you can be part of the national conversation by participating in the video competition, your middle or high school students asking you to create a 5 to 6 minute documentary that answers the question how does the federal government impact your life, showing opposing points of view from the federal policy program that affect your your community using c-span video clips that are easy to access at c-span donald, the student can competition, 100,$000 into cash prizes and you have a shot at

the grand prize of $5,000. and his must be received before january 20th, 2022,% addition rules. visit our website, studentcam.org. >> host: welcome to our book talk with lucinda robb, author of "the suffragist playbook". i'm rebecca boggs roberts and i'm here with jane campbell. we are cosponsoring the problem tonight. pop them into the q and a box was i will turn it over to my colleague terry to introduce john. >> host: we are pleased to cosponsor the conversation with a dedicated historian and lightning us with new information and maybe new theories, especially that of the 7 strategies. we love that because as local historians in connecticut were

many important figures of the american revolution came from as well as the few battles fought in many connecticut farmers who fit the continental army we always want to learn more. john ferling is a professor at the university of west georgia where he taught about the revolution, founders and military history, he's written 13 books and many journal articles on the politics and tactics of the american revolution in our early republic. he's a biographer of george washington and john adams. i can read the names of his books and awards but i prefer to tell you more about john the man. although john's parents were from west virginia, he groping galveston, texas. according to his biography his mother was college-educated in the 1920s, taught school for 11 years until she was banned by west virginia law for marrying. her father attended college on a baseball scholarship of the depression and did his

academics, he took a job with carbide in texas, and one son, john, in 1940. john has a bachelor in history from sam houston university and a masters in history from baylor university. although he is retired it hasn't stopped him from attending and speaking at seminars, and lecturing at podcasts and spending time writing which is his biggest passion. he and his wife carolyn four catholic near atlanta but there's one more thing john likes to share, his love of baseball, the first major the game he saw was in 1947 between pittsburgh and the dodgers when jackie robinson scored the winning run. john was hooked for life. like any good historian he timed his research trip around games he wanted to see especially to boston to see the red sox. we like to hear that. our audience is looking forward to hearing more about your most

recent book "winning independence: the decisive years of the revolutionary war, 1778-1781". your focus is on the ear of the american revolution. what do you love most about this chapter in our history? >> guest: let me thank you for having me in the library and the historical society for inviting me tonight. i've been looking forward to doing this. i was drawn to the american revolution because that is where everything starts for the united states. our political system was reformed in the course of the revolution. if you think about it, lincoln when he talked about four score and 7 years a, referring to 1776 and the ideals of equality and god-given rights, life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for all people and martin luther king talked about having a dream his dream was

african-americans cut in on the ideals that began with the american revolution. in addition because the revolution consists of two things. on the one hand there is the revolution itself which came as a surprise to most of the participants. a dozen years before 1776, and and and as thomas payne said in 1776, was it a struggle that

would bring about a birthday of the new world. with regard the american revolution but also a double did because you got a war, most of the congressman new when they declared independence in july of 1776 that they weren't independent. they had to win independence. that led to a long war, a war that had darkened in certain times in 1776, then like a roller coaster things brightened when france allied with the united states in 1778. many people felt, including george washington, this virtually assured american independence. and then things went south

after that, the war becomes stalemated and that is the subject of my book, the four years after the great victory at saratoga, 1770 it to yorktown in 1781 when i think the outcome of the war was until the last moment unknown. it could have gone in different directions, no one knew until yorktown whether or not america would gain independence, or if it did, if the united states would include all 13 states. it is a long, dramatic struggle, i never get tired of looking at both the revolution and the war itself and the fascinating cast of characters

that were part of the political revolution. that is why i went into it and stayed with the revolution throughout my career. >> your new book "winning independence: the decisive years of the revolutionary war, 1778-1781," this is what hooked me as i read. it challenges the assumption that america won the war. instead great britain lost a war it could have won. on page 545. elaborate on the nuance of this thesis, very different way to look at independence. >> i think the british had several opportunities at the outset of the war, 1776, 1777, 1775, 6, and 7, to have won the war. general gauge the commander of the british army at the time

