challenges. and, finally, we'll foster continued commitment to the profession after arms and noble calling founded on the bedrock of trust which will be key as we move forward and develop strength, foresfruk tour and personnel, second, modernization and third, readiness. first we will continue to meet our commitments in afghanistan and around the world. the army will continue to play a large role in the missions identified in the strategic guidance including counter-terrorism, irregular warfare, deter and defeat

aggression, projecting power, defending the homeland, providing support to civil authorities. >> we'll breakaway from this taped event now and go live to the pentagon for a briefing on air force's fiscal year 2013 budget. we'll sho you this army briefing in the entirety immediately after the air force is finished. >> the general is serving in that capacity since october 2008 which makes him the longest serving member of the body of the u.n. chiefs. we make this his fourth budget season. so somewhat of a mass kist i think as well. the general will be making a brief opening statement and then he'll be taking your questions. >> thank you so much. ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

thank you for allowing me to share insight into the air force's contributions to the new defense strategy and how we have approached the budget challenges that we face. innovation and adaptability are essential strengths of the united states air force and ones we have sharpened during the last two decades of combat operations. we have become ever more integral to the successful operations of the u.s. arms forces and our joint teammates rely on the air force for the core contributions that we provide. against the backdrop of fiscal challenges and diminishing resources, the security environment continues to evolve and become ever more complex. thus driving the need for new defense strategic guidance. and as the air force approaches further reductions consistent

with that guidance, our fleets are already smaller and older than at the end of the post cold war downsizing. the air force made the hard choices to support the new strategic guidance in the fiscal year 13 budget submission. we will be smaller but suburb force that maintains our agility, flexibility, and readiness to engage a full range of contingencies and threats. from nuclear deter ents to air, space and cyber operations,

counter-terrorism and global intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. although smaller, we will sustain global operations through our continuing presence in the asia pacific and the middle east. and by tayloring our presence in europe. air force capabilities are clearly instrumental to the major priorities of the new defense strategic guidance. such as deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power in anti-access in area denial environments, sprepreventing th spread of weapons of mass destruction, space and cyber operations in importantly strategic deterents. through virtually every area, although every area of the air force budget faces constrained resources, the air force has taken care to protect the

critical capabilities on which our joint innovation and interagency and coalition partners rely. in summary, the enduring capabilities that airmen provide every day, our air and space control, global intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, rapid global mobility and global strike. con fronted by a complex security environment as well as significant reduction in defense resources. the air force determined that the best path forward was to become smaller.

in order to maintain and protect a high quality force, mitigating risk from reduced capacity while seeking to improve our ability to deal with advancing adversaries over time. we have and we will protect readiness at any force level and strengthen our integration of the total force team of active guard and reserve airmen. we will protect programs that are most critical to future air force capabilities. for example, the kc-46 tanker, f-35 joint strike fighter and the long range strike bomber. despite the many challenges that we have faced, today the air

force is still by any objective standards the world's best. it is our intent and our obligation to american people and airmen and families that we remain the world's finest air force in the years and decades to come. ladies and gentlemen, i'd be happy to take your questions. >> second secretary panetta provides numbers for the air force and what will happen to the personnel in the six eliminated squadrons? >> the total force of our air force will come down in the neighborhood of 10,000 personnel. importantly, however, that those reductions are tied to force structure going away.

so we are not reducing personnel in order to meet budget targets. these are directly connected with the structure adjustments that we've undertaken. >> can you explain to us what is meant by using the word terminate when you talk about the global hawk but die vest when you talk about the c-27 j? you are going to sell the jets you already have, give them to other forces, give them to other government agencies? if you could go into a little detail about the cost assessment that went into play that tipped the scales in favor of extending into service and will it meet a slump? >> the bottom line on your multiple questions, let me start first with the rational.

what this provides and we anticipated both would be cost of operation on the one hand and clearly persistence on the other will play out in practice. the reality is that the global hawk system has proven not to be less expensive to operate than we need to. and in many respects, the global hawk block 30 system is not as capable from a central point of view as it is the u-2. and so we have made the choice as the secretary mentioned to cancel the block 30 program. and the disposition of the aircraft is not yet finalized. but it would be my expectation

that we would place these assets into storage, usable storage for future possibilities, what thefr might be. importantly, we'll retain the block 40 and block 20 capabilities. and so we will use the global hawk to its best effect but the bottom line is that the delta between the global hawk and the u-2 was not sufficient in order to retain both. yes, sir? >> please. >> you mentioned that every aspect of the budget is under constrained resources. aside from the block 30, are any isr platforms getting cut, getting pushed to -- getting switched to the left in i snow the cats are going up.

