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tv   Washington Journal Marvin Kalb A Different Russia  CSPAN  February 8, 2025 4:48pm-5:47pm EST

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know, subject to the king underneath the king. the idea of citizenship, which is born out of the democratic revolution, the american revolution, and the creation of a republic is the idea that in some ways you all are equal citizens, you know, equal individuals under, this government. the idea is that the citizen is what is used to describe that that new political conception of the individual, that they're a citizen, not a subject to a crown. you're independent of that. and in fact, the idea of citizenship really sweeps across the atlantic ocean because after the french revolution, those in france start describing themselves, citizens and some people start describing themselves as citizens of the world that they no longer are subject, in fact, to any country. but this this transnational category of individuals who all share the same values values. okay. i think that's going be all we have time for tonight. so if you'll all join me in giving a speaker another round of applause for fantastic call
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and, patrick is going to be in commonwealth hall shortly after the lecture where you can enjoy a reception and purchase copies of the book, answer any more questions that you might have. thank you for your support. great. thank you all. washington journal continues. host: journalist and professor, author of the new book "a different russia: khrushchev and kennedy on a collision course." start at the end if you would. right when nikita khrushchev learned john f. kennedy had been assassinated he cried. why? guest: it was one of the marvelous interesting in my judgment fascinating aspects of nikita khrushchev that he had a
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dream and the dream was that if he could sit down with an american president, he figured that he and the president could solve all the problems of the world. all he needed was that opportunity. and he got that opportunity only once in june of 1961 in vienna when they met at the summit, the summit that was greeted with enormous expectation and ended in the deepest disappointment. and khrushchev took it into his mind that he wanted to somehow or another take kennedy to the cleaners, he was going to get his way, he wanted to rewrite the strategic balance of the world which favored the u.s.. he wanted to favor russia, the soviet union and he did have that moment with kennedy which led to the cuban missile crisis, which led the world to the edge
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of a nuclear war. afterward, they reached an agreement on an atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty. after that finally in khrushchev's mind, he felt th he could sit down finally with kennedy, he thought kennedy had six more years, two more years of his first term, for years and a second term, they would reach all kinds of agreements. of course he did not know when he engaged in this fanciful illusionary kind of feeling about the world that within a month, kennedy would be assassinated and within a year he would be kicked out of power and when he learned that kennedy was killed, all of the reports that i've seen indicate that khrushchev cried. and when he went to sign his name at the american embassy the
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day after the assassination, he was in tears. host: the book is "a different russia." it is not your first memoir about your time as a journalist in russia but -- guest: the first was because khrushchev labeled me peter the great and that helped me a great deal as a journalist getting closer to him. the second book was assignment russia and that was when edward r. murrow hired me at cbs and a couple years later as he sort of moved me through the system, i had never been a journalist before and they wanted somebody representing cbs in moscow who spoke the language and knew about the history and the
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literature of the country and i had written something for the times he had liked and on that basis and the conversation we had which lasted for three hours which he asked me any number of questions, a really fantastic journalist. he stood up and put his arm around me and said how would you like to join cbs. i said yes. that was sort of the end of my career as a scholar and the beginning of it as a journalist in that second book carries me to may of 1960 and this book begins with kennedy's inauguration and a very revealing speech that khrushchev made giving it a sense of the world, his judgment of what the world should be like and kennedy of course independently was doing his explanation to the american people in the world of
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the kind of global systems and these fascinating individuals, extraordinary people were in collision because they represented two totally different sociopolitical systems and when you thought about it in national terms, there was a collision between the soviet union on one side of the cold war which is where we were at that time and kennedy on the others. it is an amazing thing that these two people were in charge at that moment in october and november of 1962. but at that time the world was literally on the edge of a
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nuclear war. and one of the two people, nikita khrushchev had the gusts to acknowledge in public that he had made a tremendous blunder. he had gambled on putting missiles and troops into cuba to shift the balance of power, to gain an advantage in the negotiation of berlin, but he failed because kennedy called him on it and khrushchev backed off. if he had not backed off on that fateful sunday, the world might be very well have ended up in a nuclear war catastrophe. host: talking about marvin's new book, a different russia. taking your phone calls as well, phone lines as usual in this segment democrats 202-748-8000. republicans 202-748-8001. independents 202-748-8002.
