>> on august 24 , 5514-year-old emmett visited bryan's grocery and meat market in greenwood, mississippi. were he was accused of flirting with a white store clerk, carolyn bryant. 16-year-old cousin, wheeler parker junior was with him when the incident happened. also four days later when was subducted. sunday on q and a. reverend parkeroa with few days full of trouble. recounts events a limit to the murder and efforts to justice for the late cousin. >> at left in the store and nothing happened while i was in there. shortly afterward i was working and i was 16. nothing happened while they were in the store. they came out of the store they once they're out of the store a short time later, comes out of

the store he loved to make people laugh. never had a dull day in his life. get you have to have understood the atmosphere in 1955. i mean that was itself. >> reverend wheeler parker junior with his book a few days full of trouble. sunday nights at eight eastern on q&a. you can listen to q&a and all of our podcast under free c-span now app. ♪ >> hello everybody, welcome. welcome to the american enterprise institute's my to welcome you to this conversation about matthew continetti the right, the hundred year war for american conservatism.

this book is both an intellectual and a political history of the american right over the past century. takes up the ideas behind the electoral coalition that has composed it, the weight that coalition has sought power and used a power in our politics for the weights thought about the country and its future for the book explores some important tensions between populism and conservatism. between libertarians and traditionalists between pragmatists and purists. so it gives us a lot to talk about. that is what we will be doing this morning. we will do it through a conversation between the books author matthew continetti and you might say at one of its subjects, former house speaker paul ryan. a practitioner and a think about politics in the modern right. a word about each of them as if they need it. matthew continetti is a senior fellow here at aei were his focus on american politics. as a prominent journalist and analyst and author.

he was the founding editor of the washington free beacon. he was price that the opinion editor of the weekly standard is also a contributing editor of the national review and a columnist for commentary magazine. this is matt's third book in one way or another they paul dealt with the evolution of the modern right. paul ryan is of course a former speaker of the house of representatives pretty served in congress for 20 years from 1999 through 2019. represent the first district of wisconsin. in that time he rose very quickly to serve as chairman of the budget committee and then chairman of the ways and means committee and ultimately served as speaker for about three and half years but i'm sure if i like a lot longer, paul. he is now among other things a nonresident fellow with us here at aei along with serving on a number boards, teaching at notre dame and other important work. our format will be straight forward and conversation up or no formal remarks, and opening statements. we will discuss the book, its core ideas, put questions to

matt's and after some back-and-forth between matt and paul, which i will moderate we will open things up for questions. questions from all of you in the room and also questions from those of you who are watching live online. if you are watching us online there are two ways you can ask questions of mats. by e-mail or if you must on twitter. [laughter] by e-mail you can send a question to jon roesch that jon.roach@aei.org procuring twitter you can use the # aei their rights. and with that, we can just jump in. matt, first of all congratulations on really and importance of her book. maybe the way to get us started help the folks get a sense of the book is telling us a little bit about why you wrote it and why you wrote in the way you did? white has the particular character and form you've given. hooks great, thank you paul and thank you all for attending. thank you to aei for providing a

home or i could write this book which has been many years in the making. and finally came to me said you have to write the book. he was able to help me too come to aei where he could write it. so, i think the book began in a few ways. first is that i have an unusual habit i love reading old journalism. when i started as a political writer in washington 20 years ago, my hobby was reading through the archives of the magazines where he worked at the time. and then moving from there to the archives of national review, the american spectator, commentary magazine, all these little magazines on the american right. and from that was an education on the history but also broader education history of american politics and culture. really for the last half-century for that something emmett doing in my spare time for two decades now. however, after 2012 in

particular i began a more intensive look and investigation into the history of the american rates. because the 2012 election, which you played a pretty big parted and are familiar with, exemplified to me some of the emerging strains and tensions within the right too. to the republican party establishment based in washington and the grassroots conservatism throughout the country. between various factions within the conservative movement and the different ideas and principles they stood for. and also, caring through 2012 seemed to me the populist moment which i believe began the most recent populist moment anyway i began in the second bush administration on 2005 -- 2006 was only gaining steam. and so i wanted to investigate why was this happening? what was driving this energy? and when donald trump came down

the escalator and 2015, eventually won the republican nomination and the presidency the next year, i thought the history of the american rate was all the more necessary to figure out how we reach this impasse. another reason why i wrote the book that i should mention it i've been teaching this material in some form over the years. some of my students are here and i'm happy to say that. i found there is no real one volume textbook i could hand a young person and say this is a history part there of course some great works george nash is the conservative intellectual movement since 1945 is kind of the key text of my field. but that book really focuses have in the post-world war ii element and it kind of ends its main body around the late 1970s. so i felt it was necessary to

broaden the story until in a narrative format that synthesizes both intellectual developments along with political developments. and so this bike and headed to my student say forget it at the class or read the book or preferably by a couple copies for you and your family. hooks paul, bite me beware of offering some starting thoughts of your own about the book. maybe help us think about the question of the history of the right for conservatives? why should conservatives care about the history of american conservatism? next i think were coming to an inflection point like all great countries do and i think if we lose the country to the left we lose with the countries all about. for me the constitution declaration is rooted in natural law. in the principles that flows that should be character in her policies to make sure country realizes its true potential. and if we lose and that is, we lose the left and we become like

other countries. other democracies. so i think it is extremely important that we are not anywhere close to where we need to be as a movement to be able to realize these things. my background is more for school-based a word about inflection points in the future of the social contract on the dalit reserve currency and how much time do we have before we can really put in place of important reforms. but we have to win a lot of arguments the country before we can do that. so, why is it important? it is important so that we can make sure the 21st century is a great american century. that democracy and self-determination and markets and the rest and human flourishing is advance which is what we work on here at aei. i too into thank aei a home. [laughter] but we were talk about this a second ago when i came to age and went to college and 88 -- 92 it's that kind of time. i became a political agent in the reagan moment.

