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>> my name is edward lewis. i'm associate editor and financial times and i'm delighted to be here in california at this event to talk to thomas wright about his new book, which you should all read as well as by because you can't read it unless you buy it. "aftershocks" pandemic, politics and the end of the old international order clerk it's a great book. i have read it now and i strongly recommended. tom is an old friend, but he knows that you know if a friend writes a mediocre book or invites me too have a conversation with him in california and i don't like the book then i will quickly find a dentist appointment or an uncle's funeral as an excuse and this isn't one of those instances it's a very timely book. it looks that the international

context for how the world handles and is handling or mishandling the pandemic since 2020 and what the likely geopolitical longtail of this will be. tom is a senior fellow at the brookings institution, a contribution writer for the atlantic monthly. he has written a previous book that came out in 2017, which in many ways is a precursor to this because it looks at the power and politics so it's a great pleasure to be here in conversation with tom. tom, let me start by asking you, you mentioned in the book and in some of the articles you've written around the book 2020, beginning of the pandemic is likely to be one of those strong years in history and modern

history, much like 2008 financial crisis, 2001, 9/11. this is a seminal day that we should pay attention to. can you elaborate on what a show paradigm shifting about culminating claimant. >> thank you. i think you know when you look at-- when colin and i-- we spoke , you know april may of last year about doing a book and i think we pulled that time in 2020 was incredibly important here because it was a year in which there was a global crisis and there was no international cooperation. instead there was governments, no populism, the part of materialism, many world leaders

were even speaking to each other and we thought it was interesting to document and study in real time to see how the world would cope and having been through 2020 i do think a sort of lift up to that sort of rather grim billing because it really did, i think show us you know the cost of the global crisis and dramatically accelerated u.s. china rivalry and it will have repercussions in many parts of the world that don't get a lot of attention like the developing world for many years if not decades to come and i think it also sets the stage for dealing with future pandemics and whether global sort of health system is between-- i think it will be well-- it may not have been in the book but maybe one of the articles, the same way the cold war which shaped the events,

future old rivalries and competitions will be shaped by events of 2020-2021 a may be beyond. >> so, a lot of people you know among foreign relations have said this pandemic accelerated pre-existing trends. i think you are going a step further saying it actually created a new trend in terms of the u.s. china relations. can you elaborate a little bit more on that. >> there is something to the acceleration you know argument particularly with the u.s. and china. i will come back to that in a second but i don't think it really captures everything. populism was on the rise prior to covid and we can talk about it but arguably covid said it back, so it might have you know actually reversed the trend in

the case of populism. some of the populace as you know -- very popular coming out of the pandemic but it was a big stumbling block for those in power so that was sort of acceleration of a trend and in the developing world in reverse and in decades, sort of plunged the country's back, so to me i don't think acceleration in a really captures it. most applicable is sort of the u.s. and china, but even there dramatic acceleration in my mind is not the continuation of the trend. it's a different scenario because going forward very rapidly has momentum and character all of its own. that sort of what happened in 2020 with the u.s. and china. i think in china's case we might come to this in a second. you know it actually reversed 17 years or so of reforms in global

public health or was actually more cooperative and more transparent for the most part with some bumps and what 2020 was bring that to a halt and reverse it so i think it is a separate sort of dynamic, not just continuation what we had previously. >> i will get to that in a second. , just from the u.s. china stuff , he read a lot of fascinating material there about china's lack of cooperation with the who, trumps-- i'm not sure what the language rules are for the commonwealth. >> family audience. >> family audience. >> yes. >> trump says something that you know very spicy about what gg

ping has done to him personally, but talk to us a little bit about what you discovered in terms of who politics. >> in trumps case you know it's a shock to him of having to shut down the economy really caused him to turn to it vengeance and endorse those in his administration wanted a more comprehensive approach, but at the who which is your question it's really fascinating, who january finds out really had this global product-- crisis and the dictator in china who they believe is willing to tolerate any type of criticism from the international community than the chinese were in 2003 and on the other hand donald trump and in the middle of this you have director general who basically believed in his own peril work--

power of persuasion to sort of navigate this by personal leader to leader diplomacy and he would praise the leaders publicly in exchange for-- in the hope of getting incremental concrete cooperation you know in a practical sense and that leads him to say certain things in january about china that are manifestly at odds with what the who is. said it's fully cooperating, perfect approach, but from documents reported on the apn others we know that it was not true and that really led to the u.s. to react and say you have to if not criticize them or at least accurately describe what they are doing and if you actually falsely praise them it's counterproductive and that set the stage for this epic battle which was-- the u.s.

