>> sunday night on q&a, jessica delong was chief engineer of the historic fire vote john jake harvey september 11 when he was called back into service to aid firefighters following the attacks on the twin towers in her book, saved at the seawall, the story of a community of mariners who came to the rescue of thousands. >> the evacuation that delivered nearly half a million people to safety is an incredible example of the goodness of people that when you're given the opportunity to help, you have the tools skill set, you have availability people over and over again made the choice to put themselves in harm's way for the psaki of fellow humans and that is very instructive and something we need to continue to member. >> jessica sunday nights 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span sku and i. you can find q&a interviews wherever you get your podcast. ♪♪

>> good evening, welcome to our book talk this evening, author of leading independence. i am trying to hear with wilson from the historical society. we are cosponsoring the program tonight. we are in webinar mode if you have any questions, pop it into the q&a box and we will read them all at the end. i'll turn it over to introduce john. >> thank you. the historical society in connecticut is pleased to cosponsor this conversation with the dedicated historian guide to enlighten us with new information and maybe new theories especially the southern strategy. we left out because as local historians, especially here in connecticut where many important historical figures came from as well as battles fought and the continental army, we always want

to learn more. john is professor and narrative at the university of west georgia he enjoyed a long career revolution, america's founders and u.s. military history. he's written 13 books and many journal articles on politics and tactics the american revolution an early public. he's a biography of george washington and john adams. while i can't read the names of his book, i prefer to tell you more about john. although john's parents were from west virginia, he grew up in texas. according to his biography, his mother was college-educated in the 1920s, taught school for 11 years went until she was banned by west virginia law for mary. his father went to college on a baseball scholarship in the 1920s but the depression ended his academics. he took a job in texas and had one son in 1940. john has a bachelors in history and a masters in history from

baylor university. although he's retired, it hadn't stopped him from attending and speaking at seminars at these kinds of events and having a podcast, spending time writing which is his biggest passion. they live near atlanta but there's one more thing john likes to share, his love of baseball. first major league game he saw in 1947 between pittsburgh and brooklyn dodgers went jackie robinson's scoring the winning run. john was brought to life. like any good historian, he timed his research trips around games he wanted to see especially to boston to see the red sox. we like to hear that. our audiences looking to forward to hearing more about your most recent book so let's begin. as a historian, your focus has been on the era of the american revolution, what you love the most about this chapter in our history? >> first, let me thank you for having me in the library

historical society for inviting me tonight. i've been looking forward to doing this. i was drawn to the american revolution because that's where everything started for the united states and our political system, social ideals were formed during the course of the revolution. if you think about it, lincoln when he talked about fourscore and seven years ago was referring to 1776 and the ideals of the quality and god given rights, life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for all people and when martin luther king talked about having a dream, his dream was african-americans would be cut in on the ideals that began with the american revolution.

i was drawn to that and in addition because the revolution, setting the revolution consisted of two things. on the one hand there is the revolution itself which i think came as a surprise to most of the participants. a dozen years before 1776, no one foresaw the revolution coming there it was so the question comes up, why did it occur and what was the revolution? suggest a case of columnists trying to gain independence or was thomas paine said commonsense in 1776, was it a struggle that would bring about a birthday of a new world? there's plenty to study with regard to the american revolution but in addition

you've got a double dip because you've got a war. most of the congressman new when they declared independence in july 1776 that they really weren't independent, they had to win independence and that led to a long war, a war that had dark uncertain times in 1776, like a roller coaster, france allied with the united states in 1778 many people felt this, including george washington virtually assured american independence and then things went south after that. the war becomes stalemate and that's the subject of my book. the four years after the great

victory at saratoga, 1778 to yorktown in 1781 when i think the outcome of the war wasn't until the very last moment unknown, it could have gone in different directions, no one knew whether or not gain independence or if the united states would include all 13 states so it is a long and dramatic struggle, i never get tired of looking at both revolution and the war itself and the fascinating cast of characters part of a political revolution and part of the war so that's why i went into it and i've stayed with the revolution

