the world has come to an end. let me ask a question mr. hicks, you're aware of the amounts of money put through the states. i've got michigan received 11-point to $4 million to upgrade their systems. all their voting machines will be replaced by the august primary. have you received any further request from michigan for funding or support beyond that? >> i'm not aware of any funding of any other additional requests from michigan beyond the reques request. >> so michigan has not raised the major crisis? and family about come down around our ears. >> i'm not aware. >> it and think so. i talked to the secretary of state and know them well. are you aware of the review of the city of detroit initiation 2016 election? >> i'm not. let me give you some data on

that. 392 precinct in the city of detroit were out of balance. 26% of them cannot be verified. one detroit precinct was making over $250. they made six recommendations. all of them relates training and staffing had not one, not a single recommendation. how are we going to support that cannot despite concerns of, my colleagues that the russians are coming, the majority of the mistakes that are happening are human errors that just multiply failed to reconcile. if there was a recount in michigan, the present one by 12000 votes, the city of detroit cannot sustain the audit. they cannot sustain a recount.

>> the eac remains laser focused on all aspects of elections whether or not that's voter registration or voting equipment or training or election night reporting. there are about 8000 jurisdictions across the country in each jurisdiction has different aspects and we try our best to help each and every one of those jurisdictions function well with the administration through the federal process. >> do you have a current need for additional resources to support training, personal systems for voting and what would that be? >> i don't have a specific number, but there's always need for additional resources. states are very tied to the fact that they have a other things they focus in on, whether or not that's roads, schools, police and so forth. elections, as mr. hatch talked about, there are additional ways congress can look at providing additional funding to the state.

>> okay. ms. oliver, let's switch up because you're not in your head. we still want to maintain a system that our state and local and not a federal election system. speaking for myself personally, my experience in new mexico, a state that is truly suffered ever since the economic decline, we can always use more funding. i personally view conducting our federal state as a partnership. states always have skin in the game. we've been doing all the elections rework, we would love to have more resources in that regard, from my perspective. >> has your group identified what those resources would be? >> certainly we can provide you a list, but i agree with you, i think not only do we need to make sure we have the resources to protect in terms

of cyber security but we also have continuing and ongoing needs with regard to training and resources other ways. and having to provide you any details you would like. >> thank you but i think any feedback you have would be appreciated by the committee and we have to provide that. at this point in time we haven't had any more requests with you want to request respect that. the generally is recognized. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. it may not be enough but it certainly is important to have his hearing. i just left a series of questions about how the russians got so proficient at what they do. can i ask you, is it true as the president has implied that the united states also engages in hacking or trying to get in to the election systems of

other countries? ma'am, i have no information. my job is to help folks. >> so you don't have any information that would indicate that the tit-for-tat kind of, as we do for example, in spying also goes to hacking election systems of other countries. >> i do not in any official capacity. >> you testified before the house committee. i wanted all the russians got to be such experts at that. you used word they didn't understand. you said the russians had scammed all 50 states. then you said 21, you were not able to see.

what does it mean that they scanned all 50 states. >> yes, ma'am, thanks for the question. if i can back up a little bit, what we have historically said dating back to last summer that we had, based on network visibility, it sensors that were on state networks that were using dhs indicators of russian activity, we were able to determine 21 states. in. >> meaning what. >> scanning can be a number of things. in one sense it could literally be a russian officer getting on his computer in moscow or elsewhere and visiting a county or state system. just browsing, going through whatever his search engine is. >> you say they scanned but you were able to see. >> you only sell 21?

why weren't you able to see, certainly with all 50, but you have your own information on only 21. >> yes, ma'am. : : : because that is where we had our sensors deployed. we were able to see those 21. i didn't have visibility over the rest of the states.

since february this year we quadrupled our visibility so when we come up to 2018 in the midterms, i suspect we will have closer to all 50 states. >> that was in the omnibus we were provided additional funds. >> do they seem to be more interested in or targeting more than other things whether it is just looking at the system to see what they can find? you act a certain extent they were performing reconnaissance to figure out where they landed and what functionality the systems have and it's important to know what they were able to see or scan in one case access the system of the voter registration database that was on the administration decided and management site. it wasn't in the vote counting.

>> what do yo >> what do you think they ultimately want to do? what are they looking to do? >> we know they attempted to interfere in the overarching election. >> and did so. >> the district of columbia committee fo for we recognize te gentleman from georgia for his question. the committee will resume consideration of the gentleman from north carolina. while the motion is not debatable i did tell my friend he would have an opportunity to be heard so i'm going to ask unanimous consent despite the fact that it's not debatable that the gentleman be recognized for five minutes. i appreciate the courtesy being

extended to m to me and i would associate myself with the remarks of the ranking member. he did point out that it has been a long time and i was at the hearing that the chairman had on the general issue of elections and that subsumed issues such as auditing and voter files and the domestic elections. it didn't precisely attempt to discern the level at which the russians interfered with or attempted to interfere. i have to say that there is a wide gap between the opinions of

many members of congress both democrat and republican, regarding russian interference, and opinions that are harmonized with our intelligence agencies not russian interference did occur and that's not what we hear coming out of the white house. and i respect my friends on the other side of the aisle when they say acknowledged, but then they talked for ten seconds about that in four minutes and 50 seconds about detroit and how the voting flails are inaccurate and how they need to train workers. that's not the point. if we have enough confidence to do the nine investigations in the house and two in the senate and have hundreds of hearings on the issue, the u.s. officials

mishandled or e-mails, hundreds of hearings and when every single indulgence agency in this country tells us they hacked the elections. that's it after a year and a half. this used to be the oversight committee. this i is running away from the oversight committee since trump took office. even when he visits us in the sides with putin, are you

kidding me this is where we are at now? this is a disgrace. that was a national embarrassment in helsinki. i was embarrassed our president was citing against the intelligence agency. and you've all worked with them. you know the good work they do in our president threw them under the bus to side with putin. you've got to be kidding me. it's time to decide what you stand for. you stand for democracy or the gangster in moscow, do you stand for the people to have a fair and honest election or do you want to cozy up to the president so you don't make him look bad?

this is black-and-white. come on. i know there are colleagues the other side of the idol to feel t feel the same way i do and are exasperated about this but the time has come on this issue you can be a good republican and still protect the process in this country. that's all i'm asking. fix this problem and you can still be a good and loyal republican. it's not a question of either or. i know there are good men and women on the side. on this issue can we deal with it on our behalf of red states, blue states that should be the deal. we shoul shouldn't let the issus divide us.