is there any sacrifice you see in isr aside from the bulk 30e? >> isr is one of those areas clearly that we maintained and in some areas increase. but generally maintained our levels of investment. there are individual changes, for example. there is a platform that was damaged beyond economic repair that we will not repair. generally speaking, the existing isr inventories will remain as they are with the exception of the block 30 had a we answered earlier. >> increase and decrease in future budgets for r & d on these platforms? >> i would say particularly in the s & t area this is an area where we'll continue to invest.

>> you talk about it being too expensive compared to the u-2. does the same rational apply to the other programs? do they have to be cheaper than the bear names to become justifiable in the budget? >> it is a consideration. i mean, we in a limited budget circumstance that we face have to compare what is the best value to the arms forces and obviously to the taxpayer. i would say each circumstance is an individual assessment. but clearly, we're going to make calls on what gives us the best capability for the dollar invested. and in this particular instance, the u-2 was the better bet.

>> block 40, does that show confidence in the program? >> you'll have an opportunity to see the five-year defense program investment profile next week, tony. i prefer not to get into greater detail given that we would like to give the congress the courtesy of seeing our program before we open it up at that level of detail. >> how do you reverse surge pilots taken out of the six squadron it's many are in the reserves and they haven't frolo for a number of years? what is the reversibility for pilots that haven't flown? >> for us, what we are doing is remissioning the units. in other words, for example, a -- a unit that was operating manned aircraft might transition to a remotely piloted aircraft

mission. >> the block 40 of the gloeblg hawk, is it expected to be that much cheaper or that much better than a u-2? why is it that the block 40 is not being eliminated and the block 30 is? >> the block 40 is a ground moving target indicator based platform that is not a u-2 censor capability. on the other hand, the block 30 is the comparable platform to the u-2 in term of its censor suite and it's for that reason that it was a trade. >> can you follow up? all told, what percentage will you see a increase in the number of uavs flown by the air force after all this is said and done or decrease? and if can you put percentage or number on that.

that number will continue to increase over the five-year defense program. >> general, just to shift a little bit. you're getting smaller, you're getting more agile. what is that going to men for airmen and their families? are they going to be deployed more? are they going to be based in places longer? how does that work for you? >> what we have done is adjust the mix of forces active reserve and guard to recognize the tempo that is inherent in the new defense strategic guidance. and our goals will be to, as a norm, to manage the active duty force that a deployed ratio of not less than one to two and not less than one to four for the reserve and the guard or better. and that we have approached this

in that mix in order to attain that predictable level of work load that we think is sustainable for the long term. you can surge. but the sustainable level of effort is one to two and not less than one to two or one to four. >> you mentioned reducing the personnel by 10,000. over what period would that happen? and also, can you talk about what effect reinstating you believe will have on the air force? >> sure. we'll execute those reductions provided, you know, the congress authorizes those reductions over the program period. they did we did a multitude of realignments and so on. and as you may be aware, there

are estimates in that era that our infrastructure -- we had excess infrastructure in the neighborhood of 20%. since 2005, our inventory of aircraft, for example, has declined in the neighborhood of 500 aircraft. and so the presumption is, i think it's a fair presumption that there is yet more excess infrastructure. >> but do you have a number of base that's could be closed? do you see any being reclosed or just the reduction of the size of the ones that you have? >> i think our expectation is that we would actually close bases in a future base closure round. please, tom? >> your opening statement you cited the air force's role in

strategic deterents. yesterday secretary carter acknowledged that this budget is status quo when it comes to nuclear forces except delaying the ohio class by two years. what kind of an lit ikz are under way in the air force today to help the president reach his goal of going lower with the aspiration of getting to zero? as you look at that, since both the air breathing and the land base leg of the try triad that you own, is do you think it's wise to sustain both in future years or you could see getting rid of one of those? >> i think multiple questions once again, tom. i think first of all, while there are no reductions adjustments in the strategic nuclear force structure for us, intercontinental missiles and the bombers in the fy-13 program, the important thing you need to appreciate is that we do have new start targets to meet

by february of 2018. those central limits just quickly address 700 strategic delivery vehicles to deploy the vehicle. another 100 not deployed, 800 total and then 1550 warheads. and that, of course, is across the enterprise including our navy teammates. i would expect that that would unfold in the 14 program. with respect to your question on the mix, it remains our conviction that especially as you go down in terms of nuclear forestructure that the triad becomes more important.

