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for more information, go to our website, student cam.org. >> a hearing on arms control agreements with the pentagon officials testifying about negotiations over future treaties and the russian noncompliance with gas treaties. senator bob corker chairs the foreign relations committee. this is an hour and 45 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> i want to thank everybody for being here. i think because we need 11 people to vote, we will go ahead and give the opening statement as soon as they get to 11 folks will stop and vote. i want to thank everybody for their cooperation.

first i want to thank her witnesses for being here with us today. we are fortunate to have such a next year instead distinguished panel. other members know, this is the fourth in a series of hearings on russia since july with today's hearing considering the current status and prospects for arms control efforts. the current situation is not encouraging. out of four agreement, new start, the inf treaty, the open skies treaty and the chemical weapons convention, we have significant problems with russian compliance with three of them. it should come as no surprise to any of us that russia has in cheating on its treaties. vladimir putin's government has annexed crimea, occupy parts of russia, interfered with elections including the runtime use chemical weapons to poison individuals and reportedly hacked facilities. given our record company is not likely to let treaty commitments getting this way either.

the question we need to ask is what are we going to do? some argue we should walk away from the treaty since russia has been in blatant violation for several years now. some think that is exactly what putin hopes for. the last time we deployed intermediate-range missiles to west germany in 1983, a million people protested. that is exactly the kind of division that russian information operations are designed to ask late and too intent by. as we discussed at our meeting on nato, it is crucial that we remain unified with european partners on defense and deterrence issues. on the open skies treaty, we are at an impasse oppression. we haven't had a flight all year. we can live without that data, but it hurts the 32 other countries that do not have the same alternative resources that we do. even with new start, which has succeeded in its object is so

far, we should be realistic about iraq's dictations about where we will be with russia in 2021 when the treaty expires and extended. we need to be thinking carefully about the effects of new weapons and technology on strategic stability between the u.s., russia and other nations. putin has posted about vehicles, nuclear power ballistic missiles, nuclear torpedoes and russian advances in cyberwarfare cometh base and artificial intelligence. each of these developments introduces new uncertainties in to the deterrence calculation of adversaries and none of them is easy to address from an arms control verification and compliance is. as we developed our own resource and development into these areas come up a mess consider potential by any country with access to them. i hope her witnesses today can

not only provide an assessment of the status of current agreement, but also offer us some assurance to state and defense departments are considering these emergency arms control challenges. i also hope we can gain a better understanding of any arms control discussions took place at the helsinki summit and what the prospects may be for future control arms control agreements. but that i wanted thank you again for being here. i still don't think we have 11 solo turn for distinguished ranking member, senator menendez. thank you, mr. chairman. for convening today's hearing is part of a russian federation. arms control efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and nuclear forces are vital for maintaining and strengthening u.s. national security. despite a number more than two months after president comes helsinki meetings with president putin, we remain largely in the dark as to what the two leaders

discussed or agreed to during the two are close section. russian ambassador to the united states that important verbal agreements were reached at the helsinki summit on arms control issues including preservation of the new start and inf treaty. we continue to find ourselves an incredible situation. the american people, the elected officials in this body and members of the president's own administration and hear more from russian officials about alleged agreement that the president is making about national security issues. what constitutes an important verbal agreement what constitutes an important verbal agreement as they reach key decisions with russian key arms control treaties. if so, why hasn't congress been informed about this decision? along with many others i have drawn support of policies to compare russia for its multiple

and ongoing transgressions including military aggression, malign influence and repressive policies. i believe we must develop comprehensive strategy to confront our adversaries that ultimately prioritize safety and security of the united states in the defense. this requires being cleared by about the threats we face in tools or after terry kimura against us. concerning proliferation nuclear weapons may be a core component of our strategy. given russia's current nuclear capacity we must collectively use every diplomatic tool in our arsenal of economic article military to achieve our goals. the stakes could not be higher. but historically negotiated and entered into agreements of adversaries and dealing with hostile powers that cannot be trusted. metrics to deceive and dodge and high-stakes agreement provision outlining compliance are essential.