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he is with us for the rest of our program today. how many years total were you a journalist in russia and how were you able to be there and do that job at the height of the cold war to be an american journalist and communist russia. guest: to understate the answer, it was very difficult. because in the first phase in my time there as the moscow correspondent for cbs, all of our copy was censored. in other words you could not say anything to the american people that did not go through a russian sensor and there would be many times when words and phrases would be asked out and if you had tried to play it smart and you sort of said it anyway, they would pull the plug on you. and suddenly -- so you always
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had in mind that not only was your ultimate listener in the united states, you had this additional listener just down the hallway, the sensor that proved to be a she, and she was very conscious of what khrushchev wanted. what was the image of the soviet union, that they wanted transmitted to the world. if you violated that image in what they would regard as an ugly way, they would yank that. what you had to do as a support -- as a reporter is be mindful of the sensor, but find language that would get you your -- get your point across without offending the soviet union.
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i remember on one occasion there was a meeting of the entire communist world in moscow. communist leaders from all over the world gathered together in the kremlin. i was trying to say to them that this is a really terrible bunch of people. there was a story at the time about a group of gangsters who had been picked up in upper new york state. i forgot right now the name of the town but everybody knew it if you were listening in america listen to the broadcast, what i said which went right through the sensor was that the communist leaders gathered in the kremlin in much the same way as the weather was if it can new york, the ethic of gang that just the other day.
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to an american ear it was a group of gangsters. but i couldn't say that because they would pull the plug. you are always in a contest with the sensor because i work for cbs i also had to take pictures for television. there was no cameraman that they allowed in the country. so i had to take my own pictures. i was not terribly good at it but i did the best i could. but if i was taking a picture that they did not like, they would stop me from sending it to new york. how would they do that? they would let you ship the film unless it developed. in the soviet union before you sent it to new york. which could have taken weeks and weeks. which meant that the stories value would have been shot. you could not travel around the
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soviet union without permission. you always had somebody on your tail. you could not travel more than 25 miles around moscow without official permission and when you got the permission there was always somebody on your tail anyway. so it was, for a western reporter in moscow in the midst of the cold war it was a fascinating story, please don't get me wrong. all of the obstacles were worth overcoming to try and get the story out because you knew that in the midst of the cold war, it was extremely difficult to get the news out but extremely important that the news get out. for example, it is very difficult now, there are very few if any american reporters in moscow at this time. because putin simply will not allow it.
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and one of the reasons i call this book the different russia is that we are so used to thinking of russia under putin. putin has been there for 25 years. i happen to think he is a short timer by which i mean kicked out tomorrow morning. but rather that it sort of down the road but not that far down the road. he's run this place for 25 years and we are in the midst of the ukraine war and a terrible confrontation between the united states and russia and we think that that is the only russia that exists but that is not true. the russia that i covered in many ways was similar. it was a dictatorship. there is no doubt about that but it was a dictatorship that was reaching out to the west, that
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was reaching out to a leader like kennedy and trying to get a deal. khrushchev always invited western musicians, artists, scholars, journalists, to come to this soviet union. that is not happening today at all. so the relationship was so very different. we had a chance then to coexist peacefully. in a competitive relationship, coexisting. today, that coexisting factor is i don't want to say in doubt, it is something that we have to consider very carefully. guest: that russia you covered from ash host: that russia you covered. nikita khrushchev becomes premier of the soviet party in
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53, so this book is about khrushchev and kennedy. that plenty of years under a different president, under dwight eisenhower. what was that relationship like. khrushchev and eisenhower. and the changof presidencies, what was his view coming in of john kennedy. guest: great questions, a historical questions. in 1956, i arrived there in january. khrushchev had been essentially the boss only for about a year or 18 months. it took a year or so before he could establish his position following stalin's death in march of 1953. so khrushchev wanted very much by 1956 to say to the russian
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people and to the world that russia is now changed, it is no longer stalin's russia, it is now khrushchev's russia. and delivered a very famous secret speech, i believe it was february 24, 1956. and he summoned all of the leaders of various communist parties which had been meeting in moscow at the time to come back to the kremlin in the middle of the night because he wanted to tell them his view of stalin. and his view of stalin was very negative. but because he had ruled for 29 years, he was a legend, if you spoke one word against stalin you could be killed.
