c-span 2, we look at policing, starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern, a conversation with former new york city police commissioner bill bratton. then the author of the book "america on fire, the untold history of police violence and black rebellion since the 1960's". and a conversation with rosa brooks, a law professor who became a police officer in her 40s. book tv, on c-span 2, tonight starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern. ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪

>> good evening, everyone. welcome to our book talk this evening with author of "winning independence". i'm with the avon library. i'm joined here with terry wilson from the avon historical society. we're cosponsoring the program tonight. :: >> for this conversation dedicated historian to enlighten us with information predict especially out of the southern strategy. we love that because of the local historians especially here today, many important figures of the american as well as a few battles fought and connecticut

farmers the start of the continental farmer. we always want to learn more. john ferling is at the university of west georgia where he had a long career teaching course and revolution, america's founders and use military history. his written 13 books and articles of the policies tactics of the american revolution at an early republic. his biographer of george washington and john adams. i can do books and words of tell you more about john ferling the man. he's from west virginia, he grew up in galveston, texas. and according to his biography has other was college-educated it in 1920 impossible for 11 years until she was banned by west virginia law. his father also college on a baseball scholarship in the 1920s the depression and it is academics. he took a job with the texas and had one son john in 1940. john has a bachelors in history and a masters in history from

another university. although he retired it has not stopped him from attending and speaking at seminars. in these kind of events and lecturing on podcasts and sing for writing which is his biggest passion. in his wife carol the are here in atlanta. but more and more things that john like to share. his love of baseball, the first major league that is always 1945 between pittsburgh and the brooklyn dodgers when jacky robinson scored the winning run. he was hooked for life is like any good historian, he had researched run games he wanted to see and especially to boston on the red sox. for those of us are new england, we like to hear that. our audiences looking forward to hearing more about his most recent book "winning independence". let's begin as a historian to focus is been on the era of the american revolution. what do you love most about this chapter in history. john: thank you guys for having

me. and the library in the historical society for inviting me tonight. i've been putting forward to doing this. while i was broad to the american revolution it is that is where everything starts for the united states. in our political system, our socialized ideals for formant during the course of the revolution. if you think about it, lincoln when he talked about for scores and seven years ago, was referring to 1776 printed in the ideal of equality and god-given rights of life liberty and pursuit of happiness for all people. and when martin luther and king talked about having his dream, that african-americans would be cut in on the ideals the really

began with the american revolution. so i was onto that. i think in addition because the revolution of and setting the revolution consists of two things. the one hand there is the revolution and in south which i think it came as a surprise to most of the participants. a dozen years before 1776, no one foresaw the revolution coming. but there was an so the question comes up why did it occur. what was the revolution, was it just a case of columnists trying to gain independence or was it is thomas same said, common sense in 1776 was in the struggle that would bring about a birthday of a new world. so there's hardly study on or with regard to the american

revolution. in addition, you gotta a double dip there because you have a war, most of the congressman new certainly when they declared independence in july of 1776, that there really was in tampa they had when the independence. and that led to a long war, a war that had dark and uncertain times in 1776. then like a roller coaster thing, things right and when friends allies with united states in 1778 and many people felt that this virtually including george washington, for that matter help this virtually assured americans independence and then things went south after that. in the will becomes stalemated and that is the subject of my

book. the four years after the great victory in saratoga. from 17782 north down in 1781. when i think the outcome of the war was until the very last moment unknown. and it could've gone in different directions, no one knew until weather american gain independence or if it did, the united states would include all 13 states. so was a long climatic and i never get tired of looking at both the revolution and the war itself. in the fascinating cast of characters that were part of the political revolution. so that is why one into it and i stayed with the revolution

