coverage on our video app c-span now. >> a look at u.s. bio security

preparedness, health care and national security representatives testify before the senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee. this is just under 90 minutes. [indiscernible chatter] [inaudible conversations]

including the department of homeland security's ability to detect and mitigate these threats. also to discuss how this committee can work to ensure that the department of homeland security encountering weapons of mass destruction office and other government programs test with tackling biological threats have the resources as wells as the tools necessary to fulfill their mission. biological threats can emerge from any number of disease causing agent such as bacteria, viruses or talk weather naturally occurring, accidental or deliberate in origin, they can

be used to harm humans, plants and animals. we haveoc seen how naturally we occurring threats like the virus that causes covid-19 can continue to quit is significantly higherr communities if not prepared. we also face threats from biological weapons that have been manufactured it weaponize for the purpose of deliberately targeting americans. for example we havely seen bad actors to deliberately use anthrax and other agency tax including targeting elected officials. these weapons have the potential to cause everything from mass casualties toru incapacitation to agricultural destruction and other serious disruptions to our economic and national security. compared to other weapons of mass to scratch on —- destruction they are cheaper to develop and can be deployed

and also have a delayed onset to make them an appealing choice for bad actors with targeted ask. dhs has taken actions to bolster the biological program and the replacement for the 21st century program and have not measurably improve the ability to identify possible biological threats and also with those copartners on addressing such threats. and withnc the bio surveillance program including the 21 program, lacks sufficient technology with two carry-on defined mission.

in the bio watch program that has ack number of setbacks including high rates of false-positive tests and significant delays in identifying possible threats and the inability to detect earlier threats. also considering the reauthorization of department ofs homeland security office before the end of 2023. this office as previously faced on steady leadership and low morale and the inability to retain qualified employees. this body must consider whether structural's changes are needed and to combat biological threats. in addition to bolstering the federal government's readiness we must support innovative efforts by other public and in

my home state of michigan and experts developing decontamination techniques. and university of michigan flint forthcoming bio security program which i had the opportunity to discuss earlier this week michigan has also conducted exercises that test the responsiveness of state and local and federal partners to biological attacks and uses test results to identify how we canhe improve our ability to combat these threats. today's hearing allows the committee to examine how the federal government can buildpa on these types of efforts look forward to hearing from our panel of national security experts and how lawmakers can ever —- advance a o comprehensive strategy to protect our communities from all biological threats and i turn to the ranking member for opening comments spent

thinking mr. chairman i appreciate your comments and thank you to the witnesses for being here and those experts are those have been sounding the alarm as to our current bio security a look forward to hearing from you and to be willing to stand up and speak out on this. the pandemic has taught us once again we need to examine the bio security posture it is about bio security threats one is man-made others are accidental or naturally occurring pathogens and as we have seen over the last couple of years they can have a devastating impact as we have experienced with covid-19. over the past 20 years we have seen attempts at biological terrorism notably the terrorist attacks andfo subsequent there is a lot of

activity setting up what we're going to talk about today. of course the harmful pathogens including each one and one and ebola and covid. in the bio security efforts have been too fragmented in my view makes it tough to have accountability and first coordination and makes us less able to be prepared for a large-scale biological hazard. we'll see what we have the best bio detection capability out there and make smart investments a research and development and i am concerned about our capability in terms of the ability to detect period pathogens that could do a lot of harm that are not currently detectable. the department of homeland security office see wmd we will not talk about that a lot

with this mission of bio security but it was playing with challenges some of our perennial some predate the formation of the office itself and that is a lack of coordination by. watches the primary security office and for the last 20 years and has consistently under delivered on its purpose to detect the agents that can pose a hazard to the public. so in my view the roles need to be clarified that also detection expanded and i look forward to the views of the experts today that is their opinion and what can we do about it? we've invested over $1 million of all the empty offices to upgrade that program as chairman paid is just said the detection of the 20 percent i think it's a good time to

ensure that the program is based on a strong foundation to ensure it's a kind of einvestment that can be worthwhile for taxpayers from the utilities that this officer set to expire late next year this gives us an opportunity to reauthorize with that reauthorization to make the necessary changes so it does have rather keep capability and is organized and it may need more funding that mostly it requires better organization and accountability and asset we w can talk about today. we'll have an opportunity to take it a careful look with the pair this in the recommendations for improving to safeguard the american

people from these biological threats. thank you mr. chairman. >> homeland security governmental affairs committee to sweargo in witnesses so raise your right hand. do you swear that testimony will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you god? >> i do. >> you may be seated. our first witness serves as the director of homeland security and justice at the us government accountability office and leave the agency national preparedness and emergency management in critical infrastructure protection issues.