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and what khrushchev did was in this one speech destroyed the myth, the legend, the fears that surrounded the russian people when they thought about stalin. khrushchev called stalin a murderer because of what he did during world war ii. he would point out the thousands and thousands of people during the 1930's that stalin sent off to siberia. and khrushchev wanted a different kind of russia. a different russia and he began to release people from siberia, he loosened opportunities to write and to speak and he opened the gates of the kremlin to an influx of western businessmen and scholars and journalists. it was in that opening that i
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slipped through and a lot of other reporters slipped through. it was an incredibly exciting time. and when i returned to 1959 to cover richard nixon's visit, it was also a stark debate with khrushchev at that time. some people don't member that. it was very interesting and nixon tried very hard and i think to a large extent successfully to outwit khrushchev but it was a collision and it usually is when you are talking about russia and the united states. and khrushchev wanted more than anything else i would say, he wanted to strike this relationship with an american
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president. eisenhower was a great favorite in the soviet union because in world war ii heas of course the great and storic general. leading against the nazi crusade. that involved the soviet union. we were at that time allies to defeat nazi germany. but when khrushchev met with eisenhower in 1950 -- 1954 or 55 in geneva. and then twice, once in the united states and once in paris, they met three times and he wasn't able to get anywhere with moscow. so eisenhower, who would once been held in the highest esteem by khrushchev suddenly there was nothing to talk to and so he invested all his hopes that this
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stream of his about a deal with an american president, all of those hopes were invested in young john kennedy and for a time, those hopes were realistic, but then finally when it came to the division of berlin and then the movement of russian missiles into cuba, kennedy insisted that those missiles be removed and khrushchev have the gusts publicly to acknowledge he had plundered and pull those missiles out. khrushchev lived with what i regard as a dream that somehow with an american president he could accomplish miracles but miracles don't happen in international relations. you have to protect your interests and those interests
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are protected even at the cost of war and right now we have many different instances with russia and china and many other countries around the world. host: newly released, martin is the author and is with us this morning. taking your phone calls per john is up first in new york. independent, good morning. caller: thanks for taking my call. excuse me sir. i'm 77 and -- guest: young man. caller: [laughter] i knew i liked you for something. i do remember the cuban missile crisis. i remember my father stockpiling in the seller. i remember really the fear of going around the neighborhoods and people talking about and armageddon. but as i grew older i kind of
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did a little reading into it and i remember some people saying that the real hero of the missile crisis wasn't so much john kennedy it was khrushchev and the reason they felt that way was exactly what you said, he backed down. an interesting sidebar of the story was as i remember reading the united states had jupiter missiles in turkey which are intermediate range missiles at the time capable of reaching deep inside the soviet union. in order to level the playing field, khrushchev decided that he would send in these missiles as i understand it into cuba and give them like a minute and a half of american cities. it was brinkmanship diplomacy and they say the real hero of all of this was not john kennedy because he was just a new and experienced -- inexperienced guy but dean rusk who went eyeball to eyeball with his counterpart
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and resolve the whole thing. it was really scary because there were some other historical anecdotes involved, of the united states issuing the monroe doctrine which they didn't really have a right to invoke legally. so i found a whole period fascinating. we came very close and listening to you i don't know since that fateful october 62. i'm hoping -- there's invents unfolding around the world. excuse me sir. i just hope that cooler heads will prevail and things will work out. it will be interesting to hear your thoughts about that. thank you for doing what you are doing. guest: you are very kind sir and i repeat here in your 70's, i'm in my 90's so keep on going. the period of the mid 50's
