i'm pleased to introduce carmine to politics and prose. an attorney in private practice and cofounder of apron and hair she attended harvard university, columbia university and cornell law school and has worked at citigroup. when she took a job at the federal reserve bank of new york, she believed she would be monitoring the bank's behavior in order to avoid another financial crisis. instead, she encountered a federal reserve holding banks accountable and began secretly recording her meetings, recordings which became the basis of the this american life episode. noncompliance she chronicles her

experience exposing the relationship in the big banks and the government body set up to regulate them. william: the author o of money and powerhouse goldman sachs came to rule the world right noncompliance whistleblower carmen detonates a metaphorical explosive device inside of the previously impenetrable façade of the powerful federal reserve bank of new york in a gripping and highly personal narrative she reveals the depths of the shameful regularity, regular recapture that exists between the new york fed and wall street banks it is meant to supervise the high price she paid for doing the right thing. please join me in welcoming carmine. [applause] i am going to rearrange this a little bit because this isn't going to work for me. it's too high. [laughter] can i take it up or do you have

a -- [inaudible] >> like this wer or like this, h way is better? we need this one. >> do you have a little stool i can stand on? i have one at home i used to climb everywhere. [laughter] they build kitchens today for really tall people so i'm grabbing the plates to prepare dinner. it's like a workout. while we are getting the store, let me take the opportunity to thank each and every one of you for being here today. i know dc is a very busy place with a lot of options, and there are a lot of important issues and events that demand your

attention so i'm glad you took the time to be here today. [laughter] this is perfect. now we are going to try which one is better. [laughter] now i feel really tall. and i'm not 6-foot seven but if i were i'm thinking like all my god the room looks different from here. i don't like it. [laughter] it throws me off. i would rather be down there. let me grab my notes. i did write some things but i feel comfortable speaking a little more extemporaneously and

i also want to leave plenty of time for questions before we start. i do have a tendency to speak very fast so if i'm getting a little bit too fast, just go like this and then i will slow down. again it's normal because i get really nervous for these types of things because again, i didn't ask to be in this position and i never thought i would be in this position at all. so, it is quite a surprise for me to be here in a sense. and as part of the lovely introduction, thank you so much. indeed i joined the federal reserve about three years after the financial crisis. i spent most of my career before joining the reserves working outside of the federal reserve in the private sector and there are all of these like when you work at a bank it's really important because you know, you want to portray the image of stability and security and trust

to the people that use the bank but in reality i am here to tell you i was a legal made so instead of claiming this for $10 an hour my job was to clean messes for a lot more than that. i think it was great preparation and when i walked into the federal reserve and the interviews i had before had made it clear that there was a mass that needed to be cleaned so i went in sort of expecting okay i'm going to see the mass. there were days attending meetings where you had goldman sachs executives very comfortably misrepresenting their way through meetings

without any fear of repercussions and also in the di was attending meetings with my colleagues i watched as my colleagues who have been there for a very long time were trying to suppress evidence in a systematic way and expunge it from the record and this is seriousseries yes, this is evide that could be used by other regulators and by my colleagues and even by the federal reserve to hold goldman sachs accountable which is their job i didn't have to try very hard i just had to sit there and watch and take notes. fixing the problem of course was the issue. how do you go about this and how likely is it that people be effective in fixing it and it became pretty clear to me within a couple of months that this was

a mess beyond my ability to fix and beyond the ability of my colleagues that have joined us all from outside of the regulatory world. i think it was also beyond our ability to fix. within a couple of months i had seen who was in charge of the supervision and how they set up the parallels being of regulators that were sort of side-by-side supervising the banks but there were other day banks. first we were not sure these were just supervision jobs.

that sort of snowballed into a couple of other things and it's like okay i thought they were leaving and then they are not so you watch your colleagues tried to stop or pushback against bolton but in very basic ways. we are not talking about difficult things to understand we are talking about very basic things that you don't need to be an economist or loyal to understand then you see these other regulators systematically stopping any kind of accountability from happening and then the moment came and it happened more than once i was

asked to delete evidence. that in and of itself for somebody that has been to korea cleaning up messes isn't surprising. i went to law school and then you have to learn how to deal with it. i've done this before. and i know how to say no because i've done this before. but it became very clear and i go through it in the book that it was coming from above and then i started to get legal advice and i had been practicing for ten years and have professionals that i respect and

