you can find these books and all of our podcast on the c-span app and also watch about books sunday at 7:30 p.m. on book tv on c-span two or online any time at tv.org. >> my name is edward moose associate editor and financial times and i'm delighted to be here at thise event to talk to thomas wright about his new book , which you should all read as well as by, aftershocks, pandemic, politics and theaf end of the old international order. it's a great book. i've actually read it and i strongly recommended that tom is an old friend, but he knows if a friend writes a mediocre book ov

invites to have a conversation with himon then i don't like the book i will quickly find a dentist appointment or uncles funeral as an excuse and this isn't one of those instances. it's a very timely book. it looks at the international context of how the world handlei in its handling or mishandling of the pandemic since 2020 and what the likely geopoliticalel longtail of this is going to be. tom is a senior fellow of the brookings institution, contributing writer for the atlantic monthly. he has written a previous book that came out in 2017, all measures short of war, which in many ways is a precursor to this because it looks at the new era of great power politics, so it's a great pleasure to be here in conversation with tom. tom, let me start by asking you,

you mentioned in the book and in some of the articles you've written around the book that 2020, the beginning of the pandemic is likely to be one of those strong years in history in modern history much like 2008 financial crisis, 2001, 1989, the end of the cold war. this is a date we should pay attention to. can we elaborate on what is so paradigm shifting about covid-19? >> thank you so much and it's great to be doing this with you and thank you also to the commonwealth of california for the opportunity. i think when we look at-- when we co-authored, we spoke sort of april, may of last year about doing a book.

i think that time, what was an incredibly important here because it was a year in which there was a global crisis and there was no international cooperation. instead there was national governments, you know populism, proletarian -ism, many leaders were speaking to each other and it sort of interesting to document and study in real-time to see how the world would cope and having been through 2020 i think it sort of lived up to that rather grim billing because it really did, i think, show us the global crisis. it dramatically accelerated us china rivalry and it will have repercussions in many parts of the world that don't a lot of attention like the developing world for many years if not decadess to come and i think it

also sets the stage for dealing with future pandemicscs and whether global sort of help systems is a zone of contestation between the majors. i think it will be-- may not have been in the book, but it might be one of the articles. the cold war was shaped by the events of 47, 48 and 49 and that mattered. competitions will be shaped by events of 2020, 2021 and may be beyond. >> ad. lot of people, you know have said this pandemic accelerated pre-existing trends, but i think you are going further in saying it actually created a new trend in terms of the nosedive in us china relations. can you elaborate a little bit more on that? >> yeah, i think there's something to the acceleration

argument and particularly with us andnd china. i will come back to that in a second, but i don't think it captures everything. populism was on the rise prior to covid and arguably we can talk about it but covid said it back and so it might have actually reversed a trend in the case of populism. some of the populace as you know popular coming out of the pandemic but it was a big stumbling block for this populace in power. in the developing world it was reversed, decades of poverty and sort of plunged those countries bag so to me i don't think acceleration really captures it. where it might be most applicable is with a sort of the us and china, but even there a dramatic acceleration in my mind is not the continuation of a trend. it's a dramatically different scenario because if you take

forward rapidly it has a momentum and a character all of its own. i think that is sort of what happened in 2020 with the us and china. i think in china's case, it actually reversed 17 years or so of reforms on global public health or more cooperative and relatively more transparent for the most part with some bonds. what 2020 did was bring that to a halt and reverse it so i think it is a separate h you know dynamic and not just a continuation of what we had previously. >> i will get in a second to the subtitle, the end of the old international order, but just on the us china stuff you have a fast fed-- fascinating about china's lack of cooperation with the who, trumps-- i'm not sure

what the language rule-- the commonwealth. >> audience-- [inaudible] >> very feisty about what the china president has done to him, but talk to us ana little bit wt you discovered in terms of who politics. >> in trumps case you know the shock to him of having to shut down the economy really caused him to turn with a vengeance and endorse those in the administration that wanted a more comprehensive continued approach, but at the who, this is fascinating you know the who in january finds out that they really have this global crisis and on the one hand they have a dictator in china who they believe is less willing to

