series books that shaped america. join us as we embark on a captivating journey in partnership with the library of congress which first creates books that shaped america list to explore key works of literature from american history. provoked thoughts won awards, led to significant societal changes and are still talked about today. hear from featured renown experts who will shed light on the profound impact of these iconic works virtual journeys to significant locations across the country intricately tied to the celebrate authors and the unforgettable books among our featured books commonsense by thomas paine, huckleberry finn by mark twain their eyes were watching god. and free to choose but milton and rose freedman print watcher 10 part series books that shaped america started monday septembe. eastern on c-span, c spent now

are free mobile video app or online at c-span.org. ♪ welcome everyone. to the woodrow wilson center. we are congressionally chartered, scholarship driven and nonpartisan. we are also happy to welcome all of you here today. and c-span which is also filming this for the book talk. so thank you all. we are especially proud of our scholarships. we use it to power our discussions of critical challenges facing us today. rob's new book focuses on one of the most immediate challenges. try polar instability, nuclear competition among the united states, russia, and china. best of all, for all of you and people participating online, i want you to know this book is

available as an e-book for free from the wilson center. you can find online on our website. so, for this discussion i am very proud to be sharing the stage with the best of the best. rob is the wilson center senior vice president and director of international securityty studie. his strategic vision has really shaped the wilson center itself. in addition his deep knowledge and critical thinking has a shape to help many of us in this room understand nuclear issues and nonproliferation. his previous books on states that u.s. policy managing nuclear and on nuclear crises with north korea and iran have defined debates in washington and beyond. is no surprise because rob served on the national security council staff as director for nonproliferation and as a consultant to the los

alamos national laboratory. now, his latest book goes to the core questions we are facing. and i really appreciate the opportunity to get your insight. to help us ask the right question we had asked david to be part of this panel. he has been asking the right questions throughout his career at the "new york times" he has been white house national security correspondent. he is also a distinguished fellow here at wilson his most recent book was the perfect weapon or, sabotage and fear the cyber age which reads like a thriller for those of you who have not read it yet. started because his next book will be coming out. he is working on it now it's on the return of great power competition. the synergy between these two is clear. i'm going to start with the little bitty quote in may of 2022 henry kissinger said we were living in a totally new

era. cold war dynamics are being reshaped by emergent tri- polarity. can we draw from the lessons we have learned and apply them to management for the future with that question open and many others and going to turn the floor over too david. here's how it will work he will lead a discussion with rob for a few minutes then we will open the floor to questions and also questions for online participants. if you are participating with us online please look for submit a question box it will pop up here and i will see it and be able to ask the question as part of the discussion. so david, over to you. >> great, thank you very muchan robin. thank you rob for giving us not only this book try polar instability,y, but your whole series of books on this topic. also is just great to be here at the wilson center. i'm working on my third book at

the wilson center. the second one with robin down the hall to drop by every once in a while and make sure i'm actually typing. >> if it's late it's not my fault. [laughter] but a big thanks as well to rob who make sure the wilson center not only is on the edge of scholarships but is right on the news. it is not simply going off and directions that are of great academic interest. but also of great practical purpose. that is truly the case. maybe even moree so which were urgent at the time he wrote them and remain so today try polar instability. there is no bigger single problem facing national security

officials in washington then trying to figure out the changerelationship between russd china. the nature of cooperation between russia and china and what it means we are seeing such expansion of the chinese arsenal. the public estimates of the pentagon suggests willhe bring them from their minimum determent of 300 weapons currently 200 -- 300 to about 1000 by the end of this decade. and to 1600 by 2035 which would be coincidentally exactly around the limits the u.s. and russians are facing now. new00 start expires in under 100 days. with no real prospect with something be negotiated to replace it. rob is so on the news my wonderful colleague built broad