bringing almost 20 years of federal experience and expertise includes the evaluation of federal efforts and programs to prevent, plan for and respond to both natural and man-made disasters. welcome back youourk may proceed with opening remarks. >> thank you very much chairman and ranking member i appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the gao work on bio security. sorry i cannot be there in person. today i like to focus on two key areas. first how we can strengthen efforts between the federal government. second the steps dhs can take to strengthen bio security. decades well before the pandemic we have been concerned about our preparedness for a large scale biological event calling for a better strategy. is held many hearings as well but we were concerned the bio defense is too fragmented and uncoordinated across all levels of government and the private sector. unfortunately covid-19 says these gaps are real.

the 2018 bio defense strategy lays the foundation of the type of coordination needed for the type of care for and ventilate covid-19. ewthe bad news is from when the pandemic. and put the spotlight to implement the strategy for future events in years to come. for the last two years in the covid we have been focused on how to successfully implement the bio defense strategy and implement the lessons learned from covid-19. two years ago we made recommendations to better implement the strategy that are more important today. one recommendation centered around being able to make resource and priorities across agencies but they just cannot tell each other what to do like the. department of defense and agriculture and hhs and dhs. this bill has not been completed looking back at

after action reports done in the years after covid-19 many of thosed challenges in response were identified prior act exercises and after action review. prior exercisesse and reports from events like ebola and others found that coordinating at the federal level in between the fence and the states with the challenge probably saw this to be the case in the covid response as it relates to supply-chain. the problem is these gaps were not close because nobody was accountable for closing them. and wound we will close all of them that we have to make sure the lessons learned from covid on the exercises in the future

not forgotten. turning to dhs and the bio defense since 2012 we have reported on challenges that is a system to detect the newborn attackd . >> we found this faces a number of technology challenges with the inherent limitations of the technology and the uncertainty of combining these technologies for use in the domestic environment like in train stations and sporting events is very different from the lab or the war environment it is a huge challenge. for example the false alarm issue is still a big problem that has to be overcome if dhs is to detect bio threats we also found offices struggling

with a surveillance system for bio threats the national integration center at dhs struggling to fill its mandate and provide value to its partners at the federal state and local level. and the committee is interested in the effectiveness of the office in general sensory organized. it isbe on a better track and beginning to mature several years after being created. morale has improved slightly it still not great but it has improved in employee engagement. also the leadership is committed to implementing our past recommendations and more importantly speaking to best practices that has helped

others to transform effectively in the government. i know the office iswa working to communicate better with external partners that is what faltered and is taking time to restart effectively. we are currently finishing a review of the office and we plan to issue a report commitments. i look forward to her contracting work with dhs in the department of hhs serving in active duty of you the military intelligence officer

he recognized reopening comments. >> chairman peters and ranking member portman and senators and the committee thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the state of preparedness. i am the executive director of the bipartisan commission of bio defense which is cochaired by former senator and chairman of this committee joe lieberman a former secretary bridge. they send greetings and thank you for continuing to secure the homeland andna examine national bio defense. testimony before this committee in 2015 when our commission releasese the first report national blueprint on bio defense. they warned the biological

threat to the nation was rising and they informed this committee the nation was insufficiently prepared to handle large scale biological event sadly covid-19 emerged improved our point. little after six years i come before you today to warn you that again, while covid-19 dominates our national and global attention the threat that continues to increase and while someri are made we are not sufficiently prepared. lasted the state department released a report stating clearly that russia and north lykorea now possess biological weapons programs the china and iran notan far behind we must assume our enemies nationstates and terrorist are and that we must prepare for f an attack on the biological weapons we cannot afford to