actually tried to read-- withdraw from the who in the middle of a pandemic which, of course, is an astonishing thing to do, but throughout it ted was really trying to stay close to the leaders and try to work the system to get some cooperation between that and what was actually needed. >> so, i mean, if you are the who, this is a very sobering case study and it would apply to any other multinational institution. how paralyzing it is to have the biggest members at loggerhead with each other. if you in anyway and i know you are in anyway a believer in multi natural-- multi national cooperation, what can you draw from that disabling of the who? >> i think one thing we learned

was that global public health-- i'm sure that people who work on this-- it may be one of the most sensitive areas of international cooperation. you know, we like to think this is a common challenge so we should work together and it's easier than cooperating with north korea or afghanistan, but actually it is sort about getting into the sovereignty of other countries, inquiring as to why they have no outbreak, how they handle that you know demanding levels of transparency about regimes that could be pretty secretive and all of that came to a head here and i guess the lesson to me is you know there's absolutely no reason to believe that if there is a future pandemic that may be worse that china or the behavior of others would be different. it's not-- [inaudible] where they sort of believe they

handle it pretty well. there's been repeat in america where you have a president subjecting the previous president who attempted to pull out but the previous president or someone like them-- the lesson for me is that you know we should work with the who, but we can't count on the who being effective. we can't even fully count on the u.s. being supportive either and so if there is one big sort of take away, i think it is nationalism and rivalry aren't necessarily going away. we should try to change that if we want to change that domestically in around country, but we need to be ready for a world that is very problematic politically speaking and are prepared to deal with these difficult challenges, despite those constraints. >> i should have mentioned at the beginning that we will have

q&a later. it will be me reading your questions, so if you have questions of tom, put it in the text box and they will be related to me. so, is it fair to say given china still hasn't fully set up, if you like all the data or anything like all the data that it must have had even before 2019-2020 that we still can't root out a lab leak? >> yeah, we sort of you know this is one of the most sensitive issues, obviously, out there and we really talked about how to deal with this and we agreed on a few things or we knew a few things for sure. the first is that we are not scientists and we were going to play scientists in the book. you know, we were going to try to set the science on either side. so, we didn't do that, but what

we did do after talking to a number of experts and officials from all different sort of interested parties and you know the who, the u.s. and some other government, and this is the position of the who currently as well, we don't have the evidence that they can assess it, so given that from a matter of policy we should proceed, we should be worried about animal to human transition and when-- we should be worried about a lab leak in the future and so if we don't have enough evidence, you have to prepare for both eventualities because they are both probable from a public policy perspective. it is a possible period, but we just have it-- the experts have not seen the necessary

information to make-- two dry conclusion i. >> it strikes me that you know if there were a lab leak china would be incentivized to cover it up and a lot of people would deduce maybe incorrectly that the likelihood is that if china incorporates with the who another investigation i mean is there any-- which therefore makes this a pretty irrational act on china's part, a self-defeating one, is there a sign that china acknowledges that it might be learning from it? >> there is no sign they are acknowledging it, now, i mean obviously as you know-- it's

difficult to draw adjustments from failure to cooperate because leaders can have odd reasons for not cooperating with inspections. but, it is definitely not positive that they are failing to cooperate to me, i think, the main take away from it is that i draw from it is not whether or not it makes a lab like more or less likely, it's that we are not getting cooperation from china and we shouldn't expect to have transparency in the future. that is the sort of take away an implication that that then is what we do about that, so that-- we should know now that in a future contingency like this we won't have cooperation either and so we need to be prepared to act without their cooperation one way or the other or to