throughout my career. >> thank you. your new book we are featuring tonight, this is what hooked me as i read. the challenges and assumptions america one the war instead, great britain lost the war it could have one which i think -- page 545. elaborate on this and how you selected this. this is a different way to look at the independence. >> i think the british had several opportunities at the outset in 1776, 77, 75, six and seven have won the war. general gage, the commander of the british army at the time the rundown of the war was coming on told london winning the first

engagement of the war is crucial. if we can have enough troops over here we can score a dramatic victory over the columnists then probably their fervor for war will disappear. instead of that happening, they conquered them into disaster that face the british when they marched back to boston. then they had a chance to score dramatic victory two months later in boston. they really could have stored all post pictures. clinton, the third in command at the time advised general gage, send forces around to the backside and we will pin the rebels up on top of the hill and we can score a victory but they didn't do that they marched up

the hill into a disaster and there were two instances in the campaign for new york and 76 when i think the british had acted resolutely first on the front when they had about half of washington's army trapped and again in september 761 washington foolishly kept his army on manhattan didn't get off from of the british could have annihilated the entire continental army. any of those victories would have won the war for the british they had another chance in 1777 the plan but london devised was for an army to come down from canada led by john burgoyne while general with burgoyne kept

washington's army in between. instead of doing that, he left burgoyne to his own devices and how went on after philadelphia. mr. i think, the match last major chance ritesh had to win the war but that's not to say britain's defeat after that was guaranteed as i said earlier, it is a long desperate war, a lot of things go wrong after 1778 i was the war made the american economy collapsed american morale was sagging and george washington in august of 1780 wrote a letter to chief

executive of pennsylvania in which he said i've almost ceased hope. at the same time washington was writing that letter, an american diplomat the beginning of the war overseas in europe returned to america for the first time or he landed in boston of all places and he's there for a few days and talks with boston officials in massachusetts officials and he wrote most of those had, by august of 1780 included the war would end a negotiated settlement short of independence. so things are up in the air.

when they do gain their victory in game independence, america did come out victorious which we are going to celebrate and about five more years for the 250th anniversary of 1776 but i also argued america could not have won the war without french assistance. the french were providing assistance starting in 1775 they provide weaponry and clothing and blankets and whatever for the americans and they allied with the americans and content and that it was open. they could provide even more help and they settle an army and

they have a great deal of money to the americans which wound up costing the french king his head in the 1790s because the economic blows, the fallout from all of the loans contributed after 1789. the americans do with french help which i think is extremely important to remember. >> could we step back to someone you mentioned earlier, somebody would probably don't know much about general sir henry clinton. to put this thesis you think he deserves correct treatment from historians. what have i really understood why doesn't he received credit for strategizing?

a move that would have changed the outcome and redrawn the map of america. >> let me go to my powerpoint here, here is another one of washington but here is sir henry clinton. clinton became the commander of the british army learning of his appointment in may 1778, the third british commander during the war and had been there many years before the revolution before the war and was recalled after the disasters along parker road and at the hill and general william succeeded him and his commander and 76 and 77 and resigned after saratoga so

clinton was named commander and he'll be commander of the british army may of 78 and a little beyond. i found an interesting figure, here's from an aristocratic family and a naval officer who became the royal governor of new york young henry when he was growing up spent some of his formative years in new york city. he joined as a teenager and he fought into wars before the revolutionary war and he earned a reputation as a brave, courageous risk-taking soldier fiercely wounded.

in engagement in germany in the seven years war in the early 1760s, he was an intellectually curious individual, he read especially deeply on military history strategy and the year before the revolutionary war and 74th out of his own pocket he paid to make a trip deep into eastern europe to observe a war between the russians and the turks hoping to learn more about military strategy tactics. then he came over as the third in command of the british army landing three or four weeks after they conquered just in time to be action at the hill.