throughout my career. terri: thank you see new book, and "winning independence" and this is what hooked me as a reddit. the challenge of the assumptions that america won the war. and instead, great britain lost a war that kind of one which i think in allowing the nuance of the season. and how you feel like this very different way to look at it. john: sure, i think that the british had several opportunities at the outside of the work 1736, 17 actually was 177035, 1776, and 1777. general gauge who the commander of the british army at the time the run down of the war was coming on. told london that winning the

first engagement of the war, is crucial plaintiff we can have enough troops over here to weaken his dramatic victory over colonist then probably the more will disappear. instead of that happening, instead of conquering the card, in particular the disasters that faced a british when they marched back from concord. to boston and then they had a chance to score a dramatic and victory two months later bunker hill and boston. and really they could've scored those victories. so the 30 command at the time, had advised general gauge to send forces around it to the backside and will pin the american rebels up on top of the hill and we can score a bloodless victory but they didn't do that and they marched

up the hill and marched into a disaster. and there were two instances in the campaign for new york and 76 if the british have acted first on in brooklyn when they had about half of washington's army trapped and again in september of 76 when the washington really foolishly and his army on uninhabited and then get out the british could've annihilated it the entire continental army at that point pretty in any of those victories when one the more i think for the british. they still had another chance in 1777, the plan that london devise was for an army to come down from canada led by john - with general powell moved north

to rendezvous with burgoyne and catch washington's army and instead of doing that, howell went to his own devices and went off after philadelphia. and missed i think the really the last major chance that the british had to anymore. without noticing the britain's defeat after that was guaranteed. because as i said earlier, is a long disparate war and lots of things go wrong for the americans after 1778 as a more stalemated than the american economy collapse in american morale was sagging. george washington it in august

of 1780 wrote a letter to the chief executive of pennsylvania and when she said, i have almost ceased hope and at the same time washington was writing that letter, arthur lee who had been an american diplomat since the beginning of the work, overseas in europe, returned to america for the first time since before the war began and he landed in boston. boston of all places now. and he is there for a few days and talks with a number of boston officials in massachusetts officials and he wrote that most of those by august of 1780, concluded that the war would end in a negotiated settlement short of independence. some things are really up in the air. of course at yorktown, maribeth

desmond and gains is victory and gains independence. so america did come out of the war victorious. they celebrating more five more years with 250th anniversary of the 1776. but he also argued that america could not have one before without french assistance. the french were providing clandestine assistance starting in 1775, the provided emissions and the weaponry and clothing and blankets and whatever for the americans. in the allies with the americans they could then it was open help for the americans and they can provide even more help, they sent a work maybe and eventually sent over an army and they load

a great deal of money to the americans which wound up costing the french can his head in the 1790s because the economic woes and the fallout from all of that contributed to france's problems and role in the french revolution after 1789. so anyway the americans do when the war with french help which i think his extreme event extremely important to remember. terri: so we go back to some of you mentioned earlier. somebody we probably don't know too much about general henry clinton. as part of your thesis you put that he probably got mistreatment from the historians. what had been really misunderstood. why doesn't he receive credit for strategizing south carolina georgia and possibly north

carolina, the outcome and redrawing of the map of the america. john: yes, let me go to my powerpoint here. that is washington as everybody knows and here is another one of washington. but here is her henry clinton from you and clinton became the commander of the british army in light of his appointment and may of 1778. he was the third british commander during the war. negation printed for many years was revolution and the work. and was recalled after the disaster along the road and have bunker hill and general william howe succeeded him and how was commander in 3637 have resigned

after saratoga. the clinton within the commander can be the commander then of the british army from may of 78 through a little bit beyond that yorktown. i found quite an interesting figure. he with her aristocratic family in england and his father was a career naval officer who became the royal governor of new york and young henry, when he was still going out, the only active years in new york city. he enjoyed the british army teenager. and he fought in two wars. or. reputation as a brave and courageous risk-taking soldier.