>> the committee will resume the consideration of the motion to table. those in favor will signify. those opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair, the have it. >> the clerk will call the roll. [roll call]

[roll call] [roll call] [roll call]

[roll call]

[roll call] have all members that wish to vote voted? the motion is tabled. the gentleman from florida is recognized for his five minutes of questions. >> thank you mr. chairman.

it's really not the issue they've done so in the past. i think what concerns me when we talk about the witchhunt it involves over a year of investigation and not one bit of evidence has come for the president trump colluded with the russians to try to influence the election. when we are dealing with all this, this has been going on for a long time. the obama administration as early as 2014 knew that they were meddling and he did nothing about it. so the issue of meddling is one

thing. i want to go back to the topic here today. the whole system involves states of individual states. we have 8,000 jurisdictions, and hundred of ten different polling places through the states and for the most part it is a state issue, not the federal government. i know that in the omnibus passed in march there was over $400 million was granted for the infrastructure. one of the concerns that comes along with that kind of money and funding is states and the people.

the states are weary of getting involved in accepting that kind of fund. if the strings attached the funding would have to defer to the commissioner. that information is based on a range of factors including some of the risk and vulnerability assessments we conducted the

last year or so. there is a number of things that defined inconsistently across the states and networks. the georgia secretary of state applied for a security clearance with the dhs to try to access some of the shared classified information. we don't discuss these in the operational security to make mae secretary target a foreign intelligence collection i'm happy to follow up off-line on the.

how prepared are we going into this next election? >> thank you for the question. i think that we always want to be more prepared. i feel fairly confident about where we are in new mexico. i think the secretaries of state around the country and officials are taking this issue very seriously. we are as prepared as we can be and we are also ready to be able to respond to any issues as they arise. >> i agree with the secretary. the officials have always had security first and foremost and not just cybersecurity but fiscal security.

it's a great partnership between the locals and the state and enjoyed sharing information. i wouldn't be surprised if there is a breach somewhere it just happens with that many localities and attention but the key is to be prepared and resilient in the case of a breach. >> i want to associate myself with remarks about my 21 years here in congress, that has been one of the most moving statements i have heard in congress and i want to thank them for that statement. secretary oliver, yesterday a coalition of 21 state attorneys general both republican and democrat sent letters that

contradicts the republican claims that additional funding is not needed to help protect the state election systems. the attorney general brought in by quote, the right to express grave concern over the threat of the integrity of the american election system. have you seen that letter? they also wrote we are a concern that they lack the resources and tools to protect and i heard you say earlier that you have already gotten what you asked for based on a formula but do you agree that man any states dt have the fun he needed to protect?

we don't have a formal opinion as a group speaking on behalf of myself and a state i do strongly believe that ongoing funding is necessary and there' there is a consistent source of fun doing. it's not a one-time issue as it's been mentioned multiple times during the hearing, interference happened before 26 p.m. and it will continue to happen after 2016. i think 2016 really brought a level of awareness to all the fuss about how serious the issue truly is. and so yes, i believe that they are severely underfunded with regards to this depends and so any additional help in terms of tools, resources and in the federal government can continue to provide is important. for example, the funding provided through the omnibus bill wouldn't be enough to

replace systems and states that don't have a paper ballot system that are using dairy machines for example. >> that is what i was trying to get through. they signed the letter that i just referred to and this is what they sent a. a. voting for the infrastructure will not only allow them the systems but also allow for a comprehensive security risk assessment. for the upgraded technology needed. with the financial resources to safeguard democracy and voting members of the states.

how would more funding helped new mexico conduct comprehensive risk assessment. we've worked together with dhs to conduct the state risk vulnerability testing. a giant question hangs over their wrist and so one of the things we wanted is a same kind of vulnerability testing to get a baseline to see where we are. if we were to contract with an outside entity that can do that but it's good to cost

significantly more funding than we have available even for the most recent grant. the. the integrity of the voting infrastructure as the bipartisan issue and one that affects not only the political landscape that elections in the county and municipal levels. it will take a swift action for the legacy. last week republicans refused to approve another to protect their systems.

it's certainly been laid out as well as the secretary and there is a requirement to update their systems whether it comes from the state or federal government i don't have an opinion on that. we have to identify where the risk is and focus money on that risk as the secretary said there are still five states that have equipment that does not have a voter verifiable paper trail from a risk management perspective that is where i would prefer we focus the resources and assets.

