>> to an immense ongoing change in u.s. policy with respect to the war. we are also here to introduce a project that we have been

working on for the last year or so which we will talk about and introduce choose a project that was done with our colleagues on the history of u.s. ukrainian relations in the post-soviet period vis-a-vis russia. if that sounds well-timed to the moment, perhaps it is. i cannot think of a group of people that i would rather talk about the subject with than the group that is sitting on stage with me. first of all, let me just go from left to right. kohn stands -- constanze is the senior fellow center on the united states and europe. and seated next to her is the

managing editor of law fair and one of the cohost of the escalation podcast. seated next to him is the other cohost of the escalation podcast. joining us. and to my left is the great fiona hill who is a senior fellow here and among other things plays a sort of starring role in a number of the episodes of the podcast including the first one and we will talk about that momentarily. before we do however, we arrange this event when there was one major government change that was affecting western policy for ukraine, that was the transition from the biden administration to the trump administration and the

shock therapy may be that that is applying to the situation. there is now a second one which we did have elections in germany and these produced something of a mixed message with respect to ukraine policy and so i wanted to ask fiona: -- constanze to get us started and give us a sense of what happened in germany yesterday, how should we understand it vis-a-vis ukraine and how we should understand it vis-a-vis the american shift in policy on respect to ukraine. constanze: thank you very much and it is a distinct pleasure to cohost this with you. because the center on the u.s. and europe has taken the changes wrought on europe and the transatlantic relationship by

russia's full-scale invasion extremely seriously. it has literally reconfigured the way we work in every possible way. i could not think of a better thing to do today. so thank you. benjamin: thank you. constanze: as for the german election. for those of you who occasionally follow the news it would not have escaped you that the incoming chancellor of germany has made some newsworthy comments. both yesterday and in previous days. on europe's need for nuclear weapons, on what seems to him like the end of transatlantic relations. so suffice it to say, this is the chancellor who in all fairness like his predecessor olaf scholz is deeply committed to europe and also to the transatlantic relationship and the friendship in north america except he's committed to the old transatlantic relationship and the america he grew up with.

so the current shift in washington will make that slightly difficult for him. i don't want to joke about what is a deeply serious situation. i came back from three weeks in europe and the real turmoil in the translink relationship started with jd vance, the vice president's speech in munich on valentine's day february 14. i was in the overflow of the overflow room because every single participant at the munich security conference wanted to hear it. and i think is fair to say that europeans were profoundly shocked by it. i have been making the rounds in europe and stockholm. and the swedes who thought the

adjoint nato just in time are now finding their joining a slightly different nato. and people are processing things everywhere. let me give you a look at what happened in germany. we was new the conservatives were going to win this election. they pulled at double the polling levels of the governing spd. the question was how many parties would he have to govern with and that was settled late last night with the real nailbiter of the counting of votes. bs, the extreme left party, led the firebrand missed entry into the parliament -- missed the 5% threshold 13,000 votes. it will not surprise you to

learn they are going to go to the courts over this and demanding a recount which is unusual in germany, but there we are. i think we are catching up with other countries. so friedrich merz, and the less is on oh -- overturned by the courts, which i have a hard time seeing because we all use paper plow paper ballots. -- use paper ballots. pretty much going to govern with the social democrats in a coalition. i don't think he will have any compunction supporting ukraine. i think he intends to be a strong player in it. the reservations i have about that is last night also saw a doubling of the afd seats in parliament, with extremely high shares in eastern germany up to 37%.

benjamin: the neo-nazi party. constanze: that is not precise. they are good friends with neo-nazis but they are not by definition neo-nazi and i think that is important thing to say. the gentleman to mastic intelligence service has determined them to be some of the state organizations right-wing extremists, but they have been very careful in avoiding, except for some fringe figures and one or two of their leaders, in avoiding nazi language. forgive me, i say that because it is done deliberately and strategically and one of the things that make it difficult for example to outright ban them which no doubt the vice president of the united states would consider another suppression of free speech. if that was attempted. that is where we are.

i think friedrich merz will be quite constrained by an extreme right wing that will be out to split his party. i think he will try to reach out to europe and try to reach out to nato, but i am going to put out there that ultimately i think he may end up being a transitional figure in what will be an ever more german political landscape. benjamin: fiona, you were also listening, give us a sense of your impressions of where the united states is right now with respect to ukraine and with respect to european interactions on that subject. fiona: thanks very much and i would say it is great to be here today but i guess it isn't really is it. quite a depressing anniversary

and commemoration especially for those from ukraine itself. before we start to do this analysis we want to fully process what ukrainians have been through. during these last three years. this is an absolute tragedy for ukrainians and one of the reasons they are here. we have to always remember the human side of this. i listened to vice president vance's speech standing next to the former prime minister of ukraine who i happened to meet as i went into the overflow room of the overflow room. i'm not quite sure which one i was in but there were many. i tried to return to see if he could enter and tried the old former prime minister of ukraine but it did not work. he literally turned to me and

