place them against something solid. >> watch book tv now on sunday, on cspan2 treat or find online anytime at booktv.org. his television for serious readers. once welcome this event. my name is charles i direct programs on counterterrorism. today's event marks the release of it excellent new book by my scholar and colleague douglas london. retired decorated of the intelligence agency. doug's extensive superior experience ineffective multiple field assignments cia chief of

station as well as director of national intelligence representative and the president senior intelligence n representative. over 34 yearsrs of service workd extensively across the middle east weapons of mass destruction. as a fascinating memoir from someone who spent years as a case officer recruiting and managing foreign agents both before and after 911. beyond providing unique insight into that life, the recruits gives reader in an usual extreme important window to the cia's evolution hisses the pulsation since 911.li critique of politics and intelligence work and strategy doug's many stories foreign

agents about the art on the vital importance even in today's high-tech world of human intelligence. at least that's one of my big takeaways. in terms of format commentaries and i will be moderated and managed the wall street journal national securityy corresponden. ansi will engage doug and perhaps at times myself and roughly 30 minutes of discussion about thisse new book was will state of intelligence espionage u.s. national security policy particularly since 911. i may end up posing doug some questions of my own before transitioning her audience today. so too, all those tuning in today on zoom please feel free to pose your questions at any time throughout today's event using zooms a chat function on those alive streaming on youtube you can e-mail your questions to events mpi.ed you.

nancy we keeping the questions as theyon come in and will no doubt make without further do it let me pass over too nancy to get things started into both of you, thank you so much for joining today. >> thank you so much that is such a pleasure to be here. thank you for let me be a part of it. i was a big day for you as you launched your book this week. i want to invite our audience again to submit your questions were doug and i were talking yesterday one of the reasons he wrote this book was to start a conversation. we would love to hear from you and have you engage in that conversation. you know, idi really enjoyed reading your book. what struck me is how much and deeply you describe living a secret life. he would sneak out in the middle of the night, you had different jobs to identify your self. we work for an agency to discourage you identify yourself

before, during or after your career. you have done so and such a bold fashion by writing this book. could you tell me what is it like to live openly and identify yourself? what made you come out this way in this format, such a big the world you have lead for 34 years? >> thank you nancy, thank you charles and for all of us for this program. spray the quickest one or description of it. in an operational form one sort or another. it's not like you're living overseas under scrutiny by various intelligence services you could call in sick and say i'm not working today and dididy kids event at school part i do not want to be surveilled today. do not want listen people to my telephone it doesn't work that way. everything about your life is considered and deliberate with

it's a normal household aaron, picking up your kids school whatever you're doing. so you spend youre entire lifetime doing that but it's deliberate in the way to appear normal, and spontaneous because what you don't want to do is raise any attention to yourself. you want to live in the shadows you can handle agents were very sensitive, who do not want to get caught. you can develop and recruit new ones about them becoming wise to it so you can protect them. then to have this transition is just the opposite. i was not in a social media platform for years maybe it will my kids were in high schools are getting on facebook to kind of stuck them and stuff like that. aside from that i was nowhere out there. to make that quick transition was obviously a real change. making me uncomfortable at first what are the consequences. he said to one friend just recently i don't know it's the end of the journey or the beginning of a new one.

just because of the departure it takes. it was something i thought ith d to do in fact i find it odd my book is referred to as eight memoir. i never intended to be a memoir. the conversation. as whom i'd work to make set out to write a novel. i could write a novel that tells a story of what i think went wrong. i think the consequences of united states and the american or by the politicalization. there is a way to do that. i found myself describing anecdote after anecdote and thought maybe there is a way to sterilize it enough where i take away the details that would be compromising its human operation

that was dynamic between the people involved, the risks that are taken. every agent has a back story. every agent has life, dream, every case officers out there doing what they can to manipulate those dreams and hopes to get them to contribute to american security. at the same time committed above all things protection. what hasra transpired over the 0 years of 911 was a real change in the cia. change in the culture, and not one for the better. one in which we find ourselveset today, i fear as an agency we have lost a lot of ground for adversaries. capacity for intelligencer cells to conduct covid activities had disinformation campaigns we have seen. the meddling from china, ironic, counterintelligence capabilities to where we were losing operations. we were losing agents. i felt the shift in culture