published today in the science times apart section of the times a great article called the terror of threes. and in fact it's a three body problemm that rob is trying to address heree today. so rob, as we think about this and we think about the fact it was only 10 years ago, less really that barack obama talked about redesigning you a strategy to diminish the role of nuclear weapons and american foreign policy that we find ourselves in the situation where it's a very real risk of heading the other way. so, talk is a little bit through the central thesis of try polar instability? which is to say why is it introducing a third major strategicin adversary, china has

had nuclear weapons 1 since 195, is soco complicated. it's not immediately obvious to everyone why it undoes so much that we know about so we think we know. >> good day to all of you. thank you for that kind introduction and david for youro participation your presence at the wilson center. let me address your question by the obvious starting point. let me impact the title of my publication, try polar instability. china became a nuclear weapon state in 1964 but long had an arsenal that was small relative to that of the united states and then the soviet union. as you mentioned, david, china is now under sheeting pangs of modernization program which is comprehensive, new assertive political role, encompasses a drive toward numerical parity with the united states and russia. probably in the 2030s as you

indicated. that the system level change shifted from bipolarity to tri- polarity is compounded by three destabilizing development. first, competition is extending into new o domain of cyberspacen outer space. he wrote extensively about that, david. second there are no guard rails arm control architecture of the cold war era has been dismantled to the point of near collapse. the competition among the major powers is essentially unconstrained and out. and third as we know from the headlines there are ongoing crises per there is a war in ukraine and a potential crisis in taiwan. these developments system level change in the drivers of potential escalation in a crisis are eroding the foundation of strategic stability.

during the cold war the foundation of strategic stability was a stable balance of terror between the united states and the soviet union. after the cuban missile crisis the united states and soviet union each deployed secure vulnerable systems that created mutual vulnerability. assured retaliatory capability on both sides which was the hallmark ofy, neutral vulnerability s. an uneasy but stable piece the united states never adjusted to the vulnerability of that era it was the foundation. with the balance of power -- but the balance of terror did was deflect competition to peripheral areas so-called third world vietnam, afghanistan, the other crisis points during the cold war. my central argument is the developments i mention the system level change plus the new developments cyber and outer space, lack of constraints

arms-control collapses ongoingis crises are recasting the dangers of the cold war. the balance of terror is less stable as incentives for preemptive action in a crisis are beingnd re-created. andno steaks are no longer peripheral it's not about afghanistan or parts of the periphery of the soviet union or parts of what we then call the third world it is of vital interest. ukraine is the key to the future of europe. taiwan is central in northeast asia and is declared vital to both sides. the balance of tears and the stakes are that's trades try polar instability which is the title of my work. >> that is great and takes us right to the central question. so, the argument of the book is you cannot simply extend that understanding of mutual

vulnerability and mutual destruction which was the key to the two-way contest with the soviet union and then of course with that successor state. because once you addn in china and the uneasy relationship they have with russia you get said to bill broad was a conceptual problem. and i will read to the rest of his quote here. to correlate this with your argument. we have got to change the traditional approach with equalizing weapons was strategic delivery system. but how to do that is still unclear. now, since this problem has emerged i talked about it with a handful of members of the senate and a few members of the house who deal in strategic issues who deal in national securityhi issues.

i think it's fair to say i'm one of the group recent so glad you wrote this book. the understanding of the instability being inserted is pretty weak right now. so give us a fairly concrete sense of why this is such a different deterrent problem? and how it is for example we might think of some framework to address it? >> let me parse it this way. there is a numeric dimension we should focus on like numbers of strategic warheads. but, as i laid out in my initial comment there are drivers of escalation. and it is ine a context there is no ongoing dialogue with either of these parties. with the restaurant we are in the middle of the words not the time to have that kind of conversation. with that china might colleague who headstu the institute we do

not have common terms ofha reference with the chinese. we do not have shared history with them. our key dates 1914 , 62 do not have the same meaning to them. their concept of deterrence robert was tell him he would deconstruct the character that go into that word for deterrence includes not only what we think of a deterrence as a threat to prevent an action but a compelling expect to it which could open to coercive diplomacy. we are not operating from a common conceptual framework. if that is not enough of a hurdle, you have to look at the dynamiche which is much more complicated than the cold war era. you are doing with the numeric dimension what does it mean if china builds up to numerical parity with the unites it's in russia? it is in axt context this is