the run down to the war was coming on, told london that winning the first engagement of the war is crucial. if we have enough troops over here that we can score a dramatic victory over the colonists, probably their fervor for war will disappear. instead of that happening, lexington and concorde occurred, particularly the disaster that faced the british when they marched back from concorde to boston and they had a chance to score a dramatic victory at bunker hill in boston. really they could have scored a bloodless victory. sir henry clinton, third in command at the time, advised general gauge send forces to the backside and we will pin

the american rebels on top of the hill. we didn't do that, they marched up the hill and marched into a disaster and there were two instances in the campaign for new york in 76 when i think of the british had acted resolutely first in brooklyn when they had half of washington's army trapped and again in september of 76 when washington really foolishly kept his army on manhattan and didn't get off the british could have annihilated the entire continental army and any of those victories would have won the war for the british. another chance in 1777, the

plan that london devised was for an hour to come from canada while general howell to rendezvous with the coin and catch washington's army and instead of doing that, left bitcoin to his own devices and how went off after philadelphia and missed, i think, really, the last major chance the british had to win the war. but that is not to say britain's defeat after that was guaranteed. as i said, earlier, it is a long desperate war. lots of things go wrong for the americans as the war stalemated, the american economy collapsed.

american now was sagging, george washington in august of 1780 wrote a letter to the chief executive of pennsylvania in which he said i have almost ceased to hope. at the same moment washington was writing that letter, arthur lee, who had been an american diplomat since the beginning of the war overseas in europe returns to america for the first time since before the war began and he landed in boston of all places and he is there for a few days and talks with a number of boston officials in massachusetts and he wrote most of those had, by august of 1780 concluded that the war would end in a negotiated settlement

short of independence so things are up in the air. yorktown, america doesn't win and gains its victory against independence so america did come out of the war victorious, celebrating a 5 more years, 200 fiftieth anniversary of 1776 so i also argued that america could not have won the war without french assistance. the french were providing clandestine assistance starting in 1775, that provided munitions and weaponry and clothing and blankets and whatever for the americans and

the allied with the americans, then it was open help for the americans and they could provide even more help, they sent over a navy, they sent over an army and learned a great deal of money to the americans which wound up costing the french king his head in the 1790s because the economic woes, the fallout from all those loans contributed to france's problems that brought on the french revolution after 1789 so anyway the americans do win the war with french help which i think is extremely important to remember. >> could we step back to something you mentioned earlier who we don't know much about, that is general sir henry

clinton, you put as part of your thesis that he deserves corrective treatment from historians, what aspects of his career have historians misunderstood and why doesn't he receive credit for strategizing the capture of south carolina, georgia and possibly north carolina, a move that would have changed the outcome and redrawn the map of america? >> let me go to my power point, washington, charles wilson, here is another one of washington but here is sir henry clinton. clinton became the commander of the british army in disappointment of may of 1778. he is the third british commander during the war. gauge had been there for many years before the revolution, before the war and was recalled after the disasters along concorde road and bunker hill,

general william how succeeded him, was commander in 76, 77 and resigned after saratoga. clinton, clinton was then named the commander and he will be commander of the british army from may of 78 through and a little bit beyond yorktown. i found clinton interesting figure. he was from an aristocratic family in england, his father was a career naval officer who became the royal governor of new york, young henry when he was still growing up in some of his formative years in new york city, he joined the british army as a teenager and he

hotting two years before the revolutionary war and earned a reputation as a brave, courageous, risk-taking soldier who was seriously wounded in an engagement in germany in the 7 years war in the early 1760s. he was an intellectually curious individual, he read widely, deeply in military history and military strategy and the year before the revolutionary war broke out, 1774, out of his own pocket he paid to make a deep into eastern europe to observe a war between the russians and the turks hoping to learn more about military strategy and tactics and he came over as the third in command of the british

army landing just three or four weeks after lexington and concorde in time to see some action at bunker hill. he served with some distinction a couple years before he's named commander, won reputation in some circles as the best strategist among britain's high ranking officers in america during that time. at the time of his appointment, 48 years old, two years older than washington but 30 years of experience and i think he did a good job as commander.