optimize with the pandemic potential to the exclusion of all else. and across all levels of government and much of the private sector. all cabinet departments and independent agencies and one institution are responsible including preparedness. since the release of the blueprint and the trump administration released a national bio defense strategy to align all existing policies and programs across the federal government and the biden administration will refine that strategy. we should make no and those that demonstrated over and over again that a large scale

biological event will overcome the nation quickly but we do not take decisive action to ensure they became lessons learned. many homeny insecurity aspects are inadequate to meet the biological threat. we do not believe the department of homeland security will be able to detect biological effects effectively we issued a report advance by detection for the 21t century to describeto our concerns to make recommendations as to what could be done for the program of gun of 21 —- 2003 it has been painful. and those that special boulder of the amount and those that serves the need of a nation mr. chairman and ranking member and members of the committee i suggest to you that 19 years is long enough for things to have gone on the

way they haven't this program we recommend you either shut it down or replace it with the way you want it to work. taxpayers deserve no less and the good people deserve some relief. i want to apply the bio defense efforts the secret service and tsa to contribute to defending the nation against biological threats with your awareness and oversight and support. as you examine the office, i urge the committee to clarify its role. the legislation lacks direction and specificity in the needs direction and guidance from you. thank you for the opportunity to come before you today with the bike on —- bio strength for the commission. thank you to our sponsor and the donors for supporting the work and congressional staff for their efforts to address this topic. thank you.

>> our final witnesses associate dean for the global wine health at texas a&m and chair of the national science advisory board for bio security. responsible for leading and coordinating the global one health program by collaborating with national and international experts to pursue groundbreaking health solutions bringing over 36 years of public service in bio defense in my consequence with infectious diseases and the deputy commander and thank you for your service and you may proceed with your opening remarks. >> .

>> i am honored to appear before you today with those gaps with the security preparedness. associate dean for global one health and director of the pandemic bio security policy at texas a&m. but today the views and opinions i have are my own. they are informed by those executive leadership positions and then the recent tour on —- path back in congress has exposed the stark reality anywhere toar be spread around the world with devastating consequences. we knew a pandemic was coming but it was difficult to predict when, what, where and how a virus would emerge. despite those that accrue with

the response i submit that actually we were more prepared to emerge and critics will look acknowledge with the terrorist attacks on those deadly anthrax spores were mailed congress authorize programs to appropriate new funds over the years as a threat evolved and we had observed into lessons learned some are not. with that bio security and preparedness enterprise so we were better prepared than we would have been before sars two. and then government at all levels of industry and academia and other ngos we need to acknowledge the hard work of many for example the accelerated development of

safe and effective covid vaccines through operation warp speed would not have been possible without prior congressional support since 2001. this enabled the executive branch to help security vaccine research development manufacturing and regulatory science the heart of painful lessons learned with steady progress was made over the 20 year journey although successful because hhs and dod leaders took charge each assumed ownership and accountability while they established a strict chain of campaign command and put in place procedures to have the integrity of operation warp speed. in the industry stepped up to the challenge in congress provided the appropriations. and with those countless moving parts and then a clear conductor bringing the pieces together. looking back it is clear we remain dangerously vulnerable to the next bio security

crisis with a natural deliberate or accidental nature. scientists have debated with those biological threats and for over two decades. son in a hypothetical debate but it was not hypothetical. we must be prepared from the bio security crisis those lessons learned do not teach us the value of preparedness waiting for the next crisis to take action is too late a national pandemic preparedness enterprise including state andes private sector partners is essential for success. but that will require an effective centralized leadership structure and vision and goals to transcend administrations. and with that fragmented system, without the effective leadership structure that bridges the seams of the

federal bureaucracy even the best of leaders will not be able to drive effective coordination or collaboration across the preparedness continuum during the peacetime or during a crisis. unfortunately the and ability to harness the fragmented inter- agency is public health repaired is cap. now look forward to answering meany questions and those of the dhs organizational challenges. and iga on a bipartisan commission have both made numerous recommendations over the years that could improve bios security posture here in the united states.