openings for three types of escalation inadvertent accidental escalation and we had coa number of false alerts durig the cold war that almost led to nuclear use. you cap inadvertent escalation one side takes an action the other side does not view as escalatory but the other side does. for example china and opening of a conflict they might go after u.s. satellites and space or introduce malware they may not think it is escalatory because no one is been killed bluntly. but it would be significantly escalatory the third category of escalation is deliberate. this is really where the debate is most central in terms of the constellation of factors the nobel prize winner thomas schelling talked about it

competition it risk-taking. if you looknu at how the nuclear balance is shifting in tandem with conventional military balances most acutely north east asia could leave china to shift its calculus of risk-taking to do certain things in the taiwan context it had not done. and russia and i'm sure we will turn to it is facing simultaneous crises a domestic crises that played out over the weekend but also the military front which is undergoing a ukrainian counteroffensive which creates a decision point for putin on escalation or not. >> that is what i wanted to turn to next. i have to say you mention of schelling who was the original theorist brought back memories to me of really difficult final exams i did not want to go

revisit. so let's dig in a little deeper on russia. before in the book we have had a lot of things that have been unraveling the nuclear balance just with russia alone and separate out the china problem. we have had the demise of a series of treaties that was already happening before president trump took office but it accelerated during that time. i mentioned a new start which extended for five years at the very beginning of the biden administration has no provision for another renewal. you would have to start negotiating from the ground up. they started those very plimmer any discussions before the war brokee out. they have not had any in 16 months.ac the threat to use tactical weapons by putin at various points led president biden to

say at a fundraiser in new york last october that we were the closest we had been to an armageddon moment at any time since the cuban missile crisis. which i think kind of shocked the people standing around jay murdaugh's living room with a nice glass of white wine in their hands he would not release out there coming from armageddon speech. so even if china was not revising its strategy, would you argue that what held the bank balance of terror together during the cold war era referred to it would be falling apart anyway? >> that is a great question. we are in a situation we are in the midst of two cold war's phone with russia and with china. the new cold wars are playing out at a time when the

foundation the strategic ability from the old war are being eroded and art with nothing to supplanted because there is no dialogue. i think one of the questions implicit in your question is, is it truly a triangular relationship? in this study astrophysics like that william broad peace plane geometry. it's more ofla an isosceles triangle than an equilateral triangle. it was never truly equal. just think of it china economicallyun as a 20 trillion-dollar the unites faces 26 join russia's economy is $2 trillion note demolition of italy in this millennium not a major world power.

in terms of arsenals, russia and the united states have had large arsenals during the cold war appoint jan rational relationship to any strategy. china has moved from that d minimum to approaching parity. i think in terms of framing right now, the question is, as s it truly try polar? or does the united states really face when bipolar program is a russia problem in the china problem? i think the latter optic is opening the door it's a mixed metaphor. anyway you get my point. thats russia and china are not adversarial states at this time in 1969 they almost went to where they were. so part of the symmetry whites not an equilateral triangle is because russia and china can

both capabilities and hostile toward the united states the united states has to deal them in those terms but there is no one in moscow or beijing what does the mean for us? the prospect of conflict between russia and china was remote at thiswh point. >> i find fascinating about this argument is there is not an agreement yet that i hear in the strategic community about the fundamental question that you raise. do we have too bipolar? >> who of course ran national lab demos at stanford for many years said in the same piece this morning, i do not see russian china getting together on nuclear strategies. i see this is too bipolar's. on the other hand we have goton china and russia who have talked about a relationship with no

limits. they have done military exercises not nuclear exercises but military exercises. they both clearly see an advantage in being our antagonist. could you imagine a situation in which they put together a common nuclear strategy, even if they both reserved all of their launch authorities and so forth to themselves? states don't have friends, they haveve interest. we have seen and the china russia previously the soviet relationship has waxed and waned. currently their interestsst ali. i think putin and s she pulled a reverse kissinger of sorts in 1969 kissinger and nixon initiated an opening tohe chinao outflank the rising soviet union, putin and she have come