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through to the mid 60's, there were extraordinary personalities and in the middle of the cold war, those personalities had to demonstrate their value. in holding off a nuclear war between the two powers that could have destroyed the entire world. i think that we don't as people today, maybe people over the world. do not fully appreciate the deadliness of a nuclear weapon. you think back to world war ii. a nuclear bomb, two atomic bombs were dropped. the only time in the history of the world that they have been used. they were used both by the united states against japan,
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against hiroshima and nagasaki. two cities there were absolutely leveled. with tens of thousands of people killed. can you imagine? that was in 1945. could you imagine if you jump ahead to the early 1960's those weapons had been improved considerably. they were infinitely more dangerous. if they had been used by the soviet union against the united states, the u.s. against the soviet union. not only were those two countries have been wiped out, but the countries all around them all around the world would have been utterly destroyed. we would have been set back decades and decades. think today about how much more
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perfected those nuclear weapons are. and we don't think about them today. enough. to give a pat on the back to our new president, during the campaign, donald trump was the only major campaign -- candidate that i am aware of who kept raising the issue of nuclear weapons and the danger of using nuclear weapons. just this past week in davo's, trump once again raised the question of nuclear weapon negotiations, which we have not been involved in now for decades. but we have got to get re-involved in the best interest of the entire world. if president trump can lead the world in the direction of a
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containment, perhaps an end or a promised end to the use or even the threat of the use of nuclear weapons that would be a big deal. and if the world appears to be at this point, who can really be certain, but appears to be at a turning point. and that turning point screams out for another serious effort at disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, and i hope that putin and russia and xi jinping, the chinese leader would somehow get together with trump and find a way to handle this. that is -- some people and sure will say that is totally unrealistic.
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trump cannot be relied upon, he is extreme the unreliable himself. all of that may be true, but the effort ought to be made. the effort ought to be made and even if he just begins that in it of itself. >> the caller brings up the cuban missile crisis. i want to go to page 460 of your book, different russia. in the wake of the cuban mis crisis. after his cuba capitulation, khrushchev had to more out his political survival. one did no to be an american ambassador, ign correspondent or even a spy to searchv clues about khrushchev's shaky standing in the kremlin. the cuban missile crisis, khrushchev remains in charge of russia until 64. how did he overcome that shaky
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standing and what role if any did president kennedy play. guest: in a way he never did. and kennedy was killed in november of 1963 so we will never know exactly what happened with him. what we do know on the basis of the historical record, on the basis of in my case personal observation is that when these two men, kennedy andhrhchev which is really we keep saying this but it is terribly important to me and to any reader of a different russia, you have the feeling when you follow these two men they were to giants on top of the two giant nations. and they were nuclear weapons between them. and they hadn't been used since
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1945. but in the middle of the cold war these two nations were deeply antagonistic. and therefore their readers ended up being in an antagonistic position. one towards the other. but, in the remarkable case of khrushchev and kennedy, there was an example of two lears who sought or attempted to go beyond the obvious talk of the day and see if they could find a way of reaching an agreement which they ultimately did in september of 1964, the first nuclear arms agreement between these two superpowers. was to ban atmospheric nuclear tests.