i don't know if they respect me but at least they humor me once in a while and i start to ask them for advice like what should i do. this isn't normal. first without exception it was recommended you need to start preserving the evidence and recording. it was just the concern on their faces and their ramifications of what i was telling them that made me think this is something i should really do. the moment came and then i decided and i go through it in the book i decided that it was time to preserve the evidence. they made a very compelling case

to me and i agreed if nothing else it will help me do my job better and i did it go thing every day that things would change and that i would be able to find ways to work with people and turn things around. there was still hope in terms of trying to turn things around. this was three years after the crisis, occupy wall street was protesting around the world. whether you agree or disagree with occupy wall street, they very much had a point. i think it was clear and enough articles that have made it out that the fed was asleep at the wheel and things needed to change, so there was a real pressure to deliver. so as the months progressed it became clear this just was not going to happen, and i walk through that process in the book how it became very clear.

once again i was asked to suppress, take your pick, expunged from the record and it was from that point i was fired. i think at that point i had to make a decision what do you do. i think from a personal standpoint the way i see it i go through all these educations not only because i could but because it meant a lot to me and because i think it's sort of sen sent a signal i'm going to be a hard worker, which i yam and so i always thought i will just get another job. what kept me thinking and going back to this i started to share my story with my colleagues and my allies and my friends and they were absolutely horrified. i can't tell you how many people

came up to me and heard a story like you need to blow the whistle, you need to do this. this is important for the country not just for you. we as a society believe that the fed is above this. we have entrusted us with supervision for a reason and man to the story that you are telling us very compelling and it shows the opposite. so there's a long period of reflection. it's upsetting to my personal life. i am thinking in parallel this is happening at the same time my boyfriend and i got engaged and here i am sure i plan a wedding or speak to them the question is how to do both at the same time which is what i'm in the middle of giving, i planned the wedding and took a break to get married.

they were very hopeful and i call them the allies in the group, basically a big group of people who were just incredibly helpful and supportive and some of the media were kind enough to listen to my story and understand its importance and so i worked with them to file the case and bring the story to life again, hoping things would change and then of course nothing changed so after the congressional hearing you have too read boo the book and go bak and look at the testimony it will be in eye opening experience after you read the book i will just leave it at

that. you have janet yellin working to continue to advocate for less transparency and they want to promote a member of the regulators that were working with c. and involved in suppressing evidence. what is less well known is that that is a problem and so i does it that it was important to tell the full story because i think i have a lot of requests from every network you can name industry newspaper industry reporter you can imagine they all wanted to talk to me and

work on stories together but i very quickly realized to explain and show the depth and scope of this corruption that has just rot away inside of the federal reserve you needed to see that sort of format to tell the story and he detailed that would create a compelling case more than any words i could say and it doesn't matter in a 50,000-foot level intellectual sort of discourse or i could bring it down to the lowest level it doesn't matter you just need to see it so what i do in the book as i try to take you through the churning in my eyes and what it feels like to sit there and listen to these people and see the things they say and the way they say them. i hope that it will begin a

conversation in terms of what are we going to do to fix this problem and obviously i think however that first step we have to take is to understand the mess that we are in and take it seriously. i don't think we have that much time left before the next financial crisis to fix the problem and it's better to fix these types of leaky roofs when the sun is still shining because when the hurricane of the next financial crisis comes up is going to be really tough. this is a problem that impacts us all. this is not a democratic or republican problem this is an american problem that has worldwide consequences.

if we have to keep doing bailout after bailout because people were not doing their job and more importantly taking good hard working taxpayer dollars and deliberately not doing their jobs and to me that is just not acceptable and it shouldn't be too anybody that uses a u.s. dollar to pay for their bills or anybody that depends on the u.s. dollar to pay for their bills. i think i will leave it at that for now. i know it's not a very long to talk but i want to open up to questions and answers. [applause] don't be shy. i don't bite.

thanks for your presentation. as your body or to make a [inaudible] "the new york times" february 11 this year when wall street writes its own rules the most important sentence the loopholes for the investor class remain untouched and one of the conservative advisors says i don't know what happened. i am kind of a cynic. the more things change the more things remain the same. i'm not really helpful at all. this audience didn't have to worry that the average person to get on the bus every day they are not going to make it. if you don't see any profound change.