after 911 had made us more of militarization. gave less value to human intelligence. less value to deals, credibility and integrity as a spy service any service it would provide the best analysis of that intelligence provide ways for decision-makers to make the right sources. instead we were perfecting finish in which we did extremely well. that took us away frommm investments in operation. i wanted to get a conversation uggoing. the best way i could do it i have expertise that would be unique was telling stories. telling stories that made a difference to americans. made a difference to security. in the transition as a sortft telling after 911. my engagement by my headquarters colleagues in the shift thereafter. the book you described interesting and interesting.

sounds like that drove that. want to talk a little further at some the changes on the agency and how you thought there were detrimental a lot of change but 911. the u.s. failed to prevent 911. that is there is a system in place i didn't stop that. what changes would you feel needed to be made and warned what changes in particular you think did more harm than the improvements they were intending? >> broadly and having lived through it the 911 commission or for it. there's a lot of takeaways. it's not a perfect document is a very useful document. what is transparency. with a great deal of detail what occurred, who knew what and

when. there was intelligence available. the cia for its part had been ringing the alarm bells. people were not so paying attention to it. there's an app intelligence they knew to say something is coming. but even before the daily brief it was reported throughout the year is going to be a large-scale attack. did not have the transparency with other intelligence agencies there's a lot of turf battles particularly with fbi. lack of engagement with the military in some places. and i think some of that has to do with a lifestyle which is vital.

it sometimes defeated the value. in their personalities at play at thehe time. i think they worsen senior officers because they one of the glory for the one of the opportunity. they knew something was coming and they wanted to fix it. there were two actors on the pentagon that should have been watching they lost track of and had the fbi known that i think fthe changes some more good things the ones best were getting more intra-agency communication, more dialogue more sharing more transparency among the players. i think that certainly helped that was on was a default cia this report to make sure everyone is a homeland threat.

those pieces all seem to be working. i think what happened which is on the negative side is politics at the time at 911 and of course the report which the administration the bush administration used to justify it there action. that was intelligence commutative to a street from the white house. it's about survival.ze i cannot emphasize 20 years later the sense that the cia we are going to be done away with or at a minimum but under the fbi secretary of defense and particularly he felt slighted and embarrassed the agency was able to things early on in afghanistan the forces were not able to do. smaller, agile and just had

management to do a lot more the authority. i believe the senior leadership at the time was so driven by the sense of panic they felt, they had to find some way to get the white house on their side to protect themselves and threats from other agencies. and to do that first and foremost elites by service and analytics service and independent somewhat nonpolitical entity that could conduct covid action that could be for not supposed to clandestine. we did the white house but difficult situation. what is to be able to chase al qaeda andlt pakistan. another is to be able to address the new trainees coming off the

battlefield not necessarily those who could be prosecuted under u.s. law. transition even worse many of these things really came from the very top or in some cases were outsourced to contractors, psychologists in the air force came up with the parameters ofur the program. by doing so there is a media cultural shift with the sense of inclusion. without for my day early on in the agency there's unique sense of inclusion and ability to not refer to senior officers bite rank, chief, sir it was by n fit name. but that allowed for people to offer alternative points of view or further to help with debate. we are talking is life and death, you need to be sure, your

protecting agents in your protecting staff. and as a point because of the radical transformation in the atmosphere for the agency. and of course that only seem to replicate and broaden as we begin to prioritize paramilitary activity which is then really for a more rapid advancement of those who were part of that process. those who are focused on finish those who are part of the paramilitary solutions for the ones to continue to advance and influence agency policy. and even much of our analysis was meant to support combat operations. those were change for the negative as opposed to the changes for theos good. the most fundamental problem i

see since 911. begin to look at itself. i talk about with the public the raw details when it operation goes wrong when something goes w downhill. stewing internally. try to protect themselves as an upperel rank. repeat loss with bombing in 2009 were several of my colleaguesri were killed by a very talented targeted analyst not an operations officer making operational decisions was put in charge of all of this. no one suffered consequences nor about 911. more so about events numbers we had lost. perhaps in some cases preparations that were not

