clerks to supreme court nominee brett kavanaugh. they will talk about working with him in his approach to their job as a judge on the dc circuit court of appeals live on c-span. >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created by american absolution companies that we bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court and public policy events in washington dc and around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. >> federal and state officials recently testified before the house oversight and government reform committee about efforts to score us election systems. and undersecretary from the permit of homeland security said

russia is seeking to influence the 2018 midterm elections but not to the degree of russia's meddling in the 2016 presidential election. >> good morning. the committee on oversight and government reform come to order without objection. i will declare recess at any time. i recognize myself, the gentleman from maryland and today's witnesses. the right to vote is fundamental in a functioning democracy, the ability to pick our own leaders defines democracy. it is the essence of self-governing. everything we do in congress, every bill passed, every hearing conducted, every witness summoned, every document

accessed, all of it derives its power and legitimacy from an election. legitimacy of what we do is inextricably intertwined with the legitimacy of the underlying election. the power to vote is contingent on the vote being counted. no more, no less than anyone else's and the legitimacy to govern, therefore, flows from the reliability of the underlying election process. further adding to the uniqueness of this idea called america is the duality that elections are principally governed by state and local officials. sometimes volunteers even though elections decided on national implications, mistakes are national, stakes are international, state and local he driven but the state can and do ask for assistance given the nature of the attacks we now seem to face.

today hearing is faced on elections agree, advancing individual and collective leads, the legitimacy of our work and the work of others, in direct proportion to the reliability of our own elections. today's hearing is broader than what happened in 2016 but what happened in 2016 must be addressed otherwise they will attack us again. i personally progressed beyond any evidentiary burden that russia interfered with the election. i'm convinced russia attempted to undermine the fundamentals of our democracy, and so the seeds of discord among americans. our intelligence community past and present included this as did house intelligence committee report, the senate intelligence committee report, and equally importantly our fellow americans who served on two grand juries which return two bills ten days ago, the current deputy attorney

general announced russian cyber operations to interfere in the 2016 election, they hacked into computer networks and install malicious software that allow them to spy on users, took screenshots, infiltrated and removed data from these computers and discussed the timing of release in an attempt to enhance the impact on the election. this was not just his opinion but the consensus of average everyday americans called into service on what we call a grand jury. the government of justice says both indictments, there is no allegation this interference changed the vote counter affected any election result, but that was likely not for a lack of trying. what better way to undermine confidence in every derivative action of government and to cast doubt on election result as a whole.

last week many of us were in a skiff meeting with inspector general michael horwitz. there were no cameras, just us and our colleagues from the judiciary. .. the relevant information by the reality that all of us are actual victims somewhere have acted more than others but the target is america which is why

those aforementioned indictment alleged the united states of america versus it's not a political party or a group or an individual. it is the united states of america versus. i'm sure someone will correct me as they are kind enough to do from time to time. i think it was none other than the greek philosopher solon who said, and get this partially right, the place we want to live is a place were even those of s who were not victimized by crime, even those of us who were not injured, even those of us who would not agree t feel the pain of the ingested just as if we were victims ourselves. 201 2060 it was one political py that was successfully accessed, materials disseminated. those who seek to do us harm will be back at it again in 2018.

perhaps with a different target. so we must take every precaution to save regard our electoral process. explore ways noble count is over affected and discussed our election process from start to finish. it is our responsibility to ensure no election is over successfully interfered with. it is likewise are responsible to ensure with our fellow citizens place their ballot in the ballot box by whatever means their vote is recorded accurately and counted correctly. it will be efforts to affect us, the would-be attacks, efforts to sow the seeds of discord and discontent and th will be effors to call into question the legitimacy of our electoral process. but americans are uniquely good at coming together in the aftermath of the tragedy or a lost or an attack, or at least we used to be. it's one of the most enduring and unified qualities, the challenges can we come together in an environment like the one we find result in now and repel the attack before it happens,

whether we win or lose we need and want to have confidence every valid vote was counted and nothing interfered with the will of the american jury. americans are free to quarrel about who should be elected. we will have a hard time sustaining this gift of self governance if we have been given, if we begin to quarrel about who actually was elected. with that i would recognize the gentleman from maryland. >> i want to first think the chairman for this hearing, and asked the chairman was talking i could not help but feel chills. because one of the last things that my mother said, and 92-year-old woman who had fought for the vote and who has seen

people lynched and harmed trying to get to vote, one of the last things she said on her dying bed is don't let them take the boat away from us. chilling. and so this hearing means a lot to me personally and i know it means a lot to every member of this body. after all, we wouldn't be here if people did not have the right to vote. and so i dedicate this to ruth cummings. what you think the chairman for calling this very important hearing. candidly, however, it is not enough. it's not enough. it's not enough. words are cheap.

this is the first time since donald trump was elected in 2016 that the oversight committee has held a full committee hearing on russian interference in the election. it took us a year and have to finally hold today's hearing. this hearing comes less than four months -- hello -- four months before the 2018 midterm elections, and most states have already held their primaries. in addition, the chairman denied our request to invite the office of the director of national intelligence to testify today. congress needs to understand how russia attacked our states in order to help states, to help

states defend against these attacks in the future. and i'm so glad that the chairman acknowledged the fact that we are under constant attack. this ain't nothing new, and they are prepared to do it again and again and again. and they are probably learned some things of what the done to do it even better and try to get more effectively, that is,, anything with our elections the next time. dan coats, the director of national intelligence recently warned that, quote, listen to what he said, the warning lights are blinking red. he compared these warning signs to what we saw before 9/11. 9/11. let me repeat that. president trump's own director of national intelligence compared our situation now to

the months leading up to the attack of september 11, 2001. yet chairman gowdy would not extend an invitation to ask anyone for odni to testify. we understand that we make it a classified briefing at some later date, but a closed-door briefing is no substitute for a public hearing to inform the american people about what is going on. we have dhs here. we should have the intelligence community here as well. we held a subcommittee hearing in november on election cybersecurity, but it was also inadequate. mr. krebs was your from dhs also testified in november.

at that hearing we asked him for documents showing how russia attacked our states. doing our duty a as a check on e executive branch. at first mr. krebs gave us only a single document. later he gave us 50 pages, much of which was already public. thank you very much. we sent a letter asking chairman gowdy to subpoena the documents dhs was withholding, but he ignored it. we sent another letter asking him to let us vote on a subpoena, but he denied our motion. because this issue is so important, we joined with the ranking members of other key committees and sent a letter to

speaker paul ryan. we implored him to help us get from the trump administration these documents about how russia attacked our states. but all we got was silence. silence. radio silence. was not into special counsel robert mueller indicted 12 russian military officials on july 13 that we finally learned something more about the specific attacks russia launched against our states. the trump administration withheld this information from us. we should not have been forced to read about it in a press release. dhs and other agencies should have provided that information

once ago. again, that is our job, to check the executive branch. we can even get information, both classified and unclassified. so we have worked with states to help secure their election system. it is clear that the house republicans do not want information about russia attacked our states in the last election, which seems like a pretty basic first step. pretty basic, getting information. when you are trying to help these very states defend against russian attacks in the next one. but even worse, the house republicans are taking active steps to hurt state efforts to protect their election systems. just last week house republicans

blocked all attempts to provide additional funding to secure state election systems. they argued that states do not need more money because they should cover the security upgrades on their own. i have a letter here that we just received yesterday, completely contradicting that republican talking point. and ask unanimous consent to make it a part of the official hearing record, mr. chairman. >> without objection. >> this letter is from a bipartisan group of 21 states attorneys general, both republican and democrat. they express, and i quote, grave concern over the threat to the integrity of the american election system, end of quote.

and they ask for additional funding. we are concerned that many states lack the resources and tools they need to protect the polls. additional funding for voting infrastructure will not only allow states to upgrade election systems, but will also allow for comprehensive security risk assessment. let me conclude with this. some republicans have recently begun to issue more critical statements about president trump and russia. chairman heard wrote an op-ed in the "new york times" asserting that our committee must conduct vigorous and public oversight, and this is his quote. i didn't say this.

chairman hurd said this. i believe lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty as well as keep the american people informed of a current danger. as a member of the house oversight and government reform committee i strongly believe in the importance of congresses oversight responsibilities and will work with my colleagues to ensure that the administration is taking the russian threat seriously, end of quote. i agree with every syllable chairman hurd wrote. i think he is telling the truth, but it would be much more powerful with action to back it up. we need all of our republican colleagues colleagues to conduct oversight, not just use strong words. to put a request to subpoena to trump administration for documents, it is withholding

about the russian attacks. support our request through director of national intelligence to testify in public voted in favor of additional funding for states that is desperately needed. we don't need talk. we need action. this should be a bipartisan issue and, mr. chairman, you're absolutely right. this must be a bipartisan issue. this must be an issue what we put our party hats to the side. and we have less than four months to help our states before the next election. and with that i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. i'm pleased to introduce today's witnesses. i will introduce you in group and recognized individually for your opening statement. the honorable christopher krebs undersecretary for national protection programs that u.s. department of homeland security. the honorable thomas six,

commission of u.s. election assistance commission. the honorable maggie oliver, secretary of state from new mexico, the honorable rick c hatch, auditor of weber county, utah. welcome pursuant to committee rules of laughter diminishment of don't ask you to please stand and racial right hand. [witnesses were sworn in] you may sit down. there's a lighting system that will help you. you may rest assured that your opening statements are in the possession of every member and it will be red city state are able to summers remarks in five minutes that would be great. with that, mr. krebs, you are

recognized. >> thank you. chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and members of the committee thank you for today's opportunity to testify regarding the department of homeland security ongoing efforts to assist state and local election officials, those who own and operate election system with improving the resilience of election security across america. today's rate is timely, as primary elections are winding down and election officials have time to reflect and get ready for the november elections. i spent two weeks ago secretary nielsen at the dhs leadership team met with election officials as they gather in philadelphia for the summer conference. let me state plainly and clearly, the 2010 midterm elections remain a potential target for russian cyber and influence operations. as described in the 2017 intelligence community assessment, we know the russians engaged in a multifaceted

campaign to meddle in the last election, including some influence tactics that they had used for decades. based on this prior demonstration of capability and intent, we are planning and preparing as if they will try again this fall, and beyond. in terms of current activity the intelligence community has observed continued malign influence operations into 2010. while these recent activities are designed to exacerbate sociopolitical divisions, there does not appear to be an effort at the same scope for scale directed at the midterms that was observed in 2016. nor have we seen russian cyber operations directly targeting state and local election systems infrastructure. having said that there is little doubt that some adversaries and nonstate actors view elections as a target for cyber and influence operations. having been given a roadmap we are certain some cyber actors are interested in identifying and potentially exploiting