he had the misfortune of becoming commander at the same moment that france entered the war and now that britain had to fight both french and the americans, they had to withdraw some of their troops from america and send them to the caribbean to meet the new threat posed by the french. when clinton read his orders he discovered he had to immediately relinquish 8000 of his troops and he had already lost all those troops that had surrendered at saratoga. he had an army that was considerably smaller than the army the british it had in america the year before but despite that his orders were to bring washington to battle, hold on to new york, hold on to rhode island and implement this new southern strategy we will

talk about a little later on so he faced an enormous task and from the very beginning clinton knew that he was up against it. my fate is hard, as he put it. a letter he wrote almost immediately after being named commander he thought it was inevitable that britain would lose the war and he feared he would be scapegoated for the loss of the war and turned out he was prescient because after yorktown many people in england did scapegoat clinton and blamed clinton, arguing he had been too passive, that he wasn't a risktaker, wasn't dynamic enough, just had not

done enough, they argued, to have won a war that britain could have won. i think most of those arguments were picked up by historians down the road so that clinton's reputation in the literature has suffered as well. i tried to argue in the book that many of those allegations just aren't true. clinton was, i think far more active than his foes suggest. he did take risks, far more active than washington was during the four years between saratoga and yorktown for instance. thomas paine after the war in the 1790s wrote a blistering pamphlet attacking washington and pain i did, i don't agree with pain on this but pain

argued that washington slipped in the field as he put it in the real winners of the war were generals horatio gates and nathanael greene, but washington was generally inactive during that time and clinton was far more active and the most devastating thing, most devastating attack or appraisal of clinton came about almost 75 years ago but still read by scholars today and many still accept it and it was a study made by clinton's biographer, principal biographer in conjunction with a clinical psychologist and they argued that clinton sought

power, but that he had to leap subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he had. i think frankly the argument is malarkey. not that i am a particular foe of psycho history but in this case they were obviously unable to put clinton on the couch and talk with him, but in addition clinton left behind virtually no private correspondence that would have opened a window to his inner self so i think clinton's reputation suffered from that. there is your kitty. >> this is joey just joining us now. i have closed the door so my cat can't get in the room.

that study on clinton should be filed away in the circular file. he made mistakes, i recognize that in the book but i think he was a good general and exceedingly good strategist who didn't have much to work with and faced enormous challenges. i hope that my appraisal will convince people to take another look at sir henry clinton. >> i didn't know about him until reading this. the scope and depth of his abilities. we will stay with him a little bit, with the chronology, our

next question, after britain in saratoga, adopted a new strategy, the southern strategy. what was it and what was britain attempting to gain in this war from 1778 onwards? >> i think after saratoga, the british, many people in england after saratoga wanted to drop out of the war it had gone on for three years, they had achieved virtually nothing and now lost an entire army at saratoga and so when the news came in of saratoga it triggered a lengthy debate in lord north's war ministry that went on through winter of 1778 and it was a debate over for one thing whether to remain in the war and if the decision was made to remain in the war whether -- what kind of

strategy would they pursue. down to this point the strategy then, to try to destroy washington and continental army and win control of several northern provinces, they really haven't succeeded on either score so at the end of the debate the notion of remaining in the war prevailed largely because the king insisted that the war continue. let me go back to my power point here and the person who really led the fight to remain in the war was lord george jermaine, the american secretary of state for the american colony and jermaine in that position, jermaine was in

essence the minister of war and also had responsibility for britain's army in america and jermaine understood a new strategy had to be developed, and jermaine came up with what became known as the southern strategy and that was essentially to write off the northern colonies and attempt to regain control of two, and possibly three colonies down south, georgia, south carolina and possibly north carolina as well, and jermaine thought that was a plausible strategy because he believed and i think he was generally that a greater

percentage of colonists in the southern colonies had remained loyal to england than was the case in the northern colonies. they were tied to england economically and through the anglican church and other factors so jermaine felt by going into the south, many of these loyalists would willingly bear arms for their king and since many of the troops, 8000 troops had to be relinquished by clinton, they could be replaced hopefully by loyalists some of whom would come into the regular british army and enter what became known as provincial regiments and others would go into newly structured loyalist militia. the idea was the british army