>> that is a very wonderful question. i do think everybody in the room has to worry. the way that i see it and i know i look young, i'm older than i look. the way i see it one day i'm going to be 83-years-old and i don't want to be sitting in my apartment afraid to go outside because people outside our starving and hungry and have no hope for the future. i want to be that lady that walks her way to the park and sits there and watch as 11-year-olds and ten year olds make fun of her because she can't ride a hover board. that's what is going to happen unless we start taking supervision seriously and until we start making sure we restore america's confidence in the system. i think we are tired and i agree with you we are tired of these

catchable slaps on the wrist. i think the average american knows the slaps on the wrists don't work and the average american knows that as you pointed out in the article, special interests have led to wall street writing its own rules. having said that, i think what i found particularly troublesome is not a preference for the absence of the loopholes but it's the lack of endorsement of the roles that there are. this is an enforcement issue and these are basic things they are talking about. that is a good question which is one of the things people have been asking me in other contexts where do you think about potential solutions, and one of the things i point to is the federal reserve supervision powers. we have other regulatory agencies. we have the fdic, consumer financial protection bureau,

state regulators. i think we need to look at tangible options that are not a slap on the wrist. the other option i swear that would like to see put on the table is consolidating all of these supervisory bodies into one and really separating the supervision of the rules from monetary policy. i think the fed can continue doing monetary policy. i don't think they have the time or appetite or talent to do any of the work my book the, and i think that should be left to professionals and peopltheprofen other agencies that actually do it and are trained to do it. and i would have to agree with you that we need to re- staff those agencies as well. i think the book focuses on goldman and the book because it is a personal story and i'm hoping it will connect with people. but that doesn't mean that it is

an isolated problem. it's not. one person can't fix this. it's a cultural systemic problem. it's going to take us starving in our daily lives to stop rewarding bad behavior and start rewarding good behavior. everybody can do this in their daily life. a lot of you have children and grandchildren. it's a cultural thing when we start rewarding good behavior and promote good behavior and don't reward bad behavior, we start turning the clock. that's why i say it's going to take ten to 15 years i don't have any faith or confidence of the current generation of people working there are going to be able to learn new tricks. i think that this is a going forward but there is plenty we can all do in our daily lives to begin to start turning back the clock on that. >> i'm local, here my entire life so my mentality is here but

i wonder if you think there is a cultural mentality difference between new york and here that maybe tolerates some of this behavior and do you think that ben bernanke is a big part are not necessarily? >> those are good questions. to be honest, i've been to dc before but not enough to know enough about the cultural differences. i can tell you there is a very big difference in terms of people who work in the private sector and what i encountered working at the regulatory sector because people that work at the private sector when you are working for a particular bank as a team and you want your bank to win and be trusted and have more customers because more customers needs more money which means everybody in the bank is better off. so i think people from the industry were shocked to see how

it was for goldman and how unfair it was altogether banks and the systemic risk of having a bank that can go about its business without having to comply in the american rule of law and what kind of systemic risk does that create so i can tell you about the difference in those cultures but i can't tell you about dc. so sh he was the head of the federal reserve and also what do i think, wow, you know. >> thank you very much. i confess i haven't read your book. >> i haven't read it either. [laughter] >> can you be a little more concrete and give examples of the systemic corruption, can you

give concrete examples because i think at least i speak for myself i don't know the material enough to know what you are referring to. that's one question. the other part o what is the system of incentives and motivation that allows this what you call systematic corruption to exist, how is that possible? >> those are excellent questions. i will try to answer the first one. one of the drawbacks of being a voyeur and having a well documented book is they have to be very careful in how i talk about what's in the book because you don't want to end up in a situation where you are saying something different than what is in their like i'm not going to go into great detail about

anecdotes but i will point to a couple things. for example there was a meeting where we were discussing serious issues goldman sachs was having with respect to money launderi laundering. you see one of these regulators in fact this person went on to become promoted a few months later. to sweep this under the table and to have to do something about stopping the war in regulators from making goldman sachs can play with money laundering rules. we are not talking about the complicated concept, we are talking something simple that you were supposed to have your client's data on the file, this person applies, they want to open an account with you you are supposeyou'resupposed to get th, last name, how much money they have. this is basic stuff so you have

a regulator asking can you give me the files. monday i went to turn them over and then when they turned them over there is a lot of stuff that isn't there. this is not a complicated thing. it also raisethat also raises os imagine your money in the bank that doesn't keep track of who knows what. the angle of the exam is for money laundering. it's very upsetting to have a regulator told you it's not a big deal they didn't gather the basic data. this is not an opinion. this day that this is the kind of stuff nobody outside of the industry talks about because it is so basic so that is an example. and it was for real. i was sitting there listening to

this person with another colleague who was interrupting this person saying they have the same filing in japan and switzerland, looking at this regulator because this person sitting next to me was like it was ruining her party, running her purveyed. so that is an example. it walks you through a lot of those examples. you don't need to be a lawyer or an economist, it is appalling seriously. the second question in terms of incentives and motivators that is an excellent question because i didn't really understand why they did it. i will put it this way if you want to be a millionaire you will become a lawyer.