and give me that number one recommendation that remains open for dhs from your organizations to better prepare our nation to respond to biological threats. and white issue number one recommendation and deal with it urgently. >> right now two years after the pandemic started the number one recommendation was following up on i the lessons learned but the problem is we have a lot of these gaps identified what we didn't really have a mechanism of accountability to figure out who was supposed to close them or any follow-up and if we don't do that, and then that's

an absolute way so for me that is the number one thing we need to focus on and whatever actions those may be not just at the agency levels. and those to identify andwe clarify the help of congress. >> mr. chairman because you asked about those recommendations we have already made i have a number one recommendation to shut down the bio watch programs and then with useful technology thathn actually work. i want you to know our commission looking at other technologies that they exist and arete in use by other departments and agencies. and then with those other departments and agencies to develop some of these

technologies. and then to modify that technology for use in terms of bio detection. there's no reason along the way we should shut down the program to replace it with viable technology. >> so the authorization would expire in 2023 unless congress takes action. before reauthorizing this office the committee will have to see if structure allows those to combat bio security threats or examining other aspects should be moved to other parts of dhs such as the chief medical officer to ensure itit can effectively carry out its mission. but if the cwm the office is

given tools and resources to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat bio security threats deeply that would address the challenges this office spaces or would it be more effective to revisit the decision to consolidate the office ofhe health affairs and domestic nuclear detection office? >> mr. chairman, i believe the committee should revisit this decision. the consolidation with that nuclear detection capabilities and a slew of others wmd oriented related activities in this one office simply has not worked out particularly well. but those that were introduced not by statute or legislation. but we're you read nuclear in

the statutes with the nuclear detection office and that also means chemical and biological. that is too inadequate and you should know the committees on the house or senate side in that report to go with and there is no guidance for the department of homeland security to see where congress was trying to go with it. i would absolutely recommend taking a look at the various elements of this office and i would send that rate back to the rest of the department and over to other parts of the headquarters elements. the port but if you want to keep that bio watch detectors

after replacing them with better technology, send those to secret service who handles events and that's where we are putting these detectors. but those that are conducted by the department is by the science and technology they don't need cwmd to get that done. i could go on but but if you did that with the wmd intelligence people were taken out of the office of intelligence and analysis sent over to the wmd office. if you return them think there will be a stronger department and bio defense program then

what we have right now. >> thank youou for a very comprehensive issue. so in your opinion word. >> thank you. in my written testimony i do have a description about the early days of the establishment of cml and that gives background on why initially it was established opposed to the secretary. and during that time much more urgently concerned of the bioterrorism threat and we should be more concerned about that today that hurricane katrina has happened. and with intentional but the department paste will have a huge will that was the secretary's position to

advise. i firmly believe what transpired back in the day is where the chief medical officer needs to be today. in a policy or advisory role there is no reason to look at the models of the department of defense to say secretary of health affairs but it is also an advisor. >> just health and i do think it would be helpful for dhs and a big. >> mr. portman you are

recognized all of you have been sounding the alarm in today you are able to give us more specifics as to how you would deal with shortfalls. i was curious but not to make the structure more gentle but that is what but the initial question is that some of the adversaries then to protect their citizens from bio attacks and what can we learn from them? as the nation been able to analyze whether countries do? >> so it's very difficult for

anybody else to figure out what they are doing but it is to protect themselves. that russia and china are eiinvesting. >> personal protective equipment, ppe that will bring the economic aspect of biology into the 21st century they are investing at a rate much greater. >> but also puts us at a disadvantage position. >> does that relate to. >> i don't know.

>> what about you or those that we would have access to what they are doing? and i would be happy to share that information but have you learned anything from them to do a better job with detection? >> yes. especially in europe so i think the approaches are that now 18 years later we're still hanging out using the same technology. but europeans have gone to their cycles over and over and

improve. and nasa says they have the absolute solution that technology is getting us closer and closer and i believe if we have been information from our european alley on —- allies and possibly japan, if we ask. >> they are ahead of us in terms of technology. that may be.