he served i think with some couple of years before he's named commander, breast best strategists among the high-ranking officers in america during that time his appointment 48 years old, two years older washington more than 30 years of experience. i think he did a good job as a commander but he had the misfortune becoming commander the same moment phrase after the war now that britain had to fight both the french and

americans, they had to withdraw some of their troops from america and the caribbean to meet the new threat posed by the french so when you have these orders, he discovered he had to immediately relinquish 8000 of his troops he had already lost all the troops that had surrendered at saratoga so he would -- he did have an army considerably smaller than the army the british had in america the year before but despite that, his orders were to bring washington to battle, hold onto new york, hold onto rhode island and implement the new southern strategy so he faced in enormous

task and from the very beginning, clinton knew he was up against it, my fate as hard as he put it in a letter he wrote almost immediately after being named commander. he said he thought it was inevitable britain would lose the war and he feared he would be scapegoated and it turned out he was pressing it because after yorktown, many people england did scapegoat clinton and they blamed him, arguing he'd been too passive, he was a risk takec enough, he had that not done enough to have one.

i think most of the arguments were picked up by historians down the road so clinton's reputation in the literature suffered as well. i try to argue in the book many of the allegations are true. clinton was far more active then is supposed suggested. he did take risks, is far more active than washington was during the four years between saratoga and yorktown, thomas paine after the war 1790s wrote blistering pamphlet attacking washington pain argued, i don't agree with this but he argued that washington stopped in the field, as he put it and the real winners of the

war generals -- and nathaniel but washington was generally an active during much of my time in clinton was far more active. the most devastating thing, devastating attack on appraisal of clinton came about almost 75 years ago but still read by scholars today and many still accept it, it was a study made by clinton's biographer in conjunction with a psychologist and fate argued that clinton saw power but he had deep subliminal psychological problems preventing him from acting on the power he had and i think the

argument is malarkey, not that i am up particular foe of his history but this case they were obviously unable to put clinton on the couch and talk with them but in addition clinton left behind virtually no private correspondence that would have opened a window to his inner self so i think clinton's reputation suffered from fat. there is your kitty. [laughter] >> this is joey just joining us now. [laughter] >> i've closed the door so mine can't get in the room. but anyway, that study on clinton should be filed away in a circular file.

he certainly made mistakes, i recognize that in the book but i think he was good general and exceedingly good strategists who didn't have too much to work with faced enormous challenges. i hope my appraisal will convince people to take another look at sir henry clinton. >> i didn't know anything about it until reading it. i did leave enlightened in terms of his ability. we are going to stay with him a little bit and the chronology, our next questions are out of order. after britain's catastrophe in 1777 adopted a new strategy, solvent strategy, what was it and what was their attempt to gain in the war?

>> after saratoga -- many people in england wanted to drop out of the war. it had gone on for three years, they have achieved virtually nothing and now have lost an entire army at saratoga so when the news came in that saratoga triggered a lengthy debate went on through the winter of 1778 and it was a debate whether to remain in the war ended the decision was made to remain in the war what kind of strategy what they pursue? the strategy had been to try to destroy washington's continental

army and control northern provinces they hadn't succeeded on either score. at the end of the debate, the notion of remaining in the war largely because king insisted the war continued. let me go back to my powerpoint here. the person who lived to remain in the war was george jermaine, the american secretary or secretary of state for the american colony jermaine began in that position, he was in essence, the minister of war and he had responsibility for

britain's army in america if he understood that a new strategy had to be developed. jermaine came up with what became known as southern strategy and that was essentially virtually right off the northern colonies and attempt to regain control of the two and possibly three colonies down south. further, south carolina and possibly north carolina as well. jermaine thought that was in all strategy because he believed, generally correct in this that a greater percentage in the southern colonies remained loyal to anyone that was the case in

colonies. they were tied to economically and through the anglican church and others so jermaine by going into the south, and many of these would willingly bear arms and since any of the troops, 8000 troops relinquished could be replaced hopefully by loyalists, some of whom would come in to the regular british army and became known as -- others would go into newly struck oil and the idea was the british army would drive the rebels out and loyalists militias would come in behind us