accept that we just won't have it, so i think that's what people-- it's scary, but i think people are avoiding it as well because they are getting you know so focused on the question of the lab leak. really, we may never know. we need to continue to press, but we do know that the reason why we don't know, which is that there is failure to cooperate. >> sounds almost-- the reason we don't know which is a good way of looking at appeared the last telephone call that trump had as you recall with xi jinping was that spicy unprintable one followed by his spicy unprintable, in march, late march, 2020. followed then by an extraordinary sort of propaganda campaign between the trump administration and xi jinping's

people peered saying actually this was a virus that might well have come from the united states and its fake news that it came from wuhan and the trump administration mike-- mike pompeo and others branding it china flu, that china virus and implying very heavily that this was partly even a biological weapon. what did this sort of quite sinister fake news sort of propaganda between china and the united states tell you about the strength and weaknesses of each country? >> i mean, the most remarkable thing with this-- i'm the middle of a global pandemic where there is virtually no international cooperation with the two leading engaging in different ways with the primary objective being disinformation and the propaganda war which is just you

know i think to most of the country seems crazy. like there is a legitimate question about the investigation and a legitimate question about the official story and the lab leak. but to have in the middle of a pandemic the u.s. secretary of state basically blow up different international meetings like a g-7 ministerial to get the other-- because the other ministers won't use the word china virus in the communication just boggles the mind given that there is so much that needed to be done and i think that upset the europeans and others who to the extent there is the general question that they can be dealt with, but we are actually in the middle of a global pandemic so can we also talk about that, can we talk about you know diagnostics and treatments in vaccine cooperation and helping the developing world and you know the economic side, all of

these things basically were set aside and i think that was the-- the other thing on the china side where there really was a shift in their propaganda technique you know it became more russian. the vladimir putin mo is basically to say you are saying this about me but i'm saying the same thing about you. you say there's a leak in i'm saying-- i will come up with stuff on that. they embrace that fully now and it's quite counterproductive. i think it's more interesting to compare is the effect on europe and the united states because europe was actually appalled by what trump was doing in many respects. they are quite open to working with china on the pandemic and china's actions and diplomacy in

propaganda during the course of the pandemic usually alienated them. so, that i think gives you a more clear illustration of how counterproductive it actually was. >> of course australia which initially called for the international investigation certainly had whatever exports to china, uranium, whatever it might be. >> right and australia was a really interesting canary in the coal mine in terms of u.s. china relations 2020 because china kept tightening the screws on them because of the investigation and also because of a number of other things that they were doing in terms of combining political interference and you know on the 5d side so there-- that was very tense

throughout the year end of course australia had its own you know unique almost unique experience. >> so, you mentioned that we know that china isn't going to cooperate, i mean, that is sort of actionable take away from this that china isn't going to cooperate in the future investigations. is that a point that's just confined to the origin of viruses and the pandemic or are you making a broader point about china's more general noncooperation with the international community? >> i mean, i think it's possible they will cooperate on some things, but i think it's worth preparing for the possibility that they won't i think on the transparency for investigation it's clear that they won't or they don't want to, but on other aspects with the pandemic we should test the hypothesis, but

we should also have a backup plan, but if you just look at the last month even, it's quite interesting you know the biden administration has reached out. they have reached out via the deputy secretary of state and john kerry and even president biden in the phone call last week to emphasize that even though the u.s. is competing with china in a rivalry the two countries should cooperate on shared exits essential questions and the chinese position that's been not so fast if they were to cooperate with you, you need to unilaterally create conditions through which the relationship is more bendy so we cool cooperate. we won't just agree we will cooperate on shared interests if you are doing what you're doing in taiwan and trade and everything else and that is the

current position and so you know we should try to change that and engage you know with the hope of changing their mind and it might change with congress, but we also need to be ready that if they don't change their minds that we can tackle these shared problems without their full participation in cooperative endeavors, so i'm not saying we shouldn't try to i'm saying we should try and we also need to be ready-- an honorable. >> you chronicle well in your book how u.s. china relations under trump nosedived significantly after trump realized that pandemic is not a hoax and it really is going to shut down in the u.s. and therefore his election hopes are in jeopardy. at that point onward the china