he was seriously wounded in fact and engagement in germany and the seven years war, in the early 1760s. he wasn't intellectually curious individual. he read widely and especially deeply on military history and strategy. in the year before the revolutionary war broke out, 7034, out of his own pocket deeply to make a trip deep into eastern europe to observe a war between the russians and turks. hoping to learn more about military strategy and tactics. over the third british army navy just 34 weeks after washington property and just time to see

action bunker hill. and he served i think some distinction in a couple of years before his main commander and one or reputation in some circles as the best strategist among britain's high ranking officers in america during that time. at the time of his appointment, 48 years old, two years older than washington but was more than 30 years of experience. i think that he did a good job as a commander rated but, he had the misfortune i think of becoming commander at the same moment good friends and of the work announced that britain had a fight the french and the

americans, they had to withdrawe of their troops from americans. the symptoms of the caravans to make the threat posed by the french. so when clinton ran his orders, he discovered that he had to immediately relinquish 8000 of his troops. he had already lost all his troops that had surrendered at saratoga printed so he was going to have an army, he did have an army that was considerably smaller than the army at the british had had in america the year before. but despite that, his orders were to bring washington to battle and hold onto new york and holland to run on and implement this new southern strategy talked about a little bit later on. because he really face an

enormous task and from the very beginning, clinton new that he was up against, he's in my face as hard as he put it. then a letter that he wrote almost immediately after being named commander. he said that he thought it was inevitable that britain would lose the war he feared that he would be scapegoated for the loss. the loss of the warden turned out that he was - because after yorktown, any people in england dead scapegoat clinton. the blamed clinton arguing that he has two passive and he wasn't a risk taker, he wasn't dynamic enough. he just had not done enough to argue to, nor the president

could have one. and i think that most of those arguments were picked up by historians ten the road. so that clinton's reputation in the literature has offered as well. in a try to argue in the book that many of those allegations just are not true. clinton was i think, far more active than his foes suggested. it did take risks. and he far more effective than washington during the four years between at saratoga and yorktown for instance. thomas paine after the war of the 1790s, wrote a blistering pamphlet attacking washington and some agree with me on this but paine argued that washington it slept in the field as he put it in that the real winners of

the war for general ratio gave a nathaniel grain. but washington was generally an active during much of the time and clinton was far more active. and i think that the most dumb devastating thing attack came about almost 75 years ago but still by scholars today and many still accept a study made by clinton's biographer. in conjunction with the chronicle psychologist. they argued the content sought power but that he had deep subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he had.

i frankly think the argument is markey. nothing of a particular photo of psycho is tribute in this case, they were obviously unable to put clinton account. but in addition, clinton left behind virtually no private correspondence that would've opened the window to his heirs. so i think that clinton's reputation it suffered from that. there's your kitty. [laughter] terri: she just joining us now. [laughter] john: that is okay. anyway, i think that study on clinton should be filed away in

the circular file. i think he certainly made mistakes, i recognize that in the book but i think he was a good general. an exceedingly good strategist. he didn't have awfully much to work with and faced just enormous challenges. so i hope, that my book will convince people to take another look. terri: i didn't know a lot about him and i did in terms of the justices ability. i just realized actually the chronology is out of order. okay so, after britain's catastrophe exciting 77, the so-called southern strategy, what was it and something to gain in this from 1778 onward predict.

john: sure, after saratoga, the british, in fact many people in england after saratoga wanted to drop out of the war. it had gone on for three years and they had achieved virtually nothing. and now they had lost an entire army at saratoga. some of the news came in at saratoga, it triggered a debate, a lengthy debate, of war ministry to win it on and through the winter of 7078. it was a debate over for one thing, whether to remain in the war and if the decision was made to remain in the war what kind of strategy with a pursuit. down to this point the strategy then try to destroy washington's continental army and also when

control of several northern provinces. and really had not succeeded on either score. so at the end of the debate, the notion remaining in a war prevailed partially because the king insisted that the war continue. let me go back to my powerpoint here in the person who really led the fight to remain in the war lord george jermaine. he was a american secretary secretary of state for the american colonies. and jermaine, in the position, jermaine was in essence a minister of war and he was also had responsibility for persons

