very human discussions with that fdamental human activity then i'm happy. [applause] >> and thank you to the tea thank you for your work to help us to bring this to a larger audience. >> the professor of national affairs school of foreign service in the government department of georgetown university and senior fellow

at the council formulations and to serve in the obama administration as assistant to national security council. he also served during the clinton administration visiting scholar including harvard and columbia and the international institute for strategic studies in london and numerous articles on national strategic affairs and the author of nine previous books. including how enemies become friends. >> walter russell mead at the hudson institute the global economist at the wall street journal professor of foreign affairs with the council of foreign relations and offers

numerous books and widely recognized special providence and how it changed the world. i hope we have the chance for work entitled the united states is real and the fate of jewish people. and that to shield itself is the subject of the discussion tonight. please welcome walter russell mead. >> thank you for that introduction it is terrific to be here with charles i think i've known so many years now. quite a while. can certainly remember in the clinton administration doing pbs together on bosnia. so that's like 30 years ago and you have written ten books that fills me with envy. i know how you do it so quickly and they are good.

so this book, number ten on isolationism, what led you to the subject? >> it's a deep dive into history what is the relevance for what we're looking at today? and thinks to seattle for organizing this and by a discussing three revelations while i was working on the book and those of foreign policy and what came before pearl harbor.

and with containment what happened after 9/11 but i can tell you very little about american policy in the early decade and it was eye-opening. in fact my head exploded when i started to read that because but there is so little resemblance to the america that i known and have grown up in. and then to send the military forces and most of our history. that second revelation the reason we were isolationist

and to extend the strategic reach was america exceptionalism to propagate the notion that foreign ambition would come at the expense of liberty and prosperity at home. instead we should perfect the american experiment in those also revelation to me that has been the opposite. and narrative that says america has to go out and run the world. that is a post-world war ii phenomenon in the final revelation that comes directly to your question about relevance for today is that i started this book well before trump was elected but when he came into office on his first

day after swearing-in to say america first and going back to the pre- pearl harbor narrative and the unilateralism of the protectionism that we see in trumps approach to the world is right out of american history that definitely shaped my own thinking tapping into a more populous jacksonian tradition and it is still powerful today. >> it's hard for the isolationist one of the

interesting things of the cold war era and beyond is there is a moralization and to say maybe we should make a exception then you say you are the peas are and what we outsourcing to china so that a lot of foreign policy arguments that came down because it was assumed it was a singular truth the right way to do form policy and everything else was wrong. going back to compare that older tradition with the cold war and post-cold war, did you find that holding up the merit

was in the tradition or is it all bad it is coming back? >> we tend to have two different modes of strategy in this country that from 1789 through 1941 isolationism and to make it clear what i'm saying the extension a strategic commitment outside the motherland. they are very engaged commercially from the number one and culturally. to send the military abroad to defend our commercial interest and citizen but what we don't do is follow in the footsteps of great european powers or to

take over the territorial possession into the affairs of other countries that's what we should not do with washington in the farewell address said everyone political connection that basically lasted up through 1941 and the only game in town. then after 41, internationalism was the only game in town and if you said why are we in afghanistan or iraq? everyone said isolationist. bad. dark. one of the things i want to do is to win the national debate so we can talk about the pros and cons of a more isolationist strategy and

american internationalism and hopefully find a middle ground where we were in the 1930s or doing too much for think we have been amid the forever wars. and yes looking back at the united states prior to world war ii with the aversion to geopolitical attachment made great sense because it focused on western expansion and investment in the united states not in battleships and colonies. then isolationism went way too far leaving the united states to run for cover was serious unavoidable threats so when

does strategic detachment make sense when does it not make sense and what does it tell us today with america moving forward? >> we will move the conversation into the present tense as we go along but it's important to look at the historical case charles is working with. so something that anybody can recite the name of is the monroe doctrine as part of the american grand strategy.