said he thought he was going to cry after the speech. this is a man who has been through quite a lot. just putting that into perspective. there is a human side to this we must not forget. i am going to answer your questions but i will flip it around a bit. it is what has the united states done to itself in the eyes of europeans which is really depressing to listen to. i came to the united states in 1989 when there was a complete shift in the cold war. i came here and became a u.s. citizen and i never thought i would find myself in a position where i was listening to europeans in the u.k. used to be part of europe, the u.k. and other politicians talk about the united states as an adversary and that's exactly what's started to happen after the vice president's speech. because suddenly it was if a

switch had been flipped. i was also standing next to a member of the german green party whose family were refugees from the soviet union whose extraordinarily well known. he said he was sick to his stomach and never expected to be a beacon of freedom and opportunity everybody would look towards. to see them lecturing about free and openly siding with who constanze discussed, and extreme right wing party. the europeans also know that they have themselves something to blame for this state of affairs. like fiona: -- constanze, we spent time moving around europe, just after the time when the

previous chancellor olaf scholz realize the world had changed rather dramatically after russia's invasion. it was also very sobering to see this sense of helplessness and paralysis in germany over this which he is a response to as a very fractured electorate. i have been spending a lot of time in the u.k., my home birthplace, i am a dual citizen there. i've also just been in paris coincidentally the same time many european leaders showed up for an emergency meeting in the wake of that speech. like constanze, scandinavian doll the countries in between. there's a feeling europeans miss man -- mismanaged not just the last seven years, but the last decade plus since the wales summit where president obama

basically exhausted all of them to think about taking their own defense into consideration. reaching into percent spending of gdp. that was 2014. now the realization has set in in the 10 years being really serious about their own defense. that was also that moment where it became obvious that basically farming out your security to the u.s. is no longer an option. we had been told that nicely for quite some time and now being told in a rather brutal fashion not just by vice president vance but also by the new secretary of state -- defense that europe is no longer priority for the u.s.. we always thought looking at ukraine getting back to the initial question.

some of you can remember this from earlier discussions at brookings and all kinds of writings those people have had, one word to shift attrition is where the external environment has a major change and this has been the major change. not a shift in the dynamics and the insides of russia which is been a solid rock, putin has not budged in terms of his worldview, the shift in the united states. the united states has been in a process of constant change over the last 25 years going back to 9/11 and the interventions in afghanistan, invasion of iraq, we have literally been all over the place. finally it is the united states that's changed. in moscow the feeling is the united states has converged with russia and russian views. that is what has shifted the dynamic.

the united states has shifted and europe has a realized if it wants to be serious about its own security and also about a long-term settlement for ukraine which is essential for european security than they need to change as well. that will be the big question as we look ahead. he is not joining us as i learned, -- no benjamin: he's welcome on stage. fiona: we've got prime minister starmer of the u.k. coming in thursday. the writing is very much on the wall for everybody, but ukraine's is also the future of european security. and the swedes and the finns joined precisely because they realized you need to have european security. the finns are ready to go. they are probably one of the best, most battle ready at all times not just because they had the experience back in the

beginning of world war ii when they were invaded also and had to fight them on. so i think a really consequential time today where every chicken has come home to roost. benjamin: thank you. i want to pick up on something you said at the beginning which is that we have to not forget the personal tragedy and experience of ukrainians in this conversation. and so i want to ask you to tell us two stories. the first is what were the circumstances in which you learned about the american change in policy? you were literally on your way

from kyiv to hear to do this event and to launch this podcast when all of a sudden the united states switched sides. so tell us about that experience and then secondly, in the back. she may be here is your one-year-old daughter. and i want you to tell us the circumstances of her birth. >> it will be relevant i promise. benjamin: the details may not be important. >> thank you and thank you for arranging all of this. it is amazing to have an opportunity to speak about it all. when trump -- i don't think trump decided to pull the switch, when a bunch of ukrainians realized he is, i was

somewhere between the three trains and two planes in the four day long travel from ukraine to here. and i could not help but think that my whole life i've had the image of the u.s. as this kind of standard of what is right and what is good and i was tiny, i was 12 or 13. and that sort of like since then i have the conscious memory of my life. and since then i have always known this is who we are as ukrainians. we align ourselves with the west. we look to the u.s. for guidance. this is what's right and what's on the east is very wrong. and so i always joked we don't mind american meddling with some

of my more leftist leaning friends would accuse -- when it comes ukraine we love it. please clean everything up, get rid of corruption, that involved. any people who joke about this, the alternative for us is always russia. because the geography really messed us up. in between two sides. and so this whole image of the u.s. is this barometer of what is good and bad really shattered in the last week. and i keep saying, i keep hearing people saying there no going back that this damage is irreversible and you can explain to me better if that is true. but that is really depressing because now i feel like the u.s. is sort of gone and doing whatever it is doing europe