together to address for them the issue of american hyperpower. the no limits sounds hyperbole with historical experience. they have a long at times contested border. there is the symmetry in their economies work china 20 trillion russia's 2 trillion. i guess russia pivoted from selling oil and natural gas to europe to shift it to china has the potential market rate there is a convergence of interest there. could this extend into the nuclear era? russia transferred early morning assistance to china in 2018. this was in the press. china has eight launch on warning doctrine.

we have had a history i alluded to of false alerts that is a real concern. that will be a topic at any strategic ability dialogue with china. and this ist where the numbers come in but what if you took the chinese arsenal and added it to the emerging chinese arsenal and the russian arsenal? that mean the united states should have force equal to 2x so to speak? that's be equal to russia and china. there you get into the t numbers of thehe perennial issue that gs back to the cold war era which the rand corporation asked in a different historical context how much is enough? i h think while the united stats has two thirds of the nuclear deterrent potentially at sea and existing technologies, invulnerable submarines that couldn, amounts a devastating bw

on russia and china putting basically both of them out of existence functioning in societies.te we are under a commensurate threat with them. that has been mutual assured destruction and the balance of terror has a foundation of stability psychologically. do not think the numbers per se make a huge difference. stone said quantity becomes quality. yes the numbers going up is a factor. affecting strategic stability. i think in the publication i look at these drivers of escalation that i started out with. cyber and outer space. no constraints. no common dialogue or with china no common o conceptual framework we are operating from third an ongoing war and i want to come

back to the putin ukraine escalatory issue you alluded to. and a potential crisis in china with china over taiwan. in the conventional balance in northeast asia shifting at the same time that nuclear balance is shifting towards china. the question they are in terms of managing relations is could this be to increase chinese risk-taking? robert daly has a nice formulation work at the united states does the necessary prevents an erosion of the conventional balance in northeast asia that is a heavy lift and maintains the nuclear balance, the balance of terror we are not going to change china's long-term objective. they are all in on taiwan as part and are anxious to move forward on it but we can change the calculus decision so they

will saykn not this year. we push it, push it often find time and diplomacy. that's the taiwan piece and i'm happy to say more on ukraine. let's let's do that. when you read in to your essay you have this fascinating section that discusses the basic principle document that came out in 2020 under which russia would employ nuclear weapons. a lot of this i believe was done by general who had been in the news just a little bit this weekend. you say in your putin's nuclear threats during the war should be viewed in the context of the principles. one of them is an existenial threat to the state. we have not seen that and russia for some time until saturday. the point that is in his mind's

an ominous with the survival of his regime. russian nuclear saber rattling is a provoking western fears. is that your guests work now that we see a paranoid vladimir putin who now has discoveries got more to be paranoid about was some good reason? likely tor turn back to his nuclear arsenal the way he has when things are going badly in ukraine? >> where the conditions you alluded to under russian c doctrine a country it would consider nuclear use as an existenial threat to the state which he holds synonymous with the putin regime. this is where the ukraine work in the future of the putin regime become connected vessels. we tried to parse it and say the united states said dream change is not an objective.ns with the addendum of normal relations with russia are not

possible as long as putin is in power that is a real contradiction to use a word from theu soviet lexicon. the director of central intelligence william burns has said his word desperate putin might consider nuclear use. one of the conditions has been the collapse of the military front in ukraine. it's really and/or someom threat to the regime back inml the kremlin but crimea he has added in crimea. >> lexi added in crimea. i think this brings us to what happened over the weekend. i know they say in the law and order tv show ripped from today's headlines. and i do not have an answer to your question. let me analytically lay out where the debate is and where the fisher is. prior to this weekend one view