would drive the rebels out of an area and the loyalist militia would come in behind the british army and take possession of that area and pacify the area and if it works out, this is with the united states assume you got its independence might have looked like following the war. the area in red is the area that would be the united states and everything else in their would be possessed by the british. if jermaine's plan, southern strategy, panned out, georgia and south carolina, north carolina below virginia were retaken the british already had east and west florida, they gained that in a war that ended in 1763, they were still in

control of trans-appalachian west and canada so the united states would have been small, weak, surrounded by a great european power, and it would face very uncertain future. there are many in england that thought if this played out in this fashion, that in not very long many in the united states would seek to return to the british empire because they just would have very little capability of expanding and whatever. that was the southern strategy, cobbled together in the winter of 1778 in london and as i mentioned a little bit earlier, when clinton received his orders it includes implement the southern strategy, which he

gets around to pretty fast, he sent a 3000 man expedition to georgia in december of 1778 and the one day battle, the british retook savanna and then in 1780 clinton comes out, leads a huge expedition that retakes charleston in ach operation in april and may of 1780 and then clinton appoints -- one more slide real quickly. after charleston calls, clinton -- there we go, he appoints

general cornwallace to be in charge of the pacification of south carolina and georgia and from day one cornwallace's orders were to focus on south carolina and georgia. he could go into north carolina, thought would help him with subduing the rebel rebellion in south carolina and georgia so cornwallace, a major player in the war in the south from the time he takes command in june of 1780 down into the late spring, 1781 and on until he arrives at yorktown in the summer of 1781.

clinton meanwhile comes back to new york and never saw cornwallace again until after yorktown. that was the southern strategy and with the british were trying to accomplish. i try to argue they came reasonably close, things went wrong that we can talk about later this evening but at the beginning of 1781 clinton was far more confident in washington was of what was going to happen, that your. clinton later said that he began 1781 more confident of british success than it any of the other four years that he was commander, and i think what

clinton ultimately thought was if the allies of the french and americans could be prevented from scoring a decisive victory in 1781 that the war would end in a negotiated settlement and clinton wasn't alone in that. washington felt that the lafayette says that in his letters, john adams in europe is writing to congress and telling congress pretty much the same thing. adams is telling congress the french have been in this war for three years and haven't gained anything out of it so he's got to gain something in 1781 or they -- it is a face saving measure to get out, they will accept an invitation from neutral nations in europe to

come to a peace conference, and what would have happened at that peace conferences anybody's guess, maybe it would have recognized an independent united states that was smaller or something along the lines of that map that i showed her maybe it would not agree to the independence of the united states. this would have been a conference of european monarchs who weren't very friendly toward republican governments and that is what the united states had. >> you answered the next three questions. >> sorry about that. that is okay. >> we come up on a couple of different ones so i will take one that you wrote. when comparing and contrasting clinton in washington which you have been doing this half-hour, parallel leadership potential and effectiveness so what is it

about washington that the guiles the americans independent of size, which man would you prefer to serve under and why? >> first on the comparison of clinton and washington let me say a couple things. a section that runs maybe a dozen pages where i tried to look at the two and see what i can find about both of them and i found there were some similarities between the two, neither man was a gregarious, outgoing individual. in washington's case it may have been that washington had insecurities and didn't want people getting too close to him to discover what he feared were his week points or it may simply have been that washington as a leader felt

that he could not let anybody get very close to him. he had to make difficult personnel decisions. reminds me of what john f. kennedy said at one point, great leaders have to be both loved and feared, washington may have felt that way and in the case of clinton clinton acknowledged he was very shy and not outgoing, one of the strangest comments made by any historical figure, i am a shy bench, he says. so anyway, neither of them were really outgoing but clinton made friends more easily than washington who in a sense may never had a close friend in the real sense of the word

throughout his life but both clinton and washington were brave, courageous men under fire. i'm always amazed at the battle of princeton, washington was riding on horseback, riding right into british soldiers who were firing at him and they were no further away from him than a picture is from a batter on a baseball diamond, that is pretty close not to flinch and clinton had earned reputation during the revolution as somebody who was courageous under fire. both of them faced similar problems during the war in that both had problems with

supplies, both had black of money, of troops and whatever. both clinton and washington, during the war. there is a great deal of criticism of washington, after several mistakes in the new york campaign and 76 and after the campaign of 77 even more and more open criticism of washington, the president of congress around, congress could have ditched washington as some of his critics wanted but congress fortunately didn't take that step and new is would bring on political chaos and