we must ensure that the upcoming 2018 midterm are secure. accordingly, we ask for a system so that we may protect from foreign attacks and interfering. let me ask you this, do you agree with this? 's panic i >> if you could repeat that -- basically what they are saying is we want to make sure that our electoral system is protected and that people know that their votes are going to be counted and that the process is untainted and i would guess that is what you are in office for. >> that's why it's important we are having this hearing for the

efforts that they are leaving with the commission that the state secretaries are reading. this is a partnership working right now we are in proving the practices across the electoral system in the nation. there's a lot of work to do. >> you listed a number of things you are looking at. the one thing you did not mention is voter suppression. >> that is not one of the functions. >> the gentleman from florida is recognized. >> for the 2016 election was there any cybersecurity jurisdiction to your knowledge? >> they are drilling down to the

cyber enabled state election systems. we do not have information to suggest they had access to the vote tallying systems and that is why i made the distinction earlier there's the administration peace in the vote tabulation side. >> the other stuff is still important and with the registration database if that were to be compromised how would that have a negative effect? >> the way the nation's laws are built up, there are checks and controls in place but in fact the state registration database had been compromised to the point information was deleted or changed such as the voters showed up to vote and their information was i unfair or otherwise wasn't consistent with an abnormality of the pool. there are processes in place including provisional ballots that would allow that american

voter to cast their vote and it would be counted correctly. i have to emphasize the outcome is not security. its resilience. we should take a hit and keep functioning. that would create challenges on election day and it would probably be detected before hand. as we saw where that compromise was detected there are checks and compensated and can controls for that compromise. >> what is the breakdown between the states that used electronic books and those that use paper backs >> electronic poll books referred to the voting experts on those numbers if i can. >> we would have to get back bak

with you on that information because a number of states that are going towards more as opposed to paper or registration things. there is a resiliency that is compromised so they can ensure that they are eligible to vote with provisional ballots they shouldn't be able to leave without having a chance to cast their ballot under the federal law. >> is it better to have the paper ballot? >> as long as we continue with security and accessibility. they can still cast ballots and those that are disabled i would say yes.

>> what about the election night reporting is very vulnerability of the local oat the local or sl mr. secretary? >> basically adopted the unofficial results being reported either to the media or in some cases website keeping in mind that is not the official data and what we have seen recently were either technical glitches on the reporting or cyber efforts to disrupt election night reporting so it's important here because it is a website with vulnerabilities like any webpage is what we are trying to do is work with our officials, state and local election officials to communicate clearly to the voting public that this is

unofficial beta and it is a problem we are still going to get the official results or a readout it just might take a little bit more time. there's no connection between the reporting website and the official data. >> i would like to disclose documents about the russian attacks on the state election systems document the administrations have provided to the committee. you are familiar with the letter to the dhs requesting the document from the ranking member cummings and the subcommittee. you are familiar with the

records requesting the documents? following the testimony of the joint subcommittee hearing last fall, is that correct? >> back in late january, the oversight committee democrats wrote seeking a subpoena for these documents and we were ignored. ranking member cummings along with the other house committees wrote to the speaker brian. they would be needed for the record for today's hearing. >> without objection. >> back at that november

hearing, you stated and i quote, if you permit me to go back and i commit to you we will have a wholesome answer for you, the dhs provided approximately 50 pages of documents most of which were already publicly available. the production did not include any classified documents or documents about the precise nature of these attacks. the number of times the states were targeted or when they were targeted. that isn't an answer to the request. it's just more documents we didn't ask for that do not answer our question. why are you withholding about how russia attacked us.

>> we need to go back and review the answers provided. it's always been my commitment to approach this in a bipartisan manner or nonpartisan manner as i see this as a matter of american and national security. so if you will permit me i would like to go back and look at the answers into the range of briefings as i understand we we provideweprovided close to 30 ie classified briefings. i personally participated in the house wide classified briefing earlier this summer, late spring and provided information on what he saw. if you are not satisfied certainly we can go back and look at what we provided. >> we are asking what you at the department of homeland security determine a and how they attack

us. >> that information is in the intelligence assessment, the committee assessmentof the declassified version provides a significant amount of detail and catch here is on the classified side in terms of tactics and techniques that they used against states that works it's not highly classified information. it is technical. the recent indictments provide additional information. >> how about initiating the interagency process to obtain clear in to give us these documents, can you give us to? >> i will once again commit to you that we will go back and look at what you need. >> we learned more about what happened in illinois in reading the special counsel's indictment of the 12 russian intelligence officers. we are just asking for

simplification here. to share with us what you know. the. i will yield, well i don't have time to deal with now but thank you. >> you timed out perfectly. >> the gentleman from alabama is now recognized. >> did russia determine the outcome? spinnaker based on the cybersecurity aspects of the state and local election officials don't have any information to suggest the access and therefore any ability to technically change the votes.

>> one of the waste out of influence the vote tally in the registration is that accurate? >> you are asking if we can influence or manipulating the voter registration for those that are not eligible to vote. >> coming at it from the angle of disrupting the registered voters and their ability we already talked about the resilience of the system but in terms of adding additional people to the vote, i'm not sure what the question is. >> we saw this in 2008 and 2010 in the voter registration efforts in nevada, colorado, florida and other places and

indiana 2100 forms that were validated. we had a lady that was leading the effort in nevada at project vote. in colorado they pressured the agency's adult with people on public assistance and the fraudulent registration rate. is that a fair assessment of? >> i don't have experience in that side of the boot process.

does anyone else want to respond to that? >> there will always be attempts whether that is a cybersecurity attack or influencing social media were trying to get additional people to register to vote. i hav have to focus on the thini can't control that are in my domain so we recognize that there are all sorts of influences out there and there will always be. what we do is make sure the public is confident in the process diprocess of the deadlyh to the candidates parties to.

