shanksville, pennsylvania three minutes past 10 a.m. that morning, 44 perished. these events, as everyone knows, what a great shock to our nation and the world. as a small way to commemorate this moment in u.s. history, here are some of the callers to the c-span network the morning after beginning at 6 a.m. >> the entire united states is shut down. you're talking to people around the country and around the world who are shaken to their roots by this. >> i'll look back on the september 11th of the attacks on book notes plus, listen at c-span.org podcast or wherever you get your podcasts. >> good evening, everyone, welcome to our book talk this evening with john ferling. i'm joined here with the historical society and we're co-sponsoring the program

tonight and we're in webinar mode. if you have any questions at any point during our discussion, pop them into the q & a box. i'll turn it over to my colleague to introduce john. >> we're pleased to introduce the dedicated historian with new theories out of the southern strategy. with local historians, especially in connecticut where much of the american revolution came from and the continental army we want to know more. john ferling enjoyed a long time teaching courses on the american revolution, the founders and american history and written 15 books on journal articles on the revolution in our al republic. he's a biographer of george

washington and john adams. i can read more about his books and awards, i'll tell you about john the man. although his parents were from west virginia, he grew up in texas. she was banned by west virginia law from marrying, his mother. his father attended college on a baseball scholarship in 1920's, but the depression ended his academics. he took a job with union carbide in texas and had one son, john in 1940. he was a bachelors in history from sam houston university and a masters from baylor university. he hasn't stopped speaking at seminars, these events and lecturing on podcasts and spending time writing which is his biggest passion. he and his wife live near atlanta. one thing thatton likes to

share, his love of baseball. the first major league game in 1947 between pittsburgh and the brooklyn dodgers when jackie robinson scored the winning run. john was hooked for life. like any good historian he timed his research trip around games he wanted to see, especially to boston to see the red sox. for those of us in new england, we like to hear that. and we know the audience is looking forward to the book "winning independence". it's focused on the american era of the revolution. what do you love most about this chapter in our history. >> and first, let me thank you guys for having me in the library and the historical society for inviting me tonight. i've been looking forward to doing this. what i was drawn to the american revolution because that's where everything starts for the united states and our

political system, our social ideals were formed during the course of the revolution, if you think about it, lincoln, when he talked about four score and seven years ago was referring to 1776, and the ideals of equality and god-given rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for all people, and when martin luther king talked about having a dream, his dream was that african-americans would be cut in on the ideal that really began with the american revolution. so i was drawn to that and i think in addition, because the revolution, studying the revolution consists of two things, on the one hand, there's the revolution itself, which i think came as a surprise to most of the

participants. a dozen years before 1776, no one foresaw the revolution coming, but there it was and so the question comes up, why did it occur and what was the revolution about? was it just a case of colonists training to gain independence or was it, as thomas payne said in common sense in 1776, was it a struggle that would bring about a birthday of a new world? so there's plenty to study with regard to the american revolution, but in addition, you've got kind of a double dip there because you've got a war. most of the congressmen knew certainly when they declared independence in july of 1776, that they really weren't independent. they had to win the independence. and that led to a long war, a

war that had dark and uncertain times in 1776, then like a rollercoaster, things brightened when france allied with the united states in 1778 and many people felt that this virtually, including george washington, for that matter, felt that this virtually assured american independence and then things went south after that and there's-- the war becomes stalemated and that's the subject of my book, the four years after the great victory at saratoga, the period from 1778 to yorktown in 1781 when i think the outcome of the war was until a very last moment unknown. it could have gone in different directions.

