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fiercelyly nonpartisan. we are happy all of you today c-span is also coming we are proud of our scholarship, we use it to power discussions of legal challenges facing us today. this book focuses on one of the most immediate instability info china only, is available as an e-book free from the wilson center for special i am sure best. the wilson center president and

director of international strategic vision is really should the center. in addition, his knowledge and critical thinking shape many of in his room understand nonproliferation. in previous books on u.s. foreign policy crises. rent in washington and beyond. that's no surprise because of the security council staff to the national laboratory. his latestt books questions we are facing insight to help the right person, we have asked to

be part of this panel. he's asking the right questions throughout his career white house national security correspondent, a distinguished fellow here in his most recent book was more sabotage and fear in the cyber age which reads like a thriller and you book will be comingow out. to their start with may of 2022, reshaped.. can we draw from lessons learned in the future? turn it over to david.

he's going to need for a few minutes and then open the floor to questions and also online. if you participate online, please look for thehe question x and it will pop up and i can see the question. david, over. >> thank you very much for his series. also it is great to be here working on their. second oneha down of all to drop down every once and a while. >> it's late, and. >> a big thanks making sure

you're getting on the edge of scholarship is simply going off in the direction that great academic interest but also of great practical purpose and that is truly the case, maybe even more minutes of time you wrote them with instability because as no bigger there's single problem facing security officials in washington to figure out the relationship, the nature of cooperation and what it means for the chinese arsenal.

it is suggested to bring them from 300 weapons to currently 300 to 200, about 1000 by the end of this decade and 1500 by 2035 which would be coincidently, exactly around the limits the u.s. instructions are facing now it expires in under 1000 days with no real prospect. my wonderful colleague published today. it is thero problem rob is tryig to address today.

as we think about the fact that it was only ten years ago, that's really redesigning u.s. strategy refined our self in a real risk of heading the other way. congress through central pieces of bipolar stability which is to say why is it introducing a third major strategic adversary 1964 is so complicated? it's not immediately obvious why we know about deterrence. >> good day all of you, thank

you for that introduction. let me just a question and unpack the title of my publication. china became a nuclear weapon, and arsenal those small relative to the of the united states and soviet union bipolarity to try polarity compounded by three stabilizing developments. first, competition extending intoou cyberspace.

second, there's no guard rails. it's been distant to collapse so the competition among these powers is unconstrained now. as we know from the headline, there ongoing crisis of war in ukraine and potential crisis in taiwan. these developments, a change in drivers of potential crisis are eroding the foundations of strategic ability. during the cold war, the foundation was a stable balance between the united states and soviet union after this crisis each deployed secure and vulnerable systems that created mutual vulnerability and assured

retaliatory capability on both sides and created an easy but stable piece. united states ever adjusted to that but it was the foundation. it deflected competition to these areas not afghanistan during the cold war. mymy argument is the development many close new development strengths but the balance is less stable as incentives in a crisis are being re-created and

stakes are no longer peripheral. the soviet union, it is vital ukrainee is in europe, taiwan ad northeast asia and clarify the interest of both in the elements of in the argument of the book, it extends the understanding of mutual ability and destruction which is the key to the soviet union because once you add in china and the uneasy

relationship with china, you get what bernie said, a conceptual problem and i will redo the quote here and correlate this with your argument, you've got to change traditional approach utilizing weapons with the delivery system but how is still unclear. since this problem emerged, i talked about it with a handful of members ofat the senate and a few members of the house who deal in strategic issues and national security issues and to say that the understanding of the instability is pretty weak. ... is such a different deterrence problem and how it

is, for example, that we might of some frameworks to address it in. let me pass it this way that there's there's a numeric dimension to this which you focus on like numbers of strategic warheads. but as i laid out in my initial, you know, comment, there are drivers of escalation. and it's in a context where we there's no dialog ongoing with either of these parties with russia. we're in the middle of a war, it's not the time to have that kind of conversation with. china and have tipped in my colleague daly who heads our kissinger institute. we don't have common terms of reference even with the chinese. we don't have the shared history with them. our key dates. 1914, 1962 don't have the same to them. their concept of deterrence. robert was telling me if you deconstruct the characters that