was driven by the view of a desperate putin might act is that if zelensky government went for it, tried to reestablish the pre-2014 boundaries of ukraine, that could be a condition under which putin would consider the use of a tactical nuclear weapon as a shock to the system. say it western government you need to get control of zelensky and rein him in and bring this conflict to an end. the biden administration the national security advisor jake sullivan using the metaphor or not going to slice the salami nuclear use is nuclear use. laid down but that view of a

boot to check putin russian expo the need to if they went for status quo affected 2014 that could trigger putin's nuclear use. since the weekend went to base isn't existenial threat apparently it is opaque in playing out in real time there has been a view that look what happened when he has an existenial threat he got outside moscow, he made some type of compromise to ameliorate the situation. paint did not immediately that assessment then has led to calls for the west to be all in on ukraine's maximalist geographic aspirations.s. that's the pull of the debate right now i don't have an answer

too. one version if ukraine goes for it it could trigger escalation. the other is putin has shown he will accommodate an existential threat in the united states and nato should not self deterby themselvesn by trying to rein n zelensky and the counteroffensive but i do not have an answer to that question. >> are getting near the moment for people coming in with questions of their own. let me add one or two more nabecause this is so fascinatin. imagine you are shooting pain right now. i realize most mornings you get up and say what if i was running nachina. [laughter] and you have got the americans on your case to start up some kind of discussion. the first that you think is and theyhave got 1500 deployed and several thousand stored we have 200 -- 300 deployed, building

the silos. it's going to be a decade before may be more before we are even up to their level. what possible incentive does he have to enter that discussion when his arsenal is roughly the size of the u.s. arsenal or the russian arsenal? or until it's as invulnerable because of submarines and other capabilities as those are? >> he had minimal incentive to maintain a minimal deterrent under conditions. chinese decision-making is opaque. we don't know why china decided to build up to parity. it might be one version of what's going on is a natural extension of sheeting beings modernization program. this is a great superpower in thei world. but we also have to take into

account what we do and how it is perceived in beijing. there's one line of strategic analysis in our debate when china had a small nuclear arsenalet was a great break takn out the first strike during a crisis we would build the united states could dictate instability on china. they read these journals in beijing and have the capabilities to build up. and irony is, after the space shuttle exploded the united states was reliant on chinese space launch vehicles to put our satellites into orbit they have a very robust program to build long-range missiles. it is not a heavy lift for them to ramp up. what can we talk to him about? i think we have to be modest in our expectations. it would be useful for strategic stabilityas talks which the

chinese the minister of defense i believe is under u.s. sanction. that is a bit of a problem in terms of dialogue from the chinesere perspective. >> they view the card was as pure containment. >> pure containment and american rationale to lock-in superiority. it is their narrative they can certainly put together a history and empirical data points that support their view of history. i think w what can we do for whe we are at now? a strategic stability talks with russia, with the china should be on issues of concepts, deterrencece and drivers of escalation so there's clarity of understanding. we are not entering an era where the beat new arms control agreements per se. we may be able to develop understandings about norms.

china didn't antisatellite test that generated thousands of pieces of space debris and lower orbit in her own international space station had to dodge around some of these pieces. generate some good sign fiction movies as well. with insight sunlight tax that would be a constraint and would assist in moderating any temptation in a crisis to start launching attacks on a satellites you would not of tested systems that allow you to do that. artificial intelligence is a topic i know you were addressing, david reporting in your new book that is out there on the horizon. under accidental escalation we had episodes during the cold war where there were false alerts of flocks of geese were mistakenly viewed as incoming american missiles in 1983 in the then

soviet union. ifif you combined doctrines that are known to have had problems as a line from doctor strangelove after the attack on then soviet union that i would not knock the whole program because of one failure. if you have one failure it would be catastrophic. if you add to that is prior chapter you haven't written artificial intelligence to automatic launch systems. ie would say no more in terms of the potential threat. that's why the biden administration and the smart move has laid out norms of conduct to manage artificial intelligence in the military sphere. one of the norms was but i don't