agreements with russia we conduct on-site inspections of military bases and facilities and required data exchanges in order to track status and make make up of their nuclear forces. we know russia is violating the intermediate range nuclear forces really. if we have evidence that country is violating international commitments, we must be unequivocal in working through the construction of the agreement to bring them back into compliance. we must never lose sight of project is with the arms control agreement. to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and constrain our adversaries ability to threaten us and our allies. in assessing the value of an agreement we must consider whether participation further advances our goals. bill ultimately passed without a seat at the table without inciting to adversaries stockpile. the senate ratification of the

treaty until liberated in 2010, my colleague including our chairman made it clear they were willing to vote for the treaty but only as part of a deal to modernize their nuclear forces and infrastructure. neither an unconstrained nuclear arms race their blind faith in arms control agreement serve u.s. national security interests. american securities has served with a strong credible deterrent that operates up in a legally binding, stable and constrain arms-control environment. i hope the trump administration fully appreciate this language. diminishing the value of arms-control and placing conceptions of nuclear strength to bring the russians and the chinese will result in a far more dangerous strategic environment. i want to remind the administration bipartisan support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an arms control process that controls and seeks to reduce russian nuclear forces

which inevitably means promoting military and fiscally responsive policies on ourselves. we're not interested in writing blank checks for a race with russia we don't want to step up our current path is ability to wander down an uncertain road filled with potentially dire consequences. the final note i would make, mr. chairman, is that i hope as part of our oversight, which i applaud you for having conducted with the syrians, we will also get to an opportunity to mark up a desk in a similar related bill. it is important for the congress to speak about russia's violations of the international order, certainly undermining of our election and since we have very often in this committee taken up sanctions as part of our overall foreign policy tool, which is one of the critical tools of peaceful diplomacy, i would urge you to make sure we also keep jurisdictional

opportunities as it relates to data and we can have a markup but then they hopefully united message that we will not tolerate their actions both at home and abroad. what i look forward to the witnesses. >> thank you for that statement. everyone here understands depending on how you write a bill and what key phrases he used to make determines which committee it goes to and we are not giving jurisdiction on anything but they have to understand if they want foreign relations they have to write it in a certain way. i know you did on your bill and if they build up in this committee so i thank you for referring to that. i thank everyone for their cooperation in being here. what i would like to do is recess arguing and move to a very quick business meeting if we could continue not call. it doesn't mean much to them is here to confirm these nominees. it means a whole lot of them in nature medicine onto the

countries that they are going to do. the business meeting of the foreign relations committee will come to order on the agenda today are nine nominees. would you like to make any comments? >> i'll introduce my remarks to the record. i support all the nominees. >> anyone else? see no comments, i have a letter to hold over the nomination of mr. san francisco pommier, ambassador to honduras. he did just by the way, his written answers to just come in, but apparently another one of our members here was not able to read those yes we will consider them next time. we will now consider all the other items on the agenda including the following. ms. linda blanchard to be ambassador to slovenia. the honorable earl robert miller to be ambassador to bangladesh. mr. daniel rosenblum to be

ambassador to uzbekistan. mr. tip tom to the u.s. representative to the united nations agencies for food and agriculture. ms. karen williams to be ambassador to the republic observed on. the honorable donald camacho to be ambassador to somalia. mr. kevin sullivan to be ambassador to nicaragua. mr. mark rosen to be the u.s. direct executor of the international monetary fund. is there a motion to favorably report these nominations and block the voiceover? >> second. >> some of his second, the questions to report favorably denominations are all in favor will say i appeared opposed. with that, the eyes have it in the nominations are agreed to. i complete the business. staff be authorized to make technical and conforming language. without -- without without objection the business enable it

to and we will begin again to hearing and i thank you all for being here. you've completed your opening statement i think. let me move to another part. our first witness today is the honorable andrea thompson under secretary of state for arms control to international security. we had a chance to speak in the back great thank you so much for being here and share your expertise with us. i'm now old david trachtenberg undersecretary of defense for policy should the same idea. if you could summarize in about five minutes any written materials you have with the objection will be entered into the record. we thank you again and if you could just begin in new york are introduced and appreciated. >> at morning, chairman corker, ranking member menendez and