unique and not complementary. we did because we wanted to we wanted to get the resources and the attention. those of the questions i think the agency still has. >> and eager to check up some the areas your world have operated me but before we do what i sawbu in your book was tt tension for a case officer manifesting in a case officer found himselfe or herself betwen two worlds. the bureaucracy and the challenges of the agency. in the very world they were operating in trying to find agents to work with them. in a couple people you describe knipe should preface this by saying no real names are used. the agency you described went to the book very thoroughly to keep out intelligence she would argue in some cases thanks it did not look so good for the agency but there couple people here describe gave them pseudo- names. one of them not just because of his name stood out to me was

because his love of family. the couple people that seem to be stuck in this world who you happen to find in the most ways. and it wanted to know if you could talk about that, how his case tell if i'm reading it correctly, he found himself in between these two worlds. if you could talk a little bit about him and how that case ended because of the conflict of what the agency wanted to put you on the ground wanted to continue to have his intelligence come forward. >> for talk about muhammad the individual turned over too another officer. correction ever since. the job of the case officer is managing the risk. looking at my resume what did i

do for 35 years? i solve the problems and manage stress. the challenge is in managing the risk as a case officer in the changes at the agency was really where the tensions grew most over theos years. ideally there is risk versus gain what's in our interest, what can we control it can't be controlled? talk about the book the transformation of's the agency s more geared toward politics. on the front page of a newspaper as opposed to is the risk to secure intelligence worth it to both the agent and the collector? someone could get hurt, killed, rested, what have you. muhammad's case charming interesting man he was involved in counterterrorism.

>> would you mind how you came across them? works i had a break in at my house. i was in a country in a very difficult area going through an insurgency people would lay that a civil war. it's a dangerous environment. there is no family we had houses to keep officers like myself away from official platform to make it harder for the local service keep an eye on us. go out, have our conduct and activities. it was a big house it looked like it must have money and people were desperate it was hard times in the country. security forces came to investigate, but caught the perpetrators. the last thing they wanted was for americans to be killed, that would make them look weak to their own country. trying to push away anyh of the

intrusion what's going on, can we help? they had their terrorist team look into it. was there a terrorist threat? what a great opportunity. he was a target i was trying to meet. on their units to give us an idea of what their strengths,ve what their capabilities were. but there intelligence were on terrace but that's what we needed to protect ourselves. war was coming at us what could the maintain and not maintain? i found myself going to the police station. and presented myself as a very naïve innocent very concerned. is also worried about my security. are they coming after me question my going speak to onene of the investigators to find out and be reassured. i met muhammad which was one of the investigators. he of course reassured me jamaal was fine.

he was from the country if you would. he was not a city kid. speak local language only. it was not terribly well educated and to be fair he was a thug. his job was terrorist making others go away and keep others and join the cause. so he was thrilled at the opportunity as an american official. maybe he could do security of my home? i take a look get cameras and alarms or things like that. that was my way to separate him from the herd if you would, get into independent start moving towards do it anyone in my industry to know this is like moonlighting and i know you guys

do that. we became fast friends or all of this. the time came i was nearing the end where my cover was at risk. no matter what coverage you use it as soon as you start using your cover going to start eroding it. you're going to become interest of a local and truth intelligence or third world country for people forgot whatever we ought we were about the russian, the chinese they are very much interested in whae were doing. harold was what that new agency really wanted. harold was very much a corporate guy. he will be a great description was more like what do they want to hear?

he was technically proficient at his tradecraft. he did not have the gift of the real ability to engage with people, to engage with people across all cultural changes and divides. folks from any spectrum or any kind of outlook. charles was very much visual more of his suburban privilege if you would. this is not muhammad. he felt disrespected, particularly for a culture that was a big deal. there he was a very much a man in his own world and here was this kind of suburban privileged american disrespecting him. harold shows up at my house.