vulnerabilities. some driven by private actions and global dialogue about risks to election infrastructure. malicious cyber activity from various actors is observed against u.s. infrastructure, including during the 2018 primary season. often common types of activity seen by many internet connected systems. due to that threat landscape we remain vigilant and any attempt to undermine our democracy will be met with consequences. we will continue to work with our election partners to strengthen the resilience of our election systems. as i've traveled across the country during primary season it's clear to me sectors of state and of the election officials are not sitting back. they take cybersecurity and security in general seriously. our mission at dhs is to our stakeholders better understand and manage the risks they face. through concerted efforts in part by building relationships, establishing trust and understanding what it takes and

what it is our stakeholders need to manage their risk we've made significant progress over the last year and half. with strong partnership with the election assistance commission we are working with state and local officials as well as those private sector partners who support them. we have created government and private sector council who collaborative work to share information, promote best practices and develop strategies to reduce risk to the nation's election cirencester with gritted election infrastructure information sharing and analysis center with almost 1000 members including all 50 states. we respond to secure clearances multiple election officials in each state with increased availability and deployed to plymouth free technical assistance and with offered cybersecurity and physical security training and exercises and, in fact, later this summer we will conduct a three-day tabletop exercise with a number of election officials. we will continue to refine and update our suite of services as the requirements identified by

our stakeholders mature. this will take time and a deliberate effort on both sides come across the 50 states and five territories over 10,000 jurisdictions that are responsible for elections. the systems processes and procedures used very quickly. what works for the floors voters do not likely work for the voters in california. we are focus on engaging those jurisdictions by every, but each state and territory. this effort known as a last mile initiative is focused on tethering awareness of the threat and security mitigation best practices in elections to get guides checklist to the individual county or local level. we understand the only way to deliver a resilient election system is to work collaboratively with those officials including our partners at the eac as well as those on the front line running the process. before i conclude i want to take a moment to thank congress alleges that progress in strengthening dhs cybersecurity authorities and we strongly

support the passage of the cybersecurity at infrastructure to get agency act. i look forward to for outlining our efforts to enhance the security of elections come, our progress to date and a strategy moving forward. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> good morning chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings and members of the committee. i'm pleased to testify before you today to discuss the u.s. election assistance commission to work to support state and local election leaders in efforts to conduct efficient, accessible and secure elections. when congress passed the help america vote act of 2002 the established the eac as an independent bipartisan commission charged with developing guidance and help meet requirements. adopting voluntary voting system guidelines and certified election systems come serving as the national courthouse of information on election administration as well as dispensing and auditing funds. i'm pleased report are capable team continues to fulfill this mission day in and day out. and election officials across

the country constantly for our work does indeed help america vote. the eac is the only federal entity focused sold on the administration of elections. we serve as the central hub for other federal agencies that spend only part of the temperature of this important issue including those who specialize in technology and cybersecurity. our partners ranging from dhs and the fbi to the u.s. postal service and dod rely on the eac to provide deep knowledge about how elections work and clear line of communication to those in the field who administer the vote. election security is not new to those election officials for the tens of thousands of election administrative staff members and election workers support network. that said, you can see from this diagram it is not our only responsibility. the work described for the election officials encompasses everything from the ada

compliant and voter registration to election mail management and human resources. this is what it's so vital that congress and federal agencies especially the eac provide election administrators with resources and tools they need to help succeed. the establishment of election systems is part of the nation's critical infrastructure which one with the federal government sought to prove the mechanisms it uses to accomplish this goal. following former secretary johnson's critical infrastructure announcement, the eac worked actively to provide state and local election officials with the voice of the table during discussions about how the sector with function. dhs is often stated that sectors, according to counsel, gcc, was formed faster than any other critical infrastructure sector council today. the eac takes pride in its role we play to make that happen. it is proof of how state, local, and federal governments can effectively work together fo foa common goal of protecting our

nation's infrastructure. i serve on the gcc executive committee which has worked diligently to ensure the critical infrastructure designation as tangible, meaningful impact across the nation. we all know that many solutions to the security challenges take resources and we are pleased members of this committee under congressional colleagues recognize this reality when supporting the consolidated appropriations act of 2018. that legislation contained $380 million in security funds for state and territories to improve the administration of federal elections. just four months as the appropriation bill was signed into law i'm proud to report that we received disbursement request for 100% of the funds. that demonstrates the pacs dispositive in the states and territories urgencies and addressing ways to improve election systems. less than two weeks after president trum trump's on appropriation bill into law the eac personally notified each

eligible jurisdiction and issued notice of craf grant award letto every state and territory just one week after that the first state requested funds and the weeks of both the esa conducted a webcast at public for him to explain the funds and work directly with the nice association of secretaries of state at the national association of state election directors to share information. the eac conducted webinars, published faqs and other resources on our website, educated nongovernmental groups including those focused on issues such as accessibility and security about the funds. expert grant tina smith up states navigate logistical hurdles. to date we know the states plan to spend the vast majority of this money, nearly 75%, on cyber protection, new voting equipment, updates of registration systems and audits. these are all investments that reflect congressional guidance

and priorities. for those of you have specific questions on how your state are investing those funds for programs overall, the eac would be happy to establish a time to provide additional details about those plans. the eac has broad spectrum of ongoing work to complement our vital role as the administrator of how the funds including the testing certification of election systems creation of new resources related to a broad spectrum of activities, production of new research, convening public events that bring together election administrators, security experts, academics, federal government officials and many others as the approach to election system to better serve american voters. the commission continues to receive training participation in a series of events including initiatives focus on election security, our staff was intricately involved in the establishment of harvard university centers tabletop

exercise that is conducted across the nation. all staff festival to nearly a dozen states to conduct election officials as i.t. management trainings for state and local election officials. these trainings are ongoing and we work with the dhs to put these trainings online. while election administrators at the state level, which is yet another layer of security to protect the vote, those who administer elections are grateful for federal support and use these resources to ensure the election systems are secure and resilient. the eac appreciates congressional support of our efforts and your commitment to provide resources to the states that territory we serve. i look for to providing additional details and answer any and all of your questions. thank you. >> ms. oliver. >> good morning. thank you, chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and members of the committee for the chance to appear before you today and address some of the things happening at the national

level and somewha support specio new mexico and also to the national association of secretaries of state. my name is maggie oliver, the new mexico secretary of state. prior to serving as secretary of state i was county clerk in albuquerque metropolitan area. i ran elections and the largest jurisdiction in the state of new mexico for ten years. i'm also the treasurer of the national association of sectors of state, and a founding and current member of the election infrastructure subsector government coordinating council, the eas gcc. nas is a nonprofit professional organization founded in 1904. the organization provides sectors of state, she election officials and other public officials from across the united states with opportunity to share public policy ideas and best practices. this collaboration is important because it gives election officials accessed information beyond what is available in our own state, helping us find innovative solutions to, election administration issues.

during the recent nas summer conference held in philadelphia, pennsylvania, over 80 of our sessions, workshops and discussions revolved around elections cybersecurity. election officials like myself are taking the possible threat of foreign actors meddling in our elections very seriously. in addition, during the conference department of homeland security, sector kirstjen nielsen delivered remarks to members of nas international association of state election directors during which secretary nielsen emphasized the fact that election security is national security. she also highlighted the positive progress in working relationship between dhs and the states to protect elections infrastructure. while state and local officials have always been focused on election security, the focus of our national organizations and the federal government has increased significantly since 2016. it is clear that election security will be a top priority for state, local, and federal

officials as well as the general and public moving forward. what is also clear is that the federal government and state and local election officials must keep the lines of communication open when it comes to election security and thus continuously work together to harden our nation's election systems. now too little bit about my state. in mexico is a leader in election best practices i am proud to say. we utilize paper ballots and all elections and have robust pre- and post-election testing, accuracy and auditing processes just to name a few. in fact, ne in mexico was one of the first states to conduct postelection audits. additionally, the vote tabulation systems that use are never connect to the internet and include other security mechanisms that reduce the belief that after to change votes. these practices are important election security safeguards that are now being adopted by

states all across the country. in regard to specific state preparations for 2018 and beyond, i would like to thank you and your colleagues for appropriating the remaining help america vote hava funds. according to his election assistance commission as of jule funds have been requested by the states and eligible u.s. territories as we just heard from mr. hicks. the new mexico we requested our portion of over $3.6 million in hava dollars from u.s. election assistance commission. we planned use these funds to ensure new mexico's election systems continue to be resilient and secure. some of the fence be used to purchase more robust voting systems that provide additional security features for all counties. we've launched a brand-new election security program within our bureau of elections with a portion of the hava funds is more to find a full-time staff position to manage this program through 2023. the program administrator will

be responsible for implementing security best practices to safeguard in mexico since the election data and systems at the state and county level, and to provide training and support to county clerks and their staff on cybersecurity issues. this is typically important in new mexico's smaller more rural counties that may have limited technical support available to assist with security issues. we will allocate some of the funds to assist counties with berries system upgrades that they cannot afford on their own. we are excited to have the opportunity to put this program into effect and appreciate the support of congress and dhs in these efforts. thank you again members of the committee, mr. chairman, for inviting me and my colleagues to testify before you and for giving me the opportunity to speak about the sport met with of nas and the state of new mexico. i look forward to answer any questions you may have. >> thanthank you, madam secreta. mr. hatch. >> chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, members of the

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on how we can ensure the safety and security of our election system. my name is ricky hatch untied the elected clerk auditor for weber county, utah. today on your behalf of the national association of counties which represents all 3069 county governments across the country. and addition to run in elections with my i serve as an appointee to the election assistance commission board of advisors. i am on the government coordinating cel council electin infrastructure subsector and i'm the division director election officials for the international association of government officials. as elections are the foundation of our democracy, election officials across the country embrace our duty to ensure that our elections are secure, fair and trustworthy. all elections are local and i'm here to underscore the importance of including counties in federal and state discussions

to strengthen our national efforts to secure elections. also to offer suggested to prove collaboration among all levels of government. counties like usual and our nation's election system and work with states to ensure the integrity of the process. in virtually every state counties run daily operations of election. they're almost 9000 dedicated local election officials likely throughout the country who oversees allegations of voting machines, manage polling locations, print and mail bows can recruit and train poll workers and should integrity of the entire voting process. during the 2016 election counties of all sizes manage over 100,000 polling locations and hired and trained over 800,000 poll workers. but elections are not just a one-day event for a county. from a cybersecurity standpoint alone we worked around to protect against direct hacking attempts that seek to improper access border roles, remove election information from county website or alter voting data.

