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no interruption and completely unfiltered. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. >> next look at the relationship between the u.s. and china. china's posture towards taiwan and the russia-ukraine war. the discussion was hosted by the center for the national interest. >> our first speaker will be my long-standing friend, bridge colby who is a principal at the marathon initiative and also the author of the new book called strategy of denial. bridge has attained a great deal of prominence for his contention that we should be looking more at asia in essence i think is calling for an asia first policy rather than expending so much effort on europe. our second speaker is paul heer,

formally affiliated with the center for the national interest. interest. now a senior fellow at the chicago council on foreign relations. he is also the author of a book on mr. x and asia. and he is a gifted writer and lucid thinker. and i'm delighted to kick off our conversation with these two authors and foreign policy experts by asking them, in the wake of the balloon incident which acquired so muchci prominence in recent weeks, are the united states and china inevitably headed towards some kindd of clash? or can it be warded off? can we establish a more mutually beneficial relationship? bridge, i would like to start with you. >> thank you my friend. great to be with you jacob and with paulan as well, two a great

mind so look for to the discussion i'll try to be brief. i think rivalry and to some degree confrontation is inevitable. in fact, it's over there and that's basically driven by structure and sort of incommensurate goals that the united states and china have. china being a classic rising power with expanding ambitions and since of its own what it is entitled to. i do not believe that war is inevitable. i agree i think eli put it well in response to question from senator rubio the other day in testimony, which is we can get out of this decade without a war. my view is that the way to do so is from a position of strength. that's a cheesy cliché but i think there's truth in it. my view as i we discussed befor, jacob, is that we need to be hawkish if you will to get to a place where they can be more dovish. i think i country like china, it could be i was having a

conversation with some chinese experts a while ago about my book and they said you could describe the way are talking about us as country see and you as country pay. i think that's right, it's human nature as china grows, it's going to see what he can get away with. there's going to increasing for those of us who are in washington during the iraq war we're familiar with the sense of a country feels like it's a rising power, it's likely to be tempted to use. the important thing is, i don't want to suggest specificity delicacy, a reagan sends an disincentive to china in such a way that it will negotiate the terms of its continued rise on terms that are reasonable, equable to was put in the goal is détente in my view but to get to détente we have to be a position where china has to respect our fundamental equities. if we try to détente now if you willw and would likely get taken advantage of and other countries are likely to defect.

i was reviewing paul's thoughtfulie and incisive discussion kind of pivoting off of my book that involve some critiques and help we can get into somee of these more fundamental issues, my view is not that we should not take china seriously as a culture anything to the contrary but i think politics tends towards the darwinian at some level. animals practice it asce well, strategy and so forth. that's the sort of model we want' i think as we discussed before, jacob, michael is not revolution, i mean for the chinese people's sake of it was a revolution away from chinese government but i don't think we need the dismemberment of regime change in china. what we need is a china that respects others claims and equities, andts then china wille in that world will be one of the two world superpowers that will command respect. it will effectivelys have probably a sphere of influence even if we don't formally recognize it. that's a reasonable goal but

asked my friend matt sometimes put that we have to sprint to qualify for the marathon. i think that's the trouble where we are now. >> paul, sprints to qualify for the marathon. is that what we need to do? >> i wouldn't disagree with that. actually i can come with much of what bridge just said. i think rivalry is inevitable, it's structural but i also agree that conflict is not inevitable. i think where i might divert is i think that bridge said we need to be hawkish before we can be dovish. i think wendy need to beis botht the same time.i i fully agree that we need to bolster our defense capabilities with regard come we can come back to the taiwan issue and across the board, i think that can't be toar the exclusion of diplomacy. in fact, i think that's one of the tragic consequences, maybe tragic is too strong a a wordf

this balloon episode. i think there was at least an attempt to get some momentum of restoring come reciprocal engagement with the chinese then i think the balloon episode really revealed the strategic mistrust and the hostility on both sides, or the inherent disinclination to be attentive to each other's respective interested in that regard i agree with the bridge that article should be to reach a point where china is able to accept peaceful coexistence with the united states, although he didn't use that term. i think itt does apply, and whih the chinese respect our fundamental interests. but it don't think we can escape an element of that equation that involves the u.s. paying more attention to what the chinese perceive as their fundamental interest. there's different outlets about how you want to define core interest and where the taiwan issue fits into it. i suppose maybe that's the main