tolerate l any type of criticism from the international community than the chinese were in 2003 with sars and on the other hand you have donald trump and in the middle director general who basically believes in his own power of persuasion that he thinks he can sort of navigate this by personal leader to leader diplomacy and he will praise the leaders publicly in exchange for-- in the hope of getting incremental concretee cooperation in a practical sense and that leads him to say certain things that in january about china that are manifestly at odds with what the who own assessment is and he said they are fully cooperating, perfect approach, but privately from documents that have been reported on the apn others, we know that was not true and that really led the us to react with

fury and to say no, you have to have not criticize them at least accurately describe what they are doing and if you actually falsely praise them, that's counterproductive and that set the stage for this epic battle which in some part of errors on all side as the us actually tried to withdraw from the who in the middle of a pandemic, which is an astonishing thing to do, but throughout it really trying to stay close to the leaders and tried to work the system to quit cooperation, but there was an enormous gap between that was-- that and what was needed. >> if you are the who, this is a very sobering case study and it would apply to any other multinational institution and how paralyzing it is, perhaps

you two biggest members at loggerhead at odds with each other. if you in any way as i know you are in any way multi- natural cultural oration, what can you conclude from disabling on the who? >> i think one thing we learned was that global public health and i'm sure that people who worked in this sort of-- [inaudible] it may be one of the most sensitive areas of international cooperation. we like to think this is a common challenge and we should work together and it's easier than cooperating with north korea or afghanistan, but actually it sort of about getting into the sovereignty of other countriesbo, inquiring abt why they have no outbreaks, how they handle thatt, demanding the transparency about regimes that can be pretty secretive and all of that came to a head here and i guess what is the lesson to me

is that there's absolutely no reason to believe that if there's a future pandemic that it may be worse that china's behavior or the behavior of others would be different, though we think in china. [inaudible] they believe they handled it well, but in america where you have a president objecting to the previous presidents objection to pull out, so i think the lesson for me is that we should work with the who, but we can't count on the who being effective because we can count on china's cooperation and we can even fully count on the us being supportive either and so if there's one thing sort of a take away from the book it's nationalism on rivalry is not necessarily going away a, but we should try to change thatng if e

wante to change that domesticaly in her own countries, but we need to be ready for a world that is very problematic politically speaking and i have prepared to deal with these difficult challenges despite those constraints. >> now, i should've mentioned at the beginning that we will have q&a later, but we will be taking your questions so if you want to pose a question put it in the text box and they will be related to me. is it fair to say given that china still hasn't fully g fessd up if you like or if you like all of the data that it must have had december, january and beforehand of january 19, 2020, loudwe can't rule out a leak? >> we sort of you know this is one of the most sensitive issues obviously out there and we

really talked about how to deal with this and we agreed on a few things or we knew a o few things for sure t. the first is that we are not scientists and we were not going to play scientists in the book and not try to assess the science on either side, so we didn't do that, but what we did do after talking to a number of experts and officials from all different sort of interested parties and you know the who, the us and other governments was that-- and this is the position of the who currently as welll, e don't have the evidence to make an assessment and so given that from a matter of policy we should proceed to see if both theories are true. we should be worried animal to human transmission and worried about a lab leak in the and so we don't have enough evidence

and we have to prepare for both eventualities because both are plausible from a public policy perspective, so that is sort of where we come out but we just you know the experts have not seen the unnecessary information and data to be able to make a conclusion and that's the who position as well now. >> it strikes me that if there were a lab at leak china would be-- [inaudible] do you think maybe incorrectly that the likelihood they was out lab but leak is higher, but if china cooperates with the who and others, i mean, is there any -- which therefore makes this a pretty irrational act on china's part, self-defeating

one. is there any sign in china might be learning from it? >> there's no sign that they are acknowledging it, no. i think it's obviously as you know, it's difficult to draw a judgment from the failure to cooperate because-- like in a rack as well, leaders can have audit reasons for not cooperating with inspections, but it's definitely not positive that they are failing to cooperate. to me, i think the main take away i draw from this is not whether or not it makes a lab leak more or less likely, is that we aren't getting cooperation from china and we should expect avenuee transparency in the future. that's the sort of and then the implication is what we do about that, so that will make it--

