america authors, journalists and politicians often refer to situations as being mckinsey and. in. jamie hartley emeritus professor at roehampton university in london has published three books on charles dickens. the most recent one titled a very short introduction by oxford press. we asked professor hartley details about his life and accomplishments including his two trips to the united states in 1842 and then 1867. >> author gini hartley on this episode a booknotes+. listen@c-span.org/podcasts or whatever you get your podcasts here. >> good morning. i'm david wessel director of the hutchins center on fiscal monetary policy. i am very pleased to welcome mark carney to our virtual stage today. extraordinary is an overused

word but mark carnies career qualifies for sure. if you look at his resume you think you must be 96. he was born in fort smith northwest territory in canada which i mentioned only because it's official model is perseverance. he has an undergraduate degree from harvard, phd from oxford, spent 13 years at goldman sachs, a a decade in the game, including five years as a governor of the central bank of canada. during the global financial crisis in the because that wasn't challenging up he became governor of the bank of england from 2013-2020 during the whole brexit mess. he's and invited the british prime minister, u.n. u.n. special invite for climate action and finance, vice chair of brookfield asset management, mentioned as a future potential candidate for the prime minister suga of canada and he is only 56 and a not not going to deal with this collegiate career.

mark must've decided he would write only one book in his life so his new one which is called "value(s): building a better world for all" is really several books in one ear it's a history of money, discussion of what markets can and can't do well, a primer on climate change and what to do about it, lessons on leadership and then some. i am probably one of the few people that read all 20 paragraphs of the g7 finance ministers communicate. i think mark carnies book as a background briefing almost everyone of those 20 chapters. we are very happy to have you with this, mark, and as people know if you want to ask a question you can type it in and i'll try to get to some. i thought we would start with the very provocative and interesting title of your book, which is "value(s)." and you talked about the tension

between value which is a market determined something or other, and values which has to do with our moral being. what if you could talk a little bit about what we trying to do by putting those together and what does that tell us about how we should find a society that is market driven but not market controlled? >> first, thank you, david and thanks for having me, thanks to brookings for putting on this event but really for all the great work that you do. i've been a huge consumer over the years and beneficiary and expect over the coming decades. you and i read the g7 communiqé communiqué, and i'm not sure anyone else did but many people will be affected by what's in that communiqué. i'm sure we'll get to that. in terms of -- thank you for going straight to the town because the parentheses is the to get across in the book is the

causality between value and values goes in both directions. on the one hand, you have circumstance which and i'm simplifying but in the run up to the financial crisis some of the underlying values that support good market functioning and this is the point that goes back to adam smith and i think most political philosophers and political economist i should say, and in the end most market participants would recognize there's a role for regulation but also a role for other institutions in the sense of douglas north which are customs and rules that support good market functioning but we lost some of that.

in effect bring them into the crisis and in that process depending on the activity, in the process there can be a corrosion of the value conclusion of incident. it ends up being counterproductive. that's not the core element of the book. it's an observation which i need it for completeness. the third aspect is when value can deliver societal values. in other . in other words, the market deliver societal values and really what in getting at here is the example in terms of climate change. as we move out of a tradoc mentality which is almost in the moment is a policymaker as an economist but to a hierarchy of certain, there are certain objectives societal objectives which become a focal point and

argue where moving to that position now as sustainability. then the market properly informed with the right tools will be the driver of delivering the solutions, so value delivering societal values. yes, there's a lot in the book but it's trying to capture those elements and using experience of the crises that i lived through and others of course on this webinar will have been active participants as well over the course of the last ten, 15 years. >> do you think if you had to look at the needle, are we too far towards the market or too far toward the moral at the moment? or is that not so simple? >> i think we were, at a live to see this as a policymaker, we are definitely too far to the market in the run up to the crisis, global financial crisis. it was an era, i don't think

it's an overstatement to say market fundamentalism. the answer to market failure was generally to trade new, create new markets. since this is brookings i can use this shorthand to say it was an error of a different world. we had incomplete markets so the answer is missing markets. of course the students know there's a lot of fundamental assumption the go underneath that perfect competition, commodity, which mostly don't exist in the circumstances. you also had and this is a real balance for policymakers who had a belief that the policymakers nothing to tell the market, only to listen to learn the lessons of the market. there was the approach in central banking.