think anyone would take issueou with is that a human being should be in the chain of decision-making on any nuclear use. let's go for tacit norms as a vehicle. the united states has to do its part. we have tot play out our hands. and to reinforce deterrence and extended deterrence which is of interest to robin. mostst of us recognize deterrene by punishment the threat of punishment if you do this, than that. the other variant of deterrent is deterrence by denial which is actions that are taken to confound and to block the efforts of the adversary. sophie harden our infrastructure to protect against malware attacks we harden ourur satellis to make them less vulnerable to probing by an adversary. toughen our targets that could be a deterrent. cliques are saying in the attack

wouldn't work?ul >> they could not be sure it would work and launching it would start a process where they might lose control. ask we are on our at west point. you raised ai, there is a lot of discussion making that the first area. but the last thing i want to ask you about is the use by china and russia hypersonic delivery vehicles which is a way to evade our protections. add to the instability? >> absolute great emerging technologies -- this is where it picks up the comments i think former secretary about numbers and concepts and categories. hypersonic's our new category. it can be used suborbital and deliver ordinance at a distance in tens of minutes. whichak decreases the time for decision-makers to make the

decision. and it is being tested in both conventional and potential nuclear mode by china and russia. united's said it's going to be only -- it's unclear china or russia or if they see a hypersonic system coming in which can evade defenses and strategicc defense is been the black hole of defense spending in terms of money spent to get the desired outcome. is that a nuclear system coming in or is it a conventional one? that blurring of conventional and n nuclear which arises in a number of contexts. the co- location of conventional and nuclear system you are attacking a conventional system that's colocated with nuclear you may be escalating at wilson wrote a book that lead thinking on this. inadvertent escalation from the co- mingling of conventional and nuclear systems.

the moderate model of the center is an unofficial motto is it may require study. there are a lot of challenges out there. analytical and otherwise but the wilson center's role is to promote policy relevant scholarship which is what i tried to do this publication by. >> and have done very successfully. so rob, we turn this back to you for your own questions and those of our audience. >> thank you. for the audience in the room your moment iss coming. so think about this. get your questions together have a bunch online so you have got competition. meanwhile while you are thinking i'm going to ask one of my own questions to rob. some of you know as i was her acting ambassador in berlin. i am especially tune and therefore to how our allies rely on the extended deterrence the couples our ability. you talk about this a bit in

your book. can you tells more about the hardware and software needed to keepnc that extended deterrent going? my question is are we doing enough? >> great question. let me preface it with a historical point of reference. right now there at night and nuclear weapons the security council are brought into as nuclear weapon states there are three states india, pakistan, israel which exerciser solvent rights and joining a nonproliferation treaty. north korea became a nuclear weapon saved in 2006 it is treated differently and within it you have ironic which is a nuclear threshold state. we do not live in a world with whither 30 or 40 nuclear weapon state that assumption was not always the case. in the 1950s 1962 president kennedy gave his speech at the general assembly he talked about

a world of 30 or 40 nuclear weapon states alleged in the negotiation that culminated the nonproliferation treaty we do nott live in the world. one of the basin's reach as we don't disestablish that literature oned this is the u.s. extended deterrent commitment. why germinate doesn't take its own nuclear weapon japan doesn't south korea doesn't the nuclear umbrella. the national security advisor jake sullivan talked about the hardware and the software of extended deterrence. ukraine war of the united states, nato augmented its dual use of nuclear capable aircraft in europe. there are questions about northeast asia lee then soviet union would prove technical weapons there is a question now about how the united states should address the nuclear balance in northeast asia to

address the competition or risk-taking i alluded to between china and taiwan the nuclear piece about what is necessary to bolster japan and south korea? what can we do? we can do more. that if the hardware side of it. these software side are the consultations with your institutionalized nuclear group the planning group within nato when she worked in brussels as well are conversing and know all aboutt that. david's about too go to the nato summit meeting were nuclear planning discussions will be an important point on the agenda. we do not have that type of institutionalized framework in japan and south korea. there are discussions with them to talk about nuclear contingencies and what can be done to bolster deterrence, taking into account japan's constitution which places limitations on their ability to develop offensive system. ksouth korea there is a debate