no one knew until yorktown whether or not america would gain independence or if it did, if the united states would include all 13 states. so it's a long, dramatic struggle. i never get tired of looking at both the revolution and the war itself and the fascinating cast of characters that were part of the political revolution and part of the war. so that's why i went into it and i've stayed with the revolution throughout my career. >> thank you. so your new book was the one we are a featuring tonight in the independence and this is what hooked me as i read. it challenges the assumption that america won the war. instead, great britain lost a war it could have won which i

take directly. and the nuance of this thesis and how you feel like -- it's a very different way to look at the independence. >> sure, i think that the british had several opportunities at the outset of the war, 1776, 1777, 1775, 6 and 7, to have won the war. general gage, who was the commander of the british army at the time the rundown to the war was coming on, told london that winning the first engagement of the war is crucial. if we can have enough troops over here that we can score a dramatic victory over the colonists, then probably their fervor for war will disappear. instead of that happening, lexington and concord occurred and particularly the disaster that faced the british when

they marched back from concord to boston. and then they had a chance to score a dramatic victory two month later at bunker hill in boston, and really, they could have scored a bloodless victory. sir henry clinton, who was the third in command at the time, advised general gauge, look, just send forces around to the back side and we'll pinion the american rebels up on top of the hill and we can score a bloodless victory. but they didn't do that and they marched up the hill and marched into a disaster. and there were two instances in the campaign for new york in '76 when i think if the british had acted resolutely, first brooklyn when they had about half of washington's army trapped, and then in september

of 1776 when washington foolishly kept his army on manhattan and didn't get off, that the british could have annihilated the entire continental army at that point. and any of those victory would have won the war, i think, for the british. and another chance in 1777, the plan that london devised was for an army to come down from canada led by john burgoin, while general howell, moved north to rendezvous with burgoin and catch washington's army in between. instead of doing that, howell left burgoin to his own devices and howell went off after philadelphia. missed, i think, really the

last major chance that the british had to win the war. but that's not to say that britain defeat after that was guaranteed because as i said, earlier, it's a long, desperate war, lots of things go wrong for the americans after 1778, as the war stalemated the american economy collapsed. american morale was sagging, and george washington, in august of 1780, wrote a letter to the chief executive of pennsylvania in which he said, i have almost ceased to hope. and at the same time as washington was writing that letter. arthur lee, who had been an american diplomate overseas in

europe, returned to america since before the war began and he landed in boston. boston of all places now, and he's there for a few days and talks with a number of boston officials and massachusetts officials and he wrote that most of those had by august of 1780 concluded that the war would end in a negotiated settlement short of independence. so things are really up in the air. of course, at yorktown, america does win and gain its victory against gain independence and they were victorious and to celebrate five more years with the 250th anniversary of 1776.

so, but i also argued that america could not have won the war without french assistance. the french were providing clandestine assistance starting in 1775, they provided munitions and weaponry and clothing and blankets and whatever for the americans and then they allied with the americans and then it was open help for the americans and they could provide even more help. they sent over a navy and they eventually sent over an army, and they loaned a great deal of money to the americans which wound up costing the french king his head in the 1790's because the economic woes, the fallout from all of those loans contributed to france's problems. it brought on the french

revolution after 1789. so, anyway, the americans win the war with french help which i think is extremely important to remember. >> thank you. could we step back though to somebody you mentioned earlier and somebody we probably don't know too much about and that's general sir henry clinton. you've put as part of your thesis that you think he deserves corrected treatment from historians. what aspect of his career have historians misunderstood and why doesn't he receive credit for strategizing to capture, georgia and north carolina and an outcome that would have retrain the map of america? >> yeah, let me go to my power point here. that's washington, as everybody knows, wilson and payne and one of washington's-- and here is sir henry clinton.

clinton became the command earth of the british army. he learned of his appointment in may of 1778. he was the third british commander during the war. gauge had been there for many years before the revolution, before the war, and was recalled after the disasters along concord road and at bunker hill. and general william howell succeeded him and howell was commander in 1776 and 7 and resigned after saratoga. so clinton, who -- clinton was then named the commander and he'll be the commander of the british army from may of '78 through and a little beyond yorktown. i found clinton an interesting

figure. he was from an aristocratic family and anyone, his career was a career naval officer who became the royal governor of new york and young henry, when he was still growing up, spent some of his formative years in new york city. he joined the british army as a teenager and he fought in two wars before the revolutionary war and he earned a reputation as a brave, courageous, risk taking soldier who was seriously wounded. in fact, in an engagement in germany in the seven years war, in the early 1760's. he was an intellectual ly curious individual and he