there were other light touch approaches in regulation, other aspects and very little, lots of reassurance the market must have it right or something like subprime was unlikely, it wasn't going to happen, as opposed to and much less of what happens if it does happen? what would we wish we had done in that event? in that case we definitely had the pendulum wrong. i think in the case of something like sustainability i'm not sure the issues with climate change are the product of tragedy of comments of course. that's a market failure, can be fixed so it externality, through a carbon price, the factors so that something with more comfortable with. i tried to argue over the years is also a tragedy of the horizon in that we are discounting the future quite heavily and by the time it's clear and present danger in terms of physical impacts of climate risk it's too

late to take it into account. the question is how do we change that? in the end that's a question, it's a political question which is, does society found sustainability? until we get to that moment the market isn't is a fully gn service nor our regulators. we make it into this more but i'll take the opportunity to say this, which is what we very clear he did six years ago in setting up with mike bloomberg as part of the g20 process promote private sector process, what -- >> climate disclosure. >> task force and climate disclosure which was a standard for companies to come at it is not a standard, a recommendation, voluntary recommendations for companies to disclose not just current carbon footprint but what are the risks going for it and what might you do about it.

that was this was just to provide information to the market to make a market in transition because some people thought it was an issue, some people didn't think it was an issue so you can have market. so who thought it was an issue thought governments would act and some who thought it would an issue that the government would act and in the end of this would end up in the price or it wouldn't end up in the price in a reasonable horizon. now that shift as you go forward to today, not to the same degree in every country, but in many, many countries and there's a lot of momentum around this, the countries say no, we are going to move to -- we are having a carbon price. sitting in canada legislated carbon price going to $170 by 2030. even though it is canadian dollars that's a lot of money. that brings forward the future so we see that shift. that's a long way of answering your question in terms of the

values but those values in the end are determined by society and you need that process. but if you do and all finisher, david, this is where i spend a lot of time with people who are very focus on the environment. they tend far too early to discount the market and underestimate the power of the market, finding solutions to an issue even one as big as climate change. >> that we get back to climate change by want to talk about the nature of money first and particularly your thoughts on the fixation that a lot of people have with cryptocurrencies and what the potential and the risks are. i noticed the g7 says they tend to be warming up to the idea central bank digital currency. they seem to be really down on

any rush to globals table coins like facebook formerly known as libra until we get a better regulatory bank. put this moment in perspective for us and what should we do to make sure it has more positive than negatives aspects? >> so, yes, i thought that was particularly eye-catching as well in the communiqué all aspects of that. let's take a step back. we are in the time of proto, competing currencies. facebook's efforts which is now called dm instead of libra which is a stable going so for those come most people know but the idea is it's a crypto instrument which is back one to one by the underlying assets so if it's u.s. dollar is back with ideally -- by the way this is key point.

ideally not just treasures but liabilities, safe risk-free liabilities in u.s. dollars that matches the maturity of money which is instantaneous. i can think of one place that provides that called the federal reserve i can't think of anywhere else. by definition yet some mismatch and just want him on that topic, history shows bank of amsterdam be the example in the book where the temptation to run a bigger and bigger mismatch overtime for private sector stable coin which in the end was this little with the bank of amsterdam was is just too great and ultimately how credible is that commitment. [inaudible] >> 1600s. it ultimately, they end up not just running a mismatch but to lend it to the dutch east india company and people realized the bank of amsterdam bills have risks when they previously were back one to one with a gold and

silver that had been deposited. that's a real, there's lots of concerns with stable coins but that's one of them which is in the end will get a new cfo, new treasure, ultimately they will stretch money for nothing type approach. and in the end why wouldn't you just as a central bank is going to a stable coin, why wouldn't you have your own stable coin which be a central bank digital currency that is tokenized? there's of the forms which is account base which i suspect is this is where this will go. context or tapping voice with currency competition basically running up. a series of crypto assets of varying degrees and purposes,, varying degrees of being money. what's of them are not money. some of the most interesting ones are those that are solely