and a disjunction between popular opinion on developing independent nuclear capability and the south korean government'sco commitment to its allied relationshipp with the united states the extended deterrent commitment. so, are we doing enough? it requires constant tending and adjustments as circumstances change. and i think in those circumstances have emphatically changed in the last year. >> okay, alright. for those in the room this is your moment. we have a microphone. this will bees eventually coming your way. i'll take the question here. >> dave. rob, what is your assessment why putin moved tactical nuclear weapons into belarus? is this something you think nato or the u.s. should be responding to? >> putin, who operates from his

own historical narrative of a grievance and the place of a russia in the world he has made a number of assertions including rush is a special commitment tos onrussians outside of the russin federation. russia does not have natural boundaries. there are 25 million or so russians in other parts of the adjacent countries to declared extraterritorial commitment to defend those individuals i by member from the coldpe war. the then soviets and state we feel surrounded by nato in china.11 by the 11 time zones i would feel surrounded two. us[laughter] why belarus? let's call it as it is it's a state of russia. lukashenko has limited scope for autonomous action.

if you want to go there kind of mafia analogies. it's one of the five families he is out there managing the belarus portfolio. and the notion belarus would have autonomous control over russian deployed nuclear system really beggars belief they would remain under control of russians if they had been deployed. putin of course in his own framework of a grievance and russia's role in the world basically said were doing nothing different than with thee united states has done by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in europe with the dual use system. >> at that pointt that is in fat we have done for. >> exactly. >> before taking to the audience question.rim coming back to all.

i'm going to give an online question that comes from a colleague at king's college. and also because it is very specificg. in what it's proposi. i thought i would give it to you. with a china operating under arms chasing mentality do you believe they could be persuaded to participate in arms-control discussions if the u.s. and russia were to agree on a number they could settle on? and let site hard cap at 750. you talk a little bit about the parities and forces. going to give you the proposal. >> that is a great question. david kind of alluded tot it. right now there's a new treaty going back to the cold war era. two different iterations which limit united states and russia to 1500 deployable systems. russia under putin has suspended

aspects of compliance with that in terms of consultations and inspections. russia significantly has not abrogated the treaty as an signaling the step of building upnd beyond 1550. the question that has been posed online is really a central one as we move forward and look to 2026 at what will happen then. i heard one analyst say arms-control is dead, dead, dead. when it dead would have been enough the others are redundant. but to make the emphatic point. i think back to country interests, even with the tortured history china has not been party to it they have been numerically inferior so ask them toto join and locking american superiority is a real concern

for them. but i could just analytically i could afford the china watchers like robert daly on whether or not this is realistic, i could see chinese interest in one to lock united states and russia into a lower number rather than having unconstrained buildup. so it's analytically possible to see how we could get there politically, i do not know. there was a nice quote from einstein who is challenge like e you crack the adam you unravel the mysteries of the adam but at you kanawha with a system to manage the control of the atom so we do not destroy ourselves. we destroy humanity. einstein quipped back that is because physics is easier than politics.n we are now in the realm -- mccue could analytically lay out. that is what we approach and the buckets on a heart advocacy book it's from it analytical

landscape. and what would be the prerequisite for policymakers to make decisions such as a one a great one but i'm not sure the 750 number is the one locked and it would be a higher number. i think the concept is nanalytically invalid whether politically we can get that were not is the open question. looks okay, all right we are in the room. i'm going to take it right down here. yes that's you. >> hi robert, i was a fellow here. now i'm u.s.di correspondence. my question is regarding deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in ukraine by russia. many china expertsts say deployg

tactical nuclear weapons in ukraine that will be the redline for beijing. because according to the core principles ofei foreign nuclear weapons should be used for deterrence not to attack another country. but also was supposed to be one for the chinese as well but we see that's not thehe case. they have been with her writings vision of ukraine. i was wondering first if you think china would indeed decide with the west if russia deploys nuclear weapons in ukraine. and second if that would give nato a reason to get directly involved in the conflict? arguing nuclear contamination is sort of like an attack for nato allies, thank you. >> that contingency would really put the no limit situation to the test.