and take possession area pass by the area. it worked out, this is assuming they got their independence might have work life following the war. the area in red was the area that would be the united states and everything else in white would be possessed so the seven strategy panned out south carolina below virginia were retaken, already had east and west florida, they gained back in a war that ended 1763, they were still in control of the trans- appalachian west so the united states would have been

surrounded by great european power and it would uncertain future. there are many who thought if this played out in this fashion, not very long many in the u.s. would seek to return to the british empire because they would have very little capability of planning whatever so that the seven strategy and they got together in the winter of 1778 and london earlier when clinton received his orders, it includes the southern strategy which he gets around to pretty fast, 3000 man expedition to

georgia in december 1778 a one day battle the british where he took savannah. in 1780, quentin comes south and the expedition where he takes charleston in a siege operation in april and may of 17807 clinton -- also you one more slide here quickly. after carlson falls, quentin appoints -- there we go. he appoints charles to be in charge of georgia.

from day one, his orders were to focus on south carolina and georgia. he could go into north carolina, he thought it would help him subduing the rebellion in south carolina and georgia so the major player in the war in the south from the time he takes command in june of 1780 down into late spring -- 12, 1781 until he arrives in the summer of 1781. clinton comes back to new york and he never saw one quality

until after yorktown. that was the southern strategy and what the british were trying to accomplish. i tried to argue in the book they came reasonably close, some things went wrong maybe we could talk about that later on this evening at the beginning of 1781, quentin was far more confident than washington was of what would happen that year. clinton later said he began 1781 more confident of british success than any of the other four years he was commander and what clinton ultimately thought

was if the allies of the french and americans could be prevented from scoring a victory in 1781, the war would end in a negotiated settlement. clinton wasn't along and that, i think washington felt that, i washington said that in his letters, john adams writing to congress and telling congress pretty much the same thing. adams tells congress the french have been in this war three years and they haven't gained anything so i've got to gain something from 1781 or it's a face-saving measure to get out, they will accept an invitation from patients in europe to come to a peace conference and what would have happened is anybody's guess, maybe he would've recognized independent united

states that was smaller or something along the lines of the map and i showed or maybe it would not agree to the independence of the united states. what have been a conference primarily of european monarchs who want friendly to republican governments and that's what the united states had at that time. >> i think you just answered the next three questions. [laughter] >> sorry about that. >> would come up with a couple of different ones. when comparing and contrasting clinton in washington which you have been doing for half an hour, parallel leadership potential and what is it about washington which hand would you prefer to serve under and why?

>> first on the comparison of quentin in washington, i'll say a couple of things about that. as a section that runs maybe a dozen pages where i tried to look at the two and see what i could find about both of them. i found there were some similarities between the two. neither man was an outgoing individual. in washington's case, it may have been that washington had insecurities and she didn't want people to get too close to him to discover what he feared were his weak points or may have simply been that washington as a leader felt he could not let anybody get very close. he had to make different

decisions. he didn't say this but it reminds me of what john f. kennedy said great leaders have to be both loved and feared. washington may have felt that way in the, quentin acknowledged he was very shy and not outgoing. he made one of the strength made by any historical figure who i am shy -- he says anyway, neither of them were really outgoing i think made friends more easily washington and never have had a close friend in the real sense of the word throughout his life but both quentin washington or brave, courageous men under fire rule,

i voice been amazed at the battle, washington was riding on horseback into british wiring they were no further from him in a picture is from a baseball batter on a diamond. clinton earned a reputation during the revolution as somebody who was courageous under fire. both of them faced similar problems during the war in that both had problems with supplies and lack of money and troops and whatever. both quentin and washington endured considerably criticism