isn't really doing anything. as one friend put it it would be nice if europe was a thing. ukrainians, i have had bad experiences with the u.s. over the history and europe as well. so we really feel like were once again we are left on our own and it's really not a position anyone should be in and we now don't even have the institution is more values and liberty. we are now being accused of being a dictatorship which is laughable. and so there is this prevailing feeling of disappointment that everything i've always thought of as right and good is all shattering in front of my eyes and it affects the country. so that's just really depressing. so the spicier story, my daughter she is sleeping thank

god, she is very much cooperating with this event and i am grateful for it. she was born on december 31 in 2023 and that is already crazy enough. the whole thing is crazy enough. what's even crazier is the next day after that russia launched one of its biggest ever aerial attacks against ukraine. the use january 1 or second grade the time we were still at the hospital. at 5:00 a.m. at some point there is this massive attack. it's a most 100 drones or something. it was really big. at that point it was one of the biggest attacks in the years. and so it was just incredible. we were fine, we were all taken to this shelter with dozens of pregnant women. i was only very -- always thankful i didn't have to go through that.

and i just include a member -- remember the feeling that me, people around me, we weren't scared because we had been at this for years and we lived there since the very beginning. we were just very annoyed. there was this frustration we really shouldn't be dealing with this. in any sort of sense but especially right now. it was really can we just go and have a life and take care of our babies. and i think it is so tragic that those were the murdered -- emotions we were feeling. we were not all, but a lot of us are pretty much numb at this point because we see this gruesome this and this tragedy every single day and at some point unfortunately even though i prefer we kept feeling the

strongest empathy. at some point something in your body on a biological level adapts. and you end up being in interviews with iranian drones flying around you and you are not going anywhere because god bless american air defense. and you know you will be fine most likely. and you just keep on living with it and people tell you stay safe and you don't even know what that means anymore because that's just your reality. and so it just, the fact that we've been added for three years is insane because our member having a conversation with friends in early april of 20 when he too suggesting around a month since the invasion started , and i was in a city in eastern ukraine and i went to town with my friends to come stay with me and they fully seriously told me you do not want to leave kyiv

because they want to be there for victory day. so my friends did not come because they had this distinct feeling that they would the on the precipice of this historic moment. they were ready to march and celebrated. now it is three years later and sitting here we are going to talk about how our biggest ally is turning into something of an enemy. that i guess is where we are at. benjamin: i just want to say if that sounds dramatic, on asia is understating. i woke up that morning to a set of texts from her which i think i still have that this was january 1, 2024 in the first one said the good news is i have a beautiful baby girl, the bad news is i'm in a bomb shelter under the hospital with a whole bunch of laboring moms. anastasiia: on one hand it's a

hospital, no one targets a hospital but then you are like they are russians, they might. benjamin: well i don't mean to be glib, but the good news is we have a riproaring podcast out of it. [laughter] tyler: are you going to set this one up. anastasiia: smooth, thank you. benjamin: you've got to take lines where they present themselves. tyler, tell us a little bit about the story of escalation and how this project had its genesis and where it came from. give us the institutional history of the project. tyler: i'm honored to be up here i think the past three weeks

have been a proof of concept. to say the least grade this podcast started i guess three years ago. and about a year in. the biggest story in foreign policy in the time russia's invasion of ukraine, so it just seems like on the one had an obvious choice to think about how we can tell the history of the u.s. and ukraine and how to explain what we were seeing. i am certainly no russia expert. so it's not surprising that i was surprised at the full-scale invasion. i got the sense that even people who have been watching this closely were surprised. we wanted to answer that question. around that time i believe there been amazing reporting.

and ben was hosting a show called live from ukraine and anastasiia had joined one of those episodes. what was important of that show was to get a sense of what was like for ukrainians in ukraine at the time. i think the conflict is -- has been the victim of a lot of misinformation and revisionism. so a podcast that really lays on the history of the u.s. relationship we felt was so important to set the record straight. i will say one more thing that working with anastasiia i think you got a sense of how it was really healthy dose of perspective every time i was feeling may be tired or trying to finish up and edit. and it was quite humbling to have someone on the other end of zoom who is eight years younger than i am, is under bombardment,

is in an air raid shelter and i think that's also what we are trying to do in this home what s experience is like and what the stakes are. >> one of the key voices in the first episode is fiona, who tells this incredible story about -- that i think most americans have, if they ever knew of, and i certainly did at one point because i lived through it, but i forgot about it, which is how reticent the united states administration was about the idea of ukrainian independence to begin with. one of the themes we were exploring in the podcast is this cycle of american policymakers not being as fully on board for

the idea of independent ukraine as they later imagined themselves to have been. a lot of these episodes seem to involve european cities that begin with bu but this one actually involved the president going to kyiv and making a speech, not quite against ukrainian independence but almost against. anastasiia: i would say it was against. benjamin: it was certainly not four. take us back. you have this incredible line in the first episode where you say you graduated and then the field you were and went out of the -- of existence. tell us the story of president bush and his speech to the ukrainian parliament.