and i came into the conservative movement as a young person as a think tanker and then as a member inside a fight for the republican party which was alive and well. bill clinton had just one. i did big churn within the conservative movement and factions fighting one another but this is not new per this is happened from the beginning on figure book is a perfect example of that. for new young people who are shocked at this infighting so to speak of the conservative movement, this is what happens in movements. until you have a big standard bearer a reagan type person you're going to have that kind of fighting. so, we are we have been before. where we go we do not yet know but it is important that the conservative movement in my opinion becomes the majority movement in the country with respect to winning elections we can effectuate policy. so we can solve these big problems and in front of us.

>> and maps, it must be a challenge to decide where to start in a book like this. you mentioned george nash's wonderful book really looks at american conservatism as a post-world war ii phenomenon. you don't do that pretty put a lot of emphasis on the pre-war right to the pre-new deal rates and begin in the 1920s, why? what is there to learn now? >> i think for a historian the two hardest questions are where to begin and what to leave out? and those are the two things they criticize. we not rush the spring of 1921. i thought it was important to show the institutions that american conservatives saw themselves defending. if conservatism is the defense of the inherited institution

american conservatives are in an unusual place. the institutions we are meant to defend our crated by the american founding, the constitution, the declaration of independence, the political theory of the federalists. but in 1932 many people on the right believed a revolution taking place the nature of the american experiment. in the nature of the american government. the people on the right were defending the inherited institutions of the constitution against fdr and the new deal. i think it was important to show how they came to define themselves in opposition to the new deal. prior to 1932 where progressivism would settle on the american political continuum is still up for grabs. teddy roosevelt aligned with the

progressives. of course it was a very successful republican president. woodrow wilson aligned with progressives. he was eight not so successful pretty successful in some ways not in others. democratic president. it wasn't until 1920s the republican party with harding and coolidge he saw the gop align itself against progressivism. we are going to define ourselves as the party of americanism. hours harding put it of normalcy. gop of the 1920s was extraordinarily successful. the great depression, and delegitimize the gop's claim to providing prosperity for the average american. world war ii delegitimized the rights of foreign policy of non- intervention in the mainstream american electric. and so conservatism there had to reconfigure itself for the

post-world war ii cold war era. that part have been told in some places, who considered himself who wrote a book on the subject. i wanted to incorporate that story into the story of the postwar conservative movements including donald trump cracks in some ways the kind of work you are most engaged in, the efforts to reform the entitlement system, and to think about the role of government often depicted by the left as attempts to restore pre-new deal america. is there some truth to that? is the american right still seeking some way to recover an error made by fdr? >> you can make that argument maybe 20 years ago. i don't think that is the case anymore. i think everyone has reconciled

themselves with this. what i will call the social contract. look, the founders gave us a system was designed to reach political consensus. and when you do that, you do big things. i don't think that's the case you must take the social contract you have consensus as to something government has an important role to play on. so then the question if we agree with that i would argue most do agree on the rates. if you agree with that the question is let's move on making sure that's the case. many have a fight about left and right. markets, choice, individualism is involved in this. or if you are a progressive you see it as a way the government reaches into people's lives.

i do think the right has reconciled itself of the social contract which is basically erected in that. between new deal and great society. and now it's a question for this with the budgets were all about. not to repeal these things but to rework the program so they are actually -- they work in the 21st century. did not create debt crisis. did not bankrupt the company entering country. and use markets and choice and competition as a means of delivering on these goals without hamstringing the country, slowing down growth, and bankrupting the country. i think we are there. in populism. trump wrote about this one. he and i thought about medicare and internment reform all the time. it became clear to meet there is no way he wanted to embrace that. other than making a good on the promises of repeal and replace which for me where one vote shy of getting it done.

it was not popular in his mind. was very frustrating to me as an example of where the right is now we reform it. repealing it is not in the card. >> it's always a dilemma for the right in a variety of contexts. which left it is responding too. and so the right in america's always felt on the defensive because first it has dealt progressives. then it has a built fdr. that has to do with lbj or hold it, now we are in the obama era we are dealing with that were jennifer great awoken ink as we meet here today. another left. each time they transform themselves take on new guises the right often has to do as well. whenever i teach the founding

documents of national review that magazine in 1955. says conservatives are against the new deal and in parentheses were not sure there can be any other kind. all align with national review principles. for the american on the right to read that order here but paul just said said clearly things have changed. the small see conservative instinct of just well we don't want to rock the boat. but also the left has changed too. the left has moved on into new territory. and in many ways we are not fighting over the new deal as so much as the cultural agenda of the left which really comes out i think of the anti- or movements of the late 1960s.