ruin the war effort and after congress cuts off the "a system of washington, launches the campaign to make washington and iconic figure from valley forge on to the end of the war to elevate him so he would be of above criticism and begin celebrating washington's birthday annually and that sort of thing. clinton ran into a lot of criticism too. i think in the case of both of these guys it is sort of like my experience when i was a student all the students complained about their professors. when i became a professor of the professors were complaining about the administrators and whatever, same sort of thing went on in the british army and

among the americans too. there were things like issues over promotion, people got left out, were unhappy about that so both of them ran into a great deal of criticism but there were plenty of differences between them and you mentioned when you were talking about why washington was a leader, one of the differences is washington was a better leader than clinton and washington just exuded leadership. he was a big man. this was a time. go when the study of mister coles demonstrated the average full grown american male was 5 feet 7 inches tall. only 5 feet engines -- only 5 feet and inches in world war ii, so haven't changed month in the period after the revolution. washington was almost 64 inches

tall so he literally towered over other people. he weighed in 178210 pounds, 64, 210 pounds and he's about the same size as the quarterback of ohio state, clemson or university of alabama or something today and he did have a reputation of athleticism. athleticism in those days was equestrian is him, how you rode a horse and he seemed to be majestic on a horse, seems to walk gracefully. clinton was about 5 feet 7, pretty average in many ways so there were differences in that respect and one other difference other than their backgrounds, clinton was from

an aristocratic family in england, but one other difference was people today often forget that washington often see washington as being above politics but washington was really a very good politician, almost unsurpassed in his political skills and clinton acknowledged openly even though he had held a seat in the house of commons at one point he acknowledged that he was not a very good politician, he was a fish out of water in that regard. there were similarities and differences. i forgot the last part. >> who would you serve under? >> okay.

well, that is a tough question. i guess it would depend on your rank and whatever but i think i would have served under either man really. i think clinton was a good general. neither ofhese guys were bloodthirsty, neither send their men into battle in hope of situations and squandered troops, both of them were trying to preserve life, because both i think had humanitarian qualities about them but also because neither, both had so many shortages, both faced so many shortages of troops they couldn't afford to lose troops so i think they

both were good commanders and i probably would have been willing to serve under either one of them but i have to say i don't know that i would have wanted to be a soldier in the revolutionary war on either side. it was a really tough go. these guys, officers, higher ranking officers were on the move a lot. the higher ranking officers could travel on horseback but everybody else marched and they, many of these guys marched thousands of miles and many of them even in the british army, we know all about the suffering at valley forge, moorestown, whatever, in the american army but even the

british army in many cases the men were ill provisions, ill equipped, whatever, it was a tough go for these guys. we are coming through a pandemic now and these guys faced disease at least in the american army most of the american soldiers who died wound up dying of disease, not from combat, risky, difficult, harsh environment they faced, might have been willing to serve under both generals i didn't i didn't have to serve on either side. >> a question about one of those other characters, a connecticut person, has to be

on both sides of the war. benedict arnold. is he a trader or just a guy who wanted a steady paycheck? >> that is the million-dollar question. a lot of biographers, can't get entirely in arnold's mind to know what was going on. let me try to answer it this way. he had some legitimate grievances. he had been passed over for promotion unfairly, unjustly and when he became military commander when the british evacuated philadelphia, consorted with families that

were regarded as tory families, the daughter of a family suspected of being a tory family and was actually prosecuted for financial percolation so legitimate grievances, many other generals did too, arnold - which thomas paine wrote about, don't know if he believed this or was trying, the fallout from arnold's trees. many people argue that arnold is after the money and he did get a great deal of money, for

turning but there's another side to that. arnold owned a considerable amount of property in new england and if america wound up winning the war he was going to lose that property, really a trade-off, lose valuable property but gain the money the british were going to pay and could have done just as well financially had he remained on the american side. one thing that intrigued me about arnold, he negotiates with the british through intermediaries and those intermediaries report to sir henry clinton and clinton didn't know who it was the intermediaries were talking to.