[inaudible] we should know now that in a future contingency like this we won't have cooperation either and so we need to be prepared to act without their the cooperation one way or the otheo and i think that's what people are sort of avoiding it as well because they are getting youel know so focused on the question of was about lab leak or was a genetic transmission. we may never know that. we should continue to press, but we do know the reason why we don't know, which is that there is failure to cooperate. >> sounds almost from felty and, the reason why we don't know which is a good way of looking at it. the last telephone call that trump had, as you recall, with xi jinping followed by his spicy

unprincipled comment in late march of 2020. followed then by an extraordinary sort of propaganda-- counterer propagana campaign between the trump administration and xi jinping's people with them saying it was a virus that might've come from the united states and fake news that came from wuhan and then the trump administration, mike pompeo and others renting it china flew, the china virus and implying heavily that this wasas perhaps a biological weapon. what did this sort of quite sinister fake news propaganda between china and the united states tell you about the strength and weaknesses of each country?

>> the most remarkable thing with this, you have in the middle of a global pandemic where there is virtually no international cooperation is the two leading powers engaging in different ways with the primary objective is just information and a propaganda war. it is just, i think to most of the countries seems absolutely-- [inaudible] like a legitimate question about the investigation and legitimate questions about the official story of the lab leakbo hypothesis, but to have in the middle of a pandemic the us secretary of state a basically blowup different international meetings like a g-7 ministerial because the other ministers won't use the word china virus in the communiqué c just boggles the mind you know given that there's so much that needed to be done and i think that's what has upset europeans and others

to the extent there are legitimate questions those can be dealt with, but we are actually in the middle of a global pandemic so can we also talk about that m, can we talk about you know diagnostics and treatments and vaccine cooperationn and help to the developing world and the economic side, so all of these things, if you were set aside and i think that was the most remarkable thing. the other thing on china's side where there was a shift in their propaganda technique. it became more russian. the vladimir putin and though is basically saying this about me and i'm saying the same thing about you and you say it's a lab leak, while i'm saying it's fort dietrich and i will come up with stuff on that. they do that and they embrace that fully now and what is quite counterproductive, i mean,--

europe was actually appalled by what trump was doing in many respects. they were quite open to working with china on the pandemic and china's actions on diplomacy and propaganda during the course of the pandemic usually alienated them and to that i think it gives you a clearer sort of illustration of how counterproductive it actually waslu. >> and of course australia which called for the international investigation with exports to china and uranium, whatever it might be, they just stopped buying it. >> right in australia was really interesting and there in the coal in terms of us china relations because china kept tightening thehe screws on the

because of the investigation and also because of another-- number of other things that they were doing in terms of combating therecal interference and was-- that was very tense throughout the year and of course australia had its own unique almost unique discontinuing covid with this fear and travel restrictions on lockdown's. >> you mentioned earlier that we know that china isn't going to cooperate, i mean, that's the sort of actionable take away from this g that china isn't gog to cooperate with future investigations. is that a point that is confined to the origin of viruses and pandemics or are you making a broader point about china's more general noncooperation with the international community? >> well, i mean, i think it's possible they will cooperate on