when we talk about protecting the elections it's from the domestic influence and it's critical i agree with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle it is absolutely critical that people have confidence that the vote count is accurate and reflects the will of the people and it hasn't been manipulated. so when we talk about that, i hope that every state is taking this seriously but isn't just making sure we are protected from foreign influence in the domestic attempts by any group in any side of the aisle. is that part of what we are doing here? >> absolutely. and i think the examples that you just gave we have similar situation when i was a county clerk in new mexico have a

questionable referral to law enforcement and i think that those are what we've been talking about all along which is we have to not onl only try to protect our system that we can never have a 100% secure system so it's all important to make sure the systems are resilient. that is all part of what you're doindoing and absolutely it doet matter who this great interfere foreign or domestic that is what we are focused on. >> each one of us is outraged that when anyone makes an attempt to deny the public their hard-fought four and well defended right to elect for

themselves. >> the unanimous request is not objected to the gentleman from massachusetts is recognized. >> i think fishermen at his ranking member for his kind words. i want to think tha to thank ths for your willingness to be so truthful and a blunt and honest and perfect russians have interfered in the past. with my colleagues across the aisle we traveled quite a bit and spend a fair amount of time in afghanistan pakistan, iraq, nigeria, egypt and we look very closely at the rule of law issues and elections in all of

these have had problems and it has a corrosive effect on the democracy in those countries. you look at those judiciaries as a decided and pronounced lack of rule that are not seen as endorsed or supported by the general public as a top-down system. it's to the interest of the minority rights and human rights in those countries so i just worry if we allow the process and built to creep into the mind of the american people that they are not legitimate to bend the law is not legitimate and again

it's a corrosive effect that happens, and i'm just very concerned about that and i think we ought to be all over this. with much more gusto than the president has invited. i want to start with a couple of quick questions. recently we had the fbi director testify before congress and he said that he wasn't specifically directed by the president to address russian interference. i'm just curious what the president that you specifically to address the russian interference? >> yes or no, i don't have a lot of time here. >> i've been in a meeting where it was made clear that it is a priority. >> russian interference in the system yes it is a priority.

>> the director of the national intelligence agency said there was no single agent in charge of our sort of countering russian interference. interference. is that still the case or do we have a single agency that has taken that over? >> i get in the range of authorities and capabilities this is a team effort and whole of government effort. >> is there a specific white house guidance on the issue? >> cinched john bolton came in as the national security adviser, he fired rob joyce who was the cybersecurity coordinator. he said he wanted to streamline things that a lot of people feel

he was one of the smartest people we have on cybersecurity. as a matter of fact he didn't just fire him, he eliminated the position. we don't have an advisor on cybersecurity anymore at the white house. do you think that is helpful? >> i don't mean to contradict you, yet i think that he was on a detail from the nsa and returned, said he wasn't fired, he's stilhe is still on the fedl government. the cybersecurity coordinator position as i understand has been virtually eliminated. there are cybersecurity directors and senior doctors in the national security council. the important thing to notice appreciable responsibility residenote isoperational respony resides in the technical agencies. i have a very clear job and my work is to -- my job is to work with these folks at the table to

provide them the resources and capability they need so i have clarity of mission and purpose. we know what you're doing every day. >> everybody feels that way? we are on the same page and we will secure the election? >> yes, sir. >> i've exhausted my time and ad think the gentle man and yield back. >> the gentleman from north carolina. >> thank you mr. chairman. for articulating how clearly you feel the mission is for you and your team. we have all kinds of narratives that are out there. but will you reiterate for this committee and perhaps for the american people your primary responsibility is to make sure that our election process is secure and every vote is counted accurately, not double counted and not interfered with, is that

correct? >> yes, sir. >> you have articulated and you feel empowered. >> i have had guidance from my secretary and from the white house. i am empowered to do my job with clarity of mission and purpose and spent 40 to 50% of my day focused on the midterm and beyond. >> i appreciate you reiterating that because i talked with the secretary and she articulated that very clearly to me and it's good because sometimes it doesn't get transferred to those that actually do the work. what you're saying is you have a clear vision. the people that work with you have a clear vision? >> i would have to be fair to answer that question and ask the secretary she feels my folks that work with her on a daily basis are able to do their job. that's the best way to get that answer.

>> yes. i wanted to make a comment earlier as described in the provisional ballot process and some of the other technical processes that we undertake. i'm so proud of dhs has learned from working closely with us and maybe not completely but yes i absolutely believe so. >> one of the concerns i have is that a paper trail obviously we have a bipartisan bill that looks at a paper system, but here's the problem and part of why we are seeing this. we need from a security standpoint a level of this is most secure, kind of like when you put in a password. the longer the password the better it is, i'm talking about systems because i represent 16 counties and we have multiple different ways to vote within my

own congressional districts we have paper ballots and part of it, electronic in another part. we have the typical scan in one county and yet they are making individual purchases many times on the systems so it's not necessarily handled at the secretary of state level in some states so it would be good to have a resource where they say okay if you are upgrading your system here are the five things you need to do and this is most secure, this is -- do we have that currently? >> we will pick this over t take commissioner but we work closely with the government coordinating council and you've got to keep in mind every state is different from the top-down or bottom-up. every county will be different in terms of resource population, the quality of the infrastructure.

>> you are preaching to the choir, but the problem is that there is not a resource at this point at the federal level. with all due respect, this is the first time i've ever heard of the commission assistant. when we see that, when you google that, it doesn't come if you are not in the top ten in terms of the search. how do we make sure states are not only aware and not just the witnesses today that there is a criteria asked me to >> we want to make sure we work with the states so they get the resources they need to ensure that the process functions correctly. we were down in your state government to go with a certification class and we do certify voting systems, but it's a voluntary basis. states come to us and say these are the systems we want

certified and the systems are certified. right now we do not have a quorum so we can't do the next iteration of the guidelines that haven't been updated since about 2007. >> is there a guideline on what you would recommend in terms of how to secure the system? >> there are guidelines on that. >> are their priorities in replacing equipment and what are the recommendations that you have? >> we do not have a vote on because -- >> i will you back. >> the gentle lady from michigan is recognized. >> thank you mr. chair. february 201 2016 that "the newk times" article targeted inside of a three-year campaign to influence u.s. voters mentioned the painstaking efforts taken by the russian government for not only divide our nation along

party lines but also along social, economic and racial and then in october and instead ran the count ran by the internet resource agency. the method hatred for trump is misleading the people and forcing blacks to vote for killary. we would surely be better off without voting at all. then just days before the americans went to the poll, another account controlled by the russians called black activists urged its followers to choose peace and vote for me is a sign is expected to get support from the clinton campaign and the message read