it was an important american, willing to commit treason, it was not until august of 1780 that arnold makes the decision to turncoat and what happens in august of 1780. in august of 1780, cornwallace scored a victory over an american army at camden in south carolina, and army surrounded by horatio gates. an american army in 20 months had been destroyed in the southern theater. more than 8000 american troops killed, wounded or captured in those four engagements, that is the same month washington writes that letter saying i

almost ceased to hope and the same that arthur lee in boston is saying many of the leaders in massachusetts believe the war will end and negotiated settlement so you can argue when arnold makes his final decision in august of 1780, he may very well have believed americans goosed was cooked and the winning side. nobody knows what was going on at arnold. >> in the context, was not an impetuous move.

the new context, couldn't resist -- so thank you. >> this has been a terrific overview of this book how it flows from you. were we ready for that. the last one we put together. and give the audience time to type anything they would like to ask, it requires sacrifice and the numbers of the american revolution, casualties of people involved, is staggering. what do you want modern readers

to understand and the consequences of war. >> a great many more than that and one of the things i already mentioned, how long the struggle to win independence was. because saratoga occurs in october of 1777 and a huge british army surrenders, textbooks always depict saratoga, there has been a tendency on the part of many people to think anything that followed saratoga was anticlimactic in the american

victory was guaranteed so i wanted readers to come away from my book understanding that a long grim war had -- clinton thought that britain could win the war in 1781 and i did people to be aware of just how grim this war was. 15% of those who fought on the british side died in this war. pretty heavy and as best i have been able to determine roughly the same percentage who fight

on the american side, tried to prepare a meaningful term, the united states lost 350,000 men in world war ii, if the united states lost 15% of its soldier rees in world war ii more than 2 million americans who died in that war. it is a much bloodier war than many people are aware. i did people to understand the outcome of the war is determined after saratoga during that for your struggling

during four years after saratoga more americans died then during 30 months of war before saratoga, by 65% of all americans who fought on american side died after saratoga. another 4000 americans who died fighting for great britain during this war. in 1780, there are more americans fighting for great britain, those were the things i did readers to come away with. what i tried to do in the book was look, the crazies washington faced crises, decisions made during those crazies. what they knew and didn't know

in those decisions, they read history backwards, they know how it came out but the actors obviously didn't know that when they made the decision, whether it would be a good decision or bad decision, they made the decision based on what they knew at the time so i tried throughout the book when i look at the decisions that clinton and washington and nathanael greene and others. what they knew when they made those decisions. >> what would have been a reason for the british to allow a negotiated peace? what would have been in it for them? >> guest: many people in england just wanted to get out of the war. it had gone on for a long time, winning the war, there was a

fear that they were going to lose all trade with america that france would gobble up postwar commerce with america, the british economy might be ruined the longer the war continued. there were some in england who were pushing for a negotiated settlement. immediately after saratoga, the prime minister learns of saratoga, proposes a negotiated settlement. the north peace plan of 1778, diplomats known as the carlisle commission that came to america in 1778 and authorized to

negotiate a settlement. what clinton, lord north was willing to accept, everything the first continental congress asked for on the eve of war, for independence. he was willing to let continental congress remain, give the americans greater autonomy and on and on and on, the first continental congress had asked for. up to the pinnacle of power in england, there were people who were willing to accept a negotiated settlement. >> your answers have been thoughtful, the book is extensively researched.

in lightning, i encourage the audience to pick up and read it. it was a different perspective. the avon historical society. >> i look forward to that as well. i thank you once again for having me. .. charter has invested billions building infrastructure upgrading technology, empowering opportunity in communities big and small. charter is connecting us. >> charter communications along

with these television companies supports c-span2 as a public service. >> beginning now its history and books on c-span2. this weekend it's c-span's american history tv and watch booktv, television for serious readers. that they would mark the 20th anniversary of the september 11 terrorist attacks with several programs about that date including a a tour of the flit 93 national memorial near shanksville, pennsylvania, president bush's address to the nation from the oval office the evening after the attacks and a series of interviews with people who are at the white house, the u.s. capitol and the pentagon on that day. you can find a full schedule of history programs airing today in your program guide or by visiting c-span.org/history. now it's time for lectures in history, an opportunity to join students in college classrooms. jonathan marwil talks about the victims of the september 11 terrorist attacks with a focus on an associated press