has waxed and waned over the ensuing decades. cracks wasted about bill buckley been essential character of the book for it simply seems to be the case. you probably should put ronald reagan on the cover. you can see why. i think it is up to you you would've put bill buckley on the cover. was william f buckley doing? what was his purpose? what was the movement he had in mind to create? if you think about national review and the rest of the massive buckley project starting in the 1950s, what was his ambition? >> i think his ambition you put at that young age when it comes on the scene in 1951 he said this to mike wallace in early interviews that i am a counterrevolutionary. and the revolution he wanted to overturn was fdr's.

the evolution the change in the nature of the american social contract the new deal launched. so how to go about doing this? there are many different avenues he pursued. the first was institution building. so in addition to review he was also responsible for the creation or played a part in the creation of the intercollegiate studies institute. it's college armed collegiate network which for many decades as a place for pro-life intellectual work. he did it in terms of trying to build up a counter establishment. to recruit people who inhabit these institutions the four

channels they had in the mid- 1960s. also wanted to build fences around conservatism. the bigger problem of the american right in the aftermath of world war ii and the post- mccarthy. the mid- 1950s curing through the early 1960s mid- 1960s it was considered a fringe ideology. it was thought to be but a liberal country, constitution the bill of rights. who after all harsh critic of the popular republican president they just seem a little bit odd. the intellectual ties were all in the area of government expansion and regulation.

fringe in the 50s and 60s. make it respectable. he begins drawing fences about his collection of american conservatism. saying that iran cannot be part of his movement cannot be part of his movement because he was and a narco capitalist. he could privatize everything get rid of the state totally. national security also played a big part in this. buckley's conservatism would be one of engaged nationalism. america should be strong for it should be powerful it also had to be engaged in the world to defeat, to rollback the soviet

union. that meant a large military establishment. a standing army, that meant forward defense and deployment of troops. met alliances like nato meant interventions like vietnam. all of which the would've been extremely skeptical this is the version of american conservatism that bill buckley created. the last part of his legacy was political. working within the republican party the traditional vehicle of american conservatism to turn it away from the moderate republicanism. lexi so-called me tours. and toward conservatism. and so we played a big role in the early draft goldwater campaigns that culminated in 1964 and barry goldwater's nomination for it mr. conservatives nomination for president. the republican ticket but

ironically then the goldwater campaign which was managed by one in those prominence of this institution locked buckley out of the campaign. he was afraid. afraid goldwater would be associate with national review of bill buckley. that kind of political energy also expressed itself in his early friendship with ronald reagan. even got to the point later in his life he is willing to intervene buckley in democrat primaries in support democrat candidates order to get rid of the original. i came to age at the tail end of this. grew up reading the pages. i had a conservative econ prof who gave me his issue of

national review. i did not know what it was is in the late '80s and college pretty said i think you should take this. i'll just give you my copy when i'm done with it. and then i just consumed it and really took to national dealings. if you are a young budding conservative in the 80s, early 90s this is the path you took. this is the movement you came into. we have different movements like this in different times when people are coming of age the conservative movement. i think buckley of all people pretty much dominated it for premature three decades. and nevertheless still had a bunch of people, there is a big fights. but he was the center of gravity. i think if he didn't put dragon on the cover. >> i would say to and all the debates were having at the moment over the new american rights if you go buy my book,

the third new right we have had over the last 100 years. i think there's great energy being devoted to building up an infrastructure that can compete with the conservative infrastructure that bill buckley began creating in the 50s and 60s. the early neoconservatives help build throughout the 70s and 80s and 90s. that had been missing for this new right for many years. but now, in the final years of the trump president and that years subsequent to that they are building their own infrastructure. it just shows you, you will appreciate this point the importance of institution, right? because without these institutions, without these basis for work and for organizations, it's just people riding in their basements.

cracks buckley created this kind of conservative mainstream through all these institutions. in a way it was built around ideas that would've been very controversial in the old right that presented itself as a consensus, as a mainstream of the right. within that main stream within those institutions there's also a dividing line. a dividing line between traditionalists and libertarians. between freedom and tradition. that dividing line came to define the internal debates of the buckley conservative movement. and over time the attempt to overcome those divisions became known. at least the 1960s when it was meant to be, what it wasn't spirited it makes sense as a way to try to solve the problem buckley confronted within his own camp?