during the war. i'm not sure how many people remembered today but there was a great deal of criticism of washington and 76 and then after the campaign of 77, even more, more open criticism of washington, at one time president of congress around 1778 said when washington communicated with congress, it was met with peals of laughter. congress cut off -- congress could have ditched washington as some critics wanted but congress fortunately did not take that step, they knew it would bring on political chaos and probably ruin the efforts. after that, congress cuts off the open criticism and really

launches the campaign to make washington an iconic figure on toward the end of the war to elevate him so he would be above criticisms and they began celebrating washington's birthday annually and that sort of thing. clinton ran into a lot of criticism, too. i think in the case of both of these guys, sort of like my experience when i was a student, all students complained about their professors complaining about the administrators and the same sort of thing went on in the british army and among the americans. there were things like issues over promotion and whatever and people who got left out were

unhappy about that so both of them ran into criticism. there were plenty of differences between them and you mention when you are talking about when washington was a leader, one of the differences is washington i think was a better leader than quentin. washington exuded leadership, he was a big man and this was a time. when the studies demonstrated that the average full grown american male, 5-foot 7 inches tall was only 5-foot 8 inches in world war ii so didn't change much in the period after the revolution. washington was almost 64 inches tall so he literally towered over other people.

he weighed, in 1780, 210 pounds. 6-foot four, 210 pounds, is about the same size as a quarterback of ohio state or university of alabama or something today. he did have a reputation of athleticism and in those days, that was the question arianism how you wrote a horse. he seemed to be majestic on a horse and walked graceful. clinton on the other hand, was about 5-foot seven, pretty average in many ways so there were differences in that respect and one other difference other than their background, quentin was from an aristocratic family in england but one other difference was people today

often forget that washington often see washington as being about politics but washington was really a very good politician. he was almost unsurpassed in his political skills. winton acknowledged openly, even though he held a seat in the house at one time, he acknowledged he was not a very good politician, he is like a fish out of water in that regard so there were some similarities and some differences. i forgot the last part. >> who would you serve under? >> oh, okay. that's a tough question. [laughter] i guess it would depend on your

rank and whatever but i think i would have served under either man really. i thought quentin was a good general, neither of these guys were bloodthirsty, neither sent their men into battle in hopeless situations and squandered troops. ...

>> it was really a tough go for these guys. we're coming through a pandemic now, and these guys faced disease and at least in the american army, most of the american soldiers who died wound up dying of disease, not from combat. it was a risky, difficult, harsh environment that they faced. while i might have been willing to serve under both generals, i'm glad i didn't have to serve in the war on either side. >> there's a question here. this has to do with one of the characters, the connecticut person. >> it has to do with being on both sides of the war. benedict arnold, is he a true traitor, or just a guy who

wanted a steady paycheck because -- [laughter] >> well, that's kind of the million dollars question, and a lot of people biographers have looked at that, and you can't get entirely in arnold's mind to know what was going on in there, but let me try to answer it this way. he had legitimate grievances. he had been passed over for a promotion, unfairly, unjustly, i think, and then when he became the military commander in philadelphia after the british evacuated philadelphia, many people turned against him, because he was consorting with families that were regarded as [inaudible], families who married a daughter of a family

who was suspected to be a [inaudible] family. he was actually prosecuted for financial [inaudible]. so i think he had some really legitimate grievance, although many other generals did too, and only arnold is the one that committed treason. thomas payne wrote a pamphlet about in the wake of this, i don't know whether payne really believed this, or he was trying to smooth over the fallout from arnold's treason, he pointed that out to people. but having said that, there is a second thing here too, many people argue that arnold just was after the money, and he did get a great deal of money from the british for turning coat, but there is another side to that equation, and that is that

arnold owned a considerable amount of property in new england, and if america wound up winning the war, he's going to lose all of that property, so it would really be a trade off, he would lose valuable property but gain the money that the british were going to pay him. he could have done probably just as well financially had he remained on the american side, but one of the things that intrigued me about arnold is he negotiated with the british through intermediaries, and those intermediaries report to sir henry clanton. for a long time clanton didn't know who it was that the intermediaries were talking to. he assumed it was an important american who might be willing to commit treason.