specific gaps in the payment system. some of them are for wholesale finance, euros dollar coins for wholesale finance and getting efficiencies in there and are doing it in a way that actually serves payroll. legitimate question or legitimate possibility shall assay those will continue to play a role. some are trying to play the role on cross-border payments and laura cross-border payments. i think and in the central bank can get to position where they solve that issue but we will see. psalm and it has to be said and we seen the examples, like bitcoin there's a gap in the payment system. it's called elvis of finance, it's called ransomware. you know it literally is that's one of the gaps. that's not a gap we necessarily want to close. you get the point. these are questions of the

values underlying money. we need something resilient, something that is transparent and it also needs key points an adjustment mechanism. for example, the gold standard, it was ultimately felled by too much weight of adjustment on labor in the interview put all the weight, that's always been one of the risks. where do i think it's headed? i think we'll have central bank digital currency is. i think are more likely to be accounted based than token-based. i think they will likely, hopefully i should say maybe, that those central bank digital curtsies there will be some efficiencies in terms of cross-border linkages across to cross-border payments will come down. most people won't see the cbdc because they will see the wallet from a bank or a tech company or

a fintech company. that will be their interaction. we'll still have insight money, created by the spider and as institutions which will be indistinguishable from the cbdc. there probably will be in parallel psalm private monies or so-called dated curtsies for specific applications that a legitimate gaps in the payment system that are used by a subset of users and the interoperability will have to be established. >> so an account base a central bank digital currency but i would have an account. i will have an account with a bank of the bank will essentially a digital account with the fed? >> exactly. just as it does today what will be interesting is it won't just be the banks that have those accounts. by the way, i'm more confident this is what will happen in the uk and other places. it could be the instagram

wallet. it could be a fintech companies wallet, some other consumer facing and ended up that account up top as well so that the settlement is just across the account. there's a settlement risk, just across the account of the public financial seditions at in this case the bank of england. >> and the advantage of that is competition? >> it's sufficiency, it's competition, it is as i understand it at a not the one doing the program but it is also potentially programmable. programmable for smart contracts and other applications which are potentially very attractive, so contingent contracts in effect potentially very exciting to add efficient to the system although like much of this area it's pretty nascent.

>> and will we see a currency less society in a decade or two? >> think of the people you know and maybe as you were suggesting i have done here. i am 56 but i know a lot of people who always will carry cash. i always say when i was governor in the uk was we will continue to produce banknotes as long as people want them. i think we've got a few decades where there will be a residual. >> so let's turn to climate. your basic argument is that if we are serious about resisting climate change, and you think we are increasingly serious about it, that there's a growing political consensus that doing nothing are doing as little as we've done so far would be a huge mistake and a disservice to our children and grandchildren. and if your basic argument if i get it right is you want to bring climate risks and

resilience into the heart of financial decision-making. so tell me how that happens. how do you get companies and banks and insurance companies and consumers to fully internalize their cost of our behavior, which is contributing to fossil fuels, i need to greenhouse gas and so forth? >> so what of the key organizing principles for this is net zero. what's happened with climate change is, and this has always been understood or is been understood for a long time, that we can't stabilize the temperature whether it's at the paris stretched objective of 1.. three degrees. we can't stabilize it until we get to net zero greenhouse gas emissions. all short that to carbon emission. >> can you define what net zero means? >> net zero means that the emissions come in the emissions

that exist because of, not just because human activity, human or agriculture or other activity, that those are removed from the atmosphere so there is some net process, and the two obvious net processes are, one is for us while they're going, so new forests while their growing. you remove net once you get to the height, your net awash, and carbon capture and storage of some form. those are the most obvious ways. you got to get emissions without order to be able to net out whatever you are still doing. the point is that the temperature is, the phases of its it's a function of the stock of carbon in atmosphere, greenhouse gases. you organizing principle number of net zero were about 130 countries and counting who have said net zero is our objective.

the u.n. meeting on climate this november is a net zero cops who were trying to continue to reset the u.s. has joined this, made its commitment try to get a few other emerging economies in there but it's 70% global in mission, organize net zero. so then that gets dead if your company a financial institution the question is and you operate in these jurisdictions, what is your plan for net zero? you can have a plan which is my plan is -- there's three options. one is i don't have a plan because i don't think this government is credible or this will actually happen for whatever reason. that's an option. you may choose which stakeholders employees and you may be surprised but that's an option. the second is i don't think i can get to net zero or i meant in a sunset industry this movie to net zero and uncle to run off

my business. most people don't choose that option but you could, and i'm going to -- these certain activities over 15, 20 years. the third option which most major companies seem to be thinking as i have, i'm committing by 2050, putting in place a plan for by 2030 will be at this point enters what i do. now you moving to financial system which is getting that information. in the financial system you have this information. you are judging companies in terms of whether they are likely come to the have planned, i do likely to succeed with your plan? are they going to be competitive in the world is moving to net zero with if not a rising price on carbon, tighter and tighter environmental regulation, more and more competition from low carbon technologies in their area. that is a decision on value.

