no votes expected today. you are watching live coverage on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the parliamentarian will read a communication to the senate. the parliamentarian: washington, d.c., february 18, 2022. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable jack reed, a senator from the state of rhode island, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: patrick j. leahy, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 3:00 p.m. on tuesday, february 22, 2022. >> the senate remains in 022.

recess until monday the 28th. as always find the senate live on c-span2 and now we go back to the committee on biopreparedness. >> congress required and the trump administration released a national biodefense strategy to align all existing policies and programs across the federal government and the biden administration is said to be refining that strategy now, but in many other ways, we either made no headway or took backward steps. for example, we prepared in exercises that demonstrated over and over again that a large scale biological event would overcome the government and nation quickly, but we didn't until those lessons observed became lessons learned. many of the homeland security that we have are not to meet a threat.

we do not believe they will be able to detect biological attacks on our country. and advanced biodetection for the 21st century to describe and what can be done to achieve the division for the program begun in 2003. it has been painful watching the dhs try over and over again, like pushing a boulder up the mount to create a biodetection system that serves the needs of the nation. mr. chairman, ranking member, and members of the committee i suggest to you that 19 years is long enough for things to have gone on the way they have with this program. we recommend that you either shut it down or replace it with a program that works the way you want it to. our states, localities and taxpayers deserve no less and the good people working in the department of homeland security deserve some relief. and i want to applaud the biodefense efforts of fema,

coast guard, ice, tsa and cisa to defending the nation against biological threats and deserve your oversight and support. but as you encounter the bioweapons destruction office, i urge the committee to define its role. it lacks direction and it needs direction and guidance from you. thank you again for the opportunity to come before you today with the concerns and recommendations of the bipartisan commission on biodefense. would i like to thank hudson institute for being our sponsor and donors to the commission and congressional staff for their tireless efforts to address this important topic. thank you. >> thank you, dr. george. our final witness is dr. parker, associate dean for the global one health at texas a & m university and chair of the

national science advisory board for biosecurity. he's responsible for leading and coordinating the global one health program which works by collaborating with national and international experts to per sue ground breaking health solutions. and he brings over 36 years of public service in biodefense, high consequence emerging infectious diseases and global health security and a former commander and deputy commander of the u.s. army medical institute of medical diseases. dr. parker, welcome to our committee and thank you for your service. you may proceed with your opening remarks. >> well, thank you. it's an honor to be here. so chairman peters, ranking members portman and distinguished members of the committee. i am honored address the biosecurity preparedness. i'm for global one health and director of the biosecurity and

program at texas a & m university. today the views and opinions i have are on my own and they're informed by leadership positions in dod, in the pentagon as well as for dhs and recent tour back to hhs at the end of last year. covid has exposed the stark reality that a novel virus can emerge anywhere and spread around the world in weeks with devastating consequences. we knew a pandemic was coming, but it was difficult to predict when, what, where, and how a novel virus would emerge. and despite many acknowledged failures that continue to accrue with the response, i submit that actually we were more prepared for the virus to emerge than critics acknowledge. after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and letters containing that deadly anthrax spores were mailed in 2001.

congress appropriated new funds over the years as threats evolved and we accrued some lessons observed and some turned into lessons learned and they make all preparedness enterprise. so we were better prepared than we would have been had sars not occurred and more importantly the work of many dedicated career professionals in government at all levels, in industry, academia and other ngo's, we need to acknowledge the hard work of many. for example, the accelerate development of safe and effective covid vaccines through operation warp speed would not have been possible without prior congressional support since 2001. this enabled the executive branch to help with vaccines and therapeutics research, and regulatory science. this came with hard and painful

lessons learned with steady progress. they were successful in crisis because hhs and dod leaders took charge, each assuming ownership and accountability while they established a strict chain of command and powered their subordinates and put in place procedures for operation warp speed and fda provided the fine regulatory pathway and industry stepped up to the challenge and congress provided precipitations. together, a sort of sympathy was established with countless moving parts, the first expertise and a clear conductor bringing the pieces together. but looking back on the response to date. it's clear we remain dangerously for the next inevitable security crisis whether natural, deliberate or accidental. and they have looked at the attention necessary to deagainst biological threat over two decades.