army in america. and jermaine understood that a new strategy had to be developed and jermaine, came up with what became known as the southern strategy. that was essentially to an innocent virtually right off the northern colonies an attempt to regain control of two and possibly three, colonies down south. georgia, south carolina, and possibly north carolina as well. and jermaine thought that was a possible strategy. he believes not think that he was generally correct in this that a greater percentage of colonists in the southern colonies had remained loyal to england that was the case in the

northern colonies. they were times we glinted by economically and through the church and other factors. so jermaine felt that by going into the self, many of these loyalists would willingly bear arms for the king. and since many of the troops, a thousand trips had to be relinquished by clinton, they can be replaced hopefully by loyalists. some of whom would command to the regular british army and enter what became known as prudential residents and others would go into newly structured loyalists militia. and the idea was the british army would drive the rebels out of that area and in the loyalist relations would come in behind the british army and take

possession of that area and pacify the area. workout, missus once the united states assuming its independence might have looked like following the war. the area in red is the area that would be the united states. everything else on their and white, would be possessed by the british. so if jermaine's plan can out in georgia and south carolina and north carolina and virginia were retaken, british already had east and west of florida and they had gained that in the war that ended in 171763 and still had control of the trans- appalachian and still in control of canada. so the united states would've

been small and weak and surrounded by a great your pan tower. and it would face marion certain future. in fact there were many that thought if this played out, and his fashion, and and not very long, many in the united states would seek to return to the british empire. they would've had very little capability of expanding and whatever. so that was in southern strategy. and cobbled together in the winter of 1778 and in london and earlier i mentioned when clinton received his orders, and includes implementing the southern strategy. he did this pretty fast, he sent 3000 men expedition to georgia

in december of 1778, and one day battled and took savannah. and then in 1780, clinton comes south to a huge expedition that retakes charleston. that was in a seizure operation in april and may of 1780. and then, clinton appoints. let me show you just one more site here real quick. after charleston, clinton appoints there we go. he appoints general corn wallace to be in charge of the

pacification of south carolina and georgia. from day one, corn wallace orders were to focus on south carolina and georgia. he could go into north carolina and he thought it would help him with subduing the rebels rebellions and south carolina and in georgia. so corn wallace is going to be the major player in the war in the south from the time he takes command in june of 1780 down into the late spring. into 1781, and on until he arrives at yorktown in summer of 1781. clinton comes back to new york and he never saw cornwallis

again until after yorktown. so there was southern strategy and that is what the british were trying to accomplish and i try to argue in the book that they can reasonably close but things went wrong and we can maybe talk about this a little bit later on this evening but at the beginning of 1781, clinton was far more confident in washington was pretty what was going to happen that year and clinton later said that he began in 1781, more confident of british success than in any of the other four years that he was commander. and i think where clinton and ultimately thought was that if

the allies in the french and the americans can be prevented from scoring and the victory in 1781, that that war would end in a negotiated settlement. and clinton it was and i think the washington thought that in lafayette says that in his letters and john adams in europe, he's writing to congress and telling congress pretty much the same thing. adams is telling congress the french have been in this work for three years and they haven't gained anything. so you got again something so in 1781, they're going to has a face-saving pleasure to get out, going to accept an invitation from neutral nations in europe to come to a peace conference. and what would've happened if that peace conference is anybody's guess. maybe one of recognized the

united independent united states that was smaller something along the lines that meant that i showed her maybe it would not. then to the independence of the united states. but this would be when the miniconference primarily of european monarchy were very friendly towards republican government and that was the what the united states had at that point. terri: i think you just answered the next question. [laughter] john: sorry about that greatest we did know that is okay. we become of different ones, i'll take one of these that you wrote. were comparing and contrasting clinton in washington which you have been doing this whole half-hour. they were just nearly leadership potential effectiveness. what is it about washington that denial the americans and set it aside, which would you prefer to serve on and why.