go into their their word, deterrence includes not only what we think of as deterrence like a threat to prevent an action, but also has a compelling aspect to it which could open the door to coercive diplomacy. so the the framework we're not operating from a common conceptual and then once that if is not enough of a hurdle, you have to look at the which is much more complicated than the cold war you're dealing with kind of the numeric dimension of it. what does it mean if china builds up to numeric parity with united states and russia? but it's in a context where there these drivers of it's in the context of these drivers of escalation i mentioned at the onset this creates openings for three types of escalation in, accidental escalation, we had a number of false alerts during the cold war that i was led to nuclear use, inadvertent excavation, where one side

takes an action the other side doesn't view as escalatory but the other side does for example, china and open work conflict they might go after u.s. satellites in space or introduce malware they may not think it's escalatory because no one's being killed but would be significantly escalatory. there's the risk of inadvertent escalation in the third category of escalation is deliberate or instrumental escalation i think this is really where the is most central in terms of the current constellation of factors. nobel prize winner thomas schelling talked about competition and risk-taking if you look at how the nuclear balance is shifting in tandem with conventional military balances most acutely in northeast asia china to shift

calculative risk-taking to think certain things in the taiwan context have not done in russia and china will return to his face and simultaneous crises a domestic crisis that played out on the weekend also the military front which is undergoing ukrainian counteroffensive which creates a decision point for putin on escalation or not. >> that's what i wanted to turn to next. you mentioned showing let's dig in a little bit deeper on russia. we had a lot of things that have been unraveling the nuclear balance just with russia oalone.

separate china problem we have been advising the theories of already happening before president trump took office but accelerated during that time. i mentioned the new start which was extended for five years of the by administration has no provision for another renewal. you have to start negotiating from the ground up they started those very preliminary discussions before the war broke out. the threat to use tactical weapons by putin at various points led president biden to say ãlast october we were the closest we had been to armageddon moment at any time since the cuban missile crisis. that shocked people standing

around james murdoch living room with a nice glass of wine in their head who hadn't thought they were coming for an armageddon speech. even if china was not revising its strategy would you argue that what held the balance of terror together during the cold war would be falling apart anyway. >> that's a great question. >> we are in a situation where we are in the himidst of essentially two cold war is one with russia will china and these new cold wars are playing out at a time when these foundational strategic stabilities that emerge from the old cold war are being eroded and with nothing to supplant it because there is no dialogue. i think one of the questions implicit in your question is is

this truly a triangular relationship? in the study i talk about i don't go for astrophysics like in the william broad piece i go for just plain geometry and say it's more of an isosceles triangle than an equilateral triangle it was never truly equal. that just think of it china economically is a $20 trillion ããrussia's economy is $2 trillion in the size of italy, no denigration of italy but russia and the united states have had large arsenals during the cold war beyond the rational relation to any strategy and china has moved from minimum determined that you mentioned to approaching

parity. i think in terms of framing right now the question is is it truly try polar or is is the united states really faced twin bipolar problems. the door to that latter optic it's a mixed metaphor that russia and china are not adversarial states at this time. 1969 they almost went to war they were. part of the oximetry and why it's not an equilateral triangle is because russia and china combined both capabilities and hostile adversarial toward the united states united states had to deal with them about those terms but there's nobody in moscow who's like what is that three peer problem fixed.

>> it's fascinating because there isn't an agreement yet that i hear in the strategic community about the fundamental question that you raise which is we have a try polar problem we have two bipolar's. hecker who ran los alamos national lab and then at stanford for many years set in the same piece this morning i don't see russia and china getting together on nuclear strategies i see this as two bipolar's. on the other hand we got china and russia who have talked about a relationship with no limits. they've done military exercises together not nuclear exercises but military exercises. they both clearly see an advantage in being. situation in which they, nuclear strategy even if they

both reserved all their launch authorities and so forth to themselves. >> as good i'll put it, states don't have friends they have interests. we've seen in the china russia previously the soviet relationship it's waxed and waned. currently there interests align i think putin and xi jinping pull the reverse kissinger of sorts in 1959 kissinger nixon initiated opening to china outflank of them rising soviet union that come together to address for them the issue of american hyperpower. but the no limits sounds like hyperbole the five historical