we also were to protect voting machines, computers and other equipment used to cast, record, howling and certified votes. the integrity of the election process is our main goal. and security is a key component. coordination between the federal government and localities have improved dramatically in the past 18 months. these partnerships have been invaluable to help protect us from cybersecurity attacks and decently the sounds of the government coordinating council dhs which has been open and refreshingly responsive to our frank and frequent feedback during this process. they include the $380 billion in mv-22 under the spirit many states including my home state of utah are chordate with a local governments of the best ways to use this funding. throughout this process the eac has been the glue in coordinating and promoting all of these new efforts. while all of these are positive

changes we suggest three items to further improve our collective election security efforts. first, we encourage congress to support a dedicated predictable federal funding stream to help local governments protect elections. as you can imagine resources get stuck at the state level which can be problematic for those of us on the ground. we upgrade aging equipment to short our defense defense is a t cost to county governments which often do not have the luxury portability to increase revenues to offset these costs. while the of this funding was helpful we need more at the local level to combat these cyber threats. second, we recommend additional work needed in state outreach to local jurisdictions. especially those that are more remote and rural asked ms. oliver mentioned. fofor a variety of reasons suchs limited staff on a small percentage of local election officials accessing the valuable free technical resources provided by our federal partners. we urge our federal and state parties to help us reach these jurisdictions.

and finally congress and federal agencies should undertake a robust federalism consultation process with states and local governments when considering any changes to election cybersecurity protocols. local election officials have the most complete understanding of the elections process. we want to share that understanding with lawmakers to help ensure that any federal legislation or programs are fully effective on the ground. ultimately the best way to safeguard our elections and short our cyber defenses used to communicate and work together. we stand ready to work with you, with federal agencies and with our states to strengthen our nation's elections process and retain the public's confidence. chairman gowdy and ranking member cummings, thank you again for inviting me to testify today and this concludes my testimony. i'm happy to take any questions. >> thank you very much. >> mr. chairman? >> for what purpose does the general from west virginia seek recognition? >> i have a motion.

>> recognize five minutes to state his motion. >> i think the chair. mr. chairman, like so many of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, i was very concerned by the president statement last week in helsinki with his one-on-one meeting with vladimir putin to president trump capitulated mr. putin on nearly every point of contention in the bilateral relationship with russia. he publicly cast doubt of russian interference on our election. he praised as an incredible offer an unprecedented proposal from mr. putin to hand over american officials, including the former u.s. ambassador to russia, for russian interrogation. according to the russian president trump even make agreements with mr. putin on syria and russian aggression in the ukraine. president trump refused to allow his fello own senior staff to ad the meeting and the president has so far declined to provide congress with the public with

any details about what occurred in that private meeting. our committee must act swiftly to determine what would cause president trump to act in this way and to what extent president trump is being manipulated by mr. putin. to do this we must immediately hold a hearing with the director of national intelligence and others who can inform the committee and the public about the extent of the russian threat to our country. i enjoyed in the concern by subcommittee chairman hurd wrote an op-ed stating that he had seen russian intelligence manipulate many people as a cia undercover officer, but he said, and i quote, i never thought i would see the day when an american president would be one of those, unquote. he explained a committee must work to quote, ensure that the administration is taking the russian threat seriously, unquote. and to fill out oversight duty

and keep the american people informed of the current danger, he went on. even you, mr. chairman, said on "fox news sunday" that the evidence of russia's attack on our country is overwhelming and that the president needs to say that and act like that. i couldn't agree more, mr. chairman. in contrast, however, so far the chair has declined our request to invite the office of the director of national intelligence to testify today. we appreciate your agreement to hold a classified briefing with odni but we think the briefing albeit helpful needs to be accompanied by a public hearing. closed-door briefings are simply not a substitute for public testimony from the top federal intelligence official on how states were attacked by russia in 2016 at the current threats to our election security. mr. hurd again said, and i quote, lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duties as was to

keep the american people informed of the current danger. certainly a public hearing would help accomplish that goal. for all of these reasons i hereby move to subpoena the director of national intelligence mr. dan coats to testify in a public hearing before this committee and the public about the extent of the russian threat involved. i make this motion, mr. chairman, pursuant to house rule 11, clause two k-6 and i believe the motion is in order. a written copy of my motion in the sabine is that the clerks desk. i ask that we disposed of the motion immediately. >> i second the motion work with the gentleman yield of course. >> mr. chairman, i want to second the motion and associate myself with the eloquent words of -- i ask you to invite a representative of the office of the director of national

intelligence, testify here today next to dhs so that our committee members and the public could hear directly from the experts about the threat that russia poses to our country and our electoral system. director coats one recently, adequate -- ward, the warning lights are blinking red picky compared these warning signs to what we saw before 9/11. 9/11. our country is under attack and we must understand that attack in order to protect ourselves. we must make sure that the public hears directly from director coats about the attack. we have to ring the alarm bells and we need to bring it loud. i know, mr. chairman, that you believe that director coats, because i have heard you say it, and just this past weekend i i heard a quote from you and it says, quote, the evidence is

overwhelming. it can be proven beyond any evidentiary burden that russia is not our friend and he tried to attack us in 2016. you said, going on, the evidence is overwhelming and the president needs to say that and act like it. if i just may have one more minute, mr. chairman, but the simple fact is that the president is not saying that and he is not acting like that, and that makes it all the more important that we in congress keep ringing that alarm bells and bringing it loud. that we make sure that the public understands that we hear clearly, directly from the experts, that we make the evidence public, and that we put our money where our mouth our and find the solutions. thank you we should have director coats year testify at this hearing today, but you did not invite him.

so i joined my distinguished colleague, mr. connolly in his motion to bring director coats before this committee on another due to testify about the threats that russia poses to our national security and our electoral system. and what you think the gentleman for yielding. >> the gentleman from early yields back to the gentleman for virginia, what purposes does agenda from north to let us seek recognition? >> i move we tabled a motion and penny that note the absence of a quorum. >> gentleman is great. quorum is not present the motion to table is made. the motion to table and the underlying motion our health and advancements of sufficient quorum is present. out of respect for our witnesses, i would suggest removal in every seat with me, me until such time as that. and with that -- >> mr. chairman, may we hear the motion? >> i understand the abeyance and

the lack of a quorum, but for the members other here, i think it would help greatly if we were allowed to discuss the members motion. >> i do understand the concern. since the motion to table is made, i would ask my friend from massachusetts, you're welcome to discuss it but i want to vote on it later on, given the fact that the motion of the table has been made and given the fact we have our witnesses here. but i'll be happy to get a chance to speak on it at the appropriate time. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> with that legitimate from north carolina is recognized for his five minutes of questioning, mr. walker. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think our panel for being here today. just for record notice, secretary of state of new mexico, would you mind announcing the name one more time? >> thank you, mr. chairman member,.

>> welcome back emmitt smith remember that the districts can start with you if that's possible. this past march congress appropriated $380 million in grants for state election security expenses that were intended to update voting equipment and accrued subsequent practices over all. mr. hicks, how much of these funds are how many of the sons of interspersed to state? >> all the money is going to be going to states. so it's -- >> which would be that all the money will be going? >> about 335 million has been dispersed right now but 100 100f the money has been requested. >> do have a timeline when the other -- >> we will have the money out in next couple of weeks. [inaudible] so secretary oliver and mr. hatch, how much did your state request and how much have you received so far? start with the secretary of state. >> our state requested the format amount of a six-point

which we were entitled based on population. we did request the flip and we have received the full amount. >> utah because of the same full amount, not the cinema but he came to about 4.1, $4.2 million. >> have you received as well. >> was yes. >> interview. security protections are the majority state using decides to pursue, giving information? >> yes, sir. most of the future looking to either do cybersecurity upgrades or purchase new voting equipment. equipment. about 75% of the money is going towards voter registration or cybersecurity are purchasing of new voting equipment. >> mr. krebs, from your experience what is the importance that the federal government plays in maintaining the integrity of elections? can use them out, with only taking 30 and 40 seconds a giving an overview of what you see that role as? >> thank you for the question. as secretary mattis nhtsa

sometimes election security tests could. dhs plays a supporting role of the state and local officials and it's important we provide our crosscutting savage could expertise to help fill in some gaps of the state and local level where they may not have in-depth cybersecurity expertise. what we can bring our broader learning threat the critical infrastructure community, help at the local level. >> let me follow up if i could. what d.c. from your perspective caucuses will support states and states and counties chemical administration. would you speak to that? >> continue to enable me to do my job in support of state and local support, election assistance commission provide, if necessary, additional support and resources. >> i concur with mr. crabs, the continued provision of tools and resources for state and local jurisdictions utilize particularly as we get down the

road with regard to local entities. for example, states utilize centralist statewide voter registration databases. while i'm managing that and overseeinoverseen get from offie completed and utilize by 33 counties across new mexico. some of which may not even have full-time i.t. staff. it's important we are able to conduct risk assessments and provide the tools that have been provided at the state level so we will continue working with dhs and would love to the system of congress. >> mr. hatch, you want to follow. >> was i agree. the best way the federal government can help is to provide assistance to resources, consulting, as well as dedicated unpredictable funding so that we can identify with our needs how much we will be able to meet the states financially. >> the first two years i was your i served on homeland security, i was amazed at how many times wrote on a daily basis that there are attempts

from the russians for cyber hacking, that is nonstop in fact, it was all the way back in 2012 when i believe a former presidential candidate pointed at the concern expressed the geopolitical threat that rush is. mr. hicks, question for you. what advice does the election assistance commission from your and we can provide the state and local officials when evaluating vendors for cybersecurity? >> we operate under the voluntary system. if a vendor wants to submit a system for certification, then we would give them guidance on that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i feel the back. >> -- yield back. >> gentlelady's time new york is recognized. >> thank you, ranking member and thank you, mr. chairman for calling the fully vital, important hearing. this past weekend i went on a date and politics pilgrimage,

bipartisan led by congressman tom reed to upstate new york, the home of two of the vital human rights and social justice ancivil rights movements in our country, the right to abolish slavery, the fight to abolish slavery and the fight to grant women, half the population, the right to vote. we went to the grades of harriet tubman, frederick douglass, susan b. anthony, all people that dedicated their life to freedom and the right to vote for american citizens. i cannot think of anything more important than this hearing, and i must say it is a national scandal that we've been asking for it ever since the election, to find out what happen with the tampering of trying to interfere and prevent people from having their votes. the evidence is absolutely clear

that the russians tampered with our elections. nothing is more important, and hope, mr. chairman, is is the first admin hearings focusing on preserving the integrity of our boats and of our election system. i don't think anything is more important in our country. i'd like to start first by asking mr. krebs, has read the indictment from mr. mueller? yes or no. >> was yes, ma'am. >> and the indictment, the object of one of the russian conspiracies was, i'm quoting from the indictment, to hack into the computers of u.s. persons and entities involved in the 2016 u.s. presidential election, steal documents from these computers and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere with the 2016 u.s. presidential election. do you believe there is any reason to doubt this statement in this indictment, mr. krebs?