so how did you come to think of the monroe doctrine and its place? >> and the monroe doctrine i will tell a very quick story from 1793 because i think it will convey just how tenacious to go way back to the beginning to george washington and the british were getting the best of us and the founders and in through those powers said we need the alliance with the french otherwise we will lose and what happened? we had the alliance in the french came over and they helped us to win the revolutionary war. then britain and france go to

war again so what does george washington do? he issues a proclamation of neutrality and to despite the alliance good night and good luck you are on your own. that is the last alliance the united states has until after world war ii. that is tenacious coming to the monroe doctrine issues of deprivation this is after many spanish colonies had turned into republicans one - - and to the republic and the americans were afraid the spanish might come back and in

the conventional wisdom this is a great declaration of american hegemony there was nothing of the sort in the united states did not lift a finger to defend the hegemony in the western hemisphere and a couple of years later in 1826 when the american delegation was invited to panama just for a conference about the future of republican government in latin america and the president who at that time was john quincy adams to send a delegation, congress went berserk and that we have no business interfering in the affairs of latin america in any way.

that is not us or our business a strong racist reaction. but it was so late that one of those died before they got there in the other arrive so late that congress was over. so much for the monroe doctrine. >> washington when he broke the treaty with france these they are breaking the treaty? and he would not tell a lie to his dad about the cherry tree how does he break in alliance with france? >> a hugely controversial issue that you can imagine. there are different camps in the united states at this time in the jeffersonian's that

dominated in the southern part of the country where pro- french the hamiltonian's dominated and then north for pro-british. so when washington said were not coming and will remain neutral the jeffersonian's went crazy. washington was very smart and strategic and then to know that alliance in under the current circumstances we don't think it is in the american national interest to involve ourselves in a war between britain and france. and then to have the constitutional authority and

in some respects of 1796 was the effort to thread the needle and said we don't want those entangling alliances. but let's not do this again. so although defunct not until 18 oh one that they were pulled down by the french and to create a new treaty. and with that empire and then why do we just go back to the isolationist after world war ii? >> we start off and then to

finish westward expansion. that the united states saw itself as the chosen nation. and a lot of people died and native americans were pushed out of the way are put onto reservations, we grabbed a big chunk of land from mexico, we tried unsuccessfully to take over canada on multiple occasions. so it's not like the united states was sweet and my throughout the 19th century but it did adhere to the founding fathers admonition to go no further than the pacific coast to tend to our own

garden and don't look for trouble abroad or we go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. but then at the end of the 19th century with a world-class economic power focusing on domestic development. with frederick jackson turner so as americans began to worry the dynamism of the democracy or prosperity could began to wane with industrialization and taking and so a new narrative emerged, that if this exceptional experiment will continue, we need a new frontier. where is that now that we made it to the pacific coast? it is overseas. that is the narrative president mckinley, teddy roosevelt, the admiral used to

justify the spanish-american war to basically say to take manifest destiny on the road because we completed the mission here at home. and those to keep the spanish out of cuba we also took over cuba, took over puerto rico and samoa and to say wait a minute we took manifest destiny abroad to spread democracy and suddenly we are colonial occupiers both for the will sony and correctio correction.

>> so what is wilson's reaction against this policy to take shape in your view? >> part of what happens is the sharp backlash with real imperialism americans are not imperialist it's not in the constitution there are interesting debates in the early 1900 about what we do with these territories and puerto rico and samoa because they were not on the path to favor not occupied by white people and the qualifications for integration into the union. so they really did struggle to figure out the status.

and should puerto rico becoming a state. so to go through this movement away from empire. and the democratic candidate for president and is the idealist / isolationist who pull out the commitments with a strong interventionist in the western hemisphere. as a country to spread democracy around the world and basically disavows and in 1817 after the germans began to sink american vessels.

on the basis of pure idealism and to ask for war declaration to save the world for democracy and those that are dying in the trenches and we could encumbrance a sentence we will convince american people that is a referendum of american internationalism and republican candidate warren harding basically said make my day. i stand for the policies of george washington i am against foreign entanglement running

against his own handpicked buffoon. what happened? he wins one of the most lopsided elections in american history and that clears the way for this isolationism of the twenties and thirties. >> those that were the most isolationist at least in the twenties they had the idea the federal reserve should work with the bank of england those with the financial flows in postwar europe so it was an adequate and hyper optimistic to keep the economies of the world going with name for disarmament.