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when those tests were taking place, people all over the world were terrified. because the atmosphere itself was being poisoned. it was affecting the ability to drive in the food that you ate. the air that you breathe. and so there was a strong feeling of urgency that you had to somehow contain the spread of atmospheric tests. so they did reach this agreement. and khrushchev living in a bubble of hope believed that he could take that one agreement and build it into a monument of agreements between the u.s. and the soviet union and would take care of all of the problems. of course it did not happen, kennedy was killed. in that time between the cuban missile crisis and when
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khrushchev was kicked out of power in october, khrushchev was in a deep depression for about a year, traveling from one country to another just wasting time. he was not accomplishing anything. because he could not quite get over the fact that people around him in the kremlin kept referring to him as khrushchev, the man of the harebrained scheme. they use that expression. and they kept throwing that not at him directly but around him. and they were losing confidence. and took them two years, actually one year from the agreement on from 63 to 64, they
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built up their strength around khrushchev for what purpose, to kick him out of power, which they accomplished on october 14, 1964. khrushchev at the time was a beaten man, but the country he left behind when he was kicked out of power was significantly different from the country he took over 10 years earlier. and 10 years earlier, if you would opposed leader style you would be killed. when khrushchev was kicked out of power they did not kill him. they sent him off to a relatively satisfactory post power life, he was given a small home outside of moscow and an apartment in moscow. given a car and driver, he had a
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substantial pension, his children were allowed to continue in their work. it was civilized. khrushchev left a somewhat civilized soviet union which did not exist until he was in power himself. so in that period between the cuban missile crisis and when he was kicked out of power, he was in a depression, he did not accomplish terribly much but he felt when kennedy was killed that his opportunity was killed along with it. he felt as if this golden opportunity had slipped through his fingers. >> this is bernie in louisville, kentucky.
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>> good morning. i have to confess i had to do a little bit of research on you and your career so i came up with some type of reasonable question on the topic about the russia and relations. in one of my research you were one of eddie mauro's boys. -- ed morrow's boys. also on nixon's enemies list which i thought was outstanding combinations. anyway, during that time in 62 with russia, china was not the china that we knew now. who was russia's allies back then, did they have any other than cuba and i'm just curious about the relationship with
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these other countries around their and i have to ask you both. you can answer if you want to. are the commanders going to the super bowl? i say yes. guest: i say i would be thrilled if they win today and went on to the super bowl but i always have that in my thought and i think that has to do with simply being a journalist. you have to examine what the evidence is. the commanders came out of nowhere and they are on the edge of the super bowl and is an extraordinary thing. so much will depend on this rookie quarterback. and if mr. daniels can pull it off today i would regard that as a football miracle. on a measure of the agreement at the end of the cuban missile crisis. now to come back to reality, you
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are asking essentially russia's allies at that time and especially china. it is an extremely interesting relationship. right now they are very close and the agreement between xi jinping in china and putin in russia, the each call and agreement of no limits, that it was boundless in its capacity. i think that it is boundless only in their diplomatic imagination. because they each have interests that are quite different and i think they are now coming to a head. by which i mean the central issue is the war in ukraine. the war in ukraine has been supported by china in many ways.
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china helps russia on the diplomatic scene, helps putin particularly politically at home, works out in economic trading relationship that allows china to use in a way that superiority economically to help russia economically because russia is besieged by sanctions. russia is now on a rough -- war footing. china is helping russia but if you went back to the period in the 50's and 60's they were extremely antagonistic. they actually fought minor skirmishes along their common border.
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the antagonism was tense in the communist world in those days. most communist had to believe what it is that came out of moscow, it was russia was the first communist nation and leave that was therefore entitled to the respect of all other communists not just respect, obedience of all the other communists. china present -- was in dissent against the idea that it -- mausert did not believe he had to bow down in front of anybody and he regarded khrushchev as a peasant. that they were both peasants. but khrushchev was a peasant to became the soviet union.
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mao, a president to leader of china. china was in the 1960's was only 10 years or so removed from its own revolution becoming a communist country. he thought it deserved to be the leader. they were in constant ideological conflict, splitting the communist world apart. if you went back into history, several hundred years there is one example after another of russia and china not in a cozy relationship, far from it. but in a very antagonistic relationship, it is something we ought to keep our eye on when we think today about who are russia's key allies. russia today as china and north korea, as iran and those for
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regard themselves as an access of resistance against what, against the united states. i believe definitely they are not going to succeed, but so much depends on the leadership of the united states and how well the new leaders of the united states are going to do on the world scene. >> 20 minute slough with marvin cal this morning. the book we've been talking about a different russia. russia, khrushchev and kennedy on a collision course. we will take viewers to don in fall river massachusetts on the republican line. fall river by the way, broadcast home of the lizzie borden murder case. go ahead from massachusetts. are you with us?