point i think on where we diverge, as to whether the hawkish approach is the only one we should pursue. i'm a big fan of engagement. i think that's a necessary element of this equation. i think we're in a bad place in the relationship right now because the balloon episode has exposed the reasons why there's a resistant to both sides to pursue that. there's not enough mutual trust to do that. i will leave it at that for now. >> i want to tell the audience, all our viewers, that i am more than happy to pose your questions too our panelists, if you just submit them i will ask them. let me cut to the nitty-gritty, gentlemen. of talkw there's a lot about china assisting russia. the biden administration has publicly warned china not to send military equipment, not to raid its own arsenal to aid

russian in its war of conquest against ukraine. now, bridge, how does that fit with your thesis that we are extending too much effort on ukraine and not enough on china? are we, in fact, seen an alliance between the two developing? >> effectively. i mean, it's an alliance in a sort of pre-1914 use 14 use of the term. they are clearly a a light in weight written in france were probably in 1913 or something. just on that, people often say that means you need to fight them in europe in order to defeat them in asia. that's not true. the fact that are actively collaborate only accentuates the importance of focusing on asia because it means they can act collaboratively to try to distract us which is highly possible. i don't know but it would not surprised if the chinese are deliberately inculcating that are encouraging that dynamic. i'm just struck and i was saying

this last couple days, secretary blinken warning of series consequent should they provide lethal support, and by the way the essential beenou propping up the russian economy and provide other forms of military support. my read is there's almost no way and i'm influenced by people like others who know more about this but it stands to reason structurally russia is china's only major power ally and they're not going to let that ship go under. now, russia being weakened have some forms of advantage for them in the center becomes a more pliant junior partner, as my partner wes mitch would say, , a sidecar. at the same time it's a useful distraction especially if the war seems likely to become protracted sadly at the united states is doubling down. i was struck on your question about how there are serious consequences but they refused to rule out the use of force against taiwan and they flew a balloon over our country and that didn't have serious

consequences. i mean, to be fair where i'm thinking, i thinki there are elements within the administration that are trying to focus on china and i applaud your efforts. they're been big things on the force posture issue. they bend a semiconductor sanction and other things being worked, very important but is clear to me at the political level, i thinkor the president himself, he said he has a part of his heart in tf. he said as a final contest between democracy and autocracy. this is a big problem is we are saying china is a priority but we're not following through on it. >> bridge, let me follow up just to bore in here little. if we were to fail to stand by kyiv in its war to maintain sovereignty, that would send a signal to china that is game on? >> i mean, i think we are

realists here. i don't think normative -- these are somewhat theoretical, but they are very practical. my view is china's ultimate decision on taiwan will be primarily driven by political achievements. how the united states behaves vis-a-vis ukraine is a data point, but i would say, like, a tertiary one, and that has to be weighed against the more significant issue, which is how does this deplete not only u.s. weapon source but political capital and willingness to expend money and other things just in a generic lyrical sense vis-a-vis a potential contest in

asia -- a general political sense vis-a-vis a potential contest in asia? the logic that you have to fight china in ukraine is the same logic defenders of the war in vietnam applied to the contest in europe, and i just don't think that's true. i'm not in favor of cutting off support for the ukrainians. i think we should support ukrainians consistent with the genuine prioritization of china, and the critical thing we have to bear in mind is that we are not yet on the right trajectory in a good place. there's there's a good article and "washington post" where she quotes the admiral, pretty sober in his public commentary saying we need more of the sense of urgency to deter war. we are sort of pocketing, there's a broader dynamic year which is that where pocketing gained as if we solve problems just because we recognize them. like the defense industrial base there's a lot of hey, everybody realizes we need to spend more and tone fix our defense and database. that's like saying we have a