>> no, ma'am. >> also, mr. krebs come to david goes on to say that in july 2016 the russian spies, and i quote, hacked the website of the state board of elections and so information related to approximately-thousand use voters, including names, addresses, partial salsas give you numbers dates of birth and drivers license numbers. do give any reason to doubt this information, mr. krebs? >> no, man. >> and also the russian spies quote hacked into the computers of use vendors, not just voters, but the vendors that supplied software used to verify voter registration information for the 2016 u.s. election. do you have any reason to doubt this information? >> no, ma'am. >> and then furthermore, the object of a second russian conspiracy was, quote, gain from the indictment to hack into the protected computers of persons

and entities charged with the administration of the 2016 u.s. election in order to access those computers and steel voter data and other information stored on those computers. do you have any reason to doubt this information? >> i do not. >> i'd like to ask you member of the panel whether or not you doubt any of these information, mr. hicks can do you doubt this indictment anyway. >> was no, ma'am. >> ms. oliver? >> no. >> mr. raskin you doubt this in any way? >> no, ma'am. >> you know, now many people have called this, including the president of the united states, a witchhunt. just within the last few days. mr. krebs can do you consider this a witchhunt, this information? >> this is a duly authorized investigation, authorized and overseen by the deputy attorney general. >> do you have any reason to doubt this information, to call

it a witchhunt, mr. hicks? >> no, no, ma'am. >> ms. oliver? >> no, man. >> mr. hatch? >> no. >> well, nobody really. and have no reason to doubt it either. and this president at administration and congress need to take this threat seriously and i would say this committee needs to take this threat seriously. no fight was harder, no more blood and suffering was shared in this country and the fight for liberty, independent and the right to vote. and i would like to give to the great state of new mexico last word. ms. oliver, i just a few seconds left, your statement on this,, how does your state feel about it? how do you feel about it? >> i'm deeply concerned, and that is why we are taking this so seriously and working so closely with our federal partners. >> i think you and i yield back. >> gentlelady's time.

the children from michigan is recognized. >> taking mr. chair. we had a hearing, unconcerned about some members of me talk how there's been no hearings on this. with mr. hurd we had a hearing in 2016 elections. we had a number of people election for come in and asked specifically wasn't any evidence that the votes in the 2016 election were altered we had multiple state there. not one, not at the federal level reporting, not that the statement indicating votes were in any manner altered. there is no quarrel that outside entities including russia attempted to interfere with our election, conflating the two gets in the way of doing the job we're trying to do, which again fight resources we need to protect the integrity of that system. i uphold of the ongoing complaints of those two and so did the world has come to an end. but as to question. mr. hicks, you are aware of the

amounts of money put to the states to assist with elections? michigan requested and received $11.42 million to upgrade their systems. all of the voting machines will be replaced by the august primary. have you received any further requests from michigan for funding or support beyond that? >> i am not aware of any funding in any other additional request from michigan beyond the request from -- >> michigan has not raised of major crisis our election system in mission suddenly about to come down around our ears at this point? >> i'm not aware. >> i didn't think so. i have talked to secretary of state and the window. are you aware of the city of detroit's administration 2016 to election? >> i am not. >> let me give you some data on that. 392 precincts in the city of detroit were out of bounds. 26% of them absentee voting could not be verified.

when precinct was missing over two and 50 ballots. they made six recommendations. all relate to training, and staffing of the precincts. not one, not a single recommendation related to either the voter registration file, electronic records, or the actual ballots. the actual voting. how are they going to support that given the fact that despite the concerns of some of my colleagues have that the russians are coming, the majority of the mistakes that are happening or human errors that just multiply and they feel to reconcile? detroit, if there was a weekend michigan, but the way, the president one x 12,000 votes, detroit could not sustain a recount because of these problems. how do we support that? >> the eac remains focused, laser focus on all aspects of elections was not that's voter registration, voting equipment, poll worker training, election night reporting.

there are about 1000 jurisdictions across the country and each jurisdiction is different aspects of it and we try our best to help each and every one of those jurisdictions function well with administration. >> do you have a current need for additional resources or support, training, personal systems for voting and what would that be? >> i don't have a specific number but there's always need for additional resources states are very tied to the fact that the other things that they focus in on, whether or not that's roads, schools, police and so forth. elections initiative looked at as a lesbian as mr. hatch talked about the audition was congress can look at providing additional funding to the state. >> okay. ms. oliver, let's switch because you're nodding your head. however, we still what to maintain a system that in our elections are state and local and not a federal election system. i don't think we want to

federalize them, do you? >> no, sir. speaking on behalf of of nas, the secretary of state, national don't have a position on this issue. speaking for myself personally my experience in new mexico, estate which estuary suffered ever since the economic decline, we can always use more funding. i personally view conducting our federal, state and local elections together on one ballot as the partnership states aforesaid skin in the game on this issue. we've been doing all the election security work. we would love to have more resources in that regard, from my perspective here .. is true

president implies the united states engages in hacking and trying to get into the election systems of other countries? >> i have no information on that. my job is to help to protect their systems. i am a defense of homeland

security homeland defense operation. >> you don't have any information that would indicate the tit-for-tat as we do inspiring, also goes on with this hacking into the election systems of other countries? >> i do not. in any official capacity, no. >> you testified before the house committee on homeland security. i am interested because i want to know how the russians got to be such experts at this. you said the russians had, quote, scammed, you were not able to see. what is scanning, they scan all 50 states? >> what we historically said,

based on network visibility, sensors on state networks using dhs indicators, 21 states, in some sense. >> scanning meaning what? >> scanning can be a number of things. it could be a russian officer getting on his computer in moscow or elsewhere and visiting a county or state system. browsing, going through whatever his search engine is of choice. >> you say they scammed people but you were able to see only 21. certainly was all 50 but you have your own informational only 21.

>> i referenced and albert spencer. it is a network in detection, it is an ips, i am sorry. intrusion detection system. what it does is sits on a network and looks for certain traffic, ip addresses, internet connected device somewhere else trying to come in and go out of the system. >> you spoke to 21 states about this system. >> we assumed because we only saw 21 because that is where we had our albert sensors deployed, we were able to see those 21. i did not have visibility over the rest. since february of this year we quadrupled our visibility. when we come up to 2018 in the

midterms we will have closer to all 50 states. >> robert sensors will be used before that. >> that was in the omnibus. we were given additional funds. >> the russians seem more interested in targeting more than other things, just looking at the system to see what they can find? give us some information. >> i believe to a certain extent they were trying to figure out where they landed and what functionality this is. it is important to know what they were able to see or scan and in one case access the system of voter registration database, that was on the administration side and information management side. it wasn't on the vote counting. >> what do you think they ultimately want to do? what are they looking to do? >> hard to tell based on their

demonstrated capability. we know they attempted to interfere in the overarching election. >> and did so. thank you very much. >> the district of columbia yields back. before we recognize the gentleman from georgia, a quorum being present will resume consideration, the gentleman from north carolina's motion to table the motion that is not debatable. i tell my friend from massachusetts that he would have the opportunity to be heard so i went to keep my word. i ask unanimous consent despite the fact the motion is not debatable that the gentleman from massachusetts he recognized for five minutes. >> appreciate the courtesy of this meeting. and assume the ranking member. they he did correctly point out it has been a long time. i was at the hearing chairman

abca16 had on the general issue of elections in this country and that subsumed issues such as auditing and voter files and other mechanics internally of our domestic elections. it did not precisely attempt to discern the level at which russians interfered or attempted to interfere with our election but there is a wide gap between the opinions of many members of congress, democrat and republican regarding russian interference. and they are harmonized with our intelligence agencies.

russian interference did occur. that is not what we hear coming out of the white house. i greatly respect my friends on the other side of the aisle who acknowledged interference by the russians, they talked for 10 seconds, 4 minutes and 15 seconds about detroit and how voting files are inaccurate and we need to train election workers. that is not the point. if we had enough concern about hillary's emails and two in the senate, we thought the us official mishandled their emails hundreds of hearings and we have two. when every single intelligence

agency tells us the russians packed our election, two hearings. after a year and a half, this used to be the oversight committee, the running away from oversight committee since trump took office. we do 0. i am surprised we are having this hearing today. i am shocked. because the republican effort has been to rally around the president even when he is wrong, even when he puts down publicly our intelligence agencies. even when he disses us and sides with vladimir putin. are you kidding me? are you kidding me? this is where we are now. this is a disgrace, a disgrace. that was a national embarrassment in helsinki.

i was embarrassed that our president was siding against our intelligence agency and those people work hard, you will work with them, you work with the nsa, cia, you know the good work they do and our president through them under the bus in front of the world to side with vladimir putin. you have got to be kidding me. it is time to decide what you stand for. do you stand for democracy? or do you stand with the gangster in moscow? do you stand for the right of your people to have a clean and honest election? or do you want to cozy up to the president and don't make him look bad? i can understand when there are gray issues but this is black and white. come on. i know there are colleagues on the other side of the aisle that feel the way i do and you are

exasperated about this but the time has come on this issue, you can be a good republican and still protect the electoral process, you can do both. that is all i am asking. we can get at this, fix this problem and you can still be a good and loyal republican. it is not a question of either or. i know there are good and women on that side. you care deeply about this country. on this issue can we deal with the issue? can we deal with it and fix it on both our behalfs? red states, blue states, all americans? that should be the. you shouldn't let the president's focus on this issue divide us, we can work on this problem as americans. >> the gentleman yields back. the motion to table, those in favor signal by saying i.

as opposed signify by saying no. the opinion of the chair, the eyes have it. mister chairman, i would ask -- >> gentleman from maryland and virginia ask for a recorded vote. the clerk will call the roll. >> [roll call vote]

[roll call vote] [roll call vote]

[roll call vote]

[roll call vote] >> have all members who wish to vote voted? clerk will report the tally? >> on this vote there are 17 is and 15 nos. >> the motion is tabled. the gentleman from georgia is recognized for his 5 minutes. >> thank you, mister chairman. i don't think anyone here denies the fact that russia attempted to meddle in the elections.

that is not the issue. they have done so in the past, attempted in 2016, don't have any reason to believe they won't attempt it again in 2018. what concerns me when we talk about the witchhunt involves a year of an investigation, not one bit of evidence has come forward that donald trump colluded with the russians to influence the election. when we are dealing with all this this is been going on a long time. the obama administration as early as 2014 admitted there was meddling and did nothing about it so this is something the issue of meddling is one thing. the issue of the president colluding is another and that is indeed a witchhunt. i want to go back to the topic

here today. our whole system involves states, not individual states. we have 8000 jurisdictions, 110,000 polling places throughout all 50 states and for the most part it is a state issue, not the federal government. what was passed in march, there was merely $400 million granted for the states to improve the security of the election infrastructure. one of the big concerns with those tons of money and funding is states and people know there as a general rule there is federal funding and there are strings attached to it and as a result states are leery of getting involved and accepting that money. in georgia that has been an issue.