>> every now and then i ask myself one of the wonderful 1929 treaty president outlawed war and just in the nick of time can you imagine what history would have been like it for was not outlined in the late 19 twentie twenties? the murder and mayhem taking place. they were not complete idiots because for one thing the idea the self-determination the wonderful humanitarian and to be lots of little countries and to have a quarrel is not

between the big empire to drag the american. and those that get to the united states and to push naval disarmament very far so they have a sense we prevented the worst and got rid the naval disarmament to keep the economy going. in the twenties this internationalism like no institutions and building or form or one - - formal alliance alliances, but in the thirties when the depression hits and roosevelt says we cannot. so he torpedoes the london

conference and so up until the fall of france in 1940 when people really began to worry and the administration we were just out of it for those ten years. does that sound right? >> yes. in the twenties the us practiced what i call isolationist internationalism that the us was internationalist because it is involved commercially and continued to conduct diplomacy through wall street when wall street was in europe and east asia basically to run the world and the other thing that occurred in the 19 twenties a new multilateralism that

interestingly this is all in action as long as they were commitments to do nothing not to build the navy or outlaw war you never get the senate to ratify something that committed the united states to force us into world war ii and then the turning point that's in the us not only detaches itself politically but also commercially and roosevelt says i will be focused like a laser on the domestic front and then to shepherd through the congress one neutrality act after another cutting the united states off from the outside world to avoid the prospect of being drawn into

war. and this is another revelation. and a great leader but until pearl harbor he was part of the isolationist extreme and to change course and 39 to provide assistance to the british and others over the victims of nazi is a minute fascism and then to alicia 1941 but it wasn't for the war but to prevent the risk of going to war by letting others defend themselves and preventing the nazis to be strong enough to come to the western hemisphere. that he had no choice because japan brought the world to the us. >> and that was sounds internationalist to people but

really to supply them with all the weapons that they need so we can sit here safely. and that british gold was the way he hoped to win the war and even when they did get in that there were two goals one was to destroy the british empire the other was not see germany.

but nonetheless she had to fight the america first committee because again but that rigid hemispheric isolation because that we started with the british we would end up at war. and the public opinion in 1941 and 80 percent of the american public was against world war ii to give you a sense of how strong the sentiment was. >> you can understand it. do you really want to stick your hand? do you want your kid to die on an island in the pacific you don't even know the name of? i heard of it but i haven't thought about it until we did my work on us israel relations

but i did not realize after the end of world war ii they immediately reverted so to dismantle 90 percent of the army. one of the reasons roosevelt made this many concessions as he did was stolen is he believed there was no way to keep americans for more than a year after the end of the war. it's not until stall and began to loom much larger that that starts to take shape. with that internationalism would not last and then to

revert with default position and there was a demobilization and there was bipartisan support for what we call liberal nationalism and with very little objections but you are right over the fifties the isolationist reappeared and dug in their heels. and then to be more quiet than when the cold war heats up and you get the korean war the decision to deploy three divisions to europe in the early 19 fifties, people start to get worried and those that

say wait a minute this is going too far and in 525354 there were various amendments i tried to curtail the ability of the united states and then to take those actions to the cold war. >> it your refresh button. >> can you hear me? can you hear me? >> actually walter lost the connection. >> he froze for a while. i cannot see him.

>> i think the russians have stopped messing with communications. we have been interested in the way that looking at the document of that. and the un charter itself they incorporated the reservation and with the league of nations without saying anything about i it, they quietly turned it from wilson's lead to lodges in the weaknesses in the un today they can trace them to that. but if you look at the nato tree it is fascinating historically the nature of the

alliance of countries a and to be our allies and country see her bigger than country be then country a is legally obliged to go to country be's defense. but under nato treaty and then to consult the constitutional profit because the senate's with a treaty that took the power to declare war out of the hands of the senate but also and then talking about with the reservation and those

in the senate the republican opponents and led by mr. vandenberg came if you are willing to revise the treaty to water it down so they can tell us what to do, then wilson said no. that be a moral compromise and that's exactly what happened. he went down in flames. and roosevelt, you are right learned from those mistakes. and he made sure the document that emerged to put the un forward was one that could pass the senate and to make sure there are republicans and