experience they have a long contested border there is the safe summitry their economies when china's 20 trillion 2 trillion i guess russia pivoted from selling oil and natural gas to trying to shift it to china as a potential market so there is a convergence of interest but could this extend to the nuclear? russia transferred early warning systems to china in 2018 china has a launch on warning doctrine and we've had a history i alluded to a false alerts so that's a little concern that would be a topic on any strategic ildialogue wit china. but and this is where the

numbers come in one of you took the chinese arsenal and added it to the emerging chinese arsenal and added to the existing russian arsenal does that mean the united states should have a equal to 2x there you get into the numbers the perennial issue that goes back to the cold war era which the around corporation how much is enough i think while the united states has two thirds of its nuclear deterrence and existing technologies and vulnerable submarines that could more than mount a devastating blow on russia and china putting basically both out of existence as functioning societies and we are under threat from that has

been the balance of terror as a foundation of stability which is hard to adjust to psychologically i don't think the numbers per se make the huge difference. staunton quantity becomes quality times yes the number going up as a factor affecting strategic stability but i think in the publication i look at these drivers of escalation i started out tawith fiber and outer space, no constraints no common dialogue and with china no common conceptual framework we are operating from and an ongoing war and i like to come back to the ukraine escalatory issue that you alluded to and a potential crisis in china with china over taiwan.

there the conventional balance in northeast asia shifting at the same time the nuclear balance shifting china and the questionnaire in terms of managing relations is this lead to increased chinese risk-taking. robert daly has a nice formulation where if united states does the necessary prevent iaerosion of convention balance in northeast asia that's a heavy lift. and maintain the nuclear balance of terror we are not going to change china's ilong-term objectives. they are all in on taiwan as part of china and are anxious to move forward but you can change the decision so it will say not this year. and we push off that's the taiwan piece i'm happy to say more and ukraine but. >> let's do that. when you lead into your essay you have is really fascinating

section that discusses the basic principle document that came out in 2020 under which russia would employ nuclear weapons. a lot of this i believe was done by guatemala who in a little bit this weekend. you say in here putin's nuclear ãduring the war should be viewed in the context of these them is an one of existential threat to the state and we haven't seen that in russia and some time until saturday. but you bring up the point that that is in his mind synonymous with the survival of his regime. that russia nuclear saber rattling is provoking western fears that your guesswork now that we see paranoid vladimir

putin who now has discover he's got more to be paranoid about with good reason likely to turn back to nuclear arsenal the way he has when things were going badly in ukraine. >> one of the conditions you alluded to under uwhich under russian doctrine the country would consider nuclear use of an existential threat to the state when she holds synonymous with the putin regime. this is where the ukraine war and the future of the putin regime become connected vessels and we tried to parse it and say the united states has said regime change is not an objective in russia it's a real contradiction from use of the word from the soviet. the director of central intelligence william burns said his word desperate putin might

consider nuclear use and one of the conditions has been the collapse of the military front and ukraine or or some threat to the regime back in the kremlin. >> in crimea. >> yes. i think this brings us to what happened over the weekend. as they say on law and order tv show, haripped from today's headlines, i don't have an answer to your question. but let me analytically lay out where the debate is and where the figure is. prior to this weekend i think that was one of you was driven by this view of ããif the zelinski government went for it

try to reestablish the pre-2014 boundaries of ukraine that can be a condition unto which putin would consider the use of a tactical nuclear weapon as a shock to the system saying western government you need to get control over zelinski and bring this conflict to an end. the biden administration he said we are not going to slice the salami, nuclear use is nuclear use and even though low yield weapon the deterrent marker that you put in russia escalation was they needed to care with ukrainian war objectives because if they went for the return to status quo antebellum back to 2014 that could trigger russian, putin's nuclear use.

since the weekend went face is x essential threat take made some type of a compromise to ameliorate the situation. he didn't immediately escalate that assessment that has led to calls for the west to be all in on ukraine's maximalist geographic aspirations. one version of this is that if ukraine goes for it they could trigger escalation the other is that putin has shown he will accommodate even even existential threat.