smoking problem but we haven't kicked the smoking probably get ember as he has if the smoking problem. that's a huge problem. that dangerous thing, jacob, his award war appears likely to go on. david sanger was reporting today that the russians may indeed, their offensive so far has fatally been unimpressive but they may do further mobilization. they are digging deep. he gave a speech, pulled out a new star trek he's not giving up. anything is possible but i don't think that's a prudent assessment. we are confronted the problems of choice and i think our state a strategy is correct. china and asia should be our priority. we should act like it. >> paul, , i want to follow up with you on this and your previous statement that you didn't think that a hawkish posture towards china would be beneficial. you, in fact, think that it would boomerang on the u.s. in places like ukraine prompting china to take a tougher line

against the u.s.? is that wherein you're headed? >> we've got at least three different sets of issues where grappling with. one is a prospects for the war in ukraine. two, is what the implication are for taiwan and three, what beijing's policy with regard to the war is. i wasth a couple of things. on the second issue that i'm not an expert on what's going on on the ground in ukraine, but in terms, i mean your question is framed in terms of how beijing is interpreting the u.s. posture and how it should respond to that. with regard to taiwan i think the chinese, i think their assessment on both of these issues is continuing to evolve. with regard to taiwan i think the chinese certainly appreciate the fact the extent to which we are preoccupied in job, i agree with bridge on that. i think it will probably appreciate the extent to which we are depleting our resources

and weaponry there. that might not be applicable to taiwan. on the other hand, i t think the chinese have to be somewhat kind of chastened by the fighting spirit of the ukrainians, which they can expect to see i think in the people and i want if they move in that direction. i think the chineseve are also frustrated that the ukraine thing because of the comparisons that have been made is increasing attention to the taiwan issue, if only for the wrong reasons because there's so many differences there. i think on balance the chinese are marginally more cautious about their planning with regard to taiwan because of what's happening in ukraine. but i think the bottom line for me is the chinese are not going to use what's happening in ukraine ass an opportunity to seize an opportunity to move against taiwan. we can come back to this and i

think it's because the chinese are not looking for an opportunity to use force against taiwan. that's a separate issue. on the broader issue of the great power confrontation there, which, is inherent in all the cometary witching over the last couple days about the reports the chinese might be considering delivery of legal aid to the russians, i haven't seen the intelligence of there. i'm not sure i think h it's interesting what we know is that they're considering it. the chinese have in trying to walk a line and not successfully for the last year. claiming neutrality and claiming they're still committed to peaceful, or to sovereignty and territorial integrity even though the russians, our friends, are violating that in ukraine, while at the same time maintaining the relationship with russia. there have been limits to the support in spite of their no limits commitment because, as bridge said the sagas and

economic support base there. the chinese have tried to avoid explicitly violating the sanctions and to date they have not provided decisive military aid. my bottom line is that the chinese don't want on this problem, they don't wantt world war iii. i don't think the chinese believe that they can provide legal aid too the extent that it would make a difference. i can't see them calculating that. they don't want russian to lose but i think, i think that calculate it's not necessarily within their power to prevent that from happening. that's why what we are seeing this week is this simultaneous reporting on how they might increase support to russia. but what is apparently about to come out now is xi jinping is apparently can make some speech with axi peace plan our proposal for cease-fire.e. i linked those two things good and seems to be the chinese whatever they are considering a terms of increasing their aid to the russians, iin think is more likely aimed at bolstering that

support for the purpose of trying to hasten and into the conflict. i think there are some arguments the chinese enjoy the benefits of this war that they wanted to drag on. i don't subscribe to that. i think it would like it to end but there grappling with how to because of lead them of a lot of the limits if this was over in some way but i think they are still grappling with how to achieve that. i think they are focused more on this peace proposal then they are on providing substantial lethal aid. i mean, it might happen but i would be surprised if it crossed that line. >> bridge, the portrait that paul has just drawn strikes me as more of a status quo that a revisionist power. >> right. >> isn't it the case that if we, and you may violently disagree with paul when he said that

china is not looking for an opportunity right now to roll over taiwan, isn't it the case that rush is, in fact, the revisionist, the more volatile, the more unpredictable power of the two, where as china is perhaps, if paul is correct, lookingt, more for a come some kind of stability with the west? what is your take? >> you put your finger on it. and again i think this gets back to the fundamental theoretical assessment. i really resist attempts to kind of a centralized state behavior, that they areli revisionist or t revisionist. i think that largely is due to structure and relative contingent factors. 20 years ago and was a status quo active are now he's a revisionist actor. .. we cannot assume that is fixe.