the really bad combination. you should never be seen in public with them. the other problem harold was heavily armed. i let him in for. >> it was w mohamed that showed up? >> yes muhammad regressive i said harold regrets i'm sorry. harold may get a job but he didn't show up at my house. getting muhammad settled down and taking away his weapons. folks in this country i think the country very animated. the pistol was in his and. making comments about harold was a terrible thing. patting his knee and dreading his hand easing the pistol out of his hand testified muhammad

to work they through a lot more money to muhammad. harold did not think he was at fault here. muhammad was the one delivering. in fact muhammad at one point disappeared its reliable he was going to go away. it was about a year or so later muhammad reached out to us, muhammad was shot up in a firefight. he was badly shot up. he was in convalescence for many, many months. through that he was disabled ind the sense he could no longer work for the group he was working with. but, we gave muhammad a nice settlement, transition his life.

it even at the muhammad was very thankfulul. just never really had much to say about harold. indeed it's very possible because why take a risk for someone who's not seeing me for what i am. who's not appreciating me for what i i am in mine. you have to be in a world where your best friends is in this no judgment zone. i think as we transition to not really recruit a more diverse road of case officers the differences in our country wetland differences throughout the world. the attitude work human intelligence is less and less of a priority work focused on paramilitary operations. i think it was those like harold

who then influenced invest and influence how much weight we would lend to intelligence which i believe it remains vital today than ever. >> one thing people might find surprising in the bark details cut out is how many human stories you till the interactions you have with people you are trying to fit convinced to work with you. you end up reading it people are empathetic. he finds are empathetic toward. whoak speaks perfect english isn a dangerous position with you. is going to take the risk he does not want to be late home to his wife so a universal problem. and the man who to do the right thing in his fighting himself digging more and more into the al qaeda network giving a better and better intelligence. does not know how to extricate

himself was driven by his love of family and a reason to do something like work with the agency to provide intelligence. all of these interactions you have it.ev and even your family has as part of this effort to recruit agents who can provide the united states with key intelligence. i was really struck by how many human stories are required in the interchange of personalities which is afghanistan but we've been talking a lot about the country. i wonder, given what we talked about in terms of a evolution of the agency, the way the u.s. collects human intelligence. shares throughout the united states government all at a time

when the agency has become than it should. why do you think theo struggled to understand the depth of the taliban? it's ability to move in the state we now find ourselves in? >> 's upper trials are for me? >> for you in the number and the platform over too charles. said think unfortunately and listen to the testimony for some time now rather interesting comment about no one told us. it's a politically convenient. but not a fair reflection on years of intelligence reporting on afghanistan. the cia was consistently much more critical in afghanistan.

the cohesiveness of the military forces, the police, the army. that is one of the benefits i think of being in an organization that's not supposed to be a policymaker. i'm getting too far down that road. were not criticizing our own work. here's a receipt going on here are the projections and here's our concern. the military showed up to this book on the afghanistan papers, it does paint picture for the military much more rosy picture. and at regular conferences with the militant regular briefings with officer's success just around the corner. owing to be so much better this year than last year. they were invested, they were responsible they were the ones on the ground trying the national army. reinforcing the image they wanted. they were having success of her

a lot about metrics, combatants killed, missions are carried out in operations but that does not tell how were going to transform the country. which i think was the u.s. policy which we did if you look at what we actually went there for. trying to take an american model and posting on a ready for that. maybe it never should have actually suffered that. it's our model not theirs. imposing a model or critiquing the stateul department, the whie house would have to say yes we are making progress. when i was chief of that team to the pentagon, we are losing the war and this is why we need to find a way to do up afghanistan

or at least to deal the taliban. it was always how can we fight? i just don't think american policymakers want to hearan it. they want to lead, the going to be successful. one point i made to my military counterparts the cia from covid training program ofin securities the funding intelligence service who had parent military mission. dealing on a fair scale withpe military operations and criticize that. but we didn't and we did it well. there is never one incident cia ever suffered in afghanistan. none of the afghan troops we trained fired upon us. the military suffered a great number. it's a much more culturally

historic model what's going to be more workable. the military is fantastic for this excellent fighting there technically position. but they are not trained to understand and see the realities on the ground we need to adapt our blueprint two. we have one blueprint works great for us, works great for the developed countries but doesn't work great for everywhere. the keep sticking with it despite. it wasn't 11 days a cia photographer years and years. as my time in the trump administration this is a set of conditions wasn't talking to an not delegating authority, troops were not being paid byut the taliban military solution. basically providing insight into the country. we said days to weeks.