fiona: i am catching the eye of an old colleague of mine. back in the early 1990's, it kicked off thinking about this transformed landscape after the collapse of the soviet union that i did a masters in soviet studies, which soon became history, and a phd in history afterwards after i got my degree in june of 1991, at the same time as the last foreign minister of the soviet union. and was looking very perplexed. i was sitting on the stage and he was soon to be the first president of an independent georgia, so this is taking us back a long time, to 1991. by the end of that era, the soviet union had not really collapsed, which is something important to remember. it got picked apart, including by boris yeltsin, first

president of an independent russia, because they needed to reform -- it sounds familiar where we are sitting at the moment, of the soviet system and the heads of the republics of russia, belarus, and ukraine got together to basically dismantle the soviet union, attempting to keep together some part before that, as this starts to move through the whole system toward this amazing and dramatic set of events, george h. w. bush goes off to kyiv and starts to make an appeal for the guys to keep the band together and this is very interesting to think back on. this next year's are 250th anniversary of u.s. independence , from the united kingdom. it is quite remarkable or we

have come in 250 years when we think about what that anniversaries want to like next year, that we have had a hard time, despite being a revolutionary power that fought towards independence, of going along with others when they have come to that moment as well. that is because in the meantime the united states started to become an imperial power itself after being held by the french to keep the brits out of the picture again during 1812. after that, we moved on doing the same thing as other great world powers were doing at the time, expanding our territory, etc., so george h. w. bush is feeling uncomfortable at the idea of what he fears will be, and he was right in many respects, a chaotic coming apart of the soviet union. it was almost violence and conflict free and that was not the case at all. what we are in the middle of his

the wars of soviet succession, so this is kind of like 1812. it is kind of the whole uproar all over again because ukraine had been independent for 30 plus years by the time russia tries to take it back in the fold again and in some respects george h. w. bush, who had been the head of the cia, he might not have been far wrong in thinking we were heading to some kind of disastrous outcome down the line if all of this came apart. benjamin: it is an extremely powerful story that i think represents something larger in ukraine's relationship with the united states, which is the subject of the podcast, but also in ukraine's relationship with europe because you have this moment where ukraine becomes independent but everybody

continues to look at ukraine through the lens of russia, and that includes european countries who see ukraine to some degree as a transit situation for russian natural gas and i guess there is this -- we clearly see from the trump administration that this has not changed in the case of the united states. we are back to thinking of ukraine as something that you negotiate directly with moscow about without even having ukrainians at the table. has europe learned the lesson that we clearly have not learned? constanze: i knew when i signed up for this i was going to be the damned european on this

panel. i think there is a lot a fair criticism to law but europe and germany over its behavior in the past 10 years, including the fears of the trolls -- scholz -led coalition escalation. that said, i do think circumstances have changed completely. the other place i went to before the munich security conference was brussels. i spent three days running around nato and the european commission. and i think -- before i get to that, i want to perhaps say something slightly more personal because, like you, i was a reporter for a long time and my time as a reporter began after

the fall of the wall. because i had trained as a human rights lawyer people said the balkans, afghanistan. i spent a lot of time covering war crimes and i am angry every time i read about russian bombardments of ukraine. i wake up angry every bloody morning and go to bed angry about this. this is not ok. and i think i can tell you that many of my fellow europeans and people in my field feel the same way, a visceral, profound anger at russia. there is no going back for my generation to a comfy relationship with russia that goes over the head of a country that is attacked every day.

i want to make that clear. i want to say, anastasiia, if we are fair, some of those air defenses protecting kyiv right now are danish and german and -- anastasiia: and norwegian. constanze: if you look at the numbers, we've a president of the united states currently telling us we do not do anything for ukraine financially. i think we all know if you look at the numbers those tell another story. benjamin: and sweden just made a major commitment. anastasiia: the other thing operating here -- constanze: the other thing operating here apart from profound anger about what is being done to ukraine and the lies being told about that in moscow and elsewhere -- anastasiia: and in washington now. constanze: let me put my way. the other thing that of course

is motivating europeans is a very real, visceral fear about the degree of russian disinformation and sabotage in europe and germany. there's especially an amount of meddling in the german election that we have not seen since the cold war and maybe not even then. and the intelligence services across europe but also in germany -- even in germany, because they were long reticent about this could have been forthright in calling this out and attributing it. i think the russians have stopped bothering trying to hide their signatures. the people i met in brussels were working day and night to cobble together support for ukraine, day and night to cobble together additional money for european defense, and day and night literally -- one of my

meeting started -- in the evening, not the morning. let me end on a point that is easy to say that this is all performative, but the entire european commission and leadership and the leader of the council and 13 heads of state are today in kyiv to mark the anniversary. that has to turn into money. that has to turn into more weapons. but i think it would not be quite fair to say that is not meaningful. all the people i met meant it deeply and i think my generation knows this is the conflict of our lifetime and the future of europe depends on its resolution.