i have debates about this with my good friend at the university of virginia, who would be a real good person to sit in on one of these sessions. i think the problem here is that china is -- and i really want to hear more on what paul said because i think this is the nature -- i actually agree with paul that china is not looking for an opportunity to use military force against taiwan. my fear is -- my concern is that their goal -- their express goals but also what what they are naturally looking to obtain which is great power over there region basically is only obtainable by military force and they will work out the logic, taiwan is not going to f fall in her lap, it's not in my view. the only way to get there is military force and come back and they probably already have, i think there's any reason to think we are not at them they are, so i think this is i think fundamental, this is the right

debate to have and i don't want to put you in a box but my approach is sort of deductive and social and i think is in other approach you and with chinese over the years but nothing like policy but where do you put the weight on continuity based on the history we know what we expect the rationalistic cost and benefit or calculus in mind is the latter especially thinking about war and peace and we look historically countries can radically change their orientation behavior and is especially important because china has immense incentives to generate as much surprise as possible, not quite the right term but act in ways that do not trigger or accelerate countervailing actions so i

don't take comfort in the fact that they are not advertising although frankly, the kind of our they are easy to do, i know that is their position but obviously was security conference, a little flexible but the way paul is talking about is the what of cost and benefit, i have a different assessment of the nature of the ondecision-making right now, xi jinping is more aggressive for the they say publicly a discount more what they are probably doing quietly maybe the he does but i think the fundamental problem is they are unlikely to achieve goals peacefully and essentially they are going to come to the decision whether or not they want to pursue the goals militarily or not and if m they have an advantageous way to do so they are likely to do so and i don't think we can ride on

ironies but taiwan is important nonetheless even if cavities are to be in watching these time, it is important to american interest and that is the problem and what ist fear is we are keeping up the situations by folks on ukraine for taiwan will receive a comparison to ukraine perhaps justified but single points, taiwan is important anyway if you are the civil gains and even allies you will wonder japan is not a culture either, they're getting around to it sort of but it'stu not 192 so the logic takes you to a dangerous place from the position of maintaining and developing what i think is this coalition. >> i like to give you a chance to turn to audience responses. >> that does get too the faultlines here, i think ith age

the chinese are trying to pursue what we would call regional hegemony and we could talk separately about their global hegemony which is an understatement but i think it depends and i think it's addressed in the book, there's way with preeminence or whatever, sometimes they are interchangeable but that occurred to me listening but there is, i'm a historian, i think is a political scientist and that's the way i approach things i guess. i would say about hegemony, two points. i don't think i can depending on how we define this, their vision for hegemony is necessarily hostile too or exclusive of the united states and its interests. i think second and perhaps more importantly face on what is said, of the chinese catholic military power is the primary exclusive vehicle for achieving

and i think the chinese believe there hegemony regional and whatever extent of influence they try to extend globally will be based primarily on their economic power and i think that's the way they are pursuing it in the region and i will leave it at that for now. >> we have a question from jeffrey kemp affiliated with the center for national interest for decades and he says australia and japan and south korea are fully capable of developing nuclear weapons. should the united states review its policy toward nonproliferation in light of the china threat. >> the way i think -- and i wrote about this ten years ago geopolitics should trump nonproliferation, we have strong valid interest in nonproliferation but the

fundamental foreign policy is to deny one of the world key regions especially asia given the concentration of global wealth and productivity in any country to dominate that. if necessary or we get into a situation which there is proliferation to our allies, that should be subordinated logically to the maintenance of our real political interests. i would say the alligator closest to the boat is the north korea situation where the development basically outpacing the defense systems effectively present a difficult dilemma that cannot stalled by reassurance and i mean this reflexive reassurance the problem is happens on the peninsula divorced from china is not important enough to risk american cities so we either have to be able to deny their ability or there will be

pressure toward proliferation and japan. china as well. i talk about this in my book, proliferation is interesting in the late 60s about this, the era for they seriously grapple with this, small vulnerable not accurate arsenals in the hands of allies are not going to be a huge factor because china will not want to march to the bay. they macy's in ten or 15 years as a negotiating leverage and australia this is my objection, if australia gets nuclear weapons a and they use it againt china, it's not clear it gets through because china might first strike them and have its own missile defenses and then it will destroy australia. i have no doubt chinese will result in not so any friendly proliferation would have to be integrated within the american alliance structure. where i think this is going to