>> thank you serve. there is a lot of opinions why this may not have quickly as you want but talk about surveillance it is basically scanning the world for biological threats but we can get them as soon as possible. and those bio defense enterprise and we pointed out local because then dod has want another what has erotic some certainly have not been integrated together. i think part of the problem is the lack of integration but one last look. but then to look at some new innovative surveillance system to monitor covid to get down

to the state and local level in the private sector intimate in the pharmacies and things like that. we need to lookk at what we have created did not just get rid of it when covid is under. >> do you have any thoughts? the first case with the cdc confirmed january 21st, 2020 and recent studies from public health officials suggest it was undetected a couple of months previous to that. >> it really comes down to the need to read and envision bio surveillance and take advantage of what we did build. that was recommended with.

>> so why did go at the that we need to address that were not just on the public health but in and we do have a national bio defense but i don't believe we ever had a day but what this means and how we could take advantage

but it has to be one hell of an approach. >> it is inexcusable that now just actively believes it could have been before january. we have to fix is the future so the laboratories can pick it up. we are looking for disease i hope to get a second round but do you think but then that's with the biotech.

>> yes the states how quickly that we pounced on covid the but then to be a public health and then the lords livermore as part of the infrastructure that livermore in particular in the labs spell counter weapons of mass destruction the last mission is at biology and internet on —- engineering in the physical sciences to address natural challenges from a national insecurity and from human health and then

shipped specifically with the office and the national labs is an important piece of the government response to developing exceptional science and technology so to ask each of you the importance of partners on —- partnerships and other government entities and with that to develop as the committee considers. >> those types of partnerships are critical and need to be focused. talking about science and technology, but all of them are science but it can be

utilized in worked in a number of ways. but in this case we are talking about basic science and you have to ask when talking about what element not to be working with them from the department have to ask is it appropriate for the cwmd officer science and technology to be conducting those partnerships? i submit that if it is a basic science issue like biologic, then 19 years of the office of health affairs trying to engage and sometimes not engaging with the natural labs is enough and. but i am confident that the

national lab and the other science and technology organizations but i think that for it to come from a national lab has been incredibly important but anything we can do to encourage that with that

scientific expertise at the national labs and livermore are particular to mention that covid proved how the lack of biological incidents in multiple agencies reported issues and to coordinate with the federal government to ensure that we have a full and complete picture of the pandemic. we had itin much earlier cases.

>> we talked into that tell pandemic but actually it took several months before that with those cases it is not until hospitals were able to tap that data but those would

turn into actual fee. we have got to do this. it is hard because the data so this is not an easy challenge. we have to figure how we keep was national awareness has been needed. >> but also tracking icus where that i am eager to get this to the question and it is this. we know covid-19 has taken you can't and equities as well as the and with the disparities of my threats to public health

i have communities and families andes individuals without sufficient resources. and then with reliable high-speed internet that

getting those biotech responses and what you have for the committee. >> thank you senator. the first step is but another thing with the g data is that part of the problem is but the beginning of covid and other disasters that there really isn't a lie the data on how these programs impact certain populations in certain parts of the country and that

created a lot of questions about how effective they were in it makes it difficult for the federal government to target resources as well. that's the first step we have to take to get better at this. >> i look forward to following up with you. >> thank you. i need to step away to attend an armed services committee the ranking member will take the gavel with additional questions. >> thank you mr. chairman. looking for some quick answers to figure out a better way to move forward in terms of the fragmentation that's currently out there in terms of responding to bio threats and also to figure out what is working and what's not working in the current system this

does have bio security programs that it leverages universities is there a good relationship with academia? >> earlier in the life of dhs there was creation of the university and centers of excellence and that has been a very good and effective program to engage academia. the threats have evolved over time with what i have observed as bio security is important with the centers of excellence that but after the anthrax

attacks and other incidents one thing that is missing is to have a firm on —- far more so that is one thing we went to work on with you. and with the national integration center. doesn't add something beyond what cdc already does and it is part of dhs and also cdc essentially for more

responsibility. >> wera reported several times over the last decade. what we found consistently as they struggle to meet their mandate. part of it is they don't have the access to the data that they need that they had federal agencies to produce to make the that's a level at for those that need to make this arena, but another concern i have is with the mission of supports, there is one. >> all separate and all test on —- testing summer

individual purposes and some are not and it shows a lack of coordination across the enterprise. it's very difficult to make a decision of which one should go in which should stay because nobody at the top level can sayn. to make that decision. >> this is been brought up from all three of you to have four different departments or agencies effectively trying to use the same mission and not sharing information from what you said that's an opportunity fofor us in terms of reorganization. the problem that i see and i went to get anything that is classified but we have surveillance capability in certain areas and urbanrv centers. and the information is publicly available.