established members of the committee. thank you for hosting this hearing to discuss arms control with russia. a topic central to our security and indeed the world. the 2018 nuclear posture review states progress on arms control is not an end in and of itself and depends on the security environment in participation of willing partners, end quote. the value of any arms control agreement is to arrive from treaty partners maintaining compliance with obligations and avoiding actions that resulted in this trust and potential for miscalculation. russia continues to violate a series of arms-control obligations that undermined the trust united states complacent treaties including some that have served u.s. and allied security interests for years. as reflected in the administration's national security strategy and adequate in our defense strategy, great power competition is reemerging. we can no longer be complacent in the face of challenges by geostrategic competitors. we need to be creative and flexible in how we approach a

manager strategic competitions with russia and that includes evaluation of where we stand with respect to arms control agreement been in a relationship with our deterrent and defense requirements. i'll begin with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. in february this year both countries confirm compliance with icbms acyl vm and heavy bombers and associated warheads. we are committed to implementing the treaty and make sure russia stays in compliance. this committee is thought the administration's view of extending the treaty. meanwhile, russia has persisted in its violation of the inf treaty through russia's cruise missile programs. this administration has utilized new diplomatic, economic and military measures to pressure russia to return to compliance. the lack of any meaningful steps by russia to do so diminishes our hope that it wants to preserve the inf treaty professor said many said many times the status quo is

unsustainable and our patience is not unlimited. on chemical weapons, russia has bought every effort to compel the regime to stop using chemical weapons. russia is a perpetrator of chemical weapons use with the brazen assassination attempt salisbury u.k. using a chemical agent. we then post the first round of sanctions on russia required by the chemical and biological weapons control and warfare elimination act. we have been clear that we will continue to execute our mandate under this law. meanwhile he did the united states and allies has reinforced the declaration remains committed to conserving, strengthening and modernizing the euro atlantic conventional arms control regimes and confidence and security mechanisms. department of state continues to lead the effort to push back against russia's troubling behavior in base. of particular concern, russia has launched satellite to conduct sophisticated committees

at least some of which are intended to advance counter space capabilities. finally, i would note that our sanctions policy is an important tool in maintaining pressure on moscow to abandon the line activities. the global campaign to implement section 231 of the countering adversaries has denied russia's defense several billion dollars in lost sales if they abandon with moscow. the full implementation of section 231. in all, russia is destabilizing actions include transgressions in adherence to obligations they might arms control treaties and agreements. this has created the deficit that leaves the states to question his commitment to arms-control as a way to manage and stabilize strategic relationships and promote greater transparency and predictability. russia must take its commitments

more seriously to find ways to shift their relationship to a more stable path. thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues and i look forward to your questions. thank you. >> chairman corker, ranking member menendez and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify in the current data farms control with russia. i will not repeat much of what undersecretary thompson has discussed. bottom line is arms control with russia is troubled because the russian federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suited. as a result the credibility of all international agreements with russia is at risk. the united states is committed to long-held arms-control non-proliferation and nuclear security object is particularly our commitment to the goals of the treaty on non-proliferation of weapons. arms control can contribute to u.s. security by helping to manage strategic competition amongst days and we are

committed to meaningful arms-control decreases the chances of misperception, miscalculation and conflict. the nuclear posture review acknowledges the progress and arms-control is not an end in and of itself or the current security environment mix arms control extremely challenging in the near term. any future arms control must be pursued and the broader security environment and must include willing partners. it is difficult to envision progress that the noncompliance of existing arms-control obligations and commitments. in this regard russia poses a series of challenges that do not lend themselves to condition suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage the pruden arms-control agenda. it would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold russia was optimal for its violations as a reliable ally and partner, united atheist

advocate for arms control agreement that make the world more secure and include the willing participation in compliance with all parties with respect, rushes in compliance with the news s.t.a.r.t. treaty and that the limits in february this year and i can assure you the united states will faithfully implement and verify russian compliance with the treaty. moving forward the united states will consider whether to extend beyond its february 2021 exploration. any decision on extending the treaty will and should be based on a realistic exception of whether the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty remains in our interest in light of overall russian arms-control behavior. on imf, the russian federation remains in violation of its obligation under the treaty. we've been more than patient and provided russia with ample opportunities to come back into compliance but to no avail.