trust me it isn't a wasted vote. i also had -- and i ask for it to be entered into the record -- i have february 18 news article russian influence operation attempted to suppress the black vote. it reveals the special counsel indictment against 13 russian nationals in january 2018 revealed that a key aspect of the assault on the 2016 election was an attempt to suppress the turnout by african-american voters which papers filed in the federal court described in greater detail. >> without objection. >> our ranking member mr. cummings made an accurate statement in this article of particular concern the indictments shall have the russians tried to suppress the votes of minorities across the united states in order to help

the current president when his presidency. you both represent communities where there are minority votes, and the actual investigative data that shows the many campaigns across the country of the targeted suppressing minority votes. what are you doing to ensure that every vote counts? >> thank you for asking that question. we were counting the seat is approximately one third hispanic population so we do have a viable minority population. as an election official, my focus is on removing barriers for voters and to ensure that they have confidence that when they go to the polls or mail their ballots back in that they have confidence that it will be counted fairly and accurately and that the results will be fair and accurate.

i do those regardless of the nature of the voter, the location of the voter, whether it's in a neighborhood that is known for having more minoriti minorities. the focus is clearly on establishing a process filled with integrity, and i think that by doing that, that allows those in the majority and the minority to know as far as the concerns, we are colorblind and focus on you as a citizen and your right to vote. >> i would echo those statements and say that as officials, we are also concerned about accurate information on the internet and social media so we are always making sure that the most accurate and up-to-date information is being provided. another aspect that impacts voters in the communities and across the country is adequate language minority assistance to

ensure we are in compliance with section 203 of the act. i have many tribal areas in my state in addition to spanish-speaking areas, so that's also incredibly important we are doing everything within our power to do that but there can always be more that can be done. >> i want to reference some training issues that are desperately needed in the state of michigan. it is unacceptable because the vote is our democracy that withh that being said, training and to have the resources to attack, cyber attacks are meddling in our election are two different things and you can't say the only thing we need is training. our secretary has accepted and stated that she is using federal dollars to fight against the interference of to protect the integrity, so by no means does

it mean that. my question is to you mr. hicks. you have to read it is that this effort to suppress the vote is real, it's been documented and it's a concerted effort of russia. where do you stand with that and do you address that? >> thathat's something for the department of justice to address, but personally, i've always worked towards ensuring the voter confidence remains high. when i worked in the house and when i workehadwhen i worked ats and so forth. ensuring that people have the right to vote and that they can do so. right now, while the committee is having its hearing, the eac is holding a language summit for folksummit forfolks that have ao the poll over at the museum that is being webcast and there's about 150 people write their learning more about access.

>> i yield back. >> the gentleman from texas is recognized. >> thank you mr. chairman and also the gentlewoman and the chairwoman from north carolina for her courtesy. my opinion on a the russian role in our elections is pretty clear, so i'm not going to get into them today. but i'm concerned sometimes on the other side of the aisle are implying that the dhs for the congress is in taking this issue seriously. so, my question for you how many meetings, briefings, hearings, phone calls, responses to memos and letters have you had with congress -- and i don't need an exact amount. two was mentioned earlier, only to hearings. how many engagements with congress have you had and your staff have on this issue of securing the election? >> i wouldn't have the exact

numbers, but it's basically a daily occurrence in the agency right now, but that's not our only function. >> so several dozen. >> letters from various members. >> and responses you have to give. do you have an aggregate number? >> i've lost count. it would be a guess. i testify on this at least three times the -- >> your division, or does dhs have more money today to deal with support than they did in 2016? ..

>> designated it critical and this current administration continues that but there is still opposition from secretaries of state that is the case or a genuine concern among secretaries that. >> into be responsible for defending the election. >> that is correct. but we did conduct federal state and local elections. i do believe the partnership with the federal government is necessary.

but where governors and state are increasing the state funds to make sure officials have resources. >> that has been happening in the state of new mexico but the fact that it is required for the states to provide a match. each state has a 5% match. >> and to do that as well? >> absolutely. states and the federal government both. only 9% are part of the infrastructure. is that an opinion why so few are engaging in the federal

state tribal partnerships to share information on elections? >> thank you for asking that. the main reason why is it is only up and running for a couple of months. the rate at which counties are joining the states is alarmingly fast because the international association of government officials. >> i'm sorry to interrupt my time is limited but you would encourage her fellow administrations to join that and for structure? >> they go to the website it's is very easy contact any association. >> tee9.

>> i have a question to you ms. oliver with that digital infrastructure this is something dhs prepares for that with crisis communication what about things that happen on that day how does that coordination happen? or with the federal government? >> that is something we have dealt with on a case-by-case basis but to work with the government coordination council and we are working together to have a comprehensive way in which we approach and collectively discuss things that may occur around election time.

>> the gentleman from illinois. >> mr. chairman we appreciate it. tee9 dhs secretary nielsen had this to say about interference that tumors the russian government launched a brazen multifaceted campaign to undermine public faith in the democratic process generally in the elections physically you stand by that statement. >> we stand by the secretary in the intelligence community assessment. >> and you do the same? >> on january 6, 2017 the office office had this to say about russia. we also assessed putin and the russian government to help

president-elect chances. but on july 19 of this year the secretary tweeted the following quote unquote i agree with the intel community's assessment. and i assume you stand with that statement? >> we do. >> so 25 minutes ago president trump made the following tweets. hot off the press. quote unquote i am very concerned russia will be fighting to have an impact on the upcoming election based on the fact that no president has been tougher on russia than me pushing very hard for the democrats they definitely

don't want trump! as you saw from the dni report the entire community concluded russia try to harm the clinton campaign. according to the press -- they definitely don't want trump. >> to focus with my job and the federal government's and i do know that the president, thank you that he endorses the intelligence community assessment and was very clear on that very clear direction what my job is to protect their election systems they have provided me that same guidance. >> i understand.