that is influence on company value. not just in the extremes that renewables versus coal and heavy oil but all the way down through moving into the core of the system. that's what's happening now. for those who may not follow it closely, at president biden's summit in april there was an announcement of a new alliance which is the core of the financial system, the major banks, insurers, pension funds, et cetera for the world, 160 of them, them, $70 trillion of assets which for brookings in the u.s. is a huge amount of money committing to net zero, so committing to have these plans for the own assets. last point if i may come and there's lots of other ways to build this out, scenarios, stress tests, other things to make this tangible. but what is critical in building

the system is that the incentives are there to finance the transition. so in other words, the incentives are there so that i lend you or invest in a company who may have high emissions today whose emissions might even go up for the next two years but by lending, , investing, giving them capital, that those in mission to come to come over time. and avoid what we want to avoid is a very on the surface satisfying sort of binary approach, which is there's green assets and brown assets. get rid of all the brown and just go to the green. that's not a transition, that wholesale investment and that doesn't get as to where we need to go because we need this deal covers make big and buses. we need automakers, and on and on to deploy the capital so the core of the system gets its

emissions desperate let me pick up on that. when i noted on twitter is going to be talking to you, i got the people i think you probably heard from yourself to suggest it's a company like brookfield where you are involved and do a lot of investing tickets also investing in fossil infrastructure, pipelines. what is the role of the big institutional investor? you're suggesting not investing in fossil is a mistake because it doesn't give them the resources to make the transition, or what's the argus? >> it's entirely situation specific. brookfield is one of those that's part of the 70 trillion, we bring 600 quintillion to 70 trillion. because we remember something called the net zero asset managers allies, a large alternative asset manager. what are we doing is we map our

carbon footprint. where developing decarbonization plan to cross all our assets. we have a specific strategy which i'm very much participating in which is help accelerate the transition for companies, specific transition fund strategy but also addressing the overall footprint. footprint. i say that 600 billion of assets. to be clear about brookfield is one of the biggest renewable power generation in the world. it's over 20 gigawatts of power on four conus, note 23 gigawatts in production. that's london and paris or chicago and new york in terms of scale of the generation. it's a huge amount. and then here's the key thing and so also about brookfield but generally, when we own pipeline infrastructure, for example, so the judgment is about what's the

terminal value of those pipelines? so how long is like to be natural gas going through these pipelines? is there auction value for the acid to be converted to hydrogen or some sort of hydrogen blimp which extends its life? that is a fundamental part of the value judgment. i would say last thing that sort of thinking hasn't been the mainstream in the capital market but it is moving from per free to mainstream quite quickly, which is going to enhance the value of certain infrastructure assets because they have option value or because they're going to be longer lives, because it's in jurisdictions where either it's the lowest carbon solution for a period of time are one of the lowest and/or they can be extended for other reasons. that's part of thinking about the transition so just to finish, the simplistic thing

which is what we're trying to avoid for the system as a whole is is a you on a pipeline, you are bad. that's hypocritical. no, it's not. it's an energy transition. we have to make judgment,, brookfield does, others will make different judgments about what works where. we could be wrong about some of them. the transition could happen sooner but we are grown-up. we can get more right than wrong and will do will with it accordingly. >> speaking to a straight from ottawa, canada has moved to put a a price on carbon. the u.s. of course hassan and it doesn't seem to be imminent. isn't that going to create some issues and is going to be difficult for canadians to feel like this is great, we're doing our part and use is getting a free ride and will be -- >> yes. issue carbon leakage is a