fiona: although in might not feel it from the united states, the further you get from washington, d.c., it definitely does not feel it. i spent a lot of time going around the country talking about why ukraine is relevant to the united states. because of the dependence that america has had on the larger your national system rooted in the transatlantic alliance over this time and we have kind of forgotten all of that as time has gone on. in the u.k., they forgot why europe was relevant and voted for brexit, for example, so it is not unheard of to lose the plot over time and forget about where things are, but in europe right now people know they are under seizure -- siege from russia. an inquest is going on about the death of dawn sturgess, the

woman who unfortunately was killed by novichok from a bottle of perfume that military intelligence discarded in a charity donation bin that her partner found and brought home and they sprayed this perfume and discovered it was a deadly weapons grade nerve agent that had just been used to poison a former russian spy's daughter. the reason this was uncovered is because the u.k. has a facility near salisbury where they got like we have in frederick, maryland, where they can do testing for nerve agents, biological and chemical weapons. so only eight countries knew this existed, so it is by chance that this actually happened there. and it was able to be revealed. this is only one assassination

that has taken place on british soil. there was one poisoned by polonium, a radiological agent, so the first dirty bomb used on british soil and also spread polonium all the way around the united kingdom. there is evidence of intervention in pretty much every european election. constant assassinations. and of course constant attacks on critical national every structure through cyber -- infrastructure through cyber attacks. and pipelines and cables under the baltic sea with the estonians, the swedes -- constanze: threats to our freedom and democracy. fiona: all of this is real in europe, so europeans know that what ukraine has experienced, the destruction of his infrastructure, all the interventions made in ukrainian

politics, is what they've -- they are facing as well. we may be remote here. does not feel remote. if you look in polling that i saw last week in the u.k., the relationship with the united states is extraordinarily important. 40% of people said it was more important to stick by ukraine then to improve the relationship with the united states at this point. 48%. in terms of favoring sticking by the united states, it was in the 20's. people said they did not know. we are seeing a shift here where people in europe see their situation is on the line. that rupture we mentioned before israel and -- is real and is a sobering thought the chickens have come home to roost. a lot more should have been done. many have in putting this on the agenda for europe for a long time, but it is real.

the security threat and europe is not just imagined. it is not just disinformation. it is viscerally felt. benjamin: i referred earlier to this cycle that began with what came to be called george h. w. bush's chicken kyiv speech, so named by a columnist, in which sort of ukrainians expect american backing and they do not get it at the level that they expect it or that we promise it and this is a -- we may be going through what i think is the sort of fourth and most dramatic cycle of that, where we actually side with the russians, but all of these episodes have to do with ukraine's relationship with russia and one of the roles that you play in the podcast is kind

of as the sort of naive american who has kind of never -- constanze: -- tyler: it came pretty naturally. benjamin: it is a persona but you are the guy who is like, i did not know this happened. tyler: to any other naive americans or younger listeners, chicken kyiv is used pejoratively, which you may not know because it is a delicious dish, but you are right. it is -- the history of the u.s. and ukraine since independence in 1991 has been one of misunderstandings and betrayals and one of our episodes is called the worst of both worlds. benjamin: also features fiona in one of her prior lives. tyler: the new york times had an editorial in which he condemns with a complete 180 in u.s. foreign policy toward ukraine and i was thinking that is not may be absolutely true.

the u.s. -- you mentioned the u.s. has viewed ukraine for a long time through a russian lens. there was a ukrainian diplomat who we speak to on the podcast to set the same thing, that the u.s. always looks at ukraine to russian glasses and plays by their terms, so it seems the trump administration is looking at this history and picking the worst lessons and accelerating them and acting on that. i will say there is reporting this morning in bloomberg that the u.s. may commit to a sovereign ukraine in the negotiations, which is heartening. whether or not they listen to the first episode of escalation, i cannot confirm or deny that, but it seems like that is obviously the bare minimum, but -- benjamin: that is the budapest.

constanze: it started out with. benjamin: so walk us through a couple of the cycles because there are, as i joked earlier, they do tend to be named for cities in europe that start with bu and the first cycle is the independence of ukraine itself, the chicken kyiv speech. the second cycle comes only a few years later. what happens? tyler: i believe you are referring to the budapest memorandum. you ask americans even well-versed in foreign policy and it is not a household name, but in ukraine it is. benjamin: the only moment of true comedy in the entire

podcast is at the beginning of the second episode where our producer, who is sitting here in the front row, asks a young ukrainian activist who is sitting back there, what do you think of the budapest memo? and she exclaims, it is a total fail. and this is something that is not in the consciousness of the average american, but you ask a ukrainian about the budapest memo, this is fresh at the front of their minds. anastasiia: you have to hear how she says it for a full drama, so make sure to listen to that. tyler: so in broad strokes after the fall of the soviet union a large part of the nuclear arsenal left by the soviets actually was in ukraine. they could not really operate it. a lot of the command-and-control was back in moscow. it was expensive to maintain,

but nuclear weapons come with some degree of security, but the deal struck was that ukraine would give up the nuclear weapons for financial incentives as well as from the american perspective assurances of ukrainian security from the ukrainian perspective i think there was understanding it was more of a guarantee. there were two different translations and i think this is emblematic of the relationship. the u.s. wanted ambiguity, but that room only left room for russia to take advantage of ambiguity and i will end by saying in learning about this i think it was important for ukraine to give up nuclear weapons and we had this thing where it was a microcosm of the u.s.-ukraine relationship. we would argue about the narrative arc and everything, but the budapest memo is a great example.