how is the development of homeland security overcoming these concerns of strings attached, the funding to try to help with election security? >> i can't speak specifically to any strings attached, i would have to defer to mister hicks. what we have done, working with secretary toulouse oliver, we have worked on investment guidance, things that state and local election officials can do to improve cyber security. that information is based on a range of factors including risk and vulnerability we have conducted in the last year or so on state and election networks. across those risk and vulnerability assessments we

have identified clear trends. a number of things we are finding consistently across states, frankly we are finding across any other it system. that bakes into the guidance and recommendation from a technical perspective. >> let me ask you this. the georgia secretary of state applied for security clearance to access the shared classified threat information. do you know whether or not that has happened? >> we don't discuss security clearance issues due to operational security secretary camp targeted for the intelligence collection. i have to follow up on that. >> i would like to follow up on that. the integrity of state elections is at stake. miss toulouse oliver or mister hatch, let me ask you regarding homeland security.

how prepared are we going into this next election? >> thank you for the question. i believe we always went to be more prepared. i feel fairly confident about where we are in new mexico. secretary of state across the country and election officials are taking this issue very seriously. we are as prepared as we can be and more important than prepared we are ready to respond to any issues as they arrive. >> i agree with that. county election officials have always had security first and foremost, not just cybersecurity but physical security. we are grateful for the additional funding and resources provided by the dhs and states. it is a great partnership between locals and states.

we enjoy sharing information and feel confident. i would not be surprised if the attack will come and there is a breach somewhere. it happens with that many localities and that much attention. the key is to be prepared and resilient in case of a breach. >> the gentleman from maryland is recognized. >> i associate myself with the words of mister lynch. in all my 21 years in congress that has been one of the most moving statements i have heard in congress and i thank him for that statement. secretary toulouse oliver, yesterday a coalition of 21 state attorneys general, republican and democrat, send a letter to congress that contradicts republican claims that additional funding is not needed to help protect state election systems. the attorney general said,

quote, the attorney general's right to express our grave concern over the threat of the integrity of the american election system. i heard you answer other questions. have you seen that letter? >> yes i have. >> we are concerned many states lack the resources and tools, i heard you say earlier that you all have gotten what you asked for based on the formula? >> that is correct. >> do you agree that many states do not have the funding needed to protect their elections? >> won't be speaking on behalf of napa but on behalf of myself and my state i do strongly

believe ongoing funding is necessary and there is a consistent source of funding. election security is not a one time issue. as was mentioned multiple times in the searing interference happened before 2016. it will continue after 2016. 2016 just brought a level of awareness about how serious the issue truly is. i personally believe elections are severely underfunded particularly with regard to their significance so any additional help in terms of tools, resources and funding the federal government can provide is important, this funding provided through the omnibus bill wouldn't be enough to replace systems in a state that don't have paper ballots systems that are still using dre machines. >> that is what i was trying to get to.

the ag sign the letter i just referred to in this is what they said. it will not only allow state separated election systems but also comprehensive security risk assessment. the existing election assistance commission grants are insufficient to provide upgraded technology, more funding is essential to adequately equip states with financial resources we need to safeguard our democracy and protect the data of voting members of our states. do you agree with that statement? >> speaking for myself, yes, i agree.

>> how would more funding of new mexico conduct comprehensive risk assessment? >> right now we have worked together with dhs to conduct state's risk vulnerability testing. we don't have a sense of where each of our 33 counties stand. i can tell you anecdotally i think four or five of our counties are in good shape but a giant question-mark is over the rest. we want to do the same vulnerability testing to get a baseline to see where we are. if we continue to work with dhs which we would like to do it will take a wild because their resources are limited. if we were to contract with an outside entity that can do that privately that will cost more funds than we have available even through the most recent grant. these are the challenges we are working on.

>> the ag closed their letter with the following plea, quote, the integrity of the nation as voting infrastructure is a bipartisan issue that affects not only the national political landscape but elections in state, county and municipal levels. it is our hope that you agree and will take swift action to protect the national legacy of fair and free elections. last week republicans refused on the house floor to approve another dime to protect their election systems. what is the trump administration's official policy on this particular question? do support additional funding for state election systems or not? >> thank you for the question. in terms of additional funding there certainly has been laid out on the attorney general letter and secretary toulouse oliver and mister hatch, a

requirement to update systems across the board. that will take money whether it is from the state or federal government. i don't have an official opinion on that. it will take money, we identify where the risk is, focus money on that risk. as secretary toulouse oliver said, there are five states that have equipment that do not have voter verifiable paper trail. risk management perspective, that is where i prefer we focus resources. >> i hope my republican colleagues will reverse their opposition and join in helping these states, many of you represent in california. let me read one more quote from the letter. it is imperative we protect the integrity of our elections. we must ensure the upcoming 2018 midterm elections are secure and untainted. accordingly we ask for your

assistance in shoring up our systems so we may protect elections from foreign attacks and interference. let me ask you this. do you agree with that? >> if you could repeat that. >> i'm not going to repeat it. what they are saying is, we want to make sure our electoral system is protected and people know that their votes are going to be counted and the process is untainted. i would suggest that is what you are in office 4. >> that is white is important we are having this hearing so the american people can hear about the efforts of dhs that state the estate secretaries are leading. the partnership is working right now. we are improving security

practices across the electoral system, there is a lot of work to do. this is a marathon. >> you mentioned a number of things you look at is the one thing i noticed that you did not mention is voter suppression. you look at voter suppression because -- that is why you didn't mention it. >> the gentleman from florida is recognized. >> mister secretary, the 2016 election, was there any cyber activity that influenced vote totals and any jurisdictions your knowledge? >> drilling down to cyber enabled hacking of state election systems. we do not have evidence that they accessed to vote tallying systems. that is why i made the

distinction, the administration peace. >> with the registration like a registration database and how would that have a negative effect. >> the specifics would be for 2 secretary toulouse oliver, the way the nation's laws, and in fact, the election database had been compromised where it was deleted or changed and the voters showed up to vote and their information, there are processes in place including provisional ballots to cast their vote.

and to emphasize the outcome is not security but resilience. we can take a hit and keep functioning and there is confidence in the system. that would create some challenges on election day. i think it would be the technical -- as we saw in 2016 where the compromise was detected and there are checks in place. >> the breakdown roughly between states that use paper? >> deferred to the voting experts if they can. >> and registration.

is mister krebs talked about earlier there is a resiliency, the voter registration list is compromised, and some sort of paper form available so folks can make sure they are eligible to vote and provisional ballots, no voter should be the polls without having a chance to cast the ballot. >> is it just better for public confidence. >> as long as you continue with security and accessibility and paper ballots are operable, they cast their ballots. >> what about election night reporting, what threats, is there vulnerability at the local, state level?

>> when you think about election night reporting, you are talking unofficial election results being reported to the media or in some cases on a website. keeping in mind on the administration side it is not the official data, and technical glitches on election night reporting or cyber actor efforts to disrupt election night reporting. on any it system like your own professional webpage it is a webpage and there are vulnerabilities in any webpage, work with election officials to communicate clearly, and this is an official data, and get you the official results or the readout. the integrity of the official

election data, and the reporting website and official data. >> i yield back the balance of my time. >> mister krebs, i would like to discuss and document russian attacks on state election systems, documents that dhs refused before the committee, you're familiar with october 2017 letter to dhs requesting these documents to ranking member cummings, correct? >> you are familiar with the official question from the record requesting these documents by it subcommittee chair.

the joint subcommittee hearing and is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> in late january, they determined seeking a subpoena for these documents. ranking member cummings and five other house committee, wrote to speak to assistance obtaining these documents. and these four letters made part of the official record on today's hearing. >> without objection. >> back at the november hearing. if you will permit me to go back and i commit to you a more

fulsome answer for you. in 2018, dhs provided approximately 50 pages of documents, most of which were already publicly available. this did not include any classified documents, nor did it include documents about the precise nature of these attacks. the number of times these states were targeted or when they were targeted and this has been eight months. this is not a good answer to our request, just more documents that we did not ask for and do not have to have questions. why are you withholding from congress documents about how russia attacked our state? >> i don't believe i withholding any information. i need to go back and review the answer we provided. it is always my commitment to

approach this matter in a bipartisan manner or nonpartisan manner. i see this as a matter of american national security. i would like to look at the answers and range of briefings with my staff. we provided 30 or more classified and unclassified briefings. i participated in housewife classified briefing earlier this summer, late spring and provided information on what we are doing and what we saw. if you are not satisfied with the information we can look at what we provided. >> we are asking the department of homeland security, determine exactly what russians, how they attacked us. >> i think that information is in the intelligence assessment, the unclassified version provide significant detail. the catch is on the classified

side in terms of tactics and techniques used against our state networks it is not highly classified information. it is technical. recent indictments provide additional information. >> how about you initiating the interagency process to obtain clearance to give us these documents. can you do that? >> i will once again commit to you we will look at this and make sure you get what you need. >> we learn more about what happened in illinois from reading special counsel mueller's indictment of the 12 russian intelligence officers then we have received from you. we are just asking for cooperation and for you to actually share with us what you know. that is our function as mister lynch said. we have the oversight function

and we really need some cooperation. mister heard -- mister samsa enough for this information. >> you timed that perfectly. >> i yield back. >> the gentleman from alabama is recognized. >> thank you, mister chairman. maybe you asked this question. did russia determine the outcome of our election? >> based on cyber security hacking aspects we don't have any information that suggests we had access to vote tallying and any ability to technically change votes. >> one way to influence the outcome of the election is not necessarily the vote tally but registration.