reach a real head with china is i think what china is pursuing as accommodation of conventional dominance and nuclear force able to fight under the nuclear shadow under the strategice shadow for stability and instability and that's what they are doing the nuclear buildup, increasing numbers but evolving discriminate accurate military capabilities but the main goal based on what they are doing is conventional dominance. if we lose conventional dominance i do not believe u.s. first used defense certainly scale is going to be credible or rational so the demonstration is not going to deter the chinese in the event of the war, it will not stop them so you have to use nuclear weapons at scale but the chinese are going to be able to hit the american home and in large numbers so i don't think unlike in the cold war initially we had nuclear monopolies and its degraded into without going into

it, different posture of the later part of the cold war, i don't think we can go back there so either we retain conventional dominance or likely will have to face friendly proliferation. >> paul. >> he knows a lot more about nuclear weapons and idea but as a historian, my answer would be more nuclear power probably not a good thing. i think there's speculation or contemplation for many years one of our sources of leverage with the chinese that we would allow the japanese or koreans or australians to become nuclear powers. i'm not sure that's a persuasive over against the chinese when they recognize the reasons we ourselves didn'tre historically not want that to happen. >> we have a question for which

from even, chicago council on globalm affairs and he asks, would bridge argue they would be fewer trade-offs between backing ukraine and preparing taiwan if the u.s. limited the number of imr's and glm sent? he doesn't think that weaponry is necessarily critical for taiwan contingency. what is your take? >> the most manifested element of the trade-off is the particular weapons. the say on that is weapons sent to ukraine are usable by the taiwanese. one about conflict over taiwan would not be groundwork, it definitely would be. the report that has problems, the number one finding would be the taiwanese ground forces so

obviously you can talk about different capabilities, range and etc. but i think by the way, taiwanese are being pushed back years as reported today, years behind delivering. the deeper problem is again and it gets like the smoking habit issue is the defense basis in structural reasons back to the 90s, that's where it is, think last week the situation is continuing to deteriorate so just because we recognize it doesn't mean it's better. we won factories that produced turtle fans or cruise missiles. subcomponents assembled from 1000 different places in various ways so it's a real problem and i think it's clear that there is

a real trade-off in terms of capabilities and again, the bottom line in taiwan, it's not where it needs to be so massively overweight and about to have a heart attack and saying we will do this otherto thing and walk and chew gum at the same time. it doesn't work. >> good question from family chow for both of you. i'll start with paul and then go to bridge. the u.s. seems to be soaking or provoking china to act on taiwan, nancy pelosi is and now kevin mccarthy was talking about visiting taiwan. is united states starting on this one china policy? was the end result of these actions?re >> that is a good question. my answer is we need to confront inconsistencies and credibility of our one china policy. that's what i would add to the

military deterrent part of the equation on the taiwan issue. i agree with bridge and he's written extensively we need to do to bolster defense capability i think there has to be reassurance element to the deterrence equation. the chinese are not looking for an excuse to attack taiwan, they are looking for reasons not to and they are insistent and clear on what they are looking for, credible reassurances of the one china policy. publish an article in the washington post overnight that address this, i think there needs to be more persuasive reassurances that u.s. policies are not aimed at permanent -- the idea we do not support independence is not sufficient frankly because the taiwan quality claims independence so i think the question is the right

one, is it appropriate? i think focused on the reasons chinese are eager to use force against taiwan without paying attention to reactive components of the approach and there are actions taken and statements made in the u.s. taiwan relationship. this raised valid questions on the one china policy and in addition to the focus on the military equation, we need to confront that part of the equation as well. >> i think actually something we agree on is a lot of the arrangement on both proliferation to some extent but also taiwan issue that were

satisfactory in an era defined by dramatically unequal power balance and inability to do anything about it are no longer satisfactory. i don't think we can keep sticking to -- we may formally stick with the status quo, i think we should keep it formally but understand we come with type one. i don't favor to one defendants, i would not go as far to reassure him i don't think we have an interest in that but that's ambiguity where there's clearly a different understanding of the beijing side for many decades and find when the chinese didn't do anything. now they potentially can so having a cleart. understanding f how to deal with that i think i important and i agree they need -- there needs to be something for them and something for their dignity but the