read deepy on military history and military strategy and the year before the revolutionary war broke out 1774, out of his own pocket he paid to make a trip deep into eastern europe to observe a war between the russians and the turks, hoping to learn more about military strategy and tactics. and then he came over three or four weeks after lexington and concord, just in time to see some action at bunker hill. he served, i think, with some distinction in a couple of years before he's named commander. he's won a reputation in some circles as the best strategist among britain's high ranking

officers in america during that time. he was-- at the time of his deployment, 48 years old, two years older than washington, but was more than 30 years of experience and i think he did a good job as the commander. he -- but he had the misfortune, i think, of becoming commander at the same moment that france entered the war and now that britain has to fight both the french and the americans, they had to withdraw some of their troops from america and send them to the caribbean to meet the new threat posed by the french. so when clinton read his orders, he discovered that he had to immediately relinquish 8,000 of his troops and he'd

already lost all of those troops that had surrendered at saratoga. so he was going to have an army-- he did have an army that was considerably smaller than the army that the british had had in america a year before, but despite that, he-- his orders were to bring washington to battle, hold onto new york, hold onto rhode island and implement this new southern strategy later on. he really faced an enormous task and from the very beginning clinton knew that he was up against it. my fate is hard, as he put it. and in a letter that he wrote almost immediately after being named commander, he said that he thought it was inevitable

that britain would lose the war and he feared that he would be scapegoated for the loss of the war and it turned out he was prescient because after yorktown, many people in england did scapegate clinton and they blamed clinton arguing that he had been too passive, that he wasn't a risk taker, he wasn't dynamic enough, he just had not done enough, they argued, to have won a war that britain could have won. and i think most of those arguments were picked up by historians down the road so that clinton's reputation in the literature, has suffered as well. and i try to argue in the book that many of those allegations just aren't true. clinton was, i think, far more

active than his foes suggested. he did take risks, he was far more active than washington was during the four years between saratoga and yorktown, for instance. thomas payne, after the war in the 1790's wrote a blistering pamphlet attacking washington and payne argued, i don't agree with payne on this, but payne argued that washington slept in the field, as he put it, and as the real winners of the war were generals horatio gage and nathaniel green. and, but washington was generally inactive during much of that time and clinton was far more active. and he think the most devastating thing, most

devastating attack or appraisal of clinton came about almost 75 years ago, but still went by scholars today and many still accepted and it was a study made by clinton's biographer, principal biographer in conjunction with a clinical psychologist, and they argued that clinton sought power, but that he had deep subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he had. and i think, frankly think the argument is malarky. not that i'm a particular foe of psycho-history, but in this case, they were obviously unable to put clinton on the couch and talk with him, but in addition clinton left behind

virtually no private correspondence that would have opened a window to his inner self. so, i think clinton's reputation suffered from that. there's your kitty. [laughter] >> this is joey just joining us now. [laughter] >> that's all right. i've closed the door so mine can't get in the room. but anyway, i think that that study on clinton should be filed away in the circular file. i think he surely made mistakes, i recognize that in the book, but i think he was a good general and exceedingly good strategist who didn't have too awfully much to work with and faced just enormous challenges. so, i hope that my appraisal

will convince some people to take another look at sir henry clinton. i did know the know anything about him until reading this and i did leave enlightened in terms of the scope and depth of his ability. we're going to stay with him for a little bit and realized actually with the chronology, our next questions are out of order. and carrie you take mine and i'll take yours, after british's saratoga, adopted the so-called southern strategy. what was it and what was britain trying for in the war 1778 and onward? >> sure, after saratoga, the british-- in fact, many people in england after saratoga wanted to drop out of the war. it had gone on three years and achieved nothing and lost an