it's very comparable to what i was making before. it wasn't that much of a difference if you want to sort of measure it by the hour i was making more as a regulator than i was in the financial and receptor because i had to work 15 hours a day. so that right there what motivatemotivate somebody to deliberately not do their job i don't know, i'm not that kind of person i wouldn't be able to go home and sleep at night taking pride deliberately getting paid not to do my job i think it is a matter of speculation but i can tell you the book tries to not directly answer that question that gives you but gives you a y that would be. one of the things i remember is a sense of fear just people lived in fear and you sort of

see how they are afraid of their supervisors and the book sort of walks you through the scene where there's a regulator that got fired from another regulatory agency because goldman sachs pushed for it. some of them are afraid to lose their jobs. there are people that have circumstances. for them there are other life circumstances they find themselves afraid to lose their job and what that's going to mean in their daily lives. there is no one answer.

>> thank you for everything you've said so far. you said in the very beginning you refer to paul volcker but retired from the special agency and the united nations which thanks to paul volcker now has certain oversight mechanisms in place. you are aware of the inquiry that he led. i would be interested to follow up on the question i wa that wat asked if he would say something about what kind of mechanisms for oversight etc. you have to deal with. you talked about whistleblowing but that is a very broad general statement. what's in place already that doesn't work? >> that is a really good

question. when i arrived at the fed they were just beginning to revamp those mechanisms. but you get fired before you can trigger those mechanisms, so from a technical standpoint i can tell you i informed my supervisor this is happening do we need to discuss, and then i was fired, so i triggered a mechanisthemechanism but i wasno completely because my supervisor turned around and fired me before i could predate the record. another one of the things i talked about in the book is exactly what happens when you are trying to follow the whistleblower lawsuit how you manage with respect to that

mechanism so one of the decisions made was you're going to call and say we have all this evidence did you want to do something about it and they didn't want it back they didn't want to do anything about it. they could have taken it back and then you wouldn't know the story. but they chose not to take it back. >> a slight parallel question briefly to a solution bringing together other bodies such as the consumer financial protection bureau which is very weak as it is right now. but you need stronger mechanisms for whatever you put in place? >> this is an enforcement issue. the mechanisms are there. the statutes of limitations. some of the statutes that are currently in place and can be used to hold the federal

reserve, federal reserve employees, goldman sachs and employees accountable the statutes of limitations have not run out. these types of crimes they are there. they can use to enforce them, the trial lawyers could arguably choose to enforce as well. the question is what is the appetite for enforcement and the problem is you have the american people waiting for something to be done, tired of watching haphazard slap on the wrist and wondering what are we doing when our government is failing us in every branch. one of the things i talk about in the book is what happens when the judge that gets a signed to your case used to work with the lawyer representing the federal reserve and is married to a lawyer that represents goldman sachs. this is what happens, she

discusses conflicts with respect to her husband and 24 to 48 hours later something like that dismisses the case. that's what happens. >> three quick comments and any question. i don't know where to begin. >> take your time. i know what it's like to be nervous. >> i'm not nervous it's just i have so many questions. [laughter] somebody once said we get the government that we deserve. so unless we get involve involvd vote with intention and ask the right questions, -- there was a time people used to go to jail for white collar crime in the scandals years ago. to the best of my knowledge not very many people went to jail during this time, but really

remember so many peoples lives. >> host: nobody that mattered went to jail. >> guest: the justice department even under the obama administration, i voted for him and believed in him they didn't take that long so to me that is a political problem. my question now is is there anybody out there running on this issue that you think could give leadership to at least focus attention and create popular support for meaningful change? so i'm asking for presidential candidates. >> okay. that's a very tricky question to answer because to be honest one of the things that happens when you are writing a book you disconnect from the rest of the world. you have to. i wrote every word in the book. it didn't just happen by magic. i really had to tap into skills