i will noti name the number of cities although it is probably available because i like to stay away from that sort of stuff. it's not comprehensive. everybody knows that. second, when you look at the biological threats we face today, it's not comprehensive and echoes to the technology issue in one reason i asked why what countries are doing and we can learn if academia is fully engaged we have an opportunity for better technology could you address that in the appropriate way? you want to give adversaries information but how to fix the system so it's more effective. >> senator you are absolutely right we went to comprehensive system with coverage of the entire country. and what that would require is drying information data from a variety of different sources.

so it's okay we don't have that andri within the country. so that comes into a place combined with the information and the information getting from the cdc and so forth. and as chris said earlier, the department doesn't have the access it needs for that information. but the other side of the coin is that congress p did not mandate all ofce the departments and agencies provide that information in the first place. so this is w going on the way it is. spent there are two great opportunities and to consolidate is the place to do it and then second this was

discussed earlier the academic contribution we have ability to collect and assess data we never had before quite frankly after anthrax and other biological threats to come up with a national system and we have capability to give something that's meaningful then disseminated to the different agencies or departments. >> we have a capability as a nation we do not have that data analysis at the department of homeland security. you have to make that kind of investment and that part of dhs if you choose. we can get there just requires more money and upgrading the

capability. >> thank you very much. i want to thank you senator portman and senator peters for holding this hearing and thank you to the witnesses for your testimony and for providing expertise and perspective on this issue. because i have been in and now i may be repetitive and apologies in advance. to detect biological threats the department of homeland security has focused on detecting airborne biological agents to the bio watch program is only able to detect from a limited known threat which leaves a critical blind spot especially with naturally occurring disease outbreaks

and the department but they are looking at technology although that is years away. what is a successful program looks like and how our federal programs falling short quick. >> as successful bio detection on —- detection that actually now it's detecting where it is supposed to. but you are absolutely right. you we are facing so many other threats that biological i was so for example you could have particle detectors that are not looking for specific

agents but to see how many are in a particular room or area. and then s to note suddenly we see a bunch of something or a bunch of virus in this one place. what is that? and sending another to take a look. there are handheld detectors that you can put inside or outside. we need a fast but there is something going on in china. somebody is in the hospital. this is unexplained. medicare has things to say and now cbs is reporting everyone is rushing in to get but

that's it big area including those questions. >> that one way we can detect on —- deductive screening for healthcarets facilities. and the discussion coming in with senator portman this issue of what type of data do we have? but as i understand it is collected by non- federal entities and they need to closely coordinate but unfortunately as the gao reports the current national bio defense strategy does not assess those capabilities nor does it establish a organism of non- those that have the

capabilities to detect information of potential biological threats and how can congress better coordinate federal and nonfederal efforts. >> thank you senator i cannot think of a better example of a lesson learned from covid-19 them better coordination of nonfederal entities. we saw this notti just with the strategic national stockpile is that different in every state so in my view to make a great point and with that tracking systems in mechanisms and they need to be formalized and implement these formally

post covid for the future. that may require because the issue classes jurisdiction and federal departments that will likely require legislation to do that formally. >> a couple of examples of hhs the establishment of the supply chain control tower able to link to all private sector supply chains and then focus t on to anticipate were supplies would be short and then under the healthcare control chain with to anticipate if they are shortages in the hospital systemta or if ships could be made in coordination with the federal government and the private sector to work in unison and how to test those 2 trillion into lessons learned.