some must have thought it was a hypothetical debate, covid, rebuild, it was not hypothetical. we must be prepared for the next inevitable biosecurity crisis. the covid lessons learned do not teach us the value of preparedness, i do not know what will. waiting for crisis to take action is too long. a national pandemic preparedness enterprise store state and partners was for success and that would require a leadership structure, vegs and goals that transcends administrations. we must overcome and learn how to manage a fragmented interagency system. without effective leadership structure that bridges the seams of the federal bureaucracy even the best leaders at all levels of organizations will not be able to drive effective. coordination, collaboration, continuation during peace time, nor during a crisis.

unfortunately, it's a long recognized biodefense, health security and public health preparedness gap. thank you for the opportunity to appearing before us, looking forward to some of the questions that aren't in my opening remark to the dhs organizational challenges. thank you. >> thank you, dr. parker. well, the gao and the bipartisan commission on biodefense have both made numerous recommendations over the years that could improve our biosecurity posture here in the united states. so, i'd like to ask my first question to mr. curry and then to dr. george. if each of you could give me and the committee your number one recommendation that remains open for the dhs from your organizations that will better prepare our nations to detect and respond to biological threats. if you'd give us that number one recommendation and why it

is your number one recommendation and why we should deal with it urgently. mr. curry, we'll start with you and then dr. george. >> thank you, mr. chairman. right now, two years after the pandemic started, i think the number one recommendation is about following up on the lessons learned and the after actions from covid. i mention this in the opening statement before covid, the problem is we had a lot of these gaps identified and the actions identified and we didn't have a mechanism of accountability to figure out who was supposed to close and any follow-up to see if they were closed. if we don't do that after covid, then it's just lessons learned are going to be an absolute waste. i think for me right now, that's the number one thing we need to focus on, and whatever actions those might be, not just at the agency level, there could be legislation and new roles and responsibilities and clarified as well and that would require the help of congress. >> dr. george.

>> mr. chairman, you asked about the recommendations that we've already made as opposed to her recommendations that we might make then i will tell you our number one recommendation is to shut down the biowatch and 21 programs and replace those programs with useful technology that actually works. i want you to know that our commission went and looked at other technologies, these technologies exist and they're in use by other departments and agencies and in fact, the cwmd office has engaged with some of those other departments and agencies to develop some of this technology, but has not asked them to perhaps modify some of that technology for use in terms of biodetection, there's no reason to keep it limping along the way it is, we should shut down that program and replace it with viable

technology. >> well, authorization for the cwdm office was going to expire in 2023 unless congress takes some sort of action. before reauthorizing this office this committee is going to have to consider whether the current structure allows for dhs to protect and prepare for potential biosecurity threats, including whether aspects of the office should be moved to other parts of dhs such as the chief medical officer to assure that it can effectively carry out its mission. so dr. george, the question, if the cwdm office is given more time, it's given tools and resources to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat biosecurity threats, do you believe that that would address the challenges that this office challenges or in the alternative, would you be-- would it be more effective for this committee to revisit the decision to consolidate the

office of health affairs and the domestic nuclear detection office? >> mr. chairman, i believe the committee should revisit the decision. the consolidation of the department's nuclear detection capabilities. biodetection capabilities and chemical detection capabilities and a slew of other related activities in this one office has-- it simply hasn't worked out particularly well. there were a lot of decisions that were made that were actually not addressed by statute or legislation. the legislation just asks that where you read nuclear in the statutes, having to do with the domestic detection office that that should also mean reading chemical and biological. that's too inadequate and you should know that none of the committees on the house side and none of the committees on

the senate side actually took up that legislation and talked about it. there's no bill reports to go with it. therefore, there's no guidance for the department of homeland security to really understand where congress was trying to go with it. i would absolutely recommend taking a look at the various elements of this office and i would send all of those elements right back to the rest of the department, down to the operational components and over to the other departments elements, the port monitors for example, should go to the people who are securing the ports, cvp and the coast guard. if you want to keep the biological detectors after replacing with better technology then send those to the secret service that handles national special security events and to perhaps the cisa, because they're in charge of critical infrastructure and that's where we're putting these detectors. the material threat

determinations that are conducted by the department are for the most part conducted by the science and technology directorate. they don't need cwmd for mina to go on. you see where i'm going. i think if you did that and returned the intelligence element, the wmd intelligence people were taken out of the office of intelligence and analysis and sent over to the wmd office. i think if you returned where they started from and send them to where it makes sense to have those assets, i think you'll have a stronger department and a stronger biodefense program at the department than what we have right now. >> well, thank you. thank you for a very comprehensive answer. i appreciate that. dr. parker, if your opinion where should the chief medical officer reside within the department of homeland security? >> well, thank you.