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got to stick by your phone, line for democrats, republicans and independents as usual. you were just talking about vladimir putin and where russia is today. let me take viewers to the final paragraph of the book. th iwhat you write, russia y is not ready for democracy, putin stands in its way. they think the struggle land in a historic struggle between east and west, a powerful tug towards authoritarianism and a strong pull towards a western-style democrac khrushchev's russia was radically different from putin's russia and may yet prevail. why do you think it may yet prevail? guest: i guess it has to do with my feeling about russia writ
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large rather than russia today as a country governed by putin and antagonistic to the united states. think about the literature that comes out of russia, the great music that is, out of russia, the philosophy, a range of issues that unfortunately are not reflected so much in the politics of russia, through russian history they have been governed by one czar after another, that is an autocracy, that is a dictatorship. 1917 communists come into power and they are in power from 1917 to 1991. and that was a run of dictatorships one after the other culminating in joseph
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stalin -- not culminating but the high point, after 29 years. so you had one example after another of russia being governed by autocrats. i speak in terms of putin as -- and what i mean by that is when the mongol hordes came out of the east in the 13th, centuries. and governed large part of what is today russia, ukraine even going into western europe, they imposed their form of dictatorial rule, it was a genghis khan in one case the great mongol leader, but followed by his sons who were also leaders imagining
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themselves the leaders of huge empires and they were. so, russia's background politically is locked into autocracy. and it is very difficult to imagine the russian political system being democratic and yet there are strands of democracy that run through 19th-century russian history even through good parts of the 20th century. there is in the literature you know people who are thinking that an open way you want to deal with the western world. a czar like peter the great in the early part of the 18th century spending more than a year in western europe, leaving russia to go because he wanted
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to find out what the west had that was so fantastic that we russians did not have. and he tried to bring not only parts of the economy from the west into the russian empire, there were ideas that flowed along with the goods. when catherine the great and the latter part of the 18th century she had a steady relationship with western french and english writers, philosophers. the ideas were there, they are still there. but they are not probably on a scale, they are not as heavy. as the autocracy. but there is very much a strain that found with khrushchev,
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gorbachev and yeltsin. in recent ruston -- russian history there are movements which get cut off because they are not strong enough. so for me it is a hope that the democratic side of russia would emerge after putin and in that democratic side emerges a gorbachev type leader who will reach out to the west and find in the west a friendly hand and ready to help the east. it is the same planet and we have to share it and find a way to do that without war. without a small war becoming a big war, you have to be incredibly careful. host: this is marianne in the
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keystone state, republican. good morning. caller: good morning. guest: good morning. caller: i have a question about the cuban missile crisis. i only heard it once that khrushchev took the missiles out of cuba because we, the united states, agreed to remove missiles that we had pointed at russia. and that's why it was settled so quickly. is there any truth to that? guest: there is some truth to that, yes ma'am. we had known for a long time now that the united states had starting in the mid-1950's they began to move a medium range missile into turkey. and this was the time when the united states in the midst of the cold war was trying to encircle the soviet union to stop the spread of communism.
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it was very much in america's interest to put those missiles in turkey. when khrushchev found out in april of 1962 with those jupiter missiles were in fact operational in the soviet union. khrushchev was furious. and he told his defense minister when they were at a meeting in bulgaria, he said -- what he meant by that was he was going to try to put missiles, russian missiles into cuba pointed at the united states to offset the jupiter missiles in turkey pointing at the soviet union.