factors i am describing a rising power, the great rejuvenation, they demand recognition so we have to have that as part of the missed, what that is consistent with our interest will be difficult problem that i agree. >> we have a very complex response from paul, senior vp for china stonebridge group who writes having spent time in taiwan, i am struck by the intent in which there is little report on the island for mobilizing the conflict with i china. there's a clear desire not to move in this direction in part totoer avoid leaving taiwan and maintain vibrant business climate particularly the tech

sector maintaining confidence critical so i don't see any chance of harming taiwan as an effective approach to deterrent. to rethink the trilateral relationship, ramp up diplomacy and tone down the rhetoric mobilizing both taiwan and allies tohe prepare for conflic. the stakes are high here. >> the fact that the taiwanese are not adequately motivated is a huge problem, perhaps the biggest but doesn't change anything. i have this metaphor i thinkros works, they don't necessarily love it but last spring break i was in the water with my wife and lifeguard called us and said a shark was by and you could see it, you're lucky to me lifeguards higher up, the unite. states is like a person about.

i don't think it actually is but in about we have the world's best intelligence gathering architecture, we are not always right obviously but it is unparalleled. we can see far more than anyone else. taiwanese are like a man in theh water with a cut. they have this -- americans are shouting the sharks in the water but they are closer to the sharks so they have finger feel like the chinese do for china but they don't see how big the shark is and the problem is taiwanese in a way, the person saying swim to the boat, i will help you out, your paralyzed with fear in a sense in different dynamics, i think there's fear, on the other hand government increased to little, the real problem is taiwanese is critical for their defense in

the military sense. if the u.s. has to carry too much weight, they will fall but the thing is the question, china will look at this the taiwanese have no interest becoming part of china so there's incompatible problem in the chinese, the taiwanese will not fall in their lap, it won't happen. they are militarily week and resolute and it's a great opportunity for military aggression because he couldgr me it work. that is the real danger and what i tell the taiwanese directly, chinese are talking about the education, ultimately talking aboute reeducation so imagine -- look how they shut down the covid protests no problem, people talking about regime, forget it they will crush beyond taiwan in weeks so the taiwanese are in real danger and i don't think the american people arell fully but in two defending taiwan, it's important that they

do for their own interest but they are not going to so the situation -- this is why i am not saying -- i think about if b were sitting in beijing thinking about it from the perspective for the u.s. i would say that looks pretty good and if we wait around, the americans will have 121 in a few years, they will finally pump out submarines along with australians and might lose the window. that is a really bad situation. >> could you give us a briefou response as well? >> i think that applies to the extent that china is looking for opportunity to use force and i don't think they are. i'm still trying to figure out how i would interpret your metaphor bridge. there's different ways -- >> i didn't go into the whole thing, i'll tell you off-line. >> i'm still grappling with it

but i think it makes sense as far as the military equation is but taiwan is fundamentally not military problem that lends itself to a military solution. as i said before, i agree with the deterrent elements of our policy regard to both taiwan self-defense capabilities and i think theri problem is a diplomatic political one that needs confronted and that's the way to avert military conflict and it something i said earlier, i think part ofte the problem to the extent that we approach this as a military problem, and i take bridges points, he's not an advocate for what's announced as strategic clarity but i think in your book and the things you written, you essentially create logic to support the logic for u.s. support for permanent

separation and i think that flows from the determination you and others made about strategic importance of the taiwan. my concern is u.s. support for permanent separation defect or otherwise, and strategic clarity are both inconsistent with one china commitments because they would both constitute restoration of defense back to taiwan, primary requirement of the normalization process and i agree with bridge but there's a lot of things wrong with that scaffolding 40 years later but i think we need to confront those fault lines rather than continue to approach this is primarily of military challenge and deterrent. >> i think this a is -- look, there's the logic of things and then diplomatic actions and enpolitical fictions that can be useful. i agree we need to confront and think clearly so i am in favor

of a-uppercase-letter strategic ambiguity but i am in favor of small strategic clarity like that's out of both sides of our mouth but life in the big city and permanent separation, i don't think we need to take n -- that's the thing why don't think we need to have clear policy, i don't think -- you know better than i do but i don't think the one china policy we don't take a position they also don't know what kinzinger said in beijing, will look worse and worse as time goes on but we may have to reassess very carefully not because of the moral, but they will be angry about that. that's something we need to be realistic about. it would be a big disaster if taiwan were to fall.