>> i think one of the underappreciated figures in the history of the american right was a man named frank meyer. he was annexed communist who converted to the right from his reading of the road to serfdom. he became a contributor to many of the right-leaning journals like freedman and like the american mercury. and then he became associate with national review. eventually senior editor at national review and books and arts editor. frank meyer, he had been trained and communist dialectic and polemic. so he fought very dogmatically. this is what conservatism is. until these are the parameters in which we are going to operate as american conservatives. sickle air traffic control. make sure all the planes were going in the right direction landing and taking off on time.

so in the 1960s meyer who again has a libertarian straight strain to him because of his love and appreciation actually begins, disputes over the nature of the american weapons programs, and what the conservatives desired a policy of communism including military intervention was necessary. libertarians of course that libertarians are noninterventionist. the war will grow the state and reduce individual freedom. it's in the course of the debate with libertarians that myers says look i'm going to describe to you with the american conservatism is. and what american conservatism is, tracing back to the american

founding and traditional values what we would call traditional values. moral order. and because the american founding took place before the great ruptures of the 19th century. before the french revolution in 1789 synthesize these two principles. freedom and virtue, write this essay his best friend who is bill buckley's brother-in-law and another senior editor, who is moving toward a very devout traditionalist catholicism at this time. he became more and more devout as the years went on. he read the essay said this is ridiculous. freedom is not the end of politics, virtue is grade what

you are trying to do, frank is some type of fusion. so fusionism is one of those words it begins with an insult that ends up being appropriated. >> out neoconservatives on. this is where the debate begins within the american right. can you unify individual liberty and traditional morality. the people associate with national review said you could. even if it did not work out in theory it was revealed in practice. it was revealed in many american conservatism themselves that these two things can coexist but even if it does not quite working theory. and by the way as conservatives we should not worry about whether it works in theory or not just whether or not it works in practice. that was not enough. i am more religious right p eventually broke off from buckley's american conservatism. it wasn't enough for libertarians to continue to

creep teak conservatism as to status. because of its belief you needed a powerful military and engagement with the world in order to defeat communism. i see a lot of debates today. and that's not always work in theory. in fact the closer you look at might break down. but it does so work in practice. how people on the right in the main. huxley put it this way. for people who are not used to the term fusionism. reagan coalition. but when you go to effectuate and policy, going to politics absolute fusionism works. so, trite working in congress and building a coalition a working majority in congress. it requires fusionism to come together. members of congress, people up on the ballot running for election except this.

they know and a big diverse country to have a working majority they have to coexist in a coalition of people who come from different regions, different backgrounds, different velocities for the democrats for the progressives. we have diffuse these things together. fusionism is absolutely essential to have practical working majorities to pass laws. in the think tank it is hard to justify for its hard to rationalize. it's hard to stitch it together. we are affecting politics when you're practicing politics it becomes essential. toxic coalition that began to be built around this notion took shape the 1960s. and in the 70s and the nine states experience would have to say is an extremely difficult decade. the story you tell in this book

is a story of extraordinary vibrancy. i think i would say stepping back from the book the 1970s seemed like the most important decade of the 10 decades you describe in the development of the right. what happened to the right in the 70s? how is it different coming out of the 1970s and going into them and why? >> the simplest answer to that new groups came to become associated with the rights and with the american conservative movement during the 1970s. a lot of that played out as a result of the overreach of liberalism. in the radical left during the vietnam era, during the student rebellion. during the social turbulence of the late 1960s early 1970s. people who would not have identified as being on the right ended up coming event into an alliance with the american

conservatism. it became a question of how american conservatism could deal with these new entrants but i'll give you two examples. the first are what bill gavin who is a speechwriter for richard nixon in a very good writer called streetcorner conservatives. these were conservatives who were not familiar. who are not familiar with russell kirk, the great traditionalist author. they often were democrats. they're part of fdr late 1970s the look of the television screens and read the newspapers and said what is happening to mike country. rising crime, dissolving families democratic party wracked in the new rights revolution taking place. they began moving into the

republic column. they come to be known as the hardhats. they tend to be blue-collar. they tend to be not having attained a college degree. so, the hardhats enter this republican coalition. they are critical of richard nixon's landslide win in 1972. they become part of the right over the years. they are the reagan democrats. they swerved towards perrault in 1992. newt gingrich brings them back in 94. they are the trumps silent majority or forgotten man, right? there's another group as well that comes into the right in the 1970s those of the neoconservatives. these were liberal anti-communist, democrats who for the same reasons as the

hardhats found themselves out of sync with their allies on the left and with the democratic party. not all of that make the migration to the republican party in the 1970s when irving kristol endorses richard nixon in 1972. it is a scandal. many of his fellow neoconservatives don't actually make the jump to the republican party until well into the 1980s. but these neoconservative intellectuals who were often well positioned within the liberal establishment now are migrating to the right. onto the national review conservatives have to decide how they fit in the picture. i always member the moment i read during my research editorial in spring of 1971 a national responding to essays and commentary magazine were clearly indicative of the editor of commentary at that time.

the title of this editorial was come on in, the waters fine. welcoming them in. bringing in. and finally the last script that enters the picture of the american right in the 1970s the religious right had been dormant in many ways. at least at the national political level since the beginning of my story. federal decisions and judicial rulings of the 1970s and also because of disappointments in the presidency to jimmy carter. evangelical and fundamentalist move from the democratic party into the republican column. the vehicle of that be the moral majority in 1980. the american right looks very different to have the reagan revolution. not only that now has the hardhats. has that neoconservatives.

it now has the religious right as well pray. >> i would add one thing. inside the party's word came of age with the supply-side movement. really reinvigorated economics in the conservative movement. from economics, pain and suffering to hope growth opportunity. bob bartley in the editorial pages really reinvigorated. reagan was not the supply-side of his governor. he became a convert to it with jack cap some californians. i came on the supply-side crowd that was my entrance into the movement. that really reinvigorated economic message that unified people. as a key stitching. >> what did this they say to the party in the country? >> frankly there's a big which were the chicago guys in the 3%

real people like bob mundell who were also a chicago guy there is a better fight inside chicago, the university of chicago and the conservative movement which is sound money. nixon took us off the gold standard. you had a big monetary policy fight which we never had before during the gold standard. you had supply-side errors bringing answers to the problem of inflation. bringing answers to tax reform. to achieve economic growth and to show hate of growth and opportunity. and to bring an agenda which built steiger a wisconsin guy and jack kemp and then in 1981 -- 82 after having passed the tax cut. basically approved supply-side economics.