john: let me first, on reimbursement of clinton in washington. let me say a couple of things about that a section that runs maybe a pages where i tried to look at the two and see what i can find about both of them. and found that there were some similarities between the two. neither man was a gregarious after calling individual. in washington's case, it may have been that washington had insecurities and then they didn't want people to get too close to him to discover 20 fear in his or maybe simply in washington as a leader felt that he could not let anybody get very close to him. he had to make difficult

personnel decisions really did it say this but it kind of reminds me of john f. kennedy said at one point. great leaders have to be both loved and feared. in washington and may have felt that way read in the case of clinton, clinton acknowledged that he was very shy. and not outgoing. in fact he made one of the strangest comments were made by any historical figure. i am a shy bit he says. [laughter] so anyway neither of them were really outgoing. but clinton i think made friends more easily than washington. who innocence may never have had a really) and in the real sense of the word throughout his life. both clinton and washington were brave and courageous men under

fire, i'm always amazed at the battle of washington and riding horseback riding right into british soldiers who were firing at him. there were no further away from him than a picture from a pattern the baseball diamond. that's pretty close not to pledge predict and as i said clinton it earned a reputation and more. reporter: and again during the revolution as a video was courageous under fire. both of them i think faced similar problems during the war in that both had problems with supplies both had lack of money and troops and whatever. both clinton and washington

angered credit chrysostom during the war. criticism. it much of washington it after he made several mistakes in the new york campaign and 76-six and then after the campaign of 77, even more and more open criticism of washington and one point the president of congress around 78 said that when washington it communicated with congress it was met with peals of laughter. and so but congress cut off or could have ditched washington it is of his critics wanted. but congress fortunately didn't take that step they knew that it would bring on political chaos and probably ruined the work effort. at that congress cuts off the

open criticism. it really launches the campaign to make washington an iconic figure from valley forge on towards the end of the war. to elevate him so that he would be above criticisms. they begin celebrating washington's birthday annually. and that sort of thing pretty clinton run into a lot of criticism as well. anything in the case of both of these guys it was sort of like my experience when i was a student, all the students complained about the professors and i became a professor and all were complaining about the administrators. and whatever and i think that things sort of went on in the british army. and among the americans as well. there were things like issues over promotion and whatever and people got left out there and

happy about that. so both of them ran into a great deal of criticism. there were plenty of differences between them. he had mentioned it when you're talking about washington it was a leader. in one of the differences is that washington i think was a better leader than clinton. in washington just exuded it leadership. he was a big man. this was a time. when i must study had demonstrated that the average homegrown american male was 5-foot 7 inches tall predict and he was only 5 feet 8 inches in world war ii. his son had not changed much in a period after provision but washington was almost 6 feet 4 inches tall. so he literally towered over other people. he waited in 1780, he weighed

210 pounds. so it 6 feet 4 inches, 210 pounds is about the same size as a cornerback of ohio state or university of alabama or something. honey did have a reputation a of athleticism. in those days it was a question of how you rode a horse and he could seem to be majestic on a horse. he seemed to walk gracefully reading clinton on the other hand was about 5 feet 7 inches and he was pretty average. in many ways. so there were differences in that respect. one of their difference was that other than the background which was quite a similar because is that magic clinton was from a family in england. but one of their difference was

that people today often forget washington often see washington as being about politics. if it washington it a very good politician. he was almost unsurpassed in his political skills. and clinton and canola did openly even though we had actually have a seat in the house of commons at one point, he acknowledged that he was not a very good politician. he was just like fish out of water in that regard. so there was similarities in their work differences. and i had forgotten the last part pretty. terri: who would you survivor. john: oh okay. well, is a tough question. i guess it would depend on your