some things, but i think it's worth preparing for the possibility that they won't. i think on the transparency for investigation it's clear that they won't or they don't want to , but on other aspects of the pandemic we should test the hypothesis, but also have a backup plan, but if you look at the last month even, it's quite interesting you know the biden administration has reached out-- but in administration-- [inaudible] also the deputy secretary of state and john kerry and even president biden in a phone call last week to emphasize that even though the us is competing with china in a robbery, the two countries should cooperate on shared sort of extra essential questions like climate and the pandemic of the chinese position atn every level has been not so fast. if we cooperate with you, you

need to unilaterally create conditions through which the relationship is more bendy so we can cooperate so we don't agreee that we will just cooperate on issues with shared interests if you are doing what we do with taiwan and hong kong and tradede in every thing else and that is the current position, so we try to change that and engage then the hope of changing their mind and it might change next year out, but we also need to be ready that if they don't change their mind that we can tackle these shared problems without their full participation in cooperative endeavors, so i'm not saying we shouldn't try. we should try and we also need to be ready that if their future answering with their current answer is. >> you chronicle very well in your booker how us china relatis

on the trump nosedive significantly after trump realizes this pandemic isn't a hoax and it really is will necessitate a shutdown, a lockdown in the us and therefore the election hopes are in jeopardyle and at that point onwards the china-- china hoax basically you know arguing but not winning in the white house from then arm a warrant, but you also make the point that biden inherited that and hasn't really changed it, so if you are china, maybe that's what you are looking for. you just mentioned the chinese have been linking corporations to change us behavior another fronts, human rights, hong kong and maybe that's the chinese are looking to see, setting the clock back in us china relations to pre-pandemicch. >> i mean, i think the roots were there before the pandemic and they m may have ended up ina

similar spot to some degree, but i think they did hope they could change it back, but i think at one point and we are careful in the book do not really criticize the administration for being tough in china in some respects as well,. [inaudible] some is a justified and the response to what china did, so you know china did fail to refuse to cooperate. it became much more assertive and cracked down on hong kong and so even though trump sort of changed because he felt politically of frontage, china was giving many reasons for the community to respond in that way and i think by the time biden came in for president biden i don't think it was obvious, but he was going to pursue a very tough on china policy, but i think when he came in the situation was such h that it was

what he was presented with, that he had chinese activity in a range of areas that he felt was unjustified and he needed to push back. now, the big question is how do we get to that equilibrium where you can compete responsibly and you also have some coronation you know some boundaries on the competition and that's the big challenge i think they and china have two figure out how to get to that point. we are not there yet. it could take some time. >> i mean, i do want to ask us china questions and maybe the view as i said earlier they can post questions , but sticking fr a second to the us china situation, but how it looks today from the biden f administration's point of view because biden has stressed as

you mentioned we are going to compete and cooperate, there's a rivalry and also potential working together and that's the sort of fairly complex and nuanced approach that biden was to take to china. in the meantime we have a world where the wealthy countries including for the most part the united states been vaccinated, but the developing world is woefully behind. you have got 90% of shots in people's arms basically taking place in wealthy countries. isn't this an area where there's competition between china and the us, the chinese are leading in that competition and maybe the russians also. their vaccines aren't nearly as good as the ones developed in the west but there-- it's a problem for the west. >> it's a huge problem.

you know and not to be-- not primarily geopolitically, but we could both agree on that, but it's a human problem and it's also a geopolitical problem, but first and foremost i think it is a global public health problem and it boggles my mind really that the estimates that the cost of the pandemic will be around or just over i think 22 or $23 trillion between the start of the pandemic and 2025 and when youst think about that number, which could well grow, the cost, the marginal cost of the world is tiny amounts of money in comparison with the overall cost of the pandemic and ovcertainly in comparison with e pandemic continuing in variance

emerging that are resistant to vaccines and could continue for many years, so we should be willing to throw everything at this in termsyt of getting the world vaccinated and it's not just about sending vaccines, a colleague the other day and the financial times about distribution to the world and i think the vaccine summit is a great start on that, but we have to reallybu put not just money, but resources where our words are. i will leave you one thing on this that at the g7 meeting with much hullabaloo made about the g7 was agreeing as to said new vaccines around the world,io 500 billion of those were from the us, 370 from the rest of the g7 and the who estimated that we need over 11 billion and that