entire army at saratoga. so when the news came in at saratoga triggered a lengthy debate in lord north's, in 1778, a debate over one thing whether to remain in the war and in the decision was to remain in the war, whether the-- what kind of strategy would they pursue. down to this point the strategy then to try to destroy washington's continental army and also win control of several is northern provinces and they really hadn't succeeded on either score. so at the end of the debate, the notion of remaining in the war prevailed, largely because

king insisted that the war continue and let me go back to my power point here. and the person who really led the fight to remain in the war was lord george germane. he was the american secretary or secretary of state for the american colony and germane, in that position, he was in essence a minister of war and he was also-- he also had responsibility for britain's army in america. and germane understood that a new strategy had to be developed and germane came up with what became known as the southern strategy and that was essentially to, in essence,

write off the northern colonies and attempt to regain control of two and possibly three colonies down south, georgia, south carolina, and possibly north carolina as well. and germane thought that that was a plausible strategy because he believed-- and i think he was generally collect correct in this score that a greater percentage of colonists rather than the northern con colony, they were tithing through the economy and anglican church. and so germane felt by going into the south, many of these loyalists would willingly bear

arms for their king, and since many of the troops, as i said, 8,000 troops had to be relinquished by clinton, they could be replaced, hopefully, by loyalists, some of whom would come into the regular british army and enter what became known as provincial regiment, and others would go into newly structured loyal militia units, and the idea was that the british army would drive the rebels out of an area and then the loyalists militia would come in behind the british army and take possession of that area and pacify the area. and if it worked out, this is what the united states, assuming it got its independence, might have looked like following the war. the area in red is the area

that would be the united states and everything else on there in white would be possessed by the british. so if germane's plan, southern strategy panned out and georgia and west and still in control of canada. so the united states would have been small, weak, surrounded by a great european power and it would face very uncertain future and in fact, there were many in england that thought if this played out in this fashion, that not very long, many in the united states would

seek to return to the british empire because they just would have very little capability of expanding and whatever. so that was the southern strategy and cobbled together in the winter of 1778 in london, and as i mentioned a little bit earlier, when clinton receives his orders, it includes implement the southern strategy, which he gets around to pretty fast. he is sent a 3,000 man expedition to georgia in december of 1778 and then a one-day battle the british retook savannah and then in 1780 clinton comes south, leads a huge expedition down to

retakes charleston. and in a siege operation in april and may of 1780. so, and then, clinton and let me show you just one more slide here real quickly, after charleston falls, clinton appoints -- there we go. he appoints general cornwallis to be in charge of the south carolina and georgia. and from day one cornwallis' orders were to focus on south carolina and could go into north carolina if he thought it would help him with subduing

the rebels, the rebellion in south carolina and georgia. so he's going to be the major player in the war in the south from the time he takes command in june of 1780 down into the late spring of -- well, 1781 and on until he arrives at yorktown in the summer of 1781. clinton, meanwhile, comes back to new york and he never saw cornwallis again until yorktown, that's the southern strategy and that's what the british were trying to accomplish and i try to argue in the book that they came and

things went wrong that we could maybe talk about later on at the beginning of 1781 clinton was far more confident than washington was of what was going to happen that year. clinton later said that he began 1781 more confident of british success than in any of the other four years that he was commander. and i think what clinton ultimately thought was that if the allies of the french and americans could be prevented from scoring a decisive victory in 1781, that the war would end in a negotiated settlement, and clinton wasn't alone in that. i think washington felt that, lafayette says that in his

letters, john adams in europe is writing to congress and telling congress pretty much the same thing, adams is telling congress, look, the french haven't-- they've been in this war for three years and they haven't gained anything out of it. so they've got to gain something in 1781 or they're going to-- it's a face-saving measure. they're going to accept an invitation from neutral nations in europe to come to a peace conference, and what would have happened at that peace conference is anybody's guess, maybe it would have recognized a united states, independent united states, it was smaller or something along the lines of that map that i showed or maybe it would not agree to the independence of the united states. this was the-- would have been a conference primarily of european monarchs who weren't very friendly toward republican governments and that's what the united