maybe practicing on a day-to-day basis but when there's a crisis we have to turn that data information pipes on to have that coordination between the appropriate federal state and local authorities and privateat sector partners. >> just with federalism and talking about data sharing. the strategic national stockpile should to have medical supplies to aid in the response. so whatt is the option with managing the strategic national stockpile quick. >> and then before covid we were concerned about the way it was funded sporadically and what that might mean for the and readiness to handle an event like this.

in the past it was more local events where you needed a target and a specific part of the country. we needed it nationwide and itt was not ready. one of the biggest challenges we identified is the lack of understanding at all levels of government including the federal partnership of how the stockpile is distributed and secured. and those to acquire those things and you need it. >> i'm committed to working with my colleagues on the past provisions on a bipartisan bill with the strategic national stockpile act already

passing the house and on the senate side. and then to make progress to bill up the stockpile to help and there's not another crisis that we are going through right now but we need to be prepared to be sure. i with that i am well over my time and i can recognize senator sinema joining us remotely. >> the testimony that we heard today is worrisome. and then to work out deliberately in a bipartisan manner must work to make sure communities in my state and arizona are protected and my first question for mr. career testimony focuses on what is happened since congress first

address the bio security risk but since thenn it seems dhs has the largest role and how they have expertise the smaller departments if you are resources and the department ofof defense so considering the resources should we look at ways they can turn on a larger role in what could that entail? >> it's a great point dod has decades of experience a bio security that they have had to do to prepare. i agree there is a tremendous number of lessons learned and efforts at the department of defense that can be learned by the domestic agencies like department of homeland u security and sba. while technology would be helpful in the coordination is great applying these technologies in the o homeland

is one of the biggest challenges. while basic research is part of the solution when you are fighting technologies to train stations and subway stations and crowded places is very different in terms of the way it needs to work. you just can't have false alarms. that doesn't work if you have to evacuate a subway station it's a technically complicated issue but i agree the department of defense has a bank role to play. >> and those considering the broad coordination with the quick response, do you believe the federal workforce will respond to an attack? and other specific steps that we are hiring and retaining the correct staff quick. are much better off

today in early 2020 or 2019. so most departments and agencies in the workforce are accustomed to this being a part of the mission they didn't think they had a role in the public health emergency. so we are much better off. . . . .

that will require a song like policy, by state and local leaders emergency management public health and get buy-in university partners of fred brian leadership at the highest levels of important authorizations appropriate by dialogue, good leaders are

partners when federal. thank you. >> my next question is for doctor parker and doctor george. much of your analysis describes issues and difficulty working across the agency and related fears. you believe you would be safer if we created one independent agency solely focused on bio security or should this be addressed by providing leadership with more authority and accountability are another option. >> we want to go first thank you, senator sinema. i think creating an independent agency would be a mistake. every department agency -- sorry, every cabinet department independent agency and one is

has the responsibility of the fence. i think across the board including department of homeland security, all of the responsible should be addressed congress should be additional legislation needed and all entities coordinated, we have to pull out one independent agency perhaps we need an entity that will be coordinate across the entire government. we recommended the vice president of the united states be put in charge for the national deputy national security advisory supporting that effort. i believe that is the way to go and the commission believes that's the way to go because there are so many departments and agencies involved. if you create another agency you have to give them massive authority to be able to tell

anybody what to do, get information from them i don't think it would work very well i agree, i think another way about his strength and potential national preparedness, diversity by the departments and agencies have their own strengths and authorities and appropriations for the laneway working they have the expertise that we need to bring to the fight for preparedness and response. how we marshal that he's across the agency then work mostly with state and local partners, emergency management public health and private sector in university partners, to. >> i know my time is expired from i have one question, you

mentioned cleaning up client statutory directive from i would like to submit a question for the record pressing pacific recommendations for changes to makeke a face, is that something you would provide for us yes, senator. >> thank you madam chair, i.e. affect. >> thank you -- oh, i apologize no worries, we have been playing musical chairs appear, would be back here. i have heard testimony today from all of our witnesses the bio surveillance programs have certainly struggled to find their mission and carry out those missions. a major part of the budget goes toward national file surveillance integration, you have been part of the enterprises for decades both