was before all of the calls for boosters, so it's less than 10% of the total and we were patting ourselves on the backe for this extraordinary act. it's a good start, but it's only a start and we have a narrow window here. if we don't get this done in the next year or two then it's going to be too late because there will be variance beyond what we see now and a lot of these problems will be consolidated in the unvaccinated world. >> i mean, it strikes me as a wide-open goal. correct me if i'm wrong but i believe the international monetary fund estimates it would cost $60 billion to vaccinate 60% of the world by mid- 2022, which would be an ambitious, but achievable target if it were a priority. $50 billion is less than

president biden is proposing to spend on amtrak modernization, so you return-- refer to the vaccine summit next week and biden is calling a virtual summit including xi jinping, we assume next week. can we expect pledges like that possible in your view from them biden administration and its partners? >> i don't think they would've agreed to do a settlement without havinggr big proposals ready, so i'm sure it would be significant proposals and commitments forthcoming and around the time of the un general assembly is the right time to do it, so i hope they do turn to that. i think the problem is that and this is a situation from the start when president biden took office. domestic challenges are so

all-consuming that it can be easy to think of this problem as a foreignlo assistance developig problem as opposed to an as to tensile-- asked essential chance. a it's not a matter of being generous, it's really an additional front in the wider array of covid-19 in the pandemic and so i think it will be interesting to see what they come upn with and it's not just biden. it really is also i think that you come japan and many others that we all need to significantly up our game and in terms of the chinese and russian parts, i think this is one area where competition like if they can vaccinations out, that's a good thing and they may not work, you know chinese ones may not work as well, but they are better than nothing so i think we should not be discouraging that we should be trying to up our game to get more vaccines distributed and shots in arms,

but hopefully others can do that also. >> let me change the focus a little bit. you mentioned that before the pandemic when there was global assessments were done as with each country's preparedness for health emergency on this scale the best in the world number one was the united states and number two was united kingdom. in practice they warned very well prepared and even if they were they didn't do much with the preparation because these two countries are no sorry sleep amongst the worst on the mortality list, so has this pandemic taught us to be a bit less complacent about how good we are? it changed your view of, you know, what we think we know, not necessarily being what we do know. >> it's been a revelation of an event because just likes folks

say, they say the true balance of power before a major conflict we had a-- may have an in accurate assessment of whichtr country is a stronger and the pandemic at the same effect on all of us, so pretty much every country either did consistently badly or had moments that itt dd badly and moments it did better and that was sort ofth repeated you know the united states was doing quite well with the vaccine development, year of the summer of 2020, but then plenty of troughs after that. >> yeah, so it's a very very good point. boris johnson and donald trump are both populous, but it had a technocratic government, plenty of countries elsewhere in europe sweet-- sweden included had what was considered to be high

quality government, but also performed badly, so is it fair to say populists have been more damaged than other forms of politics by this pandemic or is it more complicated than that and i appreciate you mentioned both scenario remains as popular in spite of everything. in brazil as he was before his own the nihilism, but can you draw at broader conclusion abot the effects on populism? >> yeah, just two points, number one i think the type of government matters, but it's interesting if you compare the eu to the us and basically near the end of theic pandemic when e are hopefully at a better moment -- it's not over obviously, but where we are now the number of deaths in theer eu are higher than in the us and

adjusted for population roughly the same so it's radically different approaches and you end up netting out at sort of the same level, so that's just interesting. it suggests despite all of these different experiments within the us and within europe and also between them it could make a huge difference in terms-- an oddball for populous, i think that incompetence was sort of displayed ended nihilism particularly with trump, but what we did not anticipate was that they also tapped into a part of the population that didn't want the restrictions or felt the cost was excessive. couldn't zoom, couldn't social distance and retain their livelihoods and they resented those who are fortunate enoughey to sit at home and work and they began to flock to populist