states had at that point. >> well, i think you just answered the next three questions. [laughter] >> sorry about that. >> no, that's all right. we've come up with a couple of different kind of ones. so let me-- i'm going to take one of the ones you wrote. >> when comparing and contrasting clinton and washington, which you've kind of been doing this whole half hour, there emerges parallel leadership and effectiveness. what is it about washington that beguilles the americans and which man would you prefer and why? >> first on the comparison of clinton and washington, let me say a couple of things about that. in a section that runs maybe a dozen pages where i tried to look at the two and see what i could find about both of them, and i found that there were some similarities between the

two. that neither man was a gregarious, outgoing individual. in washington's case, it may have been that washington had insecurities and that he didn't want people to get too close to him to discover what he feared were his weak points or it may have simply been that washington, as a leader, felt that he could not let anybody get very close to him. he had to make difficult personnel decisions. he didn't say this, but it kind of reminds me of what john f. kennedy said at one point, great leaders have to be both loved and feared, and washington may have felt that way. in the case of clinton, clinton acknowledged that he was very shy and not outgoing. he made one of the strangest

comments ever made by any political figure, i am a shy bitch, he said. [laughter] >> anyway, neither one of them were really outgoing, but clinton, i think, made friends more easily than washington who, in a sense, may never have had a really close friend in the real sense of the word, throughout his life. but both clinton and washington were brave, courageous men under fire. i'm always amazed at the battle of prince ton, washington was riding on horseback on british soldiers firing at him, and no further away from him than a pitcher to a batter on a

baseball diamond, that's pretty close not to flinch. as i said, clinton earned a reputation in the war before this one and again during the revolution as somebody who was courageous under fire. both of them, i think, faced somewhat similar problems during the war in that both had problems with supplies and both had lack of money and lack of troops and whatever, and both clinton and washington endured considerable criticism during the war. i'm not sure how many people remember it today, but there was a criticism of washington after he made several mistakes in the new york campaign in 1776 and then after the campaign of '77, even more and more open criticism of

washington. at one point, the president of congress around 1778 said that when washington communicated with congress, it was met with peals of laughter. but congress cut off -- congress could have ditched washington as some of his critics wanted, but congress, fortunately, didn't take that step. it knew it would bring on just political chaos and would probably ruin the war effort. and after that congress, congress cuts off the open criticism of washington, really launches the campaign to make washington iconic figure from valley forge on toward the end of the war, to elevate him so that he would be above criticism and they began celebrating washington's birthday annually and that's where i think clinton ran into

a lot of criticism, too. i think in the case of both of these guys, it's sort of like my experience, when i was a student, all the students complained about their professors. when i became a professor all the professors were complaining about the administrators, and whatever. and i think that that same sort of thing went on in the british army and in among the americans, too. and there were things like issues offer promotion and whatever, and people that got left out, were unhappy about that, so, both of them ran into a great deal of criticism. but there were plenty of differences between them and you mention when you were talking about why washington was a leader, one of the differences is that washington, i think, was a better leader

than clinton. and washington just exuded leadership. he was a big man. this was a time period when the study of muster rolls have demonstrated that the average full grown american male was 5 feet 7 inches tall and only 5 feet 8 inches in world war ii and hadn't changed much in the period after the revolution, but washington was almost 6 feet 4 inches tall so he literally towered over other people. he weighed in 1780, and he weighed 210 pounds. so at 6 feet 4, 210 pounds, i mean, he's about the same size as a quarterback of ohio state or clemson, or university of alabama or something today. and he did have a reputation of

athleticism. athleticism in those days was equestrianism and how you rode a horse and he seemed to be majestic on a horse and seemed to walk gracefully. clinton was about 5 feet 7, pretty average in many, many ways. so there were differences in that respect and one other difference was that other than their background, which was quite dissimilar, because as i mentioned clinton was from an aristocratic family in england, but one other difference was that people today often forget that washington often see washington as being above politics. but washington was really a very good politician. he was almost unsurpassed in his political skill. and clinton acknowledged openly, even though he had