>> you have any evidence to suggest that the russians are trying to help the democrats? >> in terms of intelligence i have to look. >> you are suggesting there may be evidence? >> no sir i am not. so any knowledge where the president tweeted? >> that evidence is that it has launched a series of sanctions to take other actions against the russian government. >> and they are pushing very hard for the democrats? >> i don't have access to all the information i have to get back to you. >> yes i like you to get back to us. thank you.

>> mr. chairman with total fiction to defy reality but mr. krebs you must be aware of the fact that the russians are continuing to target our election infrastructure in the upcoming elections? correct? >> as we have stated we have not seen anything at the level of 2015 they are continuing to have the american people in general. and then at the last election and then to influence operations to this day. you don't have any basis? >> i agree 100%. >> okay mr. trump the

president was asked the question. >> thank you very much. no. and you don't know that to be the case? no. >> you agree that president is not russian targeting russia? >> not without exchange but i will tell you i firmly believe the russians continue to attack a target or the democracy in general or the critical infrastructure in general. >> you disagree with the president? >> i am not saying that. >> you just did. >> no sir. >> gentle manuals back the gentlelady is recognized. >> thank you very much. mr. krebs thank you for being here. but i am a firm believer and

as we know much of that administration is explicitly delegated to the states to the elections clause of the constitution. and before we turn to the state level to protect the integrity it is necessary to ensure that the federal house is in order. and with that house intelligence. and clearly we need to right the ship on the federal level to make sure other harmful actors cannot repeat that behavior. unfortunately the president's recent comments at the summit in helsinki failed to hold accountable with his attacks on his country's interest or to deter him for the future indiscretions.

and those who are meddling in our elections to destroy those actions of a adversary should be a federal responsibility can you assure us you are doing everything in your power actively to safeguard our nation from that kind of meddling that we now know has occurred in the past? including hacking of the campaigns by the russians? >> yes ma'am it is one of the top priorities. >> thank you for that answer. so is it necessary for every state to have a basic purity clarence? >> it is useful to share information but we do have the ability to provide if there is a tactical piece of intelligence and to do that

using local resources. with that cyberthreat indicators to timely information sharing? >> it wasn't just to define and to get a better understanding what the infrastructure looks like. and then to have additional intelligence and in 2060 when the department of homeland security knocked on the door of the state secretary election officials and said i have never talked to before. there is no trust here but there is a problem that you need to know about. by the very nature to say i need to know more information.

to say i'm sherry i cannot share that with you but we have established that level of trust so if you do not have the parents but yet i work with those secretaries it is classified you have to do something but my guess is the level of acceptance has changed a little bit but at the same time we are more sophisticated in our information sharing protocols. and it is all based on trust we have spent so much time building relationships and trust at state and local election officials. >> you made us feel a lot better of the situation. we appreciate the effort you put into that.

and with federal security clearance. >> i was granted. >> how many have secured clearance for election related purposes? >> i do and to have my key staff as well. >> and to describe a change in behavior is there information sharing improve from your perspective since you were granted security clearance? >> communication has improved in general. i don't think it came as a result of the clearance but that contributes to our level of confidence that we could get accurate and timely information. >> do you have an idea how much information is disseminated if it is

considered classified or sensitive? >> pacific league? >> mice and is that only if there was a situation. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you for calling this hearing first to mr. hicks with the congressional district in maryland you happen to be in my district and we were notified a couple of weeks ago in maryland by the fbi that the private vendor that our state uses for purposes of election management of the voter registration database has

close ties to a russian oligarch. and then to raise profound questions and then the private election vendors due to the extraordinary lack of regulation through their business so how far this problem can go with the ties to the russian oligarch, has there been any way for you to determine to use this vendor or other vendors with ties to vladimir putin and his oligarch oligarchs? be make that is not going best dictation and we cannot comment on that right now.

i would defer to my calling to talk more about that. >> is there an ongoing investigation whether there is a systematic plot by russia to exercise influence over private elections? >> we are looking specifically at the maryland case and thank you for your letter on that. this is a story of progress. when the state board of election was notified there was a connection they immediately reached out to us and ask for help and redeploy that assistance. we are making progress. that relationship did not exist one year ago. >> we have an election in 107 days at this point it is right around the corner. that doesn't give me a lot of comfort to learn there is progress these days. so have you determined there are any other states whose election vendors have been compromised to the russian

oligarchs or vladimir putin. >> we do know in the case of maryland with the information i have seen there is no ability to influence based on the venture capital firm but we are conducting a broader assessment. >> when you expect to have the results of this investigation? >> i assume because of the procurement cycles will be ongoing and will never end as we develop more information. >> mr. krebs forgive me. are there states to have election vendors today that are running elections in member who have ties to russian oligarchs or putin? >> at this point i don't have information to share on that. >> is there anybody at homeland security who does? >> i have to do for to the fbi. >> anybody on the panel knows

how many states are currently contracted with private election vendors with foreign software or foreign-made parts in the election day products? no one can tell us? okay. >> are vendors currently required to adhere to cybersecurity best practices? or report to the eac in the event of a breach of cybersecurity are they required to dry -- to report any cyberthreats to you? but they demonstrate why i introduced hr 6435 the election vendor security act of 2018 to be owned and controlled only by citizens or permanent residents to adhere to cybersecurity best practices and report all security threats to federal

authorities immediately. i would urge all of my colleagues on both sides of the isle to join me in this effort to protect the integrity of our election process in 2018. this this needs to be done right now. this is not something to be put off to another day or postponed and we cannot be satisfied with the vague promises of ongoing progress and investigations this is a democratic emergency going to the heart of self-government in our country. >> i have long had interest in elections going back to the days i was involved in the state election once in the state of wisconsin i can only imagine what i would do if it was a foreign country trying to influence so i will ask you about areas of elections that

