policy center for discussion on bolstering u.s. competitiveness and innovation. watch live coverage at ten eastern on c-span2, online at c-span.org, or full coverage on her free video out, c-span now. >> c-spanshop.org is c-span's online store. browse through her latest collection c-span products, apparel, books, home to court, and accessories. their something for every c-span fan and every purchase helps support our nonprofit operation. shop now or anytime at c-spanshop.org. >> health care and national security experts told members of congress that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the u.s. biodefenses are too fragmented and lack of coordination. they testified before the senate homeland -- [inaudible

conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> the committee will come to order. i'd first like to start off and joiningr witnesses for us to help assess our readiness to protect americans from

biological threats to national security, including the department of homeland securities ability to detect, mitigate,se and deter these threats. we will also discuss how this committee can work to ensure dhs's countering weapons of mass destruction, or cwmd, office and other government programs tasked with tackling biological threats, have the resources and tools needed to fulfill their mission. biological threats can emerge from any number of disease-causing agents such as bacteria, viruses, or toxins. whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin, these agents can be used to harm humans, plants, and animals.n we have seen how naturally occurring biological threats, such as the virus that causes covid19, can significantly harm our communities if we are not adequately prepared for them. we also face threats from

biological weapons that have been manufactured and weaponized for the purpose of deliberately targeting americans.s. for example, we have seen bad actors deliberately use anthraxe ricin, and other harmful biological agents, in attempted attacks, including targeting elected officials. these bioweapons have the potential to cause everything from mass casualties and incapacitation, to agricultural destruction, and other serious disruptions to our economic and national security. compared to other weapons of mass destruction, bioweapons are cheaper to develop, can be deployed covertly, and often have a delayed onset, making them an appealing choice for bad actors to utilize in randomized and targeted acts.ki in response to these threats, dhs has taken actions to bolster our nation's biodefenses, including the biowatch program and its replacement, the

biological detection for the 21st century program, or bd21. these programs, by all accounts, have not measurably improved our nation's ability to identify possible biological threats, they have, however, and proved the coordination between the federal government and local partners on addressing such threats. in the their 2021 report to congress, the government accountability office found that dhs's biosurveillance programs, including bd21, lack sufficient technology and other resources to carry out and define their mission. i also remain concerned about the biowatch program which has suffered a number of setbacks, including high rates of false positive tests, significant delays in identifying possible threats, and an inability to detect familiar threats. the committee is also responsible for considering the reauthorization of dhs' cwmd

office before the end of 2023. this office has previously faced unsteady leadership, low morale, and an inability to retain qualified employees. although there are signs these issues are improving, this body must consider whether structural changes at dhs are needed to ensure they can successfully combat biological and other threats. in addition to bolstering thee federal governments' readiness to tackle these threats, we must also support innovative efforts by other public and private entities. these programs are evident in my home state of michigan, which is home to vaccine manufacturers and experts developing decontamination techniques, as well as the university of michigan flint forthcoming

biosecurity program, which i had the opportunity to discuss with their chancellor earlier this week. michigan has also conducted exercises that test the responsiveness of state, local, and federal partners to biological attacks, and uses tests results to identify how we can improve o combat these threats. today's hearing will allow the committee to examine how the federal government can build on these kinds of efforts. i look forward to hearing from our panel of health care and national security experts, on how lawmakers can advance an effective and comprehensive strategy to protect all of ourer communities from all biological security threats. i now turn to ranking member portman. you are recognized for your opening comments. >> thanks, mr. chairman, i appreciate your comments this morning. and thanks to the witnesses are being here today. a lot of those been sounding the alarm as to our current biosecurity, so i look forward

to hearing from you and i thank you for being willing to stand upsp and speak out on this. i think the pandemic has taught us once again that we've got to examine the effectiveness of our biosecurity posture. it's about all kinds of biosecurity threats. one is man-made of course, others are accidental or naturally occurring pathogens, and as we've seen over the past couple of years it will have a devastating impact on our country or even the entire globe as we have experienced with the covid-19. over the past 20 20 years wee seen attempts at biological terrorism, notably the anthrax attacksin of 2001. remember following that subsequent tos the attacks that was a lot of activity including setting up much of what we're going to talk about today. of course the harmful pathogens including h1n1, ebola, and most recently covid. despite these threats our nation's biosecurity efforts have been too fragmented in my

view. among several different agencies and departments which makes it tough to have accountability, hampers coordination and makes us was able to be prepared for a large scale biological hazard. i hope we talk about the sum to date more about what we can do to ensure we have the best biodetection capability of their and make smart investment in research and development in this area. i am concerned about our capabilities in terms of the ability to detect various pathogens that could do is a lot of harm and are not currently detectable. the department of homeland security is counting weapons of mass distraction office, which is just talked about, cwmd, we'll talk about that a lot today, very significant role in this mission of biosecurity. but the office is plagued with some challenges, some of which are perennial, some of which predate the formation of the office and as i said lack of coordination biowatch is a primary biosecurity program at