this administration's determination of russia's violation is no different than the one first announced in july july 2014. we've reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors had the evidence is conclusive the violation is real and it goes against the core purpose of restrictions of the inf treaty. this administration has sought to preserve the viability by applying pressure on russia to return to compliance with its obligations. we believe is in the national security interest of the united states and in our allies and partners interest to preserve the treaty but we recognize russia ultimately would determine whether the treaty remains viable. one thing is certainly cannot allow our treaty partner to continue to violate a core tenant of the treaty indefinitely and will not let our actions were in actions occurred the expense of our security or that of our allies and partners. the last year year the department of defense has reviewed and evaluated systems they could develop if there were

not constrained by the treaty. the identification of these capabilities seeks to remind russia that wyatt entered into the treaty in the first place. we appreciate the efforts of congress to help the department of defense implement these research and development effort. regardless of whether russia returns to compliance has broader implications for the future of arms-control due to the lack of trust created by russia. it's difficult to envision a way forward for the united states and russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a level of trans currency that could lead to a brighter future for arms control to create the conditions for this trust falls on both the united states and russia, but moscow will bear the burden should these efforts fail as russia's actions created the situation we currently find ourselves in. mr. chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify the intention of this committee to these issues and we will keep you informed of developments.

thank you again and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you both for your opening comments and your service. if the normal trantor ranking member with all of our time projections. >> i just wanted to comment. the question of how we -- was not for jurisdictional purposes. it was written in a way to be comprehensive enough to deal with all of russia's maligning committees. i don't want you to think it was just a strategic purpose. let me just ask both of you on the topic of arms-control comic initial thought was discussed during the two-hour closed meeting with president trump input? >> thank you, senator. i can't see the specifics of what was discussed. arms control is a topic of conversation. we've since had dialogue with their russian counterpart last month in august and met with his

counterpart. foreign minister laff ruffin pompeo had multiple discussions and i've had discussions as well. arms control remains in dialogue. >> is the russian ambassador said verbal agreements, did they get entered into and if so what are they? >> are not aware of any agreements. >> so what was discussed in the notice by virtue of what? >> it was discussed bake on based on feedback and the state department. >> senior representatives, can you define that for me? >> discussions of those in attendance with ambassador huntsman. >> let me ask is there anything different? >> no, senator. i'm unaware of any agreements reached. >> to put congress as a director that links our modernization program of maintaining the arms-control process? >> i agree both are indeed important.

>> do you believe congress has basically been set forth? tonight i agree that was part of the discussion in the ratification debate over the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> the limitations on russian forces, what would be the implications for u.s. national security and that of our allies? >> i'm sorry, senator. >> if new s.t.a.r.t. disappears and limitations lots, what would be the implications for u.s. national security and that of our allies? >> from the department of defense perspective come i can tell you that it's one of the issues we are currently considering both within the agency and with our allies and partners as well. >> you can give this committee at this point in time any sense of the consequences? >> i would say, senator, the issue of new s.t.a.r.t. which runs until 2021 which we are very much engaged in intensive

consultations. you are exactly correct. >> would require much larger and more for us? >> i cannot say that at this time. >> wait a minute. this worries me. the department of defense is the one that always plans ahead. don't wait for a situation to happen and then figure out what you're going to do. you must be thinking as a contingency that is new start lapses and there is no follow-on, clearly to say, what do we do then? you don't believe it would require a larger marks of the nuclear force? >> senator, the implications of whether new s.t.a.r.t. continues her lapses of bill under discussion. the department of defense plans for all kinds of contingent fees and considers. >> i find it incredible you can't tell the committee at this point in time at the

possibilities would mean. i don't think it takes a rocket scientist to figure that out. let me ask you, mr. trachtenberg. congressional testimony, senior military officials such as air force general john heiden, commander responsible for all nuclear forces and vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff voiced enthusiastic support for the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. on the go through a series of questions and you could give me a simple yes or no. communities dates me all of our current deterrence requirements with a forest at or slightly below the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, yes or no? in that we are currently meeting obligations, senator. >> pardon me? >> we are currently meeting obligations. >> so the answer is yes we can meet requirement that the forest at or slightly below the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> senator, we've met our limits. >> the reason we have witnesses here is to give us answers to the questions we pose.

