nonprofit operations, and you still have time to order the congressional directory we contact information for members of congressed and and the biden administration. go to c-span shop.org. >> you're watching booktv on c-span2 with top nonfiction books and no, sir every weekend. booktv -- authors every weekend. booktv, television for serious readers. >> greetings from the national archives. it's my pleasure to welcome you to today's virtual author lecture with the author of "nuclear folly." in october 1962, the world came the closest it's ever come to nuclear armageddon. the discovery of soviet missiles being installed in cuba triggered the most dangerous encounter of the cold war rivalry between the united states ande the soviet union. after 13 anxious days, the two nations reached a resolution, both aware of the danger of

mutual destruction. it wasn't just a showdown between two rivals, it was a global crisis. the new book, "nuclear folly, "includes white house recordings from the john f. kennedy presidential library and previously classified kgb records in moscow. sergei is the professor of ukrainian history and director of the ukrainian research institute at harvard university, a leading authority on eastern europe and russia. he's published extensively on the international history of the cold war. his award-winning books include the last empire, the gates of europe and cher known. our moderator for today's discussion is michael dobbs. dobbs was born and educated in britain but is now a u.s. citizen. he was a longtime reporter for "the washington post" covering the collapse of communism as a foreign or correspondent. he's written several books

including one minute to midnight which was a new york times bestseller. his latest book, nixon and watergate:e: an american traged, will be published in may. i thankk want to thank you for g us today. >> yes. well, thank you very much for that introduction. congratulations, serhii, on joining the growing group of cuban missile crisis historians and an excellent book about the crisis. i think the qualities of a good book, for me, a good nonfiction book are, first of all, it's readable and it appeals to the general public. and secondly, that it adds something to our knowledge that can also appeal to experts, and your book certainly does that.

so the archivist said that this is the most dangerous period in history, the close we ever got to nuclear armageddon. assuming you agree with that, why -- can you with set the stage? why did this happen in 1962? the first atomic bomb had been exploded in 1945, the soviets responded in 19 is 49 under stalin and truman, but it takes the another 13 years for this nuclear competition to come to a head. why is that? >> thanks. thank you to the national archives for having this discussion. mike, thanks a lot for agreeing to moderate it.

ihe remember when -- [inaudible] one of the first people who told me about -- as part of the story. the kgb material that -- [inaudible] going back to this first conversation, and i'm really very happy to be here for the discussion today.n the question 1962. what is rather interesting about

the first time the soviet union on terms of the nuclear capabilities to the united states of america. >> there was a missile gap between the united states and the soviet union the missile gap was there but not in favor of washington. and he wanted to deal with that and they don't have enough strategic, they had enough of range in that way in which the

american puritans. that is one of the reasons why happened in 1962 and in 1956,. >> there was a nuclear imbalance in 1962 and christopher wanted to address it, do you think you have other motivations and about the defense of the cuban revolution which castro suddenly considered to be under threat in the united states and christoph as well. >> absolutely. i was trying to keep my answers written short it was an important part of the story. in concern that you most live by

in the mission in the western hemisphere is adapted from the united states and after the bigger things that happened in april they believe it's a matter of time before he would put his act together and there would be an issue. if he convince castro to china because castro was trying to go and there was a threat coming from beijing in washington at the same time as far as he was concerned, he decided with three

bearings in the nuclear missile. >> he was an emotional type of leader, he saw the u.s. was deploring similar missiles to turkey in the hedgehog on uncle sam's, how much did his personality influence the crisis. >> he was taking risks when he came to visit to the united states in 1969 because it was the biggest airplane at the moment at the time. she was prepared in the same as truth cuba she and i believe if

she swallowed the pill on the missile that kennedy would've treated the same, and that the united states will look at that is something completely extraordinary. in the cultivation of the space and judgment to the missile crisis and that was the biggest one . . .