then very conscious of the need to keep the bipartisan aspect of foreign policy going. in the way that was drafted there was no automaticity going back to the long strain of isolationism and in many respects more than isolationism and we see it today. big time in the republican party and president trump so that no commitment that we make a broad can impair our sovereignty of our congress and executive branch to make their own decisions. >> in the column i have coming out in the journal tonight and tomorrow i talk about the modern republican party post trump is what you have are two factions. i think isolationist are

twenties to favor business engagement. but then the unilateral hawks to assert power but don't mind having associated allies but don't want to see america compromised so now you have these two wings between them which is the bulk of the republican party. >> that's reminiscent of the twenties because at that point the block that is the year reconcilable the nationalist and the internationalist wing of the republican party but a unilateralist. today we see more or less the same thing and the democratic

party meanwhile has gone in the direction of the earlier democratic party. >> it's a little more complicated because as a progressive but irreconcilable. i would think today somebody like bernie sanders where these other figures on the democratic left, are much more cautious and really do want to a much more restrained form policy. and by the way if you think of the vote in 2016 and 2020 to combine the sanders vote and the trump vote, you get a majority for those candidates

at the center of the international orthodoxy from what we grew up. history is rhyming if not repeating that a strange alliance between the progressives on the left and the libertarian weighing on the right calling for a different kind of foreign policy and in fact coming up with charles coke to found the new think tank the quincy institute in this was the desire to demilitarize with the militarization of american foreign policy to stay out of foreign wars. this is very similar to the alliance woodrow wilson confronted between emily go to

and other progressive activist on the left. and on the libertarian nationalist. >> it's funny how enduring these cultural features are. so we have questions from the audience and charlie and i had a great conversation we would be happy to spend the next three hours going down these alleys together but let's see if anybody else would like to ask a question you can use the ask a question feature that should allow you to put a question in. so to say just reading the

plot against america that plays out what might have happened if we were stuck with isolationism that was the exposure to racism is that more tapped into under isolationist foreign policy? >> excellent question. historically, racism and anti- immigrant sentiment and isolationism is entitled or entangled they may not be in the sense the united states could pursue a strategy in which it tried not to entangle itself in afghanistan and iraq and other places and had nothing to do with racism. but in the 19th century part of the break on expansion

discomfort coming into the union land not populated by whites then you get the anti- immigrant sentiment first against chinese and then asians and then as walter and i were discussing that the us passes to and anti-immigrant legislation. essentially it took down the jews and catholics in europe by 90 percent. about 1 million americans of mexican heritage were deported. yes, there had been a general correlation that also tends to be anti- immigrant or more racially sensitive and it is

happening today. if you peel back the onion on trumps first policy you see it is unilateralism we have been talking about and with anti- immigrant and identity politics. where they often go together but logically speaking. >> a lot of a was driving that movement is in fact the oasis with the idea the philippines simply could not govern themselves. and once spain was gone, if we left they would fall into chaos to be taken over by germany or japan was a force that influenced some of the

policymakers there. i would say go back at certain points in history everybody's thinking is influenced one way or another for racial stereotypes or ideas how history works somebody racially inflected so teddy roosevelt and william jennings bryant one in the imperialist camp and both actually we can see had a lot of racial influence. >> that's exactly right the anti- imperialist movement said the people in the philippines or cuba they can never govern themselves

democratically because they are the wrong race, religion, or culture so don't bother. the imperialist said you are right, they don't have the tradition but that's why we have to go out and show them how to do it. they were both racist in their own way but one camp said that is not a problem and stay away but once as have to grow and save them and that is the narrative and not to save everybody, but the idea the american experiment could be universalized and we could go out there and to spread the gospel. >> even as late as the vietnam war with william fulbright was

from arkansas and for someone of his generation he grew up for people reconstruction was still very much a living reality. a lot of his issues in vietnam was skepticism that they could become democrat so he saw johnson's attempt to have the new deal for south vietnam nation building for fulbright it look like the reconstruction hubris it addresses it on - - just wasn't going to work at one of the patterns i noticed in american history with the iraq war comes and the white self