trying to influence elections and take advantage of. first in wisconsin the reason we had that is to make sure the right person is voting to make people pretend they were somebody they were not. so can you comment with your experience how many states around the country have done what mexico has done and are you aware of any states? >> i would have to get back with you on the exact number but the number states photo id and the number of states do not there are different access -- aspects to verifying the person who cast a ballot there are ways others there are three states in the union that entirely vote by mail

that don't require you to show a photo identification but there is a provision that says if you register to vote by mail for the first time you do have to submit some form of identification whether that is a bill or electrical bill or something to that nature. >> seem so basic i was question politicians who would not do that the same that require photo identification to maybe get a life-saving drug or a variety of other things but now it comes to elections they say no. i feel that it opens the elections to fraud. is there photo identification in new mexico? >> no we don't. >> i am not an expert on

mexican law and unfortunately i don't know but i will take your word for it. >> and the reason we don't do that simple thing to guard against the various influence in our elections? >> because we have a number of individuals within our state for one reason or another do not have certain types of photo identification may be required like the tribal people in new mexico don't necessarily have a identification or want to use that we want to provide the opportunity to participate in elections. >> i'm under the impression that the next thing that concerns me and want to make sure that to fix an election i want to have a lot of people not voting in person at least then you can watch he is the guy in there nobody else is whispering in my ear but with

that absentee voting you don't know somebody else really is but over time, have we had more people voting in a place that we can they are influenced? or more people voting by mail? so the goal over time where we have a government official or a court watching to make sure vote for this or that so it seems good for integrity which way are we going in this country? that the official can watch or

somewhere that who knows who's throwing out the balance? >> i think a number of the military and overseas voters vote. >> i know that but now i'm saying across-the-board of all the people who voted in the election in 2016 compared to 2008 or 1992 which way are we going? we have four experts. >> every two years the eac publishes a document which is a voting survey to survey all the jurisdictions about the way they vote we can get you a copy of that to layout that information on who is voting where and how they are voting. >> you must know today compared how long is your current job how long you have been in elections?

>> seven and a half years. >> so in the last 20 years that has gone up or down? if they are voting in the voting? >> i can confidently speak about what is happening in utah it is almost virtually completely by mail states although centers are available but all votes by mail must sign the envelope and we have human eyes look at every single signature before the vote can be cast. >> do you know what it is supposed to be and that it wasn't somebody else's? >> yes to register to vote we will capture your signature. >> the gentleman time is expired. >> the gentleman from maryland is recognized. >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. krebs did you say the intruder detection system was put was at the 21 states had

the benefit of that? >> at the time in 2016 about state election systems at the state level were behind in this intrusion detection system. yes sir. >> were those the states that flagged? >> for the most part with those indicators that were provided with other activity including the states loaded up into the system managed by a group called the multistate but then it took hits across prior track. >> of those 21 states it was evident through this detention system there were efforts to hack? >> yes sir. >> was that in other states? >> not on the election system but they are deployed through

every state. >> that was on the election system rec. >> for most part. >> so the places where it was deployed on election systems there was a tenant protection? >> we saw traffic. yes sir. so in all those places the system was in place, they could detect traffic? >> i don't have information if it was all the systems. >> it sounds like it wasn't in place but based on the 21 states where they all seem to get the traffic if that system was on top of the other states based on 100% of current e-mail have found evidence there as well.

my operating function is all 50 states. >> that is a detail i haven't focused before. . . . . is picked up to the administrator in that state to say look, we flied this, read. >> it's not much for sophisticated than you laid out. we have a duty to warn the community when there is an

imminent threat so working with the intelligence community we identified that information into the target, reach out through information sharing protocols that we developed with the government coordinating council, we notified the official, homeland security adviser, chief information advisor so we will hit them in each state and say this threat is incoming we need to deal with it now and we are here to help you. >> so it's a team effort what can we do to help you and so what kind of resources or response or swat team and gets brought to bear when a local person says oh thank you and we are blocking the doors and pulling down the shades but we need your help. it's coming within 24 hours or less. >> so that move and evolution beyond just simply information sharing is managing risk and asking them to want what is this information mean and what are we

going to do about it. i would hypothetically contact them and say this is the problem have come around the assessment and let us know what you need. i have teams located in dc, florida and elsewhere i can deploy within an hour or couple hours notice with equipment on the ground supporting the secretary. this is a broad effort if we need to engage the national guard we can do that. >> what you are describing sounds good based on the experience of what happened with the states last time and the way the alert was given but then it seemed like the federal folks kind of walked away from the enterprise i didn't have as much confidence about this. i certainly urge that and it would be nice to get report back

in the affected states to open up a dialog wher dialogue wheree classified or not but we have to know in real time that the threats are being taken seriously and it's not just saying you have a problem, it's saying here's what we are going to do about it. i am going to yield back. >> the gentleman is recognized. >> a number of us have asked your department to document how russia attacked the systems in 2016. those documents were held in 11 days ago we finally got some information but not from you. it was the indictment followed by the special counsel against 12 russian military officials.

why did they withhold this information. >> i hate saying it is a nuanced answer but the distinction is that the fbi provided investigators the special counsel's investigators had focused on developing the case against russian operatives. that doesn't cost over the firewall into the rest of the administration so there were details within that indictment that i haven't seen before a.

they had an investigation to conduct those activities. if they hack the website of the state board of elections and store information to half of the voters. were you aware of that fact or the indictment?

that i as i understand is the state of illinois, so we've been working closely with illinois since 2016. the document going back to october at least with respect to the sense that you knew about it and the states that were not in the indictment. >> they were the state. >> couldn't you have been response to become responsive? >> i need to go back and look at the information provided.