the diversity, the variety, the attributes associated with each leg of the triad reinforce each other to a greater degree. so i will expect and offer best military advice recommending that we retain the triad even as we go to the new numbers. back here, please. >> you mentioned that there's commitment to the next generation bomber, the f-35 and the next generation tanker. do you have concerns about the various programs coming into production at one time and what effect might that have on resources? >> in fact, there is a stagger there clearly the f-35 is currently in low rate initial production. the new tanker will begin to deliver in the 15 and 16 period and, of course, we're talking about the bomber post 2020.

so clearly, this is a challenge in terms of sequencing this in a way that meets budget targets. the bottom line is important capabilities for the nation and ones that we will make sacrifices elsewhere to sustain. >> how confident are you given the intense global demand for airlifts that the air force can continue to deliver on that front? especially when we're talking about continuing to operate in places like afghanistan or the pacific? the con instruct that we're dealing with which produces lesser number of bring ok'd combat teams, for example, also has implications for the size of

the oil force. and so our assessment is that the strategic airlift force pegged at the 275 aircraft level that is 223 c-17s and 52 c-5 with reliability aircraft are sufficient to satisfy the demand for dedicated military airlift, strategic airlift. with respect to the c-130s, an inventory of the modernized c-130s, likewise, is sufficient to provide the intratheater support. so this is an analytically based approach. you asked me if i'm comfortable,

i am. the kmapders are in this instance as well. yes, sir, back here. >> sir, want to get back to the discussion about reversibility. across the program going forward, how is the air force going to address that across the board as far as force structure? are you talking about keeping things in the bone yard, putting capacity with contractors to surge if needed? how is this being dealt with across the whole program? this has a different program for the air force than it does for the ground forces. the navy and air force are major capital end item incensive. and so when you think about

reversibility, one needs to think about what programs do you have in training that really serve the role of modernization or recapitalization? i think you'll find in this program and certainly outlined in the defense strategic guidance, commitment to those programs that will allow us to expand if necessary on an established program, that would compensate for the unexpected. and i think it's certainly true with the tanker. it is true with the bomber f-35 space programs similarly.

okay? yes, sir? right here. >> general, what process would the air force determine they could establish six squad reasons or 10 or 12 and which squadrons they are based? >> the basic approach is -- there was an analytical approach associated with what is known in the jargon is case three scenario. it's one of the baseline scenarios that department uses to conduct analysis and so on. that assessment based on the new strategy, not the qdr but the new defense strategic guidance and this adjusts your question as well, sir. came to the conclusion that we had somewhat excess capacity on the fighter side. and that was the driving -- that

was the driver for the choice that's were made here. in a smaller force, can you appreciate the mandate, the necessity for maximum versatility. >> we have time for just two more. >> over here. >> is the decision to probably moth ball the global hawks a reflection of the drawdowns in iraq and afghanistan? we just don't need as much isr? is there a broader lesson? >> i don't think so. in fact, my combatant commander

colleagues would probably indicate to you that there has been suppressed demand for intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance outside the central command area for a number of years. when combat operations subside, demand for isr generally will come down dramatically. we believe that some substantial proportion of that capacity will be reapplied in other theaters where -- who have been underserved for a significant period of time. okay? >> what you are planning to do with the e-27 james that you're getting rid of? >> disposition is not clear. one option clearly is to put them in type 1,000 or type 2,000

storage at davis air force base at the bone yard. type 1,000 storage is recoverable storage. you don't use the airplanes for spare parts. you don't pick and choose and cherry pick which type the 2000 storage allows you to do. so obviously type 1,000 storage is more expensive. it requires sort of on going surveillance and so on. so that -- the disposition is not final. but those are the options. if i can just conclude, sir, by saying that we have talked about lots of things here today. i would just like to remind that

the real power of our air force like our sister services is our people. so again, why we tend to focus on things, i just want to remind that this is really about wonderful people doing the nation's business. thanks very much. >> wrapping up the air force briefing on the fiscal year 2013 budget and associated cuts, we'll go back now to the army's briefing on the same subject from earlier this morning. >> i have about an opening in about ten minutes. then what i want to do is open it up for any questions tyo