benjamin: one of the striking things about that story when we talked to diplomats at the senior levels, when you talk to people who were literally in one case my sister's college roommate, who was a 22-year-old diplomat at this time, is how guilty they feel about the budapest memorandum and there is sound from bill clinton talking about how much he regrets it. it is a thing i learned from the reporting of this, which is how many people have regrets about what we did in that context. fiona, there is city in europe that begins with bu, another european capital, that there was

an understanding reached that you played a substantial role in a number of years later that also shows up as one of these kind of recurrent cycles of our not being able to kind of form a coherent policy. tell us about what happened in bucharest. fiona: on the budapest memorandum, i had mentioned edward before. when he was president of georgia, he told his ukrainian counterpart, see if you can keep one or two of the nuclear weapons. they were like, what do we deal, stick them in a closet? he had been the soviet foreign minister and said he had seen documents about what would happen if any of the soviet republics try to succeed and he said they might come in handy later which of course belarus had been as well. belarus has been pretty much swallowed up by russia and

ukraine probably would not have been invaded and the number for an -- nonproliferation consequences are real because others have been noting in germany and other places, talking about europe needing to have a bomb and the message to japan and south korea and other countries who feel threatened, and bucharest, so we can get back to this point, becomes important in that context because it is another effort to give ukraine and georgia some kind of guarantees for their future security. bucharest was more about georgia than about ukraine at the time and this is where the reference to worst of both worlds comes. in ukraine at the time of the nato summit, which was in 2008, there was not a great deal of enthusiasm for joining nato at that point so the politics in ukraine have taken all kinds of

twists and turns. ukrainians are aware, and this was at the popular level, that there was not great support for going into nato, but it was more of an elite project around the ukrainian president, but in georgia there was a full throated desire at a popular and elite level to become part of nato. georgia had been supporting the united states in iraq and afghanistan and was pushing for a membership action plan to nato and it was thought, and i'm still trying to piece together who thought this because it seems to have been a collection of people from all kinds of different backgrounds, that georgia's case would be stronger if ukraine joint as well, so this was the kind of fateful decision. a letter was written to george w. bush asking for his support. being a good texan, he was more

enthusiastic about supporting the feisty countries of georgia and ukraine. this was after the united states well and truly waited -- wad ed into iraq. bush thought that ukraine and you georgia should be -- and georgia should be supported. and he said if they made an appeal, and on military terms looked like they had the wherewithal to contribute to nato and georgia already was come and ukraine at that time still had a sizable and capable army, certainly in terms of being able to keep the russians someone at bank, then he would support the membership action plan. the problem is no one else supported in europe, partially because of perceptions of him in his role and others new ukraine was not fully on board at this

point and there was a loss of resistance. what happened, we actually briefed against it because we think if you push for something you cannot get it is not a great idea because it just shows weaknesses and division, once president bush decided to go ahead there was, as we now know and have heard, chancellor merkel opined trying to find some kind of solution to her eastern european counterparts, well one day you'll will get into nato, and that casual aside was pounced on by many east europeans at the table who were quite supportive of pushing for ukraine's membership action plan as well as georgia's and that was turned into the text of the

memorandum. white was the worst of both worlds was it was not really a promise. it was kind of an open door and putin wanted to slam that door and bash the door off and of course no one goes to 2008 and russia does invade georgia under a pretext of basically exchanges with peacekeepers, which myself and other colleagues had been warning for some kind of flashpoint in georgia for a good year before that. there were certainly tensions building between georgia and russia and ukraine realizes at that point is exposed in terms of security. the membership action plan does not bring any security and the flaw in all of nato as far as russia was concerned it was backstopped by the united states because at this point europe has not been contributing, as we know, to the extent to which it was required, so this comes down

to a single point of failure in nato this point, which is united states willingness and from then on putin is trying to test whether the united states is willing to defend any of its allies because it finds out quickly, certainly not georgia and later certainly not ukraine benjamin: did you have something? constanze: i wanted to point out , since fiona mentioned her version, there has been in my view and intellectually academic debate about nuclear weapons, just in case the americans for one reason or another -- into asia. that academic debate has just gone out. comments by the incoming chancellor before the election saying that we -- in response to the speeches by secretary of

defense hegseth at nato and in brussels and by vice president vance in munich, that europe was going to have to develop its own nuclear deterrent and that would mean the french and british deterrent, which is not enough to replace i cannot over empathize what kind of change that is in the politics of my country. that's used to be absolute and taboo. we are signatories. i think that what we are seeing here coming out of this white house is taken the lid off of many things including of proliferation. that is and i do not need to

describe to anyone of the escalation risk inherit in that. we have similar debates in asia, mainly in japan and south korea. i will say that i was at dinner at nato before the security conference where an eastern european said, "well, we'll have to get nuclear weapons, too." that's where we are. not only i think that's ill-advised, it is a response to a fact that russia employed the threat of nuclear weapon used in this invasion of ukraine and that has served as a significant deterrent on escalation of the biden and trump white house.