leaders and of course trump lost the 2020 election decisively but it was closer than many people sort of anticipated and so i think that's sort of the mix and remains relatively popular despite everything that's happened in brazil, so i think it should-- it's a setback for populism and trump may have won the election if it wasn't for covid, but at the same time i think it did reveal a new sort of partisan divide and a new populous interest divide on public health and pandemics. >> would be going too far to say it's been a setback for the west what is the fact that most of the affected vaccines did come from the west go against that? >> i think there is a-- i think there are three things western democracy did that no one else really could have done.

the first is the vaccine development, operation warp speed which i think was extraordinary and extraordinarily combination of basically unlimited government money plus an advanced pharmaceutical industry made in the us and also europe, biotech and mrna technology in germany and so that was one thing that i don't think anyone else could have replicated and that was the outcome of so-called neoliberal societies and economies. the second thing was the economic response, which you haven't mentioned, but this extraordinaryy sort of central-bank response extremely swift overwhelming as you and others have written, long-term implications that are mixed, but the effect in the short term was decisive and the third thing

that our societies did that again in china could never do was display an ability for self correction, so we did actually elect a leader who rejected the previous leaders mistakes and that can happen in other countries also, so there were some capacity for policy change and acknowledging and i think that's important in terms of where we go forward. so, i'm not so sure you know i don't really buy the i know there's an argument out there that because china suppressed the virus early on and displayed are sort of weaknesses and there's some truth to that, but they have vaccines that are not as effective and they are still struggling with the virus and they really have no-- seems to be no ability to acknowledge air so that makes a big difference. >> do you think trump would have

been reelected without the pandemic? >> impossible to say, but it was sufficiently close in the end that i think definitely was a possibility and i think there was huge dissolution with his confidence in handling the pandemic, but i think he did benefit from the counter movement in the country, in terms of protests and resistance to some of the lockdown measures, so i think it did you know it was more complicated than the pandemic was just-- [inaudible] >> we have some questions coming in but let me ask one more before i relay those to you. you make a very good analogy comparison really between today and great influence of 1918,

1919 and say that there are a lot of parallels including the sense that the old world order is gone and of course that is in your-- the title of your subtitle of your book. what can we learn from the great influenza, which wasn't until this pandemic as well-known as it should've been because it had been overshadowed by the great war. what can we learn from how to manage a disintegrating old order from back then given the conditions we are facing today? >> that's a great question. i think we spent you know we dedicated two chapters to that in the book because we realize that it was both very important and relatively overlooked because it it was, as you point out, wrapped up in the great war

and number one the levels of the fatalities work store nearly high, but the world is already in a terrible place and then there were many contributing factors, but having said all that we do think it did have sort of a profound effect on the post war period. it's interesting you know the world is a lot less institutionalized than we didn't have any of these institutions that we have today, but in someone's-- respects we were not any better at that time then we are. the numbers are higher than death because of particular circumstance and in terms of the response with the exception of the vaccine being more rapid we think it's a lesson in democracy and like-minded societies that have to work in a more concentrated way together and hold together to sort of shape

that post pandemic postwar order and that's what really broke down in the 20s and 30s obviously. today without saying we are not living in the 30s, but we are facing a wide array of challenges, pandemic, climate change, economic volatility and we should try to work to deal with those but we need to be ready to work with those we see eye to eye with and get-- if the broader efforts fail and that-- [inaudible] >> interesting. let me move to the questions. the first is, how much responsibility does mr. trump have for creating the international climate and distrust and noncooperation around the pandemic? what share responsibility goes to trump?