actually held a seat in the house of commons at one point, he acknowledged that he was not a very good politician. he was just like a fish out of water in that regard. so there was some similarities and there were some differences. i've forgotten what the last part-- >> the question who would you serve under? >> oh, okay. well, that's a -- that's a tough question. i guess it would depend on your rank and whatever, but i think i would have served under either, either man, really. i mean, i think clinton was a good general and neither of these guys were blood thirsty. neither sent their men into battle in hopeless situations

and squaubarred troops and both of them had humanitarians is about them and both had too many shortage, both had so many troops they couldn't afford to lose troops. so i think they were-- they both were good commanders and i probably would have been willing to serve under either one of them although i have to say that i don't know that i would have wanted to be a soldier in the revolutionary war on either side. it was a really tough go. i mean, these guys, you know, the officers, higher ranking

officers when the armies were on the move and they were on the move a lot, the higher ranking officers could travel on horseback, but everybody else marched. and they literally, many of these guys marched thousands of miles and many of them were -- even in the british army, when we know all about the suffering at valley forge and morristown, whatever, in the american army, but even the british army in many cases, the men were ill-provisioned, ill-equipped and whatever. it was really a tough go for these guys, and, i mean, we're coming through a pandemic now and these guys faced disease and at least in the american army, most of the american soldiers who died wound up dying of disease, not from

combat. so, that was a risky, difficult, harsh environment that they faced. and so while i might have been willing to serve under both generals, i'm glad i didn't have to serve in war on either side. >> she has a question she's dying to ask you because it has to do with one of the other characters a connecticut person. >> and being on both sides of the war, so, all right, benedict arnold, is he a true traitor or a guy who wanted a steady pay check? >> that's a million dollar question and a lot of biographers have looked at that and can't get entirely in arnold's mind to know what was going on in there. let me try to answer it this

way, he -- he had some legitimate grievances. he had been passed over for promotion unfairly, unjustly, i think, and then when he became the military commander in philadelphia after the british evacuated philadelphia, many people turned against him because he was consorting with families that were regarded as tory families, and remember peggy schiffman, who was the daughter of suspected of being a tory family and he was actually prosecuted for financial speculation. so i think that he had some really legitimate grievances, although many other generals did, too, and only arnold is the one that commits treason,

which thomas payne wrote a pamphlet about in the wake of this, i don't know whether payne really believed this or trying to smooth over the fallout from arnold's treason, and he pointed that out to people. but having said that, there's the second thing here, too, many people argue that arnold was just after the money and he did get a great deal of money from the british for turning coat, but there's another side to that equation and that is that arnold owned a considerable amount of property in new england and if america wound up winning the war, he was going to lose all of that property. so it would really be kind of a trade-off. he would lose valuable property, but gain what-- the money that the british were

going to pay him and he could have done probably just as well financially had he remained on the american side. but one of the things that's always intrigued me about arnold is that he negotiates with the british through intermediateries, and they report to sir henry clinton and for a long time clinton didn't know who the intermediaries were talking to, but he knew that it was an important american who might be willing to commit treason. and it's not until august of 1780 that arnold makes the decision to turn coat, and what happens in august of 1780, in august of 1780 cornwallis

scored a huge victory in camden, an army commanded by horatio gates. it was the fourth american army in 20 months that had been destroyed in the southern theater. and more than 8,000 american troops had been killed, wounded or captured in those four engagements. that's the same month that washington writes that letter saying i almost cease to hope. it's almost the same month that arthur lee in boston is saying that many of the leaders in massachusetts now believe the war's going to end in a negotiated settlement short of independence. so i think you can argue that when arnold finally makes his final decision to turn coat in august of 1780, he may very

well have believed that the american's goose was cooked and that the british were going to win the war and he was trying to get on the winning side. but having said all of that, as all speculating, no one really knows what's going on in arnold's mind. >> i do like you put him in the context of all of these time and anguish and decision making, so it's not an impetuous move for him to suddenly switch side. it could have been anyone in a similar position in terms of length and opportunity and i did appreciate that that put him in a new context and i couldn't resist asking if he really turned traitor or just a guy after a paycheck, thank you, great. [laughter] >> well, i think we need to get to questions from the audience because i think this is a wonderful history of this