i haven't used since college and i had to write and rewrite and they ended up writing 600 pages. to be honest with us and to give a runaround to the questio run n it's just i legitimately in terms of the book wasn't finished until a short time ago and because i have a job so i need to work for a living got to finish the job and then jump into legal projects that sort of swallowed up the rest of my time so i am not caught up in terms of that. i can tell you this, i think that as citizens we do need to start educating ourselves. i hope this book will hope people i wrote it to be very simple. i think the missing factor in the conversation is the american people. i think american consumers are still the most powerful

consumers in the world. i'm not saying that the politicapoliticaloptions are noy are but i think we also need to be realistic. we can't sit around and wait. we have to start doing things and i think that putting pressure to strict supervision of ways to start putting pressure to hold goldman sachs accountable is a start and i think also looking realistically at how you educate your family on how you protect your family in terms of knowing how the system is working and not working. the problem we face right now it's become such a polarized environment that feels like there's no room for the issues that matter to everyone and this is an issue that should and does

matter to everyone and i think that regardless of what's going on here in dc, people get this, they get this is a problem. the solution is people are going to start implementing once they lose hope in the government's ability to fix this and it's going to be potentially detrimental to the u.s. and detrimental to the dollar. i think we are getting to that point people will realize we need to put politics aside and work together to fix it. >> congratulations on the book. you've done a great public service.

three quick questions and correct me if i'm wrong but a lot of people think the federal reserve bank of new york is a federal entity. >> it is a private think like citibank and goldman. >> it would be helpful if you could explain that quickly because it is a private entity. most people don't know that. the only federal reserve but as public as the one in the mall. every other federal reserve are all private entities. consequentially, i'm wondering if after this financial mess some updated ethical imperatives or violins have been adopted because i heard, i don't know if it is true but it's a revolving door and people are intertwined. at least in the federal

government we have sufficient safeguards that are pretty good and we have rules and all this stuff so i'm wondering in the federal reserve bank private entity what is the status and number two, when we adopted a te too big to fail concept, has that changed perspective for the operational procedures inside the bank? i think those two questions by themselves are pretty complicated so i will dismiss the question. >> s. the federal reserve is a private bank. they are not public entities and that's why i started by saying we need to put pressure on the supervision because the charter

exists until congress decides it no longer does. the mechanisms are there to strip the supervision power the way. it's easy, it's doable and i think we should do it. to phrase it differently i work in private banks all my life before joining the fed. every one of those banks of course had issues but the level of competency and commitment to setting up the programs that work into the understanding that it's important for customers and for the system that they work most pressing on all of these banks. it was completely absent of the federal reserve. please don't leave this room thinking that there is any shred of hope these people are getting, they just don't and i think the book makes that very clear. in terms of updated ethical

standards, whether they happen or not i will tell you this anecdote because i think it sort of serves to make the point a few months or it could have been a year before bill buckley re-signed there was a story that was published in which she hadn't disclosed he had a conflict with respect to a family member working at another bank that he hadn't disclosed and i go back to my point it's like a slap on the wrist. it's not a question of there not being ethical rules. these things are common sense. i will tell you this, there are thousands of things in the u.s. into compliance and legal officers. there is no need to have a

revolving door. if you are going to go down that path, you can make this a sort of creative power tracks at once you are a regulator you're always a regulator and that it. i can see problems to that as well because again if you don't have a culture and appreciation for the rule of law and the importance of upholding the rule of law to give credibility to the banking system, then you will end up where you are right now. so, i think that the problem isn't more or less i think it is deeper than that it is a kind of enforcement problem and a cultural problem and it needs to be a commitment by people to say stop rewarding bad behavior in our daily lives and thoughts will trickle into the community not rewarding bad behavior and other states not rewarding bad behavior and then employees at

the federal level not rewarding bad behavior. we need to begin to swing the pendulum. i don't think more or less rules are going to make a difference. >> i have just one question and comment i guess. i've read that the financial crisis in 2009 was triggered by all these mortgages that were given to people that couldn't possibly pay them off and then they were resold to the public at large and so on. does the new york fed have any regulatory power over that kind of thing? because of course timothy geithner was head of the new york fed and then became the secretary of the treasury after