92% in his day. it's one of things to a tax reform we wanted to have fresh evidence of our ideas. we are all posting on the fumes of the reagan revolution and the reagan movements. which were achieving higher income mobility, lower wage workers were getting faster wage growth. because of supply-side economics we were running on 20-year-old evidence. we put it back in place and got fresh evidence that yes, it does actually work. covid clearly threw a curve ball i would say the supply-side movement was a debate within the establishment of the conservative movement. the supply-side is prevailed, past their ideas that really help stitch this together. all these strands of the 70s, which when you look at them and

the weight you describe them are strange combination of ideas. a peculiar evolution for the right. really brought ultimately together by ronald reagan. the striking thing about your book is that it doesn't really culminates. a lot of histories of the right buildup to ronald reagan and then down. we sit look how far we have come down. that is not the argument you make. and in a weight the book struggles every book about the right in the last 50 years has had to struggle with is how do you explain it ronald reagan? who was this person? what really did he do? what's he drove his biographer crazy. >> an example of what it means to be driven crazy. >> are familiar with the book dutch with edmund morrissey great biographer theodore roosevelt was commissioned by reagan himself to write reagan's biography. >> is a wonderful book pray.

>> depends reopen it out. there are other parts morrissey found he had no idea what was going on behind that smile. he had to create himself as a fictional character in ronald reagan's biography to try to preempt this person. i don't think anyone penetrated that small bit look to see nancy reagan debited not so sure about that. i think ronald reagan was absently self-contained. very unusual like that. have other qualities as well make an important inconsequential. his beliefs were very consistent over the decade. reagan shows up in my story 1947 is testifying in his capacity as president to screen actors guild. hopper is a hollywood gossip columnist interviews him about

ron and what he thanks. he's talk about freedom, democracy, american exceptionalism. in 1947 it is almost word for word what he says in his farewell address to the nation in 1989. theory little in his basic belief system. i think part of that has to do briefly with the fact he was very old. very old priest born in 1911 he does not become a republican until he's 51 years old. he votes for fdr four times. he has in his head a picture of what america was like before the new deal. it's a practice rather than the theory. for him, dixon illinois was america as it should be. that life he lived by the river was how americans should live. every think they are. that was in his bones. a few other things.

he was always very much oriented towards the future. this is something he picked up from fdr. if you look at fdr's speeches and you'll get reagan speeches including reagan's famous address in support of barry goldwater in the last week of the campaign in 1964, time for choosing, reagan is picking up fdr's tips, rendezvous with destiny. you and i, fdr love that on radio. you and diane reagan does the same thing for it's you we were talking and having a conversation. that kind of orientation toward the future or a conservative. here is ronald reagan thinking about the future. and then there's finally some personal characteristics that make reagan stand out in the pantheon of the american right. a person who i really enjoyed learning about in writing better my history senator robert taft

was mr. republican. representative of the pre-world war ii posed american entry into the north atlantic tree association after the war. robert taft to rent unsuccessfully for the republican nomination several times will be the first to tell you he was not the most charismatic person around. and conservatives do have this tendency dour very pessimistic. kind of gosh, the world is going to hell and handbasket. but that was not ronald reagan. nothing fazed him. this two made him unusual. also made him i think appealing to parts of the electorate. particularly when they hear that word conservative or american rights, they flinch. neanderthal, caveman. here comes ronald reagan with this quick and a smile with the movie star hair and that baritone. people are like oh, that's not what i think why think of

conservatism. all of these qualities such an extraordinary figure inconsequential presence. who however, may have been the exception in the history of the american rights and not the rule. cooks a live on the rock river about miles upstream from dixon now. the reason i mention that is because for us, where i came from the guy down the river just became president of the united states. this is amazing. it brought people into looking at i came from an irish catholic family was a jack kennedy family. it was the entrée into let's see what this is all about. a lot of people from my family, he was an entry into conservativism. and because he is such a great base. he had such a great way about him that he was inviting people who never looked at it before, to look at it. that's why he's such an amazing

intersection in time. that is why the fusion that occurred, the written pollution really came together by a personality for that's extremely rare brickwork you had that buckley too. with reagan's departure 1989 and of course post- presidency is cut short because of his alzheimer's diagnosis in 1994. and then with the buckley lengthy retirement buckley really stretched out his retirement first he retired from publix national review unthinking never retired from was a syndicated column for. >> he was writing on the day he died. with the departure of reagan and buckley you lose the ecumenical figures who almost every part of the right and certainly every faction within the conservativism in the conservative movement saw it as unifying. with figures like that the