book and it flows from you. are we ready for that? >> the audience is typing many questions in. i want to get to the last one that we have put together. >> oh, yeah. >> i think it brings the historic story to the modern era and that will give the audience time to type anything they'd like to ask. all war requires sacrifice and the numbers. american revolution we're talking casualties, the people involved, at statistics toward the end of the book. so what do you want modern readers to understand about the impact and the consequences of war? and really, this experience of it. >> yeah, i think there were two or three things, probably many more than that in my mind when i wrote the book. one of the things was that as i've already mentioned is that i wanted people could understand just how long this struggle to win independence

was. i think because of saratoga occurs in october of 1777 and a huge british army surrenders there and textbooks always depict saratoga as the turning point of the revolutionary war and tendency for people to think everything that followed saratoga was anti-climactic and the american victory was guaranteed. so i wanted readers to come away from my book understanding that a long, grim war had to be fought after saratoga. that victory wasn't guaranteed, it was as i side clinton thought that britain could still win the war in 1781. and i also wanted people to be

aware of just how grim this war was, that about 15% of those who fought on the british side died in this war, pretty heavy attrition. and as best i've been able to determine, roughly the same percentage of people who fought on the american side died in this war. to try to put that in some sort of meaningful terms, the united states lost about 350,000 men in world war ii, but if the united states had lost 15% of its soldiery, sailors, in world war ii, more than two million americans would have died in that war. so it's a war of -- that is

really, i think, a much bloodier war than many people are aware, and also, as i mentioned, i wanted people to understand that the outcome of the war is determined after saratoga, during that four-year struggle. and during that four years after saratoga, more americans died than died during the 30 months of war before saratoga, roughly about 65% of all americans who fought on america's side died after saratoga. another 4,000 americans who died fighting for great britain during this war and, in fact, in 1780, there were more americans fighting for great britain than are fighting in the continental army.

so those were the things that i wanted readers to come away with and i -- what i tried to do in the book was look at the crises that washington faced, crisis that clinton faced and that then the decisions that they made during those crisis and what they knew and what they didn't know when they made those decisions. oftentimes i think people sort of read history backward. they know how it came out, but the actors obviously didn't know that when they made these decision. they didn't know whether it would be a good decision or a bad decision, and they had to just make the decision based on what they knew at that time. and so i tried throughout the book when i looked at the decisions that clinton and washington and nathaniel green

and others made, why they made the decisions that they did and what they knew when they made those decisions. >> thank you. go to the audience questionsment what would have been allegiance for the british to allow for negotiated peace? what would have been in it for them? >> a lot of people in england wanted out of the war. it had been going on for a long time and winning the war, there was a fear that they were going to lose all the trade with america, the follow-up post war commerce with america and that the british economy might be ruined the longer the war continued. so, there were some in england who were pushing for a negotiated settlement and in fact, the immediately after

saratoga when lord north, the head of the war ministry, the prime minister, learns of saratoga, he proposes a negotiated settlement, referred to as the north peace plan of 1778. and he actually sends a commission of diplomates that was known as the carlisle commission that came over to america in 1778 and they were authorized to negotiate a settlement. ... carlisle commission that came over to 1778, and they were authorized to negotiate a settlement and what clinton or lord north was willing to accept was essentially everything that north would not recognize independence but he was willing to let a continental congress

remain. he was going to give the americans greater autonomy, and on and on and on, that the first cotton nettle congress had asked for. so certainly even right up to pinnacle power in england there were people who were willing to accept a negotiated settlement. >> john, thank you. your answers have beenen thoughtful. your writing gestapo. the book is extensivelye researched. absolutely enlightening and i really do encourage our audience to pick it up and read it because it has a completely different perspective and refreshing look at the american revolution so thank you for spending your evening with that. >> society. we look forward to hopefully hosting you in person. >> i look forward to that as well. i thank you once again for having me. >> weekends on c-span2 are an

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