it is not until august of 1780 that arnold makes the decision to turncoat, and what happens in august of 1780, in august of 1780, cornwallace scored a huge victory over an american army at camden in south carolina, an army commanded by horatio gates. it was the fourth american army in 20 months that had been destroyed in the southern theater, and more than 8,000 american troops had been killed, wounded or captured in those four engagements. that's the same month that washington writes that letter saying i've almost ceased to hope, and it is the same month that arthur lee in boston is

saying that many of the leaders in massachusetts now believe the war's going to end in a negotiated settlement, short of independence, so i think you can argue that when arnold finally makes his final decision to turncoat in august of 1780, he may very well have believed that the americans' goose was cooked and that the british were going to win the war, and he was trying to get on the winning side, but having said all of that, it is all speculation. nobody really knows what was going on in arnold's mind. >> i do like you put him in the context of all the anguish and the decision making, so it is not an impetous move for him to switch sides.

it could have been anybody's position in range of opportunity. that put him in a new context. i couldn't resist asking if he was a true traitor or just a guy out there for a paycheck, so thank you. i think we need to get some questions from the audience. i think this is a terrific overview of this book. your history is wonderful, how it comes from you. thank you very much. are we ready for that? >> yes, while the audience is typing questions in, i want to get to the last one that terry and i had put together, which i think it brings the story to the modern era, which will give the audience time to type anything they would like to ask. all war requires sacrifice. the numbers of the american revolution, we're talking the casualties, the people involved, the statistics towards the end of the book, they are staggering. what do you want modern readers to understand about the impact and the consequences of war and really that visceral experience

of it? >> i think there were two or three or probably many more than that in my mind when i wrote the book, but one of the things that i've already mentioned is that i wanted people to understand just how long the struggle to win independence was. i think because saratoga occurs in october of 1777, and a huge british army surrenders there, and textbooks always depict saratoga as the turning point of the revolutionary war, that there has been a tendency on the part of many people to think well, everything that followed saratoga was anticlimactic and the american victory was guaranteed. and so i wanted to -- i wanted readers to come away from my book understanding that a long

grim war had to be fought after saratoga, that victory wasn't guaranteed. as i said [inaudible] thought that britain could still win the war in 1781. i also wanted people to be aware of just how grim this war was, that about 15% of those who fought on the british side died in this war, pretty heavy attrition, and as best that i've been able to determine, roughly the same percentage of people who fought on the american side died in this war. to try to put that in some sort of meaningful terms, the united states lost about 350,000 men in

world war ii, but if the united states had lost 15% of its soldiers, sailors, in world war ii, more than 2 million americans would have died in that war. so it's -- it's a war that is really i think a much bloodier war than many people are aware, and also as i've mentioned, i wanted people to understand that the outcome of the war is determined after saratoga, during that four-year struggle, and during that four years after saratoga, more americans died than died during the 30 months of war before sar to ga.

roughly about 64% of americans died after saratoga. another 4,000 americans who died fighting for great britain during this war. in fact in 1780, there are more americans fighting for great britain than are fighting in the continental army. those are the things i wanted readers to come away with. what i tried to do in the book was look at the crises that washington faced, the crises that clanton faced and the decisions that they made during those crises and what they knew and what they didn't know when they made those decisions. often times i think people sort of read history back wards, they know how it came out, but the actors obviously didn't know

that when they made their decision. they didn't know whether it would be a good decision or a bad decision, and they had to just make the decision based on what they knew at that time, so i tried throughout the book, when i looked at the decisions that clanton and washington and nathaniel green and others made, why they made the decisions that they did and what they knew when they made doze ever those decision -- when they mode those decisions -- when they made those decisions. >> what would have been in it for the british to allow for negotiated peace? >> there were many people in england who wanted to get out of the war. it had gone on for a long time. winning the war, there was a fear that they were going to lose all the trade with america,