rank and whatever. it would've served under either. a man really. i think clinton was a good general. in neither of these guys were bloodthirsty and neither said the man in the battle and hopeless situation and squandered troops. and both of them were trying to preserve life. i think both i think had humanitarian qualities about them. but also because neither, both had so many shortages, of troops and they couldn't afford to lose troops previous i think they were, they both were good commanders and i probably

would've been willing to serve under either one of them. although i have to say, i don't know that i would've wanted to be a soldier in the revolutionary war. it was a really tough tough go. these guys, the officers high-ranking officers when the armies were on the move and they were on the move a lot. high-ranking officers could travel on horseback but everybody else marched. and they literally these guys marched thousands of miles. and many of them were in even in the british army, where we know all about the suffering valley forge and more standard whatever. in the american army, even in the british army in many cases, the men were ill provisioned it and ill-equipped.

and whatever. it was really a tough go for these guys. i'm coming through pandemic now in these guys, they faced disease at least in the american army and most the american soldiers who died wind up dying of disease. not from combat. zabriskie difficult harsh environment they faced. so while the might of been willing to surrender both generals, i'm glad that it didn't have to serve a war on the side predispute here's a question dying to ask. in connecticut, has to do with being on both sides of the war. benedict arnold. was he just a guy who want a

steady paycheck because. [inaudible]. john: while that is kind of the million dollar question. a lot of biographers had looked at that and we can't get entirely in in the minds to know what was going on. we try to answer it this way, he had a legitimate reason, in been passed over for promotions unfairly and unjustly i think are needed and when he became the military commander in philadelphia to the british evacuated philadelphia. many people turned against him because he was consorting with families that were regarded as. [inaudible]. in a married peggy the daughter of a family that was suspected

of being a. [inaudible]. family and exactly prosecuted for financial speculations. so i think that he had some really legitimate reasons although, many other generals did as well and only arnold is the one that commits treason which there was a pamphlet written about in the wake of this i don't know whether if you try to smooth over the fallout from arnold's treason and he pointed that out people. but having said that, there's a second thing here as well. many people argue that arnold was just after the money. and he did get a great deal of money from the british for turning but there is another side to that equation and that

is that arnold own a considerable amount of property in new england. and if american ended up winning the war, he is going to lose all that property. so it would really be kind of a trade-off. he would lose valuable property but again it the money that the british were going to pay him and he could've done probably just as well financially and he remained on the american side. but one of things that intrigue me about arnold is that he negotiates with the british through intermediaries and those intermediaries to sir henry clinton and for a long time clinton didn't know it was that they were talking to. he just knew that is an important american you might be willing to commit treason.

and it's not until august of 1780 that arnold it makes a decision to turn code. and what happens in august of 1780, in august of 1780, cornwallis scored a huge victory over the american army at camden in south carolina. and army commanded, it was the fourth american army in 20 months that had been destroyed in the southern theater. and more than a thousand, american troops that had been killed the ones that were captured in those four engagements. that is the same month of washington write that letter saying almost sees hope and the same month that are thoroughly

in boston is saying that many of the leaders in massachusetts now believe the war will end in a negotiated settlement short of independence. something he could argue that when arnold finally makes his final decision to turn county in august of 1780, amy very well have believed that the american this goose was cooked. and at the british were going to win the war that he was trying to get on the winning side. but having said all of that, nobody really knows what was going on in arnold's mind. terri: i do like it then you put them in the context of the decision-making was not in the impetuous move to switch sides. but really it could've been anyone in a similar position in terms of rank and opportunity.