they did not want to hear that and its dismissal of the conditions we spoke about as a possible scenario. all the pieces of the puzzle there. the bureaucracy of the information is shared and treated as such that you cans then put those pieces together in a way that works. i think sometimes people think of bureaucracy is kind of boring to think what you are saying the very structure with which intelligence however good is treated, is as important as the collection of intelligence itself is what hearing you say. >> was all that 911. we certainly saw that in the embellishment the cherry picking and spending of intelligence we have certainly seen in afghanistan. next i could ask you questions all day long. hope charles has art sorts of questions i should tell you i've seen some of the queries from our listeners they're very thoughtful and looking forward to getting to them but in the

meantime i hand over too charles. >> thank you so much great i will be quick will begets the q&a. i guess i have one sort of double parted question. which talks on a little bit to the afghanistan situation. i think one of the aspects or the consequences from the t afghanistan withdrawal on the chaos and instability of course the consequences of the taliban taking over hasn't been significantly acknowledges the potential impact on the intelligencebi community's abily to continue to portray the united states as a reliable actor that sticks with its partners but does not pull the rug out from under their feet. the first part of my question, is there something to that as someone who has spent so longng recruiting people? is america's willingness and ability, no questions asked to stand by its recruits and its

agents is something that comes up in those discussions? i guess is a part of that but to broaden it, something we have talked about before, doug, off-line is human intelligence importance in counterterrorism. but more importantly for its role in getting to the duper root causes that allow terrorism to exist in the firstst place. i was wondering, linking that to the afghanistan question to broaden the importance of humans to that, very long-term generational challenge that wetm are in. i realize those are two big questions but would need to get started on them at least. agents do not have the like us. they do not have to like the night states government, they have to trust us. believe me, as you point out how we think it was to go into terrorism after the problem came

out on the torture. tried to convince someone it was in their best interest for their own good, for their consumption ideological to work with cia. against their family essentially. so many terrorist groups are by family connections. that is not easy. trying to make that transition, one agent i was recruiting was not long after the election the court versus bush that was decided by the supreme court. this is a senior security official basically from authoritarian states that you know, ias used to think the unid states was the most democratic country in the world. now i think it's probably india. that was from a country that really didn't like india. so, you've got to find a way to have that intimate relationship

between case officer and agent. where the agent understands he or she is working for the night states government. has to go beyond friendship. it has to be institutionalized. you have to sort of carp out that niche where the agent believes they can trust us and we are going to honor our commitments regardless of order policies may be. it is great when they align particularly we have had great cases of russian and chinese over the years volunteering to us because they wanted to do something. they were hoping to align with the u.s. policy for that is not always the case. we don't have that luxury. the second part of your question that is really where there is a disconnect between policy and intelligence. policy has been so focused on what is our easiest, most efficient way to combatt terrorism. the answer continually has been kinetic options. for the intelligence community and think 911 these things

happen out of conditions. there are issues that are a driving force. i have a concern today overnk domestic terrorism. we see this victimization on xenophobia, a fear to promote terrorismm occurs in those dehumanize those who they attack. we no longer see them as people, as human beings. i am fearful of that happening here with white supremacists the alternative right and stuff like that in the right wing militia coming up. they're doingng just that to fellow americans be even fellow americans of their same ethnic group perhaps. so, intelligence, here's why these people or their power base. here's their technique to

develop their group. to leverage hatred. to lever victimization, to leverage fear, to leverage what they claim the united states are supporting and enabling. that is how they get people in and that's how theyan transform them to hate. policymakers find a way to deal with that. it is a lot harder to change hearts and minds. it is a lot harder to give lip service you've got the best military got combatants on the battlefield we will keep going after them. the ripple effect of that are de- centralized threat. we are actually creating a bigger bench for more recruits. doing nothing to lead to terrorism in the first place. x you know, we have a question from jeffrey think it's a