postwar commerce with america, and that the british economy might be ruined the longer the war continued, so there were some in england who were pushing for a negotiated, see in fact, immediately after saratoga, when the head of the war ministry, prime minister, learns of saratoga, he proposes a negotiated settlement. it is usually referred to as the north peace plan of 1778, and he actually sends the commission of diplomats that was known as the carlisle commission that came over to america in 1778 and they were authorized to negotiate a settlement. and what clanton was -- what lord north was willing to accept

was essentially everything that the first continental congress had to ask for on the eve of war with one exception, and that was independence. north would not recognize independence, but he was willing to let a continental congress remain. he was going to give the americans greater autonomy and on and on, that the first continental congress had asked for. so certainly even right up to the pinnacle of power, in england, there were people who were willing to accept a negotiated settlement. >> john, thank you. your answers have been thoughtful. your writing is thoughtful. the book is extensively researched. >> i have one too. >> yes, it's absolutely enlightening, and i really do encourage our audience to pick it up and read it because it has a completely different perspective and a refreshing

look at the american revolution. thank you for spending your evening with us at the historical society. we look forward to hopefully hosting you in person at the end of the pandemic. >> i look forward to that as well. i thank you once again for having me. ♪ ♪ >> weekendses on c-span 2 bring you the best in american history and nonfiction books. this weekend marks the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, saturday at 9:10 a.m. eastern on american history tv's american artifacts, touring the flight 93 national memorial near shanksville pennsylvania hearing the story behind the hijack and passengers who attempted to take control of the plane to thwart tests heading to washington, d.c. and president bush's oval office address to the nation on the night of 9/11. and former white house chief usher gary walters recalls events within the white house

walls after the terrorists crashed into the twin towers and the pentagon. book tv features leading authors discussing their latest nonfiction books. on sunday at 2:55 p.m., we'll continue our look back on 9/11 with a historian and his book "the only plane in the sky" an oral history of 9/11. at 4:15 p.m. eastern, a winning author lawrence wright and the book "the looming tower, al qaeda, and the road to 9/11". watch american history and book tv every weekend on c-span 2. and find a full schedule on your program guide or visit c-span.org. we looked at the life of 19th century u.s. postal inspector anthony comstock who used his position to promote morality including the 1873com stock law that prohibited the shipment of obscene material through the mail. here's a portion of that program.

>> anthony comstock was born in 1844 in connecticut. then part of connecticut, he grew up on a farm. he could see the long island sound from the farm. every sunday he and his brothers and sisters and parents went to the congregational church for many many hours. his mother polycom stock was a direct -- polly comstock was a direct descendant of the puritans. anthony fought in the civil war. his brother samuel died in service. he enlisted afterwards. he appears from his civil war diaries to have felt obsessively guilty about things. we think some of his animus towards obscenity came from the fact that during the civil war men were passing around books and pictures and this kind of thing because it had become

cheaper to mail these kinds of materials. he moved to new york around 1867, 1868, like many young veterans, and he wanted to become a dry goods salesman, but because he was interacting a lot with other men his age who were visiting prostitutes and pursuing what was called sporting life, sporting culture, which included boxing billiards, is aen loos, bar -- saloons, bars, there's another book that talks about all of this. he became very bothered by the men pursuit of vice. through a series of kind of small world coincidences, he was able to befriend the [inaudible] of the ymca which was founded in this country in 1852. and through the connections that he made to those guys, who included samuel colgate, a name you might know from your toothpaste tube and john morgan,

he was sent to washington in 1872 and 1873 and got this law passed that became known as the comstock law even though it has a much longer and more complicated name. anthony comstock was essentially -- he was an iconic figure in the sense that he had kind of a classic civil war era biography which was young, religious, christian, fought in the war and then moved to a large city and became really overwhelmed by the amount of vice, noise, craziness manufacturing of new york, and it drove him to become what i call a [inaudible]. >> to watch the rest of this program, visit our website booktv.org, search for the title of the book "the man who hated women" using