the truth is if we discussing a european nuclear deterrent is in many way distraction from a much more urgent issue which is conventional deficiency and the need to dramatically increase our defense production and spending. i just want to point out there is a nato summit this summer. there are a lot of extremely urgent questions hanging over that summit. you can see from the calendar of eu emergency summits that's now beginning, march 6th, a european union summit and the third week of march. i think you will see a ticking up of news out of brussel and out of europe on developing an independent deterrent of whatever comes. >> all right, we'll go to audience questions momentarily.

if you have a question, flag for me. if you do not formulate your question in the form of a question or you go along, i will cut you off with a shocking lack of due process. please do wait for the mic and while we are - you know, he who moderates most aggressively keeps the show going. while you wait for the mic, i want to ask one more question which is in this conversation, we have focused a great deal on american follies and betrayals. we spent some time on ukrainian follies and fiona eluded to the

politics of ukraine being all over the place. as a ukraine who has not born when any of that happened. >> some of it. not all. >> you know, tell us a little bit about the experience of looking back on ukrainian history in the course of doing this work. >> that was extremely fascinating for me as you said a lot of it i have not lived through. i was walking into this show with, you know, being aware of the responsibility of spreading ukraine's message and that's why we have an american co-host and an ukraine co-host and why i had to make sure ukraine's history was given justice. we cover a lot of extreme topic that is are unreported and western audience don't understand. we spent a great deal talking about language politics because everyone is confused about it. we had to explain it.

yes, there were moments where it was very uncomfortable for me and also quite eye-opening that actually is not just evil americans who messed it all up and i am exaggerating, of course. i always knew that was not the case. americans and europeans have their problems but often the ukrainian government have messed up badly again and again. we really made ourselves looked unreliable, corrupt and a lot like russia as well. so, that was very interesting and important for me as well -- hi, baby. [laughter] >> so, it was important for r me to be objective and truthful as possible, you know, when putting my ukrainian hat on and journalist hat on. i am proud of all the work we

have done and i think it is going to be amazing to see that each issue we cover, summit and event has a distinct viewpoint from it. i hope all of you enjoy it. >> so, we have a lot of people who want questions so please keep questions brief, and if you can direct them to an individual, that would be great. >> question: this is for fiona, the united states government was in possession of at least proximate, russian invasion plan in october of 2021. russian kremlin controlled domestic media was showing in the three months before the start of the invasion.

all of the airplanes coming into kyiv with javelins and stingers and they were portraying ukrainians preparing for war. the 21st of february at the security council. >> we head this to head into a question. >> on the evening, the russians are sent in, the soldiers are woken up and stripped of their cell phones. they don't see putin's announcement of the special military, does anybody think that was weird? >> okay, we need a question. >> i don't know how to interpret that. >> well, if we think about the preparations that putin, i know by this period inside out because i was asked to comment on this and i was watching these things carefully. the russians were preparing the

ground as we knew for what they were calling special operations. they wanted to have a pretext. there were a number of other things happening around this time. given all of the imagination in ukrainian politics. in this kind of period a gentleman who's a ukrainian very close to putin and putin is the god-father, he was basically arrested by the ukrainians. putin is one person that never let his men go. one of the reasons aaron gers wits were taken into custody - there were all kinds of things happening and certainly affecting putin's columbus - calculus that he wants to go into ukraine.

he feels ukraine is getting away from russia's grip. this has been going on for a long time. in 2014 when russia moved, there were efforts taken, if you want to go back and look at youtube in 2014, you will see that russia launched a campaign in europe/russia to retake the territory. if we go back to the early 1990s before you were paying attention to what was going on in russia, there were all kinds of assassinations of crimea on ukrainians because russia didn't want ukraine to pull out the commonwealth of independence day. i am going to be 60 next year

and i wish i had a long memory and i have been live all of these kinds of stuff basically when i was in a student in moscow. my first visit in ukraine when it was still apart of the soviet union. i was been wokking on this for a long time. if you take all of this and totality, what you will see from the early 1990s when ukraine was being pushed to give nuclear weapons, constituents saw every move that was made basically a violation and didn't want ukraine to have any options to go anywhere else. every move that ukraine makes from all this way and can be documented and seen as offensive from russia's perspective. by the time you get to the things you are discussing, putin decided that ukraine has no rights and should not go anywhere. it is also belarus and