fractious this and conflictual nature of the american right comes to the fore. >> paul, you entered the political world. you got to washington right after reagan. we did the think it was headed after reagan? quickly or in a big fight. there's the fusion right there. basically the particular heads of the three different movements. working with people project for american future, all of those guys all products of urban crystal. i had never thought of myself as a supply-side or frankly but did not spend time on foreign-policy those days. which was pat buchanan, a little bit of perot, and it was funny i grew up i read from college on

the national review. guys like that over the national review wasn't a weekly standard and i think this project for american future, was that what was called? he had the neocons fighting the paleo and then some other groups in there, the point being when the reagan era ended with the defeat of h.w. bush bike clinton, a ton of soul-searching was going on. the conservative movement turned inward and shot each other. i'm not until a standardbearer emerged meaning anomaly in this case it was w who one. he worked on the compassionate conservatism that never really took hold i would say. never really replaced a solid fusion because of circumstances wars and the rest, i will not get into it all. but in the post- reagan era 92

when clinton won, we were in an internal struggle in the conservative movement for the future of the conservative movement and i think we sell our frankly. we have had a pauses for to be of one some white houses but we have never settled into a posture of eight majoritarian center right movement that's capable of racking up consistent majorities, presidencies and putting in place a governing agenda for the 21st century protector and is underway but right now it's dominated by trump, it's a populist impure ranked populism. which is really not an agenda that sort of a theory, it is a person. we are still in the spirit and i think underneath that is the kind of fight we had in the early 90s. the kind of fight were having right now but with digital. hooks map, how do you think about that churn? on the way you described the

post- reagan right is very similar and continuous with the prewritten. and reagan is a kind of exception. there is a weight which pulses populism rose to the forefront in the 1990s. well think of the '90s that way now. it was a time when the populism has been held at bay in some ways it really became the face of the write in response to clinton and others. can you think about the post- reagan years? >> on the big themes of my book is its relationship between conservativism and populism. and the irony that often times the only way conservatives get into power is through populist politics. which conservatives like buckley and meyer who i mentioned were often ambivalent and conflicted about. but this is clearly evident in the reagan election the populism being one of the driving forces of reagan's rise. reagan able to synthesize populism with the supply-side

agenda. with the interests of the religious right. with the taxcutting. the defense buildup all of the various factions of the american rate as well. this argument begins anew. i always thought is very interesting it was 1988 gop primary, in many ways was a missed opportunity because you had a moment there were the republican party could have been forced to choose between jack kemp and buchanan. pat does not run for president in 1988, he waits until 1992 because he recognizes, smart that reagan's successors probably going to be george h.w. bush who is not a reaganite. who is an established republican. so we get the fight between the established republicanism represented by bush. and buchanan in 1982

representing the populist wave representing the resurgence of the old right in its attitude toward war and its attitude toward immigration. and then really beginning in decanting 96 campaign picking at the trade issue becoming more protectionist. >> so that debate is had. but buchanan is never successful. and in 2000 and of course he leaves republican party. and he rents are present on the reform ticket or one of its rivals is a businessman named donald trump. and i think buchanan is the first to recognize the irony that 16 years later trump what ascend to the presidency on many of the ideas that he was blasting buchanan about in the 2000 cycle. so, at the moment i do think the

argument to settle in favor of the sources of populism for the conservative governing class that came to power with ronald reagan, lasted to the first george bush. was kind of moved up to capitol hill during the republican revolution. with newt gingrich and came back down pennsylvania avenue with george w. bush. that conservative governing class which lasted for about 30 years, has been displaced. >> i look at my time in congress is to periods we were the majority and then a lawsuit. when obama came in and then we got it back. i saw this book i hadn't seen for years out there. our goal with that plan was to go out and recruit members of congress who were willing to take tough votes. because what had happened to our majority is we got fat and lazy.

they ended up recruiting the local county executive state senator who is the next guideline he just wanted to earmark their way to staying in office. our movement got intellectually lazy. we got fat and happy we did earmark seems kind of ugly. those of us young upstarts in those days in the house really did not like that. we lose our majority many of us argued we deserved to lose our majority this isn't 2006. we went out and recruited people that we thought it prove true, we thought would be one to pick up votes. we were excited about the tea party movement. i remember talking with a bunch of people the movement in those days which was the tea party movement was our chance to get supply-side 2.0. 1.0 was diagnostic, 2.0 is not. so supply-side 2.0 was a progrowth economics, limited government, get the entitlements

under control and a robust foreign policy. and on the issue of trade and immigration, there is a fight that we sort of push that to the side. we really tapped the tea party movement we got the majority back. we really cannot effectuate much. but in retrospect as of the tea party movement really was? >> of the beginning it really was. there was a bit of a fight. this is back to the old supply-side versus the paleo, that's we called it back in those days, trade and immigration versus the other issues. in hindsight this is just me looking back, we did not understand think i think this were made mistakes. we did not understand the potency of those issues the power of those issues chuck wrote a really good book about populism back in the 80s. you can see signs of this, or the established republicans, people like me included, this was the effects of issues like trade and immigration.

we lost in 12, people freaked out. that wasn't fun losing in 12, but when we lost, i think people really kind of freaked out and then what happened from my perspective was i'm not having these nice guys on the ticket, no more nice guys.