commonwealth models over time we can explore to kick the can down the road we don't need to come to a political solution in the near term, we need to -- the chinese can'tav be allowed to seize taiwan but should not poke the dragon in the eye for prudence if nothing else. >> at the great time he asks, he thinks u.s. resolve appears to step in the past yearks end asks is it time tois aggregate u.s. power in india when it's the indo pacific? then asked the question that intrigues me as well, has

china's power in fact peaked? >> those are two very different questions. the first question is how we could operationalize essentially, i think.. >> correct. >> if we do and does it signify china's power peaked? they are not going to be colossal threat future. >> let me try to address the first question, i think our problems with the operational potential and i think it gets to impart, there are a range of views both within the cause and brought alliance network to how confrontational we should be toward china.

i think there are a range of uses as to what the extent of the nature of the china threat is whether it's more economic or military so i wouldn't put all my eggs in the quad basket because i think there are flaws how collectively we can operate. whether it is the way to go, i think and i support the idea that we should onto plate the policy in the region which is not entirely exclusive and targetedti. i think there's a hole in the middle because china needs to be part of the multilateralism in the region. thus the primary challenge. whether china has peaked or not, it strikes me as an academic question. i don't know that they have peaked, i think my guess is the

answer no but even the chinese had peaked, there will be consequential challenge that will big attention in this requirement to come up with a way of pursuing a relationship with them to our alliances as well. >> i think it is the anti- chine structural, i think it is coming together and it's encouraging. i don't think we can aggregate u.s. partners and allies and say it's against china because what matters what i'm saying fundamentally is military power and its defined by this in a lot

of ways. india's military is irrelevant to the taiwan military which is my argument that china would pursue in sequential strategy, not for everybody at the same time so this is the fundamental policy with the administration for the alliance system, much of that is playing japan has not been spending much they are not relevant to theer scenarios they are thinking about so this unwieldy massive alliance defeated in detail so that's the way we need to think about things and military victory, ukraine success or failure can have political ramifications with germany and they saw what way the wind was blowing 1940, 41. has china peaked? and not an economist, i don't

think anybody knows. from the strategic view, we don't know the future so we should prepare for the downside. the worst outcome would be if we under prepare and china does continue growing and become stronger and dominate asia and etc. if we over prepare in china falls down, we will have extra money and risk for here and there but that's a lot less so i think it's not that, get because we should prepare for the downside. u.s. china trade to the highest levels volkswagens, wall street funneling money into china, i'm sure everybody has spent time in china grew up in hong kong and so forth, the chinese have kind of cracked into the economic sense, likely to continue growing at some level even if there is demographic decline so it is prudent to assume china will continue to grow even if

not 7%, they may go through massive corrections. the u.s. in the 19th century, huge suppressions and depression so -- the could up like japan but it's like two thirds, three quarters gdp the u.s., in china ended up like that, would be on the american economy so it's not a reassuring outcome itself. >> you can answer easily and simply i think, is biden doing a good job? >> no, not on the fundamental issue. >> okay. paul. >> it depends on the category and how we define fundamental issues. my bottom line is the alternative was trump so i'm fine. i mean, i've got complaints against biden including china policy but that is a separate conversation. >> i know and qualify yes on

biden and asia. thank you, gentlemen. i appreciate you taking the time, i hope our viewers enjoyed it as much as i did and it will be on youtube and the website if you are moved to recommend it to one of your friends or watch it again yourself. that concludes our session. >> thank you, everyone. ♪♪ >> start your day with "washington journal", your window into the nation's capitol. the only nationally televised forum for discussing the latest issues in washington and across the country. >> it gives the people opportunity to speak for themselves on the issues they care about. >> join us for a live three hour conversation with a variety of congressional networks. >> c-span is one of the great institutions in this country for speech, sometimes unpopular is

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