that's not the question i pose to you. we try another one. does the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty forced the united states to cut back any of our current nuclear modernization effort, yes or no? >> i would say no. >> thank you. does the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty the manner missile defenses? tonight i defer to the department of defense. >> no, senator does not. >> the arms control treaties in understanding predictability with russia thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation? >> transparency and verification to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty or benefit. >> okay. let me try one more time. france has expired. do you believe that it meets the standard permits the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty meets the

standard put forward in our nuclear posture review? >> senator i believe it gives the requirements we have today. >> thank you here's >> i want to use the first minute of my time to say that having written the two amendments myself with those missile defense and modernization that there was a connection in the resolution of ratification we made sure that while we were going to reduce the amount of warhead and our ability to deliver them, we also wanted to modernize because it was a huge saving in not keeping this massive inventory spread throughout our country and not knowing whether they actually operate in huge savings in going ahead and modernize them said that to work hand-in-hand and we pass this amendment on the floor and gave other people's names on them trying to draw them on the treaty in some cases successful in some cases not. there is no doubt a tie between

the two and it's been very important. it has been very important the essence of this is the modernization piece in the reduction in warheads piece go hand-in-hand. i think that is self-evident that has been central to the entire agreement without, senator paul. >> thank you for your testimony. mr. thompson, you mentioned ongoing discussions with the russians was that your level, level of the national security council and director as well as secretary of state. do we also have some sort of permanent organization, do they set up a structure with ongoing where they can express their contention the other side is in violation of the treaty. is there an actual body of people who meet regularly? >> there are, senator. but the inf treaty during my time here we've had one expert meeting during the course of the

administration. the bcc tickets together on new s.t.a.r.t. each treaty is within our governmental representatives. >> or the separate sort of agencies or entities do they have one for dispute in new s.t.a.r.t. has one different? >> for the state department representatives come under my purview in different bureaus of their experts reside in the state department also with partners, with d.o.e., department of defense as well. >> you met once in the last year? >> in another meeting coming up to schedule or what? >> regular in the sense that some treaties are annually. some are biannually and some in conjunction with other conferences. we have another line of communication. >> we believe them to be in violation. they complain they some are in violation as well.

do you think this can be worked out to discussion that we are at a point where there could be a resolution of these things that both sides might have to give a little bit on this for duly acknowledged that there is no way were in violation of anything. >> we have enough progress thus far. an interagency process to get through this with the options available. >> it seems to mean a lot of this is detailed whether something is technically an violation or not that it seems like openness to have a discussion, ongoing discussion is important. both important. but did acknowledge the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty we are in compliance with and yet both of you are very concerned could even go forward in violation of so many other treaties. my only concern is that the iran agreement, run cad standards compliant, but we were still unhappy about other things iran was doing in there some

similarities here that many of us think the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty was an advantage in broad sound nuclear weapons and they were good things that came. my concern is we could be throwing all about out and saying they are violating the inf for this and all these other treaties and we don't like all the stuff they're doing which is true. i hope that people will think about trying to get the best we can negotiate from a position of strength but i'm concerned we would say simply just start over. it's not always that easy. the iran agreement will be difficult to start from the very beginning instead of starting with what are we complying on their differences, let's start with poker complying on if it's working, maybe we look at the inf and that is the only caution i would have and also just to say at least in office were interested in what goes on with these and would like you to come

talk to us about how the meetings are going and what the differences are the possibilities. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator cardin. thank you, mr. chairman. let me thank her witnesses. mr. thompson, the understatement in your written statement about russia taking action over the past few years that opposed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and white and a deficit of trust we have with russia, i think all of us would say that is a major concern. >> and i look at her relationship with russia on the nuclear front and we recognize new start is that the opportunities for inspections not only on mac sites, but the state that are not active. we get to see with our own people what's going on in russia, which is extremely

valuable. we have the fact that rush is in compliance. we are in compliance with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. we know in inf that russia is in violation when they develop the land-based missiles and you are using the enforcement mechanisms and diplomacy, which i strongly agree in not withdrawing, which i think would be a disaster because it would only isolate us more from what russia is doing and we've taken countermeasures very defense system in regards to what russia is doing on land. we are taking our steps in compliance with the inf in order to make sure we are secure. my point is in response to senator menendez questioned, i was surprised i didn't hear a stronger eight minutes to national security importance of both the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty

and imf. we know north korea has a nuclear program. but we don't know is the specifics. we don't have eyes on the ground. we don't know exactly what's going on in that country. and yes we have international inspections now other band, but not with the united states participation. we are somewhat limited understanding what's going on in iran. police in russia we have the capacity to understand the program because of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. so i just really want -- and we know the administration has a way of surprising mass at times was defense made by the president. that's one of the reasons we have this hearing. i would like to get both of your views as to the national security importance to the united states in these tough times with russia to be a litigator in fact there's working with theirs, understanding the nuclear program. the importance of that to the united states plan with national

security. >> senator cardin, if i could, as i stated i do believe that the verification and monitoring provisions provided several of openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial not just to the nines dates, but your allies as well. that said, what i find particularly troubling is the overall nature of russian arms control behavior and what the russians seemed to be doing in terms of selectively complying with various provisions of treaties and non-complying with others who may feel it not in their interest. it is that overall kind of behavior that i think the national security to we at least need to consider. >> i don't disagree with that at all. i agree with what you're saying. sometimes we do knee-jerk reaction from this administration and if we give up our ability to be able to have

our inspectors in russia because of a violation that imf leads to the end of the new s.t.a.r.t. it's not in our interest to do that. i was hoping to get a little bit broader response from u.s. to the importance of our current relationship with russia on nuclear as it relates to the transparency you referred to which is clearly in our interest in making counter violations violations without going under the agreement. the party tonight. modernization programs we can still do that. we can do our missile defense when i'm in violation. we can stay in compliance with the treaties without pulling out. yes, were not satisfied where russia is today. we have mechanisms to counter that through direct enforcement mechanisms within the agreement as well as iran's nuclear program and their run defense

programs in order to counter what russia is doing. it's not a fair statement? >> you exactly correct we do have mechanisms indeed i believe we are taking a deliberate approach to our assessment of all of these treaties including the neo-s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i don't see this as a rush to judgment on the part of the administration's economists. it is perfectly legitimate and appropriate for us to weigh all of the potential, look at all the potential implications. >> i agree with you. we have a specific responsibility as an independent branch of government in this unformed policy and i think that people need to understand how important these treaties are touring national security. i respect that you're going through a deliberative process. i really do. but we have seen this administration do things that

have not been under a deliberative process. decisions made by our president. and it is important that we have a publicly established record as to the importance of these treaties as it relates to america's national security and in which you would be a little bolder as to the importance of us maintaining those types of relationships. >> thank you. senator isakson. >> i want to follow up on what mr. cardin said mr. menendez. i think this is an important point for me. when i came to the senate and the foreign relations committee, the first legislation of any import was the treaty and i got very involved in it because they think the responsibility put on me of everything we do without is the most important we could do. verification, limitation of arms with us in russia and so i got really into the weeds. probably too deep to comprehend that i did it anyway. i finally voted for it and they

did so because it was clearly evident there was no other agreement we were into with any other adversary our ally in the world that better verification, that are mandated access for the united states of america and better access for them than us. am i right on that? >> i would agree with that, senator. >> i want to carry that forward. the mess we did with iran here, but it did not have any verification that we couldn't verify military bases and things of that nature. it had gaping holes which is why he voted against it or wanted to vote against it because it didn't add anything to our country's security was whatever. in comparison to russia s.t.a.r.t. treaty. my point is that i understand secretary you don't want to give away negotiating systems with russian. when you answer his question are my question about the s.t.a.r.t. treaty come you don't want to say anything that would see the point you might have to

negotiate negotiations. but i agree with that to be a little bit more pro-continuing the benefit to s.t.a.r.t. treaty gives us rather than the idea there might be someone we get out of there. knowledge is an access is tremendous. russians invented aids have access to com in fact our sites in russia. the unique hologram system so we can count the war has been what they can do. we can catch them and then catch us. if we insisted with iranians we have a treaty on nuclear weapons with russia. the two largest nuclear powers in the world. we want to put those verification center agreement with you, i ran. we want to come in and inspect yours. it was a perfect predicate to do that. secretary kerry d