growing one in trade policy. as your question suggests, david, in politics there's judgment, and they can be, it's often expressed in terms of it can be canada u.s., it could be canada, the u.s. and china in terms of the path. maybe i'll answer it in terms of how we think trade policy might go around this issue. the first is that it's a relatively small commits a smaller group of tradable prospects which this this g issue. so were carbon is a big component of value add but there some pretty politically motivated ones. steel would be a classic example. second thing is that, so what is being openly talked about here, these carbon border adjustment

mechanism. the president has mentioned it. the europeans are launching an initiative on it. canadians are talk about it. one of the challenges to be wto complaint with this is the easy, easiest way to do it is based on a carbon price. because you can look, i have this price, you have a price that is half mine. clearly, but when the u.s. does have carbon price, then you move into a world of shouting carbon pricing, which is hard to map an easier, so is the equivalent of my emissions standard worth x on the price of the price of carbon? you get the point. there's that world. the other is around product standards. so having carbon components to the product standards for steel, steel has to be of a certain quality. my personal view cutting it short is that i think over the next several years it's more

likely to land on the product standard side not least, not exclusively because of this but not least because u.s. doesn't have carbon price and doesn't seem likely to have one in the foreseeable future, , despite al the economic benefits going down that route. >> i have to say steel was made in a way that had a limited amount of carbon emissions. >> the thing is that won't just be an assertion. the ability to measure this is again part of these disclosure standards and others is the building -- ability to map that not just in the steelmaking process but odyssey from the power that is provided and the carbon that is delivered delivered steel to the ports here. >> what about china and india? this is often raised we can't fix this problem without them. they say great, you use up all

this carbon capacity to industrialize and now you want to restrain our growth. the chinese talk a good game but are still building coal plants. he has all sorts of issues. when you talk to them how do you explain to them -- how do you read them? are they serious and how do they play in this role? >> easy to answer the second, incredibly important. decisive even. there's a few, 195 countries that are all equal but some are more equal than others. most of the u.s., eu, china, canada clearly are more equal than others. how do i read them? i would say the chinese are -- one is, they are pretty explicitly taken the view that

being low carbon and having low carbon industries or being leaders in industries that enable low carbon is a fundamental driver of competitiveness, medium-term. there's a big economic motivation to the push towards net zero. that's first. the point that it's not been lost in other major economic powers, okay, so this is a reinforcing the market in some respects, competitive juices around the industries of the future. the second thing is the chinese, look at, the chinese have just started to shift their stance. president xi said at the biden summit they will peak in colin 2025 and manage, begin to manage down. it's all very fuzzy to be clear, but it's that impression on call

in the latter half of this decade, which is the key. the objective is, is coal down in advanced economies by 2030 and 24 in emerging economies. the extent they can work there is an element of growth and then tailoring off. the chinese are as you know big in solar, big in an electric vehicles, biggest in the series of other things. we collectively have a strategic issue around the rare earths that are essential for a number of these climate applications and so the development of alternatives is critical including in canada. canada is part of the solution for that but collective g7 we need to think that through. on balance i think china is a force in this and obviously the largest emitter but also one who

increasingly will be central to the solutions. india is more straightforward. it's a complicated place to govern. it's a federal structure but the commitment at the top is quite clear whether it's formalize to be seen but the scale of ambition particularly on the power side is enormous. it's one of the most attractive growth opportunities. i think i'm pretty upbeat on india in terms of what actually will happen on the ground, not least in the economics of a number of the solutions have shifted. david, we have left this issue, we have left it very late and so the scale of what needs to be done is enormous. you can pick canada, i mean, we

have huge changes that have to happen here, and that's true for virtually every country. >> there's a question is sometimes about the role of central banks on this issue. you have pointed out in the uk the bank of england has pretty broad supervisory responsibility including for insurance companies which of course the federal reserve doesn't have. it was suggested maybe they should be greening their portfolio of purchase when o do things like quantitative easing. that seems to give the people at the federal reserve the shivers. how would you describe, i think the role of the central bank ass a financial supervisor in this area is pretty straightforward. institutions are taking risks but they don't fully understand. it's the supervisors who point

that appeared that's easy part. when you get to things like green bond portfolios do think that is a step too far or this is such an important issue we have to use every tool we have? >> so i think you have summarized it well, and i will come for those who don't follow it on a daily basis, i can understand why you might not, but the bank of england received my successes at the bank event received three letters, a couple months ago, which said monetary policy committee, the macro committee and the prudential supervisory committee take climate change into account and it's all consistent with the legal framework. as a secondary or supplementary objective you have to take into account. what the bank of england is doing is now and last week and i would recommend if people are interested if you search on the