mild and that was to read the hostage. the political environment more

than once they were different in terms of the binds between the two states. they said when people ask what you do they said we would react but there was enormous political pressure and the best example of that is they wanted to figure out what the policy should be under the missile. why not four days or three or four hours. the information about the

missiles but not concerned about the service. they needed to can delete -- delivered to the science but that is the matter. >> let's back up a bit. you as the author mentioned originally from ukraine. i heard you once said you lived close to where the missiles were constructed. the tell us about that missile

and why it was important. a. >> as a student and young the professor in the city it was to the largest missile factory in new york. there were two types of missiles. the medium-range and then fourteens built at the same factory. for me it was an interesting

story and i ran to the kgb archives and i also looked at the materials during that particular factory and the development and building of those missiles. the question is the period to say that the union was producing missiles like sausages so it's interesting that wasn't actually the truth and that statement. >> they sent nuclear weapons that we didn't learn about until many years later.

with another primitive country they managed to smuggle 43,000 and understanding what is going on. i wanted to read a paragraph from your book which drawing on the archives that you concerted. >> absolutely. i'm happy to do that. going through the kgb report the fate was decided and we have to

pay the bill. they headed off to cuba. one had criticized the government and its policies. the lender was intercepted by the kgb but then decided to send him to cuba anyway in the hopes that after it works. this is a kgb office that's even more outspoken.

i'm ready to lose my party card as long as i get back to the unit. you found these reports. it turned out before i started that research 75 to 80% would go from the military district and ultimately 80% of the personnel from ukraine.

each of those ships that were bringing in equipment had to engage. the officers then required in the reports the expedition. they were reporting on the attitude of the personnel and the encounters of the ships. half of those would make one trip to cuba and back but it's a unique source of the documents, specific documents. there were certain things from

the memoirs but now they also have reported what's happening at that time and it sheds a new light on the story. >> it turns out quite a few people were not really happy about this mission and they felt it's pretty useless to send all this equipment to a place like cuba with the collapse of the soviet union when there's a great deal of discontent about all the money being wasted on the countries and this contrasts with a kind of nostalgia. but do you think that these people that are quoted in the reports are representative of the opinions of the rest of the

43,000 or are they just for a small minority? >> it's difficult to judge that on the basis. there is a certain goal on the example where there was some form of disloyalty. what we know from other sources suggests this wasn't a small group of people. they were relatively widespread and refused to go to cuba. for example the first missile regiment that came to cuba, his

name, lieutenant colonel commander that refused to go aside citing all sorts of reasons. we have other examples as well and we also know that that the commanders would send to cuba to create a percentage of people who question soviet policies. they turned back after the missile and also some were looking for adventure to get outside across the iron curtain.

the attitudes were different but a percentage of people were -- for many of them it was extended. at that time it was in the reserve. that was a major concern certain concerns were shared by the society. >> what's the difference between the ordinary russian or ukrainian soldier and the elite and nuclear forces in addition to tens of thousands of ordinary soldiers that faced elite

including mathematicians and so on. do you see the difference between the two groups? >> what we see is those that i just quoted and the officers who were there for the three year period. the top commanders they don't have much information on that. we knew from their memoirs that they were extremely critical of two things. first of their own commanders who came to cuba and ensured

them of the missiles that it turned out it wasn't possible to do and they were the ones that assured him that it was possible. and then the second situation was the withdraw from cuba was exercised and we know that from the sources in particular because they were exposed to the strip search and to show the missiles they were bringing back to the soviet union. they said the captain of the

ship received the order and was prepared to fill it. when they did refuse to do it but there were hundreds between them the minister of defense was very supportive of everything he literally was doing at that time. never in the history. it took place during the withdrawal but in the way that it was conducted and the reason they were searched is because

khrushchev was never able to convince but along the deal that he struck with kennedy he refused to go along. >> i'm going to wrap this up in a few minutes if any of the viewers have questions then please feel free to submit them and we will spend the last few minutes responding to the questions. what did you think was the most dangerous aspect of the crisis? was at this conflict between kennedy and khrushchev or do you think it was something else, the miscommunication and happening by accident. >> the solution like the one

that developed at the top level the decision made by the officer on the ground so they could prioritize one over another. too much attention is paid to the idea of the decision-making and it's not like that is not important but is not the only thing happening at that time. your book is one of the first books that tries to broaden the scope and bring people on the ground and the soviets side of the story.