forgot what it is like to be in the northern nation building exercise. >> you are right in the sense that until the 20th century, most american policymakers were very skeptical you could go abroad and reengineer a society to have debates in the 18 twenties about revolutions in latin america or revolutions should we give money and they always said no because it will not work and not until you get to the 20th century in particular or to the cold war era in world war ii that they can grow and rebuild society but this worked in germany and japan it hasn't worked in one

of the reasons americans today are so frustrated with american foreign policy is it didn't really work to turn afghanistan and iraq into ohio. so you have to subject them to the greatest level of violence anyone ever experienced with japan and germany and world war ii and then to that other power they hate even more and if you combine those three ingredients it is a little troubling to me the modern social science that intellectual energy comes from developing a methodology to extort the american way and other countries one can see

how one from another cultural background to look at that as imperialism. i think we had about this enough even though there is some merit in the things we have done. we have another question hear from the audience. with the hardship covid is inflicting do you see for see a lot of countries taking the isolationist look to regroup and rebuild? what are the risks of everyone taking that approach? >> this is an some ways the history that we have been talking about for where we are today. i am not someone who is at isolationist or councils it

, far from it the united states should stay engaged and continue to play the important role to keep the peace in europe especially given the rise of china but facing conditions that are not unlike those in the 1930s. covid-19 and the pandemic to be chief among them. we're going through an economic crisis we have not seen since the 1930s. americans are tired of the war. we are overstretched just as we were after world war i and a sense the ambition abroad comes at the expense of liberty at home because big brother has overreached on surveillance or because we keep going to war based on pieces of legislation from

2001. that's not what the founders intended they gave congress the right to declare war for good reason they are not exercising that right. given these conditions the next president needs to focus heavily on the domestic front getting the economy open dealing with racial injustice and the fact we are deeply divided country and those are stumbling that doesn't mean we can't engage abroad but a more modern form to find to the middle ground between doing too much where we've been the last couple of decades and doing too little which is where we were in the 19 twenties and 1930s. what i call for in the book is

the rightsizing of american foreign policy to bring ambition abroad back into line with political will that's the conversation we need in this country. my guess is it will start coming because we have no choice. if we don't have that discussion and get ahead of the curve, and craft a more modest and pragmatic form policy by desig design, it could happen by default and if that happen happens, then dangerous overreach could turn into more dangerous under reach as it did in the thirties. >> let me throw you a curveball. if we look at what is going on in azerbaijan and on on - - in armenia we see a war breaking out. it's not possible azerbaijan

will start to win and occupy territories the armenians have lived in for centuries or occupied after the more recent war. where that happens there will be massive flight. refugees in the winter, in the mountains is that where american engagement, do we get into that or stay out of that? what do we do with a problem like this? because with the armenians you have genocide, certainly there will be a powerful lobby in the us that will want us to do something. this is kind of in your area of expertise with policy.

>> yes. talking about lightening the load and easing up on the gas i'm speaking specifically with military engagement in the sense that our wars in afghanistan syria and libya have sapped the appetite. i do think if we pull back on those commitments we have to lean in on diplomacy. >> because when it just doesn't to come down to the binary choice the bottom line

is the united states cannot do everything. i would want the us to be heavily involved in this and then to not advocate for us involvement because of the mistakes we made in the recent past is repeated involvement and wounds of choice. but then we worked intending to save lives and protect civilians but what happened?

the country fell apart and what turned into a magnet for terrace. so yes there are times the us should use military force but realize it doesn't have that in the with those big ticket items im or skeptical but it's the issue on the diplomatic front where should we? it is the europeans. have a market to develop more

capability and then to have that space with the issues requiring military force. >> i know if i would go that far. [laughter] but i remind everyone under the obama administration that were the president said you need to spend 2 percent of your gdp on defense and do more of the heavy lifting, this is the direction that the american foreign policy is headed whether the next president is donald trump or joe biden. >> you have a couple more questions from audience members. this is from michael macleod was wilson not striving by bringing america into world war i to lead and shape in and

world war i was and with that gender had german germany. >> and exposes so the most idealist president in american history believe the rest could go out there and transform the world and we created a to be open to diplomacy and disarmament and banding together against aggression. but also number one perhaps the most interventionist president in the western hemisphere and latin america

and he was a racist in favor of segregating the civil service. in the war came to an end and oversight treaty was negotiated, he basically turned down a bid by the japanese but also the indians and many other others. so yes, there was a complicated general nation try to do with a leader who tried to change the world in positive ways but someone at the same time was a racist. >> that's how history works.