website the last two weeks they have come out with a discussion paper, consultation paper on how they may tilt, their words, their bond purchase program to take climate change into account. they have about 6% of uk corporate bond market but it is the central bank and could set a standard in a de facto standard anyone have do. they have received letter that says this is a kind of thing you should do. it's not just like the current governments policy in uk. its legislative, there's annual requirements so it is so integral to policy that you have to take into account. now over to the u.s. where it's the current governments policy. it's not legislative. there's that this mechanic of regular letters from the treasury secretary to the fed chair. the principal in general and when i was a central banker in

principle, the fed would be at as well as one of market neutrality. sometimes you deviate from this in monetary but you try to buy across the curve so you're not disturbing angela price discovery that you're getting the portfolio balance effect on quantitative easing. where are you buy or human collateral you have a credit standard but then what you meet that credit standard you more or less can put the collateral in. this is putting another overlay on top of it which my personal view is you need that grounding that the bank of england has, that the ecb has by the treaty and the requirement for them to take into account the core policies, i forget the exact language but it is pretty well-rounded legally. this stuff is -- the places stuffed full of lawyers.

that's incorporated. my read and the experts at the brookings institute in my expertise. my read is that doesn't exist for the fed, so you're going to end up, we end up with a different central banks doing different things and they are all right. they are all correct and what they're doing. it's a nature of the institution. i do think, by the way, i do think some of the common -- some people around this is quite poorly informed. the bank is reading it a bunch of, the bank of england or ecb new responsibility for its the exact opposite actually. the bank of england it couldn't be clear. >> somebody from canada wrote a question asking, how do we operationalize your recommendations and deeper

values and are economic decision-making. when you made the point when society decides to do something, then the market is a good way or a way to make it happen. the predicate is society has to decide as to values if there are important enough. the question is asking, how do we make sure policymakers and society do that? >> so, i mean, that is part of the reason why the book is so long. it actually goes through, if you go chapter 16 which goes to policy but it's in the leadership chapter, focus driven the company other aspects, is these are examples of how you do it. let me give three quick ones. it's not all about the objective but what it are the values important for market functioning is some sense of responsibility of senior managers who run financial institutions, responsible not just for

themselves but their institution and the system. how do you embed that? the book goes through this. it's alignment of conversation, holding back bonuses and when can those bonuses be clawed back, under what circumstances? the book goes through what we did in uk on that front. it's like something the scene to manage his regime were i an explicit responsible not responsible for everything that 10,000 people who work for me to but an responsible to make sure i trained them so they knew the rules, gave them the tools and had the spore, had monetary things. i don't do that and you can i am on the hook for that. that's how you embed responsibility. in terms of sustainability, part of the way we do it apart from country setting up objectives, climate stress testing, scenario analysis, those type of supervised requirements, that get you thinking as a senior manager there as a board member or what does my portfolio look like if the country does what it

says he wants to do, which is to get to net zero? i might want to take that risk but ended to be informed. nobody knew the answer to the question a few years ago. they will take their own decision. and then resilience, and i will stop here, which is another one of the values in the book that is emphasized, and honest you know another important value, which is something i said earlier which is, this is maybe more for public officials that getting into the habit of planning for failure. don't spend the whole time telling yourself a cyber attack will not get through. they think about what to do e event a large systemic bank is frozen for a period of time because of a successful cyber attack. how do you keep the system functioning? what is a backup? what you do? there are other examples but that's part of the role of building resilience in.

some of the institutions, these are examples basically how you embed it. it's not sitting around holding hands and say okay, , let's be better people and everything -- the book is anything that. just to be clear, in the end these are values about longer-term economic prosperity. i'm not -- i am an economist after all. >> let me ask you as an economist and put your central banker hat on for a moment. there's some concern around the world particularly here that we had a very aggressive fiscal and monitor response to the pandemic, which worked out extraordinarily well. i look at the forecast people were making in march 2020 and we are today and i would chalk this up as job well done by the cisco

monetary policies, and not only here. now there's a growing angst that okay, maybe we get a little too much and that we are at risk of pushing inflation up beyond our objectives. i would how you look at the world of inflation particularly given what we see in fiscal and monetary policy here and in europe? >> look, i think the prospect of, let's strip out the last couple of months, very short-term here, where it's been well telegraphed transitory factors have pushed things up, and then focus on the relevant horizon for policy. i think there are signs inflation will be above target over the horizon from here.