>> i'm not sure if this is what the question is asking, but i will relay it anyway and then a broader point is there's an argumenthe that with us china cooperation prior to the pandemic that trump pulled out a certain number of cdc officers out of china and ended public health cooperation with china and that led to its unravel rain and we dug into that in the book and talk to a lot of different civil servants and the political appointees and others and we found it didn't really hold up because they did withdraw some cdc officials, but they were associated with-- they were redeployed to uganda and elsewhere and there were other cdc and the relationship was negatively affected by the deterioration and relations and so to some extent there may have

been a reactiont to trump but t wasn't really the result of the administration deliberately trying to recap the public health cooperation efforts, so i think there largely lies with, i mean, the trump's miniaturization is not blameless, but i think we did see greater problems in the years running up to and we try to document those in the book, and the years running up to covid. more generally i think the biggest mistake he madee was february, 2020 because that was the point where he could have used that month to rally the country in the world to make the necessary investments to be ready in march and instead he felt he didn't need to do anything more than the travel ban and he didn't want to do anything additional that could harm the economy and there were

those in the administration that told him missus 1918, literally and we need to be ready and he told them-- [inaudible] i think that was his single biggest error, more so than the press conferences and disinformation because real consequences and couldn't be reversed. time was lost. >> next question. communists like xi jinping typically don't admit their failures, could-- i guess the chinese opened a chinese version or would that require a chinese gorbachev? >> xi jinping can be many things, but is definitely not gorbachevpi. i think they worry about gorbachev and that analogy and glasnost. we have seen a greater degree of secrecy. you know i think from their perspective or his perspective

they have come out of the pandemic because they suppressed it and there were far fewer deaths. we look disorganized. they were organized. they don't believe. that the lak of cooperation is a problem. they created this narrative that it's a conspiracy against them and they have seen an opportunity that they believe the us is in the crime and i don't think you see-- you don't see as far as you can tell that has been reported a dialogue. you don't see this consideration of the period that it was a huge error or major mistakes in that. so, i would hope they would have a period of reflection on how they handle the pandemic, but i think it's more likely certainly

for domestic audience that they cross this line that they have very well and we have an over 650,000 dead now in the united stateses and about the same in europe. >> we only have a few minutes left, so let me conclude with the question of my own, which is what your prediction is for this pandemic, by when do you think-- two part question, but when do you think this will be basically over and become endemic and ceased to be a pandemic? short time to answer a big question, but what are the longer-term geopolitical consequences that we have not yet discussed? >> i think-- i was hoping we would be over it this year, but i think really we may not be out of this for a couple of more years in terms of the world and we are likely to see more restrictions in place. we won't be back to pre-2020 may

be for a couple of years at least and that, i think, is quite concerning, but i think we will be dealing with it. we will also be dealing with it as a major sort of challenge requiring special responses. i think the one thing that we maybe haven't talked about as muchvi or we did talk about it a bit in the context ofne vaccine, but it will be a major long-term sort of implication that the effect on global inequality and the fact that we may have now sort of a safe world and unsafe world o you know part of the wod has been heavily vaccinated and part of the world hasn't. part of the world could socially distance, can work by zoom, technical problems notwithstanding you know, it can do all of that economic activity and many other places because of their economic models just cannot and i don't think we have

-- i hope this comes up at the vaccine summit, but i think thisin is about the title world that we want to live in. do we want to go back to thepe type of globalized world with modifications and with greater management, but basically the notion we are sort of in this together and we are connected or are we likely to see the world really devolve into blocks that protects themselves, you know, and are sort of concern about the other parts of the world outside of the block? >> i think that was a really really good-- also the theme of your book so thank you so much, tom.e' and to the commonwealth of california, which you should visit. i have to give you the correct online address.

[inaudible] thank you to you as well to the commonwealth out there. ♪♪ >> thank you. >> thank you, tom. >> starting now on this thanksgiving day, explore our nation's past with american history. throughout the day watch coverage of a recent conference hosted by the national museum of the civil war soldier in virginia. ..