hawks basically you know who had been arguing, but not always winning in the white house from then on they won but you also make the point that biden inherited that and hasn't really changed it, so if you are china maybe that's what you are looking for. you just mentioned the chinese had been linking corporations to change u.s. behavior on other fronts, human rights, hong kong and maybe that's what the chinese is looking to do, set the clock back in u.s. china relations to pre-pandemic? >> i mean, the roots were there before the pandemic and they may have ended up in a similar spot to some degree, but i think they did hope they could change it back, but i think the one point though and we are careful in the book not really to criticize you know that administration for being tough in china in some

respects. some of the laws justified and with the response to a china did, you know so china did fail to cooperate and it did become more assertive than crackdown in hong kong and so even though trump sort of changed, china was given plenty of reasons from the international communities to respond in that way and i think by the time biting him in you know for president biden it was obvious that he was going to pursue a tough and china policy, but i think when he came in the situation was such that that's what he was presented with and he had china's activity in a range of areas that he felt was unjustified and he needed to push back. the big question is how do we get to that equilibrium where you can compete responsibly and

you also have coordination you know some boundaries on the competition and that's a big challenge, i think. you know to try to figure out how to get to that point. we are not there yet. it could take some time. >> i do want to ask on u.s. china questions and maybe as i said earlier they can pose questions, but just staking for a second to the u.s. china situation, but how it looks today from a biden administration point of view. biden has stressed as you mentioned that we will compete and cooperate. there is also potential working together and that is the sort of fairly complex and nuanced approach that biden wants to take to china. in the meantime we have a world where the wealthy countries

including most of the united states, but the developing world is woefully behind. you have got 90% of shots in people's arms basically taking place in wealthy countries. isn't this an area where there is competition between china and the u.s. the chinese are meeting in that competition and maybe the russians also that vaccines aren't nearly as good as the ones developed in the west but they are sending more of them abroad. isn't this a problem for the west? >> it's a huge problem and not just primarily geopolitically, but i'm sure we both agree on that like it's a human problem and it's also a geopolitical problem, but first and foremost i think it's a global public

health problem and it boggles my mind really that estimates that the cost of the pandemic would be around or just over like 22 or $23 trillion between the start of the pandemic in 2025 and when you think about that number, which could well grow, the cost, we are talking about tiny amounts of money in comparison with the overall cost of the pandemic and certainly in comparison with the pandemic continuing in various emergence continuing for many years and we should be willing to throw everything at this in terms of getting the world's-- the world vaccinated. is not just vaccines, it's also obviously-- one of your colleagues died the other day--

[inaudible] i think it's a great sort of start on that, but we have to really you know not just put money but our resources where our words are. just to leave you one thing on this. at the g7 meeting much hullabaloo was made about the fact that the g7 was a-- has agreed to send 870 million new vaccines around the world are 500 million were from the u.s., 370 from the rest of the g7 and the who estimated that means over 11 billion and that was before calls for boosters, so less than 10% of the total and we were patting ourselves on the back for this extraordinary act. it's a good start, but it's only a start and we have a narrow

window here if we don't get this done in the next year or two then it's going to be too late because it will be beyond what we see now and a lot of these problems we have consolidated in unvaccinated world. >> it strikes me as you know the wide open-- [inaudible] correct me up i'm i believe it's estimated $60 billion to vaccinate 60% of the world by mid- 2022, which would be an ambitious target if it were a priority. $60 million is less than president biden is proposing to spend on amtrak modernization, so you refer to the vaccine summit next week which is good news. biden is calling a virtual summit of international leaders including xi jinping, we assume, next week.