if you are dropped in to run the fomc, david, next week, and you're looking forward, there are signs of, in the labor market sites in terms of supply shortages and other, you know, it's a little more than short-term. there's also reasonable reason to expect sustained momentum, all subject to it's not a black swan because it's right in front of her face. it's also the uncertainties of covid variance and all that. but the prospect of inflation being above target for longer than the makeup of the past undershoot i think the balance of risk is headed in that direction at the stage i guess is what i would put it. >> thanks. >> i'll put you down -- if you decide to add to the federal

reserve to your central bank resume obligor the hawkish side of the spectrum. mark, one of the things that struck me as i read the book is, it's very comforting. because you describe some ways, and you do this earlier in our conversation, ways that we could embed a values in our economic decision-making in ways that don't require us all to give up electricity or would all ride bicycles. you describe how we can get from here to there and you made the point earlier that it's going to be hard because we waited too long. when you look at the political system in the united states, when you look at the polarization here, when you look at what the uk has been through, when you look at the rise of populists in france and in

germany, when you look at israeli democracy, i just wonder how you reconcile your relatively upbeat view that sound, well-meaning, thoughtful policymakers can get us to a better place with the political system that seems determined to prevent that from happening? >> yeah, it's -- a couple maybe suggestions on this specific issue, which is first, it does put a premium on measures, i will shorthand into green measures, but measures that if immediate payback in terms of jobs and economic growth. so high multiplier. it's an obvious point but it does bear repeating. one of the simplest things to do certainly in the uk in the work there is you go to the houses, with all due respect to the uk,

but the room you're in, like the warmth, well, you are in washington so with that keeping the cold in, but they are incredibly -- the desire for home retrofits and all that and the need for them and actually the materials contribute to the reductions and, of course, you employ a mass amount of people that covers the whole country, it has all those benefits. there's a series of industries again in the uk on the renewable side for example, wind industry which has very high multipliers particularly and some of the less advantaged, northeast basically less advantage parts. you do those things early that have tangible benefits that affect a lot of people that create jobs and you're like this is what this is about as opposed to the one eating lentils, and as you say riding around on the same bicycle for the rest of their life. in parallel what you want to do is, this is the hard bit.

because of the political dynamics and you need enough of consensus for this to be credible, which is you want to lay out a path for tougher regulation down the road. the advantage in uk of saying there's no new internal combustion engine cars sold there after 2030 is actually incredible and its very investment in the uk plants and other things. one of the big decisions for the biden administration is what is the equivalent of that? it will not be 2030 but is a 2035, 2040, or 2040, or is it not that explicit? is it a fuel standard de facto? it seems like gm and now ford have got the messy way so they may be pushing on the door but you're doing things farther out that then spurring investment today if it's credible and predictable. i can i sound a central banker but is something i've worked on with janet yellen actually of

the g30 on a paper which was before she found something better to do. you are going to have to rely on and this is going to sound risky but it is risky, , that actually there some tangible payoff to these measures. last point if i may, what would be interesting, let's assume just for the purposes of this discussion, a change in administration with more skeptical in of the republican party, let's say, runs the two houses in the presidency. if facts on the ground are an economy that is increase leak geared to this and jobs geared to do this, it may be more rhetoric and policy made by that point but that's where it would be in my mind, , benevolent socl planner but had some payback by that point so that the benefit

of continuing, and last point, just emphasize some of this i said about china early which is this is one of the competition points with china without question. i would suggest it's going to be as big as digital, but or attack as should you generally, both from a economic opportunity bt from a geostrategic influence perspective. so we'll see. >> i guess i'm asking you a different question. you were governor of the bank of england during the brexit vote in the uk. you were very outspoken and you talked about why in the book about what would be the economic risk that britain was running if it withdrew from the european union. as you say, you said we would be ready and you were. you got some grief for speaking out. and yet despite all the elites saying this is not a great idea,

the british public voted to do it and the british government, the current british government has certainly upheld that part of the bargain. i'm just wondering, have you no doubt about the ability of our democracies to do this? >> i definitely do. i'm sorry, i thought might answer -- i was time to give you i have that, i start for the position of, the premise of your question is exactly right. there is this a risk of this shift. it depends on the jurisdiction. for example, in canada, look, it's 70% of the votes in the last several elections were for parties that were as aggressive on climate more aggressive on climate than the current government. that's a pretty big consensus, plus things are being legislated as opposed to being policy.