it is a complicated business. let's see how did the us involvement how does that fit into your analysis? test us learned from that experience? >> i think the vietnam war was overreach and in generally i think highly of american foreign policy in the sense because the strategic patience so the real concern is what

and turning the middle east into an island of democracy. apparently in the war the united states engaged level far beyond what the interest warranted. and that led not to an isolationist retreat because it didn't really happen but a retrenchment where nixon and kissinger pulled back and pursued victimization and how to have a strategy to rely more heavily on iran and saudi arabia. there's a lot of trimming of commitments but not the collapse of the consensus in part because of the cold war was still on even though there was a taunt up through the vietnam war.

lessons? i think some of the mistakes that we made in vietnam we have recently made in the middle east. that is to say as but we were talking about going into complicated countries that we don't understand thinking we can rebuild them from the inside out. and fairleigh work on - - barely works one of the things that struck me is one of the ironies was the obama administration going into libya. >> what a terrible mistake it was to go into iraq and

multiple years after the humanitarian intervention, we had great intentions for which part of the iraq war false assumptions about what can be accomplished. >> i was not in the white house when that conflict broke out but i was surprised because i understood president obama to be someone who did believe the united states had been off too much and really did want to pay for it out of the middle east and as an outside observer at the time to have 140 tribes anyone who is to invade that country should think again.

so this is completely impressionistic because it wasn't there at the time but he was dragged into it by the allies. because the europeans really wanted to do it. and all of these other countries want to do what i want to be the one who stands in the way. >> it's harder to learn from history than it looks is one lesson there. we have a question. how do we get congress to exercise the debate the war powers authority with the congressional advocation of power.

>> that's a tough question to answer in the sense that i would have thought it would of happened by now. but now it is 2020. we have been fighting wars in the middle east continuously since 11. and congress continues to go along for the ride. i guess my general answer would be this. i come only from the trump era thinking the system of checks and balances doesn't work as well as we thought it did. i am not a big fan of president trump and then to do

the anonymous amount of damage and not much they can do about it despite the fact the founders built what they call a compound the public to disperse power across the judicial and legislative branches precisely to check everybody's power he doesn't check his power that will so whatever happens in the election next week they really ought to get to gather whether on capitol hill and someone to say do you need to implement some kind of change or that we are experiencing the experiences of the recent era and one that should be on the docket is reinstating congresses role for those

permission so basically you can slap a tariff on any product that he wants. issues a there should be a sunset clause and those blank checks it would be nice to see a bipartisan committee come together and think about which one of those need to be repealed or any new random authority with the sunset clause that congress wants to call power back. but it doesn't just seem to

want to. >> i have to say in this current environment where democrats and republicans speak to each other on capitol hill, it may be hard to reach a consensus and that last ten years have illuminated that needs to be addressed. >> that is over mighty and that is the recurring theme of american politics from time to time people do dialback. >> and it started in 1898 and that will lead to executive overreach.

but then you get to the cold war era and president truman enters the korean war without even bothering to go to congress and then to enter that with no resolution with the soviet union the president doesn't have time to make phone calls before you decide whether to respond so once the president of the united states has the power to destroy can't help the system in various ways.

but those i would strongly --hyphen the recommend will help you think more but as you can see from those that are intimately connected. and then line used long enough but it has been a great talk and i'm so glad you have written this book. >> i cannot thank you enough for joining me for this conversatio conversation. i also do you need to blame you in part because as i said with special providence that influenced me and encourage me to take on this effort to look back at the nation's history americans of all political

persuasions need to know more the pre-world war ii path to try to figure out where we go in the future. >> thank you both so much for two nights talk and with that lens to look through also thank you for moderating thank you to the audience for watching as well and if you like to watch click in the top right corner we will see you sometime soon thank you for

being here tonight. >> thanks again.