it was the most problematic issue in the crisis the first one was the miscommunication and misunderstanding on the top level, to understand the logic of the actions on the other side. the second issue was the inability to communicate taken after 24 hours to the left or the leader to be sent and that's why they were saving time. so that was another issue and the control on the ground and then what happened on both

sides. again on the soviet side of the example is the military generals in general to shoot down the airplane over cuba they generally made that decision at the time before the top commander who was at that time. then about possibly ascending this is the last [inaudible]

and were terrified when they learned about that and what the consequences would be. so the command and control was a major issue at the time. >> it's interesting in the sentence that you wrote at the beginning of the epilogue they managed to avoid after making almost every mistake conceivable to cause it. i want to talk about the present-day situation, but what do you mean by that? every mistake conceivable but in the end they managed to avoid nuclear war.

the question was if they made all those mistakes the explanation is the best explanation i was able to come up with of all the differences between the leaders there was something that united them and it was the fear of the nuclear war and the extortion of 1961 so

they knew what the nuclear weapons could bring and they did their that best to stop the crisis from escalating into the nuclear war and it's exactly that kind of but it's a really important factor i dedicate in the book to those that had the courage to step back. this is the same people that created this. >> who did you think was the winner in the end? kennedy had to give up any idea

but castro was still there all these years later. it is a great, great question. if you look at that in terms of what happens the biggest is that it was saved and because again he was the leader of this revolution but he intervened when the negotiation was taken.

the second question would be khrushchev. he got rid of them as missiles in turkey but the world looked at khrushchev and he mentioned it was partially because it was a step too far. and then president kennedy who was believed to be the winner and i think at the end of the day he handled the crisis very well but there is no irony.

it was recognized by the united states and the world and that may change dramatically the relations between he and khrushchev even before the cuban missile crisis driving the agenda it is kennedy who is in control and negotiates the agreement. that is the main thing that was gained.

now we have a few questions here. perhaps you can say how the bay of pigs related to the missile crisis. there would be no cuban missile crisis. first is that khrushchev decided that he really faced he couldn't believe kennedy wouldn't follow the support and that convinced him that he could be pushed

around and i don't think that he would dare to do that after. the bay of pigs really verified the aggression but he had another invasion coming establishing this connection and this concerned him. it's not a contributing factor to his decision to deliver to cuba so in both cases it is a

bay of pigs invasion. and then another story what happened in the berlin wall. >> they had been among the first soviet target if they decided to start a war if someone else asked. >> one of the chapters in my book the chapter is about kennedy. during the first week of the crisis he advocated a strike against the soviet

installations. they called it quarantine so there is a quarantine and the response was next i am sending the plaintiff there and what are we doing after that so it was much more concerned than the possibility of the nuclear war over cuba and that was the time of the cuban missile crisis so the confrontation was extremely

important. a. >> but the question is if the subjects decide to start a war who had been among that first topic. >> this is a good question and i would say that most likely yes. my guess is based not so much on the inside knowledge of the thinking at the time but during the kind of missile that they had and they were medium-range and france and britain certainly were the targets as well. they had seven or six at the time of the missiles in reach so

i'm pretty sure in the nuclear confrontation the response again would be the attack on the u.s. major allies. turkey as well. >> someone else asked what were the reactions to the soviet withdrawal in cuba and then czechoslovakia and the others. >> one thing that we know depended on the relations that day. i quote in my book memoirs of the security shift and talking about extremely hectic behavior on the part of khrushchev.