you can change the way you get there. what i just said for canada holds even more so for the uk and europe. but, of course, if you're a politician then mapping that into giving people what they really want, which is jobs and that progress, that's your job. the u.s. is not, you know better than i but it's not in deposition so the stop start his arrest. australia has been in that position, start stop on climate. so what does matter, look, i guess we i would put it to bring back to what i try to write in the book is, there is a value of dynamism in the book which is sort of market returns and growth and prosperity. so unless you're delivering that alongside sustainability you are not good to get to where you want. if i can just bring us begin back to central banking. one of the things we're always cautioned at the bank of england is in our financial stability

role they will end up with the stability of the graveyard. don't pile capital so high in the banks so there's no lindane. that's something and it was good we had that pushed back because we took it seriously. so the analog to climate is don't have i don't know, sustainability of the graveyard if you will or sustainability which is sustainable and all sense like it's flatlining growth. that's not a sustainable political angle. >> mark, we have a few minutes left and i want to end on, if you had to draw a couple of conclusions from your chapter on leadership to people who are young or aspiring leaders, what would you tell them of the most important lessons that you have learned in your time in all these incredibly important roles? >> yeah, i think, i mean, i mentioned it earlier. one is this point on she mentally. it's the nature of the roles

being a central banker you kind of look at glass half empty lot included on brexit. my job was to think about what could go wrong and prepare for it. that aspect of humility. there's a more positive aspect of humility which is if you will, which is that i sorely had a lot of good fortune to end up in the roles i had and to some extent good fortune begot more good fortune, and so don't take yourself seriously and remember your responsibility while you're there is to improve the place and leave it better. there's a basic point which i think is increasingly understood that as a leader you are setting goals and catalyzing action, but you are not leading the way to follow. you need to get people to be fully engaged in how to solve the issue, and so it's not just

about having diverse voices at the table. it's an inclusive process so that they would are a part of making decisions. if you may have been heard, and even when the decision doesn't go their way they understand and they get behind it. that's a learned skill. maybe it is inherent for some people, certainly something i learned over time but it's really important to be able to do that and it does take more time than top-down leadership that is it's far more effective over time and far more satisfying for everybody. ..

>> i would go back and read when these things are in the news so again, thank you for your time and i look forward to your next act. >> thank you very much. >> weekends on c-span2 are an intellectual feast. every saturday you'll find events and people that explore our nation's past on american history tv and on sunday tv bank brings you the latest in nonfiction books and authors. it's television for serious readers. learn,discover, explore weekends on c-span2 . >> sunday, c-span series january 6 use from the house continues. three more members of congress share stories of what they saw, heard and experiencedthat day including

dean phillips of minnesota . >> that moment when the capital police officer announced we should take cover i stood up in the back of the gallery on the second level, a representative goes are from arizona was objecting to the arizona state of electors and at that moment i shouted out at the top of my lungsthis is because of you . i screamed it. and i think it was representing for years of heat and anxiety and anger, many of us saw this coming from a mile away. i think our representative among millions of americans who felt the same way at that moment of the entire country including myself i recognized the fragility of our democracy and my appreciation for the traditions of the congress and the courtroom. i did not like it violated but i do not regret it

because it was what i was feeling and it was four years of pent up anxiety about what was transpiring in front of our eyes. >> also hear from democrat jamie raskin of maryland and brian fitzpatrick of pennsylvania. january 6 use from the house sunday night at 10 either on c-span, c-span.org or listen on the radio app. >> is my distinct pleasure to welcome you all to the official launch of my colleague jonathan levy's new book ages of american capitalism, "ages of american capitalism: a history of the united states" and you can see that book here. the bookis just now with penguin and random house in new york . john's book offers a new and challenging perspective on american political economy.