i think there would be a limit and the chinese have always alluded to it. thele meetings with the chinese and indian leaders had contact with putin they don't use our terminology redline but they clear nuclear use would be a threshold that would create a whole new international reality. that is something the russians have to take into account. but your point about territorial integrity, russian has now annexed the providences in ukraine and have claimed they tr part of the russian federation. and this is the now the russia says we will use nuclear weapons if there's a threat to the state and that state also encompasses this claim russia had against

ukraine. that creates the zone of insurgency on escalation. i.e. characterize where the debate is now of how the situation on the battlefield could affect putin's calculus and deterrence just having been through a weekend where there was a surprise existenial threat to the survival of the regime. >> now for those in the room you are going to have a chance to talk to rob after this i'm going to take one last question from our online. that is a former ambassador laura kennedy who asks, do you see the ability of the process to tackle some of these issues you have so eloquently laid out? experts have spent years developing a common nuclear glossary discussing doctrines, taking baby sets at this difficult time is the only game in town. >> it is a great question.

the p5 plus one mechanism was championed by the wilson center to bring around the iran nuclear deal. in the prior administration u.s. administration there but hopes of that model could be built upon to address other issues. and a even went ukraine after 24 when david spent a lot of time covering these meetings as i recall. [laughter] pulling late nights even during that time russia and china cooperated with the united states in bringing the ironic nuclear deal but they have a shared interest in constraining iran's nuclear ambitions. i think we are in the middle of a war in ukraine. we' are at a point with china. i do not know what the immediate practical possibilities are of a

p5 plus one. right now russia is a pariah state. so would not be included. but i think on a pragmatic basis and to put my cards on the table people talkwh about what your theory of international relations which is a disguise question about ideology. i make card-carrying utilitarian what works and what is in our interest we should try and that is what has motivated the analysis here was to look for opportunities to explore how this mechanism could bee used. we are not there we are at a point with china we need to do some rehabilitative work to get tonv that point we could resumea conversationst with china about other issues for just a footnote on china back in the cold war in terms of proliferation was more the better or they sort of

shrugged at increased numbers of nuclear weapon states and china transferred know-how to pakistan which found its way to libya. the chinese have a really gotten religion so to speak on nuclear issues and recognized they had takenro nonproliferation on boad as an interest. they have not always been as helpful as they could on north korea. but there is some predicate there for engaging them certainly on these issues. but it is going to be a steep climb. >> thank you. i want to thank both of our panelists, rob for writing the book and making the geometry fastening force. david for asking all the right questions and guiding us through the book and posing some questions from your own experience as well. so for those of you here in person,ts the book is available outside in hard copy again it's online as ane

e-book on the wilson center website. do please go there. no excuses for not reading it, right? [laughter] thank you again c-span for also featuring us. >> thank you. [applause] >> thank you robin. >> weekends on cspan2 are an intellectual feast. every saturday american history tv documents america stories and on sunday @booktv brings you the latest in nonfiction bks and authors. funding for cspan2 comes in these television companies and more. including media come. >> at meeting, we believe whether you live here or right here, or wait out in the middle of anywhere you should have access to faster libel internet that is way. media, along with these television companies support cspan2 as a public service.

♪ this fall watch c-span's new series books that shaped america. join us as we embark on a captivating journey in partnership with the library of congress which first create a book that shaped america list to explore key works of literature from american history the features provoke thought, one awards, led to significant changes and are still talked about today. different featured renown experts who will shed light on the profound impact these iconic works virtual journeys to significant locations across the country intricately tied to the celebrate authors and their unforgettable books among our featured books common sense by thomas paine. huckleberry finn by mark twain, their eyes are watching god. and free to choose a milton and rose freedman but watch our 10 part series books that