can we expect pledges like that possible in your view from the biden administration and its partners? >> yeah, i don't think they would've agreed to do a summit without having big proposals ready, so i'm sure there will be significant proposals and commitments forthcoming and around the time the un general assembly is the right time to do it, so i hope they do turn to that. i think the problem-- you know this is a situation from the start when president biden took office pick domestic challenges are so all-consuming it can be easy to think of this problem as a foreign assistance developing problem as opposed to an exit essential challenge. it's actually not a matter of being generous. it's really an additional front and that wider war on covid 19 and on the pandemic and so i

think it will be interesting to see what they come up with and it's not just biden. it really is also i think the heat you camino japan and many others that we all need to significantly up our game and just in terms of the chinese and russian part, i think this is one area where competition is positive like if they can get vaccinations, that's a good thing. they may not work you know that chinese ones may not work as well, but they are better than nothing, so i think we should not be discouraging that, but trying to up our game to get more vaccines distributed and shots in arms, but hopefully others can do that also. >> let me change for little bit. you mentioned before the pandemic when there was global assessments with each country's

preparedness and health emergency on the scale. the best in the world number one was the united states a number to the united kingdom. they work very well prepared or at least if they were they didn't do much with the preparation that had been done because these two countries are notoriously amongst the worst on the mortality list, so has this pandemic taught us to be less complacent of how good we are and has it changed your view of you know what we think we know, not necessarily what we do know. >> there's been a revelation of an event because it's just like folks say you know the saying that war reveals the true balance of power before a major conflict. we may have an accurate assessment of which countries actually stronger. the pandemic has the same effect on all of us, so pretty much every country either did

consistently badly or had moments that did very badly and moments that did better and that was sort of repeated, united states at moments was doing quite well with the vaccine development and europe, summer, 2020, but then-- >> that's a very good point. boris johnson and donald trump are both publicist, but italy had a technocratic government, plenty of countries elsewhere in europe, sweden included and what was considered to be very high quality governments, but also performed-- is it fair to say populists have been more damaged than other forms of politics by this pandemic or is it more complicated than that and i appreciate that she mentioned both scenarios remain as popular

in spite of everything in brazil as he was before his own to nihilism, but can you draw sort of a broader conclusion about the effects on populism? >> yeah, i think-- i'll just make two points. one, i think the type of government matters, but it's interesting if you compare the eu to the u.s. basically near the end of the pandemic-- hopefully at a better moment, not over obviously, but where we are now, the number of deaths in the eu are higher than in the u.s. and adjusted for population roughly the same, so radically different approaches and you end up netting out at sort of the same level, so that is interesting. it suggests despite these different experiments within the u.s. and within europe and also

between them it did make a huge difference in terms of the end. for a populace i think that and confidence was displayed and the denial nihilism particularly with trump, but what we did not anticipate was that they also tapped into a part of the population that didn't want the restrictions or felt the cost was excessive and they couldn't social distance, couldn't zoom and maintain their livelihoods and resented those fortunate enough to sit at home and work and they began to flock to popular eateries and of course trump last the 2020 election decisively, but it was closer than many people sort of anticipated and so i think that is sort of the mix and remains popular despite everything

that's happened in brazil, so i think it's a setback for populism and obviously trump may have won the election if it wasn't for covid but at the same time i think it did reveal a new sort of partisan divide and a new populist centrist divide on public health and on the pandemic. >> would be going too far to say it's been a setback to the west or that it did come from the west? >> i think there is three things that western democracy did that no one else really could've done you know, the first is the vaccine developed, operation at warp speed which i think was extraordinary and extraordinarily a combination basically unlimited government money plus massive pharmaceutical industry and in

the u.s., but also europe with biontech and the mrna technology in germany and so that was one thing that i don't think anyone else could have replicated and that was the so-called neoliberal society in the market economy and the second thing was the economic response which we haven't mentioned, but this extraordinary sort of central-bank response, extremely swift, overwhelming as you and others have written, long-term implications that are mixed and effectiveness of the short-term was decisive and things that our society did that china could never do was display an ability for self correction, so we did actually you know elect a leader who rejected that previous leaders mistakes and that can happen in other countries also and so there was some capacity

for policy change and for acknowledging errors and i think that's important in terms of where we go forward. so, i'm not so sure-- you know, i don't really buy the-- i know there is an argument out there that because china surpassed the virus early on that it displayed our weaknesses and there's some truth to that, but they have vaccines that aren't as effective. they are still struggling with the virus and they really have no ability to acknowledge their and so i think that makes a big difference. >> do you think trump would have been reelected without the pandemic? >> obviously impossible to say but it was sufficiently close in the end. it was a possibility and i think there was huge disillusion with