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and there is no doubt that during the negotiation that led to the end of the cuban missile crisis there was talk on both sides about getting american missiles out of turkey, russian missiles out of cuba. one dependent upon the other. where i part company is good while those talks were going on, no question about it. the decisive, what was of fundamental importance of the time was not the sideline discussion about an exchange of missiles, but in the middle, the decision by one of the two leaders of the time, namely the russian leader khrushchev, his decision on that fateful sunday, october 28, 1962.
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he sent kennedy a letter saying that he was going to ship and return the missiles through the soviet union. that was the key thing that ended the crisis. there was a lot of talk about a lot of things the definitely involved the exchange referred to. as the key issue that resolve the question. the key issue i believe and i believe the documents are clear on this, the key issue was the khrushchev decision on that sunday to give the order to send back to the soviet union. where that decision not made at that time, please remember the sunday before the monday that
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kennedy had committed himself to take military action against cuba. if khrushchev had not made his decision on that sunday, the following day, kennedy almost certainly would've taken military action against the russians in cuba and that would have ignited a world war between the united states and soviet union. thank you very much for the question which is central to understand. host: sony good stories in this book. i did want to -- for you to tell the story of singer jerome hines. guest: it is a wonderful story. in the cuban missile crisis it ran from monday night until the following sunday, october 22
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28th. on the 22nd the president delivered his famous speech setting up a quarantine in cuba. on tuesday in the soviet union if you were a reporter in russia at the time as i was, you certainly felt you had to stay in the office and cover that story. but my wife had tickets to the opera and the opera performance, she had these tickets and wanted to go. i thought i should -- but my wife wanted to go and so i've course yielded and went. while i was seated there before the opera gets started, i looked off to the left and there was a
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box set aside for famous people and just before the opera began, khrushchev arrived and he was there on the first day of the crisis. people worried about a nuclear war, he arrives to go to the opera. and i am about 15 or 20 feet from him and i can see him and he was happy to be there. jerome hines was the great american opera star and he was on a tour of the soviet union, a very successful tour. khrushchev kept inviting westerners to come and hines came, he delivered this magnificent performance. he sang it in russian and khrushchev went backstage, we tailed along with him.
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as peter the great, i could get around some of his security people. only because khrushchev allowed it. and i asked him a question or two about the cuban missile crisis and he left me with a clear impression that he is going to find diplomatic way out of this crisis. which meant to me 24 hours into the crisis that khrushchev, who started it, was already seeking a way out of it. and that way was diplomacy, but it ultimately was by way of his own capitulation. he was the one who made the decision to put the missiles into cuba and is the one on that sunday who made the fateful decision to pull those missiles out of cuba and that is what
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resolve the crisis. not until i did enjoy a wonderful performance by jerome hines. host: the final two or three minutes here. in the end in your estimation, did nikita khrushchev failed to achieve a different russia, a different vision for russia than joseph stalin? if he did, why? guest: my answer to that is yes. he did succeed. in history i have found you don't succeed 100%. if you can succeed 51% sometimes that is a huge step forward. and i think in this case, he succeeded because if you were in russia at that time, you could sense the difference yourself in
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the way in which people responded. it was easy there for me to strike up a relationship with somebody on a walk through the park. or in the opera for example if you just leaned over and began talking to someone. you could get a feel for what was happening and it was clear that the mood of the stalin era had dramatically changed. once khrushchev had delivered an extraordinary secret speech in february of 56, it became possible for russians who had lived with fear to begin to feel that the fear was being lifted from their shoulders. they could talk more easily, not as frightened that at 2:00 in the morning the secret police
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would knock on the door and haul them off. there was a change, it was very obvious the russians and even obvious to some of us westerners who were in moscow then talking to russians and observing what was happening that khrushchev had made a major change, but you can only change up to a point and then you will run into the reality of the soviet system which was old, broken down, and in many ways even today remains that way. host: marvin's third memoir is titled "a different russia: khrushchev and kennedy on a collision course."
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and now in american history tv. it's a focus on history in the world of new med

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