>> we are getting near the moment for people to come in with questions of their own. imagine you are xi jinping right now, i realize most mornings you get up and say what if i was running china? [laughter] you've got the americans on your case to start up some kind of discussion. the first thing you think is they've got 1550 deployed and several thousand stored. we've got 200 and 300 deployed, building silos, be a decade before maybe more to their levels. what possible incentive does he have to enter that discussion until his arsenal is roughly the size of the u.s. arsenal or

the russian arsenal or intelligence and vulnerable because of submarines and other capabilities as those are. >> minimal incentive to maintain minimal deterrent under conditions. chinese decision-making is opaque we don't know why china started to build up to parity it might be one version of what's going on is that natural extension of xi jinping's conference of modernization program this is the progenitor being great superpower in the world but i think we also have to be taken into account what we do and how it's perceived in beijing that there were one line deof strategic analysis in our debate when china had a small nuclear arsenal was great

let's take it out in the first strike during a crisis we be able to dictate who the united states could dictate pattern of stability on china. they read these journals and beijing and they have the capabilities to build up. the irony is after the space shuttle exploded the united states was reliant on chinese space launch vehicles to put satellites into orbit so they have a very robust program to build long-range missiles and it's not a heavy lift for them to ramp up. what can we talk to them about? i think we have to be modest in our expectations it would be useful if we had strategic stability talks which the chinese have us do the minister of defense i believe under u.s. section and that's a bit of a problem in terms of the dialogue from the chinese perspective. >> they view the guardrails we are talking about is pure containment. >> pure containment and american rationale to login

superiority. if they are narrative and they can certainly put together a history and empirical data points to support their view of history. what can we do from where we are at now, a strategic stability talks with russia with china should be on issues of isconcepts, deterrents and drivers of escalation so there's clarity of understanding. and we are not going to probably enter an era where there will be new arms control agreements per se but we may be able to develop understandings about norms. china did an anti-satellite test that generated spthousands of pieces of space debris lowers orbit in the own international space station to dodge around some of these pieces it generated good science fiction movies as well.

this would be a constraint and would assist in moderating temptation in the crisis to start launching attacks on satellite because you wouldn't have tested systems that allow you to do that. artificial intelligence, a topic i know you are addressing that is out there on the horizon. and under accidental escalation we had episodes during the cold war where there were false alerts like flocks of geese were mistakenly viewed as incoming american missiles in 1983 and the soviet union. if you combined launch on warning doctrines with early warning systems that are known to have had problems and the line from doctor strange after

the attack on them soviet union general churches and said i would not pull program because of one failure. if we have one failure it would be catastrophic. if you add to that, this is for a chapter you probably a.haven' written yet, artificial intelligence to automatic launch systems. say no more in terms of potential threat for escalation. asked why the biden administration and the smartphone was laid out norms of conduct to manage artificial intelligence in the military sphere. one of the norms was i don't think anyone would take issue with is that human being should be in the chain of decision-making on any 㦠>> let's go past the norms as a vehicle united states has to do its part we have to play our hand and reinforce the parents

and extended deterrents. one variant of determinants most of us recognize deterrents by punishment the threat of punishment if you do this than that but another variant of deterrence is deterrence by denial. actions that are taken to con found and blocked the efforts of the adversary sso if we harden our infrastructure to protect against malware attacks if we harden our satellites to make them less vulnerable to probably by adversary tough in our targets that could be a deterrent. >> basically saying an attack wouldn't work. >> exactly. they couldn't t be sure it woul work and launching it would start a process where they might lose control. >> you raised ai there's a lot of discussion about making that the first area that ããthe

last thing i wanted to ask you about is used by china and russia hypersonic delivery vehicles which is a way to invade our projections. emerging technologies this picks ryup the comment i think former secretary monies about numbers and concepts and categories.hypersonic so the new ycategory can be used suborbital which decreases the time for decision-makers to make decisions and it's been tested in both conventional and potentially nuclear mode by china and russia the united states said hours are only for conventional ordinance it's unclear what china and russia. if they see hypersonic system coming in, which can evade

defenses and strategic defenses in the black hole of defense spending in terms of money spent to try to get the desired outcome is that nuclear system coming in or conventional? that icblurring of conventional and nuclear, which arises in a number of contexts like the co-location of conventional and nuclear systems so if you're attacking a conventional system that colocated with nuclear it might be estimating poit withou and barry pozen from mit wrote a book that's been the lead thinking on this. inadvertent escalation from the co-mingling of conventional and nuclear systems. the wilson center is to piece on official model is to piece along that require study. there's a lot of challenges out there analytical and otherwise in the wilson center's role is to promote policy relevant