the crisis. during the crisis and other goldman sachs president was the secretary of treasury. so it seems to me it's just kind of built into the system. when you talk about regulating the banks all of a sudden people say we never saw it coming. it seems to me any regulator would have seen that coming so i wonder if you can comment. connectors so many things i could say. regulators were not working. that's the bottom line. i don't see how they could say they didn't see that coming. i think the short answer to the question is if they have the ability or the power to stop these things from happening. yes, they do. they have an enormous amount of power. and of the things i talk about

in my interview is that i was afraid coming in after the financial crisis and let's put ourselves back there. when i joined and did the interview, i didn't think i was landing at omaha beach on the first wave. i thought that part was done. i thought i was coming in and the third wave. it's going to be safe to land. it's been three years. but no. this was the first wave and they quickly shut this down. it was the opposite, it was a supervision by us, not by them. they have the power and they choose not to exercise it deliberately and that is just not acceptable if not to me and

it shouldn't be to any american. >> it's going to take a political figure could change the landscape. with so many of the politicians on both of the parties and at all levels taking money from goldman sachs and all these other companies, where does that leave us and i also wonder if you can comment on these back channel efforts to change the international currency. it seems to be picking up speed, and that seems to be a problem for this country. where is this going to leave us and what did you think of that? >> i think the problem is coming and i get what you're saying about the jesus christ thing and i talk about that in the book. we need to be our own jesus

christ. we need to think that we matter because we do. the american consumer is the most powerful consumer in the world. you can call your bank and say i'm going to take my money out unless you stop doing business with goldman sachs. you can say why haven't you gotten my money back from them. as consumers we have enormous power. we choose where we put our money which is how we hold our money and where we hold our money and who we spend it on and that is my point we don't need to wait for a jesus christ to save us we need to save ourselves because it is in the collective action of each of us saving ourselves that we are going to save the country we can't sit back and wait it isn't going to happen. >> how do you make everyone mindful of the need to do that and how many people will actually --

>> to your second question, and that's my concern in a sense you have this sense of desperation that's out there and i know that this book is going to the reaction is going to be i knew i was right and that can lead to places that are not healthy and i hope not. that's not the point why i wrote the book. i wrote the book because i want it fixed. i want to be that 83-year-old that walks to the park, not the 83-year-old that's afraid to go out of her front apartment. but i think we just need to be mindful of the fact that as a country, we are very powerful consumers that the world is watching what you're doing and what we are not doing and they are free to make decisions with respect to what they do with their money and how they hold

it. i think in an uncertain world it's important that we make sure the u.s. dollar is a reflection of the country and the banking system is a reflection of the country and we need to start putting pressure so that it reflects the actual majority of people because the majority in the country go to work everyday, they are hard-working people, they want their money serving the bank and that is why they want this to work. i think the fact that special interests don't doesn't change the fact that we as the people are way more powerful than them. >> has president obama [inaudible] >> i don't know because like i said before in the book i stopped reading everything also provides it just doesn't get done. it's possible. to answer the question as a

lawyer, which i am, i think there's two things that are really damaging to the country and obviously at some point we have to figure out how to fix it. one area is the press in the sense that there were walls that were overturned at the end of the 80s that required the press to present both sides and to service act in the public interest and not as a private moneymaking entity. that has been harmful and we are seeing what that means today. the other thing that has been harmful is the special interest. and again that's not surprising. >> has it become a special interest that is so corporatized these days. >> special interests don't work if we don't let them. i'm not saying we should change the law, we showed that again i'm not the kind of person that wants to sit here and wait. it's like we can put pressure

and we showed because we shouldn't lose hope, but we also have to be realistic. i think if we choose not to run come i,if we choose to exerciser power as consumers, we can notify the effect of special-interest. all the special interest in the world but if we decide we are not going to let our money be touched by them, they are gone. it's really that simple. >> i have three questions. can you comment on dodd frank come is it good, not good? number two, the banks are subject to credit examinations now, and from what i understand they all get a healthy bill of health by that like a comment on that and last, you could argue you had bear stearns and lehman

brothers and you could have allowed a cleansing process and that is the biggest penalty then you would start fresh. what do you think of that as a solution? >> to answer the three questions and i hope i remember them. dodd frank or frank dodd as i prefer to call it, give u givese power to the fed which is why i am standing here to strip the power away from the federal reserve. this is what my book shows you they are choosing not to do their job and we are paying a lot of taxpayers money for them. second question, credit exam which is another way of asking for change in the ensuing years.