is that accurate? >> it could be. if i understand your question, to influence votes by disrupting voter registration processes. >> or manipulating voter registration to register people not eligible to vote. >> coming at it from the angle of disrupting the registered voters we talked about the resilience of the system but in terms of adding additional people to the vote i am not sure what the question is. >> my point is there is more than one way to influence the outcome of the election. we saw this in 2008-2000 and with a group called acorn and their voter registration efforts in colorado, florida and other places where they were registering people. in indiana, 2100 voter registrations were invalidated because they were filled out by the same person, another 5000

set aside. a lady who was leading the 2010 effort in nevada. was under indictment. and a situation in colorado where they pressured colorado agencies to deal with people on public assistance and fraudulent registration rate was four times the national average. there are other ways to influence the election other than attempting to manipulate the vote total on election day. is that a fair assessment? >> i don't have experience on that side of the vote process. i would have to defer to the election process on the table. >> anyone want to respond to that? >> there will always be attempts

to metal in elections whether it is through a cyber security tax or influencing social media or trying to get people to register to vote. it as a local election official i have to focus on things i can control and things that are within my domain. we recognize there are all sorts of influence out there and we make sure the public's confidence in the election process and we do that by outreach to candidates, parties. >> you have a responsibility to protect our election process from all threats, foreign and domestic? >> absolutely. >> i want to enter into the record a report from capital research center on what happened with acorn as a reminder that when we talk about protecting our elections we are not just talking about foreign influence but also domestic influence and

it is critical that people have confidence that the vote count is accurate and reflects the will of the people and hasn't been manipulated. when we talk about that i hope every state is taking this seriously, not just making sure we are protected from foreign influence but domestic attempts by any group on any side of the aisle that would try to influence the outcome of the election. is that part of what we are doing? >> absolutely. i think the examples you gave with regard to acorn. we had situations when i was a county clerk in new mexico, questionable voter registrations referred to law enforcement is appropriate and those two that we have been talking about, not

only try to protect our systems but we can never have a 100% secure system so it is important to remember our systems are resilient, identifying, rejecting state registrations being able to identify fake registrations through an online portal as well, that is all part of what we are doing and it doesn't matter who is trying to interfere with our elections, foreign or domestic, that is what we are focused on. >> appreciate the response of the witnesses and each one of us are outraged the russians made an attempt but we should be equally outraged when anyone tries to deny the american public their hard-fought for and well defended right to elect for themselves the representatives they want. i yield back. >> the gentleman at unanimous

request is not objected to and the gentleman from massachusetts is recognized. >> i think the chairman and ranking member for his kind words. i think the witnesses for your willingness to be so truthful, blunt and honest in your assessment of the fact that russians of interfered with our elections and are likely to do so in the future. on this committee i am the ranking democrat on subcommittee, with my colleagues across the aisle we travel quite a bit, spend a fair amount of time in afghanistan, 20 troops to afghanistan, pakistan, iraq, nigeria, egypt and we look very closely at a rule of law issues, elections and all these countries, afghanistan, pakistan, egypt and others have had problems with their election and it has a corrosive effect on democracy in those countries, no

independent judiciary. they are decided and pronounced lack of respect for rule of law in those countries because it is not seen as endorsed or supported by the general public, sort of a top-down system with a lot of corruption. it is often times in a medical to the interests of minority rights and human rights in those countries so i just worry that if we allow our electoral process, if we allow doubt to creep into the minds of the american people that the elections are not legitimate then our leaders are not legitimate, our laws are not legitimate and there is a corrosive effect that happens and i'm concerned about that. we should be all over this with much more gusto than the

president has invited. i want to start with a couple simple questions. and christopher a testified before congress that he is not specifically directed by the president to address russian interference. i am curious. has the president elected you specifically to address russian interference? >> thank you for the question. >> it is yes or no. >> i was in a policy meeting where the president made it clear election security is a priority. >> russian interference. >> russian interference is a priority. >> that is a good start. the director of national intelligence said there was no

single agency in charge countering russian interference. is that still the case or do we have a single agency that has taken that over? >> given the range of authority and capabilities across the federal government this is a team effort, a whole government effort. and specific guidance on the issue? >> the guidance to secure the election, yes, sir. since john bolton came in his national security adviser, he fired rob joyce, the cybersecurity coordinator at nsc. he said we wanted to streamline things but a lot of people feel that he was one of the smartest people we had on cybersecurity. he didn't just fire him but

illuminated the position. we don't have an advisor on cybersecurity anymore at the white house. do you think that is helpful or should we use somebody? >> i don't mean to contradict you. mister joyce was on a detail from the nsa and returned on his detail so he was not fired. >> the position was eliminated. >> the cybersecurity position has been officially eliminated. there are cybersecurity directors and senior directors in the national security council. the important thing is operational responsibility resides in technical agencies. i have a very clear job and my work is to work with these folks with me at the table and provide them the resources and capabilities they need to secure the election. i have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose, we know what we are doing.

>> everybody feels that way? we are all on the same page and we are going to secure the elections, is that your assessment? >> my sworn duty. >> i have exhausted my time. i think the gentleman for his courtesy and yield back. >> the gentleman from north carolina, mister meadows. >> thank you. thank you for articulating how clearly you feel the mission is for you and your team. we have all kinds of narratives out there. will you reiterate for this committee and perhaps the american people, your primary responsibility is to make sure the election process is secure and every vote is counted, counteract really, not double counted, not interfered with. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> you had that articulated from the administration to you and you feel empowered? >> i had a clear guidance from

my secretary. i received guidance the white house. i'm empowered to do my job with clarity of mission, clarity purpose. i spent 50% of my day focused on the 2018 midterms and beyond. >> appreciate you reiterating that because i talked to the secretary and she articulated that clearly to me and it is good because sometimes it doesn't get transferred to those that actually do the work. you are saying you have a clear vision. to the people that work for you have a clear vision? >> i have 2-d for on answering that question. i would ask secretary toulouse oliver if she feels my folks that work with her are able to do their jobs. that would be the west way to get that answered. >> very well. go ahead. >> yes. i wanted to make a comment earlier as mister krebs was describing, the provisional

balloting process and other technical processes we undertake. i'm so proud dhs has learned elections from working closely with us. maybe not completely but i absolutely do believe that. >> thank you both. let me give you a to do. one of the concerns i have is the paper trail. we have a bipartisan bill that looks at a paper system but the problem on elections and part of the reason we are seeing this. we need from a security standpoint a level of this is most secure like when you put in a password, you know the longer your password the better it is but i'm talking about systems. i represent 16 counties and we have multiple ways to vote in my own congressional district so i have paper ballots and electronic ballots in another part. we have the typical bubble in

and scan in one county and all electronic and yet they are making individual purchases many times on voting systems so it is not necessarily handled at the secretary of state level. it would be very good to have a resource where they come and say if you are looking at upgrading your system here are the 5 things you need to do it this is most secure because i don't find that. do we have that? >> i will speak briefly and we will kick it over to commissioner hicks, we work for the government coordinating council. every state is different, some are top-down, it is bottom-up, every county is different in terms of resource population, quality of infrastructure. >> your preaching to the choir but the real problem is there is not a resource at this point at the federal level. with all due respect to the commissioner, this is the first time i ever heard of the us

election assistant commission. when we see that, when you google that it doesn't come up, you are not in the top 10 in terms of search. not just our witnesses today but there is a real criteria. >> we are doing our job because we don't wants to be known, we want to work with states to make sure they have the resources they need to assure process functions correctly. and do certify voting systems, voluntary basis, states come to us to certify manufacturers. we don't have a quorum of commissioners so we don't have the next iteration of voting

system guidelines since 2007. >> is there a federal guideline in terms of securing the system. >> there are guidelines on that. >> what are the recommendations you have. >> which we can't because we don't have a quorum. >> is insulated from michigan is recognized. february 16, 2018, article targeted inside, mentioning painstaking efforts, not only defining along party lines that along social economic and racial lines. and instagram account ran by the

internet resource agency. and misleading the people, we cannot resort to the lesser of two evils. days before the americans went to the pole, another instagram account controlled by the russians, black activists urged its followers to choose peace and vote for miss stein, to the clinton campaign. and the message read trust me, it is not a wasted vote.

and russian influence, to suppress the black vote. and a key aspect of on the 2016 election. was an attempt to suppress the turnout by african-american voters. >> without objection. our steam drinking member mister cummings made inaccurate statement, the indictments show how russians tried to suppress votes of minorities across the united states to help the current president. miss oliver and mister hatch, he

represents communities where there are minority votes and we have actual investigative data that shows many campaigns across the country are suppressing minority votes. what are you doing to ensure every vote counts? >> thank you for asking that question. the county seat is approximately one third hispanic population. we have a sizable minority population. my focus is on removing barriers for voters and ensure they have confidence that when they go to the polls or mail their ballot back in, that will be counted fairly and accurately in the results will be fair and accurate and i do those regardless of the nature of the voter, the location of the voter, and known for being more minorities, the focus is clearly

on establishing process full of integrity and by doing that, that allows those in the majority and minority to -- as far as election ministration concerns, we are colorblind and focus on you as a citizen and your right to vote. >> miss oliver? >> i would echo the statement and say as election officials we are also concerned about accurate information on the internet and social media and so we are always working to make sure the most accurate and up-to-date information is provided to the voters. ..

. the eac is holding a language summit for folks with access issues to the polls at the museum that is being webcast and there are 150 people learning more about that. >> i yield back. >> gentleman from texas recognized. >> i think the gentlewoman from

north carolina for her courtesy. my opinions on the russian role is pretty clear. i am concerned my friends on the other side of the aisle are applying dhs, congress is not taking the issue seriously. my question, how many meetings, briefings, hearings, phone calls, responses to memos and letters you had with congress? i don't need an exact amount. it was mentioned earlier there were only two hearings. how many engagements with congress have you had on this issue of securing our election? >> engagements? i wouldn't have the exact numbers but it is a daily occurrence in our agency but that is not our only function. >> several dozen? >> of letters from various members of congress? >> responses you had to get. do you have an aggregate number?

>> i have lost count. it would be a guess. i testified on this three times. >> does dhs have more money today to deal with support for election than they did in 2016? >> 26.2 million in the omnibus. >> secretary toulouse oliver, has your state received more money from the federal government to defend the election and they did in 2016? >> we have. >> who are you comfortable representing? >> 24 for the state. >> for both of you election officials. let me start with this. i remember prior to the 2016 election many secretaries of state were against the idea of establishing critical election systems as critical

infrastructure. there were a number of hearings prior to the election and after the election in the previous administration designated quickly and the ministration continued that. is their opposition from secretaries of state to have the election system be critical infrastructure? >> that is the case and i believe that stems from a genuine concern among secretaries? >> federalizing elections. states are responsible for elections. >> ultimately states responsible for defending the elections. >> we do conduct federal, state and local elections. it is necessary and critical. >> are these happening around the country where governors and state representatives are increasingly state funds to ensure election officials have resources and tools they need.