follow-up to-u the point you jut made. he asks, and the posts are generally six climate in thepr united states, how much harder will the process of bringing in new staff for the intelligence be for recruiters? there is this divisiveness complicate background check? and the former case officer do you believe the polymerization of intelligence has af negative impact on recruiting? >> i think the cia recent ads have been focused on improving their brand. i teach student, graduate students and i asked them what is your initial reaction it's critical that bless insight or eareading less and things like that. i think the cia one of the problems in the economy is

getting out of the stereotypical case files. sadly white, mail, suburban privileged individuals who may be well educated and travel on holidays or studies abroad, it does not know how n to deal with people like harold from different parts of the world or can dealdv with adversity or see people for what they are. he spoke very eloquently about agents. some were not the nicest people and had blood on their hands. but they all had families, they all had kids, a good number of them cried, i watch rum comes with some of them so i am aware of it. but getting out of that. to the questioners points, i think part of the problem with background check has been to us this propensity to screen out people contexts were nationalized in their citizens. it may be a little bit of trouble he got into trouble in high school with whatever criminal activity but then righted themselves. you may have gone to community college as opposed to a top 100

university. so, i think that is part of the problem. they are going to need to make adjustments. you have to have a process but it should not be a process that is politically biased. and i think there is a danger of that. certainly to the point of the question will there be a politicalization of that? it could be a camp bullet out. i'm hoping the professionals do the job and most subjective way. i found even the agency people have talked about secret group of people trying to resist trumper that's not really how it works. people a great mission focus their focus on the f job. but they can be subject, as we all are. i think that is what we can screen out to bring in the right people. i think susan as a great follow-up question which is how you see the agency getting closer to a more nonpartisan

environment that you describe? particular file the factors you describe and an increasingly politicized and divisive environment? >> should be a meritocracy. it should be will be or selecting people have is that contribute. they are inclusive of different points of view, thoughts and different backgrounds and perspectives and things like that. i have never sensed partisanship in the agency even prior to the trump administration. you just never knew what political party people were part of. people criticize operations or issues being that saddam or they don't really understand what we are doing. he kind of friction and mentality think that will always be the same. but i did see more partisanship in terms of people projectingec more.an and hopefully not projecting

away of what we are doing. what was most partisan of all was the nature of the leadership that went across republican, democratic, republican and democratic administrations alike. what can we say or not say. we certainly saw that early trump administration. vertically reporting on russia on pam pao as the chief director in which things were made more difficult in terms of production and analysis. things were censored or there was such a fear of the repercussions on one's career that would help censorship. that is really the most direct impact of partisanship and polished ships. what i saw more broadly and johf ratcliff when he worked for trump, very different than dan coats. they were both republican, greag professional, very objective and

tried to protect objectivity. it was all over again. so terrible disappointment not long before the nine states government acknowledged former fbi agent was dead, he who had gone into the fbi unfortunately on the very ill considered mission that analysts had thought of it. it's an effort to beat up on the present at the time he is in prison and we know it. those weeks before he acknowledged it. purnell knew he was dead. it was politically self-serving to beat the drums to serve the white house best interest records everything you are describing is a trajectory one way p. is there a way to put all of that back in its box? is that possible question reduce the evidence director burns is trying to do that? >> and very actually very heartened by it what director burns is doing in terms of personal tracing.

and who is who and who has been appointed, he is maneuvering out some of those who need to o go t have been there for too long and have been part of the problem. and part of the circling of the wagon. he sees some very innovative ways to get them out. at the same time he has the ability to get better jobs byil those leaving to move them out. dand he's made some very good points. think dave marlow was publicly recognized a colleague and friend i think very highly of him. it's a very professional case officer, tremendous experience. he's going to do the right thing he wants to bring back the service and promote that in the right way please also very thoughtful guy when it comes to workforce. he's not going to just cut off heads. he is going to be fair. the appointment of the individual taking care of the yvonna task force i can see his

name is undercover. another excellent officer. very capable, very talented, he will do the right thing. so the problem is 20 years of nurturing one perspective covid action there's a lot of folks in charge of an operational transformation who had very little direct experience at those kinds of operations. who have been company people so to speak, where are the winds going there will favor me? that does not change overnight. i am gratified by what i see the director doing. director. but it won't be that easy. i think a healthy agency is leadership from above, the white house. we areif compelled to really reprioritize the competition that means a kinetic solution is not going to be the answer but