the entertainment wing of the party with the digital age with cable i think the entertainers sort of replaced the think tank type people and intellectual buckley. the country in the reactionary moment against a progressive reactionary barack obama through the best entertainer, the best bomb thrower he could, ted finished second in the race. they through donald trump at it and he won. >> and remember ben carson was kind of marcia ely. >> it was a rotating lead. all outsiders. >> and this testifies to the importance of the 2012 election.

i think the beginning of the first term as president had that gone a different way and for the world to be a very different place, but i totally agree with what paul is saying that a 2012 was a hinge in the sense that many people on the right had to internalize the idea that because of american exceptionalism, barack obama had to be jimmy carter reborn and he could only be one term because he was so interested in moving america in a direction where it had not gone for many years. as he said, his ambition was to be the progress of reagan, just as consequential to change, politics in a similar way. so the right i think really believed that this was as the senator put it this is the battle and win the election is

called for obama on election night, 2012, so early in the evening, by the 11:00 news, i think many people on the right were just stunned. >> tried being on the ticket. [laughter] i can imagine. and that made them say all right if we are reaching this point where the input, the electoral input, we elected scott brown in massachusetts but obama does obama care anyhow. we have the tea party congress, but they are not able to do anything. then 14 we get the republican wave again and it captures the senate and after the election in 2014, obama says i heard the people voted to the republicans in congress but i also hear the people who voted for democrats and the people who didn't vote at all and i'm going to govern for those people.

it's infuriating. the election should matter and yet it didn't and i think that drove a lot of people to say we need an external force to come in and shake up the system and that's the only way we are going to be able to achieve and they got it. >> please think of your questions, but want to follow up on this you mentioned three issues. immigration, war, trade. those were the issues where things really broke open after that moment whereas you say some voters on the right foot this isn't working. why was it those issues and does that mean the seeming consensus was an illusion with the voters really wanted and were voting for?

>> as a reporter during george w's second term i worked for the magazine where the editors had the comprehensive immigration reform that was included in amnesty for illegal immigrants but my reporting was saying there was no way that was going to happen because even if it passed the senate, the republicans in the house would not allow it because they were hearing from their constituency and that's when you begin to see the break between the grassroots right and conservative and republican establishment in washington over the issue of immigration. the war is a little bit more complicated because for a while, republican voters stood behind their republican president who was, who had launched the wars in afghanistan and iraq. but beginning in 2007 was the rise of ron paul and of the liberty movement. you see there that that has discontent on the right with george w. bush for the policy.

now protectionism is a little bit more complicated. i think what trump did in coming out against the transpacific partnership or dpp as he always said throughout the campaign was basically provide a concrete symbol for the depths of despair that were ravaging america. for the opioid crisis, for the rise and alcoholism, for this unimaginable social crisis. he says it's the deindustrialization. it's china's entry into the wto and that is what is giving you this. whether that's true i believe is an empirical question and what complicated. but politically it's brilliant

and this speaks he did a similar thing with immigration. immigration is a complicated issue clearly the legal immigration is something republicans and conservatives opposed. but what happens with the rise of isis in the second half of obama's second term, after the shootings in san bernardino, trump was able to take immigration and combine it with national security and all of a sudden we need to close the borders not just to prevent people from coming in who might be searching for jobs, but we needed to make america safe. you see how he's able to thread these issues together in 2016. it's something he was not able to do in 2020.

>> let's open things up for questions. i would only ask you do ask a question rather than make a statement. >> rephrase your statement in the form of a question. >> if you can come to an interrogative and please wait for a microphone and tell us who you are when we call on you for a question. let's start there in the back. >> i work at a third way. one reason we are having all these discussions about the new right is because it is becoming apparent a lot of small government conservatism's are not that popular with voters like peeling social security and medicare are politically toxic now. what does that mean for the future of the american right and conservatism? >> i'm working on a big book project here on that question and there's about 18 of us working on that project.

i think he had to reconcile with these programs. like we said these are subtle issues i would argue the consensus then the question is how do you go about achieving those in the best possible way to maximize the upward mobility, economic growth, limited government in your economy and so once we get over that these programs exist and we have the social concept that we all agree should exist then let's get on to the task of repairing them from bankruptcy and making them perform the best. where you then go into the issue is the left wants the government to run it all. they want no private sector. they want command of resources, means of production. they want to use it as an extension of their ideology. we want to use the power of markets and choice and

competition to deliver these services that as a country we had reached a consensus on. that may sound like a reason but it's radical pragmatism. we are where we are. we do agree that these things are here and should stay so let's get on with the business so we don't lose the reserve currency and have a debt crisis because if that happens, imagine what happens to the social contract into the chaos and polarization in the country if we go about the past ten or 20 years we lose the reserve currency. these things explode and then you have a total debt crisis where you're doing surgery taking benefits away from people in real time. that is what would happen if we basically do nothing. so i think that conserving these things stepping ahead of these things but yet you have to win the argument said when