>> all kinds of times in the previous administration when there might have been tens of thousands of pages of documents provided was often not adequate and threatened to contend subpoenas that were issued because the entirety of the request had been meant. i seem to remember excoriating for example the former irs commissioner even though he sometimes have difficulty producing the documents. in your case we have outstanding requests going back to october

but ask you this, you were prepared to promise you will cooperate with the best of your ability going forward. >> i've always made that pledge and i will continue to do so. >> we will want to know more about the case and whether there were other states like that. >> i know my own home state of virginia was also probed by fe fees. we are makin were making the cal governments to.

we have the finance, we have to finance a lot of our elections. when you make big changes it is for the local governments us are able to absorb the cost and others. i appreciate the point being made because it escapes a lot of us in congress and that is a very salient fact as we look at reform or tightening up or projecting from cyber attacks. if the chair will allow us to react and then i will yield back. >> thank you for those comments. we want to put the local back into the state and local statement. state and locals are working together. i have great experience from the state of utah working with our state and other individuals such as the secretary and the efforts that they've been doing. it's not perfect. we are not there yet but we

appreciate working with our state partners but you are correct in virtually every state with the administrators that have the boots on the ground and running the data operations. thank you. >> the gentleman from you yield back. i will ask my questions last i want to start by thanking all of you for your expertise and comedy with one another and members of the committee. i want to start by addressing some of my colleagues concerned because i think that they do want to be addressed and i understood the concerns earlier in the hearing on this kind of two-part, number one they want an investigation into what russia did and the they would pe preferred that it be made publ public. i spent the better part of 2017.

i get that they want everyone to look into the fact pattern. the reality is given the sensitive nature of this informationcome of that investigation is best handled but in a confidential setting which is where th the house ande vigilance committee meets. it's where the senate intelligence committee is currently a. would have been issued by a grand jury. anyone sitting through the proceedings were a.

anyone have a problem with the fact that you haven't sa sent in any interview backs of the most productive classified briefing i think that i've ever been part of last week. i wish michael citizens could have participated. i wish they could have heard that the inspector general told both sides, not just this committee that the judiciary because if you heard what he said, you wouldn't view this as a partisan issue. i hope at some point the light of day can be shown for all of what happened in 2016 that i just caution michael citizens they do not have any issue with

the fact. the greatest deliberations by an appellate court and their state and they don't have a problem with the fact that certain things are done in confidence and when it comes to not get off our adversaries as to what we know and how we know it and what we are doing to guard against it in the future if there's ever an argument for things to be done in confidence, i think that is the best argument. having said that, i do not know when he became secretary of state. were you in your current position? a. i do want you to weigh in.

i've never really understood why jay johnson waj. johnson was cre former dhs secretary. elections are predominantly state and local matters and the notion that he is a federal cabinet level official was supposed to decide to inject himself into election i don't think was fair but there was a decision made to declare our infrastructure a critical infrastructure. can any of you address why the decision was not made them fall but it was made in january of 2017? not all at once. i will just add that the way that i look at the infrastructure it is a national critical function. it is essential to the functioning of the government and the department of homeland security will continue to support state and local governments. i guess the reason i will start

this off my wish, i guess that the other 364 days will be about who should be elected. i would like this to be the one day that we make sure the person that is elected service so we haven't had hearings about with president trump discussed with vladimir putin just like we had hearings about with president obama discussed with vladimir putin while the hacking was going on. in 2016 we had no hearings on that. >> final question because i'm out of time. there's a lot of ways to count votes. it's based on decibel rather.

if you are interested in making absolutely sure that it's safe, secure and reliable what is the safest way to cast a ballot box it utilizes a state that is right for them and even in the states and jurisdictions is a slightly different system for making sure you ar you're utilia system voters have confidence in is extremely important. with that being said in my personal opinion, the use of paper ballots is critical because you have a paper and voter verifiable backup at the end of the day. if there's ever a question as to whether the tabulators were tampered with, but election reporting system, you are always able to go back and reconstruct

on the backend utilizing the paper system, so in my opinion mr. chairman, that is the safest and most secure way. but with that being said, every state has security and resiliency plans for whatever systesystem you're using and evy state has absolutely dedicated to making sure the systems are protected. >> i know that if they bought a factor analysis you want to incentivize people to vote and make it as easy as you can. there is a speed element people don't want to wait three weeks to see whether or not they won or lost, but in terms of safety, security, reliability, knowing the person who received the most number of votes actually was elected. in your judgmen judgment that ie with paper ballots. >> guesser that is correct. >> i am out of time. i want to thank the witnesses

and reviewing before us today. and they really mea i really med appreciate the expertise and public service even in a sometimes try and environment. the record will remain open for two weeks for questions for the record. the gentleman from maryland? >> my heart wouldn't let me get out of here without telling you this, don't play with us. you said that you read the letter this morning about the request time is short back when mohammad ali was biting bee pieo something called the rubber dope.

would you please give us the documents and don't play with us. can you let us know when we are going tweregoing to get the doc? i have a job to do as well and my job would be as transparent as possible. >> i want you to be as transparent as possible. and i don't believe to date that has been the case. i'm just telling you. i apologize for that oppression but that hasn't been my goal or the direction that i've provided my team.

time is of the essence. so i'm hoping your staff will sit down with our staff and i'm talking about bipartisan. it is all rolled up to me. >> thank you very much. and thank you all for your testimony. it's been quite helpful. >> the record will remain open for two weeks to set at openings to answer questions for the record and if there is no further business without objection, the committee stands

adjourned. the [inaudible conversations]

military officers leaving the troops in texas and arizona testified about the president's position to deploy the national guard along the us-mexico porter in a house hearing. border patrol officials discussed how the national guard hopes to secure the southwest border. this committee hearing is one hour and ten minutes. the board of the torah and the e subcommittees meeting today