>> that is happening in the state of new mexico. to the extent our state service is receiving these funds it is required for the states to provide a match. each state is providing a 5% match. >> we have heard here today the federal government can do more and be safely doing more. >> states and the federal government. >> mister hatch, you stated 9% of election officials are members of the election infrastructure, information sharing and analysis centers. this seems to me to be concerning lilo. why are so few people actually engaging in the federal, state, tribal partnership responsible for sharing information on the integrity of our elections? >> thank you for asking that. it is low. the main reason why is it is new.

it has only been up and running a couple months. the rate at which counties are joining as well is alarmingly fast which is really hopeful and organizations like the international association of government officials, the eac. >> sorry to interrupt, time is limited but you encourage across the country to join the election infrastructure? >> one of my primary jobs. >> how do they do that? >> go to the website and contact any association. >> they can do that through the national association of secretary of state as well. christopher krebs, my last question is to you and secretary toulouse oliver as well. when it comes to defending infrastructure and vulnerability assessments, this is something they prepared for and doing a lot of work but my concern is

crisis of communications. who is responsible for the things that happened on the day that is used in a way to mislead potential voters. how is the coordination happening among election officials and secretaries of state and the federal government? >> that is something we dealt with on a case-by-case basis. through our work with the coordinating council, we developed the communications protocol and we are working to develop a comprehensive way that we collectively discuss in the public sphere things that may occur around election time. >> i yield back the time i do not have. >> gentleman yields back. the gentleman from illinois. >> appreciate that. secretary krebs, april 17th of

this year, dhs secretary nielsen had this to say about russian interference in the 2016 election, quote, two years ago the russian government launched a brazen multifaceted influenced campaign aimed at undermining public faith in the democratic process and our election specifically and you may have alluded to this before. i assume dhs stand by the secretary of state and? >> we stand by the secretary and the secretary stand by the assessment. >> you do the same, you stand with the secretary? >> on january 26, 2017, the office had this to say about russian attacks. ..

>> yes or. >> let's see here. fifteen, 25 minutes go present from just made the following tweet. hot off the tweet presses. quote, i'm concerned that russia will be fighting very hard to have an impact on the upcoming election. based on the fact that no president has been tougher in russia than me they will be pushing very hard to the democrats. the deftly don't want trump. obviously, as he saw from the dni report from 2017 the entire intelligence committee concluded that russia was trying to harm hillary clinton's campaign and

help donald trump's campaign. question is this, according to the president the russians don't want mr. trump, do you agree with this? >> , admitted habit to focus on my job and work with state and local governments and not interpret headlines or twitter. i do know the president has -- thank you. i know the president endorses the intelligence committee assessment is clear on that. as i said earlier. i have clear direction on what my job is to help state and local officials protect their election systems. secretary nielsen provided me the same guidance and i'm empowered to do so. >> i understand but here's my question, do you know if any evidence classified or unclassified suggests that the russians are trying to help the democrats? >> in terms of any intelligence

i have to go back and look. i'm not able to speak classified matters of the sport. >> your suggesting that there may be evidence. >> no, sir, i am not. >> you are not. you have any knowledge of any evidence that my backup what the president is just tweeting -- >> the evidence would be that this administration has launched a series of sanctions that involve expelled elements and take actions against the russian government. >> you have any evidence that they are pushing hard for the democrats, the russians? >> i do not have the access to information that upon the president on that. i'll have to get back to you. >> yes, i'd like you to get back to us. thank you. mr. chairman, this tweet and the substance of this tweet is total fiction. it defies reality and contradicts everything our own intelligence officials have concluded.

you must be aware of the fact that the russians are continuing to target our election infrastructure in the upcoming elections, correct? >> i believe that as he stated we certainly have not seen anything of the level 2016 by continuing to conduct information operations against american people in general. >> fbi director ray on july 18 said the judges committee assessment is unchanged in my view has unchanged which is that russia attempted to interfere with the last election and it continues to engage in malign influence operations to the state. you don't have basis for disagreement -- >> i agree one 100% with director ray. >> okay. mr. trump, the president was asked a question just as wednesday, is russia still targeting the us, mr. president? answer.

thank you, no. question, you don't believe that to be the case? answer, no. do you agree with the president that russia is not targeting the 2018 -- >> i believe there's disagreement on what happened in a change but i tell you now the russians continue to attack a target or democracy in general but are critical in the structure in particular. >> so you disagree? >> no sir, i'm not saying that spirit you just did. >> know sir i'm not -- >> judgment your back. gentle lady from north carolina is organized? thank you, mr. chairman. mr. krebs and all of our witnesses, thank you for being here. i'm a firm believer that before any problem can be addressed we need to find out where the responsible he likes. as we all know which of what the administration election is explicitly delegated to the state through the election clause of the constitution and

before we turn to what's being done at the state level to protect the integrity of the elections i believe it's to ensure that the findings of our on intelligence the no doubt that russia maliciously attempted to influence our elections and clearly we need to write the ship on the federal level to ensure that russia and other collectors cannot repeat that behavior. unfortunately the president's recent comments of the summit in helsinki failed to hold putin accountable for the attacks on our country interests and deter him from future indiscretions. i believe deterring for an adversary for meddling in election and disrupting the malign actions of a foreign adversary should be a federal

responsibility. can you assure us that the department of homeland security is doing everything in its power actively to safeguard our nation from the kind of meddling that we now know has occurred in the past, including the hacking of our campaigns by russian intelligence officers? >> yes, ma'am. it's a top priority. >> thinking. shifting to the topic of security clearances of state officials, is it necessary for every state to have an official with a security clearance? >> it's useful in the event we need to share information but we do have the ability to provide one date regions if there's a tactical piece of intelligence where i needed to share with someone in new mexico or utah and i could do that using local resources. >> thank you. what is dhs doing to declassify cyber threat indicators to allow

for more widespread and timely information sharing? >> we work closely with intelligence committee to defi define, not just what -- information of interest for this committee would be but also to get a better understanding of what the temperature looks like. that can go help and for collection at the that process we can identify additional intelligence and pushback to the declassified space. one thing i will note, ma'am, in 2016 with the department of home is a gritty knock on the doors of state secretaries and election officials and they said i never talk to you before, there's no trust here, but i've got a problem you need to know about. anyone by very nature would say i'm going to need a little bit more in response because was classified as i'm sorry i can't share that with you. two things that happened since then. we've established that level of trust. if someone in new mexico does not have a clearance and yet i work with secretary oliver and

say we have a problem is classified and i need you to do something, i think and my guess is that the level of acceptance has changed but at the same time we are more sophisticated in our information sharing and more sophisticated in our ability to declassify information and take action. it's all based on trust. we spent so much time building relationships, building trust with the state and local election officials that we are much more effective than we were a year ago. >> thank you, mr. krebs. i thank you made us feel a lot better about the situation. we appreciate the effort that you and your colleagues have put into it. miss oliver were you able to obtain a federal security clearance -- >> yes, ma'am. >> you were.

how many officials in your state have security clearance for election -related purposes? >> i have that clearance into a my key staff have that clearance as well. >> thank you. as mr. krebs has described change in behavior and trust level so has information sharing between dhs and your office improved from your perspective since you are granted security clearance? >> i believe that medication has been proved in general. i don't think it's a result of the clearance but i do think that contributes to our level of confidence that we will be able to get accurate and timely information. >> one more quick question. if i could, how much, do you have an idea of how much information disseminated from dhs and the federal government is considered classified or sensitive? >> in the election space specifically? >> either one of these. >> my sense is that frankly

there is not all that much and it would only be if there was a situational specific piece of information that needed to be conveyed. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> gentle lady wheels back and the judgment from maryland. >> thank you for calling the theory. article first to the chair of election system commission and i represent the eight congressional district in maryland, proudly. your offices happen to be in my district so i follow your work closely. in maryland we were notified a couple of weeks ago by the fbi that the private vendor that our state uses for purposes of election administration management database has close ties to a russian oligarch connected to vladimir putin this bizarre revelation perhaps a coincidence or perhaps not has raised profound questions about the potential for interference in elections by compromise

private election vendors. this is due to the extraordinary lack of regulation and how election vendors do their business. i wanted to ask you several questions to see how far this problem may go after this revelation about ties to a russian oligarch and has there been any way for you to determine what other states may be using the sender or other vendors who have ties to vladimir putin and his oligarchs back. >> that's an ongoing investigation. dac does not have the way with all to comment on that right now. i would defer to my colleague at you just to talk about more about that. >> i don't have too much time but let me ask you is there an ongoing investigation about whether there is a systematic plot by russia to exercise

influence over private election vendors? >> looking into the specific maryland case and thank you for your letter on that front. this is one of the stories of progress. the state board of election in maryland was notified that there was a connection they reached out to us and asked for help. you deploy that assistance. we are making progress. those relationships do not exi exist. >> forgive me for my urgency but we election in 107 days, maybe it's 108 and at this point it's around the corner. doesn't give me a lot of comfort to learn this progress being made. have you determined that there are any states whose election vendors have been optimized by connections to russian oligarchs or part of food? >> in the case of maryland ellis according to the information there's no ability to influence based on that venture capital

firm but are we conducting a broader assessment of the risk apartment. >> when you expect to have the results? >> i assume this investigation will be ongoing and frankly will never end as we develop more information. we will act on. >> forgive me, are there states who have election vendors today that are running elections in november who have ties to russian oligarchs or the putin government? >> at this point i don't have information to show that. >> anyone who does have that information? >> sir, i would have to defer because the federal bureau of investigation. >> anyone on the panel who knows how many states are currently contracted for using foreign-made parts or foreign-made software in their election day products? no one can tell us. okay.

>> this is a broader -- >> i got you. our vendors currently required by federal law to adhere to cyber security best practices and or to report to the eac in the event that there is some breach of cyber security? >> no. >> our vendors uniformly required to report any cyber threats to you? >> uniformly, no. >> as i thought. i thank you all for your answers but they demonstrate why i've introduced hr 6435b election vendor security act of 2018 which requires election vendors to be owned and controlled only by citizens or permanent residents of the united states to hear to cyber security best practices and report all known or suspected cyber security reaches or threats to state and federal authorities immediately. i would urge all my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in the effort to protect the integrity of our election process. this is something that needs to

be done right now. it's not something that can be put off till another day or postponed. we cannot be satisfied with big promises of ongoing progress and investigation. at the democratic emergency and goes right to the heart of the mechanics of government in our country. i yield back. >> the gentleman from wisconsin is organized. >> i have a long interest in election integrity when i was involved in state election in the state of wisconsin. i can only imagine what it would do if i was a foreign country trying to influence our countries will make sure the wrong person one. i'll ask you about areas of election if i were trying to influence our elections that i might take advantage of. first thing they finally passed a photo id law in wisconsin last year. we want to make sure the right

person is a voting. if i would fix election i might try to get people to pretend they were someone they were not. i know they have photo id in mexico. can you comment on, in your expense, how the states on the country have done what mexico does or wisconsin does and has voter id laws and if they don't, why wouldn't they do that? >> i would have to get back with you on the exact number but there are a number of state photo id and states that do not. there are different aspects to verifying the person who is casting a ballot but other ways the peoples are casting ballots. there are three states in her union that are entirely vote by mail that don't require you to send in your photo id but the help america vote act has in it a provision that if you register to vote by mail you have to submit some form of id and

whether it's a bill or electrical bill or something to -- >> it seems so basic and i always had a question politicians who wouldn't do that? the same politicians require photo id for getting life-saving drugs and a photo id for variety and when it comes to elections they say no. i feel it opens up our elections to fraud. d they have photo id in mexico? >> no, we don't. >> you must be familiar with mexican lot right across the border. until they have that in mexico? >> i'm not an expert in the law. unfortunately, i do not know but take your word for it. >> any reason we don't that simple thing to guard against the various influence in our elections? >> main reason is because we have a number of individuals

within our state who for one reason or another do not have certain types of photo id that might be required. for example, tribal people in new mexico don't have necessarily id or want to utilize the idea and we so want to provide the opportunity for them to participate in elections. >> okay. i'm under the impression and i might be wrong that the handle in mexico. next thing that concerns me and i feel that i want to make sure that if they want to fix election i want to have people not voting in person. when you vote in person, you see the guy go in there and no one else is whispering in my ear and you can do early voting are absentee and you never know if someone is filling out that form. over time maybe mr. krebs could no overtime have we had more

people voting in a place where we can see that there not been influenced and whispering in her ear or to have more people like early voting or voting by mail and who knows who's filling out the ballot and i would hope our goal would be overtime more and more people would be voting where we have a government official of a local clerk watching to make sure no one is following them in the booth and saying vote for this or that. it seems like a good thing. which way are we going in this country? to be have more people for the government official can watch or more people voting somewhere where who knows what's filling out the ballot?.