scholarship which is what i try to do in this publication. >> and done it very successfully. let me turn this back to you robin for your own ãand those of our audience. thank you. for the audience of the room your moment is coming. think about this get your questions ctogether got a bunc of them online so you got competition meanwhile while you're thinking i'm going to ask what my own questions. drawing on my time zone you know i was acting ambassador in berlin i'm especially attuned therefore to help our allies how our allies will annex to the deterrents a couple security and ability to resist coercion you talk about this about. tell us more about that hardware and software needed to keep that extended deterrents going and my question is? >> great question let me preface with historical point of reference.

right now and nuclear weapon states that members of the security council brought into the nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear weapon states states exercise their sovereign right and joined with north korea became nuclear weapon state 2006 treated differently because it was in the npt and then you have the wrong which a nuclear threshold state we don't live in a world where there are 30 or 40 nuclear weapon states that wasn't that assumption wasn't always the case in the 1950s there were studies 96about the rand corporation 1952 president kennedy gave a speech at the un general assembly he talked about a world of 30 or 40 nuclear weapon states that led to negotiations that culminated nuclear nonproliferation treaty one of the major reason and there's establish literature on this is the u.s. extended deterrent whcommitment.

why germany doesn't think it needs its own nuclear weapon japan doesn't south korea doesn't the nuclear umbrella. the national security advisor jake sullivan talk about the hardware and the software of extended deterrents. so during the ukraine war the united states nato augmented its dual use nuclear capable aircraft in europe the questions about north east asia were united states and russia and then soviet union withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from the korean thought and there's a question now about how the united states should address the nuclear balance in northeast asia to address this competition risk-taking i alluded to in china and taiwan the nuclear piece of it what's necessary there to bolster japan and south korea. what could we do? we can do more that's the hardware side the software side of the consultations which are

institutionalized the nuclear group within the planning group at the nato which if you work in brussels as well you know all about that dave is about to go to the nato summit meeting covering that were nuclear planning discussions will be a point important point on the agenda we don't have that type of n institutionalized framewor japan and south korea but there are discussions with them to talk about nuclear contingencies and what could be done to bolster deterrents taking into account japan's constitution which places limitations on their ability to develop offensive systems and south korea where there is debate and certain disjunction between popular opinion on developing independent nuclear capability in the south korean government's commitment to its ally relationship with the united states and the extended deterrent commitment.

so are we doing enough? it requires constant tending and adjustments as circumstances change and i think those circumstances have emphatically changed in the last year. >> okay. for those in the room this is your moment. we have a microphone so this will eventually become your way. i will take the question here. >> dave at the woodrow wilson center. what is your assessment of why he moved tactical nuclear weapon into the and is this something you think nato or u.s. should be responding to? >> putin, who operates from his own historical narrative of grievance in the place of russia in the world is made a number of assertions including russia has a special commitment

to russians outside outside the russian federation does not have natural boundaries so 25 or so elections in other parts in the adjacent countries undeclared extraterritorial commitment to defend those individuals are numbered from the cold war period when the russians than soviet say we feel surrounded by nato and china the click back was if i had 11 time zones i would feel surrounded too. [laughter] why belarus? belarus is as a vassal state of russia because younger hands limited scope for autonomous action sort of if you want to go there in mafia analogies it's one of the five families is out there managing the belarus portfolio and the notion that the lease would have autonomous control over

the aggression deployed nuclear systems really beggars belief they remain under control of russians if they had been deployed. putin of course in his own framework of russians role in the world basically said we are doing nothing different than with the united states e.as don by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in europe with dual use systemic. >> not a bad point. because none of that is what we done. >> before i take another audience question don't worry i'm coming back i'm going to give you an online question because it comes from a colleague at king's college and also because it's very erspecif in what he's proposing i thought i would give it to you.