in-and-out of government information in your testimony time to transition once there's better technological solutions, what you think the country is developing these technologies also, what programs and capabilities or technologies would you just dhs should focus on financial we are prepared to mark doctor george has made comments about what we need to do. i comment about it's time to transition, we need to re- envision what bio surveillance is the age rule in the surveillance strategy and i do believe we need environmental

detectors, aerosol detectors like fire watch improved technology. we don't need them everywhere but we need them for some, there's a reason why testify for government, for cap three racks for anthrax, anthrax and anthrax bioterrorism aspects so we better have aerosol cluster devices to detect that we may have been attacked by something like that but we need a comprehensive strategy implementation plan that brings together the best of the cdc usda department of interior wildlifefe surveillance as well. intelligent information information that will be a critical part as well. will have to invest in development to come up withe te right better schools we need. i might disagree doctor george a

little bit, i would not want to be the federal official who says let's turn it off three months later we m experience aerosol anthrax so we have to look at the trade-offs determine what the highest priority threats and locations we may want to deploy by the current veneration of technologych with file watch detectors have been focus on the research and development, formative technology fully out of the approaches from covid-19 taught us a lot about wastewater surveillance so i think that's for home is pretty to look at what strategies we can do for novel surveillance approaches wastewater, for example the department has reached different components, opportunity for the

surveillance activities i can be for new ways of thinking we have to fix our federal agency enable that because it will require coordination for dhs to do that effectively. >> my next question for you, the gao reports reviewing national bio defense strategy found no clear detail processes, roles and responsibilities for decision-making including agencies to identify opportunities to leverage resources or make and enforce thoseve decisions. the gao made priority recommendations to dhs and all remain open. you could spend time telling this committee the wayss you believe the federalhe government failed to implement strategy

from 2000. >> thank you. the good news is we thought a strategy the committee was developed to have that coordination. what we have not seen is the execution tough decision making and coordination across departments. doctor george talk about this when they recommended vice president be responsible for the function, i think one key here is has to be an entity or a way to look across the enterprise and make resource decisions that has not happened. oh and before have to play a role, looking at budgets and resources but it's difficult to prioritize programs to say let's invest in file watch and not hhs infrastructure because they can't tell each other what to do

so that still has not been sorted out and because the strategy was just implement it before public, we have not had a see how things play out in the budgeting process see if they make those decisions. i think we still need to get there, i'm not w certain the structure we have under the strategy is not able to get there eventually but if not then we need to do something else. >> one area of particular concern is the workforce morale is extremely low. in 2019 morale was ranked lowest among all sub agencies in the federal government and only

slightly rose in 2022. improvement is good, only slightly improvement. the office has faced problems in recent years, you are someone who's worked in numerous federal departments are addressing these threats, what would be your top recommendation to the committee as to how we might improve morale? >> well certainly whatever you hear about morale issues in any organization, it's always something disconcerting. i wasnl encouraged to hear that there are some improvements so perhaps on the right track at any time there are issues in an organization, it's important to understand the root causes and maybe the organizational changes that happened last several years, change is hard on people so that sometimes is not surprising when you have morale issues with organizational

change for their required leadership working closely with people make sure they are part of the change as they evolve from the current state but finding the root cause is important making sure the workforce feels like they have a voice. they are created with respect and dignity, it's important mission effectiveness. >> i would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today, this is an incredibly important discussion and it certainly does not end of today. we will have a lot more to discuss in the months and years ahead. our nation continues to respond to public pandemic and it's certainly clear we need to do a much better job to preparene for future biological incidents. your testimony will help inform the committee and legislative activities, the reorganizing and re- reorganizing and reauthorizing perhaps the cw empty office type oversight action in the process i want to thank courtney for holding this

with me and i look forward to address these threats and improve the home and security for our nation. i'd like to note thatwo unfortunately doctor alex, the former chief medical officer and assistant secretary for healthal affairs of the department of homeland security was invited unable to testify today because of personalto circumstances. he was able submit written testimony which we appreciate so i asked unanimous consent testimony be placed into the official record of the hearing. the record for the hearing will remainin open team days until 50 p.m. fourth, 2022, physician statements and questions for the record. this hearing is not returned.

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