>> seven and half years. >> in the last 20 years gone up or down and we know that person is voting in the body both --

>> we do have vote centers in early as well as on election day and anyone who votes by mail must sign the envelope and we have the human eyes look at everything before we allow the vote to be cast. >> if i moved to utah you would know if the signature was mine and not someone else's? spirit yes, to register to vote we capture your signature. >> gentleman time is expired. gentleman from maryland is organized. >> thank you. mr. krebs, did you say and you mentioned something that intruder detection system had been put in and did i understand you to say that it was 21 states have the benefit of that? >> in 201,621 state election or about 21 state elections systems at the state level were behind in since the intrusion detection

center. >> were those states that flagged. >> yes, sir. we uploaded the indicators provided on other activity including in the midwest state and loaded up into the system and is managed by a group called the multistate so the indicator was located up in the system and took there were hits across prior traffic so in 21 states there is evidence that the detection system there been efforts to hack into. >> yes, sir. >> was the ideas in other states or just -- spirit not just of election systems but our sensors are deployed to receive estate. >> but in those 21 states it was on election system? >> for the most part, yes. >> so places where the ids was deployed on election systems there was the detection of efforts to get it. >> we talk traffic.

>> so in the places where the idea system was in place with respect to election systems they were able to detect traffic. >> i don't have information on whether it was all of the systems but out of the 21 states we did have. >> it sounds as though the system was not in place in 29 states but based on the experience of the 21 states where they all seemed to get this traffic one might reach the conclusion that if that idea system had been laid on top of the election systems in those other states based on one 100% occurrence in the 21 that you might have found evidence there, as well. >> my operating assumption is all 50 states. >> that's an interesting detail. i wanted to talk again about the process you have when you spot

through dhs or some other in cooperation with intelligence community, what have you, that there is an immediate present danger be imposed on election systems somewhere in the country and what you will do or what the process for reaching out in real time as soon as that threat is pick it up to the election administrator in the state to say look, we find this, red alert and here is what we are hearing et cetera. can you describe how that will work? >> is not much more sophisticated than what you laid out. we have a duty to warn the intelligence community or imminent threat. we would work with the touch committee identified information, it done by the target, reach out for information sharing protocol that we develop with the government cordoning council and notify the chief election

official in the state and the chief information officer so we will hit the big four or five in the state and say the threat is incoming we need to do it now and here to help you. >> okay. not just notification but okay, team effort here. what can we do to help you and so what kind of resources or response or swat team effort gets brought to bear with a local person says thank you and we will do and locking the doors and the shades but we need her help, what do you -- >> we're getting to is the move evolution beyond simply information sharing. it's managing risk and asking two questions. one, so what? what is the simplest meat into what we do about it? when i would theoretically or hypothetically contact mrs mrs. oliver and let me know what you need i have flyaway teams

located in dc, florida and elsewhere the country that i can deploy within an hour or couple hours notice with equipment on the ground supporting the secretaries. it's not just dhs. it's a broader effort. i need to engage in the national guard we can do that. we need to engage -- >> can i ask you to do me a favor because i'm running on time. what you're describing felt good and based on the experience with what happened with the 21 states last time and the way the alert was given but it seems like the federal folks in a sense walked away from the enterprise i did not have as much confidence about this so if this will be the kind of response you have going forward and i certainly urge that it would be nice for us to get some reporting back particularly for in the affected states. open up a dialogue with her has to be classified or not, that's your judgment but we need to know in real time that the alerts and the threats are being

taken fiercely and is not just saying you have a problem but saying here's what to do about it. i go back. >> gentleman is on time. judgment from virginia is organized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. krebs, a number of us have repeatedly asked your department for documents showing how russia attacked the election systems in 2016. those documents have been withheld since last october. eleven days ago we finally got information but not from you. it was from the indictment filed by the special counsel against 12 russian military intelligence officials. why did dhs withhold this information back when we were able to read about it when doj released it in the indictment statement? >> yes, sir. thank you.

i'd hate saying it's a nuanced answer because that's our aunt enemy right here but the distinction is that the fbi provided investigators to special counsel mueller's investigation. those investigators have focused on developing the case against russian operatives. their information is a result of the investigation stays within the case building the special counsel mueller has developed. that has not crossed over the firewall into the rest of the administration. there were details within that indictment that i had not seen before. that's not to say that if they found something about an imminent attack that they were not have shared. >> so, your department was kept out of the loop by the department of justice. >> by phone national agent

mueller's investigation. i information sufficient to work with the various secretaries of state and county officials to provide cyber scaredy expertise. >> according to that indictment in july 2016 [inaudible], russian intelligence officer and his co-conspirators quote, hacked the website of the state board of election and stole information related to half a million voters. including their names, addresses, partial social security numbers, dates of birth and drivers license numbers. we were aware of that fact before the indictment? >> i was aware that there was a state board of elections that was compromised and as i understand is in the state of illinois. we been working closely with illinois since 2016 on the incident.

>> so, presumably you could have answered our queries about documents going back to october at least with respect to the since you about it and you the state which is not identified in the indictment? spirit that is correct but illinois has come forward is that they believe they are a victim and they've also said that yes they were the state -- >> could you not have been responsive to our out to the document request with respect to this? >> i need to go back and look at information we provided. we provided classified and on classwide briefings to the congress that have included that information. >> that i'm being more specific. this is the committee of oversight in the united states congress and i remember and maybe you do too but all kinds

of times in the previous administration when even though there might've been tens of thousands of pages of documents provided it was often not adequate and threats of contempt and subpoenas were issued because the entirety of the document request had not been met for whatever reason. i seem to remember the former iris commissioner in that regard even though he had physical difficulty in producing the documents we wanted but that did not matter. in your case we got at the request of the outstanding request to go back to october. let me ask you this. are you prepared to promise at this hearing the will cooperate with document request going for it?

>> i have always promised to do so and will continue to. >> want to know more about the illinois state case and whether there are other states like th that. >> yes, sir. >> i don't my home state of virginia was probed by the -- final point, i can't resist having been local government, and appreciated the point you made in your opening statement about local governance. so much of congress is focused on statewide level and we forget the implementers are local government. you are making a point the most local governments are on their own in running elections. they don't i don't know whether new mexico provides its local governance with local assistance but virginia does not. we have to finance our machines and finance a lot of our elections.

you make big changes it's a big burden on local government and some are better able to observe the cost than others. i appreciate that point being made because i think it escapes a lot of us in congress and that's a very salient act as we look at reform or tightening up of protecting from cyber attac attacks. if the chairman will allow us to react if he wishes and then i'll reveal back. >> we want to put the local back in the state and local statement. the good news is states the locals are working together and i have great experience in the state of utah working with our state and other individuals such as secretary oliver and the efforts they been doing. it's not perfect were not there yet but we appreciate the state partners but yes, you are correct. in virtually every state that the local election and ministers who have the boots on the ground running the day-to-day

operations. >> gentleman from virginia yields back. i'll ask my questions last and was start by thanking all four of you for your expertise and comity with one another and with members of the committee. i want to start by addressing my colleagues concerned because i think they warrant the address. if i understood the concerns earlier in this hearing there were two parts. number one they want investigation into what russian did and prefer that that investigation the public. i'm sure some of my colleagues are aware of this but for those who are not in congress and who may be watching or reading i spent the better part of 2017 and a skiff interviewing more than 70 witnesses on what did to this country. i get that some of my colleagues want every single committee of congress to look into this

including the small business administration committee including natural resources. they want every committee of congress but the reality is, given the sensitive nature of this information that investigation is best handled in a confidential setting which is where the house intelligence committee meets and we met for the better part of 2017. it's where the tenant intelligence is currently meeting and they will issue a report and it's not lost on me and perhaps it will be lost on our four witnesses but there been a number of references this morning to the indictments that have been issued by the grand jury in the robert mueller probe. anyone sit through the grand jury proceedings? anyone got a problem with the fact that you didn't fit to the proceedings? anyone sat in on any of bob mueller's interviews? any of you have a problem with the fact that you have not sat

on bob mueller's interviews? everything can be done in public. we had the most productive classified briefings that i have ever been a part of last week. i really wish my fellow citizens that participated in it. i wish they could have heard what inspector general horwitz told both sides, not just this committee but judiciary because if you heard what he said he would not be this is a partisan issue. would you it as the united states of america was attacked. i hope at some point the light of day can be shown of all of what happened in 2016 but i caution my fellow citizens they do not have any issue with the fact that in every one of their local jurisdictions somewhere, some investigation is being done confidentially. whether it's a grand jury or deliberations by a pettit jury or deliberations by an appellate

court in their state they don't have a problem with the fact that certain things are done in common. when it comes do not tipping off our adversaries as to what we know and how we know it and what we are doing to guard against it in the future, if there's an argument for things to be done combatants that's the best argument for having said that, and secretary i do not know when he became secretary of state to let me start asking, in 2016 were you in your current position? >> no, sir but i was county clerk largest county in new mexico. >> it's not fair to ask me this question but to the extent you have information i want you to weigh in. i never understood why jay johnson was resized between 16, former teacher secretary, elections are predominantly state and local matters in the notion that he, as a federal

cabinet level official, was supposed to summarily decide to reject himself in the 26 elections, i don't think it's fair. there was a decision made in january 370 to declare our election infrastructure a critical infrastructure. can any of the four of you address why the decision was not made in the fall 2016 but made in january 2017? >> that predates my time at the department. i will add that way i look at election in particular is a national, critical function. it's essential to the petitioning of this government department of homeland security and will continue to support state and local governments. >> the reason i start off by saying -- i get that the other 364 days of the year we will quarrel about who should be elected and i would like this to be the one day that we quarrel about major the person who is elected actually serves so we

have not had hearings about what president