with china operating under arm tracing mentality you believe they could be persuaded to dissipate in arms-control discussions if the u.s. and russia were to agree on little number that they could settle on what's a hard cap at 750 we talked a little bit about the impurities and forces them going to give you. >> that's a great question and david kind of alluded to it right now there is the new start treaty that when we go back to the cold war era to different iterations which limit the united states and russia to 1550 deployable systems. russia has utunder putin has suspended aspects of compliance with that in terms of consultations and inspections but russia significantly has not abrogated the treaty as in signaling the step of building beyond 1550.

the question that's been posed online is a central one as we move forward and look to 2026 and what will happen then. i heard one analyst say that arms-control is dead. when dad would've been enough others are redundant. but to make the emphatic point. back to countries have interest. even with the tortured history and china has not been party to it and numerically inferior so asking them to join and lock in american superiority is a real concern for them but i could just analytically and i would defer to the china watchers like robert daly on whether this is realistic or not. could see a chinese interest in wanting to lock united states

so it's analytically possible to see the nice quote from einstein who was challenged like you cracked adam you unravel the mysteries of adam but you can't come up with the system to manage the control of the adam so we don't destroy ourselves and don't destroy humanity. einstein clicked back because physics is easier than politics we are now in the realm of you can what you can analytically lay out that was the approach of the book it's not hard advocacy book and what would be the prerequisites for policymakers to make decisions such as the one reflected in the question which is a great one i'm not sure the 750 number would be locked t in by i think the concept the concept is

analytically valid where the politically we can get there or not i think is the question. >> all right. we are in the room. >> hi, my question is regarding like the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in ukraine by russia many china experts and alice say ããthat would be the redline for beijing because according to the corian foreign policies nuclear weapons should be used for deterrents not attack another country but also

like territorial integrity should be one of the ããwe see that's not the case since they been aligning with russians existing vision of ukraine i was wondering first if you think that china would indeed side with the west if russia deploys nuclear weapons in ukraine and second, if that would give nato a reason to get directly involved in the conflict arguing nuclear condemnation would be sort of like a direct attack nato allies. >> that contingency would really put the no limits formulation to the task. i think there would be a limit and the chinese already alluded there's been meetings with the chinese and indian leaders that they make contact with putin they don't use our terminology of redline but they made it clear that nuclear use would be

a threshold that would create a whole international eality. this creates the zone of uncertainty on escalation. the debate is how the situation on the battlefield can affect calculus of deterrence having just been through weekend where

there was a surprise x essential threat to survival of the regime. >> those in the room you'll have a chance to talk after i will take one last question from our online contributors, that is from former ambassador laura whkennedy. experts have spent years developing, nuclear glossary discussing doctrines baby steps but is this difficult time seeing a game in town. >> that's a great question. you know the p5 +1 mechanism was championed by wilson centers on catherine ashton to bring about the iran nuclear deal. in the prior administration withdrew from the deal better

than hopes that the model could be built upon to address other issues. even when ukraine after 2014 when david spent a lot of time in hotels eating chocolates covering the meetings even during that period of russia and china cooperated with the united states in bringing about the iran nuclear deal because they had a shared interest in constraining iran's nuclear ambitions. i think we are in the middle of a war ukraine and there have been nato point with the china. i don't know what the immediate practical possibilities are of the p5 +1 right now russia is a pariah state so would not be included but i think on a pragmatic basis and to put my cards on the table, people talk

about the international relations really is a disguised question about ideology, card-carrying utilitarian, what works what's in our interest usually we should try that's what motivated the analysis here we should look for opportunities to explore how this mechanism could be used but we are not there. we need to do some rehabilitative work to get to that point where we could resume conversation with china about other issues. back in the cold war china was in terms of percolation was the more the better or they shrunk that increased numbers of nuclear weapon state and china transferred know how to o backstab which found its way to the young. the chinese have really gotten religion so to speak on nuclear issues and recognized they've

taken nonproliferation on board as as an interest but not always been as hopeful as they could be on north korea but there's some predicate for engaging them certainly on these issues but it's going to be a steep climb. >> thank you. i want to thank both of our panelists david for asking all the right questions and guiding us through the book and posing questions from. for those of you who are here in person the book is available outside in hard copy. also available online as an e-book on the wilson center website. no excuses for not reading it, . right? thank you c-span for featuring this. [applause]

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