majorities and have a president throw his or her neck out to get this done. that is the task of the conservative movement for the moment right now. >> right here, please. >> pete murphy with invest in education. i think you made a reference to the iraq war. does the book that you address now where the republican voters soured on the conflict? i ask that because i found a very powerful moment in the 16 campaign when donald trump really had a moment in one of the debates early on where he just eviscerated that in a very passionate way. i thought it was a cheap shot but i think his history was pretty spot on and i wonder if you could identify when you felt

that was soured upon by republican voters where the war began spinning out of control and public opinion was ambivalent about the policy in iraq sending more troops with more strategy and yet mccain and romney engaged in a debate over the surge in a run up to the primaries in 2008 and it's a debate that mccain a strong supporter one. so even then with the candidacy we could see that winning and an iraq order achieving stability that would allow us to leave, exit most of the forces from the country was still powerful among

the republicans. however i think what was going on when trump attacked jeb bush over the war, when he said w lied us into a war, iraq was part of it but also much more. it was more about ending the bush era. turning the page on the bush era. you think about the condition of america in 2016, 2015. clearly we are ending a very polarizing two-term presidency. barack obama. the situation overseas at that point, situation domestically it's not good and yet who do the two parties offer? jeb bush and hillary clinton. so another stain on the bush dynasty and you can't get more establishment than hillary clinton on the left so trump there is basically saying it's

bush is over because there is disappointment in the iraq war. there is still huge discontent and opposition to comprehensive immigration reform which of course jeb bush had written a book about prior to his run and the economic legacy of the bush presidency which ended with the global financial crisis and the great recession also in the back of the voters had so i think that played a part. i will also say that we, the important moment is not a trump's victory in the republican primary. the donald trump won about 45% of the total vote in the republican primaries and caucuses in 2016. had he lost the general election i think the anti-trump forces still would have had been in a very good position in that debate that is a debate that goes on between populists and conservatism for a hundred years would be more evenly matched.

the decisive moment was trump winning the presidency and winning it on kind of a fluke. about 30,000 votes i think in three states gives the electoral college victory, substantial college victory. once you become president, you are the most famous person in the world, the most supported person in the world may be next to the fed chair man, one or the other. but definitely most supported person in your party. you define the alternatives, set the agenda and set an example. so it's not donald trump winning the nomination that is such a consequence. it's him winning the presidency and being president for four years that transforms the republican party and the conservative movement. hispanic our time is drawing to a close. there is much more to be said. i wonder if we can end with each of you thinking a little bit about the future. this book ends at the end of the

trump era, may be the end of the trump era. it ends now. we will see where we are. so, where are we and how do you think based on your thinking about the past hundred years how do you think about where the ride is headed and the generation on the right is looking to, where does the future look now? >> i would say it's very important that american conservatism remember that it's america and that we make it distinct as a reference to the american founding and the american political institution and it's always made great space, liberty and freedom. i worry sometimes today it's being drawn to model continental continentaleurope which is a dit ride. it's not an american right. even though i think that the

terrain has shifted to an argument over the size and scope of this cultural power and public policy may be leveraged the list cultural power, the american conservatism than the right will be something very different then it's been for the 100 years i write about and we will not be able to sustain the coalition that will attract the nonpolitical everyday americans living their lives who are looking for substantive answers to these concrete policy challenges. >> i just didn't put a lot of thought into these institutions because i was busy formulating policies as the committee chairs. when i ran the legislative branch i became a strong

institutionalist for what you said basically which is we had a conservative movement that is tethered to principles that is uniquely american. it's here in the right. the reasons for that i won't get into all of that but to me it is extremely important the conservative movement dedicate itself to these institutions and the dedication to these founding principles, so you have of course the standard in which you operate and then it's a movement that can have that great debate on the policy matters within the sphere of these principles. you have a party or a movement capable of having the strong

debate not dominated by just one personality and so this kind of populism is one that isn't tethered to principles. we can get to the principles that has a vibrant debate and the way that i look at it just from frankly economics and a number of standpoints and trajectories and in competition with technology and on and on. we don't have a whole lot of time to get it right. but i do believe the country is yearning for this. it is still a centering country so the question is can we put together a movement that can move and can accommodate and can accept different factions in a new fusion that is a center-right fusion that has men and women capable of carrying that torch and standard multiple not just one so that we can win and effectuate change, dodge the

bullets manning existential problems in the country and get us back on track and have a great 21st century america i think we can but we are not there now and we've got to go through some cycles to get there i think. >> that is a note to end on and we will end there. the book is the right for the american conservatism. [applause]

middle and high school students it is time to get out your phone and start recording for your chance to win $100,000 in total cash prizes with a grand prize of $5,000 by entering c-span's student cam vid documentary contest. for this year's competition we ask students to picture yourself as a newly elected member of congress and tell us what your top priority would be and why. create a five to six minute video showing the importance of your issues from opposing and supporting points of view. be bold with your documentary. don't be afraid to take risks. there's still time to get started. the deadline for entries is nuar20th, 2023. for competition rules and tips on how to geted visit our website on student cam.org.

that's why we are providing lower income students access to affordable internet so homework can just be homework. connect to compete. >> along with of these television companies supporting c-span2 as a public service. >> you right brace yourself the american empire is over and the dissent is going to be horrifying. how did you come to that conclusion? >> first of all i spend 20 years on thehe out