kazakhstan. it is not only how things are being depicted by ukraine. you can see depictions of many other places when georgia was invaded. the same depiction happening on russian television. i think you are presenting something and looking at your face and you are saying that russia had cause for this. russia only had calls if you still believe everywhere is passive russia, perhaps we can take this outside so you can clarify. it was weird from the point of information, russia has been gunning for the return of ukraine basically since the 1990s when ukraine got away. >> ma'am? >> thank you so much. this is a question for fiona again. what would be your advice to u.k. prime minister when he's approaching those conversations concerning ukraine later this week? >> well, i think there is a

prime minister has probably figured out clearly that this is an enormous consequential meeting. it is not just because of ukraine but the whole future of european security for the united kingdom itself. the u.k. and the united states are extraordinary defense relationship. it is going to be critical for european members of nato to make the transition of taking charge of nato as there are being expected to. also, the u.k. has met some strong commitment to ukraine. i also referenced poland and the u.k. showing of a very large considerable support in the u.k. and still supporting ukraine as across of europe. so, the case is going to have to be met and prime minister starr has met commitment of the depth

of u.k., even willingness to deploy some troops onto the ground and any peace keeping operation. so, the important thing is to get all of this across to president trump and, you know, the best way we can. again, i don't want to put words into his mouth. i am sure he's thinking carefully and president macron is already here. we are seeing all european leaders at this particular point realizing this is the daunting and very much of a new era and they are to figure out where they themselves stand but how they're going to manage the relationship with the united states and not just ukraine moving forward. >> we have time for one more question and it is yours. >> let me thank you so much for an intellectually stimulating and emotionally troubling discussion. i would like constanze and fiona to follow up on the world view of the united states and russia. could you con template how this

could affect policies to punish russia if there is a ceasefire. if the united states take one approach to sanction to lift but europe does not. if europe does want to punish war crimes bus the united states does not. what will this do to the dialogue? thank you? >> constanze? >> it is a good question. to be honest, i think that there are a number of things that are in place. the use of the russian frozen assets as collateral for further expenditures on behalf of ukraine.

of course, a security guarantee of whatever kind and a german friend of mine, commentator has said that security guarantee is a pompous word for weapon deliveries. at this point is a correct description of what we are talking about. there are still this proposal of putting european troops into the theater most notably endorsed. that's something that the russians oppose. to be completely honest here, i can envision a situation where the europeans want to be more muscularly supported where the white house says that's not what we want and we are doing the opposite of that. where there may be quite unpleasant conversations between

the white house and individual european countries on whether it was advisable for us to do what we are trying to do. i am not sure i think that will then be another sort of a decisive moment for the trans atlanta relationship which like the german chancellor i have grown up with and every german has a sort of - all europeans like to say they would like to have a special relationship with america. arguably, german feelings of america is a benevolent occupying power for western germany for more than 40 years and mid wives, the not just - this is very hard for a country of 18 plus million germans to digest that this is no longer a benevolent

relationship. i would not call america an adversary or an enemy but what we are seeing is hostility. >> fiona, you get the last word today. >> well, i think one thing in mind, your question is this is a global conflict. we have not mentioned that and now we open a whole door that we'll be closing as a session. for most of the rest of the world, ukraine is a proxy conflict with the united states. china is supporting russia, north korea is supporting russia and north korean troops in europe fighting the course region against ukrainian troops and we are always watching to see this spilling over and also into ukraine. iran is also supporting russia and you talked about shaheed drones, irans are helping to

construct drones because the russians don't have the capability to do that themselves. the peace talk that president trump has called in saudi arabia. the middle east damage and because of iran, there is very influential. one of the people involved of the talks, the head of the russian sovereign well fund who was involved in the accord. south korea and japan have been supporting ukraine because the south koreans wondered if the north korean troops are preparing some kind of action against south korea. so, as we talk about a negotiation between the united states and russia, we left out all of these global dimensions as well.

the chinese have told the ukrainians that i have learned from one of the former ministers, - look, this was not about you. china was a massive investor in ukraine before the war. they say we'll invest again. as we contemplate on the way we flip on europe, there is a hole host of other discussions going on around the globe of what this war is and what the aftermath of it may be, well, north korea turning its attention to south korea and what will then south korea and japan facing and will china really be kind of the beneficiary in some respect of this of the country that reconstructs ukraine are also moving back basically into relationship with europe off the munich security conference.

saying to european, we'll be there for europe when it is all over as well. they have also, china has been aiding and abetting the largest land war in europe since world war ii. they were also on the other side of the war in world war ii. to be continued. >> indeed, please join me in thanking our spectacular panel. if you could remain in your seats while the panel evaporates the room and heads to a shelter underneath a local hospital. thank you to constanze and tyler and nastashia and fiona. [applause] >> these escalation and you should all download it of the

first episode is now available. thank you for coming.