his this confidence in handling the pandemic, but overall i think he did benefit from this counter movement in the country, which in terms of protest and resistance to some of the lock down measures so i think it did -- it was more complicated than that pandemic was a net mind for him. >> we have some questions. let me ask one more before i relay those to you, tom. you make the analogy or comparison really between today and great influencer of 1918, 1919 and say that there are a lot of parallels including the sense of the old world order is gone. that is the title or the subtitle of your book. what can we learn from the great

influenza which wasn't until this pandemic or as well-known as it should have been because it was overshadowed by the great war appear what can we learn from how to manage disintegrating old order from back then given the conditions we are facing today clocks. >> that's a great question. i think we dedicated two chapters to that in the book because i think we realized it was both very important and relatively overlooked because as you point out you know just the great war, world war i and the levels of totality was extraordinarily high, but the world was already in a terrible place and then there were contributing factors, but having said all of that we do think it

did have sort of a profound effect on the postwar period and the main sort of-- it's interesting, the world is a lot less institutionalized than. we didn't have any of the institutions we have today, but in some respects we were better at this time. the numbers were higher in terms of deaths because of particular circumstance, but because of the response in the vaccine was more rapid. we think the maiden method is democracy and like-minded societies have to work together more and hold together to sort of shape that post pandemic postwar order and that's really what broke out in the 20s and 30s, obviously. today i would say we are not reliving the 30s, but we will face a wide array of challenges,

pandemic, supply chain plus our rivalry with the economic volatility and we should try to work to deal with those but we also need to be ready to work with those we ci to eye with, and that i think-- [inaudible] >> interesting. let me move the question. the first is how much responsibility does mr. trump have at creating the international climate of this distrust around the pandemic? what share of responsibility goes to trump? >> we-- i'm not sure if this is what the question is asking, but i will relay it to the broader point, there's an argument that u.s. china cooperation you know prior to the pandemic that trump pulled out a certain number of

cdc officers in china and ended public health cooperation with china and that led to its unraveling and we dug into a lot of that in the book and talk to different servants and others and we sort of found it didn't really hold up because they did withdraw some cdc officials, but they were associated with hiv aids and redeployed and there were other cdc officials left in place who are working on infectious disease. it was negatively affected by the deterioration of relations and to some extent there may have been a reaction to trump, but it wasn't really the result of the administration deliberately trying to recap the public health cooperation efforts and so i think it largely lives with beijing, i mean, the trump administration is not blameless, but i think we

did see greater problems with them cooperating with the who in the years running up to and try to document those in the book in the years running up to covid. more generally, i think he-- his-- the biggest mistake he made was february, 2020, because that was the point where he could have used that month to rally the country and make the necessary investments. instead, he felt with the travel ban he did need to do anything more and that he didn't want to do anything additional to harm the economy and there were those in the administration who told him this is 1918 literally, 100 years ago, we need to be ready for it and he-- i think that was his single biggest error, more so than the press conferences

and the disinformation. it could be reversed. that time spent was just last. >> next question: communist like xi jinping typically don't admit their failures. could they-- i guess the chinese have opened a chinese version or would that require a chinese gorbachev? >> xi jinping can do many things, but is definitely not gorbachev. i think they worry about gorbachev and that analogy and glass half-- we've seen a greater degree of secrecy. you know, i think from their perspective and his perspective coming out of the pandemic because they suppressed it and there are far fewer deaths in the west. we looked disorganized. they were organized. they don't believe that the lack of cooperation is a problem. they created this narrative for

domestic consumption that there's a conspiracy against them and they have seen this opportunity that they believe the west-- i just don't think we see that she don't see as far as we can tell it's been reported dialogue, we don't see this consideration that it was a huge error or a major mistake and that in the same way you do here, so you know i would hope they would have a period of reflection on how to handle the pandemic but i think it's more likely for domestic audience that they cross this line that they handled it very well and we are over 650,000 dead now in the united states and more or about the same in europe. >> we only have a few minutes left, so let me go to a question