and i appreciate to put them in a new context and i couldn't resist asking. was he trying to really or was he just have her paycheck so thank you for that. well i think we need to get to questions from the audience. is been a terrific overview of this book in history is wonderful how jusco glows from you pretty so thank you very much. are we ready for this prayed in the audiences typing in the questions. here's the last one. i think brings the historic stories to the modern era. all four require sacrifice in the numbers of the american revolution are you talking people involved, percent of the book. in 19 so what you want the moderators to understand john about the consequences of war. and the impact of it. and just the overall experience

of it. john: i think there were i think many more in my mind when i wrote the book but one of the things was that i've already mentioned it is that i wanted people to understand just how long the struggle when independence was. i think because of saratoga occurs in october of 1777 and huge british army surrenders there. and textbooks always depict saratoga as a turning point of the revolutionary war. there has been a tendency on the part of many people that everything that follows saratoga was anti- climatic in the american victory was guaranteed. so i wanted to become one of the readers to come away from my

book understanding than a long grim war had to be fought after saratoga, the victory was not guaranteed. as i said, clinton thought that brittany could still win the war in 1781. they also wanted people to be aware of just how grim this war was. about 15 percent of those who fought were the british side, they died in his work, pretty heavy. that is best i have been able to determine it, roughly the same percentage of people who fought on the american side, died in this war. two put that in some sort of meaningful terms, the united

states lost about 350,000 of men in world war ii. but if the united states and lost 15 percent, of his faltering, the sailors in world war ii, more than 2 million americans would have died in that war. so it is a war that is really think much bloodier war than many people are aware. and also as i have mentioned, i wanted people to understand that the outcome of the war is determined after saratoga. after that for your struggle that it during that four years after saratoga, more americans died indicted during the 30 months of work before that the saratoga probably about 65 percent of all americans who

find an american side, died after saratoga. in another 4000 americans who died fighting for great britain during this war parted and infected 17 in 1780, there were more americans fighting for great britain then there fighting in washington in the continental. those were the things that i wanted the readers to come away with. what i tried to do in the book was look at the crises that washington faced of the crises that clinton face and then the decisions they made during those crises. and when they knew and what they did not know when they made those decisions. often times i think people sort of read history backwards.

the actors obviously did not know that when they made their decision. they did not know the rate would be a good decision about decision. and i had to just made and make a decision based on what they knew the time. and so i tried throughout the book when i look at the decisions that clinton and washington and nathanael greene and others made, why they made the decisions that they did and when they knew when they make those decisions. terri: what would lead the british to allow for negotiations pretty what would've been in it for them. john: well as many people, just wanted to and out of the war right it has gone on for a long time. they were winning the war. there was a fear that they were going to lose all the americans and all of the trade with america, and the france would

gobble up postwar commerce with america. and that the british economy by be ruined the longer the war continued. so, there were some in england who are pushing for a negotiated so in fact, immediately after start toga, when board north of the head of the work prime minister, lord to saratoga, he proposes a negotiated settlement. referred to as the north peace plan of 1778. he actually since the commission of diplomats was known as the carlisle commissioner, they came over to american in 1778 they were authorized to negotiate a settlement what lord north was willing to accept was

essentially everything the first continental congress and ask an even more with one exception that was independence. north would not recognize independence but he was willing to put the continental congress remain i was going to give the americans a greater autonomy and on and on and on the first continental congress and asked for. the certainly even right up to the pentacle powers in england, there were people who were willing to accept and negotiate a settled. terri: thank you john, your answers have been thoughtful. your writings are thoughtful and the booking and for the books has been extensively researched to. i really do encourage audience to pick the seven read it because it has a refreshing look

at the american revolution. so thank you. and the historical society and hopefully we will see you in person seven printed. john: okay i look forward to that as well and i think it was again for having me. >> tonight i'm on tv, on "c-span2", look at policing starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern conversation with former new york city police commissioner, bill broughton, then the author of the book, america on fire, mental history of police violence and rebellion since the 1960s. in a conversation it with brooks, a law professor who became a police officer in her 40s read a book tv, on "c-span2". tonight starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern. wednesday night, on book tv, on "c-span2", space travel, we start with the book, virgin galactic's in the making of a modern astronaut.