in terms of the rest, everyone was terrified. the closest advisors but they kept silent and really couldn't say publicly what they felt that the attitude was critical. there were reports to visit soon after and what they report on is almost hours trying to sell to them it was a great success and

that is very clear he had to get the access and that it was critical. a. >> we need to wrap up now, but i have one last question for you. this was said to be the most dangerous going into the history. what do you think of the situation we are looking in today? is it a more or less dangerous world than it was back in 1962 if you could be quite succinct about that? i thought it would be possible in the introduction of the conclusions. the feeling is [inaudible]

pre- 62 this is the nuclear arms race, uncontrolled nuclear arms race that creates the crisis and churchill reflected that and khrushchev was trying to create and then after the cuban missile crisis there's a non-corporation treaty and so it was and finally agreements between reagan and the white house and gorbachev. now we live in the world where every single arms control agreement with the exception all

of those treaties are gone. the last one signed by gorbachev and reagan in 1987 with the intermediate missiles will expired because the united states and russia left it. generally we are back in the race which isn't coagulated. that means we are in other cuban missile crisis and not only with the soviet union but north korea, iran and many others that have become nuclear. >> more drivers than was the case. >> thank you for sharing this

interesting book with us and i think all the authors of the cuban missile crisis can agree there are lessons to be learned from it so i urge people to go out and buy the book and read it and you will find many interesting parallels and lessons for the day. thank you very much. >> on our weekly author interview program "after words," democratic senator tammy duckworth of illinois discussed her new memoir, every day is a gift. >> after reading trevor noah's born a crime, his book was my inspiration because in reading it, i thought -- the title was amazing. very deeply personal about being born biracial in south africa and how even his birth was a

crime. the fact that his parents, you know, got together and had him. and, in fact, my parents, you know, met each other and fell in love and had me. my dad in his home tate of virginia could not -- state of virginia could not have married my mother because loving v. virginia had not yet passed. i learned so much about apartheid and the experience of apartheid to the individual both on the black side of the equation expect white side of the equation -- and the white side of the equation from trevor noah's book, and i wanted to do the same thing for the experience of growing up biracial in the asia. and i wanted to teach the reader a little bit about what it was like to grow up in southeast asia post-vietnam but also why i, to this day, still believe america is worth it. america is worth fighting for. it's really, i got to writing this book because my 6-year-old daughter, abigail, asked me that question. mommy, you don't have legs -- you know, she wants to learn to

ride her bike, and she wants me to teach her. i'm a little bit more patient than my husband -- [laughter] but i can't run alongside her and if push her book. she's, like, why couldn't somebody else's mommy or daddy have gone to iraq and lost their legs, why did it have to be you? i wanted to be up front about it, to hoe america is worth it -- to show america is worth it. and it began with me growing up as an american in southeast asia and and if understanding what a privilege it was. i said i was an american, but i could leave war-torn countries when i wanted to because i had that american passport. and a lot of other children could not because they had been abandoned by their fathers the way i had not been abandoned by mine. >> to watch the rest of this program, visit our web site, booktv.org, and click on the "after words" tab to find this and all previous episodes. >> here's look at some books

being published this week. the outhighier -- outlier, kai byrd re-examines the carter presidency. the first black female ceo of a fortune 500 company recalls her life and career in where you are is not who you are. in preventable, the former senior adviser to president biden, offers his thoughts on the united states' response to the covid-19 pandemic. and linguist amanda montell in cultish. also being published this week is miseducated. brandon fleming recalls his journey from a school dropout to a harvard educator. and journalist george packer weighs in on america's current struggles and offers his thoughts on how to fix them in last best hope. find these titles this coming week wherever books are sold and watch for many of these authors to appear in the near future on booktv.

>> booktv is television for serious readers. all weekend, every weekend. join us again next saturday beginning at 8 a.m. eastern for the best in nonfiction books. ♪ >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we're funded by these television companies and more including comcast. >> do you think this is just a community center? no. it's way more than that. >> comcast is partnering with a thousand community centers to include wi-fi-enablessed lists. >> comcast supports c-span as a public service along with these other television providers giving you a front row seat to democracy. ..