of my own which is what your prediction is for this pandemic? by when do you think-- it sort of a two-part question, when do you think it will be basically over and become endemic and cease to be a pandemic. also, short time to answer a big question but what are the longer-term geopolitical consequences that we having it discussed? >> yeah, i was hoping it would be over this year, but really you know we may not be out of this for a couple more years in terms of the world being out of this and we are likely to see more restrictions in place in terms of we won't be back to pre-2020 may be for a couple of years at least and that i think is quite concerning, but i think we will be dealing with it. we will also be dealing with it as a major sort of challenge requiring special responses i think one thing that maybe we

haven't talked about as much-- we did talk about it a bit in the context of the vaccines, but will be a major long-term sort of implication is that effect on global inequality and the fact that we may have now sort of a safe world and unsafe world appeared part of the world has been heavily vaccinated. part of the world hasn't. part of the world can socially distance, can work by zoom, technical problems notwithstanding, you know can do all of that with connectivity and many other places because of their economic models just cannot and i don't think we have talked a lot about-- i hope this comes up at the vaccine summit, but i think this is in part about the type of world that we wanted to live in. do we want to go back to the type of globalized world with modifications and with greater management of these efforts about basically the notion we

are sort of in this together and we are connected or are we likely to see the world devolve into blocks that protect themselves and are sort of concerned about other parts of the world outside of their block. >> i felt that was a really good theme also appear book that we are facing, so thank you so much, tom. for being in conversation with me. i have to give you the correct e-mail-- online address-- [inaudible] think you to you as well to the commonwealth. ♪♪ >> thank you. >> thank you. >> here's a look at some of the

best-selling nonfiction books according to the "new york times". taught-- topping the list is musician dave crawls memoir. after that is to rescue the public fox news host bret baier's look at the life of ulysses s grant at next is ron howard who are flex on their life in hollywood in the boys followed by a report on the transition between the trump and biden administration, imperil from the "washington post" bob woodward. wrapping up our luck, some of the "new york times" best-selling nonfiction books is midnight in washington, california democratic congressman adam schiff's argument that the trump presidency has weakened america's institution and most of these authors have appeared on on the tv and you can watch their program anytime at book tv.org. >> sunday, november 7, on in-depth, live conversation with author and "new york times" columnist on republican politics and conservatism in america.

his recently released book talks about his five-year struggle with lyme disease. 's other titles include the decadent society, privileged and bad religion to join in the conversation with your phone calls, facebook comments sunday, november 7, live at noon eastern on book tvs in death on c-span2. >> here's a look at some publishing industry news. named mitzi angel of the new president of the publishing house. ms. angel is the current publisher in editor and will be the first women president of the 75-year old book publisher and joins a growing group of women who have taken over leadership roles at large publishers recently including dana-st at shy minute-- simon & schuster. reuters reports that since legislation is taking aim at amazon's shipping cost to

customers and the country currently french law prohibits discounting the price of books and shipping. amazon charges once and for delivery to sidestep the law the new legislation would set a minimum delivery fee. pension ministry commented this is really-- necessary to prevent the inevitable monopoly that will emerge if the status quo exists. amazon argues the law will hurt consumers in rural areas and weigh on the power of consumers appear in other news performing artist has larded a lending library. named after the studio contains 50 books available at a first come first serve basis. the inaugural collection has been selected by rosa duffy, owner of an atlanta bookstore. according to npd bookscan prince books were up 3% for the week.

book tv will continue to bring you new programs and publishing news and you can watch all of our past programs anytime at book tv.org. >> cap next on book tv author interview program afterwards, argues that corporate america is signing onto woke culture only to increase profits. he is interviewed by harvard university economics professor greg mankiw and afterwards is a weekly interview program with relevant gas hose interviewing top nonfiction authors about their neatest work. >> welcome. it's a delight to be here. to chat with you, congratulations on the book. i know how much work it is to write a book so congratulations. i have been watching the sales on amazon and obviously you hit a chord because a lot