were going to be smarter with gotta be sneakier. the agency is bitter. they are allowed to do it, if it's nurtured we've got to start looking or tradecraft which is been ignored for 200 years. the not so the great power. >> a stock of a a couple of thoe rivals and i were limited on time i want to try to squeak to more questions and i hope you will indulge me. gh smiths ask how important is intelligence to the chinese? how effective is intelligence services and how to this relationship of politics and police differ from that of the united states? >> their advantages and disadvantages. the security, military intelligence service are very well resourced very well-funded. it's all about loyalty for them. they suffer from the politicalization they've got to stay here and how they want tosh hear it they cannot be too contrary.

that is somewhere where they are weaker. they traditionally have focused on operations that are more about transfer, working ethnic cases those who they think are going to be empathetic towards china as opposed to just rolling out those relationships. they don't have their case officers with as much of that flexibility to engage on a personal level of which i'm speaking. they bring a lot of force to the game. what they have done it most importantly the counterintelligence game both in terms of technology, which is where they have had us a number of times because in some cases not because our technology was weak because her tradecraft isow weak. we allowed for compromises through backdoors or by peoplexp exposing us. the chinese are certainly a force to be reckoned with by their sheer numbers invested are overwhelming. i know the fbi

at home and for the agency abroad. it's going to be through very smart, very well conceived operations to penetrate those nations which are doable pretty done it before, we can do it again. that is going to be the best reflection of what are they really doing question require their plans where their capabilities and threats? we will learn that from the agencies we recruit oner the otr side. someone had that last question as a moderator to so many mentioned earlier, my favorite intelligence correspondent warned of the wall street journal who asks how was the agency and the community of former officials reacted to your book question at this time to be self protected to say the leaste and do not like to talk about human intel operations even when presented in an anonymous version. i'm curious what feedback you have gotten, has anything about it surprise you? >> the negative reactions are through folk some of my former colleagues. their effort and then i did

current props that they try to do is undermine my credibility think my motives weret disappointed and stuff like that. well realizingng the motives of the nation is not always aligned with the credibility of their intelligence for their motives could be in their cases vindication or telling a story or ideology and not truthful. bm that system, those who advanced and some of whom are very deep in the pockets of saudi arabia, united arab emirates or the beltway and to which a exercise contracts. those of the most supportive our senior officers from the past who saw the change after 9/11 who felt the same disappointment that what happened to the agency and those at my great or lower who have been in the trenches fighting these wars for all these years and seeing our agents dispense or dispensable. i knew that going in that would

be the case. my goal was starting a conversation in getting it going but at the end of the day those who read the book will see it's a love story about human intelligence, a love story about the art form and the and the lost art form on which i'm worried. >> all sorts of questions. one more if you will indulge me. the question that i got says thankou you for sharing your knowledge and experience. do you feel the threat has increased or decreased since your time in service and what is the one pressing issue you would like resolved sooner rather than erlater in terms of the future r the united states and its approach toar national security?

>> the threats a have evolved. counterterrorism evolved overol the years. two then all these different affiliates of al qaeda and i think we tend to overreact. how can you overreact to a tragedy that was 9/11. it's going to make us suffer in our day-to-day lives. it must be considered. the preacher that spoke at the cathedral we just have to be

patient and thoughtful. i'm deeply concerned. to take the action that we need there's a lot of politics at play. the threats from the great power competition they've gotten a lot smarter and we had no answer.

i hope they are able to do that. there's a risk to speaking truth to power and some have great politicalio connections and want to take the bold and courageous moves. having a bit more accountability to secure public support will be a useful step in that direction. the last hour i think it is done ands it read as a love story. i want to thank the institute for allowing me to be the moderator. it's an interesting conversation i know i've learned a lotot from it and thanks to you for letting

us to go on this journey with you in an unclassified a setting if you will. it's been illuminating and i appreciate you sharing your experience with all of us. >> thanks to everybody that's watching it. >> have a good day, everyone.