dhs, operated by the cwmd office. for the last 20 years in my view biowatch has consistently under delivered on its intended purpose to detect biological agents that could possibly pose a hazard to the public. so in my view though rules need to be clarified but also detection expanded. again i look forward to the views of the experts today about whether that's their opinion, and if so what can we do about it. weni have invested as taxpayers over $1 billion into the biowatch program. the cwmd office now wants to upgrade the program as chairman peters just said with this bd21 program, biodetection of the 21st century. i i think it's a good time for us to ensure that bd21 program is based on a strong foundation and ensure that it's the kind of investment that is going to be worthwhile for taxpayers and most importantly that it's the system that can protect the american people from these

harmful biological threats. the authorities of this office, cwmd, at the problem of homeland security, are set to expire late next year. this gives us an opportunity here and is committed to reauthorize, and with the reauthorization to make the necessary changes so itma does have broader capability and is better organized. so it may require more funding but i think mostly it requires better organization and better accountability. that's what i hope we can talk about today. we will have an opportunity again with his reauthorization to take a careful look at this an approved the system. i look forward to hearing the witnesses assessments and we are now with regard to our preparedness and the recommendation for improving this national effort to safeguard the american people from his biological threats. thank you, mr. chairman. >> iq, ranking member portman. it's the practice of the homeland security government affairs committee to swear in our witnesses, so if each of you will stand and racial right in

including doctor curry whoou isn video. [witnesses were sworn in] truthe truth, and nothing but the truth so help you god. >> i do. >> you may be seated. our first witness is christopher curry. mr. curry serves as the director of homeland security and justice at the u.s. government accountability's. he leads the agency's work on national preparedness, emergency management and critical infrastructure protection issues. mr. curry brings almost 20 years of federal experience, and his expertise includes the evaluation of federal efforts and programs to prevent, plan for, and respond to both natural and man-made disasters. welcome back, mr. curry. you may proceed with your opening remarks. >> thank you very much, chairman

peters. i appreciate the opportunity to discuss doj's work on bio security. today i would like to focus on two key areas. first is how we can strengthen efforts across the federal government and the steps the department of homeland security can take to strengthen bio security. well before the pandemic we have been concerned about our preparedness for a large-scale biological event and difficult for better strategies. this committee has held many hearings over the years on this issue as well. we were concerned about offenses too fragmented and uncoordinated across all levels of government and the private sector. covid-19 showed that these gaps were real. the 2018 defense strategy laid the foundation for the type of coordination needed to better prepare for events like covid-19, but the bad news is the strategy was new when the pandemic hit.

the pandemic put the spotlight on this, creating an opportunity to effectively implement the strategy for future events in years to come. for the last two years we have been focused on how to successfully implement the defense strategy and implement lessons we have learned from covid-19. two years ago we made recommendations to better implement the strategy, which are more important today i think. one recommendation cetnere -- centered around agencies. by going interagency biological plans, exercises, and after action reports done in the years before covid-19. many of the problems and challenges that occurred in covert response were identified

in prior exercises and after action reviews. prior exercises at reports from past events like ebola, zika, and others found coordinating at the federal level and between the states would be a challenge. we saw this to be the case -- we have doors the lessons are not forgotten. i would like to turn to dhs. since 2012 we have reported on challenges and implement it by watch, a system to detect airborne bio attacks. just last year we reported on

challenges in an effort to upgrade the system moved to bd21 . we found it faces a number of technology challenges and uncertainties of combining these technologies for use in the domestic environment. it is very different than trying to do it in a lab or the war environment. it is a huge challenge. the false alarm issue is still a big problem that has to be overcome so dhs can more quickly detect threats in these environments. we found the office has struggled to develop an effective surveillance system. integration center has struggled to fulfill its mandate and provide value to its partners. under the committee is also

interested in the effectiveness of the office in general since the office was set up and reorganize. overall i think the office is on a better track and is beginning to mature several years after being created. morale has improved slightly, so not great but it has been proved particularly in some of the areas of employee engagement, which is important. i think the leadership there is committed to implementing past recommendations and sticking to best practices developed other organizations we organize and transform effectively in the government. i know the office is working to better communicate with internal and external partners. it is taking some time to restart effectively. we are currently finishing a review of the office and we plan to issue a report on that in the coming months. this completes my statement and i look forward to the discussion and questions. >> thank you, mr. curry.

our next witness is dr. george, a public health security professional. dr. george serves as the executive director of a bipartisan commission whose mission is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of u.s. bio defense efforts and issue recommendations. she has also served as a staff director and brings a wealth of experience through her contracting work with dhs and the department of health and human services. she served on active duty in the united states army as a military intelligence officer and is eight decorated desert storm veteran. welcome back, dr. george. you are recognized for your opening comments. >> thank you. chairman peters, ranking member and -- ortman, and the rest of

the committee thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the state of american bio security preparedness. i am the executive director of a bipartisan commission. they send you their greetings and thank you for continuing to secure the homeland. senator lieberman and government -- governor ridge testified before this committee when our commission released its first report, national blueprint they warned the biological threat to the nation was rising and they informed of this committee that the nation was insufficiently prepared to handle a large-scale biological event. sadly, covid-19 emerged -- >> we will leave this hearing to watch as the senate gavels in

for a brief session. no votes expected today. you are watching live coverage on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the parliamentarian will read a communication to the senate. the parliamentarian: washington, d.c., february 18, 2022. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable jack reed, a senator from the state of rhode island, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: patrick j. leahy, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 3:00 p.m. on tuesday, february 22, 2022. >> the sen february 22, 2022.